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Cover: An Egyptian protester waves the Egyptian flag from atop the Qasr al-Nil Bridge in Cairo amid the violence that erupted during the 2011 uprisings. Photo courtesy of the Egyptian Liberal.
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President’s Foreword

Change is many things if not inevitable. It has become a pervasive part of everyday life, yet it defies description or analysis at its most basic level. While many see change as destructive, its presence means that people must continually evolve, adapt, and innovate to meet tomorrow’s challenges. This issue of the *Marine Corps University Journal* highlights the concept of change in all its forms.

Even as recent regional events in the Middle East have challenged the individual governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have been the most active in reshaping their existence in the wake of the Arab uprisings. In this issue’s lead article, Christopher Steinitz and William McCants posit that, for the United States, understanding the goals and motivations of these Gulf states remains key to effective international relations. At the regional level, Gulf states are in accord on the need to prevent instability even as their perspectives on the most dangerous threats vary as developments occur. At the global level, Gulf states hope to internationalize the security of the region by keeping the United States engaged and active in the area. While the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia are similar in many ways—particularly in their heritage, culture, language, political systems, and economies—their differences highlight the disparity of their goals, strategies, and approaches to foreign policies. While the United States should endeavor to avoid appearing biased toward a single Gulf state, it should actively support a common purpose with its allies for Syria and Egypt. Appearances suggest, however, that the issues with these two Arab states will not end until the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia move in the same direction.

The often volatile nature of human interaction indicates that deaths in areas of conflict will continue along cultural and ethnic fault lines, requiring the kind of mass atrocity prevention and response operations (MAPRO) discussed in the second article. In this piece, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Thieme believes that military forces involved in MAPRO activities must continually adjust to emerging and shifting factors, even if a force is already en route to foreign destinations buried in conflict. Thieme also suggests that
diplomats and peacekeepers fully understand that military forces are capable of bringing more to a volatile situation than a “large hammer.” Diplomats must consider that an external forceful response will likely act as an accelerant as the perpetrators react to the inevitable clash with intervening forces. These foreign interventions can work, however, when commanders are backed by proper political actions and given a large degree of autonomy, setting conditions for more stable conflict resolution with forces on the ground, as demonstrated by British forces during Operation Palliser when tensions in Sierra Leone boiled over into violence. Operation Palliser was a success, according to Thieme, because it combined three key enablers: the right person, the right command and control, and the right force structure. MAPRO are complex operations intended to deliver an end to killing. These foreign campaigns do offer a new model that better enables leaders to make timely decisions that might potentially bring an end to regional conflicts.

Finally, author David J. Ulbrich continues the discussion on the use of military forces as he traces the progression of strategic plans through the doctrinal formulation phase, to the force structure development phase, and finally through the equipment procurement phase, citing specific activities before and during the U.S. war with Japan and how that process is modeled today in current Marine Corps doctrinal development. In 1933, the creation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) gave the Corps a platform to support amphibious assault and base defense units. Committing the FMF to paper via doctrine served as the foundation for two tentative manuals—the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934) and the Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936)—but also looked to the future for a separate doctrinal work that would become the Small Wars Manual (1935 and 1940). As the global environment reacted to the threat of war, Marine Corps doctrine intersected with practice and recognized the principles that would be essential to their success: combining naval and aviation close air support with the Marine Corps’ amphibious assault, expanding logistical capabilities to maintain troop supplies on shore, and securing against counter-attack with specially equipped and trained defense battalions. The early problem-solving efforts of such legendary Marines as Pete El-
lis, Holland Smith, John Lejeune, and Thomas Holcomb became the legacy for understanding the critical concepts required by the operational challenges of the twenty-first century. As was the case in the 1920s and 1930s, the need to project military force and humanitarian assistance from the sea remains a priority, particularly when one considers that most of the world’s population lives within a couple hundred miles of major bodies of water. The Corps’ amphibious mission today may differ from the one it experienced in the Second World War, but it could be argued that Marines are in better shape today because they possess an integrated and tested force structure platform. Future doctrinal development must then keep pace with the speed, capacity, and agility of the Corps in the contemporary operating environment.

In a June 1963 address, President John F. Kennedy said, “Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or the present are certain to miss the future.” Marine Corps University is determined to not simply react to change as it happens, but rather to be a required educational element for American military forces and to represent the lodestone for academic discourse in our global world.

H. G. Pratt
Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
President, Marine Corps University
Demonstrators surge around an Egyptian Army vehicle in Tahrir Square in Cairo on 29 January 2011. Photo by Ramy Raoof.
Reaping the Whirlwind of the Arab Uprisings

by Christopher Steinitz and William McCants

Activism and competition between Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)\(^1\) have increased since the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia in late 2010. These developments come at a time when some observers have noted a strategic split between the United States and its Gulf allies. Understanding the motivations, behaviors, and capabilities of these significant regional players is important for the purposes of crafting U.S. policy toward the Middle East in an era of change and tumult.

Recent regional events have challenged each member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)\(^2\) uniquely, and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have been the most active of the Gulf monarchies in shaping the region in the wake of the Arab uprisings. The actions of these three nations over the past several years provide evidence of

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Steinitz is a research analyst with CNA Strategic Studies. As a Middle East specialist, Arabic linguist, and scholar of Islam, he has applied his expertise to studies dealing with the Arab world, Iran, and Pakistan. As a naval analyst, he has examined maritime security, maritime infrastructure protection, allied and Coalition capabilities, mine warfare, and carrier strike group operations. Steinitz also tracks global maritime trends and contributes to CNA’s wargame development team. He earned his MA in Arab studies from Georgetown University, where he also received a certificate for advanced proficiency in Arabic. His BA in political science is from La Salle University, and he has been the recipient of a Fulbright research grant to Kuwait.

McCants is a fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy and director of its Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World at the Brookings Institution. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Johns Hopkins University and has held various government and think tank positions related to Islam, the Middle East, and terrorism. From 2009–11, McCants served as a U.S. State Department senior adviser for countering violent extremism. He has also held positions as program manager of the Minerva Initiative for the Department of Defense; an analyst at the Institute for Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and SAIC; and a fellow at West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center. McCants has a PhD from Princeton University and has lived in Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon. This article was taken in part from a CNA report published in 2014 titled *Reaping the Whirlwind: Gulf State Competition after the Arab Uprisings*, coauthored by Steinitz and McCants.

\(^1\) A federation of seven emirates along the eastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula.

\(^2\) The GCC was established in 1981 between Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For more information, see the Global Security Web site at http://www.global-security.org/military/world/gulf/gcc.htm.
their evolving strategic calculus and national capabilities in a time of regional crisis. These activities also reveal important differences in approach that have created tensions and promoted competition among the members of the GCC. Understanding the goals and motivations of the Gulf states is an important key to maintaining effective U.S. relations with these important regional players, particularly as many observers have commented on a possible strategic divide between Washington and its Gulf allies.
For the Gulf Arabs, domestic security begins abroad. The events transpiring in two of the most critical Arab countries—Egypt and Syria—have not only rattled the core strategic concerns of the Gulf states, they have provoked responses that reveal important differences in approach and outlook among the GCC countries. This article examines the activities of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in dealing with the unfolding situations in both of these countries in order to better understand the strategic concerns of these Gulf countries.

Gulf Concerns

Although the Arab uprisings\(^3\) ushered in an era of tremendous change, the foreign policy determinants of the Gulf Arab monarchies have remained largely the same. Long before 2011, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE formulated their foreign policies to deal with challenges that emanate from domestic, regional, and global levels. While there are similar interests among the GCC states, the differences in approach give rise to disagreements and competition.

At the domestic level, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are each acutely aware that numerous threats to their political stability have emerged as ideological movements in other countries. From Arab nationalism, to revolutionary Shiism, to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB),\(^4\) transnational groups can impact the domestic politics of the Gulf monar-

\(^3\) The Arab uprisings, also known as the Arab Spring, were a series of antigovernment protests, insurrections, and armed rebellions that began in Tunisia in late 2010, and spread across the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011. For a deeper description of the events and issues at play, see http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/SR011.aspx.

\(^4\) Founded in 1928 by Egyptian schoolteacher/activist Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood—a Sunni entity—is one of the oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organizations in the world.
chieds and create opportunities to foster instability. Since 2011, a key difference among the Saudis, Qataris, and Emiratis has been in their approach to the MB. While the Saudis and the Emiratis have long worked to eliminate the group’s influence, the Qatari approach was to co-opt it to limit its political influence in Doha, while allowing the MB to pursue its regional ambitions elsewhere.

At the regional level, the Gulf states agree on the need to counter instability, though their perspective on the most dangerous threat changes with regional developments. To limit the impact of this instability, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular, have invested heavily in media and diplomatic efforts to cultivate their regional leadership, while the UAE has taken a more subdued approach. All three of these states use financial investments to cultivate regional influence.

At the global level, the Gulf monarchies seek to internationalize the security of the Gulf by keeping the United States involved. At this level, their priorities have been to establish their reputations as responsible global citizens and to nurture strong ties with influential world powers. As a result of their economic position, the Gulf states inherently rely on good business relations throughout the world. They also look to extraregional powers to provide an external source of security and stability. While the United States in recent decades has essentially played the role of the region’s policeman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE are all keen to broaden their security ties with other outside powers to diversify their security partnerships as a means to address their relative military weakness compared with regional states such as Iraq and Iran.

While Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE were able to limit the impact of the uprisings in their own countries, they each recognized the threats that could emerge from destabilization across the region. Though regional events in Egypt and Syria have had a dramat-
ic impact on the political landscape, the Gulf monarchies continue to craft their foreign policies to counter transnational groups, limit instability, expand their regional influence, and engage the international community—particularly the United States—in regional security.

**Egypt**

The most significant factor in determining the policies of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE toward Egypt has been their perceptions of the MB. The Saudis and Emiratis perceive the brotherhood to be a domestic threat; the Qataris do not. The Gulf monarchies’ fear that the Egyptian revolution would spread to the Gulf emerged in the early days of 2011 and became tangible to the UAE when the government arrested an alleged cell of Egyptian MB activists in early 2013.5

Despite differing views of the challenge posed by the Egyptian uprisings, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have used similar foreign policy tools. They have each used their wealth to provide direct financial support to the Central Bank of Egypt, and they have directed investments to build the country’s future. When they provided this assistance and how much they provided reflect the changing levels of confidence Gulf leaders have in each successive Egyptian government. Qatar favored the Mohammed Morsi government while Saudi Arabia and UAE provided massive assistance to the military-led government that followed.

After Morsi was removed as president of Egypt, Qatar’s efforts to leverage its economic clout to influence the new government’s behavior backfired and contributed to the souring of the Qatar-Egypt relationship. Despite the extensive investments Qatar had made in Egypt during the Morsi era, the new Egyptian government viewed this aid as dispensable as a result of Saudi and Emirati aid that was delivered without condition.

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5 For more information on this incident, see http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/world/middleeast/in-egypt-arrest-of-5-anti-islamist-figures-sought.html?_r=0.
The different perspectives on the MB led to the rift that has erupted between Qatar on one side and Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the other. The current Egyptian government’s perception of the MB is likely to foster closer ties with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. By the same token, the question of Qatar-Egypt relations will also rest upon how—or indeed if—either side will compromise on its perspective toward the MB.

**Syria**

Though Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been united in the belief that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad should step aside, their competition in Syria has become the defining feature of their policies, as they have differed over which part of the opposition to support. Both have paid lip service to unifying the opposition, but both have hedged their bets on Syria’s future by arming groups favorable to their regional and domestic interests.

The primary Gulf actors on the Syrian issue are Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Both have made extensive use of diplomatic and financial tools in their efforts to remove Assad from power. The UAE has followed the Saudi lead, but has been notably less active than its neighbors on the Syrian issue. The Saudis, Qatars, and Emiratis have found consensus on Syria in the GCC and have worked together in the Arab League⁶ to pass resolutions, issue statements of support, and offer recognition to the opposition. Despite these diplomatic activities, the Gulf states have failed to rally the international community at the United Nations (UN), where Russia and China have continued to block any decisive action. When, in 2012, it became apparent that an international diplomatic solution was beyond reach, Qatar and Saudi Arabia began to spend tens of millions of dollars to fund their preferred—and frequently competing—rebel groups.

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⁶ Also known as the League of Arab States (LAS), this organization was formed in 1945 to focus on the political, cultural, economic, and social programs of its members and to mediate disputes among the regions or between them and third parties. Today the members of the Arab League are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE, and Yemen.
Changing Perspective in the Gulf

Over the past several years, the perspective from the Gulf has clearly not always paralleled the perspective from Washington. These differences have sparked discussion of a recent strategic split between the United States and its Gulf allies. Saudi Arabia has been particularly vocal in expressing its concerns on this matter. As early as May 2011, Saudi pundits declared a strategic divorce with the United States, claiming that in some cases “the kingdom will pursue its own agenda.”7 President Barack H. Obama’s March 2014 visit to Riyadh was typically interpreted in the context of a “drift” in the relationship.8 Other Gulf Arab states also voiced their concerns about the status of the relationship, though not as loudly. Ultimately, this article seeks to shed light on the ability of the Gulf Arabs to “go it alone” in the region, and the implications of a rising tier of regional actors that may perceive strategic differences with the United States.

Previous studies of the Gulf states and Arab uprisings focused on how they have reacted to protests and uprisings internally. Indeed, in spring 2011, each of these states experienced protests of varying degrees and responded to them differently. Yet the activities of these countries were not limited to their domestic policies, and they do reflect a regional response to matters of their own national security. Moreover, their activities also revealed important differences in approach that created tensions and promoted competition among GCC members.

The Foreign Policies of the Gulf States

Our discussion begins with the determinants of foreign policy for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to establish a baseline for understanding the strategic priorities and approaches of these three countries in the subsequent case studies. These countries are similar in many ways: in their heritage, culture, language, political systems, and economies. Despite these similarities, there are important differences among the Gulf states that foster dissimilar goals, strategies, and approaches in their foreign policies. These variances also lead to competition and disputes that can, at times, be quite sharp. And even though the GCC serves as a regional forum for its members to interact on issues of mutual concern, its members do not act in lock-step. Indeed, the historical record shows that they rarely coordinate their policies.

### Table 1. Sources used for this analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic literature</td>
<td>A corpus of work examining the foreign policies of the Gulf states that predates the Arab uprisings and that was useful to provide context for recent responses to regional developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media reporting</td>
<td>Both traditional and social media sources offer a wealth of information on developments in Egypt and Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official statements</td>
<td>The authors conducted an analysis of the public statements and activities of senior Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati policy makers, as reported in official and independent wire services, to track the priorities of these governments as their policy priorities shifted over the past three years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>The authors conducted interviews with an expansive range of subjects to inform our findings and deepen our understanding of the regional dynamics at play. Interviewees included current and former U.S. and Arab government officials, journalists, academics, and other subject matter experts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Each country’s foreign policy perspective derives from geopolitical and historical factors. Saudi Arabia is the largest and longest-established of the Gulf Arab states. The kingdom has a long history of diplomacy and regional leadership. Nearly 30 years before its smaller neighbors gained independence, King Abdulaziz ibn al-Saud was corresponding with U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt over the fate of Palestine and its Arab population. Since the death of Abdulaziz in 1953, his sons—including King Salman, who ascended to the throne in January 2015—have ruled the kingdom. The formative years of many of Saudi Arabia’s key leaders—such as King Abdullah, who ruled the kingdom when the uprisings began—were shaped by the fall of monarchies in Egypt and Iraq in the 1950s, along with the instability in Syria and Yemen that had been generated by the rise of Arab nationalist leaders.

Not only has the al-Saud dynasty ruled a sovereign country for twice as long as many of Saudi Arabia’s smaller neighbors, the kingdom’s geography and population make it fundamentally different from the region’s other countries. Saudi Arabia is an expansive country, encompassing the majority of the Arabian Peninsula, with a population of more than 27 million. While Saudi Arabia recoups great wealth from its oil resources, its population as a whole is not as wealthy as those of the smaller emirates. The Saudis have wrestled with domestic discontent fueled by political, religious, and communal sources over the decades, leaving a significant vulnerability to transnational actors.

Qatar is simultaneously one of the world’s smallest countries and one of the richest. Though its population is only about two million—the vast majority of whom are expatriate workers—it also owns the world’s third largest natural gas reserves. Thus, its domestic politics are more akin to a medium-sized city, while its gas-derived revenues have facilitated its pursuit of an aggressive and highly visible foreign policy. Qatar’s approach to life in a dangerous region relies in part on bandwagoning with allies—it is a member of the GCC and hosts

As early as May 2011, Saudi pundits declared a strategic divorce with the United States, claiming that in some cases “the kingdom will pursue its own agenda.”
U.S. military forces—as well as hedging, as it reaches out readily to potential adversaries.

Qatar has established itself as the region’s foreign policy maverick. As a Qatari general noted, “In the future, you will never know who your friends will be, or from where you will need help.” For this reason, Doha seeks good relations with as many significant players as possible. Another purpose of this hedging strategy, however, is to underscore its independence from Saudi influence.

The UAE is unique among the Gulf states in that it is a federation of seven previously independent emirates—Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, and Fujairah. Abu Dhabi dominates the other six politically, particularly when it comes to foreign policy. Yet there have been instances of the smaller emirates breaking with Abu Dhabi’s preferred policy. The UAE’s first foreign policy crisis, Iran’s seizure of the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunb islands upon the country’s unification and independence in 1971, was complicated by the fact that Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, and Ras al-Khaima each developed different approaches to Iran’s hostility. During the Iran-Iraq War, Dubai publically supported Iran, while Abu Dhabi backed Iraq. In the past decade, however, a greater sense of unity has emerged across the emirates as a result of both regional changes and Abu Dhabi’s efforts to consolidate elements of federal power.

The divergence of the GCC states’ foreign policies amid their clear common interest is a matter of how different national leaders manage a variety of pressures on their countries. This divergence is also the starting point for competition among them. For the purposes of examining the determinants of Gulf states’ foreign policies,

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9 Interview with a senior Qatari military official, Dubai, May 2011.
we can categorize these pressures as emanating from the domestic, regional, and global levels. Regardless of their source, these pressures are closely intertwined and ultimately related to domestic security. Over the years, this framework has been remarkably constant. Long before the 2011 uprisings, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE formulated their foreign policies on several basic principles, such as limiting the influence of transnational groups, countering regional instability, and internationalizing regional security. This framework will guide the following discussion of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.

Domestic Level

The first level of Gulf foreign policy focuses on mitigating threats to domestic security. While it may seem counterintuitive, domestic security begins abroad in the Gulf region; many of the existential threats the Gulf regimes have perceived over the years have originated as ideological movements in other countries. Such movements threaten security because they can have spillover effects on neighbors’ domestic politics and provide opportunities to destabilize or remove rival regimes.

For example, from the 1950s to the 1970s, Arab nationalist parties supported by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser were the primary challengers to the monarchies of the Middle East. While Egypt funded Saudi dissidents who opposed the monarchy, the Saudis fought a proxy war against the Egyptian Army in Yemen in the 1960s to prevent the spread of Arab nationalist influence.

In the past decade, however, a greater sense of unity has emerged across the emirates as a result of both regional changes and Abu Dhabi’s efforts to consolidate elements of federal power.

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As the threat from Arab nationalism ebbed in the 1970s, the specter of Islamism grew. In the 1960s, MB activists fleeing Nasser’s Egypt found safe haven in the Gulf states. Many members of the brotherhood were well educated, had technocratic experience, and typically established themselves as teachers and bureaucrats. Saudi Arabia welcomed dissidents from Nasser’s Egypt as long as they refrained from interfering in the domestic politics of the kingdom. With their own small populations, Qatar and the UAE came to rely on these Egyptian expatriates to fill many roles in their growing economies.

By the early 1990s, MB organizations in the Gulf began agitating for change. The Gulf monarchies came to consider the movement dangerous because of its populist appeal and its decades of experience in social and political organization, and because of the viable political alternative to monarchical rule that it offered. In Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) stood at the forefront of the movement for political reform known as the Sahwa Movement. This fresh activism sparked a government crackdown on the MB’s political activities inside the kingdom. 12 Perhaps inspired by events in the region, the MB affiliate in the UAE, Hizb al-Islah (the Reform Party), also became more outspoken, and eventually Emirati leaders came to see it as a growing and possibly destabilizing threat.13

Qatar adopted a different approach to local MB-inspired activism. Rather than repress the organization, Emir Hamad ibn Khalifah al-Thani struck a political agreement with the local MB affiliates, which led to the organization’s disbanding in Doha in 1999.14 Brotherhood members were allowed freedom of movement in return for not engaging in local political activities. While this agree-

ment successfully inoculated the Qatari regime from a disruptive MB influence, it also created a platform for the organization’s influence to spread to neighboring states. For example, the popular television personality Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an MB cleric and long-term Egyptian expatriate in Qatar, broadcasts his program on Al Jazeera and has been a perpetual source of irritation to Qatar’s neighbors in the Gulf since 1996. Inevitably, al-Qaradawi remained a nuisance for those neighbors of Qatar working to eradicate the MB’s influence.

The Gulf Arabs have also worked to limit the influence of Shia organizations that they perceive as being susceptible to or controlled by Iran. After 1979, Iran sought to export its revolution by supporting Shia revolutionaries and militants around the region. These efforts were destabilizing not simply because of their revolutionary nature, but because these groups were able to capitalize on the grievances of Shia populations toward their Sunni governments. With a sizable Shia population that suffered from a lack of both economic and political opportunity, Saudi Arabia in particular has long feared Iran’s potential to take advantage of that domestic discontent.15

The awareness of transnational threats to domestic stability is not limited to nonstate actors, but also feeds the sense of competition in the Gulf. Qatar, for example, is sharply aware of the ability of groups with foreign connections to make trouble. In 1996, a year after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani deposed his father as emir, Qatar arrested a group of dissidents backed by Saudi Arabia who sought to return the previous leader to power. As a result, Qatar sees its larger neighbor as both an ally in the GCC and also as a potential threat.

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Regional Level

The Gulf states also conduct foreign policy to deal with challenges at the regional level. Throughout the Middle East, the Gulf states have endeavored to counter regional instability while expanding their own influence.\(^{16}\) As a result, numerous threats to the Gulf concept of regional stability have emerged and receded—the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, Iraq, and Iran, for example. In response, the Gulf states have pursued numerous diplomatic, financial, and media efforts to shape the region and limit instability. At times, Saudi, Qatari, and Emirati efforts have dovetailed, and at other times they have conflicted, reflecting the internal GCC competition.

Of course, Gulf threat perceptions evolve based on changing regional circumstances. After 1979, the Gulf monarchies recognized an acute threat from revolutionary Iran and coordinated with Iraq for the duration of the 1980s to counter this threat. They also allied under the banner of the GCC in 1981 to promote collective security against the threat posed by Iran. Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, however, dramatically altered the threat calculus and pushed the Gulf states to pursue closer security ties with the United States. Removing Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 eliminated Iraq as a military threat, and once again the Gulf states became focused on Iran as the premier challenge to the region.

Saudi Arabia clearly perceives Iran as the most significant threat to regional stability, primarily because of its support for transnational groups, its pursuit of nuclear weapons, and its meddling in what the Saudis consider Arab affairs (e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict). Since 2006, the kingdom has been more assertive in pushing back against Iranian influence—a new approach for a country that has traditionally preferred quiet diplomacy to an active leading role. In Lebanon, the Saudis actively backed the anti-Syrian March

\(^{16}\) For the purpose of this article, we consider “regional stability” a condition in which the status quo is tenable, the uncertainty of crises is minimized, and matters that tend to inflame popular unrest are muted.
14 Alliance\textsuperscript{17} in an effort to stave off the expanding role of Hezbollah, whose primary backer is Iran. In Iraq, the Saudi kingdom lent significant diplomatic and financial support to Iraqi politician Iyad Allawi as a way to counter Iranian influence. The Saudis also took military action against Houthi rebels in Yemen, fearing Iranian support for the group. While Saudi Arabia is not opposed to dialogue or negotiation with Iran—indeed, the Saudi embassy continues to operate in Tehran—this deep mistrust of Iranian intent in recent years provides a foundation for Saudi actions in the wake of the Arab uprisings.

Abu Dhabi shares Saudi wariness of Iran and typically follows Riyadh’s lead on Iran policy, but it holds a somewhat more complex position: the UAE is party to an ongoing territorial dispute with Iran over the Abu Musa and Tunb islands that Iran occupied as the British transferred sovereignty to the emirates in 1971. Moreover, the UAE’s relationship with Iran is complicated by its federated system of governance. While Abu Dhabi officially steers the country’s foreign policies, there is ample historical precedence for the smaller emirates to challenge a unified policy. Dubai in particular has been more willing to engage Iran because of the importance of its cross-Gulf economic relationship.

Doha’s relations with Iran distinguish it from both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. While Qatari leaders express skepticism and mistrust of Iran in private conversations, Qatar stands out (along with Oman) among the GCC states for its relatively close relations with the Islamic Republic. In

\textit{Removing Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 eliminated Iraq as a military threat, and once again the Gulf states became focused on Iran as the premier challenge to the region.}

\textsuperscript{17} Formed during the Cedar Revolution, this coalition within the Lebanese government united to push Syria out after the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri. For more information on the March 14 Alliance, refer to the Reut Institute at http://reut-institute.org/en/Publication.aspx?PublicationId=1272.
part, this is a matter of practicality. Qatar shares the North Dome natural gas field with Iran; this field is not only the third largest in the world, but it is the primary source of Qatar’s wealth.\textsuperscript{18} The Qatari leaders choose to maintain cordial relations with Iran to avoid diplomatic and economic ripples that could hamstring their national economy. Yet, Qatar–Iran relations are also a matter of real-politik (or practical politics), as Qatari leaders are conscious of the military imbalance that greatly favors Iran—hence Doha’s pursuit of military ties with the United States to counter Iran.

Qatar’s approach to Iran is part of a larger strategy to influence the region and an element of its competition with Saudi Arabia. Qatar has been particularly keen to emphasize its relationship with Iran when Saudi Arabia has pressed for greater influence over Doha. Whereas Saudi Arabia has tended to decry actors it sees as problematic—such as Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah—Qatar has actively engaged them. While observers have been regularly bemused by Qatar’s seemingly contradictory relationships, the Qatari government seems to believe that the pursuit of regional relationships with multiple parties is essential to its self-defense.\textsuperscript{19}

To inoculate the region against the malign influence of Iran and others, the Gulf states have attempted to expand their influence throughout the broader Middle East. Saudi Arabia has the advantage of controlling Mecca and Medina—the two most important sites in Islam—and the al-Saud family sees itself as the protectors of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Declared the “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” the king’s position is imbued with this protectorate notion and also contributes to the Saudi image as a regional leader. Since King Faisal bin Abdulaziz al-Saud convened the first Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in 1970, Saudi leaders have attempted to assert their leadership via the legitimacy conferred upon them as protectors of Islam’s holiest sites. This Saudi religious authority


also justifies the distribution of largesse to poorer Arab (and other) nations as humanitarian assistance rather than as political favoritism.\(^{20}\)

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have invested in media outlets to press their regional influence. After seeing the impact of the international media on the Gulf War of 1990–91, Saudi Arabia began to invest heavily in regional media outlets. It bought up newspapers and launched the Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC), the Arab world’s first satellite broadcasting company, although it remained limited in scope throughout the 1990s. In 1996, however, Qatar fundamentally changed the media landscape of the Arab world by launching the satellite news network Al Jazeera. Al Jazeera’s dramatic effect on the region cannot be understated, and its identity is intrinsically tied to that of the Qatari state. During the al-Aqsa Intifada\(^{21}\) in 2000 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al Jazeera served as a unifying source of information, building a sense of pan-Arab solidarity and people power over the years. Al Jazeera was positioned to play an important role in the Arab uprisings, as its coverage offered the Arab world a common political space for more than a decade before protests in Tunisia erupted in 2010.\(^{22}\)

The Saudi response to Al Jazeera is Al Arabiya, which was launched in 2003 as a deliberate counter to Al Jazeera’s editorial profile, which is typically pan-Arab, pro-MB, and anti-Saudi. According to a senior manager at Al Arabiya, the Saudi government sees the network as a tool to influence the region; its management


\(^{21}\) The al-Aqsa Intifada is a period of heightened violence between Israelis and Palestinians during 2000–5.

strives to be a positive influence by touting a modern voice that fits within the rubric of the Saudi reformist camp. The channel strives to be progressive, but within parameters acceptable to Saudi leadership.

Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also employed diplomatic efforts to cultivate their regional influence. Qatar has developed a niche capacity for regional intervention and has a proven record of mediating between parties in Lebanon, Yemen, and Sudan. This technique has relied heavily on both Qatar’s financial ability—which allows it to not only host the talks, but to provide lucrative incentives to reach resolution—and the personal involvement of the country’s leaders. Qatar has also been able to leverage its regional perception as a neutral party to gain the acceptance of parties on both sides of the negotiating table. This special role has enabled Qatar to emerge as a regional player.

Saudi Arabia has long considered itself the region’s senior diplomat. Compared to Qatar, the Saudi approach to mediation tends to be less personal and more reliant on the kingdom’s long-established institutions. Saudi Arabia has made efforts to mediate in Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine. Riyadh has also pushed for a comprehensive peace with Israel for more than a decade, and this topic regularly receives top billing in Saudi policy statements. Over the long term, Saudi Arabia sees the unresolved issue of Palestine as a dangerous and destabilizing wound in the region. The danger of the situation in Saudi eyes is not Israel per se, but the uncertainty of crises associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the absence of resolution, the Palestinian cause continues to fuel rage and discontent across the Arab world and provides an easy complaint for players looking to capitalize on that sentiment.

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE rely on a wide variety of economic tools at their disposal to influence the region’s political

24 Mehran Kamrava, “Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,” Middle East Journal 65, no. 4 (Autumn 2011).
course and promote stability. Most of these economic tools derive from the vast hydrocarbon revenues that drive their economies. All three countries have robust and active sovereign wealth funds. These funds profitably invest hydrocarbon money, diversify the economic portfolios of these countries, bolster economic linkages with target countries, and bring prestige to the nations. These countries are also home to several organizations dedicated to development or charitable giving that serve as conduits for distributing aid, much of which has been used to cultivate influence in the Arab world (table 2). Yet regionally, the most significant economic initiative has been the GCC itself, which has, over the past 30 years, made significant, if slow, progress toward economic integration.26 It has also allowed its six members to form a caucus in the Arab League that is often able to set the body’s agenda and lead its decisions.27 This initiative illustrates how the GCC is one of the key tools by which its members can exercise influence in the region.

Global Level
The Gulf states also craft their foreign policies to deal with global issues. At this level, their priorities have been to establish their reputations as responsible global citizens and to maintain ties to influential world powers. Their geographical vulnerability and lack of military capacity lead them to seek external sources of defense, namely the United States for the past quarter century. In addition, the Gulf states’ economic well-being relies on good business relations throughout the world. They need countries with large economies to purchase oil and hold their investments, but also those with...
large populations to provide technical and manual labor. The policies of the Gulf states are not necessarily static. For example, over the past decade, GCC states have consistently increased their economic and political interaction with Asia, especially China, India, and South Korea.  

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\[28\] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, *The Gulf States and the Rebalancing of Regional and Global Power* (Houston: Rice University, James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 8 January 2014).
Saudi Arabia has had a global economic presence since the 1930s, when it first became a producer of oil. Initially, the primary customer of Saudi oil was the United States, but the changes in global energy markets have shifted over time. Today, China and other Asian states consume a larger portion of Saudi oil than the United States. Commensurate with its global economic involvement, Saudi Arabia has also been an active participant in the UN’s international financial institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—and the World Trade Organization.\(^{29}\) Such activity is by no means unique and does not distinguish the kingdom from other global powers. However, participation in these organizations marks a significant line of effort that the Saudis use to influence the global political arena. In recent years, the Saudis have felt more empowered to use those positions to push for global economic policy changes. For example, after the 2008 global economic crisis, Saudi Arabia used its position in the Group of Twenty (G20)\(^{30}\) and on the IMF board to call for changes to the international financial architecture.\(^{31}\)

Though it is a more recent presence on the global stage, Qatar has fastidiously worked to establish its diplomatic credentials in international forums. Qatar secured a position on the UN Security Council from 2006 to 2008, and lobbied to have one of its top diplomats, Nassir Abdulaziz al-Nasser, elected as president of the UN General Assembly in 2011. Over time, Qatar has also been more willing to use these positions to advance policy changes. In 2008, for example, Qatar was involved in such efforts as the World Economic Forum’s Global Redesign Initiative that was intended to channel the views of smaller states into the G20 process.\(^{32}\)

In addition, Qatar has pursued an international branding campaign, seeking high-visibility opportunities to promote itself glob-

\(^{29}\) Giulio Gallarotti and Isam Yahia Al Filali, *The Soft Power of Saudi Arabia*, Division II Faculty Publications/Paper 140 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University, January 2013).

\(^{30}\) The G20 is a forum of international finance ministers and bank governors interested in advancing cooperation and coordination among 20 major advanced and emerging economies. The G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union (EU).

\(^{31}\) Ulrichsen, *Gulf States*.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
ally in other venues. For example, Qatar has worked to attract international sporting events, such as the 15th Asian Games in 2006 and the 2022 FIFA World Cup.\textsuperscript{33} It has also invested heavily in such prominent institutions as Barclays, Porsche, and Harrods department store.\textsuperscript{34} These efforts were intended to increase Qatar’s recognition around the world and to establish it as a major global player.

The Gulf states also look beyond their immediate sphere of influence to provide an external source of security and stability. For the Gulf Arabs, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait illustrated the ability and willingness of a militarily powerful neighbor to impose its will on a smaller one without contest. As a result, the Gulf Arab states seek to internationalize the security of the Gulf and ensure that extraregional actors also have a stake in regional security. In stark contrast to Iran—or Iraq previously—the Gulf Arabs work to keep as many global powers tied to the region as possible. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE each rely on an alliance with the United States to support their national security.

A cornerstone of Saudi security has been its relationship with the United States. While the kingdom has one of the largest military expenditures in the world, its military capabilities do not match its investments. Thus, Saudi Arabia seeks to keep the United States actively involved in both regional security matters and the kingdom’s defense not only by emphasizing their mutual security interests, but by engaging America in its security. In 2010, for example, the kingdom announced an agreement with the United States that would

\textsuperscript{33} The FIFA World Cup bid has come under increasing scrutiny for allegations ranging from corruption to inhumane treatment of workers. Nevertheless, Doha’s quest for the 2022 World Cup venue demonstrates its determination to position itself on the global stage.

provide advanced aircraft—McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagles—to the Royal Saudi Air Force, a deal worth an estimated $60 billion.\(^{35}\) Saudi Arabia is also pursuing major programs with the United States, such as the joint Office of Program Management–Ministry of Interior (OPM-MOI) initiative that seeks to improve domestic and infrastructure security.\(^{36}\)

Qatar has actively engaged the United States as its primary security partner since the early 1990s. The cornerstone of this relationship is that Qatar hosts the U.S. Central Command’s forward headquarters at the al-Udeid Air Base. Hosting this command’s forward headquarters provides Qatar with an important link to the United States and security against potentially hostile neighbors. Notably, this relationship also plays a role in Qatar’s competition with Saudi Arabia. In 2002, the Saudis protested the planned invasion of Iraq by denying the United States use of Prince Sultan Air Base for that purpose. Qatar’s timely opening of al-Udeid to the United States removed a valuable lever that the Saudis could use to shape U.S. behavior in the region. In this way, the U.S. presence supports Qatar’s strategy to maintain its sovereignty and assert its regional leadership.

Like its neighbors, the UAE has engaged the United States as its primary security ally because, as an Emirati academic observed, the Emirates continues to see the United States as “the only game in town” for providing regional security.\(^{37}\) But while the UAE has looked to America to be the primary guarantor of its security, it has also pursued security ties with other nations. The UAE has purchased arms not only from the United States, but also from Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Ukraine. Abu Dhabi maintains its historical relationship with the United Kingdom, but also hosts a French naval air station and pursues strategic partnerships with a variety of countries, including a $20 billion deal


\(^{37}\) Interview with Emirati academic, Abu Dhabi, May 2011.
with South Korea to support the UAE’s nuclear energy program. While the UAE tends to align itself with Saudi Arabia in regional affairs, it certainly seems to favor a hedging approach when it comes to engaging global powers as security guarantors.

**The Arab Uprisings**

The uprisings of 2010–11 shook the Arab world and prompted a process of forging new norms and rules governing regional interactions. For such countries as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Syria, the most dramatic change involved revolutions in their internal dynamics. In Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, however, the spillover effect was minimal. The most major events were that Saudi Arabia witnessed some significant protests from its Shia population, and reformers in the UAE publicly petitioned for greater political participation. The limited repercussions are attributable, in large part, to the financial ability of these countries to mollify much of the discontent in their countries. Saudi Arabia, for example, immediately pledged $130 billion in projects and handouts to its population to preempt escalating protest.

From the perspectives of these Gulf states, domestic crises had been managed, but the potential for more political turbulence resulting from broader regional instability remained. Understanding that domestic security begins abroad, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and to a lesser extent the UAE took the initiative to respond to these regional threats. The most dramatic manifestation of unrest in the Gulf states erupted in Bahrain, where the government suppressed protests with overwhelming force. Saudi Arabia then led the drive to forge a GCC-wide military operation to support the crackdown. The Saudi kingdom also pledged $20 billion each to Bahrain and Oman to bolster those governments against

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further unrest. Additionally, the Gulf states took significant action in Yemen; Saudi Arabia led an effort to mediate a governmental transition from then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh to a successor who would be more politically acceptable to protestors. Qatar and the UAE surprised many by contributing aircraft to Operation Unified Protector, the UN-sanctioned operation to protect Libyan civilians from the brutality of Muammar Qaddafi’s regime. The sum total of these actions gave many observers the impression that the Arab uprisings launched a new era of aggressive GCC policy throughout the broader Middle East.

Taking Stock

The 2010 and 2011 uprisings brought fundamental changes to the Arab world. In some countries, such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, the momentum of events resulted in revolutions that changed the governments and leadership. In other cases, such as Syria, though the regimes persisted, they were forced to contend with existential threats and bitterly divisive situations. Even those governments that were able to manage their own domestic situations so as to avoid significant unrest were forced to deal with new crises that threatened the stability of the region.

In the midst of the turmoil of rapid change, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have been among the most active regional players responding to these challenges. Each of these three Gulf states was insulated from the worst of the shocks of 2011. Moreover, each had the means to engage beyond its borders to address their national security concerns. These three states have led the Arab world diplomatically through the GCC and the League of Arab States, but have also demonstrated their leadership through their actions in those countries that have experienced destabilizing uprisings. Yet despite their intermittent cooperation, these three countries have often been bitterly divided over how to achieve what are ostensibly similar objectives. The actions of these three Gulf Arab states throughout the region offer insights into their strategic priorities in a new and uncertain era.
Shared Concerns, Different Approaches

Since the Arab uprisings, the foreign activities of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE have been motivated by enduring goals, though a divide in the GCC has emerged over approaches to achieving those goals. Gulf leaders have been clear in expressing their belief that their own security is tied to the stability of Egypt, and they have endeavored to ensure the country’s success. They have differed, however, in their assessments of the threat posed by the MB and its ability to support or inspire transnational groups. Whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE worked to curtail the growing influence of the MB, Qatar allied itself with the organization as its influence increased in Egypt. This division builds from differing approaches toward the MB that date back to the 1990s.

In Syria, the Gulf states at first opted for stability as they encouraged President Bashar al-Assad to pursue reforms that would address widespread discontent. Yet, as the brutality of the repression continued, the Gulf nations became more committed to removing Assad from power, fearing that the extreme violence would become destabilizing to the region. These fears were recognized when, after the 25 May 2012 Houla massacre, Gulf funding and fighters flooded into Syria, adding fuel to the crisis and increasing the potential for domestic radicalization. Moreover, the Gulf states’ anger over Assad’s tyrannical approach was exacerbated by the support the Syrian regime received from Hezbollah and Iran. Saudi Arabia’s al-Faisal made clear the Gulf perspective when he declared in June 2013 that “Syria can only be considered an occupied land.”40 The Gulf states have long harbored concerns about Iran’s influence in Syria, and the support the Islamic Republic has lent Assad since 2011 only proves that it has greater influence in Damascus than they do.

39 The Houla massacre occurred in the Houla region of Syria, primarily in the village of Taldou. According to UN spokesman Rupert Colville, 108 people were killed, including 34 women and 49 children, mostly in summary executions. In a 2012 report, the UN stated that Syrian government troops and the Shabbiha (pro-government militia) were likely responsible for the bloodshed.

40 “Remarks with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal after Their Meeting” (remarks of Secretary of State John F. Kerry, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, 25 June 2013).
Gulf activities since 2011 have also reinforced the notion that the states greatly desire extraregional involvement, as long as it supports their interests. The persistent efforts of the Saudis, Qataris, and Emiratis to prod the international community into action via the GCC, Arab League, and UN certainly attest to their desire to internationalize regional conflicts. Yet Gulf frustration with the United States builds upon what is perceived to be inaction in the face of Russian and Iranian interference in Syria. In Egypt, Gulf perspectives on international involvement were complicated by their own political divisions. While Qatar’s desire for the government of Egypt to engage the MB following Morsi’s expulsion closely paralleled U.S. policy, Saudi and Emirati policies supported the crackdown. This divergence of policies then further contributed to the Saudi perception that the United States was not playing a positive regional role. The Gulf states therefore seek international backing for their positions, but are keen to ensure that international action supports their own ends.

The increased activity of the Gulf Arabs and the notable difference from the U.S. approach indicates to some observers a strategic split with the United States. Saudi commentators have been the most vocal in claiming that the kingdom will “go it alone” if the United States is unwilling to intervene. 41 Although the Saudis have been particularly vocal in their dissatisfaction with U.S. policy, the sentiment is widely shared throughout the GCC. A significant part of this divide, like the divide within the GCC itself, relates to differing evaluations of what constitutes a destabilizing threat. While the United States would like its allies to embrace more open political systems to improve domestic stability, the Saudis and

Whereas Saudi Arabia and the UAE worked to curtail the growing influence of the MB, Qatar allied itself with the organization as its influence increased in Egypt.

Emiratis see such a strategy as opening Pandora’s box. The Saudis and Emiratis do not see the U.S. backing of the Egyptian government under Morsi as benign support for the rule of law, but rather as empowering a destabilizing element in the heart of the Arab world. The nature of U.S. alliances with the Gulf Arab states is one of unequal power dynamics and, in any such arrangement, the lesser states will be concerned with abandonment—that is, being left behind as the stronger nation’s strategic interests change. It is therefore natural for Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to harbor concerns about strategic drift.

In a period of chaotic change, it is important for policy makers to remember that there is still considerable strategic convergence between the United States and the Gulf states. America shares its Gulf allies’ desire for regional stability. The United States, despite the ongoing negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program, continues to be concerned about the Islamic Republic’s malign influence throughout the region. The U.S. government is interested in ensuring that the Gulf countries, as key global energy producers, continue in that role, even as they pivot toward Asia themselves.42

Limited Capacity

There are numerous areas where the interests of the United States and the Gulf Arabs overlap, but U.S. policy makers must recognize the limits of the Gulf states’ ability to shape the region. The Gulf Arabs are well aware of these limits. In a 2013 press conference on Syria with Secretary of State John Kerry, Saud al-Faisal noted that “we are a small country. The aid we can provide is proportionate

42 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “The U.S., Asia and the Middle East: A Convergence of Interests,” Baker Institute Blog, 9 May 2014, http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2014/05/the-u-s-asia-and-the-middle-east-a-convergence-of-interests/. Ulrichsen notes that “there is some irony when officials in the Gulf express concern about the prospect of the U.S. diverting attention to Asia, for they are doing exactly the same.”
to our capabilities." 43 Such a statement may seem counterintuitive, given the financial resources and global influence of a country like Saudi Arabia. Yet, even though its financial power is the backbone of its foreign policies, in absolute terms, this power is fairly limited. Figure 1 shows the gross domestic products (GDPs) of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE in the context of comparable economies of U.S. states. While investments and cash support from the Gulf states are sizeable, the extent of the economic support they can provide to a country as large as Egypt is relatively limited. They can offer assistance in the form of large sums of cash, but the real economic weight of their investment contributions cannot match the potential influence of the United States, Europe, or China. In other words, Gulf financial support comes with significant short-term benefits, but the long-term gains are uncertain.

The Gulf states are also limited in their ability to provide other kinds of support. Gulf military capabilities remain quite limited. Qatar’s and the UAE’s involvement in coalition operations in Libya

Figure 1. GDP of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and selected U.S. states in 2013 (U.S. dollars in millions)


43 “Remarks with Saudi Foreign Minister.”
indicate a desire to participate in multilateral operations, but not an ability to lead them independently. Similarly, the recent Saudi military experience in Yemen betrays challenges to deployment of their ground forces. Although these activities helped forge the perception of increased GCC activity in the region, they remain extraordinary events that were limited in scope and effectiveness and without parallel in either the Egyptian or Syrian case. Both the Saudis and the Qataris were able to finance the purchase of weapons for the Syrian opposition, but both required varying degrees of U.S. and Turkish logistical support to deliver them. This capacity gap is not necessarily surprising—neither Saudi Arabia nor Qatar has a military with global reach or expeditionary capabilities—but it does impose a limit on what they can accomplish. Recognizing that limit only contributes to the broader sense of insecurity felt by the Gulf Arabs and further highlights their keen interest in keeping the United States involved in the region.

Foreign Aid in a Multipolar World

Another key lesson to be learned from Gulf activities relates to the reality of foreign aid in a multipolar world. The rise of empowered regional actors has significant implications for U.S. engagement. The fact that Egypt was able to seek options for financial assistance from a range of actors who had the means to provide it gave Egypt alternatives for what conditions it was willing to accept. In essence, there is now a market of aid providers where countries can shop for the best deals. Between 2011 and 2013, Egypt turned to the IMF no less than three times for support, and each time broke off the negotiations as a result of aid from the Gulf states. This financial life-line contributed to Egypt’s ability to refuse the IMF and thus avoid addressing many of the deep and longstanding structural problems within its economy. Moreover, having financial support options empowered Egypt to push back against calls for political change. Qatar, in its push to leverage the aid and investments that it had provided, found itself shut out. Egypt’s reaction damaged both Qatar’s real investments and its influence in the country. Borrower nations such as Egypt understand this dynamic, as do their enablers, such as Saudi Arabia, and even U.S. rivals, such as Russia.
Given this new reality, it may be necessary to reconsider the utility of financial assistance. The old assumption that aid can be used as a carrot for good behavior, and its withdrawal as a stick to encourage a change in behavior, proves weak when aid recipients can pursue other options. The advantage of providing financial assistance comes in the access that it provides to the recipient regime. As more countries become able to provide assistance, countries that need it will increasingly be able to choose the donors that provide it with better terms, much like any borrower will shop for a loan with the most attractive terms. This is precisely what Egypt has done in recent years. The U.S. government must determine the strategic importance of aid and provide it accordingly. Changing the terms of that provision will send a message, but it may also result in decreased access and damaged relations. In such an environment, however, the United States is likely to find a greater advantage through its unparalleled investment potential, rather than via the foreign assistance it can lend.

Both the Saudis and the Qataris were able to finance the purchase of weapons for the Syrian opposition, but both required varying degrees of U.S. and Turkish logistical support to deliver them.

Recommendations

This examination of the activities of the Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE offers a number of lessons for U.S. policy makers. These lessons relate to both how the United States can interact with its Gulf allies, and how the United States can interact with the broader Middle East in the context of new regional dynamics. Our recommendations are as follows:

• Enhance strategic messaging to clarify to the Gulf states what the United States will do to ensure their security, and where the United States draws a line. Given the concerns of the Gulf Arabs and the differences in approach and priority between the United States and its Gulf allies, Washington must both manage expectations and reinforce
its commitments. The recent U.S. announcement that outlines areas of potential cooperation provides a solid basis for such messaging.\(^{44}\) Yet, the communication should be constant, clear, and consistent, and it must plainly address Gulf strategic concerns. Because of the highly personal nature of Gulf leadership, these messages need to be delivered from the secretarial as well as presidential levels, but must also echo throughout the various agencies. The U.S. government should reiterate its clear intention to defend its Gulf allies from outside attack, cooperate with its Gulf allies to counter violent transnational threats, and work with its allies to build institutional capacities that will enable them to contribute to their own security. At the same time, the United States should emphasize that, while it will not become involved in their domestic politics, in the long run more open, inclusive, and transparent governance will provide the greatest stability to the region.

- Strategic messaging should be followed with substantive action to engage the Gulf Arabs in ways that meaningfully address their security concerns. Actions speak louder than words, and communication of U.S. policy will prove insufficient if it is not followed by consistent action. To that end, the United States should work closely with its Gulf allies to identify specific areas of security concerns and ways to address capability gaps. Since the Gulf states are perennially concerned with the threat from Iran, continued security cooperation to build military capabilities should figure heavily in U.S.-Gulf relations. Qatar and the UAE are likely to welcome efforts to build their air forces’ interoperability with the United States and other NATO nations, given their participation in previous operations. Security cooperation should not be limited to the military domain, however. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s cooperation with the Saudi Ministry of Interior is a prime

example of the security cooperation that could be extended throughout the Gulf region. Similar programs should be pursued with Qatar and the UAE.

- Consider the practice of intelligence sharing not just for its practical utility but as a form of strategic engagement. Sharing information and intelligence is a pillar of the U.S. security relationships with its Gulf allies, and a regular practice that has a tangible utility for U.S. security interests in the region. Gulf leaders, however, frequently complain that Washington does not appreciate their security concerns. Intelligence sharing activities must address U.S. interests first and foremost, yet they should also be considered for the message of support they send to U.S. allies. Transnational groups that have risen in prominence since 2011 are of particular concern to the Gulf Arab monarchies. While Saudi Arabia and the UAE perceive the MB to be the greatest challenge, they are also concerned by the rise of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) and other jihadi groups.45 The challenge lies in assessing the groups of the greatest concern to the United States. U.S. intelligence agencies must understand the various groups, but also the nuanced perceptions of the Gulf governments toward those groups. Salafi-jihadist groups currently operating in Syria and Iraq are prime targets for this sort of intelligence sharing. Previous crackdowns on the MB in Egypt have spawned additional violent groups, and it is possible that the current crackdown will have the same effect. The United States and Gulf countries can find common cause in working against such groups. Yet, the fact that the Gulf Arabs are

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concerned with political security complicates U.S. efforts to act as security guarantor. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are likely to continue to employ tactics to maintain their domestic security that are not possible for the United States to support—for example, arresting nonviolent opposition members on the basis of their political affiliations. Senior officials in the intelligence agencies must understand the nuances that define these groups and translate that into appropriate cooperation against violent groups.

- Intelligence sharing and cooperation with the Gulf Arabs can potentially have great impact in the field of terrorist financing. The ease with which money flows into Syria reflects a new reality. Modern communications, particularly social media, enable militant groups and their supporters to facilitate the rapid movement of money that is often difficult to track. The activism of private residents in the Gulf on behalf of the Syrians is substantial, and the states have (to varying degrees) attempted to co-opt and direct it for their own geopolitical aims. Saudi Arabia has led the way in this regard, although it now seems to worry about the consequences of its policy and is attempting to sharply curtail the ability of its residents to act on behalf of Syrians. Still, the ability of the Gulf states to curtail private money is limited. In the age of social media, supporters easily find ways around the bans Gulf governments have put in place. Having ratified the popular view that the conflict in Syria is an existential struggle for sectarian supremacy in the region, and having turned a blind eye to Sunni foreign fighters and Sunni foreign fundraising for two years, it will be difficult for the Gulf states to contain the enthusiasm of Gulf residents as long as the Syrian conflict continues to churn. Nevertheless, the United States and the Gulf Arabs have a history of working to limit funds available to al-Qaeda. Washington should therefore build on that history by assisting the Gulf governments to target informal networks and curtail emerging trends in terrorist finance that the Syrian crisis facilitates.
• Finally, while the United States should avoid taking sides in the Gulf rivalry, it should actively rally its allies around a common purpose in Syria and Egypt. There is little to be gained in pressing the Saudis and the Emiratis to change their current attitude on Qatar. Such direct pressure is likely to be counterproductive, and it may be interpreted as yet another example of Washington’s naivete regarding regional threats. Rather, the United States should focus on unifying the efforts of its Gulf allies toward the ultimate goals of stability in Egypt and resolution of the Syrian war. The problems of Egypt and Syria will not be fixed until Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar are pulling in the same direction.

Modern communications, particularly social media, enable militant groups and their supporters to facilitate the rapid movement of money that is often difficult to track.
The West Side Boys were well known for both their brutality and their wild antics, particularly their active recruitment of young children into the Sierra Leone conflict. Photo courtesy of UNICEF.
Putting the Force in MAPRO: Options for National Decision Makers

by Lieutenant Colonel Donald Thieme II, USMC

The constant nature of human conflict means that violent killing will continue on a large scale along cultural and ethnic fault lines, creating situations that require mass atrocity prevention and response operations (MAPRO). Combined with the tools of killing; interactive media; and the global agility of ideas, resources, and information, troubled regions such as Rwanda and Syria will very quickly devolve into chaotic and dynamic situations where only one thing seems clear: the need for governments and organizations to intervene, impose peace, and implement such mechanisms as the still-emerging responsibility to protect (R2P) concept.

A graduate of Auburn University, LtCol Thieme volunteered for Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force 4-88 and deployed to the Persian Gulf. He made two more deployments that included the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Beirut in 1989 and Operation Provide Comfort in 1991. Thieme completed two reconnaissance tours prior to being selected as an Olmsted Scholar at Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland. After completing the School of Advanced Warfighting, he was assigned to Marine Forces Pacific and U.S. Central Command, where he served as war plans chief from 2001 to 2003. In 2004, Thieme reported to the U.S. embassy in Warsaw, Poland, where he served as the last Marine and naval attaché until 2007. In July 2007, he reported to 25th Marines as the regimental inspector-instructor and then served as the Marine attaché at the U.S. embassy in London. He has taught at the United States Military Academy, Tufts University, and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College; has published numerous professional articles on operational and tactical warfighting; and helped write the Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook (2010). Thieme is a graduate of the Army War College and MIT’s Center for International Studies Seminar XXI, and he currently teaches national security policy and decision making at the U.S. Naval War College.


2 According to findings from the 2005 United Nations (UN) World Summit, the three pillars of R2P are the state carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; the international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist states in fulfilling this responsibility; and the international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from these crimes. See Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, UN, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/responsibility.shtml.
Mass atrocities put U.S. strategic interests at risk in three ways. First, if the United States does not respond to a nascent humanitarian crisis, mass atrocity, or genocide event, it may lend credence to the appearance of a superpower in decline, inadvertently encouraging other potential actors to undertake larger operations. Using the strategic lens of balancing, the United States will have to weigh the strategic risk of choosing not to directly engage and perhaps look for other means to support the nations in the lead (e.g., U.S. support of the French and British in Mali in 2013). Second, when the U.S. government does not respond, it enables rivals in the international political system to accuse America of falling short of its own oft-proclaimed moral legitimacy, or more specifically that “U.S. foreign policy and America’s reputation as a supporter of human rights would certainly suffer if Washington admitted genocide and did nothing.” Third, should the U.S. government choose not to respond and intervene, the country could be accused of violating sovereignty by using the response as a guide for foreign adventurism. Whether the United States seeks to follow a strategy of selective engagement, hedging, offshore balancing, restraint, or liberal internationalism, the image and reputation of the government are at risk due to the complex challenges inherent in any humanitarian crisis.

Thus, the stakes are higher than they might at first appear, frequently resulting in frozen interagency debates as policy makers struggle to compose a “best possible” response and to explain the situation to multiple audiences simultaneously. While “do something” is not a strategy, leaders need pragmatic options to counterbalance the pressure of a public that has more information than understanding. This article considers the tactical, operational, and strategic factors of genocide or mass atrocities interdiction, and uses a case study of the United Kingdom (UK) in Sierra Leone, including Operation

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Palliser (1999–2001), to analyze a recent example of relative sustained success. It also addresses the operational context within which mass atrocities or genocides occur, considers the international operating environment, and concludes with a proposed a force model.

**Diplomacy and Armed Force**

The inflection point between good ideas with intent and action lies with military force underpinned by diplomatic efforts. Military forc-
es must be able to adjust to emerging and shifting factors (i.e., what a leader thought he or she knew yesterday may be irrelevant or incorrect today) even as forces are en route from bases, staging areas, and ships to the area of conflict. More precisely, British Army General Rupert Smith explained that “on every occasion that I have been sent to achieve some military objective in order to serve a political purpose, I, and those with me, have had to change our method and reorganize in order to succeed. Until we had done this we could not use our force effectively.”

Diplomats and peacekeepers must understand that military forces bring, and are capable of using, a suite of tools not simply a “large hammer,” recalling the adage that when the only tool you have (or are willing to use) is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Likewise, diplomats must realize that a forceful response will, in most cases, cause the killing to accelerate as the perpetrators seek the best possible conflict termination conditions prior to the arrival of intervening forces.

“Bridging this conceptual gap will be essential” but can only happen if potential force packages and employment concepts are planned in detail and in advance of the next crisis. For example, at the end of World War II, German forces aggressively sought to reorganize and redistribute the prisoners in their concentration camps, killing many in forced marches as the Soviets approached from the east and the rest of the Allies pushed into the Saar Valley and on to Germany. Similarly, during the Balkans Wars of the 1990s, each time the threat of a negotiated settlement or applied intervention (e.g., Kosovo) came to fruition, hostile forces accelerated their kill-

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ing and ethnic cleansing. Another instance of this was in the Sudan; as the brokered independence of South Sudan approached, violence again intensified as the date for independence neared.

The key to prebuilding mass atrocity intervention force (MAIF) modules that are more of a “checklist than a straightjacket”\(^7\) requires enabling diplomats and military leaders to provide national leaders with credible, responsive, and sustainable force options that work in concert with the rest of their diplomatic tools. Importantly, a conceptual address must take place when a “local” civil war or insurrection crosses the line between a sovereign affair into one that requires a violation of such sovereignty in an attempt to protect and restore individual human rights.

For 20 years, intervention has been “the most extravagant and noble, ambitious and dangerous element of Western foreign policy.”\(^8\) This policy is frequently ad hoc and driven more by the Sunday morning news cycle than carefully planned options with pragmatic applications of the full range of national and international power tools, as seen in Libya’s civil war in 2011 and the Syrian conflict in 2013–15. To better understand the effective application of interventionary power, we must first frame the issue, remembering that the most lethal weapon in the last quarter century has been a machete.\(^9\)

**Conceptual Mass Atrocities Structure**

There are three factors that interact with this complex problem—external, internal, and regional. Interventions, whether UN, North

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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other multilateral actions or coalitions led by the United States, are referred to under emerging “doctrine” as mass atrocity response operations (MARO) or the previously introduced MAPRO. The crux of the issue is determining when to exercise restraint (primacy of diplomacy) and when to dispatch forces (primacy of military operations). Whether selective engagement or liberal interventionist policies are preferred, governments must understand that there is no simple approach that will be effective in all operational contexts. Mass atrocities or genocides are hard to prevent and even more difficult to predict. When they occur, however, they tend to happen much faster than the domestic and international political systems can galvanize will and deploy resources.

External Factors

The three critical factors external to genocide or mass atrocity—information, power, and prestige—all compete in the arena of foreign policy decisions with other equally vociferous champions of myriad national interests. The perceived legitimacy of an operation is an important fourth factor that depends on the complex interactions of actors in the international political system, whether unilateral, multilateral, or in conjunction with the UN, and especially without a UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) to legally justify operations and activities.10 Deciding to commit resources and leadership prestige to a complex operation represents additional domestic risk, especially in times of competing demands and crises with resultant austerity measures, conservative policies, and skeptical public response of any overseas ventures. The international media cycle—traditional, online, and combined with multiple other information feeds from diaspora networks to social media—creates a pressure bubble under the political leadership to act decisively. Showing diplomacy at work is a requisite precursor of any operation and is where governments powerfully assume the offensive. This message is intended to reach

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10 For example, on 3 March 2015, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 2206 to impose sanctions on groups blocking peace negotiations taking place in South Sudan. For more information, see the coverage from the 7396th meeting of the security council at http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11805.doc.htm.
the domestic population as well as the posturing or potential perpetrators, victims, bystanders, and (possible) interveners, showing that governments, key leaders, and multinational organizations are observant. The power of “witness,” or quickly disseminating firsthand accounts to local, regional, and global audiences, represents the first step in this process and demonstrates that governments are not solely at the whim of a news editor, whether online or in print. The ability of external actors to decide and act makes these internal reports an external factor in policy decision making.

Leadership Power

How much action can leaders marshal and direct against this complex problem set? What are the domestic and international influences on that power? These are questions that every political leader will ask, whether in the Ukraine, Syria, or Mali. Proactive leadership must galvanize actors and sustain action, which means that leaders will risk their prestige in these types of operations as many are leery of taking absent a clear and compelling reason. President George H. W. Bush committed forces to both northern Iraq—Operation Provide Comfort in particular—and a series of missions in Somalia, in part, to sustain U.S. prestige and reassure foreign actors of the efficacy of America as a world power.11 U.S. casualties in Mogadishu drove President William J. “Bill” Clinton to cautiously consider a wide range of options in Rwanda.12 These formative

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11 UNSCR 688, adopted on 5 April 1991, declared that Iraq’s repression of its own people resulted in urgent humanitarian needs and constituted a threat to international peace and security. UNSCR 794, adopted on 3 December 1992, proposed the need for humanitarian assistance in Somalia.

experiences initially stayed the hand of NATO in Libya. Leaders must demonstrate some form of success, such as those eventually seen in Libya or former Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic’s trial in The Hague for war crimes. Subsequently, each experience refines the expectations of policy makers and electorates, good or bad. This fact is carefully noted in the International Red Cross Sphere report that calls on all external interveners to carefully “analyze people’s needs vulnerabilities and capacities” in building “coordination strategies for humanitarian civil-military dialogue.” The fact that “regime change” was not a designed end state in the UN resolutions set for Libya gives further cause for reluctance regarding Russia and China, particularly when considering a UNSCR for Syria. In the wake of the end of the Libyan regime, policy makers are not so convinced that the experience sets a precedence as the default template for success.

What Can Work?

Interventions can work, particularly when the commanders and their arrayed forces, integrated with political actions, are enabled with a large degree of operational autonomy—something Canadian Lieutenant General Romeo Dallaire did not have in Rwanda—and a tightly integrated planning/executing/observing/repeat cycle. Military forces, however, can prove very effective in stopping mass atrocities and setting the conditions for a more stable conflict resolution.

16 Adopted on 26 February 2011, UNSCR 1970 condemned Muammar Qaddafi’s use of lethal force against protestors of the civil war and imposed international sanctions against his regime. Adopted on 17 March 2011, UNSCR 1973 allowed for military intervention to end the fighting in Libya and enforced a no-fly zone over the area.
17 Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, xxv.
Operational Framing: Internal and Regional Factors

Inside a genocide or mass atrocity, a myriad of factors impact perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. Perhaps the overarching factor is that they are most frequently a subcontext of armed conflict, creating a complicated set of human–terrain problems, overlaid with political-economic challenges for would-be interveners\(^\text{18}\) in that they must first stop the fighting, then stabilize and secure the environment, and quickly transition to some form of defense and security sector stabilization. These actions require far more than merely separating the perpetrators and victims; they are full-spectrum military operations to achieve a desired effect. Culture, language, religion, and the historical legacies of power relationships among competing groups\(^\text{19}\) all add to the mix. When Serbs talk about the battle on the plains of Kosovo that serves as the seminal event in their history, planners and commanders ignore this at significant risk to mission accomplishment.\(^\text{20}\) Failure to fully understand the complex weave of internal factors in Kosovo meant that U.S. Army General Wesley K. Clark and Western leaders were surprised when the pace of the killings accelerated. Students of the region were only surprised that Clark\(^\text{21}\) was so unprepared for what appeared obvious to even a first-year graduate student.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., 25.

\(^{20}\) On 28 June 1389, Serbian and Bosnian forces engaged a large Ottoman force on the plain of Kosovo in southern Serbia. This battle served as a catastrophic turning point, marking the end of an independent, united Serbia. This single event became the core of what many call the “Kosovo ethic” that would sustain the Serbian people during centuries of foreign rule.

\(^{21}\) The article’s author, an East European foreign area officer, was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide planning guidance and targeting information against Serbian information operations capability sets during Operation Allied Force, which was launched by NATO in response to the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.
If the first set of internal factors covers human terrain, then the second set of internal factors bearing on the problem lies with the geographic terrain. What are the needs of the force, and how can they be either hindered or enabled (or both) by the battlespace physics? What are the ports, roads, and airfields like? Whether the force is bringing Class V (ammunition) assets or field hospital support, the force logisticians need piers, cranes, trucks, airfields, forklifts, fuel, potable water, and other sustainment requirements. While the indigenous forces fighting in the region may get by with sandals and AK47s, a MAIF arrives with a significant footprint and extensive basing and throughput requirements. Additionally, seasonal weather can significantly impact operations—Uganda is a very different place in May (wet season) than it is in January (dry season).

Who are the victims and what are they trying to achieve? How are their goals in conflict with the perpetrators? These are hard conceptual “target sets” that the commander, political leaders, and all organizations in the operating area need to assess, understand, and disseminate to ensure unity of understanding that every operational environment is unique.

Between the purely internal and external factors, transitional factors of the region—most importantly informational, political, and enabling—must be considered. Information operations (IO) directly affect mission accomplishment. Whether IO refers to getting access to base high frequency (HF) and very high frequency (VHF) radio transmitters (ground or air-based), interpreters, or working with regional organizations to create multilateral and bilateral frameworks in place, shaping, conveying, executing, and sustaining them is the foundation upon which all other operations will be

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22 “The force,” as will be examined later, refers not only to military forces, but to all of the instruments and support sets of power that will be needed, from nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and international governmental organizations to UN, multinational forces, humanitarian supplies and all of the impedimentia that comes with a full-spectrum interdiction response.

23 For the purposes of this discussion, IO is a transitional factor in that it is simultaneously an internal and external factor.

24 Mass Atrocities Prevention and Response Options, 56–58, provides an excellent conceptual overview and checklist.
built. Conducting an immediate information campaign will foster political support from regional actors or, at the very least, compliance and noninterference.

Political activities and operations must go hand in glove with the informational construct to provide measurable and visible actions supporting what is said. In this age of hyperconnected (even if ill-informed) consumers, all local politics and actions can be instantly globalized. Leaders should not fight this reaction, but embrace and leverage this modern phenomenon. Additionally, the signed deliverable is not necessarily the most important aspect of the process, but rather the discourse and continuance of dialogue, which can be frustrating, especially to kinetics-minded military leaders. However, the politics of sustaining what is possible, not optimal, is crucial.

Finally, regional concurrence and support from the preceding two pillars then enable throughput convergence of activities to deny protagonists the freedom of intellectual space, deny physical sanctuary, and serve as platforms to launch further informational, diplomatic, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and interdiction operations. Absent the active involvement of multiple regional actors—both state and nonstate—any plan, no matter how well conceived, and any force, no matter how well built, is ill-fated. As Operation Palliser demonstrated, operational planners cannot address and resolve the challenges and opportunities of a campaign in Sierra Leone if the importance and influence of Liberia and Nigeria are ignored.

In this age of hyperconnected (even if ill-informed) consumers, all local politics and actions can be instantly globalized. Leaders should not fight this reaction, but embrace and leverage this modern phenomenon.

Case Study: Sierra Leone and Operation Palliser

All of the aforementioned challenges are enough to make most leaders blanch, but the British experience in Operation Palliser demonstrates that it can be done. For an intervention to be effective, there are many planning factors, but we must beware of our own hubris and realize that “in international affairs, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions.”26 Certainly for Operation Palliser, the three key enablers were the right person (Brigadier General David Richards), the right command and control from the prime minister to the battalion level of a multinational force, and the right force structure available for Britain to deploy and employ.

General Richards (now General Sir David Richards, chief of the Defence Staff of Her Majesty’s Government in the UK) was the designated UK commander for Operation Palliser. As the Sierra Leone crisis developed, he was at the Northwood Headquarters for British armed forces just outside London, and he frequently briefed at the highest levels of the British government. Furthermore, he had been deployed as part of International Forces for East Timor (INTERFET) from the very beginning of that operation in 1999, which gave him a hard-earned reputation as an effective thinking leader in complex, fast-moving operations.

From his experience with INTERFET, Richards gleaned two crucial lessons: speed of action and integrated command structure.27 Working closely with the Australians and U.S. Pacific Command elements, including the Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (now the Standing Joint Force Headquarters), he saw how a focused intervention could work and where the structural and operational fault lines lay. INTERFET, the immediate precursor to Sierra Leone for General Richards, provided a case study of the challenges as well as the opportunities for delivering “coherent preventive as

26 Stewart and Knaus, Can Intervention Work?, 59.
27 This section is based on “Sierra Leone: Pregnant with Lessons,” in Victory Among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States, ed. David Richards and Greg Mills (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2011), as well as the author’s interview with Gen Richards on 8 May 2012.
well as reactive strategies in which [UK] national security interests are minimal.28

General Richards had also been involved in creating the new joint headquarters at Northwood with its deployable headquarters and assigned forces. Consequently, Richards understood exactly what the UK could provide in the way of headquarters and forces combined with practical experience applying interdiction power in a combined, coalition, and international environment. He already had a functioning staff that knew him and the overall intent of the British government well.

It is neither plausible nor prudent to plan on or assume that every evolving mass atrocity or genocide will find a General Richards29 to take the helm; as such, the other two critical enablers of UK success in Operation Palliser must be studied in detail—command and control and force structure. The British force was prepared and willing to deploy with a standing headquarters that not only maintained a permanent alert posture, but it had operational concepts written and tested in frequent exercises. Furthermore, Prime Minister Anthony C. L. “Tony” Blair had provided two critical pieces of guidance: one publicly in his speech30 in Chicago and one directly to Richards and other leaders involved in the operation. General Richards noted that “because of this, I knew exactly what Number Ten [the prime minister] wanted and was willing to support, and I made sure that was conveyed publicly, throughout the force and across the area of operations.”31 After first securing an operational relationship with North-

30 Widely quoted, Tony Blair’s speech, “The Blair Doctrine,” at the Chicago Economic Forum on 22 April 1999 asked the following open-ended questions: Are we sure our cause is just? Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long term? Do we have national interests involved? The full transcript can be read at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/international-jan-june99-blair_doctrine4-23/. For more information, see Maj Walter G. Roberson, British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone: A Case Study (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 5.
31 Richards interview.
wood based on his personal relationships as much as structure and evolving operational “doctrine,” Richards quickly flew to Sierra Leone and established his command functions, colocated with the British High Commissioner David A. Jones, to ensure the tightest integration of political and military operations. Initially, this effort was to be a noncombatant evacuation (NEO), but the quick assessment of Richards and his team convinced the British government that the basic enabler—security—was lacking and would be the essential precursor to any operation in Sierra Leone. As such, Operation Palliser rapidly transformed from a “simple” NEO to an intervention and stabilization operation. Side-by-side communication supported UK leadership alongside the mandated force, sometimes in conjunction with NATO’s “Blue Helmets” as well as (frequently) independent operations.

Finally, Richards had a command and control structure that capitalized on personal relationships to overcome the inherent instability of three different forces. He added embedded and liaison officers to indigenous and UN forces, as well as allowed, to the greatest extent possible, many different leaders access to him and his command staff. This mitigation was reinforced by good communications procedures (enabled by the deployment of excellent communications equipment and capable staff and operators) back to

INTERFET, the immediate precursor to Sierra Leone for General Richards, provided a case study of the challenges as well as the opportunities for delivering “coherent preventive as well as reactive strategies in which [UK] national security interests are minimal.”
the British High Commission in Freetown, Sierra Leone, as well as back to the operational headquarters in Northwood and the British government, including the prime minister.

The British used a “base” force (the standing Joint Rapid Reaction Force) and added capabilities to get the best force, which could be adapted as the mission evolved to best support and accomplish multiple lines of operations, most importantly to “reassure the local population and deter enemy forces”\textsuperscript{36} as well as to support United Nations Mission Sierra Leone,\textsuperscript{37} to support the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF), and to prepare for humanitarian activities. To accomplish this, the British government quickly assembled forces from the UK as well as from those already deployed. The 42 Commando Royal Marines (roughly the equivalent of a battalion landing team) had debarked the HMS Ocean (L 12) in Marseilles and was training inland at Camp de Canjuers, France. As they quickly began reloading the ship, the 1st Battalion, Parachute Regiment, and elements of the British Army’s Special Air Service departed within 24 hours for Dakar, Senegal (demonstrating the importance of regional factors). Four Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters deployed 3,500 miles in 36 hours to provide assault aviation lift, while the Ocean steamed through the Straits of Gibraltar and around the “shoulder” of West Africa for Sierra Leone.

Richards and the UK quickly assembled a credible force, and the red-bereted soldiers of the parachute regiment conducted an NEO of roughly 500 British citizens as the Ocean was still steaming toward Sierra Leone. The rapidity and effectiveness of this force underscored the serious and significant intent of the UK—an informational piece of dominance that sent a clarion message to regional countries, other UN forces, the Sierra Leone government, the citizens of Sierra Leone, and armed forces who might be planning operations against citizens of Sierra Leone or intervening forces.

\textsuperscript{36} LtCol Simon Tucker, Royal Marines, interview with author, 5 February 2012. Emphasis added by author.

\textsuperscript{37} For more information, see http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/facts.html.
Lift was important both to posture and sustain the force, and as always both available aircraft and base operating support at the aerial port of debarkation and maximum on ground were determining factors in achieving maximum use out of Lungi International Airport and other airfields. The UK reached out to the United States to provide reinforcement in this critical support area.38

Command, control, and informational concepts were a primary concern, and effective protocols were put into place by General Richards. Richards assigned liaison officers “everywhere,”39 using the adage that “if the guy you send out to be an LNO [liaison officer] doesn’t hurt you to lose, then you probably didn’t send the right guy.”40 While then-General Vijay Jetley from India commanded the UN forces, the Nigerians insisted that the deputy commander be a Nigerian. Richards quietly sent over Royal Marine Colonel Peter Babbington to serve as the chief of staff, while simultaneously dispatching Colonel Jerry Thomas to serve as the chief of staff of the SLAF. Since Nigerians tended to see Western Africa as “their” sphere of influence, they resisted any external intervention, a sensitivity that Richards was quick to note and address by providing command guidance to frame all actions regarding Nigerian concerns.

39 Woods and Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone, 62–64.
IO activities were conducted by a very small subset of operators in Richards’s headquarters, but to brilliant effect. Realizing that the information domain is a marketplace of available information and competing “brands” and narratives, his staff achieved comprehensive local awareness and penetrated and exploited indigenous, national, and regional media. This process was all driven by a smart “IO Major” who was not designated as such, but inherently understood and created the requisite effects, designing cartoons for the newspaper, getting onto all of the radio stations, and ensuring that Richards “conducted radio interviews and shows throughout the country to ensure that everyone could hear [his] voice directly.” It is hard to overestimate the impact and effectiveness of this ability to simultaneously compete for “narrative supremacy” across multiple lines of IO—domestic (perpetrators, victims, and bystanders) as well as other contributing military and police forces in the UN structure, regional actors (e.g., Liberia, Nigeria), and the rest of the intervening and international community.

Naval support was a critical capability. Within days, British ships from the Royal Navy were steaming for Sierra Leone. For a navy far smaller than the U.S. Navy, this represents quite a significant commitment of national will, power, and prestige. The HMS *Illustrious* (R 06), HMS *Ocean*, HMS *Argyll* (F 231), HMS *Iron Duke* (F 234), HMS *Norfolk* (F 230), HMS *Chatham* (F 87), HMS *Richmond* (F 239), RFA *Fort Austin* (A 386), RFA *Sir Belvidere* (L 3004), RFA *Sir Percivale* (L 3036), and RFA *Sir Tristram* (L 3505)—11 ships in total—provided a visible force with a great IO message for all to see directly or hear about in the press.

Flexible and fast with vast firepower and embarked forces and stores, they could quickly move to any point in the Gulf of Guinea or littorals of Western Africa, providing regional impact even as they clustered off the coast of Freetown. Carriers, troopships, frigates, support auxiliaries—with the aircraft of five different squadrons, a Royal Marines Commando force of approximately 600, and

41 Richards interview.
42 Roberson, *British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone*, 64.
43 Richards interview.
special operating forces embarked—created a powerful strike force that was more than equal to the tasks Richards and the UK leadership, political and military, wanted accomplished. Without needing to “clobber” the Lungi airport, the ships provided bed-down, launch, recovery, and maintenance options for more than 20 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, including McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harriers and Westland Lynx, Aérospatiale Gazelle, and Westland WS-61 Sea
King helicopters. What the naval force does in terms of a firm base, flexibility, endurance, maintenance, communications, simultaneous proximity and standoff, medical, and sustainment cannot be underestimated in terms of perception impact as well as capability. As Richards indicated, the “ships give us a resilience system” with which to operate that was very stabilizing in a rapidly evolving campaign.

The UK did not, of course, have the only boots on the ground in Sierra Leone. While British force levels rose to approximately 5,000, the overall force level from all participating nations grew to more than 17,000. UN forces at the time included many countries—29 in total—but as with all such operations, national caveats and agendas complicated the command structure, the operational picture, and the ability to operate in an effective unified manner. The Nigerians and Indians were frequently at contretemps, and the Nigerians appeared to attempt to undermine General Jetley. The contributions of police forces from 28 nations offered significant value to this effort. Integrating the capabilities of both police and military forces from such a diverse array of contributing nations reflects well on the diplomatic efforts of the UK and the international community—and on the ability of Richards’s command group to get them operating decisively and engaged to provide security and deter aggression, whether from Liberian marauders, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), or armed thugs like the “West Side Boys.”

Follow-on operations to sustain the viability and vitality of the information and influence campaign were vital to the overall effectiveness of the UK operations in Sierra Leone. The first significant operation was Operation Barras in August–September 2000 after a

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45 Richards interview.

46 Tucker interview.

47 The West Side Boys were a violent militant rebel group that evolved during the civil war in Sierra Leone. “Who Are the West Side Boys?,” BBC News, 31 August 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/901209.stm.
West Side Boys roadblock took members of the Royal Irish Regiment hostage and tried to negotiate with the UK (map 1). The UK swiftly launched forces, aircraft, and ships to Sierra Leone, including the Special Air Services and Special Boat Services, to kinetically negotiate with the rebel group. The Royal Navy launched RFA Argus (A 135), RFA Sir Percivale, and HMS Argyll to Sierra Leone, again providing a visible commitment with significant capability to rapidly reinforce the diplomatic actions of Tony Blair’s government. Once the attack was over, and the UK soldiers rescued, the operation emphatically underscored the commitment of the British government to Sierra Leone and “there was a lesson to be delivered—to discourage the RUF and their kind from interfering with British servicemen when they come calling with their hand extended.”

Kinetics, informational, and diplomatic actions mutually reinforced each other in the UK operation.

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49 Woods and Reese, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone, 68–70.
Map 1. Reconstruction of Operation Barras

1. 6.16am: SAS and Paras in three Chinooks supported by two Lynx helicopters, take off from Freetown.

2. 6.40am: Chinooks land at Maghenti and Geri Bana.

3. 6.40am: Lynx helicopters provide covering fire throughout operation.

4. 6.40am: SAS and Paras support team land in Chinook and attack Geri Bana to rescue hostages.

5. SAS team rescues six soldiers of the Royal Irish Regt and Sierra Leonean liaison officer from hut where they are being held.

6. 7.00am: All hostages rescued and airlifted out to Freetown.

7. 8.00am: West Side Boys in immediate vicinity suppressed and their commander captured.

8. 8.40am: Two Chinooks land Pana in jungle to south of Maghenti where rebels are dug in with captured British Land Rovers and a heavy machine.

9. 10.00pm: Last Pana extracted by helicopter after mopping-up operation. One British Paras killed, one seriously injured and 11 slightly. 25 West Side Boys killed and 18 captured. British Land Rovers and equipment recovered.

Map courtesy of Special Operations Command.
Subsequent significant operations included Operation Basilica\textsuperscript{51} and Operation Silkman,\textsuperscript{52} two longer-term plans to assist and sustain security-sector reform so that Sierra Leone could provide long-term self-governance and security for itself and its citizens. As Roberson notes, the operations “expanded the UK’s involvement and commitment to Sierra Leone . . . with a vigorous IO campaign to let the people of Sierra Leone [and the region] know that the UK was committed to restructuring the nation.”\textsuperscript{53} While the numbers of Britain’s forces quickly drew down, their intent, will, and demonstrated capability during and following Operation Palliser remained the bedrock of success for longer-term UN operations in Sierra Leone.

\textit{The Importance of MAIF Capabilities}

To be viable, an MAIF must have four core capability sets: information and communications, command and control, force projection, and intelligence. Properly considered, integrated, and planned for, these capability sets allow decision makers to quickly move past the “what tactical force and operational how” questions to deal with far more important and trickier “when and strategic/campaign how” questions that will frame the mission, inform the detailed planning and decision-making processes, and provide the best opportunity for an effective genocide/mass atrocities response/prevention operation.

Intelligence is the glue that weaves all of these capabilities into a viable campaign plan. Intelligence in an operation of intervention and peace enforcement is just as critical as the intelligence requirements for fighting a motorized rifle corps, but probably more difficult because very little electronics-derived intelligence will be available, and human intelligence (frequently abbreviated as HUMINT) will be difficult to obtain, especially in the early stages of planning and execution. “Operational reporting may also have information of intelligence value that originates from the local populace,”\textsuperscript{54} but it

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{51} Roberson, \textit{British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone}, 20–23.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Roberson, \textit{British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone}, 20.
\end{itemize}
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Putting the Force in MAPRO: Options for National Decision Makers

It takes time to develop the relationships that yield this kind of intelligence—time that the force is not likely to have. Intelligence that is developed, however, may be impossible to act on in a poorly designed campaign, as evidenced in NATO’s Balkan campaign. The force lacked both the integrated intelligence capability to track wanted war criminals and the authorities to target known Iranian operatives in the Balkans when the intelligence did identify them.

Some have argued that, in the case of Sierra Leone, the lack of intelligence functions and focus by the army-for-hire and the initial UN force led directly to the collapse of the peace process, resulting in the UK’s deployment to Sierra Leone. As “intelligence was severely lacking [in Sierra Leone interventions], only the introduction of well-disciplined, organized, and equipped British troops averted disaster.” Intelligence in mass atrocity intervention allows a force to seek, develop, and provide clarity or “understanding,” as Mark Phillips puts it, “in a congested, cluttered, contested, connected, and constrained battlespace.”

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57 It is worth noting that, in general, “intelligence” is a concept neither embraced nor well understood within the UN. This “blind spot” creates significant gaps in understanding between deployed forces with intelligence infrastructure and command and control relationships back to the UN, who does not have the same access to, or understanding of, intelligence processes and products.
58 Cultural and Interagency Operations: Decolonization Case Study: Sierra Leone (syllabus, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA, 2011).
Further, as Phillips defines intelligence, these type of operations necessitate an “in-depth knowledge of an adversary . . . their culture and decision making,” which requires a force to depart from the traditional intelligence template and shift emphasis “towards better human understanding.”59 The final limiting factor points to the fact that intelligence agencies are demand-driven consumer-based organizations with limited resources, most of which end up feeding the current crisis, rather than being truly focused on the poorly illuminated corners of the global operational and security environment.

The force must identify these challenges, and the demand for intelligence will be greatest at the inception of the campaign, precisely when culture and contextual understanding are the hardest to come by. Just as counterinsurgency demands a “nontraditional” intelligence focus and function, the requirements for effective operations in mass atrocities intervention operations must be similarly unique. Intelligence structure must be built to provide for not only the commander and all subordinate forces, but for local and regional actors as well as the media that informs worldwide public opinion with at least five distinguishable functions: acquisition, delivery, acceptance, interpretation, and implementation.60

The force’s final intelligence challenge will be focusing on mostly open-source and unclassified information sources to perform the most inclusive and comprehensive intelligence function for the commander and staff. Intelligence, without revealing sources and methods, needs to be publicly shared to support the information and influence capability of the force and diplomats operating simultaneously along multiple lines of operations. “Collect, analyze, and write for release” needs to be the mindset of the intelligence directorate.

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in mass atrocity intervention operations—a cultural paradigm shift that will not come easily for the straitlaced (and frequently strait-jacketed) intelligence core community. Without these intelligence capabilities, however, the force will suffer, diplomats will struggle to explain, and the media and public will quickly tire of the operation. And the campaign—no matter how well designed and effectively executed—will quickly terminate without lasting effect, exactly the opposite result leaders sought when taking the risk to intervene in the first place. Commanders must find, cherish, and protect intelligence “mavericks” who can quickly shift to produce what the force, diplomats, and international community will understand, support, and enable. Although intelligence organizations are drowning in data and demand, they must focus on targeting and intent, and not “just of the enemy, but also of every actor that is party to the conflict,”61 to be relevant in mass atrocity interventions. This becomes a geometric expansion of complexity, but a core requirement for successful operations nonetheless.

Building on the ideas of Admiral James G. Stavridis, General Richards, and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, all of whom repeatedly emphasized the primacy of information-communication interaction from the strategic to the operational level, the MAIF must have a high-capacity deployable communications, command, and control (C3) package that includes IO capability (technical) as well as the human ability to study, see, seize, and exploit information domain opportunities in the “Battle of the Narrative” that must be waged.62 This battle is fought for at least six audiences: indigenous victims, perpetrators, bystanders, regional actors, members of the force, and the international community. The British fought this battle in Sierra Leone, as did the United States in northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort.63 Deployed forces must carefully plan for inclu-

63 The author deployed to northern Iraq as a company commander with Battalion Landing Team 2/8, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, and Joint Task Force “B.”
sion of vibrant and well-integrated communication packages that do not just provide information but enable effective command and control. Contemporary examples include, but are not limited to, Joint Communication Support Element, U.S. Pacific Command’s current configuration known as the Standing Joint Force Headquarters, or a Marine expeditionary unit’s Joint Task Force Enabler, each of which is designed to provide fast, flexible, and effective communications.

Once in place and operating in all spectrums and along all PMESII/DIME\(^6^4\) lines of effort, command and control can now be executed and extended. As Gordon Rudd noted in his study of Operation Provide Comfort, “Ad hoc is a hard way to do business.”\(^6^5\) Rather, there must be both a smart construct at the beginning of planning and execution, as well as an awareness of evolving circumstances with flexible commanders and communications suites that can expand to enable and include other forces in addition to nontraditional sources of assistance and operational impact in the area of operations. In other words, the “main” command post must be able to communicate with the ambassadors, the UN command post, the civil-military operations center, the joint force press, and others. A force list must be a guideline, not a coffin, so that commanders can deploy equipped with effective liaison officers to send out to as many locations, organizations, and units as the commander deems necessary. Operations should not be a staffing zero sum game, but rather an extension of the force commander’s operational effectiveness. A review of the author’s personal experience in Operation Provide Comfort, as well as of Rudd, shows just how much and how fast a command and control capability\(^6^6\) will have to transform, evolve, and grow to be effective.

Force projection, like planning and execution, must be both simultaneous and sequential. As Richards noted, speed generates surprise, which provides the operational initiative and overcomes inertia, but only with significant streamlining and inputs from the top

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\(^6^4\) PMESII: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure effects. DIME: diplomatic, information, military, and economic actions.

\(^6^5\) Rudd, *Humanitarian Intervention*, 129.

Whether far inland, such as in Rwanda and Kurdistan, or in the littorals, such as in Sierra Leone, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft will be crucial assets. Bed-down and support for those aircraft are the critical capabilities that sustain this projection of the force.

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67 Richards interview.
whereby fuel, water, parts, hangars, and basic operating support for the forces are assigned to the airfields to maintain a throughput of supplies. The force commander may well have to change the equation in austere and expeditionary environments, perhaps by adding riverine craft and boat bases, offshore (but close enough to be seen) amphibious shipping, and a combination of brown-water capabilities to effectively operate in the assigned area of operations.

Speed, reach, and sustainment can be considered three core principles here, not unlike more conventional military operations. But as seen in Sierra Leone, these three capabilities then provide a crucial function in supporting and further enabling the effectiveness of campaign design because it validates IO themes and proves the political point. Further, force projection sends a regional message, as it did in Sierra Leone, to other state and nonstate actors who would try to cross borders to take advantage of periods of internal instability. In doing so, force projection sustains the political will and resilience of the force and reinforces the message that “you can cease and negotiate, or fight and die,” as stated by British Major General Jonathon P. Riley in Sierra Leone.

In addition to the purely military portion, force projection requires the forward deployment of diplomatic teams, security and defense sector reform specialists, public diplomacy assets, and financial teams. The diplomatic teams must be on the ground in the first lift to ensure planning for the transition from the first day, but also to convey the powerful message that this is not just another invasion-like operation by outside forces. Rather, it is a “whole of government” response to an emerging crisis designed to engage and reply across the full spectrum of actions needed to effectively restore security and protect basic human rights while also ensuring an

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68 For example, contingency raid forces in the Persian Gulf in 1988–89 used two old barges modified to support special operations forces.

69 Roberson, British Military Intervention into Sierra Leone, 22–23.
inclusive dialogue between diplomats and soldiers throughout the operation. Academics and specialists in the region must also deploy to assess and integrate human terrain knowledge that will enable an effective transition. For if intervention forces stay too long, the operation takes on the appearance of an occupation, not an interdiction. Public diplomacy teams, fully resourced and with an “open tent,” must be deployed with the force to ensure accurate and timely reporting, and engage a daily battle to assert the good news narrative locally, regionally, and globally. Finally, money, quite possibly a large amount of it, will be needed, and the structuring of financial operations is something that exceeds the capability of most soldiers and diplomats. Those specialists need to also be on the ground early in the operation.

Conclusion

MAPRO, genocide interdiction, peacemaking, and enforcement operations, or whatever the nomenclature, are complex operations that seek to deliver a negative value—an absence of killing. To deliver that, forces must use all levers of national and international diplomatic power, including traditional warfighting functions of force projection, intelligence, command and control, and communication and information operations. As demonstrated by British forces in Sierra Leone, it can be done effectively. Other operations in East Timor and northern Iraq have likewise demonstrated the ability to successfully intervene and be a “force for good” in the conduct of international affairs. MAPRO is not for the faint of heart or weak of will. As international norms evolve and national leaders are pressured to “do something now,” however, these campaigns offer a new model army upon which to build force modules and employment concepts before the next crisis, to better enable national leaders to make the best possible timely decisions.
Marines storm the beach during a training exercise in the 1950s. Amphibious landings such as this one were first formulated, practiced, and then perfected prior to and during World War II. Official U.S. Marine Corps photo.
The U.S. Marine Corps, Amphibious Capabilities, and Preparations for War with Japan

by David J. Ulbrich

The U.S. Marine Corps’ amphibious mission had its genesis at the dawn of the twentieth century. Following the Spanish-American War in 1898, American strategists worried about the possibility of war between the United States and Japan because both nations vied for influence in East Asia and the western Pacific. Acquiring the Philippines, Guam, and Wake Island after winning the Spanish-American War gave the United States a presence in East Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Then, as now, China represented an important commercial resource for the United States whereby Americans wanted expanded markets in China and hoped to maintain an “Open Door” trade policy with that nation’s large population. These commercial interests required sufficient forces to protect them. By 1905, victory in the Russo-Japanese War turned Japan into the dominant nation in the region. However, due to severe deficiencies in natural resources, Japanese leaders coveted the raw materials and agricultural produc-

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tion of the Asian mainland. Any southward or westward expansion would inevitably bring this rising power into conflict with America’s strategic and commercial interests in that region.

As early as 1900, senior admirals in the U.S. Navy argued that this new strategic situation required American power to be projected across the vast Pacific Ocean. American strategists evaluated a number of scenarios with potential allies and enemies designated by colors. The U.S. Navy’s planners focused their attention on the Pacific Ocean and on Japan, otherwise known by the color designation “Orange” in American war plans. The potential threat represented by Japan gave the Marine Corps two new roles: amphibious assault and island defense. Marines could no longer expect to subsist based on nineteenth-century duties as shipboard police, legation guards, and constabulary troops. Doing so would soon relegate the Corps to insignificance and eventual extinction.2

The plan to defeat Japan—War Plan Orange3—spanned the next several decades until 1938. All its variations shared several tenets (map 1). American strategists expected that the Japanese would launch a preemptive strike, likely without a formal declaration of war. That attack would presumably be directed against American bases in the Philippines and Guam. Following the initial Japanese onslaught, the U.S. Fleet would sortie from Hawaii and sail across the Pacific. During this offensive campaign, the Marines would seize and hold “temporary advanced bases in cooperation with the Fleet and . . . defend such bases until relieved by the Army.”4 These roles constituted a new dual mission for the Marine Corps. The newly captured bases would subsequently function as coaling stations, safe anchorages, repair facilities, supply depots, and eventually aircraft bases. The U.S. Fleet would either relieve besieged American forces

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3 For more information about the origination of this plan, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/war-plan-orange.htm.
Map 1. War Plan Orange from the 1920s and 1930s

Map courtesy of U.S. Naval Institute.

in the Philippines or liberate the archipelago, if it already had fallen. As the U.S. Fleet menaced the Japanese home islands, American planners hoped that the Imperial Japanese Navy would contest the American offensive. The ensuing naval battle, as was unquestioningly assumed in every iteration of War Plan Orange, would result in a decisive American victory. If the Japanese chose not to fight, then the U.S. Fleet would blockade their home islands. Regardless, the American victory would consign Japan to the status of a diminished, isolated regional power.5

This article traces the progression of America’s strategic plans to the doctrine formulation phase, to the force structure development phase, and to the equipment procurement phase in the decades leading up to the Second World War. During the planning process

behind War Plan Orange and subsequent plans, missions were dispensed downward from the Department of the Navy to the Marine Corps (figure 1). Once strategic priorities were set for offensive or defensive portions of the Marines’ dual mission, Corps planners worked to fulfill those needs. The doctrines for advanced base defense and amphibious assault formed the pivot point for the Marine Corps to match operational, force structure, and material capabilities to the U.S. Navy’s strategic needs in the Pacific Ocean. It should also be noted that the Marines embraced amphibious capabilities as a means of institutional survival during the resource-poor interwar years. Lastly, this article also highlights a few of the personalities that helped drive this process.

General Thomas Holcomb’s career spanned more than four decades from his commissioning as an officer in 1900 to a seven-year term as 17th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps that ended in 1943. As much as any other Marine, Holcomb heavily influenced the strategic, doctrinal, technological, and organizational evolution of the Corps’ amphibious capabilities. Even so, other Marine officers like Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. “Pete” Ellis, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, Major Robert Hugo Dunlap, and Lieutenant General John A. Lejeune also played critical roles in preparing the Corps of this amphibious mission. Ultimately, the efforts of Holcomb and many others, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, would

The potential threat represented by Japan gave the Marine Corps two new roles: amphibious assault and island defense.

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bear much fruit in the Second World War. Their habits, as well as their actual ideas about amphibious warfare, likewise provide examples that can be applied in the twenty-first century.

**Establishing the Corps’ Place in American Strategy, 1900–1933**

The Marine Corps made positive strides in developing its amphibious capabilities from 1900 to 1915. Marines specializing in this new type of warfare could attend their own Advanced Base School, where they studied operational issues important to any base defense, such as artillery placement, communications, logistics, and staff organization. Academic study and practical experience coalesced in 1914 with a simulated assault on Culebra, a small Caribbean island near Puerto Rico. Warships from the U.S. Atlantic Fleet “attacked” approximately 1,700 Marines defending the island. The Marine advance base brigade succeeded beyond expectations by quickly fortifying the island, harassing the Navy warships, and repulsing amphibious assaults.7

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In 1915, Assistant Commandant then-Colonel John Lejeune created an ad hoc War Plans Committee comprised of himself and three promising Marine captains assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps—Ralph S. Keyser, Pete Ellis, and Thomas Holcomb. Ellis emerged as the premier amphibious assault theorist until his untimely death in 1923. However, Holcomb and Holland Smith provided the Corps with a continuity of purpose and baseline knowledge from 1915 to 1943 as they rose through ranks.

Among other issues, Lejeune’s committee set to work examining the Navy’s evolving strategic needs and determining how the Marine Corps could best meet them. By 1916, however, it was not the specter of a war with Japan or the possibility of amphibious operations in the Pacific that absorbed the Corps’ energies. Instead, their attentions were diverted by the bloody conflict raging in Europe. Lejeune and his War Plans Committee worked diligently to determine how new weapons technology and battlefield tactics might affect their Service’s combat capabilities. Mobilizing and fighting the First World War in France demanded the Corps’ entire attention. Although Marines gained invaluable combat experience, World War I did little to support the Corps as an amphibious assault or base defense force. Indeed, Marines worried that their service might be seen as a second American land army that could be disbanded during the postwar demobilization.8

Such soul-searching occurs even now as the present-day Marine Corps attempts to return to its roots as the United States’ premier amphibious force, after having served as a land army in both Iraq and Afghanistan for more than a decade. There is a generation of midcareer Marines who have limited knowledge of or experience with true amphibious operations.

Amidst postwar anxieties in the 1920s, the Marine Corps did not disband after the conflict’s end. Instead, recently promoted Major General Lejeune helped solidify its place in American naval strategy when he became Commandant in 1920. At his behest, then-Major

Pete Ellis authored two definitive reports on amphibious operations that very next year. *Navy Bases: Their Location, Resources, and Security* and *Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia* served as primers on how advanced bases could support fleet operations. Two decades before the American entrance into World War II, Ellis predicted with uncanny accuracy the base defense and amphibious assault operations that characterized that conflict in the Pacific.9

Because Japan was “the only purely Pacific world power,” Ellis saw it as the principal threat to the United States. His findings in *Navy Bases* anticipated that Japan would take the offensive and try to capture outlying American island bases. These bases would then form a strategic defense-in-depth.10 Ellis’s *Advanced Base Operations* stood as a companion work to *Navy Bases*, outlining a strategy for seizing and defending various Pacific islands, including the Marianas, Marshalls, and Carolines, which the Japanese already controlled. Imagining a potential campaign in the Pacific, Ellis outlined targets for amphibious assaults and anticipated certain sea battles. He suggested that Marines receive simultaneous training for the offensive and defensive components of their mission. The knowledge required to defend an island against an enemy amphibious assault could only improve

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the attackers’ abilities to make a successful assault in the future, and vice versa.  

Both of Ellis’s seminal reports cast the Marine Corps in roles mandated by War Plan Orange. Later in 1926, the inter-Service report, *Joint Action of the Army and Navy*, similarly called for training, supply, and maintenance of Marine units for the following priorities: “for land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign.”*12* A dual mission now drove the Marine Corps’ strategic raison d’être, as well as the ongoing key to its survival during an era of restricted resources. In this way, military necessity blended with institutional pragmatism.

Ellis was hardly alone in his advocacy of an amphibious focus for the Corps in the interwar years. Other ardent supporters included his fellow Marine officers: Lejeune, Holcomb, Holland Smith, Robert Dunlap, James C. Breckinridge, John H. Russell Jr., and Ben H. Fuller. Naval officers like Rear Admiral Clarence Stewart Williams, in his role as head of the Navy’s War Plan Division, also recognized the Corps’ potential as an amphibious force in the early 1920s.*13*

Although the Corps’ new mission was clearly distilled, two obstacles remained: the continued emphasis and commitment to the Banana Wars in Latin America, and a clique of Marine officers that remained dedicated to constabulary security as the Corps’ primary role. Lejeune, Russell, Holcomb, and others needed to overcome this internal resistance against amphibious development. Obtaining the resources and writing the doctrine to fulfill that mandate became Lejeune’s primary goals in his final years as Commandant. Reductions in budgets and personnel, however, persisted throughout the

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1920s, despite his best efforts. The Corps was not alone in experi-
encing years of famine. The U.S. Army and Navy also saw declining
budgets.\textsuperscript{14}

Meanwhile, Lejeune decided to maximize resources and exper-
tise within the Corps. He put a premium on military education for
his Marines and founded the Marine Corps Schools (MCS) in the
1920s. The next Commandant, Major General Wendell C. Neville,
saw the wisdom in Lejeune’s actions and ensured that Marines would
receive advanced training in all aspects of warfare at schools run by
the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Army, and at such prestigious
institutions as the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris, France. These
opportunities allowed Marine officers to consider warmaking in sys-
tematic ways, as well as to interact with peers from other Services.\textsuperscript{15}

As a result of their legacy, to-
day’s Marines, soldiers, and
sailors from around the globe
can benefit from this sys-
tematic approach to military
education through advanced
courses at Marine Corps
University, such as military
operations other than war,
contemporary conflict, war-
fighting from the sea, opera-
tional art, and culture and
interagency operations.

One Marine who took advantage of the advanced military edu-
cation available at the time was then-Colonel Thomas Holcomb. As
a highly decorated veteran of Belleau Wood in 1918 and a member
of Lejeune’s War Plans Committee two years earlier, Holcomb ap-

\textsuperscript{14} See Ulbrich, \textit{Preparing for Victory}, 38–42; and Keith B. Bickel, \textit{Mars Learning: The
Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940} (Boulder, CO: Westview,

\textsuperscript{15} W. C. Neville, “The Marine Corps,” \textit{Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 55}
(October 1929), 863–86; and Donald F. Bittner, “Foreign Military Officer Training in Re-
verse: U.S. Marine Corps Officers in the French Professional Military Education System in
plied past experiences to his studies at the Naval War College from 1930 to 1931. He exemplified the type of professional development advocated by Neville and Lejeune. Holcomb’s year at the Army War College from June 1931 to June 1932 played a significant role in his development as a senior officer. He worked with other students to formulate plans for attacking hostile nations and defeating enemy forces. Some scenarios were fabricated, while others were realistic. In one course project, Holcomb acted as naval commander of an American force conducting an amphibious assault on Halifax, Nova Scotia. This assignment reinforced his conviction that planning down to the minutest details was necessary for a successful landing operation. Another career officer—the Army’s Major George S. Patton Jr.—also worked on this group project with Holcomb. These academic exercises clearly helped Patton during his amphibious operations a decade later.16

Additionally, while working independently at the Army War College in 1932, Holcomb wrote a special report titled “The Marine Corps’ Mission in National Defense, and Its Organization for a Major Emergency.” He asked an important question about the Corps: what should be the most suitable organization for a major emergency? His lengthy answer outlined the principles of seizing and defending advanced bases, and he discussed all aspects of training and supplying Marine units. Amphibious operations represented the Corps’ future role in the nation’s war plans. Holcomb no longer saw the Marine Corps as a constabulary force fighting small wars, or “other minor operations” as he called them.17

Although Holcomb’s report drew on existing ideas and documents, its significance as an original endeavor should not be discounted. In an appendix, he also anticipated the creation of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) in 1933, the end of the Corps’ constabulary

16 “Report of Committee No 6. Subject: Plans and Orders for the Seizure of Halifax” (report, File Number 386-6, Army War College [AWC], U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, Carlisle Barracks, PA [AHEC], 29 March 1932); “Analytical Studies, Synopsis of Report, Committee No. 5” (report, File Number 388-5, AWC, AHEC, 2 March 1932); and Daugherty, Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 359–99.
duties in Central America in 1934, the creation of a triangular Marine division-sized unit, and lastly the publication of doctrinal manuals on amphibious assault operations in 1934 and base defense operations in 1936. The degree to which Holcomb’s report circulated beyond the confines of the Army War College is not clear. However, this report did constitute a blueprint for the Corps’ future and that Holcomb would later follow in 1930s and during the war years.19

After graduating from the Army War College in 1932, Holcomb’s critical academic study and practical experiences prepared him for his next duty station in the Department of the Navy, where he served on the Navy’s War Plans Division and offered advice on amphibious operations and strategic planning relating to War Plan Orange. In this position, Holcomb advocated what military historian Edward S. Miller calls a “cautionary” strategy. The U.S. Navy would strike at Japanese forces across the Pacific using island bases seized and held by Marine Corps units as stepping-stones, rather than seeking a single climactic battle between Japanese and American fleets as a primary goal. Japan’s acquisition of the Micronesian islands in the Pacific from the Germans after the First World War necessitated this more realistic and cautious strategic mindset.20

Codifying Doctrine, Creating Force Structure, and Procuring Equipment, 1933–38

Despite the best efforts of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his pro-defense allies in Congress, the U.S. military’s funding slipped to low levels. The Marines Corps’ annual expenditures ran between $15 and $25 million from 1935 to 1939. To put this in perspective, these figures amounted to 3–4 percent of the U.S. Navy’s annual expenditures. Nevertheless, the decade of famine also saw force structure improvements, doctrinal developments, and technological adaptations flourish at a rate that easily surpassed any decade before

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18 Divisions can be split and merged in a variety of ways. For example, binary may indicate two brigades in the division; triangle refers to three; square refers to four; and superior firepower refers to five.
or since in the history of the Corps, if not the entirety of American military history. In 1933, for example, the creation of the FMF gave the Corps a platform, albeit modest in size, to support amphibious assault and base defense units.21

With an amphibious force structure on paper, the Marine Corps needed to codify the doctrine that would be employed by the FMF in future conflicts. Much work was already being done at the MCS in the mid-1920s when Brigadier General Robert Henry Dunlap was the schools’ commandant. His ideas and efforts, as well as the ideas outlined by Ellis, formed the foundations for the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934) and the Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936) produced by MCS faculty and students.22 The two “tentative” reports looked to the future, while a separate doctrinal work titled the Small Wars Manual (1935 and 1940) enumerated past lessons from Marine deployments as constabulary units in Latin America. Taken together, these three manuals constitute what Marine Corps Chief Historian

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Charles D. Melson calls the “holy trinity” of Marine Corps doctrine.23

MCS classes were suspended from November 1933 to May 1934 so that faculty and students could compile the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. They completed their work in June 1934. Not only did this resulting document outline lessons from past amphibious operations, it also anticipated challenges in future operations. Despite the British amphibious fiasco at Gallipoli during the First World War, for example, American Marines postulated that careful planning, adequate training, and proper equipment could overcome the tactical advantages enjoyed by an enemy defending a shoreline. This document created a rational framework that would facilitate American amphibious assault operations in the Second World War. This process of systematic analysis regarding practical lessons of the past likewise demonstrated the institutional adaptability that has been the hallmark of the Marine Corps.24 We see the same process in today’s approach to lessons from the battlefields of the Middle East, as in the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* published as a joint U.S. Army/Marine Corps field manual.25

The 1934 landing operation manual made no detailed examination of the complexities of advanced base defense, the other half of the Corps’ dual mission. By 1936, the *Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases* filled that void by providing a doctrinal foundation for advanced base defense that had been so intrinsically tied to the Corps’ roles since 1898.

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In the meantime, Holcomb received his first star and became commandant of MCS in February 1935. During the next 22 months of his tenure, MCS made various revisions to the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* that would subsequently be folded into the U.S. Navy’s *Landing Operations Doctrine* (Fleet Training Publication 167 or FTP-167) in 1938. Holcomb also supervised the completion of manuals on base defense and small wars. Because of his previous work on war plans and his military studies, Holcomb brought especially significant knowledge about amphibious warfare to the new base defense manual. Just as he routinely conducted spot inspections in classrooms and on parade grounds at Quantico, it is reasonable to infer that he sat in on discussions about artillery placement, unit deployments, or other topics, as well as read drafts of the manual.26

Although no documents cite Holcomb by name, his tacit influence can be seen in the following lines from the *Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases*:

Defense of advanced bases will involve the combined employment of land, air, and sea forces. Depending on the nature of the hostile attacks against a base, one arm or service may play the major role, but in the event of a general landing attack, the land forces will constitute the basic element of the defense. In any case, the ultimate success of the defense will depend upon the closest cooperation and coordination between the naval defense forces, the shore defense forces, and the aviation forces.27

This quote highlighted the need to use coordinated combined air, naval, and ground forces to mount a successful defense reminiscent of the 1932 report penned by Holcomb at the Army War College. In summary, Marines looked up from the operational and tactical levels to the U.S. Navy’s strategic needs and then formulated operational and tactical doctrines to fulfill those requirements.


Thomas Holcomb became Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1936, eclipsing several Marine generals for numerous reasons. He had maintained a friendship with President Roosevelt dating back to the First World War. Holcomb also fit a particular political profile inside the Corps that placed him in the ascendant clique. He favored the new dual mission of amphibious assault and base defense over the outmoded mission of constabulary security in small wars. Indeed, Holcomb’s interest in amphibious doctrine and strategic planning dated back 20 years to his membership on Lejeune’s War Plans Committee in 1916. This made Holcomb an ideal candidate for succeeding the 16th Commandant, Major General John Russell, who was one of the most fervent amphibious warfare advocates in the Corps.

Holcomb’s career track provides other concrete justifications for his promotion. In the first 36 exemplary years of his career, he climbed steadily through the commissioned ranks, gained valuable experience in World War I, distinguished himself in the military’s education system, demonstrated administrative skills in performing staff duties, supervised significant doctrinal developments at the MCS, and maintained cordial contacts with both civilian and naval officials. He enjoyed prestige as a “China Hand”\(^\text{28}\) and as one of the “Old Breed”\(^\text{29}\) of the First World War. Holcomb benefited from such high-ranking patrons as Lejeune and Russell, both of whom helped him into many key postings.

With the FMF established and amphibious doctrines codified, the next stage of readying the Corps for amphibious operations entailed conducting several fleet landing exercises (FLEXs) between

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\(^{28}\) A term to describe those with expert knowledge of the Chinese culture, people, and language, particularly soldiers, journalists, and diplomats before, during, and after World War II.

\(^{29}\) Refers to Marines with 5–10 years of service.
1934 and 1941. When Holcomb became Commandant, he continued these efforts despite severe budget constraints. FLEXs simulated amphibious assaults and base defenses, which gave the Marine Corps and Navy opportunities to experiment with doctrines, troubleshoot problems, and field test equipment. The Navy performed several types of long-range shore bombardment, including counterbattery and interdiction fire. The Marines tested existing weapons and vehicles they might employ in an actual amphibious assault, and they established a defensive position against possible counterattacks from land or sea. In so doing, the Marines discovered deficiencies in the Navy’s landing craft. For example, Navy whaleboats or motor launches were not sufficient to transport troops from ships through the surf to the beach. These craft offered little protection to their occupants, moved too slowly, lacked seaworthiness in rough surf, and failed to traverse coral reefs. The Marines also found weaknesses with combat loading, which would need careful consideration to ensure that transport vessels were packed so that equipment could be off-loaded more efficiently. While existing Navy warships were an absolute necessity as weapons platforms, they were not ideal for moving men or equipment. It took several years before the Corps found suitable landing craft and the money to pay for them, partly because the Navy would not fund these efforts. Eventually, however, the Marines identified two ideal civilian designs for landing craft—the Andrew J. Higgins “Eureka” boat and the Donald Roebling “Alligator” amphibian tractor. Both could be adapted to military use, and both surpassed anything in the Navy or Marine Corps’ existing inventory.30

Meanwhile, tensions in East Asia grew more acute, and 1937 represented a watershed moment as Japanese forces invaded China. By year’s end, Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing fell under Japanese control. These successes did not, however, bring Japan victory in this Sino-Japanese conflict in 1938 or thereafter. Instead, the fighting dragged on with no end in sight. In Europe, Nazi Germany steadily expanded its territory by annexing Austria and occupying the Sudetenland in 1938. The fluid situations in East Asia and Europe reduced the utility of War Plan Orange. This new set of threats dictated that the United States prepare for several scenarios.31

The Japanese, for their part, also planned for a possible war with the United States. Military historians Mark R. Peattie and David C. Evans argue that the Japanese had long followed a “wait-and-react” strategy. The Japanese anticipated three phases for naval operations during the conflict:

first, searching operations designed to seek out and annihilate the lesser American naval forces…in the western Pacific; second, attritional operations against a westward-moving American main battle force coming to assist in the relief or reconquest of American territories there; and third, a decisive encounter in which the American force would be crushed and the Americans forced to negotiate.32

Everyone assumed that the Japanese would capture American-held advanced island bases in the western Pacific. The Japanese ex-


pected to use their own bases in the Marshalls, Marianas, and other Micronesian islands in offensive and defensive operations. Construction of airfields began on these islands as early as 1934 and accelerated military building programs thereafter. The Japanese plan to defeat the U.S. Fleet mirrored the American Orange Plan. It seems that each side played into the other’s hands. Japan’s wait-and-react strategy remained intact until 1940, when such priorities as a hunger for natural resources and such realities as American naval expansion caused the Japanese to shift toward an offensive mindset.33

In the United States, the outmoded War Plan Orange did not affect the Marine Corps, but it continued to play an important role in the last plan as well as in subsequent war plans. Because the Corps’ contributions were tactical and operational rather than strategic, the Marines kept their focus on defending friendly bases or attacking enemy-held bases. They adapted to the evolving situations in 1938 and thereafter.34

Two important measures bore witness in 1938 to the U.S. Navy’s acceptance of the Marine Corps as its amphibious assault and base defense force. First, the Navy adopted Landing Operations Doctrine (FTP-167) as its blueprint for amphibious operations. Commandant Holcomb had ordered a committee to modify the Corps’ 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations according to the Navy’s needs. The resulting revision added broad strategic and naval perspectives to the Marines’ tactical and operational focuses.35

Second, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Claude A. Swanson appointed Admiral Arthur J. Hepburn to head a board of naval officers to assess the strategic roles of bases on Guam, Wake, Midway, and other

34 Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet to CNO, 27 July 1937, Marine Corps Budget Estimate (MCBE) FY 1936–43, Box 1, Entry 248, RG 127, NADC; and Gerald C. Thomas to Alexander A. Vandegrift, 9 August 1945, HAF 204, MCUA.
islands in light of Japanese threats in the Pacific. In December 1938, the so-called Hepburn Board prioritized the advanced bases in the Pacific according to strategic needs dictated by a given base’s possible benefits for aircraft, submarines, and surface warships in a war with Japan. The board argued that Guam should become a “major advanced fleet base” for operations in support of American forces on the Philippines and in the western Pacific. Wake and Midway Islands should become patrol plane bases for reconnaissance or supply bases for defensive and offensive actions. Hepburn Board members believed that construction should be started as quickly as possible on those islands. Apart from recommendations regarding a base proper, the board’s final report instructed the Marine Corps to organize “defense detachments” to hold those island bases against possible Japanese attacks in the opening stages of a conflict. This decision drew on ideas outlined in the MCS’s 1936 Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases.36

Other important steps toward operational readiness occurred in 1938. American entrepreneurialism provided the technological means for effective ship-to-shore transportation during an amphibious operation. The American military possessed no landing craft capable of providing speed, durability, and seaworthiness during this transit. Furthermore, a landing craft needed to be able to land on a

beach and extract itself from that beach with relative ease. Ironically, the commercial designs of Roebling’s Alligator amphibian tractor and Higgins’s Eureka boat provided vessels to meet performance specifications. Both found enthusiastic support from Marine officers. Nevertheless, subsistence-level budgets restricted the Marines from supporting the two boat builders. To their great credit, Higgins and Roebling spent their own money to modify their civilian designs to fit amphibious assault applications.37

Ironically, the commercial designs of Roebling’s Alligator amphibian tractor and Higgins’ Eureka boat provided vessels to meet performance specifications. Both found enthusiastic support from Marine officers. Nevertheless, subsistence-level budgets restricted the Marines from supporting the two boat builders.

The fast-rising tide of Nazi Germany in Western Europe and militarist Japanese in East Asia made War Plan Orange obsolete by 1939. American strategists reacted by formulating the more realistic Rainbow Plans with five versions addressing several possible wartime circumstances that the United States might confront. The versions ranged from Rainbow Plan 1, which entailed a unilateral American defense of the Western Hemisphere and no involvement with conflicts in Europe or East Asia, to Rainbow Plan 5, which envisioned combined American, British, and French offensives to vanquish Germany as quickly as possible. The United States, meanwhile, would remain on the strategic defensive in the Pacific against Japan. Once Germany was defeated, all available American and Allied forces would be redirected to crush Japan. As a result of these new scenarios, the U.S. Army reoriented its strategic emphasis to-

ward defense of the Western Hemisphere and the war in Europe and away from Japan and the Pacific Ocean. East Asia held little or no interest among most Army planners, except for those who agreed with General Douglas MacArthur’s misguided belief in the defensive viability of the Philippines in a war with Japan.38

All the Rainbow Plans expected the Corps to play an active operational role in the Pacific. It mattered little what the Navy did at the strategic level. If the U.S. Fleet launched an offensive campaign against the Japanese, then the Marines would capture enemy bases in support of the fleet and defend them against possible counterattack. Or, if the U.S. Fleet stood on the defensive, then the Marines would also be called upon to hold American bases and recapture any bases taken by the Japanese.39

As American strategies shifted to meet new threats, the Marines honed their amphibious assault techniques and improved their landing craft in additional FLEXs in 1939. The force structure for the other half of the Corps’ dual mission also began to take shape during that summer with the unveiling of the Marine Corps’ “defense battalion.”40 As envisioned on paper, this 1,000-man unit boasted an impressive array of weapons: 12 of the Navy’s 5-inch artillery pieces for coastal defense, 12 3-inch antiaircraft artillery guns for air defense, 48 .50-caliber machine guns for either antiaircraft or beach defense, and 48 .30-caliber machine guns for beach defense. All units would also receive high-intensity searchlights and radar systems. Some defense battalions might receive larger 7-inch artillery pieces. The proportion of Marines per heavy weapon far exceeded


40 Hepburn Board Report, 1–6, 62–70, 87–89; and CNO to MGC, 16 February 1939, Holcomb Papers, Box 6, MCUA, 1–2.
the Corps’ typical light infantry unit. Indeed, the defense battalion’s firepower rivaled that of a U.S Navy light cruiser.\textsuperscript{41}

Once ensconced on a fortified island, defense battalions provided American naval or aviation forces with self-sufficient bases of operations. Nevertheless, the Marines did depend on the Navy for logistical support and eventually for relief during a campaign. They could not hold out indefinitely against determined enemy assaults.

The defense battalions became part of the FMF and complemented the amphibious assault units therein. The defense battalions represented the reincarnation of the Marine Corps advanced base force of the early twentieth century, as well as the realization of the \textit{Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases}. The defense battalions thus fit strategic and doctrinal molds perfectly.\textsuperscript{42}

Despite the fact that a global war appeared ever more likely, the United States’ Armed Services remained ill-prepared for conflict. Isolationism maintained its hold on an American public who did not wish to become entangled in the conflicts in Europe or Asia. Instead, they turned their attention to feeding their families during the last years of the Great Depression.

In the summer of 1939, the Navy conducted a detailed self-assessment to answer the question, “Are We Ready?” The results released in the final report were not positive. According to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark, both seaborne Services suffered from numerous and “critical deficiencies” in manpower and equipment. The report pointed specifically to the Corps’ “lack of Pacific bases west of Hawaii.” Stark further cited the inability of the

\textsuperscript{41} Holcomb to Commanding General of Fleet Marine Force (FMF), 28 March 1939, DPPWPSGC 1926–42, Box 4, RG 127, NACP; Robert D. Heinl, “Defense Battalions,” 15 August 1939, DPPWPSGC 1926–42, Box 4, RG 127, NACP; and “Material Requirements for Four Defense Battalions,” unsigned memo, 15 August 1939, DPPWPSGC 1926–42, Box 4, RG 127, NACP.

Navy and the Marine Corps to seize any island bases or to protect those bases once they had been captured. The admiral saw it as his primary task to alleviate these deficiencies, and he spent the next 30 months trying to do so. Rarely did the Marine Corps enjoy a better advocate than Admiral Stark, who had begun deploying Marines to island bases in the Pacific. He subsequently asked the Corps to organize four fully manned and equipped defense battalions. This task, however, caused severe strains for the already thinly stretched and underfunded Marines.43

Shifting American Strategies and Marine Corps Missions, 1938–41

When German forces rolled over the Polish border on 1 September 1939, the governments of France and Britain promptly declared war on Germany. That same month, President Roosevelt announced the need for a “limited national emergency” with two goals in mind: “safeguarding” American neutrality and “strengthening our national defense within the limits of peacetime authorizations.”44 War in Europe similarly affected American strategic planning, causing rapid succession from Rainbow Plan 2 with its focus on Japan, to Plan 3 with its focus on Germany, and finally to Plan 4, which modified the first three plans based on the assumption that the United States would become a participant with Great Britain and France. This last change occurred when France surrendered to Germany in June 1940. The strategic situation degenerated to a point that the United States stood only with beleaguered Great Britain

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against the Axis powers. Rainbow Plan 4 reduced the United States to defending the Western Hemisphere against potential incursions. American forces in the Pacific would set up a defensive parameter from the Panama Canal to Hawaii to Alaska.

There was no longer a question of whether the United States would enter the Second World War. The new seminal questions concerned how much and how fast the nation could mobilize and prepare for conflict. President Roosevelt adopted a short-of-war strategy.45

The Marine Corps exercised little influence over changes in the strategic planning process, so they instead focused on fielding a force adequate to meet the expectations of fighting on one and maybe even two oceans. Making matters worse, the Corps could not hope to mobilize quickly enough to keep up with any of the Rainbow Plans’ timetables.46 The Marines did their best to augment their amphibious assault and base defense capabilities between the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 and the end of 1940. Marine units participated in FLEX 6 in the Culebra area from January to March 1940.47 The simulated attacks showed the greatest improvements and achieved the highest level of realism to date, though limitations and deficiencies in equipment and manpower still plagued the Americans. Doctrine intersected with practice as the Marines


47 FLEX 6 was created for Navy and Marine Corps participation alone, while the Army planned for a separate amphibious exercise. FLEX 6 introduced the idea of night patrol landings from destroyers and submarines using rubber boats with outboard motors. See Norman Friedman, U.S. Ships and Amphibious Craft: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), 19.
recognized that the following principles were essential to successful assaults: naval gunfire and aviation close air support could be combined with Marine forces to affect an amphibious assault, logistical capabilities could be expanded to supply troops on shore, and specially trained and equipped defense battalions could secure islands against counterattack by enemy forces. The Eureka boats and Alligator tractors proved themselves superior to all competitors. Higgins and Roebling finally received contracts for the Eureka and Alligator, which would become officially known as the Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP; more popularly known as the Higgins boat) and the Landing Vehicle, Tracked (LVT).48 Even so, funds disbursement to contractors took quite some time, and the manufacturers procured new materials at an interminably slow pace. The sluggish pace of this process vexed such senior Marine leaders as Holcomb and Holland Smith.49

The final months of 1940 clarified the fact that the United States could only expect to find an ally in Britain. In the Pacific, token resistance by British and Dutch forces could not hope to halt the determined Japanese expansion. Not even Rainbow Plan 5 accounted for the complexity or flexibility of the new circumstances.50

Consequently, the United States adopted a “Germany First” strategy.51 In so doing, the Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations, Ad-
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miral Stark, conceded to what the Army’s strategic planners wanted when he formulated Plan D or “Plan Dog Memorandum.” In this newest scheme, the war in Europe would be dominated by the U.S. Army, leaving the Navy in a subordinate role. The seaborne Services would play a larger, albeit defensive, role in the Pacific against Japan. Plan Dog formed the nucleus for America’s wartime strategy.52

Although the Marines remained observers of the process surrounding Plan Dog and successive war plans, this did not mean that the Corps was ignored as irrelevant. Stark and the Navy concentrated on strategic and national goals, which only concerned the Corps in terms of mobilization timetables and resource allocation, but mattered very little in terms of its dual missions. Both base defense and amphibious assault fit into operational requirements of Plan Dog because they concerned the prosecution of the war. With help from the Marines, the U.S. Fleet would hold the defensive perimeter from Alaska to Hawaii to Central America against Japanese incursions. American forces were also expected to preserve the logistical lifeline through Australia to British-held Malaysia. Stark hoped that advanced bases on Wake, Midway, and other Pacific islands could be maintained for future operations. Japanese-held island bases would have to be assaulted, taken, and defended in turn. Any American islands taken by the Japanese would need to be recaptured by American forces. In sum, the Navy would conduct limited operations using its air, surface, and amphibious forces to maintain the strategic status quo in the Pacific. Once Germany was eliminated as an enemy, the United States could then turn its full weight against Japan. Herein lay the significance of Plan Dog and its successive plans for the Corps: Marines could expect to play active roles in both base

defense and amphibious assault, whether in operations supporting defensive or offensive operations.\textsuperscript{53}

Because the naval campaigns outlined in the war plans would require larger amphibious assault units, the Corps received authorization to create more viable, larger division-size units of approximately 18,000 Marines capable of seizing enemy-held islands. The creation of two paper divisions in the FMF occurred in early February 1941. Later in July, elements of the U.S. Army’s 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Marine Division, and the U.S. Atlantic Fleet made simulated amphibious landings in the Caribbean and at New River, North Carolina. The new force structures and exercises followed the doctrinal principles laid down in the Tentative Manual for Landing

\textsuperscript{53} Stark Memorandum; Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power, 154–57; and Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, 64.
Operations and the Landing Operations Doctrine. Although these exercises suffered some setbacks, the participating Marines, soldiers, and sailors learned what not to do. This Marine Corps’ emphasis on amphibious warfare took on another element as well—institutional survival.

From Prewar Doctrine to Wartime Application

The last few months of peace in late 1941 passed quickly. Marines struggled to ready themselves on far-flung Pacific islands as well as mobilize back in the United States. Commandant Holcomb’s efforts to meet expectations resembled “robbing Peter to pay Paul” as he ordered units with full complements to be split apart to create cadres for separate units. The U.S. Navy’s and Army’s senior leaders experienced similar problems in matching resources to needs.

While American strategic planners anticipated Japanese attacks on the Philippines, Guam, or Wake, the idea of a massive air attack against the main U.S. Navy and Army bases at Pearl Harbor seemed too far-fetched to be plausible. Sadly, underestimating the skill and audacity of the Japanese had dire consequences on the morning of 7 December 1941. On that infamous Sunday, the Japanese launched a preemptive strike that destroyed the U.S. Fleet’s battleship component and laid waste to the ground-based aircraft on Oahu, Hawaii.

In the subsequent hours, days, and months, the Japanese launched attacks against Wake, Guam, the Philippines, and Midway that were consistent with their anticipated actions. Elements of a defense battalion on Wake Island resisted for more than a fortnight before succumbing to an overwhelming Japanese force in late December.

54 Training of Units of the FMF, unsigned report, n.d. [c. February 1941], GBSF, GB 425, Box 135, RG 80, NACP; H. Smith to CNO via MGC, 10 September 1941, Holland M. Smith to King, 14 November 1941, and Deputy Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to CNO, 10 October 1941, all in Holcomb Papers, Box 27, MCUA; Holcomb to Marston, 22 November 1941, Holcomb Papers, Box 4, MCUA; Smith, Development of Amphibious Tactics, 36–38; Isley and Crowl, U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 63–65; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, 348–49.

55 See Ulbrich, Preparing for Victory, 92–102.

56 The best single-volume survey of the Pacific War remains Spector, Eagle against the Sun. See also the relevant chapter in Millett, Semper Fidelis.
The few Marines on Guam surrendered without a fight. The Philippines fell five months later after American and Filipino forces fought desperate holding actions, waiting for the relief force envisioned in War Plan Orange that would take nearly three years to arrive.

Although attacked, Midway was not secured by the Japanese. It would later be the scene of a decisive naval battle in 1942. Indeed, Marines in two defense battalions held Midway against Japanese aerial attacks. Their antiaircraft fire downed 10 Japanese planes during their aerial assault, which did not destroy the ground defenses in anticipation of an amphibious assault in the coming days. It is also worth noting that a defense battalion opposed daily Japanese aerial bombing raids and frequent Japanese Navy bombardments on Guadalcanal from August to November 1942. The Midway and Guadalcanal Marines’ tactics and unit structure followed the doctrines laid down in the *Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases*.57

During the war in the Pacific, the doctrine in the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* was successfully applied in the island-hopping and leapfrogging campaigns, though not without halting progress and severe casualties. At Guadalcanal, the 1st Marine Division made an unopposed landing on 7 August 1942. The real challenge came not in defending the tenuous beachhead and all-important airfield against Japanese air, land, and sea incursions, but in maintaining the Navy’s supply lines to American units on the island. Although suffering severe losses in men, aircraft, and ships, the Navy succeeded in this logistical mission and also destroyed the Japanese supply system.58

More than a year after the amphibious operation on Guadalcanal, the long-anticipated drive across the central Pacific began in November 1943. The Marine Corps’ bloody assault on Tarawa was one example of how, even with the most sound doctrines, the fog

57 A more thorough examination of Wake Island can be found in Urwin, *Facing Fearful Odds*. For an overview of defense battalions in the Pacific War, see Melson, *Condition Red*.
and friction of war can conspire to bring about near defeat. The Marines and their Navy counterparts used a feedback loop that created a learning curve. The Americans adapted doctrines, equipment, and force structure to overcome the Japanese, conforming the evolution of tactics in their defensive efforts to Peleliu, Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.\textsuperscript{59}

The value of Marine Corps doctrine extended beyond the central Pacific into the southwest Pacific and European theatres of operations, where the U.S. Army and Navy conducted several large-scale amphibious assaults.\textsuperscript{60} The principles outlined in the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* found their way into the Navy’s *Landing Operations Doctrine* and subsequently to the War Department and Army in *FM 31–5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores* (1941). This document’s preface stated that it “is based to large extent on the *Landing Operations Doctrine*, U.S. Navy, 1938. The arrangement of subject matter is similar to the Navy publication and many illustrations are taken from it.” The name appearing on the signature block “by order of the Secretary of War” was the Army’s chief of staff, General George C. Marshall.\textsuperscript{61} The table of contents from *FM 31–5* and later revisions, as well as wartime revisions of *FTP–167*, reveal that the U.S. Army and Navy continued to borrow and adapt the Marines’ doctrines.

**Conclusion**

The operational and tactical applications of amphibious assault and base defense in the Pacific and European theatres remained the means to strategic ends as determined by the senior Allied leaders. Although untested in the 1920s and 1930s, the Marine Corps amphibious doctrines laid out in the tentative manuals as presented

\textsuperscript{59} Even after more than 60 years since publication, the seminal work on amphibious operations in the Pacific War remains Isley and Crowl, *U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare*. For the latest study, see Sharon Tosi Lacey, *Pacific Blitzkrieg: World War II in the Central Pacific* (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2013).

\textsuperscript{60} See the chapters on Gen George S. Patton Jr. (USA), LtGen Arthur G. Trudeau (USA), and RAdm Walter C. Ansel (USN) in Daugherty, *Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare*, 298–400.

by such Marines as Pete Ellis, Holland Smith, John Lejeune, and Thomas Holcomb; in simulated amphibious assaults; and in equipment procurement proved to be remarkably forward-looking in fulfilling strategic needs in the Pacific and Europe. The late military historian Russell F. Weigley saw great value in this process:

Simply by defining the specific problems into which amphibious operations divided themselves, the Marine Corps made it evident that the problems most likely were not insoluble; and the Corps went on to delineate many of the solutions.62

Such problem-solving efforts are just as critical in the twenty-first century as they were in the Second World War. Consider, for example, the concepts presented in Expeditionary Force 21, which focuses on a return to the Corps’ expeditionary sea-based principles, or world powers relying on Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/D2) warfare.63 The new operational challenges to successful assaults can be seen in accurate long-range rockets, advanced underwater obstacles, high-speed jet aircraft, and even tactical nuclear weapons. Overcoming these requires that the amphibious assault forces have plans to breach obstacles, establish beachheads, and maintain logistical networks. These missions can only be achieved under an umbrella of air superiority and a cordon of naval (surface and underwater) superiority that reach several hundred miles in all directions. Today’s conflicts require truly “joint” operational capabilities.64

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perspective, the key elements include disruption of enemy assault forces and logistical support efforts. Indeed, improvised explosive devices have been so effective on land that they will doubtlessly be used to impede ship-to-shore transit and onshore maneuver by amphibious assault forces. Just as was the case in the 1920s and 1930s, mastering the offensive side of amphibious warfare in 2015 necessitates an equally clear understanding the defensive side.65

The need for projecting military force and humanitarian assistance from the sea will not diminish, especially given that most of the world’s population lives within a couple of hundred miles of major bodies of water. This fact becomes even more relevant as the U.S. military pivots increasingly toward the Pacific Rim. The twenty-first century amphibious operational environment certainly requires the type of doctrine, force structure, and equipment that only the Marine Corps stands in any position to develop. The Corps’ amphibious mission—whether executing an assault under fire, landing to support humanitarian efforts, or defending a shoreline against enemy invasion—differs from that in the Second World War or even Gallipoli in degree, but not in kind. In fact, one could argue that Marines are in better shape now in the twenty-first century than in the previous century because the Corps possesses an integrated and tested force structure platform, albeit in ground combat deployments conducting counterinsurgency operations via the Marine air-ground task force concept. Admittedly, it remains to be seen whether new, effective amphibious assault vehicles will keep pace with the requirements for speed, capacity, and agility in the contemporary operating environment. How the amphibious mission should best be balanced against the Corps’ other missions, such as in counterinsurgency operations, also remains uncertain. Nevertheless, almost 80 years later, the foundational doctrines still ring true in the Tentative Manual for Landing Operations (1934) and the Tentative Manual for Defense of Advanced Bases (1936), which helped the Corps prepare to fight the Pacific War (see sidebar, Modern Marine Corps Doctrine).

Modern Marine Corps Doctrine

Since those first tentative manuals, the Navy, Army, and Marine Corps have individually and jointly revised and created doctrine to serve as a guide for current and future operations. The success of the U.S. Services is associated directly with how well their doctrine captures and addresses lessons learned, addresses current challenges, addresses current capabilities and future needs, and is understood and incorporated into the thought processes of its forces.


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The habits of earlier Marines—Thomas Holcomb, John Lejeune, Pete Ellis, Holland Smith, and others like them—drove doctrinal development, equipment procurement, and force structure creation to meet the challenges of amphibious operations during World War II, including not just solving problems in the amphibious lane but also ensuring institutional survival and maintaining strategic relevance during times of constricted resources in interwar periods. These are the same characteristics we rely on as today’s Marine Corps prepares a place for itself among multinational military forces.
Peter Kiss proposes that his lessons for the future are laudable and timely for a particular generation of military leaders. While conflict is a normal human condition, the context, ways, and means by which we conduct conflict in pursuit of goals must be constantly evaluated and our resolution techniques refined if our responses have any chance of success. The threat we currently face from Islamic extremists mutates faster than our doctrinal responses, and Kiss should be applauded for trying to throw light on that deficit. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have posed a very real danger since the mid-1990s; however, the ongoing conflict in Syria and the potential for violence from returning homegrown Islamists expands that threat profile and takes it to another level. Therefore, all attempts to broaden the political debate on this new threat of domestic jihad, whether described as “asymmetric conflict” or not, are helpful.

While it is now widely acknowledged that the response to an insurgency or what we might call a “domestic jihad” should be comprehensive, the examples Kiss discusses shed new light on the challenge.

PHILIP WILKINSON is a retired British Army colonel with 32 years of military service, 12 years of counterinsurgency experience, and doctrine writing experience. He has also served as an academic and policy advisor to the government of Rwanda and in the occupied Palestinian territories, Kabul, and Baghdad. He is currently a research associate at Chatham House and a member of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences.
He emphasises the potential advantages and pitfalls of strategic communications. The persuasive use of the media by the Kosovo Liberation Army was the decisive factor in drawing in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces and ultimately the withdrawal of Serb forces. The use of social media, as a means to mobilize and coordinate the masses, was taken to new heights in the Arab Spring. As Kiss implies, information technology and social media are essential elements of a modern strategic communications strategy of both governments and insurgents.

In light of Kiss’s observations, this reviewer wonders whether he would use the same four case studies today. I suspect the answer would depend on his target audience. While the author looked back to identify lessons for the challenge of domestic insurgency, the specifics of that threat have mutated at a pace almost inconceivable three years ago. In his French case from 2005, Kiss gave us a glimpse of the type of complexity presented by the mob in a modern inner-city context. This poses the question of whether we could now see groups of combat-hardened jihadists returning from Syria to Western cities and attempting to establish and defend “no-go” areas where sharia law reigns supreme. During the 1970s, the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland established no-go areas in Belfast and Londonderry in which they maintained their own rule of law. The troubles in Northern Ireland beginning in 1969 make an interesting study on a homegrown domestic “insurgency,” as does the Palestinian Intifada in 2001 that Kiss mentions in passing. While the British Army has a tendency to promote success in Northern Island as directly related to their tactics, techniques, and procedures, perhaps the real lesson is that only after the Royal Ulster Constabulary was given the security lead in 1975 was real progress made.

While the author acknowledges the need for a comprehensive multifunctional response to insurgency that addresses both its causes and symptoms, the emphasis of his research is on the military element of that multifunctional response. In virtually all counterinsurgencies where success has been defined in terms of self-sustaining peace rather than military victory, the role of the military may be to ensure that government forces retain a monopoly on the use of organized force; however, long-term peace and stability require re-
establishing the rule of law and access to justice, which is the job of the police. Initially, military activities will inevitably involve combat operations, but they must be conducted with restraint as “collateral damage” is the most effective recruiting tool for insurgents. It is not enough for security forces to operate within the law, but their actions must be seen by the people as being legitimate. Kiss was ambiguous on this point (p. 188).

Perhaps it is not within the scope of the book, but from a political strategic perspective, the domestic challenge of today’s counter-jihad strategy requires additional elements than those more traditional to counterinsurgency. For example, a successful counter-jihad strategy, whether in Hungary or any other Western country, must ensure an inclusive form of governance, the redress of feelings of exclusion and disadvantage that feed terrorism, and a counter to the distortion of Islam as preached by those who promote jihad against the West.

This book is not only very interesting for what it says about domestic insurgency but also what it says the about the approach that the U.S. military takes to military operations other than conventional war—operations collectively known as asymmetric warfare. The case has often been made that the lessons of counterinsurgency and peace or support operations went out the window like the proverbial baby with the bathwater in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In this context, the U.S military’s ability to reinvent counterinsurgency doctrine was a huge and necessary shift, and in this book, Kiss takes that doctrinal debate to another level.

My only disappointment is that the utility of Kiss’s observations is limited in a nonmilitary and international context due to his adherence to current U.S. military language, definitions, and conceptual constructs. But, of course, this is not a surprising result from a recently retired military officer. Others might take issue with three other areas. The English and French, who fought their Hundred Years’ War in 1328–1453, might not agree that first-generation warfare came about after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) or that today’s fourth-generation warfare or asymmetric conflict is not a new phenomenon unless seen in a post-GWOT context. The Marine
Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* makes that clear. The use of the strategic, operational, and tactical are seen by many as counterproductive to understand the conduct of counterinsurgency and peace support operations when the “strategic corporal” is so important (p. 181). And finally, as it was pointed out to me by a retired U.S. police chief in the occupied Palestinian territories in 2011, using such common phrases as Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) is not helpful within the civilian interagency context or even with the police because most rely on their own specific language. That criticism aside, I would recommend this book for students in Western command and staff colleges as a useful addition to current doctrine regarding homegrown domestic jihad.
Our dynamic planet abounds with natural perils: earthquakes, volcanic activity, droughts, storms, floods, and tsunamis. The ever-present threat of pandemics and epidemics brings the potential for death and suffering of unmatched severity. *The Disaster Experts* parallels the urbanization of modern America, an interesting story on the development of disaster expertise and public policy. It puts into context a linear historical view of the rise of a group of experts that influenced government and private sector professionals (manufacturing insurance inspectors, degreed engineers, scientists, public officials, and emergency managers) who addressed protecting the public from disasters. Knowles begins his account by examining the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the resulting investigations, and he then asks several open-ended questions concerning building codes, firefighting techniques, and the lack of a comprehensive disaster mitigation strategy, even in the wake of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Throughout his treatment of the historical rise of disaster experts, Knowles answers those questions while encountering several reoccurring themes on the management (definition and acceptance) of risk in America and how it has changed over the last 150 years.


DANIEL W. GEISENHOF, lieutenant colonel, USMC, serves as a red team instructor at Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia. He is currently developing red team doctrine and corresponding curriculum for the university. Geisenhof attended the Basic School, Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting after completing a bachelor's degree in history at Binghamton University, New York.
Knowles examines the nexus between public and private institutions, fire protection experts, scientists, engineers, geographers, emergency managers, and social scientists that contribute to our understanding of the environment and the policies built to reduce risk and save lives. The tolerance for risk and the need to place blame in the wake of a natural or man-made disaster rests exclusively within the context of that society. He posits what could be done differently to prevent large-scale disasters. His answer provides an examination across the historical record, following the rise of disaster experts “as they gain and exert authority, and analyzing their work as it consistently defined and redefined urban risks and disasters from the mid nineteenth century into the present” (p. 9).

The author’s first case study takes place during the Progressive Era, a period that ushered change through social activism and sought efficiency through scientific management. This historical account views the period’s disaster experts through the interdisciplinary lens to understand emerging technology and the impacts of disaster on the urban setting. As he explains, “The fact is that the historical record is full and available; disasters do not recur in the United States because of a poverty of knowledge. Forgetfulness about risks and disasters is no accident. The book addresses one aspect of our national disaster amnesia, a disjunction between knowledge and action that is frustrating, but history shows is capable of being overcome” (p. 20). These disaster experts became “professionals” and slowly gained the trust of the public after many years of diligent work to alter building practices, building codes, and code enforcement.

Knowles weaves a compelling narrative that outlines the development of urbanization and how disaster expertise and public policy attempted to keep pace. Nevertheless, this gripping tale falls a bit short as the historical timeline progresses, particularly when it becomes clear that the author views history as a neat chronology with defined causes and effects. Events at the end of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century are not as neatly transposed from one location to another. Individuals involved in risk management in the New England area developed proclivities based on their upbringing and transferred those biases westward when they operated in the Midwest.
The development of the disaster expert is a tale of intertwined complexity with interdependent and independent systems. The failure of disaster experts and the local, state, and federal government to recognize the shortcomings of the systems of systems (i.e., a number of interdependent systems: governmental, economic, industrial, civil, etc.) in which they operated is no fault of their own. The complexity of these systems is telling, but the author oversimplifies the relationships of the characters in the case studies, compromising the richness of the discussion. He suggests that a diverse collection of disaster professionals shaped modern America. His comparison of the European “precautionary principle” with the Americans’ rugged individualistic “Devil’s Privilege” is not the intellectual chasm he contends. Americans and Europeans were as equally guilty as the local governments that pushed back at what they viewed as attempts at central governmental interference. Knowles does temper his argument by pointing out “that the creation and application of such knowledge reflects struggles and priority-setting through which we can learn a great deal about, among other things, the efficacy of the modern state in confronting complex emerging problems, and the evolution of the modern urban environment” (p. 5).

The second half of the book offers a darker look at how civil defensive measures were force-fed by the federal government. He develops his argument well and reprimands the U.S. government for ignoring the paradigm that brought success to disaster experts. The top-down approach he found lacking in the earlier eras was eventually pushed upon local governments. The civil defense measures appeared more rigid and militaristic, leaving gaping holes in plans and most urban areas wholly unprepared. Municipalities and the public had limited buy-in to the top-down approach, which serves as another example of symptoms taken out of context. Knowles fails to take into account the cultural dimension that fed the Civil Defense Era, which fell between World War II and the Cold War. The policy makers at the time were born during the Great Depression, were drafted into the U.S. military, were active participants in any number of conflicts, and were familiar with that military hierarchy. It only makes sense that the populace would demand strong central government action during a potential crisis or disaster, such as nuclear war.
Knowles also raises a recurring theme of blame. Shifting blame to accountability, from the omnipotent forces of the divine to nature and then to governments and institutions, he makes a fine academic argument. He further argues, “Where is the logic in erecting an elaborate structure of consensus-based fire codes for buildings, then allowing structures like the Twin Towers to go up as design experiments, tall, impressive, and risky?” (p. 301). Knowles places the issues of risk and disaster into historical context, but ultimately he oversimplifies the conversation, losing some of the complexity necessary for a proper discussion of contemporary issues in a larger context.

The author tackles a difficult subject, positing that the focus of collective efforts should be toward risk mitigation rather than merely the current effort of responses. His uneven treatment of the time frame is easily overlooked considering the well-researched and readable style of his writing. Knowles’ recommendations, however, must fall within the ability of the people and the government to implement, as unsupportable solutions are nothing more than academic exercises.
This review essay was written for a number of reasons: it recognizes the authors’ original scholarship as academic history and then considers its use in a practical sense as applied history. Within this context, the Holocaust serves as a unique event, but it must then be considered based on how it could stand as a lesson for the future, specifically pertaining to current military leaders and its forces.

_Marching into Darkness_, Waitman W. Beorn’s 2010 dissertation from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was written under the supervision of prominent Holocaust scholar Christopher R. Browning. In it, he examines in detail the German Army (Heer) in the Soviet Union during 1941–42 and its participation in the killing of Jews in Belarus as part of the German Army Group Center’s military occupation. Using Omer Bartov’s _Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis,
and War in the Third Reich (1992) as a starting point, Beorn leads us through an examination of how the German Army participated in the extermination of the Jews in six local areas.

Beorn’s thesis focuses on the predisposition to violence evident in military organizations. When coupled with a predetermined definition of the victims of this violence, however, the result is genocide. Using wartime source documents and subsequent civil trials in postwar Germany, Beorn immerses the reader in the details of specific instances where the German Army facilitated or conducted the killing of Jews under the guise of antipartisan or security actions. While considering that such terms as “holocaust” and “genocide” are modern concepts, Beorn demonstrates that they could be defined with specific historic examples. He also considers exceptions that force the reader to accept that the examples may lie within the boundaries of shades of gray rather than strictly black and white.

Ordinary Soldiers is a case study largely derived from Beorn’s academic work but presented in a format that could be used to instruct military audiences (neither private military contractors nor other government agencies were addressed). The work as a whole makes Beorn’s thesis relevant to today’s military leaders as they are the most likely to find themselves in circumstances that require life and death decisions, if not of a mass atrocity or genocidal nature, ones that could be construed as excessive or even war crimes. These elements were supported by useful appendices and educational materials, including reviews of American and German regulations that defined military conduct in combat and insurgencies. The challenge to the instructor will be how Americans in the GWOT differ from German soldiers participating in the drive to the east, events which were significant and dealt with specific circumstances.

The case study examined the actual events from the 1941–42, postwar trials, the basic principles of the law of armed conflict, rules of engagement, command responsibility, and obedience to orders as a justification for German actions. Supported by educational materials, today’s leaders are enjoined to act differently than their German World War II counterparts as presented in both works under review. The myth of the “clean” German armed forces and the documenta-
tion of its participation in crimes against humanity began as early as 1945. With the example of Browning’s ordinary men, Beorn shows that ordinary soldiers also participated in Nazi war crimes, whether by chance or circumstance. This was “its lesson for today,” to quote another military personnel teaching effort (*Nuremberg: Its Lesson for Today*). While the contribution of the author and the various institutions involved are significant, American examples from My Lai in Vietnam or Haditha in Iraq would likely be more appropriate given current circumstances. The lesson here is that the descent into darkness is an easy one to make.

One interesting aspect of this work was the participation of military experts in an otherwise academic analysis. For example, Beorn is a West Point graduate and U.S. Army veteran with combat experience in Iraq. The remaining contributors came from military service academies that have taken on ethics instruction within their curriculum.

At one time, the U.S. Marine Corps History Division was asked by its Service leadership, “What is the SS and why is it bad?” Both works under discussion expand on this question as they consider the issue of transcendent guilt by the German National Socialist (NS, or Nazi) armed services and police across the spectrum of violence, demonstrating that participation in the final solution of the “Jewish problem” in World War II was not limited to the racial extremists of the NS and SS. The myth of the “clean” German armed forces (Wehrmacht) offered as a defense at Nuremberg was easily countered by the realities found on the ground. The NS and SS would not prove to be the alibi of the German nation it had become.

All in all, both works are recommended for ethics instructors in civil and military communities. Of course, historians and more general readers will find them enlightening as well. They present clear and detailed information with an obvious application to participation in the current GWOT and other conflicts were necessity, law, and morality become intermingled.
Arguments about American exceptionalism—or the lack thereof—are invariably contentious. This should come as no surprise, since the arguments involve core issues of national identity and implicit judgments about other powers. Frank Ninkovich argues in *The Global Republic* that there is nothing exceptional about American foreign policy, although he allows for certain “unique” features, especially the globalist posture it embraced during World War II. A professor emeritus of history at St. John’s University, Ninkovich asserts that the “stimulus for the nation’s ascent to dizzying heights of power, far from emanating from within, was instead of external origin, an inadvertent consequence of the need to keep up with a fast-changing globalizing world that was filled with promise and peril” (pp. 1–2).

Ninkovich’s in-depth discussion of globalization is useful because many observers mistakenly assume that the concept is a fairly recent development. In fact, the trajectory of increased interaction of people, trade, and ideas across borders traces to the beginning of recorded history. Ninkovich acknowledges the origins of globalization but argues that its “enormous power” (p. 2) on the United States and other nations emerged in the nineteenth century as a consequence of the Industrial Revolution.

Addressing the full sweep of American history, from the Founding Fathers through the post–Cold War period, Ninkovich’s thesis is provocative and reflects original thinking. However, he overstates the power of globalization and underestimates other historical drivers, including human agency and the importance of values in shaping behavior.
Ninkovich contends that “Wilsonianism, contrary to its reputation, was a freakish, ill-conceived, one-off episode in the history of US foreign relations” (p. 8). President Woodrow Wilson’s ambitious agenda enjoyed significant domestic appeal, even though Congress ultimately rejected the Treaty of Versailles. If Wilsonianism were nothing more than an “aberrant episode” (p. 97), then this values-laden, idealistic component of American foreign policy would have withered long ago. Nevertheless, vigorous debates over foreign aid, humanitarian assistance, and military intervention abroad endure, fueled by competing realist and idealist assumptions. The author’s main argument about globalization marginalizes their importance.

Moreover, Ninkovich’s assessment of the Cold War is uneven and unpersuasive. He mischaracterizes U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1980s as a “live-and-let-live relationship” (p. 252) and credits Mikhail Gorbachev with almost single-handedly ending the Cold War. Ninkovich’s dismissive treatment of President Ronald W. Reagan misses important Cold War dynamics.

In essence, President Reagan’s approach to containment was far more muscular than his immediate predecessors—not just in terms of greater military spending, but also in supporting anti-Communist guerrillas and in challenging the Soviet Union politically. The administration spelled out its approach in National Security Decision Directive 75, which is probably the second most influential Cold War policy document after National Security Council Paper NSC-68, which focused on objectives and programs for national security. Ninkovich’s list of otherwise impressive sources ignores the former document and mentions the latter only in passing. The impact of Reagan’s approach may be open to debate, but to ignore its core elements reflects a highly selective account of the Cold War.

JAMES H. ANDERSON is the academic dean and deputy director of the Marine Corps War College. He received a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Prior to working at the War College, Dr. Anderson served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Bush administration. He is the author of America at Risk: The Citizen’s Guide to Missile Defense (1999) and numerous articles on a wide range of national security issues.
The author’s treatment of the post–Cold War era is also uneven. He is downright scornful of President George W. Bush’s administration, belittling his advisors as a “fringe group” (p. 264). “If one looks beyond the spurious comparisons to Wilsonianism, it is not clear that the Bush administration’s democratizing ambitions fit anywhere within the ideological boundaries of the history of American foreign relations,” Ninkovich asserts (p. 263, emphasis in original).

Caricatures of its policy notwithstanding, President Bush and his advisers believed that long-term success against international terrorism required far more than capturing and killing bad guys, which gave rise to Bush’s Freedom Agenda and the administration’s renewed emphasis on promoting reform and democracy. It seems fair to question the practicality of promoting these ideas in a post-9/11 environment, but in this reviewer’s opinion, Ninkovich inaccurately claims the approach itself was a historical aberration. Far from being outside the “ideological boundaries” of U.S. foreign policy, the idea of promoting democracy abroad has a historical pedigree that preceded the Bush administration.

*The Global Republic* is not for the casual reader. Ninkovich likes to cite such philosophers as Aristotle, Freud, and Søren Kierkegaard when discussing complex ideas. Most readers will want a dictionary within easy reach given the author’s tendency to use words like anopsia, chiasmus, and hermeneutic. Moreover, readers without a solid foundation in American history will find the book frustratingly abstract, and those in search of historically informed foreign policy prescriptions will come away disappointed.

Despite its flaws, Ninkovich offers a fresh and thought-provoking central argument. The book will appeal to readers interested in an unconventional perspective on American exceptionalism, as well as the conceptual underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy.
Gone are the days of America flexing her military might, putting on a show, and forcing peace through—wait for it—force. No longer are the threats to national security, both at home and abroad, coming from superpowers and mega-nations. Instead, the threats arise from the fragments of broken nations, from the fear of collapse of currently sovereign nations, and from those nations harboring terrorists and other undesirables. In the last 30 years, the foreign security strategy of the United States has evolved from one of force and a display of strength to a cooperative alliance with nations and other security forces around the globe. America instead now trains new forces, helps budding nations advance, and rebuilds broken states to prevent further conflict.

Derek Reveron refers to this activity as soft power. Soft power is the strength and the foundation of the policy implemented by the Department of Defense (DOD) built on delivering security and training for other nations rather than employing the direct, kinetic solutions that were the hallmark of military engagement until shortly after the Cold War ended. The foundation of this soft power lies in the transformation to management of noncombat missions typically reserved or delegated to civilian development organizations or the State Department. Reveron sees future engagement and security cooperation success tied to DOD’s acceptance of defense missions linked with diplomacy and development.
In many chapters of *Exporting Security*, the author presents case studies where military commanders acted as policy makers and influencers, where they were called upon by the State Department to supplement current humanitarian efforts, or even where they served as the sole providers of such efforts from the United States and/or the United Nations. Such cases, Reveron notes, include sending hospital ships to South America instead of warships and sending Marine expeditionary units from Japan to the Philippines or Japan itself to perform earthquake and tsunami relief for the victims of those areas. He is careful to note that “swords have not been beaten into plowshares” (p. 14), but that the military is purposing much of its capabilities to provide aid, assistance, and training rather than simply force and power to bear.

Reveron challenges the past wisdom and policy of militarizing U.S. foreign policy strategies by showing through example how the development and diplomacy currently in action around the world cannot happen without sufficient and potent security. To do this, it requires not only a paradigm shift in the mindset of military commanders and troops on the ground but also a stronger partnership with foreign militaries and police forces. His argument and justification centers around the idea that the future of the U.S. military will focus less on preparing for the next high-tech war and more on a force engaged in security cooperation around the globe.

Reveron quite poignantly illustrates this strategy: “A superpower is not a superhero, it needs partners. The military can build the school, but the Department of State tells them where to build, the USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] trains the teachers, and NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] provide school supplies for the students and teachers to use” (p. 8). He is careful, however, to note that, while the United States focuses its foreign policy efforts on collaboration and soft power, the strength and power of the American military is ever-present. When diplomacy and security cooperation fail, the United States will bring to bear its force to whatever degree necessary. As Clausewitz so eloquently put it, “War is merely the continuation of policy by other means.”
The author is immensely qualified to write and discuss this issue. With significant expertise from years of research at the Naval War College, Reveron has penned and edited several well-regarded books and articles. He offers a great deal of practical experience from an extended deployment in Kabul, Afghanistan, at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Afghanistan—one of the largest security assistance efforts in NATO’s history. Reveron successfully puts security cooperation in a contemporary context that is useful to the national security professional.
Climate Change and National Security is an ambitious volume focused on potential future climate change impacts in 2030. Daniel Moran, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, relied on the contributions of 23 regional specialists to evaluate how climate change would affect the physical environment and, in turn, the response of key countries and regions to a variety of crises, including flooding, reduced rainfall, water scarcity, and food shortages among others.

A conference organized by Moran formed the basis for Climate Change and National Security, and many of the conference participants contributed to this volume. Each contributor received a list of questions forming a common analytical basis. The general guidance for each author was to describe national reactions to climate change as “stress on the sinews of public life” (p. 1) as opposed to a direct, all-encompassing threat. By taking this path, the volume posits a more fundamental and perhaps more interesting question: what are the inherent weak points of each state and region under consideration?

The strength of Climate Change and National Security lies in the assessment of the historical weak points of each individual country and the discussion of how pressure caused by climate change exacerbates existing problems. For example, Kent Eaton points out that the Northern Andes is currently the most volatile subregion in South America (p. 249), and he concludes that climate change resulting in diminished resources could only make this situation worse. Eaton predicts a widening of the urban/rural divide in the region and the degradation of the central government’s authority, an assumption...
supported by both geography and regional history. Eaton perceives this bad situation becoming worse (p. 256), but makes no mention of the impact on coca production and transportation that extends far beyond Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia.

Gregory W. White predicts a more dramatic impact for the Maghreb region due to existing environmental issues with desertification, water scarcity, and deforestation. A reduction in resources, he predicts, will polarize wealth distribution even further and turn the population toward radical Islam (p. 195). Linda J. Beck and E. Mark Pires address the deleterious changes in West Africa, predicting a drier north that is even less habitable and causes a southward migration to the coast. This exodus will agitate existing ethnoreligious tensions between the Christian south and Muslim north (p. 212). Each case study reemphasizes Moran’s conclusion that “climate politics resembles politics generally” (p. 270).

Since the 2011 publication date of this volume, the climate change debate has evolved. The mix of science and politics continues to drive public skepticism over global warming (or climate change). When predictions of global heat are met with increased glaciation at the poles and predictions of weather severity are met with decreased hurricane activity, an unbiased observer may conclude that the jury is still out. Is our climatology model mature enough to truly predict medium- and long-term trends? How much environmental variation is due to natural systemic causes, and how much is due to human activity? To what degree would international multi-billion-dollar initiatives truly impact climate change? And, is that outcome worth the price of curtailing international trade and therefore abrogating the upward mobility of millions in the developing

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world? Despite these unanswered questions, it is reasonable to suggest that climate change, no matter what the driver, is a tangible characteristic of our planet and will produce environmental shifts requiring human adaption.

This volume does not pretend to answer these difficult questions but, in some cases, provides provocative insights into state responses to extreme changes in the physical environment. This exercise provides a vehicle for the contributing authors to explain how social, political, and economic dynamics play against each other, revealing unexpected similarities in human behavior despite geographical separation.

Climate change is too frequently debated in the headlines with dramatic predictions aimed to shock and awe the public. The state and regional views proposed by *Climate Change and National Security* offer a thoughtful analysis of how different states and cultures may respond to environmental crisis and its secondary impacts. This volume shows how climate change is inexorably linked to other environmental security topics, such as water scarcity, overpopulation, pollution, and migration, and suggests that each of these issues may benefit from similar methods of inquiry. In sum, this book offers a critique of how different societies compare and contrast in their reactions to environmental change, and that alone is an interesting investigation for any student of international security.
The U.S. intelligence community (IC) is a complex collection of agencies with major differences in focus, methods, and legal guidelines. Unlike most other developed nations that have one or perhaps two agencies for foreign and domestic intelligence—for example, the British MI5 and MI6—the United States supports 16 federal agencies with intelligence as all or part of their mission. These agencies are limited in what they can collect, and some are prohibited by law from viewing the others’ intelligence for fear of possibly violating the civil rights of American citizens. A seventeenth agency—the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) created in 2004—seeks to coalesce the intelligence produced by this diverse community and serve as the primary voice of the IC to senior policy makers and commanders. This situation creates a challenge because all of these agencies have their own corporate cultures, collection methodologies, chains of command, and areas of expertise. However, they all share the responsibility of generating timely, accurate, and actionable intelligence.

IC practitioners will say that, while collection provides the raw material, analysis is what turns that material into intelligence.
Numerous analogies describe the challenge of intelligence analysis, but an accurate characterization compares the process to identifying the subject of a 1,000-piece jigsaw puzzle with only 150 of the pieces provided. Add the numerous layers of review and vetting, and analysis becomes an intensely bureaucratic process. Analysts must truly know the subject, complete field work in that region or specialty, speak the relevant language or jargon, and have years of practical experience working with the agency heads, policy makers, or commanders they serve. This state of affairs presents challenges to intelligence analysis, but with such a large and, for the most part, extremely effective community of diverse concerns, this is unavoidable. Preserving the integrity of analysis while ensuring the national leadership gets intelligence in time is a major challenge for ODNI and other senior IC leaders.

Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce have edited and produced an important, updated work that clearly articulates the current state of, and challenges to, intelligence analysis. *Analyzing Intelligence* is the second edition of *Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations* published in 2008. In both works, a veritable who’s who of IC veterans and observers render essays that address common challenges to all IC practitioners. The 2014 edition includes articles from the newly appointed director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the chairman of the National Intelligence University Board of Visitors. The revised edition also addresses problems with intelligence that have existed since the IC’s creation in 1947—particularly those dealing with policy makers, maintaining awareness of bias, approaches to analysis, and influencing other elements of the intelligence cycle—but offers a contemporary perspective.

The second edition adds a discussion on analysis in domestic intelligence and the steps needed to enhance further professional development of intelligence analysts through education and outreach. Creating a “community of analysts” that supersedes agency boundaries would hopefully increase sources, allow greater consistency, and balance expectations within the IC. With the escalation of independent terrorist groups, the advent of “lone wolf” attacks, changing global dynamics, and shrinking budgets, the IC must assume that it will acquire a greater mix of responsibilities with few-
er resources to address them. Agencies that focus on foreign intelligence must still be able to converse with domestic investigative and law enforcement agencies. While the collection means of these agencies can be isolated to respect American civil liberties, their findings and the resultant analysis should not. Otherwise, gaps between the agencies will widen, and critical intelligence could again be lost and cost the nation a great deal.

*Analyzing Intelligence* is a must read for the IC regardless of function or experience. While many of its case studies and examples have been deconstructed ad nauseam (Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, Pearl Harbor, etc.), the work provides an important summation of where intelligence analysis is and where it needs to go. Customers of the IC should also see this as required reading as it can enlighten them regarding the true nature of intelligence and its capabilities.