

**COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAM (CSCDEP) 8900**



FACT BOOK FOR UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS

Program Information

Educational Philosophy, Vision, and Mission	1
Program Format	2
Program Composition	3
Learning Outcomes	3
Assessments	3
Institutional Research and Learner Performance Data	4
Faculty	4
Evaluation and Accreditation	5
Contact Information	5

Individual Course Descriptions


8901, <i>Theory and Nature of War</i>	6
8902, <i>National and International Security Studies</i>	15
8903, <i>Operational Art</i>	26
8904, <i>Joint Operations</i>	35
8905, <i>Small Wars</i>	48
8906, <i>MAGTF Expeditionary Operations</i>	59
8907, <i>Amphibious Operations</i>	72
8908, <i>Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)</i>	77

Enclosures

1 <i>Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes</i>	88
2 <i>Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes</i>	90
3 <i>Grading Rubrics</i>	92
4 <i>Academic Evaluation and Quality Control</i>	96
5 <i>Process for Accreditation of Joint Education</i>	99

COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE DISTANCE EDUCATION PROGRAM (CSCDEP) 8900

The Marine Corps College of Distance Education and Training (CDET) academic department developed the *CSCDEP Fact Book* to inform university officials of the nature and composition of the Marine Corps' intermediate level distance education program. The program is a U.S. Department of Defense, joint accredited, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase I higher education institution. With rare exceptions, learners in the program are college graduates. Each has had 10-12 years experience as an intermediate level organizational leader/manager. Most have had in excess of two combat tours leading and managing Marines.



Educational Philosophy, Vision, and Mission

The ***CDET Educational Philosophy*** reflects our background and experiences as Marines; it guides our actions. Our philosophy is based on the Marine Corps' Core Values of honor, courage, and commitment; the warrior ethos; and an expeditionary mindset. Specifically, the *CDET Education Philosophy* is to create a collaborative learning environment that emphasizes adult learning in a dynamic academic environment.

The ***CSCDEP Vision*** is to develop leaders who can think critically, solve problems, and act ethically.

The ***CSCDEP Mission***:

The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Distance Education Program provides graduate-level education and training in order to produce graduates who will lead effectively as commanders and staff officers in Service, joint, interagency, and multinational organizations confronting complex and uncertain security environments.

Our mission requires that the CSCDEP provides direction, encourages creative thinking, and addresses the cognitive and the affective domains. Our goals are to:

- Educate learners to meet the Marine Corps' current and future needs.
- Produce skilled operational-level leaders able to overcome diverse 21st Century security challenges.
- Prepare learners to perform effectively in command and staff duties with Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) and for assignment with joint, interagency, and multinational organizations.

Program Format

The CSCDEP is a 70 week part-time learning program. CDET operates on a yearly academic schedule that runs 35 weeks from October to June. Some summer courses are offered. Currently the CDET teaches using four delivery methods: onsite weekly, onsite weekend, blended, and online weekly. Figure 1 shows the two-year construct for the onsite weekly/weekend methods.




Figure 1. Two-year construct for the onsite weekly/weekend methods.

Every learner is assigned a seminar with a highly qualified member of the CDET adjunct faculty. Each lesson within a course takes one week; the week after the last lesson is reserved for the final examination. Most learners take the course through an onsite seminar; the remainder are provided with an asynchronous, online seminar. Onsite seminars meet once a week for 3 hours. Online seminars have no fixed meeting requirements, but all assignments must be completed by specified times.

Both methods allow learners to learn and interact with an instructor and their peers. Each provides a forum where the instructor and learners can ask questions and participate in relevant Socratic discussions and learning. All learners, both onsite and online, are enrolled and access course assignments, collaborative tools, and assessments through the Blackboard learning support system.

All courses are comprised of a specific number of lessons. Each lesson includes educational objectives; readings, viewings, and recordings; lesson text; and issues for discussion.

There are several types of assessments: short multiple choice quizzes, discussion contribution, point papers, extra writing assignments, planning product development, and final essay examinations. After reading a lesson—and before the seminar—learners, both onsite and online, must complete the multiple choice quiz in Blackboard. Each lesson has issues for discussion, which learners will be asked to address, either in person (for onsite learners) or in Blackboard (for online learners). The final examination will be an essay assessment, except for the Operation Planning course which will be by practical application.

Program Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
8901, Theory and Nature of War	29.6 hrs	25.0 hrs
8902, National and International Security Studies	29.8 hrs	28.0 hrs
8903, Operational Art	30.4 hrs	28.0 hrs
8904, Joint Operations	32.7 hrs	28.0 hrs
8905, Small Wars	34.9 hrs	28.0 hrs
8906, MAGTF Expeditionary Operations	36.3 hrs	35.0 hrs
8907, Amphibious Operations	11.4 hrs	16.0 hrs
8908, Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)	35.8 hrs	33.0 hrs
Total	240.9 hrs	221.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).		

Individual course descriptions are provided in the individual sections.

Learning Outcomes

Learning outcomes used in the program are listed in Enclosures (1) and (2). Enclosure (1) lists the Service intermediate-level college (ILC) Joint PME learning outcomes, while Enclosure (2) lists the Marine Corps PME ILC learning outcomes. These learning outcomes are accomplished throughout the program. If institutions need to know which of these learning outcomes are associated to individual courses or program assessments, the Marine Corps CDET can provide this information upon request.

Assessments

Assessments are a combination of examinations and practical applications designed to examine learners at all levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy. As previously mentioned, CDET is attempting to develop critical thinking and most of the assessments are designed to facilitate the development of and examine that ability. Grading rubrics used to grade

final exams and discussion contributions are included in Enclosure (3). Generally, courses comply with the following grading design.

- 20 percent of course grade based on lesson quiz questions (required to be completed before seminar).
- 40 percent based on seminar contribution for the course's issues for discussion.
- 40 percent based on final essay paper.

Institutional Research and Learner Performance Data

Institutional research (IR) is an important element in allowing the CSCDEP to maintain a dynamic and effective program. The CDET conducts IR using surveys and learner performance data. Surveys from learners, faculty, graduates, and commanders assist CSCDEP to improve the curriculum and instructional methodology to meet the learners' and faculty members' educational needs.

IR also provides item analysis and information based on learner assessments, including quizzes, seminar contribution grades, and written assignments. This capability is a significant addition to the CDET's ability to interpret and evaluate learner achievement in relation to joint and Marine Corps ILC learning outcomes. Measuring learning outcomes is critical in determining learners' depth of understanding and determining how well learners are mastering both the joint and Marine Corps ILC learning outcomes.

Faculty

The CSCDEP is designed to be taught at the terminal master's level. All faculty and adjunct faculty are approved by the CDET Dean of Academics (in Quantico). Criterion for faculty approval includes the candidate's experience (a subject matter expert in the material) and education level. The program has a faculty training and supervision program that is run by a regional coordinator (RC) and regional chief instructor (RCI). The RC and RCI handle faculty development, remediate examinations, coordinate enrollment, and address academic, administrative, and miscellaneous issues for their region.

Each course comes with an instructor package and an online faculty development site to ensure courses are consistently implemented throughout all regions. In addition to the CDET full-time faculty, the CDET hires part-time adjunct faculty to conduct onsite and online seminars. Our faculty comprises an experienced group of professionals with a unique blend of academic expertise and operational experience. This diverse group of subject matter experts includes active duty and retired military field grade officers from a variety of specialties and terminal degree-holding civilian academics. These individuals possess an eclectic blend of knowledge, skills, and experiences that greatly enhance the educational environment.

The CDET has been commended for its quality of faculty and was recognized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for best practices in distance education within the uniformed Services.

Evaluation and Accreditation

The CDET conducts an internal programmatic evaluation of the CSCDEP through the course content review board (CCRB) process. The CCRB report is the initiating document for the President of the Marine Corps University (MCU) curriculum review board (CRB) evaluation. Enclosure (4) illustrates the CCRB and CRB processes used for academic evaluation and quality control.

Military colleges, like their civilian counterparts, require accreditation to ensure that the education provided meets acceptable levels of quality. As a JPME program, the CSCDEP is accredited by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the provisions of the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE). Enclosure (5) provides information on PAJE requirements for accreditation.

Contact Information

For more information on the Marine Corps CDET or CSCDEP contact the following individuals:

John Hemleben

Dean of Academics CDET
(703) 784-0741
john.hemleben@usmc.mil

Dennis Haskin

Assoc. Dean of Academics CSCDEP
(703) 432-5257
Dennis.haskin@usmc.mil

8901, Theory and Nature of War

8901, *Theory and Nature of War*, introduces learners to important military theory and describes its impact on how we conduct war. The learner will read selected works of history’s greatest military theorists and then compare and contrast their theories. By applying these theories to selected eras and events in military history, learners will be able to analyze the evolution of warfare from the late 18th century to the present, and recognize and describe the nature of change in the characteristics of war in selected time frames. This course also discusses the concept of an “American way of war” and how it helped frame how Marines think about and conduct war.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Marine Corps Warfighting/Law of War/Classic Theorist: Sun Tzu	4.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Revolutionary Warfare/Classic Theorist: Clausewitz	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Classical Theorist: Jomini/American Civil War	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, 20th Century Warfare: World War I	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Naval Theory: Mahan and Corbett/Interwar Development and Innovation	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, 20th Century Warfare: World War II	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, The Cold War and Future War	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	29.6 hrs	25.0 hrs

¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time.
² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course’s educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6				
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C		
X				X		X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X								X					X	X	X	X

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A
X		X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X		X			X				X	X

Course Overview

8901, *Theory and Nature of War*, uses the works of important military theorists and selected historical eras, wars, campaigns, or battles to illustrate the evolution of warfare since the late 18th century. The course follows a historical sequence to the greatest extent possible.

Lesson 1, Marine Corps Warfighting/Law of War/Classic Theorist: Sun Tzu, discusses the main concepts of Marine Corps warfighting philosophy and command and control theory as described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting*, and MCDP 6, *Command and Control*. The Law of War is introduced to learners to begin their understanding of this important constraint during a conflict. Finally, *The Art of War*, written by the ancient Chinese military theorist Sun Tzu, is then explored for guidance concerning political/military relations, maneuver warfare, and information operations.

Read:

- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (1997): pp. 71 to 96.
- MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (1996): pp. 36 to 41, 63 to 65 and 107 to 117.
- “The Evolution of the Just War Tradition: Defining *Jus Post Bellum*” (extract). Major R. P. DiMeglio. *Military Law Review* (Winter 2005): pp. 131 to 146.
- “Restraint in War.” LtCol Lance A. McDaniel. *Marine Corps Gazette* “Web Extra” (November 2006).
- *The Art of War* (1963). Sun Tzu (translated by Samuel B. Griffith): pp. 63 to 69, 73, 77 to 80, 82 to 84, 96 to 101, and 106.

Issues for Discussion

- MCDP 1 defines war as a clash between organized groups employing military force. Do counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist operations fit into this paradigm? What are the differences, if any?
- The strategy of annihilation and the strategy of erosion are described in MCDP 1. Which of these strategies is most compatible with the Marine Corps’ style of warfighting, maneuver warfare? Why?
- What is the relationship between a center of gravity and a critical vulnerability?
- Control is defined in MCDP 6 as taking the form of feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation to the commander, allowing him to adapt and modify command actions. Is this an adequate explanation of control? What additional elements would you add to a definition of control?
- MCDP 6 describes mission and detailed command and control. When is one more appropriate than the other? Is there a relationship to the level of command—joint force, Marine expeditionary force, or company command—and the use of mission or detailed command and control?

- Mission command and control requires high levels of mutual trust between seniors and subordinates to be successful. Do we, as a Corps, in practice promote that level of trust in garrison, training, and in combat? What other traits must we instill in Marines to make mission command and control work in combat?
- Analyze the differences between *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello*, and *jus post bellum* and assess the key requirements for a war to be just. Who should develop these three principles prior to a conflict: U.S. political or U.S. military leadership?
- Evaluate the three proposed sets of *jus post bellum* criteria found in Major DiMeglio's article and describe the advantages and limitations of each theory.

Educational Objectives

1. Describe key elements of the maneuver warfighting style of the Marine Corps, such as combat power, center of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, offense and defense, and culminating point.
2. Explain the key tenets of the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy as described in MCDP 1, such as philosophy of command, shaping the action, decisionmaking, mission tactics, commander's intent, main effort, etc.
3. Explain the relationship between command and control as practiced by the Marine Corps.
4. Describe key elements of Marine Corps command and control theory, such as mission command and control and commander's intent.
5. Analyze just war theory as it relates to reasons for going to war and how a war is conducted.
6. Evaluate the concept of *jus post bellum* and why there may be a need to incorporate this concept into just war theory.
7. Explain key concepts of Sun Tzu's approach to warfighting, such as the pre-war assessments by the political ruler and military commander, maneuver warfare techniques, the use of deception and intelligence in operations, and the importance of tempo and adaptation in achieving victory.
8. Assess the impact that Sun Tzu's theories and approach have had on the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy.

Lesson 2, Revolutionary Warfare/Classic Theorist: Clausewitz, presents the Southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War as a means to explore conventional versus irregular war; expeditionary versus insurgency war; and the use of campaigning to achieve a strategic outcome. This lesson discusses how Napoleon conducted campaigns and his contributions to modern war, particularly his innovations in operational art and command and control, which still affect how wars are fought today. Finally, the lesson focuses on the military theories of Carl von Clausewitz based on his wartime experiences and the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon.

Read:

- *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (1973). R. F. Weigley: pp. 18 to 32 and 36 to 39.
- "Napoleon and the Revolution in War." P. Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 124 to 142.

- *On War* (1976). Carl Clausewitz (edited and translated by M. Howard and P. Paret): pp. 75 to 80, 84 to 89, 100 to 102, 479 to 483, 566 to 573, 579 to 581, and 595 to 596.
- “Clausewitz.” P. Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 197 to 210.

Issues for Discussion

- What was Greene’s strategy in the campaign in the South and how did he implement this strategy?
- What were Cornwallis’s six key decisions?
- At what point did Cornwallis reach his culminating point?
- Is the concept of the Napoleonic decisive battle still valid in the 21st century?
- Why did Napoleon succeed in his earlier campaigns?
- Why did Napoleon fail in latter campaigns?
- Are there any vestiges of Napoleonic warfare in the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine?
- Why does Clausewitz discuss “absolute war” when he concludes that such a war cannot occur?
- What are the implications of Clausewitz describing war as a “collision of two living forces”?
- Compare Sun Tzu and Clausewitz’s views on deception and surprise in war.
- What does Clausewitz say about guerrilla war?

Educational Objectives

1. Compare the impact of the operational decisions made by Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis and Major General Nathaniel Greene during the Southern campaign of the American Revolutionary War.
2. Examine how Napoleon changed the conduct of war from the more limited warfare of the 18th century to the nearly unlimited warfare of the Napoleonic era.
3. Describe how some elements of Napoleonic Warfare, such as the climactic decisive battle, strategy of the central position, and guerrilla warfare, are still extant today.
4. Identify and evaluate fundamental concepts of war developed or described by Clausewitz, such as the relationship between war and policy, center of gravity, culminating point, friction, and the fog of war.

Lesson 3, Classical Theorist: Jomini/American Civil War, covers Antoine Baron de Jomini and the American Civil War. Initially serving with the French, Jomini defected to become a military advisor to the Russians. Jomini’s most famous work, *Summary of the Art of War*, was translated into many languages and was part of the curriculum at West Point. The American Civil War witnessed the transition from Napoleonic warfare to near total war; it was also the proving ground for new technologies, organizations, and doctrine. While some American generals attempted to employ the doctrines of Napoleon, other leaders exploited manpower and industrial output advantages.

Read:

- *The Art of War* (1992). Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (translated by CPT G. H. Mendell, USA, and 1LT W. P. Craighill, USA): pp. 12 to 13, 26 to 27, 65 to 67, and 293 to 297.

- *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983). H. Strachan: pp. 60 to 65.
- *The American Way of War* (1973). R. F. Weigley: pp. 92 to 127.
- *The American Way of War* (1973). R. F. Weigley: pp. 128 to 152.

Issues for Discussion

- What's so bad about Jomini? Are his views on the use of mass and the decisive point incorrect?
- What are Jomini's views on seapower and amphibious operations?
- What conclusions can you draw from Jomini's writings on unconventional or guerilla warfare?
- How would you characterize the Civil War? Was it a limited or unlimited war? For both sides?
- Did the character of the war change? If so, how?
- Why did Lee's Napoleonic strategy fail?
- How would you characterize Grant's warfighting style?
- What were the centers of gravity for the Union and Confederacy at the strategic level? For Lee and Grant at the operational and tactical levels?

Educational Objectives

1. Identify and evaluate fundamental concepts of war, such as concentration at the decisive point, lines of operation, seapower, and unconventional warfare, developed or described by Jomini.
2. Identify and evaluate the warfighting style and overall strategy, as practiced by Lee and the Confederacy in the American Civil War.
3. Identify and evaluate the warfighting style and overall strategy, as practiced by Grant and the Union in the American Civil War.

Lesson 4, 20th Century Warfare: World War I, begins by discussing the Prussians' development of a professional officer and noncommissioned officer corps, their creation of modern general staff, and their development of strategies and tactics to take advantage of—and counter—new technological advances. This lesson does not discuss specific World War I military operations; rather, it facilitates an understanding of the organizational structures, alliances, and innovations that were relevant in World War I. The lesson also examines the effect this conflict had on future military thinking and analyzes how it changed the character of warfare in the interwar years.

Read:

- "The Prusso-German School: Moltke and the Rise of the General Staff." H. Holborn. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 281 to 284.
- *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (1987). P. Kennedy: pp. 249 to 256.
- "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment." G. E. Rothenberg. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 296 to 325.
- "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914." M. Howard. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 510 to 526.
- *The American Way of War* (1977). R. F. Weigley: pp. 212 to 222.

Issues for Discussion

- What is the legacy of the Prussian staff system in modern military organizations? Do we still use Prussian staff organization and methods?
- What was the impact of the European alliance system on mobilization and commitment of forces leading up to World War I?
- What were the essential military problems of the war at the tactical level, the operational level, and the strategic level? How were these problems related?
- How did World War I change the character of warfare?
- What were some of the doctrinal and operational concepts innovations developed during the war to overcome the stalemate in the trenches?

Educational Objectives

1. Explain the significance and continuing impact of the Prussian General Staff model.
2. Describe the alliances on the eve of World War I, why the parties entered into the treaties, and the effect this had in the conflict.
3. Discuss the technological, doctrinal, training, and education innovations—and their influence—used during World War I.
4. Examine the effect World War I had on future military thinking.
5. Analyze how World War I changed the character of warfare in the interwar years.

Lesson 5, Naval Theory: Mahan and Corbett/Interwar Development and

Innovation, examines the revolution in naval theory led by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett. Both were heavily influenced by the experiences of the Royal Navy during the Napoleonic Wars. Each, however, produced a different interpretation from their studies. Mahan was an ardent Jominian, while Corbett followed a Clausewitzian approach. The technological advances prior to and during World War I would continue during the interwar years (1919-1941). Two important areas of advancement were in amphibious warfare and the use of aviation. The efforts to develop these areas would have a tremendous impact on the conduct of warfare during World War II.

Read:

- “Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian.” P. A. Crowl. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 449 to 451 and 461 to 463.
- *The American Way of War* (1977). R. F. Weigley: pp. 173 to 191.
- *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (1988) (reprint of 1911 edition). J. S. Corbett: pp. 91 to 106.
- Coursebook, pp. 5-6 to 5-7.
- FMFRP 12-34, *History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal* (1959), Vol. I: pp. 9 to 15 and 17 to 20.
- *The American Way of War* (1977). R. F. Weigley: pp. 223 to 241.

Issues for Discussion

- Was Mahan correct when he ascertained that his “six general conditions affecting sea power” were universal and timeless and unlikely to change? Do any or all of them apply today?

- Mahan recognized the importance of maritime commerce in the economic life of a sea-faring nation and stated that control of maritime commerce through command of the sea was a primary function of the navy. What was Mahan's position as to how control of maritime commerce could be achieved?
- Discuss Corbett's concept of limited war. What are the strengths or weaknesses of his theory?
- In what ways did Corbett's vision of seapower differ from Mahan's?
- What actual amphibious warfare capability did the United States develop prior to entering World War II? What influenced the development of amphibious warfare doctrine?
- The Douhet doctrine identified the population—not the military—as the appropriate target of strategic bombing. Was this an abandonment of traditional customs of war? In your view as a prospective commander, is this immoral?

Educational Objectives

1. Explain Mahan's concept of sea power and his views toward *guerre de course* (commerce raiding).
2. Identify the six elements, or general conditions, that Mahan viewed as influencing the sea power of nations.
3. Explain Corbett's theories and fundamentals of sea power that underlie command of the sea.
4. Compare and contrast the maritime strategies of Corbett and Mahan.
5. Analyze the development of amphibious warfare doctrine and the factors that influenced it.
6. Analyze the thinking of strategic bombing theorists and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses in their arguments.

Lesson 6, 20th Century Warfare: World War II, analyzes the global character and scope of the conflict. Although World War I was fought outside of Europe, World War II covered Europe, Russia, North Africa, the Far East, and the islands of the Pacific, with naval and air forces fighting over an even larger geographic area. World War II still impacts warfare theory in the modern era. As Marine officers, you must understand World War II in its historical context; and realize how many of today's complex political issues can be traced to it.

Read:

- *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (1983). H. Strachan: pp. 163 to 167 and 169 to 186.
- "Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939-1945." P. Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 677 to 702.
- "American and Japanese Strategies in the Pacific War." P. Paret. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (1986). P. Paret (ed.): pp. 703 to 732.

Issues for Discussion

- Explore the major technological innovations of World War II. Which ones had the greatest long-term impacts?
- Why were Germany and Japan so successful initially?

- Why did they ultimately fail?
- How did World War II affect the way the United States conducts war today?

Educational Objectives

1. Evaluate the way World War II affected the way the United States conducts war.
2. Explain how World War II tactics and technology changed the character of war.

Lesson 7, The Cold War and Future War, begins with the conclusion of World War II and looks at the enduring nature and changing character of war. The Cold War was waged by means of economic pressure, selective aid, diplomatic maneuver, propaganda, assassination, intimidation, low-intensity military operations, and full-scale proxy wars. It resulted in the largest arms buildup—conventional and nuclear—in history that did not end until the collapse of the Soviet empire, leaving the United States as the only superpower left in the world. The future of warfare has become less certain with the demise of the bipolar rivalry of the Cold War era. While the specter of a major war vanished, this did not mean the end of war. The only certainty is that war, in its various forms, will exist throughout the 21st century.

Read:

- “A Look at the Great Wars of the Twentieth Century.” D. Kagan. *The Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2000): pp. 11 to 24.
- *The American Way of War* (1977). R. F. Weigley: pp. 455 to 468.
- *The Army in Vietnam* (1986). A. Krepinevich, Jr.: pp. 274 to 275.
- “How Has War Changed Since the End of The Cold War?” C. S. Gray. *Parameters* (Spring 2005): pp. 14 to 26.
- “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation.” W. Lind, Col K. Nightengale, Capt. J. Schmitt, Col J. Sutton, LtCol G. Wilson. *Marine Corps Gazette* (October 1989): pp. 22 to 26.
- “Fifth Generation Warfare.” Anonymous. *Federalist Patriot* (14 March 2005): pp. 1 to 7.
- Joint Operating Environment 2010, United States Joint Forces Command, pp. 6 to 11 and 60 to 64.

Issues for Discussion

- How did the Cold War change how the United States viewed war?
- How did NSC 68 change U.S. force structure and war planning?
- Was the U.S. military strategy employed in Vietnam appropriate to our policy objectives? Was the North Vietnamese military strategy appropriate to their policy objectives?
- What were the advantages or disadvantages of engaging in a limited war in Vietnam?
- What lessons might U.S. policymakers and strategists draw from the history of the Cold War about current transition efforts to create a force to counter changing threats?
- How will conventional war change in the future?
- What aspects of warfare remain the same, and what will change in the 21st century?

- How will war be defined in the contemporary era? Is Clausewitz's paradigm still valid?
- Does MCDP 1, Warfighting, provide a sound basis for USMC warfighting in the 21st century?

Educational Objectives

1. Describe how the Cold War changed the American way of war.
2. Assess the impact of NSC-68 on U.S. force structure and war planning.
3. Explain the concept of limited war, as it applied to U.S. policy in the years following the Korean War.
4. Compare and contrast theoretical concepts that military historians, analysts, and practitioners have found valuable over the years in comprehending, analyzing, and evaluating the events and trends of military affairs.
5. Explain the generations of war concept and differentiate between 4th and 5th generation warfare.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 25 points for multiple choice quizzes, 35 points for discussion contribution, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8902, National and International Security Studies

8902, *National and International Security Studies*, imparts the requisite knowledge of the national security structure expected of field grade officers operating in a joint environment. Officers at this level can expect assignments that require knowledge of the national security environment and the ability to synthesize that knowledge (the means) to develop and convey strategies (the ways) that lead to the accomplishment of complex tasks (the ends). 8901, *Theory and Nature of War*, provided the foundation for this course; 8903, *Operational Art*, will use what is learned here to facilitate a better understanding of the application of the military instrument of national power.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Strategy	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Instruments of National Power	2.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, National Security Decisionmaking	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, National Strategic Framework	2.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Culture and National Security	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Alliances and Coalitions	2.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Strategic Case Study: Suez Crisis (1956)	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	29.8 hrs	28.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).		

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course’s educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6		
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A
X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X

Course Overview

8902, *National and International Security Studies*, follows a natural progression and is designed to present the national and international aspects of the nation’s security framework. Each part of this framework is inextricably tied to the others; as it is being presented, nothing should be viewed as a discrete subject unto itself.

Lesson 1, Strategy, depicts strategy as the calculated relationship of the art of applying ends (objectives derived from interests), ways (strategic concepts), and means (resources or “instruments of national power”). The ultimate goal of strategy is to successfully secure national interests at an acceptable cost.

Read:

- Overview, Lesson 1.
- MCDP 1-1, Strategy (1997): pp. 37 to 60.
- “Developing Strategists-Translating National Strategy into Theater Strategy”. D. Reveron and J. Cook. *Joint Force Quarterly* (4th Qtr 2009): pp. 21 to 28.
- “The Trouble with Strategy: Bridging Policy and Operations.” R. Betts. *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 2001-02): pp. 23-30.
- “The State of the World: Explaining U.S. Strategy” G. Friedman. STRATFOR Global Intelligence (28 Feb 2012).
- “Defense Strategy and Military Planning for an Era of Persistent Conflict” R. Tomes. *Small Wars Journal* (26 Jan 2012).
- “The Complexity Trap” M. J. Gallagher, J. A. Geltzer, and S. L. V. Gorka. *Parameters* (Spring 2012) pp 5 to 16.

Issues for Discussion

- Explain why it is important to understand an adversary’s national interests that guide its military strategy.
- Figure 3 in MCDP 1-1, Chapter 2, provides doctrinal guidance regarding linkage of political and military objectives. Provide at least one real world example for each following case. Case one is a country or state with limited political objectives that pursued limited military objectives. Case two is a country or state that pursued unlimited military objectives. Discuss your examples.
- Figure 3 in MCDP1-1, Chapter 2, doctrinally shows that a country or state with an unlimited political objective can only seek resolution via the military with an unlimited military objective. Can an unlimited political objective be achieved with a limited military objective? Support your answer with an example if appropriate.
- Defining national interests can be complex and ambiguous. Discuss the U.S. national interests and the differences between vital interests, important interests, and peripheral interests.

- How could the pursuit of a vital national interest, such as physical security, possibly have negative repercussions relating to the attainment of other national interests (e.g., the promotion of values and economic prosperity)?
- Strategy, as defined in MCDP 1-1 and the other readings, is simply the use of specified means to achieve distinct ends. Discuss the ends-ways-means methodology for strategy. What factors could possibly make the execution of something simple so difficult?
- Betts uses the “strategic bridge” metaphor in his article and speaks to the difficulty of “doing strategy.” Discuss his approach and theory on how to achieve strategic success.
- Do you believe the world is more complex today than ever before? If you do, propose a way to address how our national security leadership should tackle the problems we face. If you do not believe the world is any more complex in our time than other times, analyze “The Complexity Trap” reading and provide your critique.

Educational Objectives

1. Beginning with national interests, identify and discuss the documents and linkages that lead to military objectives.
2. Comprehend the concepts of limited and unlimited objectives, and assess how the strategies of erosion and annihilation relate to these concepts.
3. Examine national power and how it is implemented in the international system. Analyze current U.S. strategy and how “non-state” actors have affected US strategy.
4. Analyze how pursuing the vital national interest of physical security affects other interests, such as promotion of values and economic prosperity in the context of current overseas contingency operations.
5. Analyze the factors that contribute to the difficulty of formulating sound strategy.
6. Evaluate the concept of ends-ways-means as it relates to national strategy.

Lesson 2, Instruments of National Power, discusses the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments with an emphasis on their integrated application and the challenges associated with developing a coherent strategy for accomplishing national objectives.

Read:

- Overview, Lesson 2.
- “National Power.” R. C. Nation. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues* (4th Qtr. 2008): pp. 163 to 172.
- “Hard and Soft Power: The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century.” C. S. Gray. *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph* (Apr 2011): pp. iii to ix.
- “Diplomacy as an Instrument of National Power.” R. J. Fendrick. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (2008). J. B. Bartholomees, ed.: pp. 189 to 194.
- “Shades of Gray: Gradual Escalation and Coercive Diplomacy.” A. J. Stephenson. *Essays* (2002).

- “Strategic Communication: Wielding the Information Element of Power.” D. M. Murphy. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (2008). J. B. Bartholomees, ed.: pp. 175 to 184.
- “Economics: A Key Element of National Power.” C. K. S. Chun. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (2008). J. B. Bartholomees, ed.: pp. 249 to 259.

Issues for Discussion

- The United States is referred to as the world’s only superpower because it still possesses vast resources and unsurpassed elements of national power. Identify and discuss factors that limit our use of national power.
- In your view, what countries today are more powerful than generally believed? Which countries are less powerful than believed? Frame your answer using the instruments of national power.
- Describe the mechanisms within the U.S. government to ensure that the instruments of national power support U.S. political objectives. Identify which is the most powerful instrument, and explain your reasoning.
- This lesson focuses on four instruments of national power. Are there others? What are they, and what roles do they play in national security?
- The information instrument is often considered less “powerful” than the other instruments because it is not a “hard” power. Provide examples of its “soft” strength and how it can be a force multiplier if used effectively.

Educational Objectives

1. Examine and discuss the concept of national power as a means or resource to further national strategy.
2. Identify and describe the tools (hard and soft power) states use when interacting with each other and how states develop strategies to employ those tools (instruments) to achieve their national interests.
3. Define the four instruments of national power and how each contributes to a nation’s exercise of power and influence.
4. Define and discuss the concept of strategic communication.
5. Evaluate the integration and application of the instruments of power.

Lesson 3, National Security Decisionmaking, defines the roles and make-up of the National Security Council system and its sub-committees, the Interagency System, and Congress in the national security decision making process. Substantive changes to the construct and workings of the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council have been implemented since the Obama Administration has taken office.

Read:

- Overview, Lesson 3.
- “The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System” (Aug 15, 2011). A. G. Whittaker, S. A. Brown, F. C. Smith, Ambassador E. McKune: pp. 5 to 31 and 42-44.
- “A Dramatically Different NSC? President Obama’s Use of the National Security Council” M. G. Jackson. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, (Mar 2012): pp. 1 to 21.

- “When Congress Stops Wars” W. G. Howell and J. C. Pevehouse. *Foreign Affairs* (Sep/Oct 2007).
- “Project on National Security Reform, Case Study Working Group Report. R. Weitz, Ph.D, ed. *Strategic Studies Institute Book* (Mar 2012): pp. vii to x, 1 to 2, and 7 to 19.

Issues for Discussion

- Discuss the changing role of the NSA in national security decision-making throughout its history. How does the role of the current NSA compare to its roles in the past?
- The NSC staff has grown over the years as roles have changed. Has this change altered the nature of national policymaking and decision-making? Is the NSC transparent and accountable?
- The Project on National Security Reform provided numerous detailed recommendations on how to improve the U.S. national security establishment. Analyze these recommendations and discuss which three recommendations are most important and why.
- The Constitution outlines an internal system of “checks and balances” between Congress and the President. How does this system affect the ability of the President to respond rapidly to an evolving crisis?
- Assess the Obama merger of the NSC and HSC staffs into the NSS. Has the merger changed the responsibilities and scope of influence of the NSA? Does the merger increase or lessen the ability of the NSS to respond to a crisis or national security problem?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the roles of the National Security Council and the interagency system in national security policy creation and decision-making.
2. Examine the U.S. government’s organizational framework for national security.
3. Evaluate the U.S. national security staff processes used to develop policies and security strategy.
4. Examine the role of Congress in national security policy creation and decision-making.
5. Analyze the results from Presidential Policy Directive-1 (PPD-1), primarily the merger of the HSC and NSC into a single National Security Staff.

Lesson 4, National Strategic Framework, examines the framework for developing strategy, planning force structure and national strategic level guidance. It introduces national strategic direction source documents and provides the linkages in the strategic guidance hierarchy.

Read:

- Overview, Lesson 4.
- “From Here to There: The Strategy and Force Planning Framework.” P.H. Liotta and R. M. Lloyd. *Naval War College Review* (Spring 2005): pp. 121 to 136.
- The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2010): pp Preface to 6.
- *Defense Strategic Guidance* (2012): pp. Preface to 8. (11 pages).

- Quadrennial Defense Review Report Preface (Feb 2010).
- The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2011): Preface and Summary slides.
- Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force (2012): pp. 1 to 15.

Issues for Discussion

- Discuss the strategy and force planning framework described in the Liotta and Lloyd article. Specifically, address external factors to consider when assessing strategy and force planning options.
- Discuss and evaluate the essential elements of the NSS (2010). Since it is mandated by Congress, critically evaluate the Congressional role in the planning and execution of the strategy.
- Analyze and evaluate the linkages of the five assigned strategic guidance documents in this lesson: the NSS, DSG, QDR, CSDJF, and NMS. How do these documents detail the ends, ways, means, and risks associated with good strategic guidance?
- The QDR (2010) and the DSG (2012) are both defense strategic guidance documents. Likewise, the NMS (2011) and the CSDJF (2012) are CJCS strategic guidance documents. Are each pair of documents in agreement or at odds with each other?
- The 2011 NMS is subtitled, "Redefining America's Military Leadership." How do you think this new leadership approach will affect the joint force to achieve the four stated military objectives?

Educational Objectives

1. Breakdown the framework for strategy development and force planning.
2. Analyze the overarching goals of *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (2010) and compare the linkage to the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (2010) and *Defense Strategic Guidance* (2012).
3. Analyze the goals and linkages of the national strategic documents in the required reading and how they identify the ends, ways, means and risks associated with U.S. strategic success.
4. Categorize the necessary attributes and characteristics of the Joint Force as specified by the National Military Strategy (2011) and the *Chairman's Strategic Direction to the Joint Force* (2012).

Lesson 5, Joint Strategic Planning System and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System, introduces the JSPS and PPBES, Department of Defense strategic planning systems that provide input to national strategy (ends), determine military resources (means) for program integration, and direct military applications (ways) to U.S. strategy. This lesson also reviews the strategic leadership of past Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Read and View:

- "National Military Strategies: A Historical Perspective, 1990 to 2012." R. Meinhart. *U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy Vol I*. Chapter 6 (2012). J. B. Bartholomees, ed.: pp. 81 to 93.
- "Joint Strategic Planning System." CJCSI 3100.01B. (12 Dec 2008). pp. Preface to A-10.

- “The Joint Strategic Planning System 101” video lecture. J. Rouse, J5, Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Section (29 Jul 2011).
- “The Joint Strategic Planning System” video lecture. COL P. Swinford, MCWAR College Faculty (2 Nov 2009).
- “DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.” Albert T. Church and Ted Warner. *Joint Force Quarterly*. (2nd Qtr 2009): pp. 80 to 84.
- DOD Memorandum: Procedures and Schedule for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012-2016 Integrated Program/Budget Review (09 Apr 2010).
- “USMC Financial Guidebook for Commanders” HQMC NAVMC 2664 REV 1.0. (2009) pp. Preface to 9.
- “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices.” (Jan 2012): pp. 1 to 15.

Issues for Discussion

- Discuss the JSPS process, along with the key documents and processes associated with it.
- Discuss the evolution of the JSPS and how it has been used over the years by the CJCS.
- Discuss national strategic direction and how unity of action is achieved. What is the role of the CCDR in national strategic planning?
- Assess and summarize past changes on the current PPBE system and what impact they have had.
- Differentiate the strategic leadership’s responsibilities and roles in predicting, defining, and programming current and future capabilities requirements.
- Analyze the PPBE system, and then discuss and compare it in terms of its complexity and responsiveness in resourcing our military requirements.
- Summarize the relationship between Congress and the DOD with the budgeting process.
- Explain the relationship of the three strategic planning systems (NSCS, JSPS, and PPBES) introduced in the course.
- Analyze how the document Defense Budget and Priorities and Choices (2012) impacts the DOD? How well does it prepare the U.S. for future challenges?

Educational Objectives

1. Summarize the JSPS, the main participants, its purpose, the inputs it uses, and the outputs it produces to formulate military plans in support of policy.
2. Comprehend and describe the JSPS as a system for integrating the diverse views of the US military establishment to provide timely and effective military advice to the President and SECDEF.
3. Discuss national strategic direction and examine how unified action is achieved.
4. Summarize the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) system and describe leadership responsibilities regarding the PPBE process.
5. Comprehend the evolution of the DOD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. Understand the origin and nuances to the system over the past four decades.
6. Breakdown and discuss the basic PPBE process flow and notional time schedule, outputs and products of the system.
7. Analyze the USMC budget, money flow and appropriation and examine the defense budget priorities and impacts to the USMC and national security.

Lesson 6, Culture and National Security, explores the role culture plays in shaping nations and the importance of understanding strategic culture regarding national security decisions. The course looks at the strategic cultures of the US, Iran, China and Al Qaida.

Read and View:

- Overview, Lesson 6.
- “Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture.” C. S. Gray. Comparative Strategic Culture Curriculum Paper (Oct 2006): Summary.
- “Introduction to Strategic Culture” Dr. P. Otis. Strategic Culture Curriculum Paper (Sep 2011): pp. 1-6.
- “British and American Strategic Cultures” C. S. Gray. Jamestown Symposium 2007 Paper (Mar 2007).
- “The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran” M. Eisenstadt. Middle East Studies Monograph No. 1 (Aug 2011): pp.1 to 19.
- China’s Strategic Culture: A Perspective for the United States.” Col. K. D. Johnson. Strategic Studies Institute. (Jun 2009) pp. 1 to 21.
- “Culture for Military Operations” video lecture. Dr. P. Otis. 2012. (23 Aug 2012).
- “Strategic Culture, Al-Qaida, and Weapons of Mass Destruction” J. M. Long. *Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum*. (20 Nov 2006): pp. 3 to 7 and 21-27.

Issues for Discussion

- Some dismiss strategic culture as being derived from power. One view believes powerful states view the world very differently than weaker powers. “Those with great military power are more likely to consider force a useful tool of international relations than those who have less military power.” If this is true, why should strategists worry about strategic culture? Is it enough to understand a country’s power position?
- From the military strategist’s perspective, how do you view the importance of understanding the strategic culture of our potential foes? Provide contextual examples that illustrate your position.
- Assess the strategic cultures of China and Iran. Discuss possible ways that the United States may be able to influence each country regarding all three country’s national security concerns.
- Describe some specific actions the United States can take to influence how it is perceived abroad.
- How does globalization shape the evolution of a state’s strategic culture? Is there a different result from a more rapid onset—an event like 9/11, a global recession, or the collapse of a peer competitor?
- How do strategic cultures differ for non-state actors? Can operational insights be gained by viewing violent non-state actors through strategic culture lenses?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze and describe the concept of strategic culture with regard to current strategic challenges.
2. Examine through using various models another country’s strategic culture and assess its impact on the planning and execution of military operations.

3. Develop an understanding of how the United States can build stronger cooperative relationships with allies by understanding their strategic culture.
4. Examine and describe the requirement to understand how other nations perceive the United States and how these perceptions affect the U.S. strategic security and global influence.
5. Evaluate and discuss whether non-state actors can have a strategic culture and how that impacts military operational planning.

Lesson 7, Alliances and Coalitions, addresses the defining differences between alliances and coalitions, and the advantages and limitations inherent when operating within either, along with a look at NATO and the UN.

Read:

- Overview, Lesson 7
- “Alliance and Coalition Warfare.” W. A. Silkett. *Parameters* (Summer 1993): pp. 74 to 85.
- “The High Price of Friendship.” P. Weitsman. *The New York Times* (31 Aug 2006).
- The UN Preamble”.
- “The Promise and Peril of the Responsibility to Protect” Colonel D. J. Francis, USA. *USAWC Strategy Research Project*. (21 Feb 2012): pp. 1 to 26.
- “Irresponsible.” J. R. Bolton. *National Review* (Apr 18, 2011): pp. 32 and 34.
- “Continental Drift,” R. Haas. *The Washington Post* (19 Jun 2011).
- “NATO: Death by a Thousand Little Spending Cuts?” L. Ch. Savage. *Canada’s National Weekly Current Affairs Magazine*. (29 May 2012).
- “Smart Defense” A. F. Rasmussen. *European Security and Defense*. (Jan 2011): pp. 7 to 10.
- “Obama’s New Global Posture” M. Flournoy and J. Davidson. *Foreign Affairs*. (Jul/Aug 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- George Washington and Thomas Jefferson were generally against “entangling alliances.” George C. Marshall, through his many wartime experiences, seems to support a more collective approach. What are your views on the U.S. security commitments regarding alliances or coalitions?
- Analyze and explain the differences and benefits, or drawbacks of an alliance over a coalition.
- Explain the difference between unity of action and unity of effort. Explain your thoughts on unity of command within a coalition or alliance. Is it necessary for success? Is the alternative, unity of effort, sufficient?
- In 2011, military operations in Libya were quickly sanctioned by the UN under its “responsibility to protect” policy and carried out by US and then NATO forces. Why has this same principle not been quickly applied in Syria?
- Take a position on the viability of NATO’s Smart Defense and defend it.
- The U.S. is making a strategic shift to the Pacific. Evaluate the national security impacts of this new focus from a Marine strategist’s point of view. Does your viewpoint change when looking at it from a joint point of view?

Educational Objectives

1. Explain the difference between an alliance and a coalition. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each? Examine how and why multinational organizations work or fail to work.
2. Analyze the need for consensus when making significant decisions within an effective alliance.
3. Analyze and discuss the UN codified concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).
4. Analyze NATO’s *Smart Defense* strategy and the consequences of this policy.
5. Evaluate the new global posture of the United States and identify its effect on other nations.

Lesson 8, Strategic Case Study: Suez Canal (1956), combines learning objectives from the previous seven lessons and addresses the political background and military planning leading up to and including the Suez Crisis of July-November 1956. Learners will review failures in strategic leadership, disconnects between national political authorities and their military subordinates, and compare the vital interests of different nation states.

Read:

- Overview, Lesson 8.
- “Strategic Background to the Suez Crisis, 1956” J. M. House. *CGSC Curriculum*. (2009).
- “The Two Sides of the Sinai Campaign” B. B. Fall. *Military Review*. (Jul 1957): pp. 3 to 23.
- “The Suez Expedition, 1956” General d’Arme A. Beaufre. *Frederick A. Praeger, NY & Washington Publishers*. (1969):pp. 23 to 25, 30 to 32, 34 to 41, 44 to 59, and 66 to 69.
- “Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991” K. M. Pollack. *University of Nebraska Press*, (2004): pp. 29-46.
- “Operation MUSKETEER: The End of Empire; A Study of Organizational Failure in Combined Operations” Major P. L. Neky. *SAMS Monograph*. (1991).
- “Operation KADESH: Israeli Participation in the 1956 Conflict” J. M. House. *CGSC Curriculum* (2009).
- “Nasser and Egyptian Defense in 1956” J. M. House. *CGSC Curriculum*. (2009).

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze and describe the strategic and operational actions taken by each of the major participants (Britain, France, Egypt, and Israel) involved in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Your description should include strategic interests, strategic and military objectives, and the tools/instruments of power used to achieve those objectives. Assess the role of culture throughout this crisis. How did it influence events?
- Discuss the contemporary results (or cause and effect) of this crisis. What lessons can we learn?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the strategic and operational courses of action taken by each state in a crisis. Analysis should include the relationships of each state’s interests, objectives, and policies in the formulation of their national strategies.

2. Examine the uses, integration, and effects of the instruments of national power and by each state in a crisis.
3. Analyze the effects of culture and alliances or coalitions during a crisis. Make judgments based on the effects of a state's leadership and strategic decision-making ability.
4. Analyze the outcome and describe the cause and effect of an event.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, 40 points for discussion contribution, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8903, Operational Art

8903, *Operational Art*, focuses on operational warfare, campaigning, and transforming strategic guidance into the employment of military forces at the operational level. National security operations should be coordinated from the highest level of policymaking—strategy—to the basic level of execution—tactics. The operational level links the two levels, providing direction and purpose to campaigns and other military operations. The operational level interacts with tactics—including the use of forces, resources, and missions—to achieve military success. As the bridge between strategy and tactics, the operational level is where campaigns are designed and conducted. It interacts with strategy to create military art that:

- Designates military objectives to satisfy the desired strategic end state (**ends**).
- Determines a suitable method to achieve the designated objectives (**ways**).
- Assigns forces and resources to the tasks to be accomplished (**means**).

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Operational Art	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Operational Design	4.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Operational Leadership	3.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Campaigning	3.7 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Joint Operation Planning	3.7 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Conflict Termination and Resolution	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Information Operations	2.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Operational Design Practical Exercise	1.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	30.4 hrs	28.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).		

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course's educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6					
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C			
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A
X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X				X

Course Overview

8903, *Operational Art*, covers operational-level warfare and the art of campaigning. The course uses a historical case study, theory, and current doctrine to improve a learner's ability to derive operational insights from any situation and exercise judgment to achieve success on the battlefield.

Lesson 1, Operational Art, introduces operational art and its application at the operational level of war. It discusses the origins of operational art and its development in the joint environment. Operational art provides the doctrinal underpinnings for all military operations that support obtaining strategic ends. The goal of operational art is the development of a campaign plan.

Read:

- Lesson 1 Overview.
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2011): pp. I-12 to I-14.
- "Piercing the Veil of Operational Art." R. L. Allen. *Parameters* (Summer 1995): pp. 111 to 119.
- "Operational Art's Origin." B. W. Menning. *Military Review* (Sep-Oct 1997): pp. 32 to 47.
- "Thinking and Acting Like an Early Explorer: Operational Art is Not a Level of War." H. W. de Czege. *Small Wars Journal* (Mar 2011).
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. III-18 to III-38.
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2011): pp. A-1 to A-5.

Issues for Discussion

- Define the operational level of war; assess its role in U.S. military thought.
- Indicate how risk governs the application of operational ways and means to achieve strategic ends.
- Analyze the level of national interest effects the application of operational art.
- Assess whether 20th century operational art concepts apply to the current operating environment.
- In the current operating environment, determine if the operational level of war is compressed between the strategic and tactical level. If so, does this allow operational art to be practiced at the tactical level?

- Define the term “center of gravity,” and explain its relation to operational design and the operational level of war?
- Describe how the operational design elements help the commander and staff visualizes the operation.
- Considering their origins, examine the relevance of the principles of joint operations to the current operating environment.

Educational Objectives

1. Examine the operational level of war in relation to the strategic and tactical levels of war.
2. Examine the elements and application of operational art.
3. Assess the application and effects of the origins and maturation of operational art.
4. Discuss the elements of operational design and principles of joint operations.
5. Describe the relationship of the elements in operational design.

Lesson 2, Operational Design, introduces operational design as part of operational art and its application in the operational level of war. Commanders and their staffs will use operational design as part of conceptual planning to understand the environment and problem, and to develop a broad operational approach that would benefit functional and detailed planning.

Read:

- Lesson 2 Overview.
- 13 Critical Variables: Red Team Handbook.
- *Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design*, Ver. 1.0, (2011): pp. II-1 to II-9, III-3, III-8 to III-11, IV-1 to VI-10, and V-1 to V-16.
- *Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design*, Ver. 1.0, (2011): pp. VI-1 to VI-7.
- *A Systemic Concept for Operational Design*, J. Schmitt. pp. 20 to 26 and 33 to 43.
- *Case Study Slides for Destablia*, D. Major.

Issues for Discussion

- Compare and contrast creative thinking and critical thinking? Assess how each one will benefit the design process.
- Assess the use of systems theory in understanding of the environment and problem.
- Determine the benefits and drawbacks, if any, in conducting a COG analysis early in the stages of environmental framing.
- Describe how designers articulate the transformation of the current system to the desired system.
- Formulate how environmental framing and problem framing provide insights on the visualization of the operational approach.
- Describe the similarities or differences in John Schmitt’s design process as compared to the one in the *Planner’s Handbook for Operational Design*.
- Examine the operation design products from the vignette on Destablia. Can you identify other insights?
- Identify some of the benefits or drawbacks of causal loop modeling.

- Determine the utility of systems thinking to operational design.

Educational Objectives

1. Discuss the activities of operational design.
2. Describe the relationship of the activities in operational design.
3. Discuss the activities for developing an operational approach.
4. Describe techniques for visualizing an operational approach.
5. Discuss the process of systemic operational design.
6. Describe the process of developing a mental model.
7. Describe how to develop an operational approach from mental modeling.

Lesson 3, Operational Leadership, examines the characteristics that effective operational military leaders possess: understanding the operational environment, visualizing the operation, describing and directing the conduct of the operation, conducting effective battlefield decision-making, and exhibiting operational courage or resolve. In all cases, effective military leaders are creative, artistic, and thoroughly educated in the art and science of their profession.

Read and View:

- Overview, Lesson 3.
- *Mission Command White Paper*. CJCS. 3 Apr 2012.
- “Clausewitz and Military Genius.” T. H. Killon. *Military Review* (Jul-Aug 1995).
- “Operational Leadership” video lecture. Gen. Mattis. (2012).
- “Strategic Intuition and the Art of War.” COL L. Tooke and COL (ret.) R. Allen. *Military Review* (March-April 1995): pp.10 to 18.
- “General Lucas at Anzio.” M. Blumenson. Command Decisions Center of Military History United States Army (2002).

Issues for Discussion

- Compare and contrast the definition of mission command from MCDP 6, ADRP/FM 3-0, and the CJCS White Paper.
- Explain how modern commanders develop their coup d’oeil.
- Explain how creativity aids the commander in visualizing an operation.
- Referring to Gen Mattis’s presentation, explain how one develops an “intellectual shock absorber.”
- Referring to Gen Mattis’s presentation, explain how operational leaders develop the “vicious harmony of trust.”
- Explain how commanders develop their intuition.
- Summarize how a commander avoids a suicidal schism or making a decision on faulty intuition.
- Explain how commanders develop *fingerspitzengefühl*, or “fingertip feeling,” when information on opposing forces is not readily available.
- Explain the relationship between courage and creativity and determine how they influence one another?
- Referring to the reading, “General Lucas at Anzio,” assess the operational leadership characteristics of Lucas, Clark, and Alexander.
- Determine if GEN Lucas could have done anything different at Anzio considering the restrictions in resource and directed orders.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the foundations and key precepts of the law of war.
2. Evaluate how rules of engagement support the law of war.
3. Explain the process for operational decision-making.
4. Explain the process for operational decision-making.

Lesson 4, Campaigning, introduces the campaign, the elements of campaign planning, and its relationship to the operational level of war. Campaign design is an intellectual process where the commander takes strategic guidance, makes an estimate of the situation, and prepares a vision of the campaign to achieve the strategic objectives.

Read:

- Lesson 4 Overview.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. III-38 to III-44.
- “Discarding the Saber: An Assessment of the Utility of the Phasing Construct in Operational Campaign Design.” (2005) A Monograph by MAJ M. J Hovatter.
- *Cobra II* (2006). M. R. Gordon and Gen. B. E. Trainor: Ch. 2, 3, and pp. 66 to 75.

Issues for Discussion

- Identify some of the main factors of operational art, and how they relate to a military campaign.
- Are all campaigns joint in nature? Can there be an air or land campaign? Why or why not? Consider Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.
- Explain why the strategic objective is one of the most important considerations in campaign planning. Can it ever change and if so what are some of the reasons for change?
- Evaluate the importance of phasing in designing a campaign.
- Using to the article, “Discarding the Saber,” articulate whether or not recent conflicts fit the phasing construct described in joint doctrine.
- What was considered the end state in the campaign design of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM? Analyze whether or not the end state was achieved.
- Evaluate the U.S. Central Command’s campaign planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
- Identify how ROMO fits into campaign phasing.
- Prior to 2006, U.S. joint doctrine categorized military operations as either war or “other than war.” Summarize why doctrine has changed to emphasize a continuum of military operations vice a hard delineation.
- Identify the implications and ramifications of this change.

Educational Objectives

1. Discuss what a campaign is and its relationship to the operational level of war.
2. Explain the elements of campaign design, such as translating the strategic aim into concrete operational objectives, and the actions and sequencing/phasing necessary to obtain those objectives.
3. Explain the fundamentals of campaign planning/phasing.

4. Discuss the elements of campaign design, as practiced by Commander, U.S. Central Command during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
5. Evaluate the elements of campaign planning, as practiced by Commander, U.S. Central Command during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
6. Describe the range of military operations and be able to classify types of military operations.

Lesson 5, Joint Operation Planning, highlights the need for a single, unified planning and execution framework that translates individual Service terminology and operational policies into common language and operating procedures. Joint operation planning systems processes must be understood by all the Services to ensure the timely creation of operation plans and orders to be executed by joint forces.

Read:

- Lesson 5 Overview.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): II-11 to II-12.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. I-3 to I-4 and II-13 to II-34.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. IV-1 to IV-4.
- *Cobra II* (2006). M. R. Gordon and Gen. B. E. Trainor: Ch. 5 and 6.

Issues for Discussion

- Assess the necessity for a separate layered level of guidance from the President, SecDef, and CJCS to combatant commands for joint planning.
- Identify what other governmental agencies should be included in the JPEC and why.
- Indicate how APEX will be useful in the context of the current operating environment.
- Examine what effect multiple IPRs have on joint operation planning. Do they help or hurt?
- Analyze the necessity of having both a campaign plan and contingency plan(s)? Should the campaign plan include contingencies for Phases 0 through 5?
- Identify the ways in which operational design facilitate the JOPP.
- Identify the options for military leaders when strategic guidance for planning is in conflict with operational realities.
- Appraise how would APEX have affected the planning of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM? Consider the SecDef's position on troop strength and build up.

Educational Objectives

1. Discuss how national strategic direction influences joint planning.
2. Discuss the members of the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) in regards to planning and their relationship with supporting and supported commands.
3. Describe APEX deliberate planning and crisis action planning activities, functions, and products.
4. Compare and contrast deliberate and crisis action planning procedures, activities, and functions at the operational level of war.
5. Explain the seven steps of the joint operation planning process (JOPP).

6. Understand how strategic guidance can influence joint planning in the context of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Lesson 6, Conflict Termination and Resolution, introduces conflict termination and conflict resolution and shows their relationship to each other and the operational level of war. Successful conflict terminated is often more important to the final resolution than actual combat operations, it must enable a conflict resolution that leads to lasting peace and is consistent with U.S. national strategic objectives.

Read:

- Lesson 6 Overview
- MCDP 1-2, *Campaigning* (1997): pp. 50 to 52.
- “Planning for Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Success,” W. Flavin: *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): pp. 95 to 112.
- *Cobra II* (2006). M. R. Gordon and Gen. B. Trainor: pp. 138 to 163 and 457 to 474.
- *Cobra II* (2006). M. R. Gordon and Gen. B. Trainor: pp. 497 to 508 Epilog.

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze difficulties in determining criteria for conflict termination.
- Describe the relationship between conflict termination and conflict resolution.
- Concerning recent armed conflict, assess the success or failures of the U.S. in conflict resolution and reconciliation. Determine how the United States can improve upon these activities.
- Examine how operational design facilitates successful conflict termination and conflict resolution.
- Based on *Cobra II* and your knowledge of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, identify the contributing factors that disrupted post-conflict activities.
- Identify the areas to consider that may impact termination and resolution during the conduct of Phase III (dominate operations).
- Describe the ways that planning can facilitate reconciliation.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the differences and relationship between conflict termination and conflict resolution.
2. Explain the planning considerations used in preparing for conflict termination in a joint campaign.
3. Analyze the conflict termination and resolution conducted by Commander, U.S. Central Command during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.

Lesson 7, Information Operations, are critical during all phases of an operation. They include offensive actions against enemy information and information systems while defending friendly ones. As the U.S. and its allies try to obtain air, sea, and space superiority, information superiority should also be a similar goal.

Read and View:

- Lesson 7 Overview.

- Strategic Communication and Information Operations in DOD. R. Gates, SEC DEF (25 Jan 2011): pp. 1 to 3.
- JP 3-13, *Information Operations* (2006): pp. ix to xvi and I-I to I-5 (12 pages) **OR** “Intro to Information Operations” video lecture. Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) (Nov 2011).
- FM 3-0, *Operations* (2011): pp. 6-15 to 6-20.
- *Strategic Communication and Influence Operations: Do We Really Get It?* Dr. L. Rowland and Cdr. S. Tatham, RN. (Jul 2010) Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
- “Information Operations and Targeting” video lecture. Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) (Nov 2011).
- “Cyberspace and the First Battle in 21st Century War.” O. A. Miller and D. T. Kuel. *Defense Horizons* (Sep 2009): pp. 1 to 6.
- JP 3-13, *Information Operations* (2006): pp. VI-1 to VI-4.

Issues for Discussion

- Discuss the possible effects of IO on an enemy, with respect to the OODA loop and the “information hierarchy.”
- Discuss how informational superiority is or is not as important as land, air, sea, and space superiority.
- Give examples of any operations that you experienced that were influenced by basic IO planning principles and IO considerations. Assess the effectiveness of those operations in light of the IO planning considerations.
- Assess the effectiveness of the Army’s approach of dividing IO capabilities and responsibilities into inform/influence and cyber/electromagnetic activities.
- Identify how operational design benefits target audience analysis.
- Assess how target audience analysis benefits MISO and military deception operations.
- Assess some of the techniques concerning target audience analysis that the military can learn from civilian advertising industry.
- Identify the possible impacts on our computer network operations from cyber attacks or surveillance.
- Identify when and where you would consider operations in cyberspace during campaign phasing.
- Identify some of the key planning considerations when developing multinational IO plans.

Educational Objectives

1. Discuss how the observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) loop and the information hierarchy relate to information operations.
2. Discuss how informational superiority is critical to the operational commander.
3. Explain the basic joint doctrine concerning IO core capabilities, IO supporting capabilities, and IO related capabilities.
4. Describe the basic joint doctrine and planning considerations associated with IO.
5. Understand the importance of target audience analysis in performing successful information operations.

6. Discuss how state and non-state actors can pose a threat or undermine military operations through cyberspace.
7. Understand the basic doctrine and planning considerations associated with conducting multinational IO.

Lesson 8, Operational Design Practical Exercise, provides learners the opportunity to demonstrate what they have learned throughout the 8903 course. The end product of this exercise is a draft operational approach.

Read:

- Lesson 8 Overview.
- Intervention in the Republic of Bafonga.
- Country Facts of Bafonga.

Products for Development

Use the Operational Design form to produce:

- 13 Critical Variables in the Environmental Frame.
- The Problem Frame for the current, enemy, and desired systems.
- The Problem Statement.
- Complete the Mental Model for Port Lewis.
- An Operational Approach by lines of effort.
- An Operational Approach narrative.

Educational Objectives

1. Develop the products/results of the operational design practical exercise.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through four types of assessment activities: 16.8 points for multiple choice quizzes, 35 points for discussion contribution, 8.2 points for the practical exercise, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8904, Joint Operations

8904, *Joint Operations*, shows the complexities and potential methods involved in joint warfare, which emphasizes unified action and involves synchronizing and integrating joint and/or multinational military operations with the activities of local, state, and other government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and elements in the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Joint operations require commanders to understand the capabilities, limitations, and mandates of all the organizations involved; and then effectively communicate the mission of the joint force.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Foundations of Joint Operations	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Service Warfare	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Combatant Commands	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Joint Force Organization	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Interorganizational Coordination	4.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Higher-Level Staff Work	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Joint Functions	3.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Domestic Operations	3.8 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	32.7 hrs	28.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).		

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course's educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6		
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A
X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X

Course Overview

8904, *Joint Operations*, focuses on the organization and employment of joint forces by using recent historical examples, current joint doctrine, and discussions of how joint forces, other government agencies, and international participants interact. Overall, this improves the learner’s ability to derive operational insights about contemporary operating environments.

Lesson 1, Foundations of Joint Operations, reviews the circumstances leading to and following the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986, which dramatically changed the organization of U.S. military forces in joint operations. Its provisions and impacts are reviewed to provide context for assessing the current efficiency and effectiveness of the DOD and joint forces, and the potential for continued reform.

Read and View:

- Lesson 1 Overview.
- “The Mayaguez Incident: Near Disaster at Koh Tang,” (excerpt) Maj M. J. Toal, USMC, Marine Corps Command and Staff College (1998): pp. 1-2, 15-22, 43, 45.
- “Has it Worked? The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act,” (excerpt) J. R. Locher III, *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2001): pp. 1-4.
- “Building the Purple Ford,” R. P. Kozloski, *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2012): pp. 41-55 and 58-63.
- “Conformity Needs Competition,” M. T. Owens. *Armed Forces Journal* (Jun 2006): pp. 24-31.
- “Declining Defense Budgets and the End of ‘Jointness’,” M. T. Owens. *National Review Online* (July 27, 2012).
- “AirSea Battle – A Strategy of Tactics?” (blog) *Information Dissemination: The Intersection of Maritime Strategy and Strategic Communications*. Posted by Galrahn (September 23, 2011).
- “Iraq, Afghanistan Wars Have Widened Inter-Service Rifts,” S. I. Erwin. *National Defense* (May 2010): p. 9.
- “Joint Interdependence,” excerpt from *Army Doctrinal Pub 1, The Army*. (2012) pp. 3-8 and 3-9.
- DOD Organization and Joint Culture Overview: pp. 1-3.
- “The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Culture,” by M. J. Meese and I. Wilson III. *The National Security Enterprise – Navigating the Labyrinth* (2011): pp. 117-127 and 130-138.
- “Fulfilling the Promise: A Joint Corps for a Joint Military,” by LTC P. Darling, AK National Guard, and LT J. Lawlor, USNR. *Military Review* (May-June 2012): pp. 82-87.

- “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Joint Force 2020,” (video brief) LtGen G. Flynn, USMC, Joint Staff J-7 (Nov 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- Describe the issues within DOD in the 1970s and 80s that led to calls for reform. Be sure to include how and why the dysfunction within the U.S. military establishment occurred.
- The Owens’s article presents some contrasting terms regarding defense policy—Strategic Monism vs. Strategic Pluralism. Discuss the difference between the two and make a case for which is better suited for the contemporary security environment.
- Describe the positive and negative impacts the Goldwater-Nichols Act has had on the U.S. military establishment.
- The ADP 1 excerpt praises the virtues of joint interdependence. Contrast this with criticisms of a blind adherence to “jointness”.
- Explain how having two distinct branches of the chain of command reconciles with the principle of unity of command. Is this a contradiction? What are your thoughts on the appropriateness of this arrangement?
- Assess the need to foster joint culture in the military. Should a joint corps be established within the officer ranks?

Educational Objectives

1. Examine the political and military atmosphere that preceded the Goldwater-Nichols Act.
2. Analyze the effectiveness of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in light of the current national and international security environment.
3. Explain the basic organization of the DOD, Military Departments and Services.
4. Appraise the need for a joint culture among military leadership

Lesson 2, Service Warfare, presents an overview of the separate Services (active, reserve, and National Guard) and the capabilities, organization, and unique planning considerations needed for their employment within a joint force at the operational level. This lesson also examines some emerging concepts that will determine how Services and the joint forces will be structured and equipped in the future.

Read and View:

- Army Overview; pp. 1-3.
- FM 3, *Operations* (2008): pp. C-1 to C-8 and C-12 to C-13.
- Excerpt from “Maintaining the Combat Edge.” MG M. S. Tucker and MAJ J. P. Conroy, U.S. Army. *Military Review* (May-June 2011): pp. 11-16.
- “A Resource Constrained Environment: A Primer to Thinking About Force Structure Change.” *Military Review* (Nov-Dec 2011): pp. 10 to 17.
- Navy Overview; pp. 1-3.
- “Revitalizing the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” C. C. Moore II. *Parameters* (Summer 2011): pp. 49 to 61.
- “Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress.” R. O’Rourke. *Congressional Research Service Report* (Aug 10, 2012): pp. I & ii.

- “The Next War.” S. J. Freedburg, Jr. *Government Executive* (Aug 15, 2012): pp. 1-5.
- Coast Guard Overview; pp. 1-2.
- Coast Guard Publication 1, *U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian* (2009): pp. 16 to 17.
- “U.S. Coast Guard Rides Waves of Change.” G. I. Seffers. *Signal Magazine* (April 2011): pp. 41 to 43.
- Air Force Overview; pp. 1-3.
- Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine, Organization, and Command* (2011): pp. 58 to 69.
- “An Interview with Norton A. Schwartz.” Col W. T. Eliason, USAF Ret. *Joint Force Quarterly*, (4th Qtr 2011): pp. 8 to 12.
- The Total Force; pp. 1-4.
- “Views of the Commandant of the Coast Guard” video lecture, ADM R. J. Papp (28 Mar 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- What are the different roles and responsibilities a corps headquarters can fulfill? What are the issues associated with these different roles?
- Explain the Army’s decision to go to a modular force.
- Analyze the capabilities and options Navy forces bring to a JFC, and how these can be integrated into joint operations.
- Explain how the Navy’s more recent strategies reconcile with their Cold War paradigm of battling the Soviet fleet. Why do you suppose the Navy increasingly emphasizes partnering with the other Services?
- How does the Coast Guard tie into the national defense? What are the Coast Guard’s capabilities in national defense?
- Describe unique operational roles for the Coast Guard that are emerging at home and abroad.
- Describe the capabilities that USAF forces bring to a JFC, and how these can be integrated into joint operations.
- The Air Force has restructured and organized to conduct operations under the air expeditionary force (AEF) concept. What are the strengths and limitations of this approach?
- Summarize how important Total Force—reserve and active— involvement is in ensuring success of joint operations across the range of military operations.

Educational Objectives

1. Examine the roles, missions, organization, and capabilities of the U.S. Army, and how they integrate with joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
2. Identify the current and emerging operational and transformational concepts of the Army for the 21st Century.
3. Examine the roles, missions, organization, and capabilities of the U.S. Navy, and how they integrate with joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

4. Identify the current and emerging operational and transformational concepts of the Navy for the 21st Century.
5. Examine the roles, missions, organization, and capabilities of the U.S. Coast Guard, and how they integrate with joint and multinational forces at operational level of war.
6. Identify the current and emerging operational and transformational concepts of the U.S. Coast Guard for the 21st Century.
7. Examine the roles, missions, organization, and capabilities of the U.S. Air Force, and how they integrate with joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
8. Identify the current and emerging operational and transformational concepts of the Air Force for the 21st Century.
9. Examine the roles, missions, organization, and capabilities of the Total Force, and how they integrate with joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

Lesson 3, Combatant Commands, covers the unique contributions of both the geographic and functional combatant commands, and the authorities of a combatant command. Numerous proposals to modify combatant command organization and authorities are also offered.

Read:

- Overview of the Organization and Structure of the Combatant Commands: pp. 1-7.
- Compilation of excerpts from various Combatant Commander websites (2012).
- USSOCOM Posture Statement 2012: pp. 1 to 4.
- USSOCOM Fact Book (2012): pp. 8, 11, 14-22, and 48.
- Assessing the Need for Change to the Combatant Commands Overview: p. 1.
- Excerpt from “Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power.” M. J. Thompson. *Parameters* (Winter 2005-06): pp. 64 to 66 and 73-74.
- “Time to Rethink Our Global Command Structure?” D. Passage. *Small Wars Journal* (2008) (online article).
- Excerpt from “Building the Purple Ford,” R. P. Kozloski, *Naval War College Review* (Autumn 2012): pp. 55-58.
- Excerpt from “The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress,” A. Feickert, *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, (Jul 17, 2012): pp. 56-61.
- Excerpt from “The Amazing Expanding Pentagon,” T. Cambanis, *Boston Globe* (May 27, 2012).
- “More Than Good Intentions: AFRICOM, Between American Ambition and African Suspicion,” Dr. El-Rayah A. Osman, *Military Intelligence* (Jan-Mar 2012): pp. 21-26
- “Rethinking the Geographic Combatant Commands,” E. Marks, *Interagency Journal* (Fall 2010): pp. 19-23.

Issues for Discussion

- Appraise the responsibilities of the combatant commanders. Which are most important?

- Analyze the functional combatant commands. Are they properly organized and resourced to effectively execute their missions?
- According to many of the readings, the design of the combatant commands should be drastically changed to better serve our national objectives. Evaluate these proposed modifications. What parts of them make sense? Which are incorrect or based on faulty assumptions?
- Do you feel that the establishment of USAFRICOM has been an effective use of U.S. resources and has generally advanced U.S. interests in the region?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the combatant commands by type and design.
2. Assess the functions and assigned responsibilities of combatant commanders.
3. Analyze the utility of the current combatant command construct and assess proposals to modify it.

Lesson 4, Joint Force Organization, discusses how joint forces are organized for operations. It describes types of doctrinal command relationships, the assignment and transfer of forces, and basic organization of joint operational areas. Joint force commanders must know the capabilities and limitations of their forces, so they can integrate and synchronize operations and apply force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat the enemy.

Read:

- Joint Force Command and Control: pp. 1-10.
- “Command Relationships” G. E. Katsos. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (4th Qtr 2011): pp. 153 to 155.
- “Evolution of Headquarters for the SSTR Mission in Iraq” Rand Arroyo Center Study (2010): pp. 31-34.
- “Thoughts on Force Design in an Era of Shrinking Defense Budgets” D. A. MacGregor. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (4th Qtr 2011): pp. 21 to 29.
- “Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization,” M. P. Noonan and M. R. Lewis. *Parameters* (Autumn 2003): pp. 35 to 45.
- Command Relations of Functional Forces, pp. 1-3.
- Excerpt from Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020: pp. 6-7.
- JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (2011): pp. III-1 to III-13.
- “Employment of Functional Components”, USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center’s *Joint Operations Insights & Best Practices, 3rd Ed.* (Jan 2011): pp. 32 to 34.
- Assignment and Transfer of Forces; pp. 1-4.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. H-1 to H-2 and H-4 to H-5.
- Organization of the Operational Areas; pp. 1-4.

Issues for Discussion

- Describe the common command relationships combatant commanders receive from the Secretary of Defense, through the CJCS, to control forces in their theater.
- Analyze the following statement: the underlying rationale for a JTF is to ensure each Service is equally represented.

- What are some of the considerations a JFC must take into account when deciding how to organize a joint force (by Service, by function, by mission capability package, etc.)?
- In a supported/supporting relationship, explain the responsibilities of the establishing authority, supported commander, and the supporting commander.
- Discuss the considerations involved in determining command relationships that best leverage special operations forces.
- Explain the relationship between the different categories of force availability for planning and conducting joint operations.
- Explain the difference between an amphibious objective area and an area of operations.
- Appraise the need to divide the battlespace into different operational areas. Why is it necessary?

Educational Objectives

1. Compare the command relationships of combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, and support. Assess these relationships, with regard to responsibility versus authority.
2. Examine the structure and command relationships within a joint task force.
3. Analyze doctrinal and conceptual methods to organize joint forces.
4. Describe command and control options available to the Joint Force Commander for high demand/low density functional forces within a theater of operations.
5. Analyze the availability of forces for planning and conducting joint operations and the documents that provide them.
6. Describe the primary types of joint operating areas used at the operational level of war.

Lesson 5, Interorganizational Coordination, discusses operational integration of various agencies and organizations external to the DOD, with the main focus on understanding other agencies' cultures, so they can work together towards operational objectives. This lesson also addresses embassy teams, provisional reconstruction teams, and other joint interagency entities, highlighting the dynamics involved in working with disparate organizations. Multinational planning considerations, command and control (C2), and command structure are also reviewed.

Read and View:

- Interorganizational Overview: pp. 1-4.
- Excerpt from "Why Interagency Operations and Reform Are Hard To Do." R. W. Stewart. *The Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute 2008 Military History Symposium* (2008): pp. 162 to 163.
- Excerpt from "National Security and the Interagency Enterprise: A Critical Analysis." J. C. Vara. *Marine Corps War College Papers 2010* (2010): pp. 32-38.
- "Taking Stock: Interagency Integration in Stability Operations." C. R. Earle. *PRISM* 3, No. 2 (Mar 2012): pp. 37-50.
- "Interorganizational Coordination Insights & Best Practices; Focus paper 3, 3d Ed." Joint Warfighting Center Joint Training Branch (Jun 2011): pp. 9-20.

- Excerpt from “Civil-Military Teaming: A Solution?” W. J. Flavin. *Conflict Management and “Whole of Government”: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy?* (2012): pp. 310-311 and 317-336.
- Multinational Operations Overview: pp. 1-3.
- Excerpt from “Non-Traditional Military Missions.” MGen A. C. Zinni. *Perspectives On Warfighting* (6)—*Capital “W” War: A Case for Strategic Principles of War* (1998). Dr. J. Strange: pp. 262 to 266.
- “Multinational Command Relationship: Part II of III,” G. E. Katsos. *Joint Force Quarterly* (2nd Qtr 2012): pp. 102-104.
- “C2 of U.S. Forces and Multinational Command Structures,” monograph compiled by course director from various sources, pp. 1-4.
- “My Clash with the NATO Chief.” Gen Sir M. Jackson, British Army. *The Telegraph* (04 Sep 2007): pp. 1-6.
- “General Zinni on Interagency Reform,” video lecture, Gen Zinni’s address to Army Command and General Staff College (2009).
- “LtGen Zinni’s Insights into Coalition Operations,” video lecture, LtGen A. Zinni’s comments to the Joint Forces Staff College (1998).

Issues for Discussion

- Within the U.S. government, what significant barriers to interagency operations currently exist? Expound on why this is so.
- Assess how the U.S. Government is faring in the achievement of interagency integration. Describe the changes that you feel are necessary to improve interagency operations abroad.
- Assess the utility of in-theater organizations that have been/are employed by operational commanders and staffs to organize, plan, and execute interagency operations.
- Which of the doctrinal command structures used in multinational operations best describes the contemporary organization depicted in the attachment? Is this the best C2 structure given the current threat and multinational environment? Why or why not?
- Discuss the command authority considerations involved in U.S. forces being subordinated to a multinational commander. Alternately, how are these considerations different when a U.S. officer is the multinational force commander?

Educational Objectives

1. Summarize the obstacles to interagency integration and past attempts, successful or unsuccessful, to overcome them.
2. Analyze the overseas mission capabilities of the U.S. government and appraise ideas to reform in this arena.
3. Examine how combatant commands conduct interagency coordination and operations.
4. Classify and appraise the command and control structures used in multinational operations.
5. Analyze command relationship considerations of U.S. forces and leaders within a multinational force.

Lesson 6, Higher-Level Staff Work, focuses on joint knowledge and professional skills a joint staff officer needs to succeed. The organization of higher-level staffs is reviewed, as well as lessons learned from recent studies on staff work. Information management and the use of technology for staff work are also addressed.

Read and View:

- Staff Fundamentals: pp. 1-4.
- *Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and Action Guide*. Joint Staff J-7 JETD. (2011): pp. 14-17, 31-35, 113-115, and 125-126.
- *Joint Staff Correspondence Preparation*. Joint Staff. (June 2008): pp. B-69 and B-73.
- “Essay: Dumb-dumb bullets.” Col. T.X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.). *Armed Forces Journal* (July 2009): pp. 1 to 3.
- “Action Officer Keys to Success.” Maj G. C. Lehman, USMC. *Marine Corps Gazette* (April 2001): pp. 60-65.
- Some Operational Staffwork Considerations: p. 1
- “Burnout: Staff Exhaustion.” MAJ S.H. Bales, USA. *Military Review* (Jul-Aug 2008): pp. 82-86.
- “The Nature of Combatant Command Teams,” from *Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and Action Guide*. Joint Staff J-7 JETD. (2011): pp. 81-85.
- “Joint Headquarters Organization, Staff Integration, and Battle Rhythm.” Joint Warfighting Center Insights & Best Practices Focus Paper 7, JWFC Joint Training Division (March 2011): pp. 3-15.
- “Maximizing Technology Software and Hardware in the Combatant Commands,” from *Joint Officer Handbook Staffing and Action Guide*. Joint Staff J-7. (2011): pp. 69-76.
- “USSOUTHCOM Staff Organization JTF-Haiti.” Excerpt from *USSOUTHCOM and JTF-Haiti... Some Challenges and Considerations in Forming a Joint Task Force*. Joint Center for Operational Analysis (Jun 2010): pp. 2-4, 8, and 18.
- “The Joint Staff/TTPs for Higher Level Staff Officers,” by BGen J. Dunford, USMC, Vice Director for Operations, Joint Staff J-3 (Nov 2007).
- “Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) Joint Force 2020”, audio excerpt LtGen G. Flynn, USMC, Joint Staff J-7, to Command and Staff College (12 May 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- Describe the boards, bureaus, cells, centers, and working groups construct. How do these nodes reconcile with the traditional Napoleonic staff sections?
- Identify and explain three ideas or techniques from the readings or viewing that you feel are particularly useful for a staff officer.
- Analyze the relationship between centers, working groups, OPTs, and decision boards.
- Assess how our use of technology both hinders and helps staff operations.

Educational Objectives

1. Assess different methods of staff organization.
2. Analyze best practices to employ as a joint staff officer.

3. Explain the structure and relationships of a higher level staff in an operational environment.
4. Examine the limitations imposed and opportunities provided by information technology from the perspective of a higher-level staff officer.

Lesson 7, Joint Functions, introduces the concept of joint functions, which are similar to the Marine Corps warfighting functions. These functions help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. The joint functions include sustainment; intelligence; fires; command and control; movement and maneuver; and protection.

Read and View:

- Intelligence and Fires Overview: pp. 1-9.
- “Integrating Intelligence and Information: Ten Points for the Commander”. LTG Michael T. Flynn & BG Charles A. Flynn, USA. *Military Review* (Jan-Feb 2012): pp. 4-8.
- *Executive Summary, Intelligence Operations at the Operational Level*. The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Training Division. (Apr 2011): p. 2.
- *Libya: Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) Executive Summary*. The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis section of the Joint Staff. (Sep 2011): pp. i-3 and 9-15.
- “Forging Jointness Under Fire”. B. S. Lamberth. *Joint Force Quarterly* (3rd Qtr 2012): pp. 48-53.
- Logistics Overview: pp. 1-5.
- JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (2008): pp. I-9 to I-10.
- JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (2007): pp.V-6 to V-7.
- “Operational Logistics” from *Sustainment Operations Focus Paper 10*. The Joint Warfighting Center’s Joint Training Branch. (June 2011): pp. 7-12.
- “Getting There is Half the Battle.” BG P. J. Donahue II and LTC F. Wombie, USA (Ret.), *Armed Force Journal* (Oct 2011): pp. 1-4.
- “Operational Contract Support: Five Things Every Field Grade Officer Should Know.” LTC W. C. LATHAM, Jr. USA (Ret.) *Military Review* (May-Jun 2012): pp. 16-18.
- “Haiti Disaster Relief: Logistics is the Operation.” Col. J. A. Vohr. *Military Review*. (Jul-Aug 2011): pp. 76-82.
- Command and Control Overview: pp. 1-2.
- “Command and Control must become Command and Feedback, says Mattis.” A. Corrin. *Defense Systems* (Aug 19, 2009): p. 1.
- “Section Four: Command and Control” *Libya: Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) Executive Summary*. The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis section of the Joint Staff. (Sep 2011): pp. 22-29 and 34-36.
- Movement & Maneuver and Protection Overview: p.1.
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2011): pp. III-27 to III-29.
- “Executive Summary: Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers.” W. S. Cohen. Air Force Khobar Report (1997): pp. 1 to 3.
- “Joint Functions,” video lecture, LtGen G. Flynn, USMC, Joint Staff J-7, to Marine Corps University (30 Nov 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- How does the joint force integrate national- and theater-level intelligence capabilities to support operating requirements?
- Assess concepts offered in the readings to improve in-theater intelligence effectiveness.
- Examine some of the intelligence- and fires-related challenges experienced by the coalition during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. What could have been done differently to preclude or mitigate these difficulties?
- Contrast the relationship between Israeli air and ground elements during Operation CHANGE OF DIRECTION and Operation CAST LEAD. What do you see as the key driver for positive change in this relationship between 2006 and 2008?
- Explain the various sustainment authorities and agreements mentioned in the readings (DAFL, CUL, EA, ISSA, ACSA), highlighting any relationships that exist between them.
- Explain the utility of the JRSOI principles—unity of command, synchronization, and balance—in operation. How are these principles manifested during JRSOI?
- Assess the efficacy of establishing a joint functional component command for logistics (i.e., a joint logistics command reporting to the JTF Commander). When might it be most appropriate to do so?
- Appraise efforts to overcome command and control challenges that resulted from cross-combatant command seams, shared command roles, compressed timelines, and involvement of coalition partners during Operation ODYSSEY DAWN.
- Identify the tasks inherent in the joint function of movement and maneuver, and differentiate between the strategic and operational levels of movement and maneuver.
- Explain the importance of protection, citing some of the measures joint forces use to achieve it and offering your opinion on the degree to which protection should outweigh all other operational imperatives.

Educational Objectives

1. Examine the intelligence responsibilities, functions, and relationships among the national-level agencies, combatant commands, and joint task forces.
2. Analyze the capabilities and limitations of joint intelligence support for military operational requirements.
3. Assess efforts to employ joint fires in recent operations.
4. Categorize and examine logistics authorities that enable the joint force commander to properly execute his logistics responsibility in the joint operating area (JOA).
5. Explain and evaluate the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) process.
6. Analyze command relationship considerations of sustainment forces.
7. Analyze command and control considerations in support of joint operations.
8. Summarize how JFCs apply the joint function of movement and maneuver in the conduct of joint operations.
9. Summarize how JFCs apply the joint function of protection in the conduct of joint operations.

Lesson 8, Domestic Operations, addresses domestic operations that involve the use of military forces, to include homeland security, homeland defense, and defense support of civil authority (DSCA). The focus of the materials is to provide the background knowledge necessary for officers to serve in support of civil authorities.

Read and View:

- Domestic Operations Overview: pp. 1-4.
- *DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support* (2005): pp. 5 and 7-9.
- Posse Comitatus - "Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations," B. Civins. *Small Wars Journal* (Mar 6, 2011): pp. 3-5.
- "A Mission Right on Constitutional Border" B. Bender. *Boston Globe*, (Oct 21, 2012): pp. 1-3.
- "Homeland Defense/Civil Support Missions," T.M. Brooks, M. Hura, and T.D. Young, *Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities*, a RAND Arroyo Center Study (2010): pp. 36-39.
- "Homeland Prep: Q & A with Paul N. Stockton, Asst Sec Def for Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs" *The Officer* (Jul-Aug 2011), pp. 36-38 and 40-41.
- "Disaster Response Staff Officer's Handbook" *Center for Army Lessons Learned*, (Dec 2010): pp. 13-14, 17-20, 27-34, 36-37, and 41-45.
- "Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities During Disasters" *U.S. Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Requesters*, (Mar 2010): pp. 1-9.
- "Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations" H. S. Blum and K. McIntyre, *Strategic Studies Institute External Research Associates Program*, (Apr 2012): pp. 5-10.
- "Domestic Consequence Management," slides with speaker notes (no audio) (Apr 2012).
- "DSCA," audio briefing, COL T. R. Williams, Defense Coordinating Officer for FEMA Region III (17 Apr 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- Discriminate between homeland security and homeland defense. What are their similarities and differences? Are DOD roles appropriately established for each?
- Describe the National Response Framework (NRF), highlighting any parallels between it and JOPES/APEX/military planning.
- Explain the considerations involved in the DOD committing forces to a Defense Support to Civilian Authorities (DSCA) mission? Is the process effective?
- Describe how USNORTHCOM is organized and assess their ability to respond to domestic events.
- Appraise the role of the National Guard in domestic operations. Is their chain of command appropriate to address contemporary threats?
- Summarize shortcomings and/or emerging improvements highlighted in the readings pertaining to how our military integrates its capabilities with those of the interagency for domestic operations. What should be done to facilitate more integrated responses in the future?

Educational Objectives

1. Explain the critical distinctions between homeland security and homeland defense.
2. Examine the strategic guidance and operational arrangements contained in the National Response Framework (NRF) and other key documents related to domestic operations.
3. Comprehend the relationships that exist between DOD entities and federal, state, and local authorities during domestic support operations.
4. Describe how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and interagency operations in the context of domestic support operations.
5. Appraise the considerations for employing joint forces at the operational level in a domestic support context.
6. Assess the challenges of, and opportunities for, interagency coordination within the context of domestic support operations.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, 40 points for discussion contribution, and 40 points for the final examination—which consists of one information paper and one position paper—or a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8905, Small Wars

8905, *Small Wars*, provides a foundation for analyzing and applying the doctrine and lessons learned from past and current small wars to the future small wars environments of the 21st century. Learners will apply analytical thought to various characteristics of small wars and conduct a more structured study of several different small wars environments—humanitarian assistance, peace operations, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and stability operations.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Introduction to Small Wars	3.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Culture in Small Wars	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Ethics in Small Wars	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Stability Operations	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations	3.9 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Insurgency	4.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Counterinsurgency	5.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Transnational Threats and Terrorism	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	34.9 hrs	28.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).		

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course's educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6		
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C
X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X				X		X

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5	
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A	
X		X	X			X		X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

Course Overview

8905, *Small Wars*, covers the characteristics and operational environments of small wars—contingencies and crises that fall short of major war. The course uses historical and current case studies, lessons learned, and current doctrine to improve the learner’s knowledge of small wars environments and their ability to contribute to planning and executing small wars operations.

Lesson 1, Introduction to Small Wars, introduces the operational environment of the various small wars missions typically assigned to the U.S. armed forces. These environments are addressed from both the Marine Corps and joint perspectives. Additionally, this lesson introduces the Philippine War Case Study, which is intertwined in several of the course lessons.

Read and View:

- Lesson 1 Overview.
- FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual* (1940): pp. 1 to 16.
- “The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual: An Old Solution to a New Challenge?” Dr. N. J. Schlosser. *Fortitudine*, (2010): pp. 4 to 9.
- *The Joint Operational Environment (JOE) 2010*: pp. 66 to 68.
- *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operations Concept*, (version 2.0, 2010): pp. 14 to 24.
- “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges.” Frank G. Hoffman. *Joint Force Quarterly* (2009): pp. 34 to 39.
- “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature and Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” video excerpt. Gen. A. Zinni, Joint Force Staff College (1998).
- “The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare.” J. M. Gates (2002) **OR** “The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare” audio lecture. J. M. Gates (2002).

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze how the Marine Corps’ view of small wars, as stated in the *Small Wars Manual*, pertains to today’s operational environments.
- Evaluate the limitations inherent in the *Small Wars Manual*, as discussed in Dr. Schlosser’s article “The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual: An Old Solution to a New Challenge?” Is the manual limited as doctrine, having been produced during the era of interventions in Central America and the Caribbean in the early 1900s?
- Evaluate the similarities in how the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* and *Small Wars Manual* assess the complexities of small wars. What are some the differences in scope between these two documents.

- Based on the readings from the *JOE 2010*, Frank Hoffman’s assessment of “hybrid wars,” and General Zinni’s video, analyze the strategic and operational imperatives upon which the U.S. military must focus to achieve success in current and future small wars.
- Evaluate how positive and negative aspects of counterinsurgency efforts learned during the Philippine War can be applied to current and future small wars.
- Evaluate how the reform orientation of the army's leaders, as described by Gates during the Philippine War, reflects precepts within the Small Wars Manual and the Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept in addressing irregular threats.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the definition of small wars and the characteristics of these types of operations.
2. Evaluate the Marine Corps’ historical perspective on small wars within the *Small Wars Manual* and in the article by Dr. Schlosser “The Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual: An Old Solution to a New Challenge?”
3. Analyze the nature of small wars and why they are so difficult to categorize within a strategic or joint construct.
4. Analyze the impact that U.S. capabilities and national security interests have on U.S. involvement in small wars.
5. Analyze the different small wars operational environments, from a joint perspective, in which U.S. forces will likely be deployed in the future.
6. Analyze the positive and negative aspects of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts on the outcome of the Philippine War and the applicability of those aspects to current and future small wars.

Lesson 2, Culture in Small Wars, highlights the importance of understanding the underlying cultural conditions in an area of operations, including an awareness of cultural codes and networks connecting various parts of society. This module focuses on operational culture and approaches the Marine Corps has adopted historically in addressing culture in planning and executing small wars operations.

Read:

- Lesson 2 Overview.
- FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual*, pp. 17 to 19.
- *Operational Culture for the Warfighter: Principles and Application* (2008). B. A. Salmoni and P. Holmes-Eber: pp. 36 to 48.
- “Culture Warriors: Marine Corps Organizational Culture and Adaptation to Cultural Terrain.” Major B. Connable. *Fortitudine*, (2010): pp. 4 to 9.
- “Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture.” J. B. Cozzens. *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Qtr 2009): pp. 1 to 6.
- “Counterinsurgency and Military Culture: State Regulars Verses Non-State Irregulars.” R. M. Cassidy. *Baltic Security and Defense Review*, (2008), pp. 73 to 80.
- *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for US Armed Forces Deploying to Arab and Middle Eastern Countries* (2006). LTC W. D. Wunderle, U.S. Army: pp. 57 to 62 and 71 to 82.

- “Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature and Need for Cultural Awareness and Flexible Thinking,” (video excerpt). Gen. A. Zinni, Joint Force Staff College (1998).
- “U.S. Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from the Philippine War.” T. Donnelly and V. Serchuk. *American Enterprise Institute’s Online National Security Outlook* (Nov 2003): pp. 1 to 9.

Issues for Discussion

- Based on the excerpt from Operational Culture for the Warfighter and Major Connable’s article, analyze whether the Marine Corps effectively applies operational culture at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- Based on Cozzen’s article “Victory from the Prism of Jihadi Culture,” evaluate how effectively the U.S. military has applied cultural comprehension to the type of “expressive warfare” conducted by al Qaeda.
- Evaluate Robert Cassidy’s and General Zinni’s assertions that the U.S. military was culturally adverse to engaging in small wars over the last several decades.
- Does the institutional culture of the U.S. military impede or facilitate its ability to conduct small wars in current operating environments? Evaluate how effectively the U.S. military incorporates cultural awareness and comprehension into training and operations. Can we improve this process?
- Evaluate whether the American military culture was helpful or detrimental to the success of the Philippine War.
- Analyze the cultural lessons learned during the Philippine War that are relevant and applicable to today’s small wars environment. Are we repeating the same mistakes?

Educational Objectives

1. Evaluate the evolution and concepts of operational culture and its influence on military actions.
2. Analyze how cultural awareness impacts operations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
3. Analyze how the U.S. military’s institutional culture facilitates or impedes its ability to conduct small wars.
4. Evaluate the function of cultural intelligence within the planning and decision-making processes.
5. Analyze the significant aspects of culture that impacted strategy and operations during the Philippine War.
6. Analyze the relevance of the cultural lessons learned during the Philippine War as they may be applied in 21st century small wars environments.

Lesson 3, Ethics in Small Wars, presents an overview of Just War theory and how this theory evolved. This overview is followed by a discussion of the Law of War and the ethical responsibilities of U.S. forces operating in small wars environments, as well as during conventional conflicts.

Read:

- Lesson 3 Overview.
- FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual*, pp. 43-46.

- “The Law of War.” *Operational Law Handbook*. (2008). Judge Advocate’s Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, Charlottesville, VA: pp. 11 to 16 and 73 to 77.
- “Ethical Challenges in Contemporary Conflict: The Afghanistan and Iraq Cases.” (2004). LtGen J. N. Mattis, USMC: transcribed lecture, pp. 7-28.
- “Moral, Ethical, and Psychological Preparation of Soldiers and Units for Combat.” (2010). BGen H. R. McMaster, USA: transcribed lecture: pp. 7 to 15 and 17 to 19.
- “Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism.” M. H. Hoffman. *Parameters* (Summer 2005): pp. 18 to 34.

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze the key elements of the law of war and determine the ethical obligations these precepts pose to commanders in small wars.
- Based on the excerpts from the *Operational Law Handbook*, determine how ROE support the law of war in small wars.
- Evaluate whether the U.S. effectively prepares military forces to adhere to the law of war and ethical standards in current small wars, based on Generals Mattis’ and McMaster’s insights. How can we prepare commanders for the ethical challenges they will face in future small wars?
- In the article, “Rescuing the Law of War: A Way Forward in an Era of Global Terrorism,” evaluate Michael H. Hoffman’s arguments regarding ethical and legal application of the law of war to transnational actors and terrorists. What are the implications of his arguments at the strategic level for current and future small wars operations?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the foundations and key precepts of the law of war.
2. Evaluate how rules of engagement support the law of war.
3. Evaluate how U.S. forces apply the law of war in adhering to ethical conduct in small wars.
4. Evaluate the ethical challenges facing commanders in small wars conflicts.

Lesson 4, Stability Operations, addresses stability operations in small wars and the major political, legal, and planning factors that impact the conduct of these operations. This lesson focuses on the overarching doctrine and policies governing stability operations, offers insights into stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and addresses the criticality of interagency coordination within these operations.

Read:

- Lesson 4 Overview.
- JP 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2011): pp. I-1 to I-9 and I-16 to I-22.
- Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations” (Nov 2005): pp. 1 to 11.
- “National Security Presidential Directive-44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization” (7 Dec 2005): pp. 1 to 6.
- “Post 9/11 Stability Operations: How U.S. Army Doctrine is Shaping National Security Strategy.” C. Zoli and N. J. Armstrong. *Prism*, (Dec 2010): pp. 101 to 116.

- Transition to Stability Operations in Iraq: A Case Study. LTC B. Davis, B. Baylor, R. Goehring, and J. Burington. Joint Center for Operational Analysis, U.S. Joint Forces Command. (2011): pp. 1 to 13.
- “Stabilization Operations: A Successful Strategy for Postconflict Management.” J. P. Terry. *Joint Force Quarterly*, (3rd Qtr, 2010): pp. 45-47.
- “Stab Ops in Afghanistan: The District Stability Framework: An Interagency, Effects-Based Planning Methodology.” Col. S. Nordhoff, USMCR. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Oct 2011), pp. 28-30.
- “Narrowing the Gap: DoD and Stability Operations.” Col. D. W. Shin, USA. *Military Review* (April 2009): pp. 23 to 29.

Issues for Discussion

- Evaluate how our doctrine and policies for conducting stability operations support planning and execution of small wars.
- Analyze how military planners can achieve unified action and improve civil-military coordination in support of stability operations.
- Analyze whether changes must be made to U.S. military capabilities and structure to address stability operations in small wars in the future. Does our doctrine force the U.S. military into roles for which it is not suited in support of stability operations?
- Evaluate whether U.S. stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are applicable to stability operations in future small wars.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the definition of stability operations and its application to small wars.
2. Evaluate the political-military nuances and complexity of problems associated with stability operations.
3. Analyze the importance of timely inter-organizational and multinational coordination in stability operations.
4. Evaluate the requirements that affect the employment of military forces in stability operations.

Lesson 5, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations, introduces humanitarian assistance operations and the importance of interorganizational coordination and collaboration. The lesson provides overviews of three foreign humanitarian operations to illustrate their complexity. The coverage of peace operations includes an overview of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention. Also, a comparison of two peace operations is conducted to analyze factors that impact peace operations.

Read and View:

- Lesson 5 Overview.
- JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (2009): pp. I-1 to I-8.
- “Foreign Disaster Response: Joint Task Force Haiti Observations.” LtGen P. K. Keen, LTC M. G. Elledge, LTC C. W. Nolan, LTC J. L. Kimmey. *Military Review* (Dec 2010): pp. 85 to 96.
- “Logistics Planning and Collaboration in Complex Relief Operations.” S. J. Romano. *Joint Force Quarterly* (3rd Qtr, 2011): pp. 96 to 103.

- “U.S. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: Keys to Success in Pakistan.” K. J. Braithwaite. *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Qtr 2007): pp. 19 to 22.
- JP 3-07.3, *Peace Operations* (17 October 2007): pp. I-1 to I-17.
- *Charter of the United Nations*: Chapters VI and VII.
- “A New Way to Wage Peace: U.S. Support to Operation Stabilize.” Major Craig A. Collier. *Military Review* (Jan/Feb 2001): pp. 2 to 9.
- “The Last Just Man” (edited video). *Turning Points of History* (2002). Sundance Channel.

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze the complexities and political sensitivities that the Services face when conducting FHA operations. How do we overcome these challenges?
- Evaluate whether the military is appropriately trained, resourced, and equipped to conduct FHA operations.
- Compare and contrast the characteristics that led to successes or failures in HA operations in Haiti, Georgia, and Pakistan.
- Evaluate the political, social, military, and environmental factors that should be addressed by U.S. political and military leadership prior to engaging in FHA operations.
- According to JP 3-07.3, distinguish the five types of peace operations and evaluate what missions the U.S. military can expect to be assigned when supporting these different types of operations. Are there peace operations the U.S. military cannot or should not perform?
- Compare and contrast the fundamentals of peace operations. Do any of the fundamentals for peace operations significantly stand out as being the most critical to facilitate the success of the five types of peace operations?
- Analyze the lessons learned from peace operations in Rwanda and East Timor, and how those lessons apply to future peace operations. Was General Dallaire morally, ethically, or legally obligated to the UN policies and decisions in addressing events in Rwanda?
- Assess the similarities and differences between FHA and PO at the operational and strategic levels of war.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze how military forces work with civilian organizations to accomplish humanitarian assistance operations.
2. Evaluate the political/military sensitivities involved in humanitarian assistance operations.
3. Analyze the scope and challenges of humanitarian assistance operations based on current doctrine and historical examples.
4. Evaluate the level of effectiveness of the application of all instruments of national power as illustrated by previous HA operations in which the U.S. participated.
5. Evaluate the different types of peace operations and describe the differences between these operations.
6. Analyze the fundamentals of peace operations and describe the key documents that guide peace operations.
7. Analyze the scope and characteristics of peace operations based on historical operations, and describe the environment in which they occur.

8. Compare and contrast similarities and differences between foreign humanitarian assistance and peace operations.

Lesson 6, Insurgency, introduces the characteristics of insurgencies based on historical and current conflicts. It also addresses the impact insurgents and insurgencies have on influencing national security strategy, associated counterterrorism strategy, and joint military organizational structures and doctrine. Through the exploration of various insurgent leaders and their organizations, a foundation will be established to effectively address counterinsurgency in Lesson 7.

Read:

- Lesson 6 Overview.
- MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (2006): pp. 1-2 to 1-19.
- JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2009): pp. II-20 to II-21.
- “Resolving Insurgencies.” T. R. Mockaitis. Strategic Studies Institute. (Jun 2011): pp. 6 to 11.
- *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. D. Kilcullen. Oxford University Press (2009): pp. 34 to 39.
- “The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One.” D. Kilcullen. Australian National University Public Lecture Series. (2009).
- “Deep Inside the Insurgent’s Mind: Past the Motorcycle Diaries Towards Understanding Che Guevara.” Hugues Esquerre. *Small Wars Journal*. (14 Aug 2010): pp. 1 to 12.
- “A Federal Volunteer Regiment in the Philippine Insurrection: The History of the 32nd Infantry (United States Volunteers), 1899 to 1901.” *The Philippine Insurrection*. Major J. R. Craig. (2006): pp. 24 to 30.
- *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*. “Attraction and Chastisement.” M. Boot. (2002): pp. 109 to 114.
- “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis.” Majors S. Afsar, C. Samples, and T. Wood. *Military Review*. (May/June 2008): pp. 58 to 68.
- “Struggle Against Global Insurgency.” D. Cox. *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Qtr 2010): pp. 135 to 139.
- “The Dangers of Mistaking Coherence for Capability.” M. Moser. *Joint Force Quarterly* (1st Qtr 2010): pp. 140 to 143.

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze how insurgent approaches assist in the mobilization of insurgencies and the framing of the conflict. What approaches to insurgency did we witness in Iraq and Afghanistan?
- Evaluate David Kilcullen's thesis regarding the "accidental guerilla syndrome" based on analysis of his four models of the current global environment. Does his analysis support or differ from the contemporary approaches on insurgency discussed in MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*?
- Evaluate how the role of core grievances, ideology, and effectiveness of leadership among Guevara’s, Aguinaldo’s, and Mullar Omar’s Taliban insurgencies facilitated insurgent’s strategic goals.

- Analyze the commonalities and differences between the Cuban, Philippine, and Taliban insurgencies. Are there common precepts that apply to all insurgencies?
- Assess if al Qaeda’s strategy fits the definition of “insurgency.” If al Qaeda’s aims do not meet the parameters of an insurgency, what type of movement or phenomenon does it constitute?
- Evaluate whether al Qaeda and radical Islamic insurgents groups sympathetic to al Qaeda’s cause constitute a global insurgency? Must there be a binding ideology and unifying leadership hierarchy that melds local insurgent actions into al Qaeda’s overall global strategy?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the elements and dynamics that are common to most insurgencies, and how these dynamics compare with contemporary approaches to insurgency.
2. Evaluate how the current environment of globalization impacts the rise and support of insurgencies.
3. Analyze the similarities and differences between the development and ideologies of selected insurgencies.
4. Analyze how insurgent leaders can effectively gain popular support based on an overview of selected insurgencies.
5. Evaluate the role ideology plays in the fulfillment of al Qaeda’s strategic objectives.
6. Evaluate whether AQ presents a global or regional insurgency and the impact that AQ has on national security objectives, counterterrorism strategies, and joint military organizational structures and doctrine.

Lesson 7, Counterinsurgency, addresses the doctrine and campaign components of counterinsurgency. It considers the Marine Corps’ operational approach to counterinsurgency as well as political, ethical, and legal considerations in the conduct of counterinsurgency. Finally, U.S. COIN operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and past COIN operations conducted in the Philippines are discussed to provide an historical context for how the U.S. has addressed COIN in small wars operations.

Read and View:

- Lesson 7 Overview.
- MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (2006): pp. 5-1 to 5-25.
- FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual* (1940): pp. 11 to 16.
- “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.” LtGen D. H. Petraeus. *Military Review* (Feb 2006): pp. 45 to 54.
- *Counterinsurgency on the Ground in Afghanistan: How Different Units Adapted to Local Conditions*. J. Meyerle, M. Katt, and J.Gavrilis. CNA Analysis and Solutions (2010): pp. 4 to 23.
- “The Spanish-American and Philippines Wars.” Dr. B. McAllister Linn. Foreign Policy Research Institute. (2008).
- *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*. D. Kilcullen (2009): pp. 293 to 301.
- “Whose COIN?” A. Etzioni. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (1st Qtr, 2011): pp. 19 to 25.
- “The Wrong War: Vietnam-Afghanistan Brief,” video lecture, B. West. U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College (2011).

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze how the objectives within the three counterinsurgency approaches, as addressed in MCWP 33.3-5, support the implementation of logical lines of operations in executing COIN strategy.
- Evaluate how the Small Wars Manual and the MCWP 3-33.5 describe the nature of small wars and COIN operations, and the major elements of the operating environment. What are the similarities and differences between the two publications regarding these factors?
- Analyze counterinsurgency practices adopted by the United States in the Philippine Insurrection, and identify those elements that were both successful and unsuccessful.
- Evaluate the relevance and application of COIN operations in the Philippine War to contemporary counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 21st century.
- Evaluate whether our COIN doctrine should be modified or revised to address current and future COIN operations? Specifically, what elements of our doctrine should change, and what should not be changed?
- Analyze the political, operational, and ethical challenges in developing doctrine and strategy for counterinsurgency operations.

Educational Objectives

1. Evaluate doctrinal principles and contemporary imperatives of COIN.
2. Evaluate the employment of military forces within the fundamental purpose of COIN operations based on the Small Wars Manual and current COIN doctrine.
3. Evaluate the counterinsurgency theories used by the United States to defeat the insurrection during the Philippine War.
4. Analyze the lessons of the Philippine War as they pertain to COIN operations, and evaluate which lessons apply and do not apply to COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
5. Analyze the effectiveness of the United States' strategic and operational approaches to counterinsurgency.
6. Assess the political, ethical, and legal considerations of counterinsurgency operations.

Lesson 8, Transnational Threats and Terrorism, specifically addresses the relationship between transnational threats and terrorism which pose threats to the United States. An analysis of past and current transnational threats is provided to foster a greater understanding of this dynamic phenomenon and what it potentially means to the U.S. National Security Strategy. Finally, this lesson looks at the current transnational threat that garners the majority of our attention and efforts: terrorism.

Read:

- Lesson 8 Overview.
- JP 3-26, *Counterterrorism* (2009): pp. II-1 to II-4.
- "Transnational Movements and Terrorism." M. Stout, T. Lynch III, and T. X. Hammes. *Joint Force Quarterly* (2nd Qtr 2009): pp. 28 to 33.
- "Terrorism and Nation-State Institutions: Actions and Interactions." T. P. Ampatuan. (2008): pp. 1 to 9.

- “Terrorism’s Evolution: Yesterday, Today, and Forever.” A. N. Pratt. *Toward Grand Strategy Against Terrorism* (2011): pp. 4 to 12.
- *National Security Strategy* (2010): pp. 19 to 22.
- *Osama bin Laden’s Death: Implications and Considerations*. J. Rollins. Congressional Research Service. (May 2011): pp. 5 to 22.
- “Hezbollah in the Tri-State Area of South America.” C. Miryekta. *Small Wars Journal* (Sep 2010): pp. 105-116.
- “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy,” video lecture. Dr. C. C. Harmon. (Nov 2010).

Issues for Discussion

- Evaluate the relationship between transnational threats and the frequency and characteristics of current and future small wars.
- Analyze the impact that transnational threats have on the current world order and the implications for U.S. political and military organizations.
- Evaluate whether the U.S. National Security Strategy effectively includes all instruments of national power to combat terrorist threats globally, to include threats such as Hezbollah pose in the Western hemisphere.
- Analyze the impact that bin Laden’s death will have on al Qaeda’s strategic and operational capabilities globally, and assess if these impacts should induce changes to the U.S. National Security Strategy.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze transnational threats in terms of their significance to U.S. national security.
2. Evaluate the linkages between transnational threats and small wars.
3. Analyze the impact that transnational threats have on U.S. military operations in the 21st century.
4. Evaluate the current and potential strategies to counter transnational terrorist threats.
5. Analyze the formation of Hezbollah and al Qaeda and the development of their operational capabilities.
6. Analyze the role that ideology and leadership fulfill within al Qaeda.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, 40 points for discussion contribution, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8906, MAGTF Expeditionary Operations

8906, *MAGTF Expeditionary Operations*, presents critical concepts and subjects that learners—as commanders, staff members, or planners at the tactical or operational levels of war—must master. Furthermore, thoroughly understanding these subjects will allow learners to effectively function in today's complex operational environment: whether on Service component, joint, or combined staffs. Overall, the course provides an understanding of MAGTF types and organizations; operational concepts; the single-battle-concept; and force deployment planning and execution. The course also covers logistics, command and control, leadership and ethics, intelligence, MAGTF fire support, and irregular/counterinsurgency warfare.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Leadership and Ethics	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Expeditionary Operations and Concepts	2.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations	3.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Rear Area Operations and Force Protection	2.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, Force Deployment Planning and Execution and the Maritime Preposition Force	3.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, Logistics Support for Expeditionary Operations	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, Organizational Leadership	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, Command and Control and Intelligence	3.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 9, MAGTF Fires and Information Operations	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Philosophy of Command Paper	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	36.3 hrs	35.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).		

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course’s educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6					
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C			
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A
X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Course Overview

8906, *MAGTF Expeditionary Operations*, focuses on the operational-level warfighting capabilities and applies the concept of operational design from 8903, Operational Art, to environments that the learners could eventually face. The course uses a Korean War Case Study to improve critical thinking through the use of decisionmaking and problem-solving skills to achieve operational success.

Lesson 1, Leadership and Ethics, provides an overview of Marine Corps leadership and ethics. It discusses U.S. military laws and ethics, our moral obligations, and the leadership development responsibilities. Specific leadership and ethical characteristics for irregular warfare are covered, including effective negotiating skills, dealing with the media, and Combat Operational Stress Reaction (COSR) coping skills.

Read and View:

- Lesson 1 Overview.
- MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (1996): pp. 82 to 84 and 122 to 123.
- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (1997): pp. 13 to 17.
- MCRP 6-11D, *Sustaining the Transformation* (1997): pp. 17 to 19.
- JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (2009): pp. I-3 to I-5.
- MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (1997): pp. 77 to 81.
- FM 3-24/FMFM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency* (2006): pp. 7-1 to 7-9.
- “Controlling the Beast Within, The Key to Success on the 21st Century Battlefields.” Major D. A. Pryer, USA. *Military Review* (Jan-Feb 2011).
- “How to Negotiate in the Middle East.” LtCol W. Wunderle, USA. *Military Review* (Apr 2007).
- JP 3-61, *Public Affairs* (2010): pp. C-1 to C-4.
- “CSC Negotiation Exercise,” video.
- “COSR Program Update” video lecture. Mr. G. Goldstein, M&RA, HQMC: (2011).

Issues for Discussion

- Define and describe the “zero defects” mentality. Does this contradict “mission command?” Do combat operations need to be micromanaged due to the significant consequences of failure?

- Analyze and describe character transformation. How do we transform our young recruits into competent decision-makers who can win on the modern battlefield? Explain your observations and any challenges/shortfalls that exist.
- Examine the philosophy of command. Can commanders avoid micro-management of subordinates given the proliferation of modern technology and their desire to “command from the front?”
- Assess the complexity of ethics during COIN. The article by Major Pryer argues that battlefield conduct should be the highest education and training priority. Do you agree with his proposal?
- Evaluate the importance of public affairs. Is it always possible to maintain mutual trust and credibility with the media? Why or why not?
- Examine and evaluate the negotiations process demonstrated during the CSC exercise. Based on your observations, were the students properly prepared to conduct successful cross-cultural negotiations?
- Identify and describe the impact of combat and operational stress. What can leaders do to rehabilitate unit members who have suffered a Traumatic Brain Injury?

Educational Objectives

1. Compare and contrast leadership and ethics, and the vital role they play in the human dimension of warfighting.
2. Explain the leadership responsibilities for Marine transformation and development.
3. Distinguish the leader development stages with regard to the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
4. Compare Marine Corps values to the joint warfare values.
5. Describe how to establish effective command climates and relationships.
6. Assess the leadership and ethical imperatives that are prominent in irregular warfare.
7. Explain the cultural and situational awareness required to effectively function as an operational-level commander.
8. Relate how to work effectively with media organizations and its importance.
9. Recognize Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) and how to prevent, mitigate, and treat Combat Operational Stress Injury (COSI).

Lesson 2, Expeditionary Operations and Concepts, examines the concepts that define the Marine Corps’ vision and articulates the strategies for future development and operations. The concepts are for Marine leaders and external individuals who must understand Marine Corps capabilities and operating concepts for effective employment in their respective Services. In addition, definitions and comparisons of conventional and irregular war are embedded within *Countering Irregular Threats*.

Read:

- Lesson 2 Overview.
- MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations* (1998): pp. 31 to 36.
- “Fast, Austere, Lethal: Marine Core Values.” *USNI Proceedings* (Apr 2009). LtGen G. J. Flynn, USMC.
- “Army Case Study in Transformation: Creating Modular Forces” (Apr 2008). R. Kugler.

- “The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle and Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team Programs: Background and Issues for Congress.” A. Feickert, *Congressional Research Service*, (2011).
- FM 3-0, *Operations* (2011): pp. C6 to C13.
- AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, (2003): pp. 59 to 63.
- “Expeditionary Operations.” *Air and Space Power Journal* (Summer 2008). LtCol P. D. Berg, USAF.
- Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment: Countering Irregular Threats (June 2010): pp. 109 and 114 to 119.
- “USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-Based Operations.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* (4th Qtr. 2008). Gen. J. N. Mattis, USMC.
- Memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command: “Joint Concept Development Vision” (28 May 2009).

Issues for Discussion

- Examine how each Service interprets the joint definition of expeditionary operations. Is the "expeditionary mindset" unique to the Marine Corps? If yes, explain why; if no, what role does it play in the other Services?
- All the Services transformed their expeditionary capabilities to rapidly project combat power. Why did this change occur? Does it threaten the Marine Corps’ role as an “expeditionary force in readiness?”
- Analyze and describe the concept development process. Have Marine concepts produced a practical effect on doctrine, force development, and future capabilities? Provide examples to validate your conclusions.
- Differentiate between the capabilities needed to fight conventional and irregular forces. What changes did the Marine Corps make to counter irregular forces in Iraq and Afghanistan? What was the outcome?

Educational Objectives

1. Define and examine expeditionary operations and understand their importance within the national and joint military establishment.
2. Comprehend military concepts and how they impact doctrine, organization, training, education, and capabilities.
3. Compare and contrast conventional and irregular war.

Lesson 3, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations, introduces the basic structure of Marine Corps operational forces: The MAGTF. The MAGTF provides the combatant commander a potent, fast reacting, all-purpose expeditionary force capable of many different missions. The lesson discusses the single-battle concept, the main effort, and supporting efforts. Operational-level Korean War vignettes are used to frame Marine competency, operational design, and offensive and defensive maneuver.

Read and Listen:

- Overview, Lesson 3.
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (9 Aug. 2011): pp. 2-1 to 2-15 and 2-32 to 2-33.
- "Fighting the MAGTF" audio interview with LtGen J. T. Conway.

- “Fighting the Single Battle.” MSTP Staff. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Aug 2001): pp. 27 to 28.
- “Is There a Deep Fight in a Counterinsurgency?” Major L. K. Grubbs and Major M. J. Forsyth (USA). *Military Review* (Jul-Aug 2005): pp. 28 to 31.
- “Main and Supporting Efforts.” MSTP Staff. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Dec 2001): pp. 32 to 35.
- *JFWC Pamphlet 10*, (20 Sep 2011) pp. A-11 to A-15.
- “Korean War: Inchon Case Study Prelude.” G. Grayson.
- Defensive Operations Korea Case Study: Pusan, Korea. Interactive multimedia element.

Issues for Discussion

- Examine the composition and components of the MAGTF. Which element of the MAGTF provides its most valuable capability across the range of operations? Is this contribution unique among the Services?
- Examine the roles of and relationship between the JTF, the Marine Corps component, and the MAGTF. What factors and considerations influence the size, task organization, and employment of the MAGTF?
- Examine the purpose of and considerations for the single-battle construct at the tactical and operational levels. How is this construct relevant to both conventional and irregular warfare? How does it impact MAGTF effectiveness?
- Analyze deep operations in a counterinsurgency. Can the MAGTF produce a desired effect on an insurgency’s cognitive depth? Provide an example that demonstrates capabilities and measures of effectiveness.
- Compare and contrast operational design during conventional and irregular warfare. How are they different or similar? Provide examples that demonstrate your conclusions.
- Analyze and discuss the factors used to select the main effort. When would it be appropriate to designate the LCE as the main effort? Describe any necessary supporting requirements from the ACE and GCE.
- Evaluate and distinguish between the forms of offensive maneuver. Operation CHROMITE has been characterized as an operational turning movement. Is it also possible to classify it as a flanking attack or envelopment? Justify your analysis based on doctrine.
- Analyze one form of offensive maneuver used during Operation CHROMITE. Do you agree with the choice of the commander at the time? Based on “current” capabilities, what would you do differently today?
- Evaluate the operational significance of the defense of Pusan. What were the strategic and operational centers of gravity? What were the defensive vulnerabilities, and how did the NKPA exploit them? Provide examples.
- Examine and discuss defensive operations during conventional warfare. Which defensive operations and tactics did General Walker employ to defend Pusan? Why were they utilized? Why did they succeed or fail?
- Describe the purpose of defensive operations during IW? How are defensive operations conducted during IW different? Are there unique planning considerations for these operations?

Educational Objectives

1. Distinguish the capabilities of the MAGTF.
2. Understand the purpose and role of the Marine Corps component.
3. Understand and discuss the single-battle concept.
4. Examine and understand the linkage between actions in the rear, close, and deep battle areas during conventional and/or irregular warfare.
5. Analyze and explain the purpose of operational design.
6. Evaluate the relationship between decisive actions and shaping actions.
7. Compare and understand the concept of the main and supporting efforts during conventional and irregular warfare.
8. Examine the purpose and types of offensive operations in conventional or irregular warfare.
9. Identify and distinguish the forms of offensive maneuver.
10. Examine the purpose and types of defensive operations in conventional or irregular warfare.
11. Appraise the considerations for defensive operations in irregular warfare.

Lesson 4, Rear Area Operations and Force Protection, summarizes rear area operations planning and execution. Additionally, the lesson introduces joint doctrine of joint security operations. Force protection is a critical priority to commanders at all levels. Today's asymmetrical environment poses threats that require tremendous imagination, creativity, innovation, and vigilance to overcome.

Read:

- Lesson 4 Overview.
- MCWP 3-41.1, *Rear Area Operations* (2000): pp. 2-9 to 2-13 and 4-1 to 4-17.
- "The Rear Area as Part of the Commander's Single Battle." MSTP Staff. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Sep 2001): pp. 44 to 48.
- JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater* (2010): pp. III-27 to III-32.
- "Private Contractors in Conflict Zones: The Good, the Bad, and the Strategic Impact." T.X. Hammes. *NDU Strategic Forum* (Oct 2010).
- "NORTHCOM Responsible for Base Force Protection Levels." SFC G. Braymen, Armed Forces Press Service (Jul 2007).
- "Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood." Report of the DOD Independent Review (Jan 2010): pp. 25 to 26 and 29 to 33.
- "Future Threats: Past as Prologue." CDR T. Thorson, Joint Staff J3. *The Guardian* (2008): pp. 19 to 23.
- "The Pros and Cons of Social Media: an AT Perspective." LCDR C. Hill, *The Guardian* (2011): pp. 33 to 37.
- "Force Protection and the Death of Common Sense." LtCol M. D. Grice. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Aug 2009).

Issues for Discussion

- Examine the importance of rear areas security. Why is security so essential to successful rear area operations? What steps can be taken to defend against level I, level II, and level III threats?

- Review the considerations for integrating non-military entities within rear areas. Are there unique challenges associated with non-military organizations? How can commanders mitigate any challenges?
- Evaluate the significance of external security threats. What are the pros and cons of social media? How can commanders minimize the risks it poses to military members, their families, and military operations?
- Identify and describe the internal security threats outlined in the DOD report, “Protecting the Force: Lessons from Ft. Hood.” How should the U.S. military resolve internal force protection threats?

Educational Objectives

1. Compare the responsibilities of the Marine component and MAGTF commanders in the conduct and coordination of rear area operations.
2. Examine and discuss how Marine component and MAGTF rear area operations are planned, coordinated, and synchronized to support other battlespace operations.
3. Compare and contrast similarities and differences between Marine Corps doctrine on rear area operations and joint doctrine on joint security operations in-theater.
4. Describe and explain the concept of force protection and its importance to joint and Marine Corps operations.
5. Analyze various methods (new and old) to improve force protection during U.S. military operations.

Lesson 5, Force Deployment Planning and Execution and the Maritime

Preposition Force, connects deployment planning with employment planning; explains the time-phased force and deployment data process; introduces deployment terminology and concepts; and provides an overview of the Adaptive Planning Process. Additionally, deployment planning and execution considerations for maritime preposition force operations are introduced and examined.

Read and View:

- Lesson 5 Overview.
- *The Generals’ War* (1993). M. Gordon and B. Trainor: pp. 54 to 66.
- JP 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations* (2007): pp. I-1 to I-13.
- “Joint Deployment Process Transformation.” *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 2007). LtCol J. W. Washington: pp. 43 to 46.
- “Force Projection, at the right time and place, is a critical component to Operational Art; consequently, TPFDDs remain relevant, now and in the foreseeable future.” Col W. Spahn, Naval War College.
- MCWP 3-32, *Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations* (2011): pp. 1-1 to 1-6.
- “Blount Island Marines.” *Leatherneck* (Feb 2012). CWO-4 R. Gaddo.
- *Prepositioning Program Handbook*, 2d Ed. (Jan. 2009): pp. 18 to 22.
- “Sea Basing: A Case Study of Past and Future MPF Operations,” Video. Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze the processes for projecting the joint force and the strategic mobility triad. What are the strengths and vulnerabilities of our power projection capabilities?

- Examine and analyze the joint deployment/employment process. Do you agree with the decisions made during the initial phase of Operation DESERT SHIELD, which impacted deployment and employment? Cite specific examples, and explain the circumstances to justify your answer.
- Evaluate and state the requirements for successful FDP&E. Do you think the Marine Corps has established a better reputation for deploying than the other Services? Why or why not?
- What were some of the FDP&E challenges associated with OIF? Why did they occur, and what was the associated impact?
- Analyze and compare the TPFDD, RFF, and APEX processes. During past and current operations, does deployment drive our employment of forces, or have our FDP&E processes operated as intended?
- In your own words describe what the TPFDD process is supposed to do. Were Rumsfeld's actions in the OIF deployment successful?
- Appraise the potential capability of the MPF (F) program. Will the MPF (F) capability augment future amphibious operations and serve as a primary enabler for seabasing? Is this a realistic expectation?
- Assess current MPF capabilities and vulnerabilities. What are the essential requirements and conditions necessary to establish the MPF MAGTF ashore? What are the critical vulnerabilities associated with these requirements?

Educational Objectives

1. Compare and contrast the employment and deployment of forces.
2. Summarize the joint deployment/redeployment process.
3. Describe and explain the force deployment planning and execution (FDP&E) process.
4. Recognize the basic concepts of how a TPFDD is put together.
5. Examine the Request for Forces (RFF) process used during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
6. Evaluate the TPFDD, RFF, and Adaptive Planning (APEX) processes and their potential for future application.
7. Categorize between current and future MPF deployment and execution capabilities.

Lesson 6, Logistics Support for Expeditionary Operations, provides a basic understanding of logistics support for expeditionary operations and provides an overview of logistics planning considerations. To project and sustain MAGTFs, logistics planning must be thorough and tied to the overall concept of operations. This lesson also shows how logistics organizations provide support to MAGTFs.

Read and Listen:

- Lesson 6 Overview.
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2011): pp. 13-1 to 13-14.
- "One Single Nail." LtCol J. E. McLean II. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Feb 2008): pp. 28 to 33.
- "Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—Marine Corps Logistics at Its Best?" Col. R. E. Love. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Jan 2004): pp. 48 to 50.
- "Enabling the MAGTF." LtGen Panter. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Sep 2011): pp. 67 to 71.

- “The Restructuring of the MLG.” LtCol D. Van Bennekum. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Sep 2011): pp. 1-5 (MCG website feature).
- “MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield.” BGen M. R. Lehnert and Col J. E. Wissler. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Aug 2003): pp. 30 to 33.
- “Logistics in Distributed Operations.” Capt J. A. Hooker. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Mar 2011): pp. 27 to 31.
- MCWP 4-12, *Operational-Level Logistics* (2002): pp. 4-1 to 4-10.
- MCWP 4-11, *Tactical-Level Logistics* (2000): pp. 4-4 (start at Concept of Logistic Support) to 4-14.
- “Providing Expeditionary Logistics.” Audio interview with BGen J. Simmons (Apr 2012).

Issues for Discussion

- How is the Marine Corps organized to provide strategic, operational, and tactical logistics support for expeditionary operations? Are there unique challenges associated with providing expeditionary logistics?
- Consider the Marine Corps logistics institutions and processes that support and sustain Marine logistics. Do you agree with the article “One Single Nail,” which characterizes them as bureaucratic and wedded to a cautious and premeditated approach to procurement?
- Identify and define the logistics deficiencies described in the article “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM—Marine Corps Logistics at Its Best?” by Col Love. What changes have been made to address them, and will they fulfill the Commandant’s vision for future support to the MAGTF?
- Review the organization and ability of the MLC to provide operational level logistics support to the MAGTF. How does the MLC bridge the gap between strategic and operational level logistics? How does it extend the operational reach of the MAGTF?
- Examine the requirements for effective logistics planning through coordination between supported and supporting organizations. How does this facilitate “push logistics” as described in the article “Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield?” Is “predictive operational logistics” a realistic expectation?
- Identify and describe any unique planning considerations and challenges of tactical logistics support for distributed operations (DO). Are there any additional logistics capabilities that are needed to enable DO?

Educational Objectives

1. Compare and contrast strategic, operational and tactical-level logistics in support of MAGTFs.
2. Identify and explain how MAGTF expeditionary operations are logistically supported at the operational and tactical levels of war.
3. Summarize the logistics support planning considerations for MAGTF expeditionary operations.

Lesson 7, Organizational Leadership, addresses the doctrine and campaign components of counterinsurgency. It considers the Marine Corps’ operational approach to counterinsurgency as well as political, ethical, and legal considerations. Finally, U.S. COIN operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and past COIN operations

conducted in the Philippines are discussed to provide learners a historical context for how the U.S. has addressed COIN in small wars.

Read:

- Lesson 7 Overview.
- FMFM 6-22, *Army Leadership* (2006): (Chapter 11).
- “Navigating a New Course to Command Excellence.” Newport, RI: Command Leadership School: pp. 6 to 16.
- “Good Decision Makers are not Enough.” Capt M. Van Echo. *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 2009).
- “Staff Officer Leadership—Not Everyone Gets Command.” LtCol D. Thieme. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Apr 2009).
- “The Road to Mentoring: Paved With Good Intentions.” G. F. Martin, G. E. Reed, R. B. Collins, C. K. Dial. *Parameters* (Autumn 2002).
- “Critical Thinking: A Weapon for All Wars.” S. D. Griffin. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Jun 2005).
- “The Fall of the Warrior King.” D. Filkins. *New York Times* (23 Oct 2005).
- FM 6-22, *Army Leadership* (2006): pp. 8-1 to 8-5.

Issues for Discussion

- Analyze and describe the commander’s potential for effectiveness as the organizational leader. How does he exert influence, internally and externally, to achieve success? How can he increase both the capability and performance of the command?
- What distinguishes a superior command from an average command?
- Develop and describe a plan for assessing the unit readiness and performance of your future command. Include actions to be taken before and after you assume command. How will this assessment shape your preliminary planning?
- Analyze and describe the short- and long-term implications of a command mentoring program. What are the pitfalls and benefits associated with a mandatory program? Would an informal program be a preferred alternative?
- Examine and describe the consequences of encouraging critical thought and creativity in decision-making. Can critical thought and creativity coexist in organizations that thrive on checklists; standing operating procedures; and use of standardized tactics, techniques, and procedures?
- Analyze and explain the leader’s responsibility to assess, evaluate, and influence the organization’s command climate. In the case study “The Fall of The Warrior King,” the commander received conflicting signals from the division and regimental commanders. How did this impact his actions and the ethical behavior of his command? What, if anything, could he have done differently?
- Examine and describe the actions required to establish a positive and ethical command climate. As a staff officer, what actions can you take to influence the command climate? If you observed your commanding officer acting unethically, how would you deal with the situation?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the role of field grade officers as organizational leaders.

2. Evaluate and describe how field grade officers lead in the development of organizations and leaders to achieve desired results.
3. Evaluate the counterinsurgency theories used by the United States to defeat the insurrection during the Philippine War.
4. Analyze the lessons of the Philippine War as they pertain to COIN operations, and evaluate which lessons apply and do not apply to COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
5. Analyze the effectiveness of the United States' strategic and operational approaches to counterinsurgency.
6. Assess the political, ethical, and legal considerations of counterinsurgency operations.

Lesson 8, Command and Control and Intelligence, explains C2 and intelligence support in planning and conducting expeditionary operations. MAGTF C2 structures permit commanders to coordinate, synchronize, and employ forces, while maintaining situational awareness and adjusting to changes in the battlespace. Intelligence support is necessary to develop plans by providing analysis of enemy capabilities and characteristics, and vital information about the environment.

Read:

- Lesson 8 Overview.
- MCWP 3-40.3, *MAGTF Communications Systems* (2010): pp. 4-1 to 4-7 and pp. 2-12 to 2-24.
- "Tempo, Technology, and Hubris." Capt Z. D. Martin. *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 2007): pp. 50 to 55.
- "What Is an Intelligence Failure? A Case Study of Korea, 1950." Maj J. F. Schmitt. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Oct 1997): pp. 60 to 65.
- "Fixing Intel: A blueprint for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan." MG M. Flynn, USA, Capt. M. Pottinger, USMC, Mr. P. Bathelor, DIA, *Marine Corps Gazette* (Apr 2010).
- "Fixing Intel and Marine Corps Intelligence," Maj R. Schotter, *Marine Corps Gazette* (Jan 2012).
- "Maneuver Warfare, Open Source Intelligence, and Military Reform." A. Mogilner. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Apr 2008).
- MCWP 2-1, *Intelligence Operations* (2003): pp. 1-1 to 1-10 and pp. 5-1 to 5-5.

Issues for Discussion

- In the article "Tempo, Technology, and Hubris," what does Capt Martin mean when he refers to the "illusion of absolute control on the battlefield?" Have you observed this? Is he overstating a valid requirement and function of HHQs? How does the illusion of absolute control relate to C2?
- Commanders lead people, manage technology, and establish procedures that facilitate effective command and control. Describe and explain the relationship between these three facets of command and control. Upon taking command, how would you implement effective C2?
- Analyze and describe the capabilities and limitations of intelligence. Based on doctrine, the readings, and your observations or personal experience: Do we need to fix intelligence in Afghanistan?

- Examine and explain how OSINT can reform and enhance our conventional intelligence capabilities. What are the risks associated with using OSINT? Do the potential benefits outweigh these risks?

Educational Objectives

1. Illustrate the fundamentals of command and control for MAGTF expeditionary operations, to include the role of technology.
2. Summarize the complex nature of the MAGTF command and control concept of employment.
3. Relate the fundamentals of intelligence with respect to intelligence operations, principles of intelligence operations, and the commander's role in the intelligence process.
4. Distinguish and access the intelligence support capabilities required for MAGTF expeditionary operations.
5. Identify and explain the intelligence functions and support for irregular warfare operations.

Lesson 9, MAGTF Fires and Information Operations, demonstrates how MAGTF commanders use fires and information operations (IO) to accomplish their missions. As combined arms forces, MAGTF commanders must synchronize fires and IO with maneuver and sustainment. It also addresses how MAGTF commanders employ IO during irregular warfare to achieve desired effects, while winning and maintaining the support of the people.

Read:

- Lesson 8 Overview.
- JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support* (2010): pp. I-1 to I-6.
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2011): pp. B-2 to B-3.
- JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support* (2010): pp. III-7 to III-13.
- "Future MAGTF Fires," by Colonels J. Walker, B. Powers, and C. O'Neill, *Marine Corps Gazette* (Feb 2012).
- JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support* (2010): pp. A-1 to A-13.
- "Offensive Cyber Warfare," by Capt R. J. Mirenda, *Marine Corps Gazette* (Sep 2011).
- *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (1966). Sir R. Thompson: pp. 90 to 102.
- MCWP 3-40.4, *MAGTF Information Operations* (May 2012 revision draft): pp. 25 to 45.

Issues for Discussion

- Differentiate between joint, operational, and tactical fires. Can non-lethal fires achieve operational effects? Explain and justify your response.
- How does the concept of fires synchronize maneuver and fires? Do we execute fires to enhance maneuver, or do we maneuver to facilitate the effects of fires?
- Analyze and discuss the joint targeting cycle and the MAGTF targeting process. How do planners measure and determine targeting success? What actions and adjustments are made if targeting is unsuccessful?

- Define and describe the role of the commander during the fires planning and targeting processes. Do these processes ensure the commander's guidance for fires and intent are being met?
- Based on the article "Future MAGTF Fires," evaluate the potential value of precision munitions. How would an "all precision munitions" force impact fire support coordination and execution? Is this recommendation feasible?
- Explain any unique challenges of fire support coordination and execution in an IW environment. Are our doctrinal techniques and procedures sufficient to overcome these challenges?
- How can IO be used to enable successful operations in the COIN fight? Can it be used to buy space and time for our operations? How?
- What ethical dilemmas do we face when we use IO to counter enemy operations based on intimidation, lies, and deception? Is it ethical for us to lie to our own forces or the public to gain an operational advantage?
- Examine and evaluate the impact of cyberspace operations on the MAGTF. The article "Offensive Cyber Warfare" states that "Although cyber capabilities cannot win a war by themselves, cyber superiority must be achieved." What does this mean, and do you agree with the premise of this statement?
- Is it possible or appropriate for IO to be the decisive component of an operation? If so, when? Why? How?

Educational Objectives

1. Comprehend and explain the concept of fires and the roles they play in joint operations and the MAGTF single-battle concept.
2. Evaluate the difference between joint, operational, and tactical level fires.
3. Examine and understand fire support planning.
4. Summarize the joint and Marine Corps targeting process.
5. Examine and discuss fire support coordination.
6. Understand and describe fire support execution.
7. Relate the use of fires in irregular warfare.
8. Illustrate the role of MAGTF IO in MAGTF operations.
9. Understand MAGTF IO capabilities.
10. Summarize the role of IO in irregular warfare.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through four types of assessment activities: 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, 30 points for discussion contribution, 20 points for the Philosophy of Command Paper, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8907, Amphibious Operations

8907, *Amphibious Operations*, provides a historical perspective on the development of amphibious capabilities. Learners will learn the kinds of interactions that will occur between planners of different staffs, identify amphibious planning considerations, understand the amphibious planning process, and contribute to the joint planning and execution effort. Proficiency and understanding gained from the 8907 course will enable the learner to expand the ideas presented in 8906, *MAGTF Expeditionary Operations* and examine the applicability of those ideas in amphibious operations.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Development of Amphibious Warfare Capabilities	2.6 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Amphibious Operations Concepts and Planning	3.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Amphibious Fires and Logistics	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, 21st Century Amphibious Operations	2.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	4.0 hrs	4.0 hrs
Total	11.4 hrs	16.0 hrs

¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time.
² Contact time is seminar hours (3) plus assessment completion hours (4).

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course’s educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6			
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C	
X	X			X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X		X		X			X								X	

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5	
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A	
				X		X		X		X			X		X	X						

Course Overview

8907, *Amphibious Operations*, follow a natural progression and are designed primarily to present the key aspects and considerations in the development of amphibious warfare capabilities, the planning for an amphibious operation, and key developing amphibious operational concepts for today and in the future.

Lesson 1, Development of Amphibious Warfare Capabilities, examines the development of amphibious operations capabilities by the United States, Britain, and Japan prior to and during World War II. Additionally, this lesson covers how U.S. amphibious capabilities evolved during the second half of the 20th century.

Read:

- Lesson 1 Overview.
- “Assault from the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare Between the World Wars – the American, British and Japanese Experiences.” A. R. Millett. *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (1996): pp. 50-95.
- “An Amphibious Resurrection.” K. L. Davies. *Marine Corps Gazette* (May 2012): pp. 91 to 96.
- “Amphibious Warfare Conference, Department of State.” Gen P. X. Kelley. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Nov 2012): pp. 37 to 39.

Issues for Discussion

- Discuss the differences in how the U.S., Britain, and Japan developed amphibious warfare capabilities during the interwar years.
- Evaluate how these differences impacted the conduct of amphibious operations during World War II.
- Evaluate how the lessons learned from Operation CHROMITE are valid today.
- Discuss the impact of Marine Corps modernization efforts in the 1970s and 1980s on current Marine Corps amphibious operations capabilities.

Educational Objectives

1. Comprehend the history behind the development of amphibious warfare theories and doctrines in the Interwar years, and the factors that influenced its development.
2. Analyze the development of amphibious warfare doctrines and capabilities and the factors that influenced each in both positive and negative ways during the Interwar years and World War II.
3. Summarize the lessons learned from Operation CHROMITE, the amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea in 1950.
4. Analyze the impact of past Marine Corps modernization efforts on current Marine Corps amphibious operations capabilities.

Lesson 2, Amphibious Operations Concepts and Planning, examines current doctrine, the expeditionary strike group concept, the different types of amphibious operations, and the command and control of amphibious forces to include command relationships within an amphibious task force. Additionally, this lesson discusses the decision-making process in amphibious planning from the joint doctrinal perspective.

Read:

- Lesson 2 Overview.
- MCWP 3-31.7, *Seabasing*, (2006): pp. I-1 to I-8.
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (2009): pp. I-1 to I-7.
- “Expeditionary Strike Group Concepts and Recommendations.” Col M. R. Kennedy. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Mar 2006): pp. 16 to 25.
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (2009): pp. II-2 to II-9.
- “A Contrast in Capabilities: Amphibious Forces at Inchon and SWA.” Major M.G. Dana. *CSC History Paper* (1995): pp. 56 to 58.
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (2009): pp. III-2 to III-11.
- “A Contrast in Capabilities: Amphibious Forces at Inchon and SWA.” Major M.G. Dana. *CSC History Paper* (1995): pp. 48 to 50.
- “Joint Power Projection: OPERATION TORCH.” J. Gordon IV. *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Spring 1994): pp. 60 to 69.

Issues for Discussion

- Are amphibious operations still relevant to the current and future strategic environment? Support your answer based on the types of amphibious operations and their associated utility for the joint force.
- Does the current U.S. amphibious doctrine adequately support the future Naval Concepts? Why or why not?
- Are the five doctrinal phases of amphibious operations still relevant in today’s operational environment? Why or why not?
- Examine the concept of the Expeditionary Strike Group. What is your assessment of its current status and how it has evolved through the years?
- Describe how the CATF/CLF support relationship is based upon the complimentary capabilities of the AF and LF, and the importance of the coequal status of the CATF/CLF during the planning process.
- Examine the differences between an order initiating an amphibious operation and an establishing directive.
- Examine the Joint Amphibious Planning Process and identify key actions that must be performed during each step.
- Identify each of the ten primary decisions made during amphibious operations planning, and discuss when and why CATF and CLF decisionmaking should be mutually performed. Are there historical examples to support your answers?

Educational Objectives

1. Examine the characteristics, types, and doctrine of amphibious operations.
2. Explain the five phases of an amphibious operation.
3. Examine the future employment of the ARG/MEU, particularly as it relates to the ESG concept.
4. Analyze the relationship between the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), and the commander, landing force (CLF); and the responsibilities of each in current and evolving doctrinal concepts.
5. Explain the purpose and content of an order initiating an amphibious operation.
6. Describe the joint amphibious planning process and compare it to the landing force planning process.

7. Compare and contrast the ten primary decisions made during the planning of amphibious operations.

Lesson 3, Amphibious Fires and Logistics, examines two central issues in the planning and conduct of amphibious operations.

Read:

- Lesson 3 Overview.
- MCWP 3-31.6, *Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations* (2004): pp. 2-13 to 2-15.
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (2009): pp. II-12 to II-17.
- “Marine Corps Views and Recommendations for Naval Surface Fire Support.” Gen M. W. Hagee. *CMC Memo for the Secretary of the Navy* (Mar 2006): pp. 1 to 5.
- “NSFS Shortfalls.” LtCol J. W. Hammond III, USMC (Ret.). *Marine Corps Gazette* (Mar 2006): pp. 31 to 34.
- JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations* (2009): pp. V-27 to V-48.
- “21st Seabased Logistics: A 21st Century Warfighting Concept.” MCCDC/NDC Paper (1998): pp. 1 to 9.

Issues for Discussion

- Discuss the linkages between Navy/Marine Corps fires related agencies (omit internal sections). Include the joint force commander and Service components in your discussion.
- Describe how the command and control of fires is phased ashore during amphibious operations. Is there a better way? Why or why not?
- Given the current operating environment and evolving doctrine on how the United States intends to fight during amphibious operations, how have the requirements for NSFS changed? Has the naval gun become obsolete as an instrument for NSFS?
- Analyze how the key logistics planning factors for amphibious operations impact the planning decisions of the CATF and CLF during the five types of amphibious operations. What is the most important planning factor? Why?
- Describe how initial supply and sustainment is planned and executed during amphibious operations. What impact will seabasing have on initial supply and sustainment?
- Compare the primacy of seabasing with the five fundamental operational tenets of seabased logistics.
- Discuss what a current MPF operation might consist of and how it would be task-organized during the arrival and assembly stage.

Educational Objectives

1. Evaluate the organization, responsibilities, and relationships between fire support agencies in amphibious operations.
2. Assess the passage of fire support command, control, and coordination from afloat agencies to those ashore.
3. Assess the current status and projected outlook for NSFS systems.

4. Examine how the key logistics planning factors impact the planning decisions of the CATF and CLF during amphibious operations.
5. Assess current and conceptual seabased logistics capabilities.
6. Assess the organization, capabilities, and operational phases of today's MPF.

Lesson 4, 21st Century Amphibious Operations, introduces future amphibious operations concepts innovation and requires learners to critically think about possible solutions to the challenges facing future amphibious operations.

Read:

- Lesson 4 Overview.
- “Amphibious Operations in the 21st Century” MCCDC Paper: (18 Mar 2009).
- “Bold Alligator 12.” BGen C. S. Owens. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Jul 2012): pp. 37 to 41.
- “An Amphibious Manifesto for the 21st Century.” Col D. C. Fuquea. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Dec 2012): pp. 10 to 15.
- “Preserving Amphibious Capabilities in a Time of Austerity.” Col M. Cancian. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Dec 2012): pp. 16 to 24.

Issues for Discussion

- Explain why amphibious operations are still relevant to the current and future strategic environment.
- Which factors should be considered when operating in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment?
- Which non-material and material initiatives show the most promise of success? Why?
- How do exercises like Bold Alligator 12 expand upon and improve Marine Corps amphibious capabilities?
- Does the Marine Corps need to drastically change its amphibious operations capabilities due to budget constraints and anti-access/area denial concerns? Why?

Educational Objectives

1. Evaluate the role of amphibious operations in the existing and future military strategic environment.
2. Describe the lessons learned from current amphibious operations exercises.
3. Analyze how the Marine Corps can better prepare for amphibious operations in a budget-constrained and technologically uncertain future.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 20 points for multiple choice quizzes, 40 points for discussion contribution, and 40 points for the essay final examination—for a total of 100 points. A mastery score of 80 points for the entire course is required to pass.

8908, Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)

8908, *Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)* is designed to enhance the conventional and irregular warfare planning abilities of future commanders and staff officers using the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPPE). This course exercises the learners’ creative thinking, critical reasoning, and collaboration skills necessary to perform operation planning in joint and multinational environments.

Course Composition

Lesson	Study/Prep Time ¹	Contact Time ²
Lesson 1, Operation Planning	4.1 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 2, Design and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace	3.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 3, Problem Framing	4.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 4, Problem Framing Practical Exercise	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 5, COA Development and War Game	4.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 6, COA Development Practical Exercise	2.2 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 7, COA War Game Practical Exercise	2.5 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson 8, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, and Transition (and Practical Exercise)	3.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson F1 Problem Framing for Stability Operations (and Practical Exercise)	4.4 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson F2 COA Development for Stability Operations (and Practical Exercise)	2.3 hrs	3.0 hrs
Lesson F3 COA War Game for Stability Operations (and Practical Exercise)	2.0 hrs	3.0 hrs
Final Exam	None	None
Total	35.8 hrs	33.0 hrs
¹ Study and preparation time based on 20 pages of reading per hour plus listening and viewing time. ² Contact time is seminar hours (3).		

Course Learning Outcomes

Each lesson has specific educational objectives that are derived from two sources. The first source is the Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 1); the second source is the Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes (Enclosure 2). The following matrices show the learning areas and outcomes that are covered by the course’s educational objectives.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1						Area 2					Area 3						Area 4							Area 5			Area 6					
A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	F	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	A	B	C	A	B	C			
X				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X							X		

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Area 1				Area 2								Area 3					Area 4				5
A	B	C	D	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	A
X	X			X	X			X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		

Course Overview

8908, *Operation Planning (and Final Exercise)* reviews the MCPP and uses it in a MEF-level operation, which includes conventional and irregular warfare in a joint and multinational operational environment. The course uses current doctrine and emerging concepts, IMI, an exercise scenario, planning product examples, role playing, and planning product development.

Lesson 1, Operation Planning, introduces the concept of operation planning; design and the three tenets of Marine Corps planning (top-down planning, the single battle, and integrated planning); the six-step MCPP; and the operational planning team (OPT).

Read and View:

- Lesson 1 Overview.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 1-1 to 1-6 and B-1 to B-2.
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2011): pp. 1-3 and 3-10 to 3-13.
- “Operational Design, Luck is the residue of design—the Battle of Yorktown, 1781.” LtCol A. Straley. *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 2011): pp. 27 to 30.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. III-27 to III-29.
- JP 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2011): pp. II-6 to II-17.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): C-1 to C-6.
- JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (2007): pp. IX-4 to IX-15.
- MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Guide* (2009): pp. 9 to 14.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide*, “Key Events Timeline,” “Crisis in Tunisia (Part 1),” and “USAFRICOM BARBARY SWORD WARNING ORDER” (2011): pp. 1 to 8 and 9 to 12.
- *MCPP Overview* IMI.

Issues for Discussion

- Explain the nature of maneuver warfare philosophy and mission command planning including design and the tenets of top-down planning, the single battle, integrated planning, and future operation planning.
- Compare each step of the MCPP and develop an understanding of the relationships between the steps within the process.

- Examine the use of the six warfighting functions, lines of operation, and lines of effort in operation planning.
- Determine the significance of the operational approach to stability operations in relation to offensive and defensive operations.
- Who are the members of the OPT and what roles do they play? What other members would you include? How does the OPT planning organization differ from a Joint Planning Group?
- What advantages and disadvantages are associated with our organization for planning? [
- Which OPT planning session preparations do you feel are the most important and why?
- Discuss Paragraph 3, “Mission,” and Paragraph 4, “Execution (Concept of Operation Phases),” of the “USAFRICOM BARBARY SWORD WARNING ORDER” 171500Z Aug 20XX.

Educational Objectives

1. Explain whether maneuver warfare and the tenants of the MCPP remain applicable in today’s operational environment.
2. Compare the steps of the MCPP and explain the relationship between each step. Where should design be applied in the process?
3. Explain how the six warfighting functions are used in the MCPP and their relationship to logical lines of operation/lines of effort.
4. Explain the relationship between stability operations and offensive and defensive operations.
5. Describe how the MEF and a JTF may be organized to conduct future operation planning.
6. Demonstrate the ability to make the proper preparations to perform operation planning as a member of an operational planning team.

Lesson 2, Design and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, introduces design and the importance of understanding the problem, environment, enemy and purpose of the operation before beginning the planning process. It also explains the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process—also known as the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). It exposes learners to the four-step IPB process, key intelligence products, decision support tools, and how to incorporate cultural intelligence into the IPB process.

Read and View:

- Lesson 2 Overview.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 2-1 to 2-4 and J-1 to J-2.
- JWFC Pam 10, *Design in Military Operations* (2010): pp. 3 to 17.
- JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (2009): pp. xvi to xxii.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. E-2 to E-7.
- MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* (2006): pp. 3-4 to 3-9.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide*, USAFRICOM Planning Directive for Operation BARBARY SWORD: pp. 13 to 18; and CJTF-Tunisia OPOD 0002-XX (2011): pp. 19 to 27.

- *Design and the IPB IMI.*

Issues for Discussion

- What is the importance and content of the commander’s orientation for the design dialogue?
- To better understand the environment and problem what might be useful items to consider?
- Analyze how the IPB/JIPOE process supports the planning process at the operational level of war.
- Evaluate the steps of the IPB/JIPOE process. Are they logical? Are they in the correct order? Should there be fewer steps or additional steps?
- What are the various IPB products and how are they used?
- Who is responsible for preparing detailed IPB products? Do you agree?
- Why have sociocultural factors recently been given increased emphasis in operation planning? Which sociocultural factors must be considered?
- Scrutinize how to effectively incorporate culture into the MCPP.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze design and the commander’s initial injects in problem framing.
2. Examine the essential design activities and considerations required to understand the environment and the problem.
3. Examine the role of the IPB/JIPOE process in operation planning.
4. Analyze the techniques and procedures involved in the IPB process and the development of intelligence products and decision support tools.
5. Analyze the sociocultural factors that should be considered to understand the operational environment.

Lesson 3, Problem Framing, begins the in-depth education of the MCPP steps. Primarily, it will teach you about the inputs (injects), process (activities), and outputs (results) of problem framing. It will also make you capable of developing key problem framing products during the practical exercise and real world operation planning.

Read and View:

- Lesson 3 Overview.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 2-4 to 2-9.
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2011): pp. IV-1 to IV-5 and IV-11 to IV-14.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. III-22 to III-27.
- JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (2011): pp. D-1 to D-10.
- MCWP 3-40.2, *Information Management* (2002): pp. 1-1 to 1-10.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide*, “CJTf-Tunisia OPORD 0002-XX (2011)”: pp. 28 to 39.
- *Problem Framing IMI.*

Issues for Discussion

- Compare specified tasks, implied tasks, and essential tasks; where they come from; and their relationship to the mission statement.
- What is “commander’s concept” and what should it include? What is the relationship between the commander’s concept and commander’s intent?

- What types of areas comprise the MEF's battlespace? How do these areas relate to the contiguous and noncontiguous battlespace concept?
- Differentiate the information environment and systems perspective from the physical areas and factors of the operational environment.
- Define and assess the framework of critical factors that should be used to analyze centers of gravity.
- What is a "decisive point" and what is its relationship to center of gravity analysis?
- In your experience, when has unclear or confusing terminology caused problems in planning for operations?
- What terms require task completion definition or intent (purpose)?
- What task(s) should the MEF be assigned for Barbary Sword Phase III?
- Examine how assessment is tied/linked to the commander's decisionmaking process. What are some examples?
- Assess the importance and provide examples of properly worded measures of effectiveness (MOEs), which are both measurable and relevant to an established condition.
- Examine the role CCIRs play in information management.
- What are your experiences with information management while in the operating forces?
- What type of information should be generated for operation Barbary Sword to support the commander's planned decisions?

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the injects, activities, and results associated with problem framing.
2. Examine what comprises the MEF's battlespace.
3. Evaluate the application of COG analysis within the MCPP.
4. Assess the importance of the proper use of terminology in planning.
5. Analyze the assessment process and its impact on the MCPP.
6. Analyze how information management (IM) supports planning, decisionmaking, execution, and assessment (PDE&A).

Lesson 4, Problem Framing Practical Exercise, is the first of three practical exercises that will enhance your knowledge of the MCPP. The keys to successful problem framing are preparation, professional competence, holistic thinking, accurately defining the problem and environment, and identifying an operation's purpose and essential tasks. Problem framing focuses the efforts of the commander and staff.

Read:

- Lesson 4 Overview.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide, CJTF-Tunisia OPOD 0002-XX Annexes A, C, and J* (including appendices and tabs): pp. A-1 to A-17, C-1 to C-19-2, and J-1 to J-1-2; and *CJTF-T FRAGORD 02 to OPOD 0002-XX (2011)*: pp. 71 to 74; and "II MEF Commander's Orientation for Phase III": pp. 77 to 80.

Products for Development

- Identify Phase III MEF specified, implied, and essential tasks.

- Perform a center of gravity analysis on the Libyan forces and the MEF.
- Draft the proposed Phase III MEF mission statement, refine the commander's intent, and identify planning assumptions for approval.

Educational Objectives

1. Develop the products/results of the problem framing step using the appropriate injects and activities (with a special emphasis on the construction of the mission statement).

Lesson 5, COA Development and War Game, covers the next two steps of the MCPP. Course of action (COA) development builds on the information and analysis of problem framing. It provides options for the commander while continuing to refine the understanding of the environment and problem. This leads to options for how the mission and commander's intent might be accomplished. COA war game examines and refines the COAs in light of the characteristics of the operational environment by testing them against the threat COAs—specific enemy capabilities and their potential actions/reactions.

Read and View:

- Lesson 5 Overview.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 3-1 to 3-5 and E-8 to E-10.
- JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (2011): pp. V-5 to V-9.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 4-1 to 4-4, E-9, E-11, and F-1 to F-7.
- *COA Development* IMI.
- *COA War Game* IMI.

Issues for Discussion

- While developing initial COAs, should planners consider all possible solutions, or only those that strictly meet the commander's planning guidance? Explain.
- Compare and contrast COA graphics and narratives for conventional operations and stability operations.
- Should essential task analysis be performed earlier in the Marine Corps Planning Process (during problem framing)? Why or why not?
- Is essential task analysis necessary to continue planning, or is the center of gravity analysis sufficient? Why?
- With regard to the red cell, should the COA war game be an unbiased force-on-force exercise; or a scripted, closely controlled exercise?
- How should the red and green cells be task-organized and staffed?
- What value do you place on COA war game and why?

Educational Objectives

1. Examine the injects, activities, and results associated with the COA development step.
2. Describe how to apply essential task analysis in the MCPP.
3. Examine the injects, activities, and results associated with the COA war game step.
4. Analyze how to apply the red and green cells in the MCPP.

Lesson 6, COA Development Practical Exercise, allows learners to develop a common, in-depth understanding of COA development for conventional operations. It also provides an opportunity for learners to demonstrate an understanding of the purpose, considerations, and criteria for developing COAs; and how to depict COAs in graphic and written formats.

Read:

- Lesson 6 Overview.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide* (2011).
- Planning products from Lesson 4.

Products for Development

- Draft one COA graphic and narrative that is adequate, feasible, suitable, acceptable, and distinguishable (from COA 2 in the IMI), and identify its task organization.
- Develop the initial synchronization matrix required to war game the COA.
- Derive the event template and matrix from the situation template.

Educational Objectives

1. Develop the products/results of the COA development step using the appropriate injects and activities.

Lesson 7, COA War Game Practical Exercise, is designed to teach learners how to war game and visualize the COA during operations. This insight is used to foresee actions and reactions as well as identify critical events, tasks, requirements, problems, and solutions/counteractions. It also provides learners the opportunity to experience the wargaming process and gain an appreciation for the red and green cells.

Read and View:

- Lesson 7 Overview.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide* (2011).
- Planning products from Lesson 6.
- *COA War Game Demonstration Video*

Products for Development

- Update the synchronization matrix and fill in the war game worksheet matrix for one turn of the war game.

Educational Objectives

1. Develop the products/results of the COA war game step using the appropriate injects and activities.
2. Apply the red and green cell concepts in the MCPP.

Lesson 8, COA Comparison and Decision, Orders Development, and Transition (and Practical Exercise), covers the final three steps of the MCPP. COA comparison and decision assists the commander to identify and select the COA that **best** accomplishes the mission. Orders development communicates the commander's

intent, guidance, and decisions into a clear, useful form, which subordinates can easily understand. Transition is designed to ensure that the plan is properly passed to the current operations section for execution; and those charged with execution understand the plan, the wargaming analysis, and the decision support tools.

Read and View:

- Lesson 8 Overview.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 5-1 to 5-2 and E-9 and E-11.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 6-1 to 6-2 and K-1 to K-25.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. 7-1 to 7-2.
- *COA Comparison and Decision* IMI.
- *Orders Development* IMI.
- *Transition* IMI.

Products for Development

- Evaluate the activities of the COA comparison and decision step; and advantages and disadvantages of your OPT COA 1 using the commander's evaluation criteria.
- Develop a COA comparison matrix that compares COA 2 in the IMI with your OPT COA 1.
- Discuss the activities and formats of orders development; and draft Paragraph 3.b. *Concept of Operations* of the base OPORD.
- Draft Paragraph 3.c. *Tasks* of the base OPORD.
- Evaluate the activities of the transition step, including the types of transition drills and their application at the MEF level of command.
- Formulate a plan of activities to transition the MEF operation order to its major supporting commands for Operation BARBARY SWORD.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the injects, activities, and results associated with the COA comparison and decision step.
2. Use the COA comparison and decision step injects and activities to create the appropriate results of this step in the context of operational level planning.
3. Recognize the injects, activities, and results associated with the orders development step.
4. Use the orders development step injects and activities to create the appropriate results of this step in the context of operational level planning.
5. Analyze the injects, activities, and results associated with the transition step.
6. Use the transition step injects and activities to create the appropriate results of this step in the context of operational level planning.

Lesson F1, Problem Framing for Stability Operations (and Practical Exercise), applies the MCPP in a stability operations environment. Stability operations are required where the legitimate civil governing entity is limited or not functioning due to a natural or man-made disaster, or an insurgency. In such instances, a joint force and/or MAGTF may be required to perform limited local governance while integrating

the efforts of supporting multinational organizations, other U.S. government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental agencies until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in providing all basic services to the population and begins with establishing a secure, stable environment through civil security and civil control activities.

Read:

- Lesson F1 Overview.
- “In Search of the Single Battle.” LtCol W. A. Sinclair. *Marine Corps Gazette* (Feb 2007): pp. 64 to 68.
- JP 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2011): pp. II-17 to II-32.
- JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (2009): pp. IX-1 to IX-10.
- JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment* (2009): pp. IV-1 to IV-14.
- *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade*, 2nd Ed. (2006). Dr. J. D. Kem, Col, USA (Ret.). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: pp. 32 to 43.
- *BARBARY SWORD Exercise Guide*, “CJTf-T FRAGORD 03 to OPOD 0002-XX”; and II MEF Commander’s Orientation for FRAGORD 03 to II MEF OPOD 0002-XX (2011): pp. 155 to 159 and 161 to 164.
- “Phase IV JIPOE and JFC Orientation and Guidance”: pp. 1 to 20.

Issues for Discussion

- Do the MCPP tenets of the single battle and top-down planning remain elusive in our planning efforts for Afghanistan?
- How does the tenet of integrated planning differ for stability operations when compared to conventional operations?
- Visualize and discuss the operational environment for Phase IV of Operation BARBARY SWORD. Determine what should characterize each of the MEF’s deep, close, and rear fights?
- Determine problem solving framework considerations for Phase IV of Operation BARBARY SWORD.

Products for Development

- Perform MEF Phase IV task analysis.
- Perform enemy and friendly center of gravity analyses.
- Draft the proposed MEF Phase IV mission statement and refine the commander’s intent.
- Draft the proposed commander's concept by LOO.

Educational Objectives

1. Determine the proper application of the three tenets of Marine Corps planning for stability operations.
2. Appraise the special considerations of the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) for stability operations.
3. Examine logical lines of operation design considerations for stability operations.
4. Critically analyze the injects, activities, and results associated with the problem framing step for stability operations.

5. Use the problem framing step injects and activities to create the appropriate results of this step in the context of operational level planning for stability operations.

Lesson F2, COA Development for Stability Operations (and Practical Exercise), covers COA development in stability operations and counterinsurgency operations. Winning at the operational level is more than simply winning in combat: It is about setting the conditions necessary to achieve the strategic end state. The environment for these operations include political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) operational valuables, as well as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) civil considerations. The commander can use proven design structures to help him develop and execute his COA—the district stability framework (DSF) and tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF).

Read:

- Lesson F2 Overview.
- MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (2011): pp. 12-3 to 12-6.
- MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process* (2010): pp. E-9, E-11 to E-18, and I-1 to I-2.
- FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (2008): pp. 4-6 to 4-14 and A-1 to A-15.
JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency Operations* (2009): pp. X-1 to X-18.
- “Commander’s COA Development Guidance”: pp. 1 to 2.

Products for Development

- The methods and end state for each LOO, while identifying the resources required for their execution.
- Information operations concept of support methods and end state.
- LOO essential tasks/operational objectives.
- CCIRs and assessment recommendations.
- COA evaluation criteria recommendations.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the injects, activities, and results associated with the COA development step in a stability operations environment.
2. Create the appropriate results of the COA development step in the context of operational level planning for stability operations.

Lesson F3, COA War Game for Stability Operations (and Practical Exercise), addresses COA analysis for the stability operations environment performed through wargaming. Marine Corps planning doctrine states that a red cell assists the commander in assessing COAs against a thinking enemy. The same doctrine suggests that a green cell represents the environment and civilian aspects and reactions to both enemy and friendly actions—the “nonlethal” challenges that can affect the plan’s execution.

Read:

- Lesson F3 Overview.
- ATTP 5-0.1, *Commander and Staff Officer Guide* (2011): pp. 4-22 to 4-35.

- *Campaign Planning: Tools of the Trade*, 2nd Ed. (2006). Dr. J. D. Kem, Col, USA (Ret.). U.S. Army Command and General Staff College: pp. 67 to 72.
- *A Tentative Manual for Countering Irregular Threats* (2006). Marine Corps Combat Development Command Concepts and Plans Division: pp. 57 to 59, 73 to 75, 89 to 91, 101 to 104, 117 to 118, and 131 to 134.

Products for Development

War game your COA LOOs on the SADR triangle. Capture your results by completing the following:

- Modified COA War Game Worksheet.
- Decision Support Template/Matrix.

Educational Objectives

1. Analyze the injects, activities, and results associated with the COA wargaming step in a stability operations environment.
2. Create the appropriate results of the COA wargaming step in the context of operational-level planning for stability operations.

Course Assessments

Learners will be evaluated through three types of assessment activities: 27 points for multiple choice quizzes, 69 points for discussion/collaboration contribution, and 54 points for planning product development—for a total of 150 points. A mastery score of 120 points for the entire course is required to pass.

Service Intermediate-Level College Joint PME Learning Areas and Outcomes¹

Learning Area 1 — National Military Capabilities, Command Structure and Strategic Guidance

- a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of U.S. military forces to conduct the full range of military operations in pursuit of national interests.
- b. Comprehend the framework within which joint forces are created, employed, and sustained in support of JFCs and their component commanders.
- c. Comprehend the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the President and the Secretary of Defense, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, JFCs, Service component commanders, and combat support organizations or agencies.
- d. Comprehend joint force command relationships.
- e. Comprehend how the U.S. military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations.
- f. Comprehend strategic guidance contained in documents such as the national security strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, national military strategy, Guidance for Deployment of the Force, and Guidance for Employment of the Force.

Learning Area 2 – Joint Doctrine and Concepts

- a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.
- b. Comprehend the factors and emerging concepts influencing joint doctrine.
- c. Apply solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.
- d. Comprehend the interrelationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
- e. Comprehend the fundamentals of traditional and irregular warfare.

Learning Area 3 — Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War

- a. Comprehend the considerations for employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.
- b. Comprehend the interrelationships among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- c. Comprehend how theory and principles of war pertain to the operational level of war across the range of military operations to include direct and indirect approaches.
- d. Comprehend the relationships among national objectives, military objectives and conflict termination, as illustrated by previous wars, campaigns, and operations.
- e. Comprehend the relationships between all elements of national power and the importance of the whole of government response, multinational cooperation, and building partnership capacity in support of homeland security and defense.
- f. Analyze a plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

¹ From Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)* of 15 July 2009

Learning Area 4 — Joint Planning and Execution Processes

- a. Comprehend the relationship among national objectives and means available through the framework provided by the national level systems.
- b. Comprehend the fundamentals of joint operation planning.
- c. Comprehend the mix of joint functions appropriate to an operational planning problem.
- d. Comprehend how IO and cyberspace operations are integrated at the operational level.
- e. Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.
- f. Comprehend the roles that factors such as geopolitics, geostrategy, society, region, culture, and religion play in shaping planning and execution of joint force operations across the range of military operations, to include traditional and irregular warfare.
- g. Comprehend the role and perspective of the combatant commander and staff in developing various theater policies, strategies, and plans, to include weapons of mass destruction/effects (WMD/E); IO; cyberspace operations; Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR); intelligence; logistics; and strategic communication.

Learning Area 5 — Integration of Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational Capabilities

- a. Comprehend the C2 options available to joint force commanders.
- b. Comprehend the factors—to include mission objectives, forces available, and associated capabilities—that support the selection of a C2 option.
- c. Comprehend the opportunities and vulnerabilities created throughout the range of military operations by reliance on networks and information technology in cyberspace.

Learning Area 6 — Joint Strategic Leadership

- a. Comprehend the skills needed to lead a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, multinational task force in accomplishing operational-level missions across the range of military operations, to include traditional and irregular warfare.
- b. Comprehend critical thinking and decision-making skills needed to implement change and sustain innovation.
- c. Comprehend the ethical dimension of operational leadership and the challenges that it may present.

Marine Corps PME Intermediate-Level College Learning Areas and Outcomes

Learning Area 1 — Leadership

- a. Analyze ethical, legal, and cultural issues within operational military leadership scenarios.
- b. Demonstrate decision-making skills associated with the operational level of war.
- c. Discuss various methodologies for establishing a combat-ready, professional command.
- d. Discuss methods to develop subordinate leaders.

Learning Area 2 — Warfighting

- a. Develop solutions that create the military conditions necessary for strategic success for challenges generated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
- b. Formulate an operational plan using the Marine Corps Planning Process.
- c. Analyze campaigns and the operational art of warfare.
- d. Examine the differences and balance among Information Operations, Strategic Communication, and Public Affairs.
- e. Apply lessons learned from history to the planning and execution of military operations.
- f. Explain the process by which policy and strategic decisions are made and how the process is integrated with decisions made at the operational level of war.
- g. Explain the link between ends and means in strategy, operations, and tactics.
- h. Discuss the linkages among strategy, operations and tactics that inform and shape campaign planning and design.

Learning Area 3 — Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations

- a. Integrate interagency organizations into the planning and execution of military operations.
- b. Evaluate joint and U.S. Marine Corps doctrine regulating the employment of amphibious and expeditionary forces across the entire range of military operations, with particular emphasis on joint and multinational operational settings.
- c. Analyze interagency operations in terms of the employment of all instruments of national power.
- d. Plan to employ the MAGTF throughout the spectrum of crisis and conflict, maximizing both lethal and non-lethal effects in a joint and/or multinational context.
- e. Discuss emerging and non-traditional concepts that are shaping the character of contemporary joint and multinational warfare.

Learning Area 4 — Regional and Cultural Studies

- a. Evaluate the nature of insurgency and terrorism and the methods for combating them.
- b. Assess the impact of cultural issues throughout the planning and execution of military operations.

- c. Analyze the impact of foreign culture in relation to confronting contemporary security challenges.
- d. Discuss the ethical and legal dimensions of warfighting leadership in a cross-cultural environment.

Learning Area 5 — Communications Studies

- a. Formulate reasoned, well organized, formal and informal communication employing rhetorical strategies.

Grading Rubrics

Rubrics identify the standards and criteria for assessing the degree of learner achievement of learning outcomes. They help the instructor and the learner achieve a shared understanding of educational expectations. Instructors apply the rubric's criteria to ensure that they evaluate the learners consistently.

All CSCDEP assessments—with the exception of quizzes—have an accompanying rubric. At a minimum, each course has assessed discussions and some type of assessed final examination. A few courses have an additional assessed assignment with an individualized rubric. For simplicity, only the discussion and final examination grading rubrics are provided below.

Discussion Grading Rubric

	Unacceptable (0 – 79%)	Satisfactory (80 – 89%)	Commendable (90 – 100%)
Critical Thinking	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unclear/irrational and poorly or unsupported positions • Little or poor analysis that adds little to the discussion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reasonable and mostly supported positions • Analysis of topic contributes positively to the discussion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rational and well supported positions • Analysis of topic enhances the overall discussion
Understanding of Concepts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited or no understanding of few or any of the lesson issues, theories, principles, and concepts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good understanding of most of the lesson issues, theories, principles, and concepts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In-depth understanding of all but a few of the lesson issues, theories, principles, and concepts
Originality and Use of Course Material	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited or no original thought • Little, improper, or unclear use of material to support points 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some original thought, but relies on others' conclusions • Mostly appropriate use of material to support points 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Original, fresh, and unique perspectives • Effective use of material to support points • Introduces unique material that supports learning objectives • Relates experience to course material
Engagement with Peers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comments or responses not timely • Little or no positive impact to others learning • Infrequent participant even when prompted • Dominates discussion • Argumentative, dismissive, or disrespectful 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comments or responses generally timely • Contributes positively to others learning • Generally participates • Usually maintains respectful attitude 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiates discussion and provides timely responses • Greatly facilitates others learning • Always a willing participant • Attentive to others • Does not dominate discussion • Shows respect

Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frequent mistakes in communication (use of words, syntax, grammar, spelling, punctuation, etc.) • Not convincing in use of language or message is difficult to understand 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Some mistakes in communication (use of words, syntax, grammar, spelling, punctuation, etc.) • Generally convincing use of language and message is sufficiently clear 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Few or no mistakes in communication (use of words, syntax, grammar, spelling, punctuation, etc.) • Entirely convincing use of language • Clear, concise and convincing message
----------------------	--	---	--

Final Examination Grading Rubric

Content

	Unacceptable (0 – 79%)	Satisfactory (80 – 89%)	Commendable (90 – 100%)
Educational Objectives	The paper shows limited or no mastery of any of the educational objectives.	The paper shows successful mastery of some of the educational objectives.	The paper shows successful mastery of all but a few of the educational objectives.
Understanding of Concepts	The paper demonstrates limited or no understanding of few or any of the course issues, theories, principles, and concepts.	The paper demonstrates an understanding of most of the course issues, theories, principles, and concepts.	The paper demonstrates an in-depth understanding of all but a few of the course issues, theories, principles, and concepts.
Critical Thinking Analysis	The paper breaks the argument, issue, or problem into parts, however, the parts identified are not the correct and/or relevant ones; some parts may be missing or unclear. The links between the parts are completely inaccurate or only somewhat accurate.	The paper successfully breaks the argument, issue, or problem into relevant parts. The links between the parts are fairly accurate.	The paper successfully breaks the argument, issue, or problem into relevant parts. The links between the parts are clear and highly accurate.
Synthesis	The parts of the argument, issue, or problem to be integrated are not clear and/or relevant; or the paper integrates only some parts into a somewhat coherent whole. The links between the parts are unclear or are somewhat unclear.	The paper integrates most relevant parts of the argument, issue, or problem from various places into a mostly coherent whole. The links between the parts are generally clear.	The paper successfully integrates all relevant parts of the argument, issue, or problem from various places into a coherent whole. The links between the parts are clear and insightful.
Evaluation	The paper does not evaluate, or poorly evaluates the argument, issue, or problem. It makes inaccurate or poor judgments based on bad or	The paper evaluates the argument, issue, or problem and makes acceptable judgments based on internal evidence or external	The paper evaluates the argument, issue, or problem and makes insightful judgments based on internal evidence or external

	erroneous internal evidence or external criteria.	criteria.	criteria.
--	---	-----------	-----------

Organization and Structure

	Unacceptable (0 – 79%)	Satisfactory (80 – 89%)	Commendable (90 – 100%)
Thesis	There is no thesis or it must be uncovered or reconstructed from the text of the paper; if present, it is irrelevant or off-topic. Any questions posed by the thesis (if available) are not answered by the end of the paper.	The thesis is obvious, but it is not made in a single statement; it is interesting and relevant. The thesis poses an idea or question that is partially answered by the end of the paper.	The thesis is a single clear and eloquent statement of the central argument; it is original, interesting, and relevant. The thesis poses an idea or question that is answered by the end of the paper.
Support	There is poor or inappropriate use of information as evidence or support. The evidence used does not clearly support the main argument.	There is appropriate use of information as evidence or support. The evidence used to support the central point is well chosen, though not particularly rich or detailed.	There is outstanding use of appropriate information as evidence or support. The evidence used to support the thesis is rich, detailed, and well chosen.
Structure	The paper is poorly organized or fails to include an introduction, body, or conclusion. The introduction does not contain the thesis or does not describe the paper accurately. It is difficult or impossible to follow which claims are being used as evidence and how that evidence is supposed to support the thesis. The conclusion is missing or is merely a restatement of the introduction. Overall, the response is confused by illogical organization, lack of focus, and wandering ideas.	The paper is well organized and contains an introduction, body, and conclusion. The thesis is contained in the introduction, and it is generally clear how the paper will get to this conclusion. It is generally easy to follow which claims are being used as evidence and how that evidence supports the thesis. The paper uses the conclusion to tie up loose ends. Overall, the response is focused on a central theme, and although the focus may stray occasionally, the author's intentions are clear.	The paper has excellent organization and contains a clear introduction, body, and conclusion. The introduction highlights the thesis and makes it clear how the paper will get to this conclusion. The body makes explicit which claims are being used as evidence and how that evidence supports the thesis. The conclusion clearly sums up the paper and ties up loose ends. Overall, the paper is tightly focused on the thesis and is easy to follow and understand.
Syntax and Construction	Many sentences are incomplete and/or ungrammatical. The author does not acknowledge that key words have precise meanings. In many paragraphs there is not a distinct or coherent point; topic sentences are missing or unclear in a number of	Most sentences are complete and grammatical. Most words are chosen for their precise meanings. Most paragraphs have one distinct and coherent point; for the most part, the parts of each paragraph connect	Virtually all sentences are complete and grammatically correct. Words are chosen for their precise meanings. Every paragraph makes one distinct and coherent point, expressed in a clear topic sentence; the parts of each paragraph connect

	paragraphs.	logically and effectively.	logically and persuasively.
Connections and Transitions	Connections and transitions between paragraphs are poor, haphazard, or missing. Also, it is unclear how each paragraph connects to the thesis.	Connections and transitions are present between most paragraphs and are generally effective. Also, most paragraphs clearly relate to the thesis.	All paragraphs move naturally from one to the next. Connections among paragraphs are clearly articulated and the transitions are effective. Also, all paragraphs directly relate to the thesis.

Style and Grammar

	Unacceptable (0 – 79%)	Satisfactory (80 – 89%)	Commendable (90 – 100%)
Originality	Original thought is limited or non-existent; if present, it is overshadowed by other's conclusions and is redundant.	Original thought is present, but it relies heavily on other's conclusions and is at times redundant.	Original thought is fresh and unique; it is the synthesis of the author's experience and knowledge of the course materials, and it is not redundant.
Tone	The paper lacks academic diligence. There are frequent informal and inappropriate usage errors—slang is present. Does not provide a tone that is consistent and appropriate for the audience or purpose.	The tone of the paper is mostly formal. There are some mistakes in usage—slang is not present. Provides a tone that is consistent and appropriate for the audience or purpose.	The tone of the paper is appropriately formal—slang is not present. Provides a tone showing a strong understanding of audience or purpose.
Rhetoric	The paper is not convincing in its use of language, is poorly developed, and is inadequately supported by logic.	The paper is generally convincing in its use of language, is well-developed, and adequately supported by logic.	The paper is entirely convincing in its use of language, is fully developed, and fully supported by logic.
Mechanics and Punctuation	The paper has frequent mistakes in capitalization, spelling, abbreviations, and italics; punctuation is often missing or incorrect.	The paper has some mistakes in capitalization, spelling, abbreviations, and italics; there are limited punctuation mistakes.	The paper has few or no mistakes in capitalization, spelling, abbreviations, and italics; there are virtually no punctuation mistakes.

Academic Evaluation and Quality Control

Academic evaluation and quality control are continuous processes within the CSCDEP. The staff and faculty of the CDET have an appreciation for the distance education environment and view the CSCDEP as a structured program of study. Thus, when evaluating the CSCDEP, the CDET completes a programmatic review of the entire system, which facilitates program design, development, delivery, and evaluation. This programmatic review comes in the form of the CCRB process. The final report of the CCRB is forwarded to the President of MCU for review. As shown in Figure 2, the CDET also uses the report as the basis for the MCU CRB and its institutional research and effectiveness report.




Figure 2. CDET CCRB process.

The curriculum revision process starts with the CCRB. This process analyzes a series of external and internal inputs, which are described below. All changes to the CSCDEP are generated through these inputs and are reported within the CCRB final reports.

External inputs that traditionally have generated curriculum changes are directives from higher authority; changes in Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training, equipment, or structure; changes identified by the MCU; the resident course curriculum; or other guidance identified in the OPMEP, the Military Education Coordination Council (MECC), and the Distance Learning Coordinating Committee (DLCC). Additionally, the CDET obtains annual feedback from CSCDEP graduates and Marine commanders.

Internal inputs that influence curriculum changes are derived from a wide range of quantitative data and qualitative information, which are used to review, validate, and modify the eight CSCDEP courses, the courseware technologies, delivery methods, and program support mechanisms. Internal inputs include student and adjunct faculty end-of-course surveys and evaluations, student assessment performance data, lessons learned/best practices provided by RCs, RCIs, and CSCDEP course directors. The following describes some of these internal inputs in greater detail.

- All CSCDEP students receive an end-of-course survey through their Blackboard course site. The survey results are then collected, categorized, and formatted by the CDET institutional research (IR) specialists for later analysis and inclusion into the CCRB process by the appropriate CSCDEP course director. RCs also have access to completed surveys.
- Faculty end-of-course evaluations are accomplished in a similar manner. The evaluation is located on the appropriate course's faculty development Blackboard site. Evaluations results are collected and formatted in the same manner as student surveys and RCs have access to these completed surveys as well.
- The CDET conducts frequent site visits to the regional campuses to ensure that the CSCDEP is professionally administered and meets the distance education needs of its students and the Marine Corps. Site visits provide the academics department additional feedback on how its PME programs and seminars are executed in the field. Significant items found during these visits are additional internal inputs into the CCRB process.

The dean of academics is responsible for conducting the annual CCRBs and is supported in this responsibility by the CSCDEP associate dean of academics, the eight CSCDEP course directors, and the IR specialists. Annually, the associate dean, the course directors, assistant dean, IR specialists and any other interested parties conduct an analytical session to build and develop a CCRB report for the Director, CDET. The dean chairs this session. A final CCRB report is then presented to the Director of the CDET for approval. The approved CCRB report is forwarded to the Director of Institutional Research of MCU.

Additionally, every two years MCU conducts a series of CRBs to review each of its colleges' and schools' curriculum, learning outcomes, and administrative capacities. MCU defines the CRB as:

"... the University's oversight mechanism to direct long-range strategic planning, coordination, and integration of the PME continuum within the curricula of MCU. Course content and assessment data related to the accomplishment of established course learning outcomes are reviewed to ensure a progressive building-block approach is utilized throughout resident and distance education course development. The CRB reviews curricula, evaluates the incorporation of the PME continuum within the programs of instruction, identifies linkages/gaps among the various MCU programs of instruction, and evaluates the academic rigor of the programs."

The CSCDEP CCRB reports form the basis for the CDET's preparation and participation in these CRBs. Through this entire set of processes, the CDET ensures that the CSCDEP is derived from and parallel to the CSC resident course and that it remains current and relevant and meets all service and JPME intermediate-level education requirements.

Process for Accreditation of Joint Education

This enclosure provides information on the accreditation of joint PME institutions. It is an extract of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1800.01D, *Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)* of 15 July 2009.

ENCLOSURE F

PROCESS FOR ACCREDITATION OF JOINT EDUCATION (PAJE)

1. Overview. This enclosure details the charter, guidelines, preparation, and conduct of the PAJE. The provisions of this enclosure apply to accreditation and reaffirmation reviews. Appendix A describes the PAJE charter, and Appendix B provides guidelines for institutional self-studies required for PAJE reviews.
2. Purpose. The PAJE serves three purposes: oversight, assessment, and improvement. Through the PAJE, the Chairman complies with statutory responsibilities for oversight of the officer joint educational system. The PAJE also serves as a method for improving college/schools' execution of JPME through periodic self-study and self-assessment. PAJE team assessment assures quality and assists in improvement. The PAJE is not intended to be a detailed checklist inspection of colleges/schools' programs but an opportunity for a balanced team of peers and experts to assure the Chairman that each college/school properly executes JPME and to offer the college/school the benefit of the team's findings and recommendations.
3. Background. The PAJE process is generally guided by accepted civilian accreditation standards and practices tailored to the needs of JPME. JPME institutions differ from civilian universities in at least two significant ways:
 - a. Underlying Theme of the Subject Matter. JPME is a CJCS-approved body of objectives, outcomes, policies, procedures, and standards supporting the educational requirements for joint officer management. The PAJE focuses on the three-phase joint education program taught at Service intermediate- or senior-level colleges, JFSC, and NDU, including the CAPSTONE course.
 - b. Learning Environment. Colleges/schools conducting JPME bring together a faculty and student body of professional military officers and civilian government officials who have significant experience in the major disciplines taught at the colleges. Also, these colleges/schools have access to and use classified information and wargaming facilities not available to civilian universities.
4. The Process. The PAJE is a peer review process and is best accomplished by individuals with an in-depth understanding of JPME subject matter and the educational environment for ILE and SLE. Consequently, representatives (military and civilian) of the Services, Joint Staff, and NDU directly involved with JPME are selected to conduct the PAJE. Despite the PAJE team's unique composition, its concept and practice are common to all academic accreditation systems – to strengthen and sustain professional education.

5. PAJE Sequence. The sequence of PAJE reviews starts with accreditation, and then subsequent reaffirmation of the program's accreditation status. All PAJE reviews are conducted using the guidelines of the PAJE and will assess institutional compliance with the faculty and student composition metrics as prescribed within Enclosure B of this policy. JPME institutions must complete a PAJE review at least every 6 years.

a. Accreditation. Accreditation is the base level of PAJE review and is intended for three situations: (1) programs that have never been awarded any type of PAJE accreditation status; (2) programs that were formerly accredited but have had that status expire; or (3) programs that are currently accredited but have undergone substantive change, as defined below. Accreditation is granted for 6 years when programs are judged satisfactory overall and have no significant weaknesses.

b. Reaffirmation. Reaffirmation of accreditation occurs every 6 years from the date of initial accreditation. Reaffirmation also is granted for 6 years when programs are judged satisfactory overall and have no significant weaknesses.

c. Conditional Accreditation/Reaffirmation. Either accreditation or reaffirmation can be granted on a conditional basis. Conditional accreditation/reaffirmation may be granted when a program is new or has undergone substantive changes and a PAJE team determines there is insufficient data to award accreditation for a full 6 years or when a program is determined to have significant weaknesses. Conditional accreditation or reaffirmation will stipulate requirements for follow-on reports and/or visits necessary to extend the school's accreditation for up to 6 years. If the identified deficiencies are not corrected as outlined by the PAJE team the school risks losing its JPME accreditation. Normally, no program will be granted conditional accreditation/reaffirmation as a result of significant program weaknesses on consecutive PAJE visits.

d. Any program that fails to achieve accreditation, reaffirmation, or conditional accreditation/reaffirmation is no longer a JPME provider.

6. Program Changes

a. Substantive Change. The Chairman, in accordance with Paragraph 5 above, must accredit again in its entirety a college or school that implements a substantive change that significantly affects the nature of the institution, its mission and objectives, and/or its PME and/or JPME programs. Substantive change may include, but is not limited to:

(1) Adding major PME/JPME courses or programs that depart significantly in either content or method of delivery from those offered when the college or school was most recently evaluated.

(2) Decreasing substantially the length, hours of study, or content of a major PME/JPME course or program required for successful completion of the full course of study.

(3) Changing the geographical setting for a resident course, to include moving to a new location, establishing a branch campus, or establishing an off-campus mode of operation.

(4) Departing significantly from the stated mission, objectives, or PME/JPME programs operative at the time of the most recent evaluation.

(5) Changing a PAJE-validated method of delivery (e.g., engaging another organization (as by contract) to provide direct instructional services).

(6) Merging with another institution.

b. Limited Change. A limited change to some aspect of an institution's overall program is one of sufficient extent to warrant seeking approval from the Director, Joint Staff, but not so extensive that it warrants CJCS accreditation of the entire program. The Director may approve a limited change based simply on the written explanation of the change or may require a validation assessment in the form of a site visit by an appropriately tailored team.

c. Advance Notification. Responsibility rests with the college or school to notify in advance the Chairman (via the chain of command) of its intent to implement a limited or substantive change and to request validation or accreditation as appropriate. Notification should include a thorough explanation of the change's nature, extent, and ramifications for the institution's PME/JPME programs. The greater the envisioned change, the further in advance notification should occur, with 12 months being the minimum notification for an envisioned substantive change.

7. Scheduling of PAJE Reviews

a. Accreditation requests for new programs are submitted to the Chairman through the respective Service headquarters or NDU. Accreditation requests for formerly accredited programs or substantially altered accredited programs are submitted through respective channels to the DDJS-ME.

b. Requests to implement changes to accredited programs are submitted to the DDJS-ME at least 6 months before expiration of the institution's accreditation status. Service and NDU colleges will forward their requests through their respective headquarters. Each request should indicate the specific program(s) for review and primary and alternate dates for PAJE team visits.

APPENDIX A TO ENCLOSURE F

PAJE CHARTER

1. The PAJE team performs accreditation and reaffirmation functions for the ILE, SLE, and CAPSTONE programs.

2. In keeping with the philosophy of a peer review, team members must be well versed in JPME learning objectives, criteria, and standards. Whenever possible, the team will be composed of representatives from the same educational level (intermediate or senior) as the college/school being assessed. Members of the executive committee and working group must receive PAJE training, sponsored by the Joint Staff/J-7 JEB, prior to participating in an accreditation review. OSD, each Service, and NDU will

nominate individuals to receive PAJE training and will maintain a cadre of qualified personnel to participate in PAJE accreditation reviews.

3. The Joint Staff/J-7 JEB will form a team for each PAJE review by soliciting team member nominations from OSD, the Services, and NDU as required. Membership will be tailored to provide the appropriate balance of expertise in JPME learning areas, objectives, criteria, and standards. The standard PAJE team composition is depicted below. However, the Director, Joint Staff or DDJS-ME may alter team composition as deemed appropriate. Team shall consist of:

a. Chairman. Director, Joint Staff.

b. Executive Committee

(1) The DDJS-ME; also serves as Vice Chairman of the PAJE team.

(2) One prominent DOD civilian educator (preferably with military background) with a doctoral degree, and experience and knowledge in civilian accreditation processes and principles.

c. Working Group

(1) Chief. One officer in the grade of O-6 from the Joint Staff/J-7 JEB.

(2) Service College and NDU Representatives. One officer or civilian (a staff or faculty member, preferably possessing a doctoral degree) from each Service college and NDU. For SLE accreditation, representatives should be in the grade of O-6 or their civilian equivalent, except when exceptional circumstances warrant nomination of qualified O-5 officers or their civilian equivalents. Qualified officers in the grade of O-5 or civilian equivalents may regularly be nominated for accreditation visits to ILEs. Representatives will be individuals directly involved in JPME at a Service or joint PME college. NDU may, at its discretion, send a representative from each of its colleges at the level of the one being assessed. Working Group members should not be from the college or school being assessed.

(3) OSD Representative. One military officer (O-6) or civilian equivalent with educational experience.

(4) For accreditation of non-resident programs, one officer O-5 or above or civilian equivalent with documented distance education curriculum development expertise; a DLCC member is desired but not required. This individual may not be from the college being assessed.

(5) Executive Assistant. One officer from Joint Staff/J-7 JEB.

(6) Joint Doctrine Adviser. One subject matter expert from the Doctrine development community.

(7) Librarian. One librarian, preferably in the grade of GS-13 (or equivalent rank) or above, from one of the intermediate- or senior-level PME institution libraries.

d. Advisory Support. The PAJE team will be augmented as required by one or more individuals from the following categories.

(1) Institution Representative. One officer in the grade of O-6 or civilian equivalent from the institution whose program is being evaluated. Participation is limited to providing technical support and the individual will not participate in deliberations regarding the institution's accreditation.

(2) Independent Technical Input. A separate and independent evaluation may be obtained by a contract with a prominent nongovernmental civilian educator or member of academia possessing a doctoral degree.

(3) Functional Experts. At the discretion of the PAJE team chairman, functional experts from within the Department of Defense may be invited to travel with and provide expertise during PAJE visits.

4. The PAJE team normally conducts an up-to-5-day on-site visit to the college/school undergoing the PAJE review (select members of the team may visit off-site elements of the college/school for non-resident accreditation). A team from J-7 may also visit the college/school approximately 1 month before the full PAJE team to review the college/school's preparations and readiness for the PAJE review. This pre-visit provides the college/school the opportunity to review its program briefings, visit agenda, and support plan for the PAJE visit with team representatives prior to the actual visit.

5. Following the PAJE review, the PAJE team chairman recommends to the Chairman the appropriate status of the JPME curriculum at a college/school based upon the results of the team's review. The Chairman is the approval authority for accreditation, reaffirmation, and conditional accreditation/reaffirmation or loss of accreditation, as required. The PAJE report will be forwarded to the Chief of the Service or President, NDU, for appropriate action.

APPENDIX B TO ENCLOSURE F

INSTITUTIONAL SELF-STUDY

1. Introduction. This appendix identifies key issues for inclusion in an accreditation self-study. These issues provide insight into the quality of an educational program. The statements are neither exhaustive nor applicable in all cases. This method highlights key areas of concern in most academic programs and provides a common framework for a self-study. The self-study report conveys the results of the college/school's self-assessment, both strengths and weaknesses. It succinctly describes, appraises, and projects the planned improvements derived from the self-assessment process.

2. Submission. A self-study report is forwarded from the JPME provider seeking accreditation or reaffirmation directly to the DDJS-ME not later than 45 days prior to the PAJE team visit.

3. Self-Study Format

a. Institutional Purpose. Provide information concerning the institution's purpose, to include the mission statement and other guidance such as vision and goals.

b. Organization

(1) Describe how the college/school is organized, to include an organizational diagram and how JPME fits into the organizational structure.

(2) Identify any committees or other bodies involved with development, review, and quality control of JPME, or the preparation and conduct of the institutional self-assessment undertaken for the PAJE review.

(3) Identify planned organizational changes that may affect JPME and explain their planned implementation.

(4) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations concerning the institution's organizational structure and JPME management practices.

c. Academic Programs and Curriculums

(1) Academic Programs. Briefly identify and describe the institution's major academic program(s).

(2) The JPME Curriculum

(a) Describe how JPME fits into the institution's academic program(s).

(b) Identify all courses that comprise the JPME curriculum. Also provide a list of guest speakers, the subject area of their presentations, and how their presentations support JPME learning areas and objectives.

(c) Provide a matrix that cross walks each JPME learning area and/or learning objective in the OPMEP to the course and lesson in the curriculum where it is addressed. (The requisite learning areas and/or learning objectives are identified in the appropriate appendix to Enclosure E.)

(d) Identify any major changes planned for current course(s) and explain their effect on JPME, to include the mission, statement, and other guidance such as vision, goals, and strategic plan.

(3) Curriculum Development. Describe the process used to develop and revise the JPME curriculum, to include the major participants and their roles. In particular, identify how internal and external feedback is used in revising the curriculum. Also identify the process used to ensure changes in joint doctrine and joint warfighting are incorporated into JPME.

(4) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations concerning the institution's academic programs and curriculums.

d. Academic Evaluation and Quality Control

(1) Explain how the college/school assesses students' success in attaining JPME objectives (see appropriate appendix to Enclosure E).

(2) Describe internal and external measures of assessment. Include grading procedures for students and curriculum evaluation methods for college/school effectiveness.

(3) List the remedial programs or assistance provided for students experiencing difficulty completing course work satisfactorily.

(4) Describe how program curriculum deficiencies are identified and required instructional or curriculum modifications are coordinated.

(5) Provide a copy of all instruments used to conduct follow-up surveys of students, graduates, their supervisors, and the joint leadership to determine curricula and educational effectiveness of their academic programs. Identify any established procedure ensuring data obtained is used to modify the curriculum in relation to graduates' performance in the field.

(6) Describe how the institution has acted on assessment findings in an effort to improve its effectiveness.

(7) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations concerning the institution's academic evaluation and quality control systems.

e. Instructional Climate

(1) Explain how the institution ensures academic freedom, faculty and student inquiry, open exploration of ideas, lively academic debate, and examination of appropriate curriculum issues.

(2) List active and passive learning methods used by the institution and the percentage of time students are involved in each.

(3) Describe how the institution approaches the JPME standard of joint awareness and joint perspectives. Explain what activities are used and describe how progress in this area is assessed.

(4) Identify the counseling and academic advisory services available to the students.

f. Student Body

(1) Describe the student body composition, to include affiliations by Service, department, or organization; specialty code or branch (for military students); grade; average time in Service; and level of civilian and military schooling.

(2) Identify the percentage of DOD and non-DOD civilian students within the student population.

(3) Describe the criteria and rationale used for achieving student mixes within seminars.

(4) Provide a breakdown of all seminars, to include student names, grade, Service, department or organizational affiliation, country, and specialty code.

(5) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations concerning the student body.

g. Faculty

(1) Identify JPME faculty qualifications and determine if they have appropriate credentials and experience. Identify all faculty members with any involvement with JPME, to include their function (e.g., teacher, curriculum development, and course director); Service, department, or organizational affiliation (if appropriate); grade; area of expertise; academic degree level; military education level; and relevant joint and Service operational experience.

(2) Describe the military faculty mix by Military Department. Include a list of all faculty designated as teaching faculty and what courses they teach.

(3) Identify the student-to-faculty ratio for the college/school and explain how these figures were computed. Include a list of all faculty used to compute this ratio.

(4) Describe orientation, training, and updating procedures established for faculty and staff members involved in JPME development and instruction.

(5) Describe faculty development programs available for improving instructional skills and increasing subject matter mastery in JPME (as identified in the appropriate appendix to Enclosure E).

(6) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations concerning the institution's faculty selection, qualifications, retention, or development.

h. Instructional Climate

(1) Explain how the institution ensures academic freedom, faculty and student inquiry, open exploration of ideas, lively academic debate, and examination of appropriate curriculum issues.

(2) List active and passive learning methods used by the institution and the percentage of time students are involved in each.

(3) Describe how the institution approaches the JPME standard of joint awareness and joint perspectives. Explain what activities are used and describe how progress in this area is assessed.

(4) Identify the counseling and academic advisory services available to the students.

i. Academic Support

(1) Library and Learning Resources Center

(a) Describe library or learning resource operations. Include a list of library or learning resources available to students and faculty and provide examples of types of materials directly supporting JPME curriculum requirements. Comment on availability and access to joint publications; Joint Electronic Library; Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System; and other resources that support JPME.

(b) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations in the library and its services, including: the staffing, the availability of electronic information resources, the information technology physically available, the print and non-print collections, the physical environs, adequacy of funding support, and the services provided to resident/non-resident students and faculty. This assessment should include results from formal and informal library surveys as well as the library administrators and staff.

(2) Physical Resources

(a) Describe the adequacy of the institution's physical facilities for the number of students, course offerings, faculty members, and other academic requirements.

(b) Describe the accessibility of technology and course material development resources.

(c) Identify noteworthy strengths or limitations in physical facilities.

(3) Financial Resources

(a) Identify sources of financial support to the institution. Describe the adequacy of these resources to support JPME curriculum development and course execution.

(b) Identify resource shortfalls affecting academic programs and explain how they affect the JPME curriculum.

(c) Describe any projected changes in resource allocation affecting the JPME curriculum.