“Look at the Afghans, their faces,” states Amin Tarzi in an interview in this issue. “That tells you how many people have passed through this area and left their traces.” This photograph shows a villager in Baghvanay, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. It was taken on 21 May 2009 by LtCol David A. Benhoff, a field historian from the Marine Corps History Division, who was accompanying Embedded Training Team 7-4, which was supporting an Afghan National Army unit on a humanitarian assistance operation in the village. Marine Corps University Press published a book of Benhoff’s photographs from Iraq in 2008. A book of his images from Afghanistan will be published in 2010.
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President’s Foreword

Someone recently asked me what I thought the U.S. military had learned in Iraq. I answered “humility.” We learned that we don’t have all the answers, and we have had to rethink much of what we thought we knew to find an effective way forward.

Our professional military education system should be at the forefront of that rethinking and recalibrating of the training that our next generation of leaders is receiving. The wars of the future, whether you wish to describe them as irregular, hybrid, or “wars among the people,” will require leaders who possess multiple skills—intellect and knowledge, critical thinking, cultural sensing, mental and operational flexibility, kinetic competence, but with an inquisitive, questioning mind-set—operating on a more dispersed and dynamic battlefield than history has seen.

As part of this mission, I am pleased that Marine Corps University is launching Marine Corps University Journal. It will serve as a forum for international security and strategy discussion among military, policy, and civilian academic thinkers. These groups have well-established channels for communicating within their own spheres, but it is our hope that our new journal will encourage these groups to talk with each other, to the benefit of all. It is through such collaboration that we will be able to build the diverse skill sets described above.

The launch of the journal and of Marine Corps University Press, which came online in 2008, owe much to the vision of the faculty, administration, and Board of Visitors of Marine Corps University. My predecessor in this command, Major General (Ret.) Donald R. Gardner, was a driving force behind the establishment of the press and the journal. Dr. Jerre W. Wilson, vice president for academic affairs, has overseen the development. The Marine Corps University Foundation, under the leadership of Brigadier General (Ret.) Thomas V. Draude, has supported the founding of the journal through generous donations from Ms. Alexis F. Thomas and Ms. Kim T. Adamson.
The Marine Corps History Division, under the direction of Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer, has taken the press and journal from concept to reality. Mr. Kenneth H. Williams, the senior editor, and his editorial and design staff have done the heavy lifting to publish this issue and lay the groundwork for those to come.

It is my hope that as Marine Corps University Journal grows over the years that those involved with it will remember the spirit of humility in which it was launched. We don’t have all the answers, and we must continue to learn, to debate, and to evolve to meet the challenges of our ever-changing world.

Robert B. Neller  
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps  
President, Marine Corps University
Publisher’s Preface

*Marine Corps University Journal* is a new publication that we hope will not only serve the United States Marine Corps and Marine Corps University, but will also provide an intellectual bridge between professional military education and wider military, policy, and academic thinking. All of these groups can benefit from breaking out of their “silos” and engaging other thinkers on topics of mutual interest and challenge. No one group has all the answers, nor do members of an individual group completely understand the goals and the constraints of those in the others.

Many people deserve credit for making this journal possible. First and foremost are the current and past presidents of Marine Corps University, Major General Robert B. Neller and Major General (Ret.) Donald R. Gardner. We also thank the Marine Corps University Foundation, including its president, Brigadier General (Ret.) Thomas V. Draude, the chief operating officer, Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) John R. Hales, and major donors Ms. Alexis F. Thomas and Ms. Kim T. Adamson. Their funding has provided a critical impetus for the launch of the journal.

At Marine Corps University, we have worked closely with Dr. Jerre W. Wilson, vice president for academic affairs, in outlining the parameters for the journal and recruiting our distinguished editorial board. We thank the individual members of the board for their willingness to serve and their enthusiasm for this new endeavor. Although he has now moved to another billet, Major Philip D. Cushman contributed to the initial planning for the journal and Marine Corps University Press.

Within the Marine Corps History Division, Colonel Patricia D. Saint, my former deputy, helped me significantly with oversight and planning for the launch of the journal and press. Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey R. Riley did yeoman work with conceptualization and writing of the plans and presentations. The person charged with implementing those plans has been Mr. Kenneth H. Williams, the senior editor we hired in 2008, who brought with him considerable
experience in academic editing and publishing. He was assisted in
the preparation of this issue by Ms. Andrea L. Connell, our newly
hired manuscript editor. Mr. Vincent J. Martinez, our graphic
designer, designed the look of the journal. While on assignment in
Afghanistan, Lieutenant Colonel David A. Benhoff, working closely
with Mr. Martinez, took the journal’s dramatic and powerful cover
photograph.

Everyone on the History Division staff has contributed to this
endeavor over the last couple of years and deserves credit for helping
make it a reality. We are pleased to finally be able to bring you the
much-anticipated first issue of Marine Corps University Journal.

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Director, Marine Corps History
Publisher, Marine Corps University Journal
In June 2009, General Stanley A. McChrystal, USA, assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. Soon thereafter, he assembled a group of analysts to consult on the situation and prospects in Afghanistan and to provide input on the commander’s initial assessment that Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had requested that he provide.

Anthony H. Cordesman, a widely published defense analyst with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was a member of General McChrystal’s strategic assessment group. While in Afghanistan, Cordesman agreed to be interviewed via e-mail. He sent his answers to the questions on 9 July 2009. Upon his return to the United States, Cordesman elaborated on much of his thinking at the time in a policy paper issued on 22 July 2009.1

Although this journal is being published several months after the interview was conducted, the vast majority of what was covered in the exchange remains current and under debate in military, policy, and public circles. The interview provides insight into the thinking of

Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. He has held senior analyst positions with the Departments of Defense and State, NATO, and on Capitol Hill. Cordesman has published more than fifty books on international security topics. His most recent are Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces (2009; with Adam Mausner and David Kasten); Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Birth of a Regional Nuclear Arms Race? (2009; with Adam C. Seitz); Withdrawal from Iraq: Assessing the Readiness of Iraqi Security Forces (2009; with Adam Mausner); and Saudi Arabia: National Security in a Troubled Region (2009). Williams is senior editor of Marine Corps University Journal. Cordesman and Williams thank Amin Tarzi, director of Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University, for arranging the interview.

the assessment group at the time the review was underway, well before General McChrystal submitted his report, which was subsequently leaked and became a focal point of the ongoing debate.

As the journal was preparing to go to press, Dr. Cordesman provided answers to follow-up questions on 30 November 2009, the day before President Barak H. Obama’s speech to address the way forward for the United States in Afghanistan. Cordesman also offered addenda to some of his earlier responses, which we have noted.

Kenneth H. Williams: From what you have seen in recent weeks in Afghanistan, give us a general assessment of the state of things there.

Anthony H. Cordesman: The situation is still slowly deteriorating in terms of the size of Taliban and insurgent presence, but NATO/ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] is scoring gains in the south and the east. The practical problem is that it will probably be the end of 2010 before the war is properly resourced and better civil–military cooperation can have an impact on the build and hold aspects of the Afghan part of the conflict. This progress will also be heavily dependent on U.S. and other outside efforts to reduce excessive corruption and predatory behavior in the Afghan government, particularly if [Hamid] Karzai is reelected.

As for Pakistan, it at least is in the fight. Whether it is really winning it in any given area on a lasting basis is still far from clear.

[Added in November] Pakistan is still focusing almost solely on direct threats to the Pakistani government and forces. The ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence] keeps up its ties to the Taliban, Hekmatyar,

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2 Cordesman observed in a cover note for his 22 July 2009 policy brief that “I was part of a group of experts that actively debated every issue in this paper. We did not develop any ‘party line,’ and we were actively encouraged to challenge every aspect of current thinking and conventional wisdom—something every member of the group vigorously did. As we worked together, we agreed on many points, although almost always with nuanced differences. We disagreed on many others” (http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-campaign).

and Haqqani and made deals with the Taliban in West Waziristan with the Taliban elements attacking in Afghanistan when it went after [Baitullah] Meshud. Unless al-Qaeda and the elements of the Taliban that infiltrate from Pakistan to Afghanistan make the mistake of directly attacking the Pakistani government and forces, we will get only as much cooperation as our mix of carrots and sticks can command. Pakistan is not an ally in the classic sense of the term, and it is not a government we can trust.

Williams: What do you see as the current strategic importance of Afghanistan to the United States?

Cordesman: Any power vacuum in Afghanistan would now bring a violently jihadist, anti-U.S., and anti-Western government to power. It would also be one that would create a sanctuary for al-Qaeda. The result would create a major base for operations outside Afghanistan and either help trigger more problems in Pakistan or be a constant source of outside pressure on Pakistan.

More generally, the resulting defeat would be seen as evidence that the United States, the West, and secular Middle East states are weak and vulnerable. It would be a major recruiting and fund-raising aid for jihadist and radical movements.

Williams: What should be the short- and medium-range goals for U.S. and NATO forces? How should we be defining “success”?

Cordesman: Success scarcely means creating a perfect or developed Afghanistan or a Pakistan that meets most Western norms. For Afghanistan, it means a relatively stable and secure country with a more pluralistic government and a reasonable rule of law in local and traditional terms. It also means one that is making economic progress toward meeting the expectations of its people, although the key criteria for use will be that its present economy is secure enough to function and recover in key areas like secure roads.

“Success scarcely means creating a perfect or developed Afghanistan or a Pakistan that meets most Western norms.”
and the repair of critical water and food processing and distribution facilities. For Pakistan, the criteria are roughly the same, although the level of governance and development is more advanced. In both cases, it means they are not meaningful centers or sanctuaries for international terrorism.

**Williams:** What will be some key indicators or metrics to show whether the United States and its allies are making progress toward these goals?

**Cordesman:** The traditional metrics that are made public are the patterns in significant acts of violence, casualties, and vague maps of the worst areas of kinetic activity. These have some value, although how they are portrayed is sometimes chosen to show a more favorable outcome for NATO/ISAF, and they map where the fighting is and not where the insurgents are actually located and making political gains. In this regard, the UN [United Nations] maps of areas of insurgent influence and risk are far more useful, if of very uncertain accuracy.

We need new public and classified metrics to deal with the realities of COIN [counterinsurgency] and shape, clear, hold, and build. These metrics should include the following:

1. Influence and control over the population: the key test is who controls and secures the population. This needs to be mapped in terms of population centers, as well as nationally. We need trend analysis to show which side is gaining by area, and we need to show this in net assessment terms: comparisons of areas of influence and control of Taliban/Hekmatyar/Haqqani influence versus Afghan government and ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces]/NATO/ISAF influence and control. We need to know where there is an effective Afghan government, aid, rule of law/Afghan police presence. We need maps that show the degree of Taliban presence and maps that show performance by phase of shape, clear, hold, and build. Most of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF metrics to date are almost totally kinetic or large blurs of threat influence. This is a civil-military conflict being fought for control of the population, and where the threat is fighting a war of political attrition, not
a series of COIN tactical battles. So far, we have done a terrible job of mapping and analyzing these realities.⁴

2. Level of corruption and perceived corruption: U.S. judgments compared with polling or focus-group data. This is one key to understanding Afghan perceptions of legitimacy. Corruption is also so critical that I would rate corruption and impact of power brokers for each element of governance and the ANSF in each province and area.

3. Quality of law enforcement and prompt justice, mapped by area and particularly by key population centers. Again, both show our judgment and the Afghan view in an area that clearly dominates Afghan perceptions and where the Taliban often scores gains.

4. Perceptions of security—military, political, and economic—with trend polling or use of focus groups where polls aren’t possible. This is a critical area in shaping Afghan perceptions of legitimacy and is the key to tracking progress in shape, clear, hold, and build. I would strongly consider a civil-military approach to both having a NATO/ISAF or national government rating of progress in clear, hold, build, and some definitions of key polling questions to cover the topic in ways that show Afghan perceptions:

   A. Provide a summary rating of Afghan perceptions of insurgent violence, including the lower levels of violence and intimidation that allow the insurgents to seek control over the population. The Sig Acts [significant acts] approach is close to useless in this regard.

   B. Provide summary ratings of Afghan perceptions of the U.S., UNAMA/Aid [United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan], and NATO/ISAF.

   C. Include comparisons of perceptions of threat posed by violence from actions of NATO/ISAF versus insurgents. We may be the good guys, but we need to know that Afghans see this.

⁴ Cordesman added this first metric in November.
5. Perceptions on employment and economic well-being. Classic economics are fine for some purposes, but again, the focus of our strategy and actions has to be on winning popular support. The economic side is critical, and I would break out young male Afghans as a special category. Their perceptions of jobs, economic well-being, future prospects, the fairness of income distribution, and impact of corruption on their lives is critical.

6. Develop ratings for the quality of Afghan governance, rule of law, and police services for key population centers/cities versus provinces. We are adopting a strategy based on population centers and not provinces. The rating system should focus at least as much on performance in the key areas of the campaign as provinces per se.

7. Show the impact of aid in governance, rule of law, and economics. Get both a rating based on official judgments and a summary score/rating based on polling. Here it might be useful to rate what most Afghans seem to care most about: roads, electricity, water, irrigation, education, and medical services. I would add a question on perceived corruption and waste in the aid process as a control.

I would add key maps/metrics, realizing that nationwide maps show the big picture, but not the detail necessary to show trends in a highly local war.

Other key maps include:

1. Well-defined, topographically shaped areas of insurgent influence, and do this by province and in ways that show whether the areas have been expanding or contracting over the previous year. Show areas where we lack clear data in gray as well. If possible, map polling results in some scale for support/opposition to insurgents.

2. Map of progress in shape, clear, hold, and build in the same depth. Get off the past emphasis on kinetics as the test of insurgent influence and apply the [General Creighton W.] Abrams test from Vietnam: if you cannot go there in a normal
vehicle, you are not yet at hold. If it isn’t safe overnight, you are not yet at build. Again, use polling data where possible, rather than just our ratings.

3. Show such data relative to population density in key areas that are the focus of our current strategy. These also are areas where we need to poll and map Afghan perceptions in detail. If we have a population-oriented strategy, we need simple maps to show its popular impact.

4. Map quality of government, rule of law, and corruption by district. Show where there is no effective government presence or the situation is unknown. Consider mapping provinces by district showing the quality of governance as polled:

   A. Map quality of governance in broad terms.
   
   B. Map level of corruption and impact of power brokers.
   
   C. Map quality of rule of law as determined by availability of prompt and effective justice.
   
   D. Map areas of major narcotics growing and narco-trafficking/major impact from organized crime.


6. Map popular perceptions of NATO/ISAF, which is the key metric for overall Western influence.

7. In all of these cases, show where we do not have meaningful data by province or district on the map. Make it clear what we don’t know.

As a last comment, every theater and task force commander now seems to have their own rating and mapping systems. I’d put a small team together, collect them all, see which are best, and include them in some form in your model. Building on metrics of proven operational value can cut through the Gordian Knot of theory in a hurry.
**Williams:** Has the United States committed enough forces and resources to accomplish these goals?

**Cordesman:** No. Few people understand how slow we have been to resource this war, and how badly we have allocated much of our aid. In the case of the ANSF, for example, we have claimed far more success in readiness than we have really had. We did not meaningfully fund that effort until FY [fiscal year] 2007 and deliver the resources until CY [calendar year] 2008. We still had less than half the required advisors in early CY2009. We only began to carry out a serious U.S. buildup in 2009, and we have done far too little to negotiate with our allies to make their forces part of an effective unity of effort and to tie our PRT [provincial reconstruction team] activity to a coordinated PRT effort throughout the country.5

We need to be honest about the need for resources. We are fighting a form of armed nation building that involves new forms of irregular warfare and terrorism. The added resources should make a major difference after seven years of under resourcing and neglect. It will take time, however, to determine how adequate they are. Even the best war planning and doctrine ultimately have little more value than sympathetic magic when very different forms of war have to be fought for the first time. The present troop-to-task ratio is a moderate-to-high risk experiment where the real issue is not kinetics and tactical victories, but rather our ability to use our forces and resources to win a political-ideological war of attrition.

**Williams:** Who is the Taliban now? There was the general perception that U.S. and Coalition forces had defeated the Taliban in 2001-2002, but now there is a resurgent force of the same name operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Are these essentially the same people and same organization, or are there some fundamental differences?

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5 Cordesman added this paragraph in November.
**Cordesman:** We never defeated the Taliban politically and ideologically. A combination of the Northern Alliance, U.S. air power, and SOF [special operations forces] drove their forces into Pakistan. We then rushed into postconflict reconstruction. When the Taliban, HiG [Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin], and Haqqani network remerged as threats, we then ignored their seriousness, and we failed to provide anything approaching adequate resources to fight the war.

The Taliban has now had years to train and regroup, to create shadow networks and governments in Afghanistan, to develop ties to movements in Pakistan and to al-Qaeda, and to develop bases and sanctuaries in Pakistan. They also now have far better access to foreign volunteers, far better funding, cadres with years of experience, broader and more international ties and ideological motivation, and the correct perception that they have been winning. Put differently, U.S. miscalculations, denial, and under resourcing through CY2008 had the effect of reempowering and strengthening the Taliban as a war-fighting enemy, and America’s top policy makers during this period must take full blame for the consequences of their incompetence.

**Williams:** At the time of this interview in early July, the general presumption is that Hamid Karzai will win reelection as president in August. Karzai’s liabilities are well established. Can the United States work around them to accomplish what it needs to accomplish? Or do you anticipate that he will remain a major impediment?

**Cordesman:** He is perceived as incompetent and corrupt by the majority of Afghans, as is the government he leads. In fact, excessive corruption and predatory power brokers, narcotics, the lack of quick and effective justice, the failure to provide security, and poor or no government services are systematically alienating the same people we are trying to help.

These failures of Afghan governance make Karzai’s constant search for self-advantage—and the broader impact of power brokers, corrupt and incompetent officials, and nacro-traffickers—as much of a threat as the Taliban. This is why any application of shape, secure, hold, and build will require independent NATO/ISAF and U.S.
action, aid that bypasses the central government, and major anticorruption efforts.

Fortunately, we now are getting enough civilians and specialists to carry out aid programs at the local and district level that directly empower local authorities and the population. This does not mean, however, that the central government will not remain part of the threat until it is far more honest and competent.

*Williams:* Do you see any progress in stemming the tides on the crucial issues of corruption and drug production and trade?

*Cordesman:* Not enough. This is a major priority for the new U.S. team, but they will have to fight a heavily institutionalized system of excessive corruption and predatory power brokers. We also have made only very limited progress in fighting corruption in the international and U.S. aid effort. It is not just the Afghans that are corrupt.

We do seem to be shifting from random eradication to focusing on key narco-networks and traffickers and eradication in Taliban-dominated areas. The success of this effort, however, is as uncertain as progress in having any lasting impact on excessive corruption.

*Williams:* Another one of the fundamental challenges for moving toward stability in Afghanistan is building capable Afghan security forces, both military and police. So far, the United States has not had as much success in this effort as it has had in Iraq. What must U.S. forces do to make more progress on this front?

*Cordesman:* There is a steady buildup of the ANSF, focused on the Afghan army, and new U.S. deployments are beginning to provide adequate numbers of mentors and advisors for the first time. The fact remains, however, that we did not make serious efforts to create an ANSF with the necessary size and effectiveness until 2007, and we will not have minimal training resources in place until the end of 2009. Again, this is not the product of Afghan failures, but those of the most senior U.S. policy makers during the first seven years of war.
We do need clear decisions about the size of the future Afghan forces needed to win and our willingness to fund them and deploy the proper number of additional advisors. The NATO and U.S. military mission feel we need to start building an Afghan army and police close to twice the size of the present force goals. There is also a clear understanding that while the ANA [Afghan National Army] is doing well, the police are badly hurt by corruption and government interference. Police reform will be a critical part of government reform.

The ANA is now the most critical element of the ANSF and is vital to the shape and clear missions. It is also the force that must receive priority in resources in the process of force expansions if key trade-offs must be made. NATO/ISAF does not, and will not, have the forces to perform the shape and clear mission on its own, and most of the Afghan police do not yet have the equipment and training to perform the hold function in threatened population centers, and the ANP [Afghan National Police] must play a major role until they are ready.

NTM-A [NATO Training Mission for Afghanistan] already is actively expanding ANA forces from an assigned strength of roughly 91,000 to 134,000, and from 117 fielded units to 179. It is procuring improved equipment and raising the number of command kandaks [battalions] from 6 to 8. A total of 76 of the 117 fielded units are already capable of leading operations.

This means that there are two key issues where hard strategic decisions must now be made:

- The first is whether to set a new goal for expansion of the ANSF that would increase it from a goal of 134,000 men to 240,000 in 2014. This would mean a major expansion in funding, in training facilities and trainers, in equipment, and in mentors or partner units. Every regional and task force commander visited or interviewed indicated that such an
expansion is now needed. If NATO/ISAF is more successful, then this process can be slowed and/or the force goal can be cut. Given the lead times, however, it is necessary to act now to begin this force expansion process, particularly if it is to both be done at the pace Afghans can support and to maintain the necessary force quality.

The second critical issue is the shortfall in NATO and ETT [embedded training team] mentors. There are no easy ways to quantify the present shortfall, but in July 2009, the ANA had a need for a minimum of 67 OMLTs [operational mentor and liaison team] plus U.S. trainers. It had 56 OMLTs on the ground, of which only 46 were validated. The requirement for OMLTs also will expand along with the ANA. It will rise to 91 by the end of calendar year 2010, and only a maximum of 66 OMLTs will actually be on the ground. This is a deficit of 25. It will take the equivalent of a third new brigade combat team to correct this deficiency. Expanding to 240,000 men would require substantially more OMLTs plus additional ETT mentors, many of which must be carefully chosen to help the ANA develop critical new “enablers” like artillery, engineering, command and control, medical services, and logistics and sustainability.

[Added in November] Let me add another critical factor. We need to be honest about ANSF readiness and partnering. The present CM [capability milestone] readiness ratings are a disgrace to the U.S. military and everyone involved in the training team. They do not provide an honest picture of readiness or deal with problems like manpower attrition, internal corruption, and a lack of leadership. We talk about the success of police training programs like the Focus District Development program, but not the recidivism after they end. We fail to address the fact we have rushed kandaks and small police elements into combat without making the Afghans full partners,
particularly at higher levels of command. Some U.S. policy makers also now are talking about accelerating quantity at the cost of quality and in ways that will get Afghans killed and give them no reason to stay loyal or trust us. General McChrystal has called for full partnering and a new approach to creating Afghan forces. This is absolutely critical.6

**Williams:** There has been increasing speculation about Iranian influence in Afghanistan. Is there much actual evidence of Iranian involvement?

**Cordesman:** You can’t go anywhere in Afghanistan without seeing traces of Iranian aid efforts to Afghan Shi’ites. There also are some transfers of arms and IED [improvised explosive device] components across the border. Few experts, however, see signs of hostile Iranian action, particularly any deliberate action by the government. The potential is there, particularly in the west, but so is the potential for cooperation in fighting narcotics and jihadist movements that are seen as anti-Shi’ite, as anti-Western, and as anti-secular.

**Williams:** Turning to the situation across the border, were you surprised by the speed and the degree of deterioration in Pakistan?

**Cordesman:** No. This deterioration is very consistent and is the product of Pakistani mistakes in the FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Area] and Baluchi areas since the formation of the country, and that were accelerated by [President Muhammad] Zia’s encouragement of Islamic extremists [in the 1970s and ’80s]. It has been tied to Pakistan’s internal crisis in governance and civil-military relations, its economic problems, Islamist elements in the Pakistani military, and

Pakistani decisions that created power vacuums in the areas that led to major jihadist advances. The U.S. government is not the only government that has been capable of serious self-inflicted wounds.

**Williams:** Do you see signs of stabilization in Pakistan, or do you think that things will get worse there before they get better?

**Cordesman:** Both. The Pakistanis are in the fight against the Islamist threat to them and are making some kinetic gains against them. Even if they do begin to see this war as one where they really have to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban threat to Afghanistan, as well as the immediate threat to Pakistan, it will be several years before the Pakistanis can solve the internal political divisions within their military forces and properly organize them for the kind of COIN missions that can both defeat the enemy and win the loyalty of the population. The same is even truer of providing the civil component in the FATA and Baluchi areas.

**Williams:** Is the United States doing enough on the Pakistani front? If not, what more could it be doing in light of the diplomatic and military constraints?

**Cordesman:** We seem to be committed to providing the right mix of incentives and disincentives. The question is when and how convincing the incentives will be, and how hard we will press. At this point, the Obama administration is still talking about putting real pressure on Pakistan and providing an effective mix of carrots and sticks, but sustaining this and getting congressional support remains uncertain. Ask me again in the middle of next year.

**Williams:** What similarities and what differences do you see in the challenges that U.S. Marines and soldiers are facing in their respective areas of operation in Afghanistan?

**Cordesman:** There are major terrain differences and different needs to work with for the ANSF and allies. The fact is, however, that

“This war is a series of microwars in a highly fragmented nation with massive terrain, ethnic, and tribal differences.”
both services need to tailor every aspect of their portion of shape, clear, hold, and build to local conditions. This war is a series of microwars in a highly fragmented nation with massive terrain, ethnic, and tribal differences.

What both services have in common is that if they do not actively win the people in their respective areas and truly partner with the Afghans, their kinetic gains will probably be pointless. There is no victory without the military; there can be no victory that is only military.

**Williams:** How do you see the roles of General [Stanley A.] McChrystal, Ambassador [Karl W.] Eikenberry, and Ambassador [Richard C. A.] Holbrooke starting to take shape? Do they seem to be generally on the same page, or do you anticipate some friction among them?

**Cordesman:** Their cooperation seems good, but that scarcely means passive and perfectly in synch. Strong, decisive leaders do occasionally go through friction to reach consensus.

The problem is not likely to be at the top. These are men who know how to resolve their differences. It is the dysfunctional impact of eight years of gross under resourcing and stovepiped operations that are not tied to the mission. It is a gross lack of civil-military coordination that is only now being addressed. It is resistance by some in the aid community to becoming mission-oriented in dealing with the realities of war, and frictions within the career side of [the U.S. Department of] State in accepting a new level of leadership and insistence on being mission-oriented. McChrystal, Eikenberry, and Holbrooke have inherited a mess, and one compounded by similar dysfunctional divisions in NATO/ISAF and in UMNAMA and the aid community.

**Williams:** You wrote in November 2008 that “no one involved believes that the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northern territories can be fully won, or even transferred to Afghan and Pakistani hands, by even the end of President Obama’s first term.” Based on what you are observing now, do you stand by that assessment?

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Cordesman: Yes. I know of no one working in Afghanistan who believes that there will be a quick, decisive victory that eliminates the insurgents and violence in this time frame. This does not mean that past insurgent gains cannot be decisively reversed, however, or that most elements of shape, secure, hold, and build cannot be in place in most of Afghanistan and much of Pakistan.

Williams: What is the exit strategy?

Cordesman: The fastest exit strategy is to lose, leave, and then fight the same struggle in different ways somewhere else. Defeat is, however, a poor strategy.

The exit strategy that will actually achieve a strategic result is to use NATO/ISAF forces to reverse insurgent gains, build up Afghan and Pakistani forces to slowly replace them, and create a high enough level of shape and clear to allow both countries to move on to hold and build where they take the lead in the mission with continuing economic assistance and aid.

We also should not plan on an exit that means a total end to aid and support. What we need to do is to make enough military gains and create a strong enough ANSF to be able to largely withdraw most of our military presence. This will not come quickly. We need strategic patience and an understanding that once our forces largely leave, it will still take years of aid and support to create conditions that leave both countries stable and secure.

What follows are responses to follow-up questions that Anthony Cordesman provided on 30 November 2009.

Williams: What are your impressions of how conditions in Afghanistan have evolved since July?

Cordesman: We have won tactical victories, but we have yet to show that we can transform any of them into serious, stable security for new parts of the population and actually implement shape, clear, hold, and build.

At a different level, public opinion polls show that we have steadily lost political confidence and support from the American
people and those of our NATO/ISAF allies. Congress is far more concerned. Allied governments doubt us more. Many Afghans, Pakistanis, and other regional governments and peoples believe we are losing and will leave. We continue to win tactically and lose the real war of political attrition. The president’s new strategy may change this, but not before mid-2010 at the earliest.

Williams: Are you seeing improvements in the training and the readiness of Afghan security forces?

Cordesman: Yes and no. We are doing a better job of meeting truly minimal standards, but there is growing pressure to rush the process and ignore quality. The trainers and partners are better, but I have grave doubts about the pressures being exerted in Washington and other world capitals.

Williams: Since our earlier interview, Hamid Karzai has won reelection for another five years in an obviously tainted canvass. You said in July that “he is perceived as incompetent and corrupt by the majority of Afghans, as is the government he leads.” That impression certainly has been reinforced by the election. Can the United States and NATO work with Karzai? If not, what are the best hopes for working around him?

Cordesman: I’ve already outlined the fact we will need to work directly with the elements of the Afghan central government that are honest and effective, broaden that effort to work with the same elements at the provincial and district government level, and work directly with Afghans at the local level to implement hold and build. We need to greatly increase the transparency and accountability of Afghan leaders and officials at every level in this process and force them to make their decisions and plans public and get the approval of local councils and leaders. We need to act on our own side to provide transparency and accountability to show what we are spending, why we are spending it, and provide meaningful measures of effectiveness. After eight years of war, as SIGIR [Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction] and SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] have shown, this aspect of the U.S. government is a national disgrace, and one that helps send our troops home in body bags.
As for Karzai, Inc., anti-corruption efforts may help a bit, but what we really need is to ensure that the corrupt and incompetent do not get U.S. funds, protection, or any form of support. In most cases, it will be enough to deny them money and support unless they begin to perform. However, I'd like to see the worst of them publicly outing in reports on the Web that name them, along with similar data on the worst power brokers and both foreign and Afghan contractors. I'd also like to see a U.S./NATO/ISAF list prohibiting them and their families the right to get visas and foreign accounts.

**Williams:** What are you hearing American troops say are the most challenging obstacles they are encountering in Afghanistan?

**Cordesman:** For the last few months, it has been a mix of accelerating tactical pressures, more casualties and IED problems, and growing doubts and questions about our lack of decisions about strategy and the purpose of the war. The real question is what they will think in late 2010, and whether they will then have confidence in the future.

**Williams:** In your paper in July after you returned from Afghanistan, you wrote that the United States and its allies can “win” in Afghanistan, “provided that victory is defined in realistic and practical terms.” In light of what has transpired since then, how would you define those terms?

**Cordesman:** The same. We are talking about security and stability at levels that are practical and cover all of the key population centers and denial of any major sanctuary for extremists and terrorists, not the creation of the kind of Afghanistan or Pakistan that can only come from years of internal progress and reform. We are talking about Afghans and Pakistanis assuming most of the burden of the security mission, with limited aid and enablers.

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What all of us need to accept, however, is that we and our allies will face this kind of extremist threat somewhere in the world for the next decade, and probably well beyond. Victory is going to be relative, and most Marines serving today will face some form of such missions for close to the length of their entire military careers.
"Right Now, We Cannot Just Let Go"

An Interview with Amin Tarzi on the Situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan

edited by Kenneth H. Williams

Amin Tarzi, director of Middle East Studies at Marine Corps University, has been a highly sought consultant on Afghanistan over recent months by both civilian and military decision makers. As both a native Afghan (although born in Czechoslovakia, where his grandfather was serving in the Afghan diplomatic corps) and a scholar who has researched and written on the region, he has rare insight on the country at the heart of current debate. He spent much of his youth in Afghanistan, with some time also in Pakistan, before his family fled to New York after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With three decades in the United States, U.S. citizenship, and a background as a U.S. Marine, Tarzi speaks very much as an American, but as one with a particular interest in a country where he still has many family members and friends.

We interviewed Professor Tarzi on 30 November 2009, the day before President Barak H. Obama formally rolled out his revised strategy on Afghanistan. With his participation, the interview transcript has been edited for readability.

Kenneth H. Williams: I have heard you say that many people working on Afghanistan could benefit from a better understanding of the history and culture of that country and of the region. So let’s
begin very generally. What are some of the key points about Afghanistan that people need to know?

**Amin Tarzi:** The first problem is that Afghanistan is always viewed as an appendix to something else. It’s an appendix to Pakistan, it’s an appendix to 9/11, it’s an appendix to what was the war with the Soviet Union—and that misses the boat. Afghanistan itself is not that important. The Afghans, first and foremost, they know this. They know they are secondary to some other aspect, so they play the game to get whatever they can in the shortest time because they know they’re not the endgame. Because they are not the endgame, culturally they feel that they are being used, or that they are being stepped upon just to get to something else, whatever that could be.

This cultural misunderstanding, this misunderstanding of the sensitivities of the Afghans toward how they view themselves in regard to their neighbors and to bigger powers, especially their neighbors, creates a partner that, while willing to take our money, take our advice, and do certain things according to the plan, is not fully in a partnership with us. That’s why they put one foot with U.S. policy, one foot somewhere else, so if this ends, they have some other parachute. This has been an impediment to the whole process since 9/11 and post-October 2001 when we went militarily into Afghanistan.

**Williams:** How do the Afghans view themselves on the larger world stage?

**Tarzi:** Afghans have a more inflated view of themselves than what they are. This is very important to acknowledge. When you look at countries such as Iran, it thinks it’s the center of the world. While important, Iran is not the center of the world, but the Iranians generally hold that worldview. The same is true with the Afghans. I’m not saying that we have to acquiesce to that or accept it, but we have to understand the cultural and historical nuances and use them to our advantage.

In the case of Afghanistan, number one, Afghans feel that they are being threatened by their two neighbors—Pakistan and Iran.
Pakistan is regarded as the number-one threat. This is where I have an issue with the whole “Af-Pak” construct because “Af” and “Pak” are not really good allies. . . . And then there is Iran. The main fear that Afghanistan has of Iran is cultural. The Afghans are very much feeling that there’s an onslaught of Iranian culture, and that creates an imbalance. . . .

We, the United States and our allies, came into an already very volatile situation. We came in with a mindset of 9/11. We came there because of 9/11, while this game—I don’t like to use “great game” because that’s a British colonial term—but this new “great game” has been brewing there. So we come in there, we have a one-dimensional mind-set—to defeat al-Qaeda, or eliminate the Taliban’s potential of hosting al-Qaeda. Yet there’s a complex situation going on. If you empower Pakistan, the Afghans don’t feel right; if you empower the Afghans, the Pakistanis don’t feel right; and the Iranians are playing their own nuclear game in Afghanistan.

The Russians are looking at this whole thing in a satisfied manner because, in my view, Russia wants to sap U.S. power. The Russians don’t want us defeated, but yet they do not want us to win. Some people in Russia think this is a way to get us back for what we did to them in Afghanistan during the Soviet period, to basically bleed us. And that is a reality. Afghans are basically caught in between. They feel that all these powers are playing a game in their country, and this has been going on for a long time.

Afghanistan has always been known as the crossroads of Asia, but when you look at the crossroads, it’s not just for trade. Trade, yes, the Silk Road and all that, but it’s also been the crossroads of empires. Look at the Afghans, their faces. That tells you how many people have passed through this area and left their traces. That has a cultural impact. Yet at the same time, they believe they have defeated all empires. This has led some commentators to refer to Afghanistan as...
the “graveyard of empires.” That is actually ahistorical. Afghanistan is not the graveyard of empires. But the Afghans believe it, and now we believe it, so that puts us in a notion that we are already going in with a defeatist mentality. . . . Afghanistan was under occupation for a long time. They did not defeat the British. There’s one battle where they did, but overall, when you look at 200 years, the British did pretty much what they wanted—pretty much; I’m not saying fully. These things show a lack of historical understanding.

What the Afghans believe—and this, unfortunately, goes way up into the current Afghan government hierarchy—is that Pakistan is set on either destroying it or keeping it as a weak vassal. The Afghans could take a—and will take, in my view—second seat to, say, NATO, or even to India; Iran, I don’t know so much, Russia, but not to Pakistan. But when they see themselves as secondary to Pakistan, all the most negative and most innate fears of the Afghans come out. They may not say it in front of a Western audience, but that is innately in their nature. So let us not forget that. In everything we do, if it shows that Pakistan is being empowered, the Afghans see that as their power being taken away from them. It’s a bit more complicated, but this war is not a very kinetic, black-and-white war. Those nuances will make it more or less successful.

Williams: Let’s shift gears to the government. Tell us about Hamid Karzai. Who is he? Where did he come from? How did he become basically the American choice to run the country?

Tarzi: Mr. Karzai’s father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, was a delegate from Kandahar to the Afghan parliament in the 1960s and eventually became a more senior person in the Afghan parliament. He is not from a royal family, as many have reported. His father was close to the court, but he is not from the royal clan. He himself was a young man during the Afghan-Soviet war, went to India and got a master’s degree, came back to Pakistan and became the spokesperson for one
of the mujahedeen parties—they were holy warriors or resistance fighters, whichever way you want to translate it. There were seven parties based in Pakistan, several parties based in Iran. Mostly the Shia parties were in Iran. The Sunni parties were based in Pakistan.

The smallest of these parties was led by a gentleman by the name of Sebghatullah Mojadeddi, who currently is the head of the Afghan senate. He had a small party, and Mr. Karzai became his spokesperson. After the fall of the communist government in 1992, Mr. Mojadeddi, precisely because his party was the smallest and weakest, was chosen as an interim president while Afghanistan prepared for elections. Mr. Karzai became the deputy foreign minister for political affairs. Then he withdrew from that because there was infighting, his party lost, and eventually he became closer to the former king of Afghanistan [Zahir Shah]. He went to Rome, where the king used to live. Then the Taliban wanted to make him their ambassador to the United Nations. He refused. His father was killed mysteriously in Pakistan, most likely by the Taliban. Then Mr. Karzai became actively involved in anti-Taliban efforts.

When 9/11 happened, back then he was much more involved in the king’s camp in Rome. There were a couple of choices of people to take over when the United States decided to avenge the attack on our country. Mr. Karzai was not the first choice, but the first choice was killed, again by intrigue, by Pakistanis and the Taliban. .. He was actually chosen in Bonn [in December 2001] without his being present.

Why was he chosen? He was chosen for several reasons: 1) because he was not involved in the higher level of the mujahedeen; 2) because he was a moderate Pashtun; 3) because he had close ties with top U.S. government officials; and 4) because he spoke all three languages—English, Pashtu, and Dari—fluently. There was a notion that a Pashtun should be the head of this new coalition government in Afghanistan. So he had the right credentials.

**Williams:** How much of a debacle was the August 2009 election for Karzai?
**Tarzi:** I think we make it more of a debacle than it was because we perceive Afghanistan as a fledgling democracy. It is not yet a democracy. I know it is hard for us to think that after eight years of our shedding blood there, we have not built a democracy, but you cannot build a democracy overnight. It is a generational process.

You know, when people talk about a Marshall Plan for Afghanistan, with all due respect to the Afghans, the concept of rebuilding Germany and Japan after the devastation of World War II is a very different notion. It is an issue of absorption capacity. Let’s look at where these countries were before the conflict. Germany had a governance notion, an industrial base, an educated class, and a democratic background. Yes, they had a horrible dictator in Adolf Hitler, but go back to German history. It’s the same thing with Japan.

That is not Afghanistan. That is not where they are. Afghan institutions that afford governance and democracy need time to develop. Again, this will take at least a generation of sustained effort to effect.

**Williams:** What traditional government does Afghanistan have to build on?

**Tarzi:** That’s a good question. Since the late nineteenth century, Afghanistan was an absolute monarchy, and the monarch was viewed by most citizens of Afghanistan as the symbol of national unity. He derived his legitimacy from the Islamic concepts of the just ruler and provider of security. In 1964, to give the citizenry more of a role in governance, the king, at his own initiative, gave up some of his authority to establish a constitutional monarchy. This led to the promulgation of a new constitution. And at the start, it wasn’t perfect, but it was moving in the right direction. The first ten years, basically from 1964 to 1973, are referred to as Afghanistan’s decade of democracy and serve as a model for present-day Afghanistan—minus the king. Afghanistan is not going back to monarchy. Afghanistan is still a very rural country. I don’t like the word “tribal.” I’ll call it rural. Including those at the periphery into the center somehow, not by
force, but by connecting them through economic, mutually beneficial projects, gives the center access and eventually power. And this was slowly happening between 1964 and 1973.

The 1964 constitution served as the foundation for the current Afghan constitution. There have been improvements. Under the new constitution, you can actually distribute power from the center to the periphery and build up local power structures and institutions within the districts. Sometimes these may not be exactly as you want. There may not be a girls’ school in some of the districts. We cannot force it on them, in my view, but help them to learn to value it over time. Again, this points to the generational nature of state building.

Williams: How do you build a sense of nation, particularly among the rural, peripheral areas that you mentioned?

Tarzi: I wrote an article in the early 1990s, in French, entitled “The Afghan Anti-Nation.” In the early days, I thought Afghanistan was not a nation, but the war against the Soviets, and even the war among the Afghans, taught me something else, and I revised my own theory at the time, that Afghanistan had become a nation. Why? Because Afghanistan had more chances of dividing itself than any country. There were times that parts of Afghanistan were under different flags, different currencies, and different passports, yet the country stayed together. The Afghans all worked together, not calling themselves something else. The possibility of a Balkanization of Afghanistan was so much there, but it never happened....

This country could have and should have split into pieces, with all this infighting and fiefdoms and warriors, but it didn’t, not because surrounding countries didn’t want it to, but mainly because this “anti-nation” actually had become a nation with a collective identity and history. Afghans pride themselves in this common history, and this is something that could be built upon.

Do the periphery, the villages, feel a part of the Afghan state? I have to say that, most likely, no. The majority of the individual Ahmads and Mahmuds (the Afghan Jacks and Joes) feel Afghan, but they don’t feel they are part of this government. We saw this during
the August elections. While four years ago there was much enthusiasm and hope about the electoral process and how lives would be impacted by the outcome, this time around, the lack of participation was telling. The people looked around and said, “This isn’t affecting me at all.” That is the problem. It’s not so much that Afghans as a whole don’t feel Afghan; I think they do. They just don’t feel that this is their government.

Williams: Is Karzai even more compromised now as a leader, or did he actually gain some begrudged respect for the way he finagled the election?

Tarzai: I think Karzai has lost a lot of his credibility. He gained a lot early on, but mainly because the West was giving him a very high platform, maybe higher than he was able to absorb. Thus it goes back to the capacity issue. At the beginning, he was the darling of everybody. Even Gucci said he was the best-dressed man. . . . Mr. Karzai was put on this platform, this amazing pedestal. He could not do wrong. Now Mr. Karzai is compromising on a daily basis. Furthermore, Mr. Karzai’s acceptance of the August election recount, instead of bolstering his image, served to weaken his credibility among the local population. Why? Imagery. Think of the message sent by having Mr. Karzai announce his acceptance of the recount with foreign dignitaries standing behind him on the platform. Even if we force his hand, we need to do it behind the scenes and allow him to take full public credit to maintain a credible image of sovereign authority.

Williams: Since Karzai was reelected, what is the way forward—working with him, or working around him?

Tarzai: We have to work with him. He is the president of Afghanistan. We need to be firm with what we expect from the Afghan government. But we need to be cautious in our approach to ensure that we do not undermine his authority among the people. If you say publicly, “Mr. Karzai, you have three months to do this,” he is already on our watch, so his people say he’s a puppet. . . .
We, the International Security Assistance Force countries, also need to get our own ducks in a row. Even though we may not have the same policies, we need to ensure we are speaking with the same voice and share a common strategic vision. If we do not, it confuses the Afghans, and more importantly, it allows the Afghan government to play us against each other, which they are very good at. Neither we nor the Afghan government wins. And in the meantime, the opposition gains ground.

*Williams:* We have talked some about corruption. How did the drug trade become such a prominent part of the Afghan economy?

*Tarzi:* The drug issue is very important. We need to delink the Afghan economy from drugs. What drugs do in Afghan culture, for the overall economy and the political economy of Afghanistan, is create an illicit culture. And within that, anything goes. Afghans need to lead here, and the Afghan government needs to step up to the plate and do a lot more.

Are the Afghans thieves? No, they are no different than any other people in the world. Right now they are desperate and focused on survival. They lack trust in the continuity of the system, so they take all they can when they can because they do not know if it will be there tomorrow. It’s a vicious cycle. . . . It leaves a very bad taste in the mouths of regular Afghans to see the luxurious lifestyles of the drug lords. If you go to Kabul, there are houses that are incredible, decorated with mirrors and statues on top of them. And the rest of the country is starving. So it’s creating this sense of injustice.

How did the drug trade become so prominent? Because it could. Weak enforcement, expediency, and opportunity have allowed it to flourish.

*Williams:* What time frame was this when it really grew?

*Tarzi:* 2002.
**Williams:** And before that?

**Tarzi:** Well, the Taliban banned production in 2000-2001 to control a glut in the market. They didn’t ban it because they were good people. I don’t recall who said that the Taliban should have been given an MBA from Harvard for this because by banning new production, current supply, on which they had a near global monopoly, the drugs became very valuable.

How did drug production become a part of Afghanistan? They’ve always had a lot of drugs there. I remember when I was growing up, there were little hotels operating in Kabul catering to a mostly European clientele who came there for their ’60s high. It was all very peaceful and on the fringe of society. Nobody cared about it. It became central during the infighting of the Afghans during 1992-1996 because of the absolute breakdown of order. The highest level of production prior to 2002 was in 1999-2000 during the Taliban. Since 2002, production levels have remained high.

**Williams:** Let’s talk about the Taliban. Give us some background on where the Taliban originally came from, and then talk about the resurgence of the Taliban in the last few years. Is it the same group, the same leaders?

**Tarzi:** The word “talib” simply means a student. The Arab word “taliba” is a seeker. In the traditional sense, “talib” is one who seeks wisdom or science. Traditionally in Afghanistan, all students were called “talibs.” Later on, in the Afghan culture, “talib” became associated with students of seminaries, or “madrassas.” “Taliban” is a Persianized plural of students.

The Taliban came out of the ranks of former mujahedeen, mainly from two parties. The majority of the Taliban leadership belonged to Harakat-e Inqelab-e Islami, led by Mr. Mohammadi, who is dead now. The second party was Hizb-e Islami, led by Mawlawi Yonus Khales.

Two versions [of the origins of the Taliban] have surfaced. The first is the romanticized version. The mujahedeen were killing people, raping boys, girls, and everything. Every city in Afghanistan was under different warlords or commanders—“commandants”—and they
would take hostages. Nobody could go across a city like Kandahar without paying tolls, and sometimes you’d have to leave your daughter, or they’d take her or your son. In this mayhem, the Taliban came in. It was around October 1994 in Kandahar. They were a group of students who were disgusted with what was happening. Their first act was clearing a checkpoint where a girl or a boy (I don’t remember the exact details) was being kept hostage, hanging the commander from the turret of a main battle tank. They became known as the Robin Hoods. And they spread like wildfire. Most of the areas, especially the Pashtun areas, were conquered without a single shot being fired. Over time, they gained more power and territory and eventually took control of the government of Afghanistan.

The other version is that, yes, there was this indigenous group, but they were helped by Pakistan—the Pakistani military, but specifically the Pakistani military intelligence, the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate]. The ISI saw an opportunity in the Taliban. After victory against the Soviets, Pakistan’s desire for a friendly government in Kabul was not materializing. The arrival of the Taliban presented another avenue to Kabul for Pakistan.

There is truth in both versions, but if you go to Afghanistan, the second has more currency. The Afghans see the Taliban as the hand of Pakistan meddling in their affairs.

Pakistan, of course, looked at the Taliban as an ally. When the Taliban gained control of the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif in 1996, Pakistan recognized them as the official government of Afghanistan. The only three countries to recognize them were Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. By 2000–2001, they had gained control of all but two provinces in the extreme northeast, Badakhshan and Takhar.

I don’t have time to go into details. When the Taliban became allies with the Arab elements of al-Qaeda who were already in Afghanistan, their organization became more centralized,
authoritarian, and disconnected from the people. Early on, Mullah Omar ruled more in the Pashtun traditional way. He apparently sat in a room, and when people came in, he had a box full of money, and he would hand it out, and people would talk to him. He eventually became very reclusive. He became hierarchical, more like [Osama] bin Laden or [Ayman al-] Zawahiri.

Who are the modern Taliban? I call them the “neo-Taliban.” It’s not my term; it was first used in The Economist. I think that we need to differentiate between the Taliban movement, which led Afghanistan until December 2001 before they were defeated by our forces, and what is there today. What I call the neo-Taliban is partially the old Taliban leaders, who made their way to Pakistan after losing power and who are very much living, not openly, but not very unopenly, in the Quetta area. The Quetta Shura Taliban are more or less the leadership that left from Afghanistan. Their leadership pretty much remained intact. How much is Mullah Omar in charge? I don’t think he’s really in charge, but the Quetta Shura Taliban are the ones who are directing most of the operations in the southern part of Afghanistan.

The Quetta Shura Taliban, in my view, do not have a strategic alliance with al-Qaeda or non-Pashtun groups. By that I mean what? If they get some help, it is more tactical than strategic. They don’t have an internationalist view. They are concentrating their efforts in Afghanistan.

Under the neo-Taliban rubric, I include the groups led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Haqqani’s views are based on an internationalist Islamist ideology. He is operating in North Waziristan on the Pakistan side and in Khost, Paktiya, and Paktika in Afghanistan. Who is he? Haqqani actually once was a mujahedeen hero fighting against the Soviets. If you go further north, you have Hekmatyar, who has his own group called Hizb-e Islami.

“The weakness of the enemy is that it is not united; the strength of the enemy is that it is not united.”

Marine Corps University Journal
This party was one of the biggest during the mujahedeen period. He has a lot of Pakistani support. Hekmatyar’s strategic view is more limited than Haqqani’s, focusing on Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of the Islamic world.

In addition to these three groups, the concept of the neo-Taliban includes petty warlords, local groups, and criminals. The weakness of the enemy is that it is not united; the strength of the enemy is that it is not united.

Williams: How popular is the Taliban? Where do they recruit?

Tarzi: I am paraphrasing our current ambassador to Kabul [Karl W. Eikenberry]—I think it’s not so much the strength of the Taliban, but it’s the weakness of the Afghan government. There’s a vacuum that they are filling. What makes them a little bit palatable in some areas, especially Pashtun areas, is that they do allow some security and justice. . . I don’t think they are very popular; as I said, it’s the fact that the Afghan government isn’t there.

The majority of those fighting under the banner of the Taliban do not hold the same ideological beliefs as the Taliban leadership; rather, they are fighting for economic reasons. The Taliban pay well. The hard-core recruits, by that I mean the people who go blow themselves up, are mostly recruited from madrassas in Pakistan or, on the Afghan side, from the poorest of the poor. This goes back to deprivation—they are people who have nothing to lose.

Williams: Turning to Pakistan, let’s start with some background on Pakistan’s traditional, and at times tumultuous, relationship with Afghanistan.

Tarzi: Pakistan is a very new country, so we don’t have to do a lot of history. Pakistan was created when British rule in India came to an end in 1947-48 and the country was split in two. When Pakistan was created and applied for membership in the United Nations, only one country voted against Pakistan’s entry, and that was Afghanistan. Though this vote was later recanted, it sent a strong message to Pakistan. Afghanistan’s claim was very similar to Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir. Pakistan claimed that the Kashmiris should be given a right
to decide to either join India or Pakistan or remain independent. Afghanistan raised the same issue about what Afghanistan calls Pashtunistan. It literally means the land of the Pashtuns. Pashtunistan includes all of the North-West Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Baluchistan of Pakistan—everything west of the Indus River. These claims on Pakistani territory raised tensions between the two neighbors, bringing them to the brink of war several times in the 1950s and 1960s. Since 1977, Afghanistan has relented on the official posturing; however, the effects of these policies have shaped Pakistani threat perceptions.

For Pakistan, the main challenge has always been India. The nightmare scenario for Pakistan is to be in the middle of the two pincers of Afghanistan and India. Throughout Pakistan's history until the 1970s, while Afghanistan never joined India in any of the wars, the notion was there.

Fast forward to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1979, the communists came in, and Pakistan got this amazing chance to deal with one of its problems. Pakistan's idea was to eliminate the Afghan threat. What ways to do it? Keep Afghanistan very weak, keep it in the Pakistani orbit, and most importantly, keep Afghanistan outside of Indian influence. How do you do all of that? Make sure Afghanistan is not a nationalistic state by infusing it with Islamism, an Islamism in which Pakistan has the upper hand. They wanted to eliminate Afghan claims on their flank. Islamism became a great tool at that time. They were joined by the United States, the Chinese, and the Saudis—we all wanted to confront the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The idea was to transform the conflict into a religious one, pitting communism/atheism against Islam to bleed the Soviets dry. It worked perfectly well.

However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we left the area. The Pakistanis still had their Islamist tool. They took all those little militants, revamped them, and sent them into Afghanistan, types like Mr. Hekmatyar and the Taliban, but also they took the same people and trained them to fight in Kashmir. . . . Kashmir was always an insurgency, but until the late 1970s, Kashmir was a very highly
secularized insurgency. Look at Kashmir today. It is transformed. Pakistan has made them such Islamists that India as a non-Muslim country can never deal with them. I’m simplifying, but that is the gist of it.

For Pakistan, Afghanistan is what some Pakistani generals call “the strategic depth.” India is going to come in. They have had three wars. In one war, the 1965 war, India came within twelve kilometers of Lahore. The Pakistanis could have lost their main city, not the largest, but the second largest, and the most important—the cradle of Pakistani-Punjabi civilization. . . . There is much more, but the fact is that they have lost every single war with India. So “strategic depth” equals Afghanistan. If you fall on Afghanistan, if you collect Afghanistan as an ally or as a subdued quasi-ally, and then you have Central Asian markets, so you have a bulwark against India.

So what is this today? Why did Pakistan support the Taliban until September 12, 2001? Because the Taliban were anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani. They were not as subservient to Islamabad as Pakistan wanted them to be, but they were friendlier than anything they had before in Afghanistan. . . .

What do you have today? Number one, Afghanistan’s nationalism is going back up. Guess where India is? India is in cahoots with Afghanistan more than ever. The military of India is building roads right on the Pakistani border. The Indians are not doing what Pakistan is claiming that they’re doing. But the Indians are not absolutely innocent in this game, either. . . .

Therefore, my assumption is that this whole notion of Afghanistan/Pakistan, I agree that they have to be seen together, but they have to be seen together as two states that respect each other, not as two states that want to gain an edge, or control the other, or take half of the other, or make the other one a strategic depth area, a playground. . . . Pakistan right now wants to be in the commander’s

“The nightmare scenario for Pakistan is to be in the middle of the two pincers of Afghanistan and India.”
seat of Afghan policy because they don’t want Afghanistan to go India’s way and too much away from Pakistani pressure. Partially, I think Afghanistan took the first shot. Afghanistan is the country that said Pakistan is illegitimate, that the Pashtuns should have freedom.

**Williams:** On the other side of Afghanistan is Iran. What are Iran’s interests, and where are those going?

**Tarzi:** When I give a talk, I always say that if you look at Afghanistan as a roulette table, Iran has a chip on every single number. They can’t lose in Afghanistan, simply. Iran has more assets in Afghanistan than any country except perhaps ourselves.

Unlike Pakistan, which has certain groups there, Iran has people—allies—at every stratum of Afghan society. There’s a wrong notion by some people that Iran is only allied to the Shia. That’s as far away from the truth as it can be. They have allies with everybody. Did they help the Taliban? Yes, I think they did. Again, people say how could they help the Taliban, they were mortal enemies. But there is more than one Iranian policy toward Afghanistan. There’s a policy in the Iranian foreign ministry that looks at Afghanistan as a way to stabilize the region, to extend Iran’s influence, mainly right now through culture and economics. They are looking at extending the Iranian hand through Afghanistan to Central Asia, specifically Tajikistan, which is the only other Persian-speaking country. (There are only three countries that speak some form of Persian: Iran, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. This is very important for them on a cultural level.)

Iran keeps on talking about being a regional power. They can’t be a regional power unless they have leverage with some of their neighbors. They want to ward off Pakistan from Afghanistan. That’s very important for the Iranians. They want to be there, not Pakistan. They are now working with India on a route of circumventing Pakistan. They just want to play that spoiler game on Pakistan. This is the “good” Iran. They actually work with us—not directly, but
indirectly, with projects together. Look at the buildup with electricity, clean water, clean air. What part of Afghanistan is that? Herat. It’s the best city in Afghanistan by far right now. It’s right across from Iran. Everything comes from Iran. This is the “good” Iran.

The other Iran, which you could say is run by the IRGC [Islamic Revolution Guard Corps], sees Afghanistan not so much for the country itself, but as a card in their overall nuclear game with the United States and Europe, with Afghanistan as a bargaining chip. That’s the dangerous one. That’s where you see aid to the Taliban, especially sending things that we are very much dreading, which are the armor-piercing things that they used in Iraq against us. . . . The Iranians are saying openly that if they are attacked, their nuclear installations, they have targets. Where do you think they have targets? They’re not going to come here. They can’t reach us, thankfully, not yet. They can reach Afghanistan very easily. And there are weak links of NATO there.

There are three other issues that I need to mention: refugees, drugs, and water. The “good” Iran is actually looking at refugees as a burden, and while they need them economically, there are a lot of Afghans in Iran, more than in Pakistan, most likely. There are no exact statistics, but somewhere around 2 million-plus. But they want most of them to go out. The IRGC Iran sees refugees as an asset. Recently, two years ago or so, they kicked out a whole bunch of Afghans without documents. They put them in two camps, right next to our base in Afghanistan, which is Shindand. . . . Eastern Iran and western Afghanistan are indistinguishable. This is not what they have in Iraq; there is no language barrier, their looks are exactly the same, so they can have assets.

On the issue of drugs, Iran is one of the few countries around Afghanistan that is actually fighting drugs. They have lost a lot of people; they have done an amazingly good job. That’s the good part.
The majority of Iranian policy toward drugs is good. This is one place we can actually work with the Iranians. . . . Yet there’s also a caveat there. These weapons that I told you were sent, they were sent through drug-trafficking routes. So there are parts of the Iranian government that are using drug traffickers as assets in Afghanistan.

Lastly, and very importantly, is water. There are three dams being built in Afghanistan. The main one is called Salma dam, the Indians are building it in eastern Herat. If these dams are all operational, eastern Iran will have dire problems with water. Eastern Iran is already very dry. All the agreements they had with Afghanistan have either expired or they have been in limbo because Afghanistan has not been a country. Even right now, eastern Iran is dying from the drought. Southeastern Iran also happens to be the most volatile part of the country. . . . They don’t want these dams to be operational. Again, that’s why you have some of these problems in there. Again, like drugs, if there’s an Iran-West-Afghanistan agreement, water could be used as a good bartering chip. Sign an agreement where water is actually channeled to Iran in a systematic way in exchange for energy. Iran has quite a bit of that. That could be a binding area, but right now, the water keeps on coming because the dams aren’t operational.

So there are a lot of aspects, but for the United States right now, we look at Iran’s game in Afghanistan as what we can do if we talk to them within this nuclear context. That’s great, but also, we have to be worried about what we can do if the nuclear problem goes south because of international pressure or also another country, a third country, if some kind of action is taken. I would posit that one of the hardest hit areas would be Afghanistan. And it is not just us. There are some very weak links across the border from Iran, very weak links of NATO. . . .

**Williams:** You’re a former Marine, you teach Marines. What can you say to Marines and other U.S. military personnel—what are we fighting for in Afghanistan?

**Tarzi:** I have a hard time sometimes to tell them that. That’s what I say in my talks—that we need good IO [information operations],
not only to the Afghans to say what we want, but to our own people about why are we there.

What I tell Marines when I talk is that we need to at least leave a stable situation such that the government of that country can make sure they don’t have an al-Qaeda base in there, or al-Qaedaesque (it doesn’t have to be al-Qaeda), any internationalist terrorist organization that has the United States and Western Europe as its targets.

Secondly, there’s an issue of IO. The current al-Qaeda came partially because, through what I just described, we empowered them to defeat the Soviet Union—not directly, I’m not saying al-Qaeda, but this whole Islamist ideology. They didn’t see that as help from outside; they only focused on their ideology defeating a superpower. They were emboldened that they defeated a superpower—the Soviet Union was no longer on the map. Guess who’s next? We cannot give them that notion, that they can do it.

If we leave Afghanistan prematurely, without leaving something that we see as a way that we want things to be, and I’ll let our president speak to what that is, I think this mess that is in Afghanistan may come more and more to our own cities, in very different forms. I hope that there isn’t going to be another 9/11-type event, but you are going to get individuals who are emboldened, or who have changed their minds. We just saw one, unfortunately, at Fort Hood. You’re going to see things like what we have in Europe right now. Just yesterday, Switzerland voted that mosques cannot be built in that country with minarets. These things are all pitting Muslim society against the West, although they’re western now, too. This guy who killed his colleagues [at Fort Hood], he was an American, he was wearing an American uniform. It becomes a very problematic issue.

That’s what we’re fighting for—that ideology cannot think that it has won. . . . When you look at it in a big way, it is a bigger war. . . . Right now, we cannot just let go.
Williams: Finally, from the other side, you are an Afghan by cultural background, some of your family is still there. What is your hope for Afghanistan over the longer term?

Tarzi: I feel very bad for the Afghans. They are at a very bad time of their history. They don’t realize it, but they are. I hope for Afghanistan to become, in twenty-five years, like Bangladesh—a semi-developed country with a functioning government that provides basic services to its citizens and prevents, among other things, the presence of terrorist organizations with international reach on its soil. That’s realistic. Not becoming a Norway; it isn’t going to become Norway. While I would be thrilled to see Afghanistan, the land of my fathers, be a place of peace and prosperity in my lifetime, the reality is different. Afghanistan’s most realistic hope is, slowly, a Bangladesh-type state in twenty-five years.
List of Selected Publications on Afghanistan and Pakistan

Prepared by Amin Tarzi


One of the best available sources in English on the history and culture of the Pashtuns. Currently out of print. Available in a limited number of libraries.


Perhaps the best source for learning how Afghanistan became “terrorist central.” The drawbacks are size (695 pages) and the author’s assumption that his reader is aware of the sequence of the events, which may leave a newcomer to the subject a bit bewildered. Available in both hard cover and paperback.


A series of essays with diverse opinions discussing the Taliban and neo-Taliban phenomena. Available in both hard cover and paperback.


No one has written an overall history of Afghanistan in the English language to make Dupree’s monumental work obsolete. The drawback is that it is only valid up to Daud’s republican regime in the mid-1970s. Reprinted in 1978, 1980, and 1997 editions. Currently out of print, but available in many libraries.


An excellent source for grasping lives of Afghans from a personal and cultural perspective. While the stories date from the nineteenth century, they provide a good insight to knowing the Afghans. Available in paperback.

One of the best books ever written in any language about Afghanistan’s emergence as a state and the progress of state-nation building up to the end of World War II. Out of print and hard to find, although available in some libraries.


A must read for anyone dealing with Pakistan. The author, who is currently serving as Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, wrote this book while he was out of his country’s governmental service. Available in paperback.


Good reading for the military side of activities in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion of 1979 to the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001. Available in paperback.


A history of Afghanistan from 1747 to the U.S. involvement in that country, from an Afghan perspective. Available in paperback.


An invaluable source in understanding the tribes of Afghanistan and Iran. This collected volume is, in my view, one of the best sources for understanding the Pashtuns and their neighbors, as well as for getting a better grasp of the tribe and state relations in Afghanistan and Iran. I specially recommend chapters one through seven; the introduction is a must read. Out of print and hard to find, although available in some libraries.
We live in a world in which many sovereign states are having increasing difficulty in maintaining control of their cities. In some instances, imposing law and order in urban environments has become so difficult, or the central government so weak, that cities have gone “feral.” These places matter to the international community now because certain actors in some feral cities pose direct challenges to local or other state authorities. Longer term, these cities will potentially challenge or threaten international stability and will be too internationally connected and too pervasive to ignore.

A feral city is a metropolis in a nation-state where the government has lost the ability to maintain the rule of law within the city’s boundaries. These cities nevertheless remain connected to the greater international system through such avenues as trade and communication. The most immediately recognizable example of such a city is present-day Mogadishu, Somalia.

Cities are built by humans, lived in by humans, and governed by humans. A city is a very human thing. So too is war. For all of its madness and horror, war is predominately a human activity. Increasingly, sprawling cities that are afflicted with weak governments are environments that are ripe for conflict. Even in the most impoverished of cities, such as Mogadishu, there will be things that inhabitants and outsiders will feel are worth fighting over. It is all but axiomatic that in the future, some feral cities will be battlegrounds.
This possibility alone should give strategic planners and military leaders cause for concern, for history suggests there are few terrain types more difficult in which to fight than urban terrain.

The difficulties imposed by urban warfare are likely to be increased as many of these potential battlefields will be feral cities, and feral cities may be several orders of magnitude more difficult to deal with than their more domesticated counterparts. Feral cities will pose significant challenges at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. These challenges will bedevil political leaders, diplomats, and inevitably, military commanders.

Before one can assess the impact of feral cities on security, one must first understand how feral cities develop and what types of alternate forms of authority can be found in those cities. These factors, in part, help shape the nature and severity of the security threat.

The Birth of Feral Cities

Today, 75 percent of the people of Europe and the Americas are urban dwellers.1 In Africa and Asia, 35 percent of the population resides in a city, but that number is projected to increase to 50 percent by 2030.2 By that time, two out of every three people on earth will be residents of an urban community.3 One need only look at places such as Tijuana, Mexico, or Lagos, Nigeria, to see that many of these cities are already growing at a rate too fast for the state to control or manage effectively.

There are several ways in which a city may become feral. As noted, one is through rapid, uncoordinated growth and urban hypertrophy. The demands of the expanding metropolis outpace the state’s ability to provide resources. The result is a softening of state controls, followed by a shift to a pattern of diurnal or patchwork sovereignty, and eventually the complete loss of operational state sovereignty over the city.

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2 Ibid.
In many ways, Lagos is a prime example of this phenomenon. Its population in 1950 was 300,000; by 2010, it is projected to reach 18 million. Nigeria’s oil industry fed this boom, drawing immigrants from the countryside and, eventually, from across state borders. Growth occurred so quickly that there were no “effective institutions, engineering planning, or traditions to guide the hypergrowth,” according to a 2007 report. The city’s metropolitan area covers more than 300 square kilometers. Lagos alone consumes more than 45 percent of Nigeria’s energy.

Cities like Lagos will continue to place increased demands on state and local governments. If, as is likely, given the historical record, the governments are unable to meet increased requirements for water, sewage, energy, education, and security, other actors may fill the vacuum. While such actors might, in some cases, increase the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of the inhabitants, the odds favor a decrease of perceived governmental legitimacy. This loss will further reduce the ability of the state to enforce its rule of law and operational sovereignty, which will, in turn, move the city more steadily toward a state of ferality.

Another manner in which a city may become feral involves the de facto surrender of operational sovereignty by the state. Such is often the case where slums and squatter settlements are concerned. These informal communities, which often are not part of the legitimate city structure, tend to be inhabited by the poorest populations of the city. They lack basic urban services and “security of tenure, including official title to homes or lands,” according to a 2007 study. State authorities have often found it easier to ignore these areas than to attempt to fix them.

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
Not surprisingly, other actors have filled the vacuum that the state has left. Sometimes these actors have been nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and local citizens’ groups. More often, they have been criminal gangs or armed groups, such as Hamas in Gaza. In several instances, these other actors did not supplant the authority of the state solely by the use of force. In the case of Hamas, it provided food, medical aid, and financial support to local inhabitants. As these informal cities grew in space and population, the state found it more difficult, or even impossible, to exert its sovereign authority, even when it wished to do so. The result was often patchwork sovereignty, with the state holding portions of the city while other actors maintained authority in others. At times, the sovereign authorities launched sporadic raids into areas not under state control, but such acts only served to illuminate the state’s lack of control.

Another way in which cities become feral occurs when a state has sovereignty ripped away. This can happen when state authorities are facing an armed insurgency. The example of Fallujah, Iraq, is a case in point. In the spring of 2003, the city of Fallujah (population approximately 250,000) was under the sovereign control of the Iraqi provincial government. However, government forces proved incapable of providing security to the city, and Fallujah became an insurgent stronghold. The insurgent grip was so tight that U.S. and Iraqi forces had to cordon off Fallujah, attempt to remove the civilian population, and take the city back block by block—with force.\(^9\) The operation succeeded, but it damaged more than 95 percent of the city structures and could not have been accomplished without U.S. military forces.\(^10\)

Currently, many cities that some people are tempted to call feral do not truly fit the definition. Observers look at a given urban environment and see crime, corruption, and the loss of services and


\(^10\) LtCol Kevin Hansen, USMCR, interview with author, 12 June 2007. Hansen served as plans officer and then operations officer for the 4th Civil Affairs Group, I Marine Expeditionary Force, in Fallujah during the time in question.
conclude that the state no longer has the wherewithal to control its city. While this may be so, it is more likely that the state simply cannot muster enough political will to devote the resources and expend the fiscal and political capital required to reclaim the area in question. What may begin as a lack of political will, however, may over time become a lack of actual capability as nonstate actors within the city gain greater capability and power.

Such a transition may be occurring in Rosarito Beach, Mexico, where criminal gangs have been allowed to attain such political, fiscal, and firepower that local police forces seem to be no longer capable of subduing them. Rosarito Beach, just outside of Tijuana, experienced a population explosion when tens of thousands of Mexican citizens were attracted by the promise of employment in newly constructed factories built by globalized firms. The city’s infrastructure was rapidly overwhelmed, shantytowns (colonias) sprouted, and schools became so overcrowded that hundreds of children were turned away and denied an education. Drug cartels were the principal source of violence. Crime rates soared. By 2008, the police forces of Rosarito Beach were losing as many as seven officers a month and were hard-pressed to control their city. Although Hugo Torres, mayor of Rosarito Beach, claimed in late 2008 that the U.S. press was distorting the danger of violence aimed at U.S. tourists, he did not deny the challenge or the carnage caused by the cartels.

Cities can even become feral through natural causes. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this avenue to ferality is the case of New Orleans in 2005. Hurricane Katrina, one of the most destructive storms ever to hit the United States, caused the breakdown of the city’s system of protective levees. The resulting flooding, combined with other storm effects, damaged 80 percent of the city’s territory. The damage was so severe that for several days, the United States was

unable, however much leaders wished the situation were otherwise, to exert its operational sovereignty over one of its most historic cities. This period was relatively short-lived, especially compared to similar situations that befall cities in the developing world, but nevertheless, New Orleans was, for a brief time, feral. It should also be noted that restoring sovereignty in this case required a level of effort beyond that of local city and state forces. Federal forces and massive economic resources were required, and, as of the writing of this article more than four years later, the restoration of New Orleans remains incomplete.

**Diagnosis and Prediction**

The following diagnostic tool is offered as one way to evaluate whether a city is trending toward becoming feral. This information can aid in assessing the lack of government control and, ultimately, the nature of the security threat posed by the city in question. Cities on the top or “green” level are in no danger of becoming feral; those on the second (“yellow”) level may be seen as marginal; and those qualifying for a “red” designator (bottom level) are in the process of becoming feral.

This tool provides indicators to assess whether a city is moving toward or away from ferality. Key to this determination is assessing to what degree the city in question is ungoverned or alternately governed, hence the “governance” indicator. The other factors are linked to governance and increase the analyst’s ability to determine the vector and intensity of a city’s movement toward or away from ferality.

One significant evolution in this tool involves the economic indicators. Initially, it was assumed that a lack of government protections and safeguards would discourage private investment in a city’s infrastructure. However, events in Mogadishu, perhaps the only truly feral city in the world today, would seem to indicate this may not always be so. At least three telephone companies were quick to establish a commercial presence in Mogadishu, despite a complete lack of state government. Indeed, these companies saw the lack of government regulations and taxes as encouragement to do business
## Diagnosing Ferality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Civil Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enacts effective legislation. Appropriately directs resources. Controls events in all portions of the city, day and night. Corruption detected and punished.</td>
<td>Robust. Significant foreign investment. Provides goods and services. Possesses a stable and adequate tax base.</td>
<td>Complete range of services, including educational and cultural, available to all city residents.</td>
<td>Well regulated, professional, police forces. Response to wide spectrum of requirements.</td>
<td>Rich and robust. Constructive relationships with government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercises only patchwork or dual control. Highly corrupt.</td>
<td>Limited or no foreign investment. Subsidized or decaying industries. Growing deficits. Most foreign investment is quickly removable.</td>
<td>Can manage minimal level of public health, hospital access, potable water, trash disposal.</td>
<td>Little regard for legality, human rights. Police often matched/stymied by criminal “peers.”</td>
<td>Relationships with government are confrontational. Civil societal organizations fill governmental voids.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At best, has only negotiated zones of control. At worst, does not exist.</td>
<td>Local subsistence industries or industries based on illegal commerce. Some legitimate business interests may be present, based on profit potential.</td>
<td>Intermittent to nonexistent power and water. Those who can afford to will privately contract or allow NGO to provide.</td>
<td>Nonexistent Security is attained through private means or paying protection.</td>
<td>Civil Society fractured along clan/ethnic/other lines. Local elites in control. Security-oriented civil society organizations may become criminal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
in Mogadishu. Although this example may be unique, it does indicate that a lack of operational sovereignty need not be an insurmountable challenge to legitimate business entities that see the opportunity for profit in a feral city.

The Importance of Civil Society

Over time, the strength of civil society has emerged as another important indicator of the likelihood of a city becoming feral. Although there are many competing definitions of “civil society” currently in use, the following, put forward by the Democracy and Civil Society Program of Carnegie UK Trust, seems the most appropriate:

Civil society is the “space” of organized activity not undertaken by either the government or for-private-profit businesses. It includes formal and informal associations such as ... voluntary and community organizations, trade unions, faith-based organizations, co-operatives and mutuals, political parties, professional and business associations, philanthropic organizations, informal citizen groups, and social movements.14

Participation in such organizations is voluntary. At the risk of grossly simplifying the issue, civil society can be seen as a type of community glue that binds a people together. In a feral city, the lack of an official state structure would make the strength or weakness of the civil society crucial.

At times, external nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can become integrated into local civil society. This development is likely to occur when the NGOs are seen as providing essential services and remain in the city long enough to become part of the social

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landscape. An example of an international organization becoming part of local civil society might be the Medicins Sans Frontiers clinic, which opened in the Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, *favela* “Complexa do Aleamo” in 2007.\(^{15}\)

A green city boasts a rich and robust civil society. The civil society has access to both governmental and commercial leaders, and mutual projects are not uncommon. Communication flows among civil society organizations, state institutions, and private commercial concerns. Cooperative projects are widespread. For the most part, civil society organizations, whether working with their state and commercial counterparts or serving as watchdogs, are motivated by a mutual desire to improve the life of the city and all its inhabitants. The relationships are constructive.

In contrast, in a yellow city, the relationships between civil society organizations, commercial actors, and state authorities are primarily confrontational. In part, this is due to the state’s lessened ability to care for the city. As a result, civil society organizations are forced to shoulder more of the functions performed by the state. For example, some communities such as in Mumbai, India, have worked with nongovernmental organizations to dispose of accumulated human waste, obtain purified water, and provide other services. The result of these efforts is the reduction of state control on at least portions of the city.

There is already evidence that some civil societies are willing to confront state governments in order to have a larger say in the future of their urban communities. In 2007, Jockin Arputhma, president of the National Slum Dwellers Association, threatened to close vital road and rail networks in Mumbai if inhabitants of the Dharavi slum were not included in the planning process for urban renewal efforts.\(^{16}\) As sovereignty softens, especially in the area of security, civil society is also likely to weaken.


In a red city, civil society is likely to be fractured along clan, geographic, or ethnic lines. Civil society organizations may have to get permission from the state to operate inside city limits; however, in order to perform their missions, they will have to be allowed to operate by the powers that be within the city. This permission from the controlling forces will depend on whether they believe that they will benefit from the work of the civil society organization. For example, some criminal gangs that control favelas in Rio de Janeiro are willing to allow NGO health workers to practice within their territory.

External civil society organizations may have to contract privately for such security essentials as armed guards and safe transports. The rise of civil society organizations that function as local vigilantes and providers of security is also possible and predictable in a red city. It is also possible that these organizations may become criminal over time. For example, the vigilante group People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PGAD), which began as an organization devoted to protecting Capetown, South Africa, neighborhoods against local criminals, has itself evolved into a criminal entity.17

What Type of Authority Exists in a Feral City?

When speaking of feral cities, it is important to remember that a feral city need not be a realm of all-encompassing chaos. It is, therefore, important to assess what alternate forms of government exist and whether or not this authority adds or detracts from stability. Although the state may not exercise total authority within a feral city, this does not mean that the city is “ungoverned.”18 Tribal elders, clan leaders, warlords, heads of criminal cartels, leaders of terrorist organizations, or even heads of citizen committees could all exert control over parts or all of a feral city. There may well be contested

18 In this case, the key component of governance is the ability to enforce rules.
zones or even “no man’s land” where rival factions vie for control, or portions of the feral city could be so toxic as to preclude anyone from living in them, but these areas are likely to take up only a small portion of the city. The lack of effective state leadership and control will form a power vacuum into which some form of authority is bound to flow. This is a familiar pattern seen from the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro to the streets of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.

The governance pattern of a feral city will be critical in determining the type of threats the city may present. In some feral cities, many traditional state functions could be shouldered by NGOs, or the city might be under the control of an international peacekeeping force. While each of these cities might pose a burden on other states, such as fiscally supporting the NGOs or supplying some of the peacekeepers, they are not likely to pose much of a threat. However, a city run by insurgents, a criminal cartel, or a terrorist organization could potentially pose a massive threat to regional and even global stability and security. Although not formal cities, the assumption of control of refugee camps by former Rwandan *genocidaires* shows that such a takeover is not impossible and may serve to widen existing conflicts. In such cases, the severity of the threat or spillover might be great enough as to compel action by one or more members of the international community.

*The Potential Security Threat of Feral Cities*

In order to more fully understand the security threats posed by feral cities, it is useful to employ three levels of analysis. This section examines the threat of feral cities to individuals residing in them (in essence, feral cities and human security), the threat to individual states, and the threat to the international system.
Not every feral city will pose a threat to the United States, although each will pose some threat to the health of the planet, each will pose threats to the individual security of its inhabitants, and each will have the potential to be the destination of deployed U.S. forces. Primarily, when speaking of threats, it is the actors within the geographic location of the feral city that matter. Thus, determination of security threats must be based on who governs or exerts authority within the feral city. The following table indicates the range of threats associated with feral cities.

### Feral Cities and Security Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level Governance Pattern</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL Human Security</th>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>SYSTEM</th>
<th>IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Minor to Improved</td>
<td>Minor to Improved</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>May require aid / relief / monetary support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in area of NGO expense</td>
<td>Could actually ease burdens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Minor to Improved</td>
<td>Minor to Improved</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>May require aid / relief / U.S. peacekeepers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>if trained peacekeepers and money held out</td>
<td>Could actually ease burdens</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIXED</td>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>Minor to Improved</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Might affect sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Behaviors adapted to utilize salient periods</td>
<td>Could actually ease burdens</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLAN/NEIGHBORHOOD, ETC.</td>
<td>Low if the individual belongs to the right group</td>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>Depending on actors</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Will likely require negotiation, resources, or fighting</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSURGENT</td>
<td>Insurgents</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Depends on nature, location of insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life as victim; violence is pervasive</td>
<td>Loss of territory and population at stake; must fight</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIMINAL</td>
<td>Criminal</td>
<td>Severe</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Depends on contacts and economic impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Must accept elites' rules and meet elites' demands</td>
<td>Loss of revenue; require negotiation or major resources / fighting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TERRORIST</td>
<td>Improved to Critical</td>
<td>Moderate to Critical</td>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>Depends on goals and capabilities of the group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Better if follows the rules, critical if a retaliation occurs (ex. Israel – Hamas)</td>
<td>Depends on aims and means of enemies</td>
<td></td>
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Feral Cities and Human Security

In today’s world, as U.S. forces seeking to enable the growth of stable governments in Iraq and Afghanistan have discovered, state security often begins with human security. If the state cannot guarantee the provision of basic human security—the most basic necessities of life—people will shift their allegiance to those organizations or individuals who can. For people living in a feral city, human security will be a precious commodity indeed.

At the most basic level of human security, obtaining access to drinkable water and breathable air may be difficult. Conditions in some of the world’s worst slums hint at what life may be like for many within the feral city. According to a 2007 study, it is common for one child in ten to die before age five in urban areas of low-income nations; the poorer the family, the higher the likelihood of an increased mortality rate. 19 Sanitation facilities are likely to be inadequate, both in quality and quantity. 20 Safe water is often in short supply, sometimes because supplies are drying up, and sometimes due to inadequate or nonexistent management. 21 Efforts to meet the demand for water, such as selling “pure water” in nylon sachets, leads to improper disposal of the nonbiodegradable sachets, further compounding environmental degradation in the city. 22 While some observers might be inclined to view these examples solely as issues of health, they are the essence of human security. Moreover, while it is true that nonmilitary organizations may be better equipped to deal with these needs, military and police forces will have to ensure that the environment is stable enough to allow such operations.

Food is another basic resource, and urban farming will occur within a feral city. Such food stocks by themselves are unlikely to feed

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 41.
22 Ibid., 47.
the city population, and hunger will be commonplace. Environmental degradation will further stress the population's ability to feed itself.\textsuperscript{23} Urban ranching and livestock production also pose grave threats to public health and add significantly to the problem of solid waste disposal.\textsuperscript{24} The resulting health issues would pose a threat to all who live and work within the city’s boundaries.

Energy demands will also impact the lives of the average men and women living in a feral city. Coal and wood—both of which are environmentally questionable energy sources—are likely to be the most common types of fuel. Blackouts will be common unless one has access to private energy generation. Promising forms of energy production such as solar power and wind generation are not likely to be available to most of the city’s inhabitants.

Residents of a feral city will be at grave risk from a wide variety of human predators. Robbery, murder, and rape will be commonplace and will be exacerbated by a lack of security personnel, adequate lighting, and the potential need to travel to sources of water, toilets, and other essential services. Oddly enough, individuals who live in portions of the city under control of criminal gangs may find that their human security “improves” as the gang protects those who live within its turf.

Women and children are likely to suffer the most severely in a feral city. Women in slums, who are often relegated to second-class status, are already suffering disproportionately as victims of both sexual violence and heath degradation.\textsuperscript{25} Children will suffer from similar threats and also from the potential for being recruited or drafted to serve as urban child soldiers.

In short, human security will be in short supply in a feral city and is most likely to be obtained through loyalty to a particular leader’s faction. This is not to say that individuals at the top of the feral food

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 54.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 8-59.
chain will not live in relative comfort, or that all amenities will be lacking for even the city’s poorest residents. Warlords, clan leaders, and criminal kingpins will likely live well. Using Mogadishu as an example, commerce will continue, some industries may thrive, and parents willing to pay the price may be able to enroll their children in schools up to and including the university level.26

At first, a U.S. national security professional may be inclined to dismiss these human security issues as irrelevant. It could be argued that these concerns are better addressed by NGOs or other altruistic actors. However, recent deployment of U.S. forces in the wake of the 2005 tsunami, not to mention involvement in Mogadishu in the 1990s, suggest that humanitarian missions to feral cities could well be in the future for U.S. soldiers, sailors, and Marines. Furthermore, as military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, operations carried out for traditional security concerns in feral cities will be affected and influenced by the plight of local inhabitants.

The Feral City and the State

What types of threats a feral city will pose to the owning state depends on the city’s governance pattern. Potential threats will range across the spectrum of the instruments of national power. In the economic arena, the feral city will in all likelihood continue to absorb large amounts of the state’s resources without making significant contributions in taxes or other payment. Examples of this phenomenon are already easy to find. As noted earlier, Lagos already consumes more than 40 percent of Nigeria’s energy. India’s urban population consumes 87 percent of the nation’s electricity.27 In some cases, at least a portion of this energy is stolen from the national grid.28

A logical question to ask at this point would be why would the owning state be willing to put up with such activity? The first and most glaring answer is that, as the Iranian government has recently rediscovered, in contrast to the rural poor, urban masses frequently riot, and many leaders will overlook much in order to avoid this level of unrest. Second, a feral city is still geographically connected to the owning state; indeed, some territory might be under shared operational sovereignty. Third, the state may control, at least nominally, some portions of the city, such as the airport or central business district, and would have to supply those areas with power. Fourth, as has traditionally been the case in the favelas of Brazil, rooting out all the illegal power connections and punishing those who use purloined electricity is a daunting task of enormous size. Fifth, in some cases, local rulers, such as crime bosses or warlords, will prevent by force actions to correct the problem.

This article has already discussed the potentially devastating environmental impact that a feral city and its inhabitants could have on the greater geographic region. The impact would be much worse for the owning state. Based on problems currently identified with urban environments, a feral city would create a plethora of environmental problems. These include but are not limited to: air pollution from gas-powered vehicles to open cooking fires; pollution from untreated sewage and human waste; and heavy metal poisoning of the ground and watershed. Depending on the availability of fuel sources, deforestation of surrounding landscapes is also a potential environmental threat to the owning state.

Some actors in a feral city will pose a much more direct threat to the owning states and to select other states in the international political system. Warlords and criminal organizations will find a natural habitat in a feral city. Given high profits, the global availability of small arms up to and including man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and a larger population of potential recruits, these
organizations could easily outgun local police forces and, in some cases, offer significant resistance to national military forces. There are several examples in contemporary cities that suggest that such a condition may be nigh. In 2006, imprisoned leaders of the criminal gang First Capital Command, referred to as the PCC based on its Portuguese initials, ordered their followers to wage war against the police of São Paulo, Brazil. This action was taken to forestall the transfer of the gang leaders to different prisons. The gang members mounted more than 100 attacks on government installations and police stations, burned more than fifty buses, and essentially shut down the city’s transportation grid. The fighting lasted seven days, while simultaneously, riots erupted in seventy-three of Brazil’s prisons. More than forty police officers were killed. The fighting finally ended when local authorities negotiated a truce with the PCC. In the aftermath of the fighting, PCC command and control networks, as well as their safe havens within the favelas of São Paulo, were intact and fully functional.

A second example involves the city of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. Nuevo Laredo is the largest inland port on the North American continent, and over the past several years, control of the city has rested in the hands of powerful and deadly drug cartels, particularly the Tijuana cartel, the Juarez cartel, and the Gulf cartel. The violence in Nuevo Laredo has created a marked downturn in the city’s tourist industry and has led many families to abandon formerly upscale neighborhoods. Tensions between Nuevo Laredo and its U.S. counterpart, Laredo, Texas, have increased dramatically. More than thirty U.S. citizens were kidnapped or killed in Nuevo Laredo in 2005. Mexican local and state law enforcement officials have been ineffective

30 Ibid.
32 Ibid., 159.
in dealing with the situation because their officers have been either killed or corrupted by drug money. The most striking assassination occurred in June 2005 when new police chief Alejandro Domínguez Coello, who had promised to break the power of the gangs, was killed less than ten hours after being sworn in.\textsuperscript{34} Tensions between state and federal police reached the point where a gunfight erupted between state and federal officers. Finally, the Mexican army and federal agents disarmed the entire Nuevo Laredo police force and cordoned off the city, as the United States did in Fallujah, Iraq.\textsuperscript{35} The Mexican army did not elect to turn Nuevo Laredo into a battlefield, which, while preserving infrastructure, did little to break the power of the gangs.

International borders also do not have much of an impact on gang activity. Cross-border assassinations of rival leaders have become commonplace, and U.S. citizens are increasingly becoming involved in violence along the border.\textsuperscript{36} The situation has been complicated by the appearance and involvement of the Minutemen, a U.S. vigilante group that seeks to assist federal agents in providing border security.\textsuperscript{37}

Deployment of Mexican army troops to the U.S. border continued in 2007. There have been some related successes, notably an increase in the acreage of marijuana and opium poppy destroyed. Mexican authorities also intercepted a shipment of stolen U.S. military weapons, including automatic rifles and grenade launchers.\textsuperscript{38} If these weapons had reached their intended destinations, they would have found capable hands to use them. Part of the reason gang wars in Nuevo Laredo have been so violent is the involvement of \textit{Los Zetas}. 
\textit{Zetas} are highly capable soldiers who were trained by Mexico to combat drug-trafficking cartels, only to see them desert and join the very men they were trained to bring down.\textsuperscript{39} The cartels are also in

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}

68
contact with, and at times cooperate with, other criminal gangs such as the Mexican Mafia, the Texas Syndicate, Hermanos Pistoleros Latinos, and Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS-13).  

MS-13, often described as “the most dangerous gang in America,” warrants a more detailed examination. MS-13 is involved in a variety of criminal activities from extortion to drug-trafficking and has “a taste for atrocities,” according to a recent article. MS-13, with a reported U.S. membership of more than 20,000 individuals, has also reportedly taken on contract work, as Mexican alien smugglers have allegedly hired MS-13 to kill members of the U.S. border patrol. 

There has even been speculation that meetings have taken place between leaders of MS-13 and al-Qaeda. While the degree of accuracy concerning these reports is open to debate, they do raise the prospect of one of the more chilling potential threats posed by a combination of terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, and feral cities. It is by no means a flight of fancy to envision how a well-financed terrorist organization could contract to load a weapon of mass destruction or mass effect at a feral port, move that cargo to a destination such as Nuevo Laredo, and have that cargo smuggled into the United States. MS-13, which extends its range of operations from El Salvador to Canada, is not the only criminal organization with such an international reach.

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42 Ibid.

The Feral City and the International System

Actors in feral cities will pose threats to the international political system in several ways. First, feral cities will threaten the environmental security of their owning state, neighboring countries, and larger geographic region. Part of this threat will be created by the inability of the leaders of the cities to provide proper sanitation for their populations. Again, using current cities as potential harbingers provides ample illustrations. Mumbai currently boasts a population of more than 17 million people, of which 2.8 million live in the neighborhood of Dharavi, the largest slum in India. More than 2 million Mumbai residents have no sanitary facilities. The resulting sewage and refuse finds its way into waterways.

Some environmentalists estimate that half of all coastal ecosystems are pressured by high population densities and urban development. Increasingly, many environmental problems are being caused by urban by-products that are compounded by a lack of productive or effective governance. While the exact impact of feral cities on the ecological health of the planet cannot be known at this time, there is no reason to believe that these metropolises will be models of environmental responsibility.

Second, feral cities have the possibility of becoming breeding grounds for pandemics. Cities already have a history of serving as pandemic incubators and launch points. As mentioned earlier, sanitation facilities in a feral city will be marginal, and those that do exist will be overused. Housing will be primarily substandard, and overcrowding may be the norm. Health services will be limited to

 Motavalli et al., “Cities of the Future,” 34.

 Ibid.


those that the inhabitants can afford or to the ability of the state and local elites to get NGOs or other actors to provide them instead. Yet these cities will still be connected to the larger world. They will not be under quarantine; indeed, it is debatable whether such a city could be quarantined. Diseases incubated in a feral city are likely to affect and infect others in the owning state, neighboring countries, the region, and, possibly, in the most extreme scenarios, the world.

Third, feral cities, by their very nature, are likely to be unusually susceptible to natural and man-made disasters. The lack of adequate building codes, the generally poor health of the inhabitants, and densely packed populations combine in a recipe for extensive loss of life and human suffering in the wake of earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, or major fire. Contributing factors to this increased susceptibility include, but are not limited to, the precarious construction of squatter buildings and shelters; lack of maintenance of more robust buildings; deforestation and erosion; inability to receive timely warning of catastrophic events; inadequate transportation for evacuation; and an overall lack of urban planning.48 The population density of these cities increases the loss of life during the event and in the recovery phase. Based on historical data, death tolls exceeding 100,000 are possible.49 Despite damage to infrastructure, however, modern communication technology is so robust that global awareness of the disaster will occur rapidly. States with the means to respond and alleviate some degree of the associated human suffering will come under significant pressure to act.

A fourth threat stemming from actors operating from a feral city concerns the potential to adversely affect international commerce and communication. A feral city offers an excellent location for various groups to remain undetected and unpunished. This phenomenon can be observed in a variety of ways. For example, the infamous “yahoo-yahoo boys” of Lagos have specialized in cyber crime for years. Efforts by the Nigerian government to curtail the gang’s activity have met with only marginal success. Estimates by the U.S. Secret Service place

48 Ibid., 115.
49 Ibid.
the yahoo-yahoos and like criminals’ gross profits at “hundreds of millions of dollars a year,” with profits increasing on an annual basis. At present, most of the cyber crime from Lagos appears to be of the scam variety. However, given the increasing sophistication of today’s computer hackers, industrial espionage and sabotage undertaken by hackers operating from the safe haven of a feral city does not seem too far-fetched an idea.

A related threat to international commerce that goes hand in hand with a feral port is piracy. In recent years, pirate attacks from small craft operating out of Mogadishu have seized more than 150 vessels and grabbed world headlines. These attacks have been serious enough to cause the redeployment of naval forces and to interrupt the scheduled delivery of relief food supplies to Somalia. In the first half of 2009, the Gulf of Aden and the east coast of Africa saw a reported 91 pirate attacks resulting in the seizure of 23 ships and more than 150 crew members. These pirates, operating inexpensive vessels and carrying the most basic of small arms, have successfully ransomed entire vessels for millions of dollars. Efforts by the international community to contain this threat have met with some local successes, most notably the U.S. Navy’s recovery of the merchant vessel Marsk Alabama with its captain and crew, but have had little effect on the overall problem. This failure indicates the difficulty in dealing with situations when there is no central government in control. That lack of control will be one of the hallmarks of a feral city, and it is likely that unless a state or the

“Future feral cities will be natural participants in illicit economic exchange.”

international community is willing to bear the cost of exerting control, future problems will be as difficult to solve as piracy is today.

The example of Somali piracy indicates the increasing ability of a feral city, as long as it is connected to the larger international political system through land, air, or sea lanes of communication, to potentially disrupt local, regional, or perhaps even international markets. Even Mogadishu boasts a functioning airport and seaport.

Future feral cities will be natural participants in illicit economic exchange. Smuggling will be endemic in feral cities. Not only does smuggling itself pose a certain level of threat to the international economic order, but the material being smuggled may also pose challenges to existing international commercial or social interests. Trade in all sorts of prohibited items, from endangered species to drugs and human trafficking, will be part of the illegal international political economy. In some cases, such as those involving exotic reptiles or pirated DVDs, the product will be the problem for the international system. Other challenging areas could be trade in illegal weapons, drugs, and unwilling sex workers.

The fifth and arguably the most serious threat facing the international political system arises when criminal or terrorist organizations that control a feral city possess the means to disrupt world commerce, communication, or stability. Such combinations may be rare but are by no means impossible. Operating from the safe haven of the feral city, these groups could deploy weapons of mass destruction or effect to targets around the globe; engage in sophisticated and highly disruptive cyber attacks; or reduce the flow of vital energy resources. As of the writing of this article, there is little to suggest that criminal cartels would be likely to employ a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), although scenarios involving WMD blackmail would not seem to be out of the question. Rather, it is the terrorists groups’ potential employment of criminal networks to produce, transport, or employ WMD that makes criminal control of a feral city so threatening.
The Challenge of Claimed State Sovereignty

One of the complications for international actors in responding to security threats emanating from a feral city will be dealing with the city’s so-called sovereign state. As long as the existing rules of the international political system regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity hold, efforts by international actors to intervene in the activities of a feral city will still require permission from the owning state. While the state may have lost the ability to exert operational sovereignty within the confines of the city, state authorities are not likely to admit this fact publicly, and they will continue to claim the full protection of sovereignty. Indeed, national pride and the desire to appear fully in control of their state may cause these leaders to be even less willing than usual to allow outside involvement within their territory.

On the other hand, when such activities pose no perceived threat to, or criticism of, state sovereignty, permission is likely to be forthcoming. For example, in India and elsewhere, numerous NGOs and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have received government permission to start projects ranging from urban farming to conversion of human waste into salable fertilizer. However, requests to mount efforts to combat criminal activity, terrorist groups, or insurgents will be much less likely to gain permission. The history of U.S.-Mexican cooperation on issues relating to border security provides several examples of the type of problems that can arise when such requests are made, and the U.S.-Mexican relationship is deeper, older, and more congenial than is likely to exist when dealing with states in Africa and Asia.

Brazil offers another case in point. In July 2007, following a major plane crash in São Paulo, the International Federation of Air Traffic Controllers (ICAO) suggested that Brazil would benefit from involving outside expertise to improve its aviation system and offered to provide help. The head of the Brazilian airport authority

immediately rejected the offer, referring to leaders of the ICAO as “a bunch of idiots” who “wanted to intervene in our affairs.”\textsuperscript{55} Such a reaction suggests equal or stronger resistance can be expected to offers to intervene in an owning state’s feral city.

**Intervening in a Feral City: What Can be Done?**

At the risk of sounding pessimistic, it would appear that little can be effectively done to stop the continued development of feral cities on the world scene. States, particularly those in the developing world, lack the ability to adequately resource the needs of their growing cities or the political will to stop urban hypertrophy or to truly make their urban areas self-sustaining. In order to gain access and intelligence to potential threats developing within these cities, positive relationships must be established not only with the owning governments, but, when possible, the ruling elites and also the criminal elements within the city. Cultivation of these relationships cannot be done overnight or in a high-handed fashion.

Also, preemptive social solutions are preferable to political-military ones requiring the use of force. Increased use of NGOs and peace-oriented IGOs may therefore be a possible approach. Not only are nonviolent answers more likely to be acceptable to the city’s power structure and the owning state, but they are also more likely to be endorsed by the United States and the global public.

At the same time, the possibility of combat operations in such cities cannot be dismissed. The war in Iraq has reminded U.S. leaders of the inherent difficulties involved with fighting in urban terrain. To do so successfully requires both special tools and training.

The possibility of a feral city is no longer just an intellectual construct. We are now watching cities, particularly in the developing world, increasingly move toward ferality every day. It is no longer a question of if one of the world's states will lose sovereignty within the city’s confines, but how much sovereignty will be lost, when and where it will be lost, and which actors will control it.

Based on the complexities involved, it will not be possible to take a “one size fits all” approach to this challenge. As this article has shown, properly diagnosing the level of ferality and identifying which actors actually exert authority within the feral city will be critical. It will also be necessary to understand the nature of the threat and, assuming a response is required, the nature of that response.

More than ever, no single element of U.S. power will provide the solution all the time. The full range of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military tools must be considered.

For the U.S. military, dealing with feral cities will require new tools. Among these will be an already identified need for increased regional awareness and linguistic capabilities. U.S. military planners will also need to continue to gain a better understanding of urban issues than many government agencies currently possess. It is time for the services, particularly the Army and Marine Corps, to train units specializing in urban combat. In the past, prescient military leaders identified the need for specialized amphibious and alpine forces as essential capabilities that were missing from the military toolbox. What the military needs most today are forces that are expert in surviving, fighting, and achieving victory in the feral urban environment. It is time to start gaining the understanding, building the required capacity, and forging the relationships to grow those forces now.

However, it is most assuredly not only the U.S. military that needs to prepare for operations in a feral city. It is equally or more imperative that the Department of State and other agencies that are the custodians of the levers of U.S. power acquire their own particular
expertise. The early and effective use of diplomatic, information, and economic tools may result in not having to look to the military for solutions.

Feral cities represent new political forces and actors. If new ways and means of dealing with the feral city’s actors, as well as new solution sets, are not found, it is all too likely that a U.S. response to the challenges of a feral city will overly rely on the military’s toolbox. Failing to build an approach that integrates all levers of power will also all but guarantee that the challenge of responding to operations within a feral city will catch the U.S. government off guard and ill-prepared when the time comes.

This book is a good piece of work. It is the product of collaboration between the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning and Marine Corps University. The stated purpose is to “help Marines link concepts of culture to the realities of planning and executing military operations around the world.” The objectives are “to provide clarity of thinking with respect to defining and understanding culture—as a warfighting and operational competency relevant at all ranks and levels of command; and, to provide a systematic, intellectually rigorous framework for understanding cultures globally, in a way attuned to operational needs.”

The authors, Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber, believe that no such source currently exists, describing the new Army and Marine Corps MCWP 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency manual (2006) as inadequate and incomplete. They state that the “human terrain system” approach falls short of what is needed by Marines in the field in foreign lands. The Army’s new Stability Operations manual FM 3-07 (2008) was published after this work, but it too would fall short in the view of the authors.

Operational Culture for the Warfighter is essentially a checklist of all the elements of culture that need to be taken into consideration to achieve the military and political objectives of the United States in foreign countries through Marine and Army operations. Issues of culture have been of
considerable importance to the Army and Marines since 11 September 2001, particularly during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All the services, governmental agencies, and political leaders now understand that the United States made serious mistakes in these countries by not understanding the cultures of the people they sought to influence and change, the people whose “hearts and minds” they sought to win.

The authors have done their homework. They have studied many of the works on culture and have provided sound definitions and a substantial bibliography. What is “culture,” and what is “operational culture”? According to the authors, culture is “the shared worldview and social structures of a group of people that influence a person’s and a group’s actions and choices.” The authors list attributes of culture and consider other definitions of the term. According to them, “operational culture” is a “skill set” comprised of “knowledge of considerations at play in human societies globally, capability to function among diverse peoples, understanding of specific human societies to which one deploys, and ability to successfully integrate this knowledge and understanding into operational planning and mission execution.” This definition recognizes that “the people” are the center of gravity, the key terrain, and that foreign cultures are very different from the American norm, and that to be successful in foreign lands, it is absolutely necessary to engage the people on their terms.

The authors propose a new framework for analyzing mission requirements and conducting operations that consists of five related operational culture dimensions: the physical environment, the economy, the social structure, the political structure, and belief systems. The book is divided into three parts. In the second of these, one chapter is devoted to each dimension. Each chapter contains a list of questions that Marines need to ask themselves in developing plans and operations orders and executing those operations.
This book is an effort to get Marines and service members to think critically and comprehensively about the cultural aspects of American military operations in foreign countries in order to facilitate mission accomplishment. It is a good effort, a useful manual that is worth reading (even though in places it does read like a field manual). However, it does not achieve its primary objective. By providing a checklist, it does not require troops to think critically, analytically, or comprehensively.

Marines and soldiers need to think creatively. They need to think in a nonlinear manner, and they need to shed many of the tenets of American culture that cause them to not see what they are looking at. Marines and soldiers need a broad, diverse education, not just a training manual, and not just a series of checklists. They need to study anthropology, political science, economics, history, languages, public administration, international law, communication, and other fields that better enable military leaders to develop effective plans, strategies, and doctrines to win the “hearts and minds” of people they are trying to influence and change. Such an education does not destroy the warrior; it enlightens him (or her). It makes him a better warrior.

This book is also lacking in its consideration of jointness. It is directed almost exclusively toward Marines, as if they operate alone. The authors could have enhanced the value of the book had they addressed this work to a larger audience, to all the services and all the governmental agencies that are now involved in nation-building and stability operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other parts of the world.
For U.S. Marines, command is one-half of the mechanism known as command and control, the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. The book under review is not, however, a discussion of military command, but rather one of leadership development. As the editors indicate in their introduction, *The Art of Command* examines nine exemplary American military leaders, each of whom personifies an essential quality of leadership. These qualities—integrity, determination, charisma, vision, adaptiveness, institutional leadership, cross-cultural leadership, and exemplary followership—are certainly worthy of consideration, even if the reader does not consider the editors’ list to be an all-encompassing one.

The editors’ stated purpose is “to provide both aspiring and experienced leaders, especially those in the military but also civilians in every field and profession, with a historically grounded exploration of leadership development” [2]. In this, *Art of Command* excels. The reader can follow each leader from inauspicious beginnings to greatness in the course of a short story that chronicles the development of a particular quality in that leader.
In Jon T. Hoffman's examination of Lewis B. “Chesty” Puller, the quality of charisma is one that is of immediate importance to junior leaders, where Larry I. Bland’s discussion of George C. Marshall highlights the ability to lead institutions, which will captivate most young leaders less than their seniors.

Colonel H. R. McMaster’s discussion of Harold G. “Hal” Moore is, like McMaster’s book *Dereliction of Duty* (1998), more provocative for what it fails to discuss than what it discusses. But while *Dereliction* was unable to peer into the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s undocumented conversations, McMaster’s chapter on adaptive leadership could have but did not examine the enduring relevance of adaptiveness to Moore’s success through the entirety of his uniformed service. Instead, McMaster discusses the road to Moore’s most famous two days in the Ia Drang, implying that they were characteristic of Moore’s thirty-three years of uniformed service and not a “finest hour” that, while compelling, does not represent Moore’s story as a whole. McMaster does, however, create a compelling portrayal of a man whose mental flexibility, respect for education, and interpersonal skills culminated in an epic display of virtue in a moment of crisis.

Thomas L. “Tim” Foster’s portrayal of Hyman G. Rickover is one of the most intriguing chapters in *The Art of Command*. Known widely as a curmudgeon with fanatic dedication to the nuclear Navy, Rickover emerges in Foster’s description as a study in contrasts in the pursuit of excellence. While his argument for the relationship between technology and leadership is unconvincing, Foster successfully pulls back the curtain on Rickover’s public persona to reveal a driven man who succeeded in developing technology as a weapon, sometimes because of and sometimes despite his personality.

In the unending discussion of nature versus nurture in human development, *The Art of Command* adds to the chorus of voices chanting the anthem of the developing leader. What the book lacks is a discussion of crucible experiences, the intense, often painful events that catalyze leaders to embark upon meaningful processes of self-improvement. The book’s chapters inadequately describe the moments of decision that inspired these leaders to fulfill their immense capacities for influencing others.

This book’s nine succinct biographies provide the reader with focused chronicles of nine historic leaders and the development of their most remarkable capabilities. While the ability to accomplish this in under 300 pages is admirable, it should also inspire caution in the reader. In creating such brief discussions of each leader, the authors and editors have at times stripped their stories of vital context, without creating a structured discussion of the qualities that would create a basis for contextualizing the assembled stories.
The U.S. Army entered the Vietnam War as a highly trained and disciplined force, but it emerged from the conflict deeply scarred by the Vietnam experience. It would take more than twenty years to overcome the corrosive effects of the war. General William E. DePuy was one of the principal architects of the changes and reforms that took the broken and demoralized Army after Vietnam and set it on the path to becoming the force that performed so magnificently during the Gulf War of 1991. Despite the impact that DePuy had on the development of the modern-day Army, his contributions are not well known outside U.S. military circles. Henry G. Gole has gone a long way to remedying that situation by providing the first full-length biography of this key figure in the history of the Army.

Gole guides the reader from DePuy’s boyhood and college days in South Dakota through his early career in the Army and his service in the 90th Infantry Division, in which he saw combat from D-Day to VE Day. Gole demonstrates how DePuy’s experiences gained fighting against seasoned German troops taught him lessons that remained with him for the rest of his life and shaped his outlook on training and leadership.

Following the surrender of Germany, DePuy was stationed in Czechoslovakia. During the Korean War, he was recruited by the Central
Intelligence Agency and directed undercover operations against China. DePuy subsequently served in the Office of the Chief of Staff during the debate over “massive retaliation” versus “flexible response.” During this period, he was instrumental in establishing the Special Forces in Vietnam. Reassigned to Vietnam, he served first as General William C. Westmoreland’s deputy for operations and then as commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, where he gained a reputation for ruthlessly relieving officers who failed to measure up to his standards.

After Vietnam, DePuy served as special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assistant vice chief of staff, Army, where he wielded significant behind-the-scenes power. However, it was as the first commander of the newly established Training and Doctrine Command that DePuy made his major contributions in integrating training, doctrine, combat development, and materiel. In doing so, DePuy played a seminal role in the effort to revitalize the post-Vietnam Army, laying the foundation for a military force that was prepared to fight and win on the modern battlefield.

The author, a retired Special Forces colonel who saw combat in Korea and Vietnam, has provided an invaluable service with this book. Using DePuy’s personal letters and papers, oral history transcripts, and personal interviews with DePuy’s peers, subordinates, and family members, Golen not only conducts a comprehensive examination of DePuy’s contributions to the Army but also provides insight into the complexities of the man and his motivations.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It is well written in a highly engaging style and extremely informative. I strongly recommend the book, not only to those who are interested in U.S. military history, but also to anyone interested in the role of leadership in organizational change.

The Norwegians have been thinking about war, not because they desire to start one anytime soon, but rather due to their recognition that the threat to Norway’s national survival has transitioned from the clearly defined Cold War Soviet hordes to a more complex and undefined spectrum of possible scenarios indicative of the twenty-first century. The Norwegian Armed Forces Joint Operational Doctrine 2007, published by the Norwegian Defence Staff, serves as an aid to the command and control process and provides a theoretical basis for military activities. It is oriented toward the development of a professional culture within the Norwegian military.

Available online in an English translation, the precise, direct, and euphemism-free text is easily read and understood. The Norwegian chief of defence, General Sverre Diesen, states in the foreword that “it is no longer sufficient to make concrete plans. Today we need to understand the possibilities and limitations of military force and, not least, the political and social context in which we operate” [3]. Diesen adds that this operational doctrine exceeds established procedures and rules for action. It is a teaching tool for developing a common understanding, a shared way of thinking, and a joint frame of reference for his officers to develop an intellectual and analytical approach to problems. This book is specifically designed to be a guide for research and

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development activities, interagency and nongovernmental organizations, private and public industry, and, arguably axiomatic, their military allies.

The Norwegian Defence Staff took an instructive approach while developing their operational doctrine. Although they are lucky to have a smorgasbord of operational solutions that proliferate the dusty libraries of operational art, they chose to first define their strategic problem based on political reality and strategic economic interests, then directed their young officers at the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College to develop the solution. An analogy close to home would be the development in the 1920s and 1930s of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Small Wars Manual and Tentative Manual for Landing Operations.

An interesting observation U.S. operational planners should note is that the Norwegian administrative regulations and directives are based on doctrine and are not developed independently of doctrine. So much U.S. doctrine is not based on how the American armed forces really fight, but more on how we would like to fight. U.S. doctrine also is often subject to inter-service, intra-service, and joint rice-bowl competition and is almost completely divorced from administrative regulations and directives. Also, the only industry with which the U.S. military has familiarity is the usual round of defense contractors.

The bibliography demonstrates that the authors clearly took pains to study, understand, and choose the best strategists and operational designs. The approach the authors took was to develop the attitude of the individual professional and to avoid concepts, procedures, and technological solutions that can quickly become outdated. The Norwegian view of doctrine is notable in that it considers a working process with a five- to ten-year shelf life. The Norwegians considered guidance from several sources, primarily the Norwegian political establishment, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

One criticism identified by a colleague is that large passages of text were taken from other manuals verbatim with odd definitions of attrition, maneuverist approach, and parliamentary. Another is the acceptance of the NATO doctrines of effects-based operations and net-centric warfare, which are still under debate based on evidence from recent Israeli experiences in Lebanon in 2006.

The Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine is an appropriate book to read prior to assignment to NATO or bilateral missions with the Norwegian armed forces. Furthermore, the book provides a model for developing a working operational doctrine that is based on reality, which U.S. planners should consider. Finally, and probably most salient, the book demonstrates that Americans are not the only ones thinking about war.
General James T. Conway, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, has lately expressed concern with the lack of amphibious experience of the most recent generation of U.S. Marines. They possess a wealth of combat experience but generally have little time on board ship and equally little time planning and conducting amphibious operations. Given the current deployment schedule to Iraq and Afghanistan, this is a problem that may not resolve itself anytime soon. Reading and self-education can aid in addressing this shortfall. There is no better place to start such an effort than with Michael Barrett’s *Operation Albion: The German Conquest of the Baltic Islands*. Barrett is a professor of history at The Citadel, and given the Commandant’s remarks, his book is indeed timely. There is much to be gained from a close study of Operation Albion.

From the German perspective, by the fall of 1917, events in World War I had reached a critical stage. The German army was under enormous pressure due to the extent of its commitment on the Western Front and because of the need to assist its faltering Austro-Hungarian allies. The pressure on the Western Front alone promised to become more intense in 1918 when the Americans were able to join the fighting in large numbers. To cope with this deteriorating situation, the German army needed to end the fighting in Russia as quickly as possible in order to make the troops available for service on other fronts.

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The result was Operation Albion, an assault on the Baltic Islands that protected the Gulf of Riga. If the Germans were able to take these islands, they would threaten the right flank of the Russian field armies as well as potentially open a sea route to the Russian capital at St. Petersburg. If the operation was extremely successful, it could shake the Russian government, still reeling from the aftereffects of the March Revolution, and cause the Russians to sue for peace. The successful German assault ultimately led to the realization of this best-case scenario.

Until now, little has been written about Operation Albion. There are many potential reasons for this. The English literature on World War I focuses primarily on the Western Front. It is also possible that Albion was overshadowed by the events that followed (the October Revolution that brought the Bolsheviks to power occurred two weeks later). Operation Albion deserves attention for a number of reasons. With no previous experience with amphibious operations, the German army conducted a successful division-sized amphibious assault, one of the most difficult military actions to plan and execute. In addition, the German army and navy in World War I had essentially fought separate wars, with little or no coordination; hence they had no real experience of joint operations to draw on. Add to this the ambitious goals for the campaign and there are all the elements necessary for a great story, which Barrett tells with an elegant balance of detail and readability.

In the 1930s, U.S. Marines carefully studied Operation Albion and borrowed a number of elements from the Germans when crafting amphibious doctrine. There were many valuable lessons. The German army and navy struggled with issues of command and control, operational planning, ship-to-shore movement, and combat loading of assault shipping. Studying these elements, the Marines appropriated the landing table as well as the command relationships between the navy and embarked troops. It is altogether fitting that modern Marines may rediscover these lessons from their original source.

Barrett does an excellent job of examining the campaign from both the German and Russian viewpoints. The narrative is well paced, and although there are only nine maps, they are more than adequate. Barrett brings immediacy to the events he describes, even though they occurred more than ninety years ago. The casual reader will find this book informative and entertaining. For the military professional, a careful reading will pay tremendous dividends, particularly for those interested in amphibious operations and staff planning.
This book by William H. Thomas Jr. is part of a renewed historical interest in the World War I period, particularly on the home front. This work compliments such efforts as Steven Kohn’s *American Political Prisoners* (1994) and David Rabban’s *Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years* (1997). The passage of the Patriot Act and the FBI’s renewed activities after 11 September 2001 are correctly noted in Thomas’s introduction as reasons to reexamine how the government enforced loyalty and the activities of the governmental agencies in the past.

Thomas moves beyond the courtroom and examines governmental efforts to silence those opposed to the war. The book suggests that this is one of the first tomes to examine such efforts of governmental repression. Thomas discusses some Espionage Act prosecutions but spends more time detailing how Justice Department employees went about trying to convince those who were antiwar to be silent. He notes in multiple places the interactions of the federal officials with private citizens and organizations like the American Protective League that wanted to oppress “disloyalty” and argues that the federal agents generally acted as a brake on private vigilantes. The author also analyzes the federal investigators’ own biases and suggests that at some times the agents were more active in enforcing the regulations than at others. He focuses his effort on three core areas: what went on in Wisconsin, how
clergy experienced repression, and how the left was affected. He adds one chapter on vigilantism and two others on the general governmental efforts to support the war. Though the attention is on individual cases and occurrences, the broad lessons learned about these three groups’ experiences are still generally noted. In his overall survey, Thomas discusses the federal efforts to silence the Socialists and the Industrial Workers of the World. The application to the overall war effort is somewhat detailed.

This work looks at both the nature of the government’s campaign and at the Justice Department itself. Thomas argues, both in his title and throughout, that the governmental effort to silence dissent was a covert one, and, while the government did not draw attention to itself, some evidence in the book suggests that it might not have been as covert as readers might perceive. For instance, Thomas notes that some of those targeted tried to censor themselves because they knew there were government agents around, which argues against the campaign being covert. He successfully argues that the Justice Department was a reflection of Progressive Era America, and that progressive-type methods were used.

This work is well researched. The bibliography alone is worth the price of the purchase. Thomas researched many books and articles, delved into various archives, and examined copious governmental records. His notes on his research methods will be helpful for those who want to examine other aspects of the same period. Thomas goes beyond just discussing the World War I period and brings in examples of governmental action in other wars and during Reconstruction. In some areas, though, more discussion would have helped, as the vigilante activities of the second Ku Klux Klan are largely ignored, even though they occurred right after World War I.

Unsafe for Democracy is definitely safe for use if one wishes to learn about governmental actions to silence antiwar speakers in certain areas, and it provides a good ground-level view of what went on in part of the home front during World War I.

Carlo D’Este’s biography of Winston S. Churchill puts him in a crowded field of popular and academic writers in search of Churchill’s core identity. Was Churchill an ambitious politician on the make, a prescient statesman and war leader, a loquacious orator and writer, or possibly a war criminal? While critics have rightly taken a jaundiced view of Churchillian hagiography, they have often digressed into cynical portrayals of their subject. Fortunately, D’Este’s superbly researched appraisal of Churchill’s life achieves the right balance between praise for his accomplishments and blunt depictions of his flaws. In Warlord, readers find a three-dimensional Churchill, with maddeningly contradictory qualities of arrogance and humanism in equal measure. D’Este sees the British war leader as a military man at heart whose lifelong drive to compensate for the psychological pain of rejection and abuse in childhood led him to seek military command, even as his political career reached the highest office in Britain.

Churchill’s difficult childhood involved being raised by aloof and celebrity-minded parents, along with a harrowing ordeal at the hands of a sadistic school master that almost broke him mentally before the age of ten. It is a testament to his remarkable strength of character that these painful experiences only strengthened his resolve to succeed. As a young subaltern
army officer in India, Churchill was contemptuous of privileged “gentlemen” officers who he thought showed little initiative or interest in learning the art of war. A few years later, after the battle of Omdurman in 1898, Churchill gained a clear-eyed appreciation for war as a dirty business that only fools played at. Unlike so many of his contemporaries, he saw through the shallowness of Victorian sporting metaphors used to describe warfare before World War I. At a time when jingoism was rampant in Europe, Churchill was appalled at the way Western values were debased in the colonies. While he admired the skill and bravery of the Mahdist warriors in the Sudan, his commanding officer, General Horatio Herbert Kitchener, saw only “filthy corruption.” Churchill publically accused Kitchener of perpetrating war crimes, even as the British government was trying to whitewash the official record of the “River War.”

During the Boer War, as an embedded reporter for a British newspaper, and later during World War I, when he served front-line duty in France, Churchill demonstrated remarkable audacity, courage, and willingness to share the same risks as men under his command. Despite his limited military training and experience as a soldier, he acquired a profound understanding of warfare in the industrial age. These military qualities, D’Este argues, were the foundation upon which Churchill built his political career. Churchill has been accused by critics of being a warmonger who callously viewed soldiers as cannon fodder for his political ambitions. But D’Este resoundingly refutes this caricature of Churchill, noting that in fact he knew better than his civilian counterparts in government the terrible human costs of war. In a speech before Parliament in 1912, he presciently warned that the risks and consequences of a general European war “can only end in the ruin of the vanquished and the scarcely less fatal dislocation and exhaustion of the conquerors” [153]. When Britain declared war in 1914, Churchill declared that “the world has gone mad” and wept openly in the House of Commons [210-11]. This did not deter him, though, from working tirelessly to transform the rigid and antiquated command structure of the navy. Amazingly, British admirals in 1914 were still wedded to medieval notions of holding a greater loyalty to the crown than to Parliament. Churchill’s creative energy shook the admiralty from top to bottom and made it a much more effective fighting force in the process. Yet gratitude in wartime was in short supply. As one contemporary noted, “They have pissed on Churchill’s plant for three years—now they expect blooms in a month” [209].
D’Este’s cursory assessment of Churchill’s interwar record glosses over his ambivalent and contradictory stances on fascism during the 1930s. Contrary to Churchill’s claims in his highly influential war memoirs published between 1948 and 1954, he was far from prescient on many occasions regarding the dynamic of expansion that was at the heart of fascist militarism. It was not until the Munich Agreement of September 1938 that Churchill finally abandoned notions of ingratiating himself with Neville Chamberlain’s pro-appeasement administration in order to gain high office. When the war began in September 1939, Chamberlain had no choice but to bring Churchill into the war cabinet. At the admiralty once again, Churchill revealed himself to be a military man more than a politician at heart, throwing caution to the wind. As First Lord in World War I, Churchill’s political career had almost been destroyed. Yet in 1939, he vigorously pursued ambitious plans to attack German supply lines in the Baltic and launch amphibious landings in Norway. In doing so, he revealed a limited appreciation for interwar changes in air power, which had also transformed naval warfare. Aircraft carriers, not battleships, had become masters of the sea. Churchill also underestimated the threat of modern submarines until forced to accept the necessity of a convoy system on the high seas. However, he more than compensated for such blind spots with his unparalleled genius for raising the morale of the British people while the war went from bad to worse.

The largest portion of D’Este’s book is dedicated to these years, when Britain’s survival was at stake. The key moment in the war came early, in May 1940, when Churchill resisted a cabal of top government officials anxious to cut a deal with Adolf Hitler. Churchill’s ability to outmaneuver the defeatists in government marked a fateful turning point in Western civilization. Ironically, it was the very un-English qualities of Churchill—his adventurism, flamboyance, and willingness to take enormous risks—that enabled him to succeed in this test of wills against senior respected political colleagues. Still, Churchill’s stirring rhetoric in 1940 was mostly bluff, designed to put backbone into a wavering populous. As irrational as continuing the war seemed, Churchill understood what the peace advocates did not—that there could be no secure peace with Hitler, whose promises were worthless.

The latter third of D’Este’s book is somewhat anticlimactic. Churchill’s dogged refusal to recognize Britain’s rapidly diminishing status as a world power makes for melancholy reading. He continued to act as if Britain were
still the global hegemon of his Victorian youth, when in fact the country was bankrupt and entirely reliant on American military and economic aid for waging war. President Franklin D. Roosevelt only accepted Churchill’s strategic vision in 1942 because he thought it the quickest way to bring American power to bear in Europe. But General George C. Marshall was never fooled by British advocacy of a Mediterranean strategy, correctly viewing it as a sideshow that would only delay victory in Europe. Indeed, missteps in the Mediterranean prevented a cross-channel invasion until mid-1944. Before then, however, Churchill enjoyed one more finest hour following the battle of El Alamein in November 1942, when he was cheered wildly by British and American troops alike. But his failing health and the growing U.S. role in the war meant that Britain was soon reduced to junior partner in the Grand Alliance. This reality was bluntly driven home to Churchill at the Tehran Conference in November 1943 when Joseph Stalin and Roosevelt mocked his attempts to win approval for operations in the Aegean. Churchill’s dream of conquering Rhodes, invading the Balkans, and drawing Turkey into the war was pure fantasy. Even the usually affable General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who got on well with Churchill, was roused to explosive anger at such distractions.

D’Este’s magnificent biography elicits Churchill’s genius and imperfections in equal measure. The result is a well-rounded image of the war leader that makes Warlord so enjoyable to read, as well as being a valuable addition to historical scholarship. It adroitly balances insights, criticism, and praise of its subject while highlighting poignantly Churchill’s humanistic qualities. At a time when pacifistic literature on World War II seems bent on morally disarming contemporary readers by vilifying and caricaturing the motives and actions of Allied war leaders (such as the policy of strategic bombing), this book represents a most welcome corrective. It is the compassion and humanity of Churchill at war that makes his experiences as a commander and a politician so interesting and relevant as a role model for our leaders in the present day.
April R. Summitt’s *John F. Kennedy and U.S.-Middle East Relations: A History of American Foreign Policy in the 1960s* uses official U.S. government records to assess the thirty-fifth president’s policies toward ten Middle Eastern nations (Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Yemen), though not all nations, understandably, receive the same depth of treatment. For a survey of such a large region, this volume manages to make an original contribution to the literature and in the end provides a respectable overview of the subject.

As Summitt astutely notes, the Kennedy administration’s Middle East policy rested on three goals. The first, and perhaps the one Kennedy himself felt most comfortable with, was to maintain long-standing U.S. relationships with what might be termed traditional or conservative Middle Eastern nations, such as Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, in the hope that the lure of U.S. aid might lead to a quid pro quo in domestic reforms and cooperation in regional peace and stabilization efforts. The administration’s second goal was to establish a good working relationship with Egypt’s Gamal Abd al-Nasser, whom Kennedy believed could be used to transform regional nationalism in a pro-American—or at least anti-Soviet—direction. Finally, the administration sought to make headway on the Arab-Israeli
problem by focusing on the issue of Arab refugees as a means of achieving regional stability.

Besides providing a comprehensive overview of the crises, events, and issues that confronted the Kennedy administration in the Middle East, Summitt also effectively demonstrates the deleterious effects that U.S. Cold War concerns had on relations with the region. Her claim for the role that fears of Soviet expansion into the region played in shaping U.S. policy is spot on and in keeping with an accepted element of the historiography. What she adds to this strand of thinking is the way that regional leaders successfully manipulated administration officials, including Kennedy himself, with hollow promises, disingenuous claims, and outright falsehoods. Even a short list of such instances—Israeli claims that the Dimona nuclear reactor was for peaceful purposes only; promises by Iran, Syria, and Kuwait that much needed domestic reforms were underway; Saudi insistence that it had done nothing to provoke Egyptian air strikes during the Yemeni civil war—makes plain the conclusion that the administration seemed to hear what it wanted to hear when dialoguing with Middle Eastern leaders, disregarding signs that pointed toward other, less palatable realities.

That so many Middle Eastern leaders were able to manipulate the Kennedy administration leads, not surprisingly, to Summitt’s generally negative overall evaluation of U.S. policy in the region during the “thousand days.” In the short term, to be sure, the United States did maintain relatively stable relations with such traditional allies as Iran, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and Israel. But the cost of that stability was high, not only in the monetary outlay of economic and military assistance, but also in the chances for domestic reforms or regional peace that were lost when these allies refused to bow to U.S. pressures. Kennedy’s goal of achieving rapprochement with Nasser again fell short of the mark, as the latter resisted the domestic reforms U.S. policy makers recommended, refused to eschew contacts with (and aid from) the Soviet Union, and rejected calls for Egyptian disengagement from the Yemeni civil war. And of course, efforts to resolve the thorny problem of the Arab refugees, assiduously not referred to as Palestinians in U.S. policy-making circles, were crushed on the shoals of Israeli resistance and duplicity. Ultimately, Summitt concludes, somewhat regretfully, that the administration cannot be credited with even one “real” regional success, an outcome she traces to both the success of regional leaders in playing U.S. Cold War fears for their own gain and a lack of U.S. appreciation for regional conditions and realities.
Summitt has succeeded in presenting a “warts and all” portrait of the Kennedy administration’s Middle East policy; indeed, it would not be unfair to say that the warts seem to predominate. Readers unfamiliar with the events detailed here will find this volume to be a good introductory overview, and specialists too will profit from Summitt’s insights into the ways that regional leaders succeeded in using Washington’s obsession with the Cold War to further their own aims.
No one in 2009 is under any illusion that relations between allies are straightforward. It is perhaps understandable that the Cold War is sometimes regarded with nostalgia as a time when allies were reliable, predictable, and united in the face of a common threat. As *NATO and the Warsaw Pact* amply illustrates, such nostalgia is misplaced. Moreover, some level of conflict between allies may not be an inherently bad thing: in a theme echoed in several chapters, S. Victor Papacosma suggests that “history reveals that effectively accommodating intrabloc conflict is a related component for defining and maintaining purpose,” and every alliance needs a purpose to survive [xv]. This edited volume reaches beyond current-day debates to focus on that history, delving into newly available archival material in some cases, charting new approaches and highlighting unexplored territory for future research in others.

The book is not a study of the workings of NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but rather a showcase of feuds and factions between, and even within, nations. Nor are the United States and the Soviet Union afforded the limelight as leaders of their respective alliances. The advantage of this overall approach is that it demonstrates the continuation of the normal rough and tumble of international relations between states with diverse national interests, over and above any Cold War framework. This highlights the artifice of the simulated appearance of unity that both the United States and the Soviet Union determinedly fought to promote outwardly. The disadvantage is that the book does not delve deeply into how disputes affected allied relations as a whole, meaning that the gravity of each dispute for each alliance, as opposed to the individual nations involved, is often neglected.
Nor, thanks to the division of the book into two parts, is there any explicit comparison between the ways in which NATO and the Warsaw Pact handled intrabloc tensions, or discussion of the notable congruence in the timing of the most serious disputes on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In fact, the volume demonstrates that despite—laudably—soliciting contributions from scholars based in the United States as well as Eastern and Western Europe, and emphasizing multiarchival research, there remains a stubborn division in academic expertise between historians who write on Eastern and Western Europe.

The first part of the volume is dedicated to NATO countries and begins with an excellent synthesis by Lawrence S. Kaplan of the most serious intrabloc disputes NATO faced from before the outbreak of the Korean War to 2004. The equivalent introduction to the second part, focusing on Warsaw Pact countries, is by Vojtech Mastny. These two introductory chapters form a model summary of the history of both alliances. Kaplan sounds an upbeat opening that Winfried Heinemann sustains, applauding NATO for “learning by doing,” progressing from the diplomatic disaster of Trieste in 1953 to the successful handling of Iceland’s determination to remove U.S. forces from its soil in 1956.

John O. Iatrides, by contrast, paints a picture of abject failure. Iatrides shows that NATO’s unwillingness to intervene in the enduring battles between Turkey and Greece “perpetuated their sense of insecurity and isolation” despite their alliance membership [72]. Anna Locher and Christian Nuenlist effectively look at how intrabloc tensions intersected with NATO as an organization. Focusing on the role of successive secretary generals in trying to contain the Gaullist challenge to NATO, they conclude, “Spaak, Stikker, and Brosio significantly contributed to the transformation of NATO from a defense organization into an instrument for managing collective security” [85]. It remains unclear, however, whether this was despite, or because of, Charles de Gaulle’s provocation. In a detailed chapter, Oliver Bange challenges several elements of the historical orthodoxy on Ostpolitik, using the extensive archival research he has amassed through the University of Mannheim’s project on Ostpolitik.

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Mastny highlights the struggle for the Warsaw Pact to define its purpose, and the “more or less subtle differences of attitude . . . to the German question [that] permeated the alliance” [147]. Indeed, Germany is almost omnipresent in the second half of this volume. Sheldon Anderson focuses on Poland’s enduring suspicion of the German Democratic Republic, its former invader and then supposed protector. Douglas Selvage offers a valuable overview of the Warsaw Pact and the German question from 1955 to 1970, chronicling three distinct phases to answer the question of whether the Pact was “a transmission belt for Soviet directives, an alliance, or something in between?” [178]. Jordan Baev’s chapter on Romania, Albania, and Bulgaria follows on neatly from Selvage’s essay, starkly illustrating the Soviet struggle to manage her allies after 1960.

Those tensions were, of course, also affected by the Sino-Soviet split, which Bernd Schaefer explores through 1980. It is notable that the “paranoia” Shaefer points to as a product of the Sino-Soviet split is glossed over by other contributors as a factor coloring the intrabloc tensions they cover. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Hungary’s reaction to this 1979 “out of area” conflict completes the volume. Csaba Békés concludes that his case study can be taken as an example of “the limits of small-state diplomacy,” or as an example of the possibility a “closely cooperating group” can influence superpower decision making to achieve limited goals [228]. That problematic is central to understanding of the practice of multilateralism and should have, perhaps, been brought out more in this otherwise excellent, thought-provoking volume.
Almost a half century after these events took place, there is still an active interest in the details of the Rhodesian War, the last of the British Empire and Commonwealth’s independence struggles in Africa. Recently, this has even seen the reprint of previous accounts but without substantial update. Yet original records and study exist, and this narrative is a first-rate example of what the last decades of research work have accomplished.

The author, J. R. T. Wood, produced one of the classic company commander’s accounts of the Rhodesian War, *The War Diaries of Andre Dennison* (1989), while editor Chris Cocks wrote the defining personal memoir of front-line fighting in *Fireforce: One Man’s War in the Rhodesian Light Infantry* (1997). Both men have also been active in continued work and publication of material on the conflict that continues with this current project.

My interest in the conflict in Rhodesia began in 1971 while in Southeast Asia. As a junior leader, I was pondering how to do a better job in my small patch of the Vietnam War. Direct exposure to British experience in Malaya and reading about Rhodesia’s “thin white line” seemed to offer other solutions to tactics, techniques, and procedures. A number of Americans, including U.S. Marines, served in the Rhodesian Security

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Forces during the war, bringing back firsthand experience and recollections. The U.S. Marine Corps maintained a low level of continued curiosity in pseudo techniques, mine- and ambush-proofed vehicles, and the conduct of operations through the 1980s and 1990s. The so-called Global War on Terrorism witnessed a renewed (or belated) focus on irregular warfare and low-intensity conflict that conventional campaigns in Kuwait and Iraq had failed to quell. At Marine Corps University, Operation Dingo was used as a planning exercise. Tracking, pseudo operations, mine and ambush countermeasures, and helicopter-borne reaction forces are now essential elements of counterinsurgency campaigns, as shown in the current U.S. Army and Marine Corps field manual Counterinsurgency (FM 3-44, MCWP 3-33.5).

How does the Rhodesian experience apply to Iraq and Afghanistan? This text provides some of the needed answers. References like this book should be found on professional reading lists and as command and staff course texts. If not, true professionals will buy it “on their own dime.” Wood uses sixteen chapters to describe the development of just one of the tactical innovations coming out of the Rhodesian conflict. This was the successful use of air-ground task forces to eliminate guerrilla bands with the direct application of aerial firepower and maneuver. With the example of similar British, French, American, and Portuguese experience, the Rhodesians developed a unique brand of aviation technology, command and control, and effective troop units to meet the situation they faced on the ground. I would argue this was the result of necessity rather than innovation, as the problem was how to cover MMBA (“miles and miles of bloody Africa”) with limited manpower. This was the same problem the nationalist insurgents dealt with by flooding the country with large numbers of ill-trained and ill-equipped terrorists and guerrillas to dominate areas populated by rural black Rhodesians. Fireforce was a concept and application that depended on killing the insurgent to the detriment of occupying the territory thus cleared by police, militia, auxiliaries, and other “protective” forces with an acute lack of political and material support. The Fireforce “killing machine” was not a “hearts and mind” effort. Despite this, it allowed the Rhodesian Security Forces to fight guerrilla incursions to a standstill to allow time for political solutions to be negotiated.

Wood covers this from Sinoia to Chimoio by describing the evolution of Fireforce as well as providing context in the form of background on the “armed struggle” by the nationalists, the security forces response, and the
overall development of the counterinsurgency campaign. His coverage ranges from border control and support to the civil power, to the joint operations command, and to the implementation of combined operations and the evolving civil-military response to the insurgent threat. He describes the place of the internal Fireforces as well as an example of Fireforce "writ large" with the November 1977 raid on Chimoio, Operation Dingo. This shows how a predominantly internal technique worked for external operations. As the road less taken, the use of the concept outside Rhodesia's geographic borders was soon countered by the guerrillas expanding the area covered by their camps and staging points and no longer providing a concentrated target that could be confined successfully. There came a point when the combined operations commander, Lieutenant General George P. "Peter" Walls, realized that more insurgents could be killed by external rather than internal operations. Fireforce remained the backbone of the internal effort, while flying columns and special forces led the attacks in external operations. The Rhodesian defensive effort focused on holding "vital asset ground," at the expense of good tactical terrain and other ground. With this, Fireforce soldiered on with almost daily actions and casualties, as covered by Wood's final chapter. On 28 December 1979, a last call out occurred from Grand Reef as a brokered cease-fire went into effect.

Wood's prose, graphics, illustrations, and Cocks's audio-visual presentation successfully bring the reader and viewer into the intense world of Fireforce operations. This is a fully documented work written and edited from the insights of participants. I highly recommended it, as the lessons of the past have a relevance to the needs of the present.

The reasons for the dramatic coalition victory in the Gulf War of 1991 seem obvious now. Overwhelming allied air power wrecked Iraqi forces, paralyzed their command and control, and destroyed soldiers’ morale. Last-minute negotiations failed because Iraq began the systematic destruction of oil wells to cover the evacuation from Kuwait. How could anyone fail to acknowledge the overwhelming defeat dealt to Iraqi forces in Kuwait?

Kevin M. Woods, a retired Army officer and analyst with the Joint Forces Command Institute for Defense Analysis, offers a glimpse into Saddam Hussein’s regime and the calculations behind the 1991 Gulf War with *The Mother of All Battles*. Based on captured documents, video and audio tapes, and post-2003 interviews with senior Iraqi officials, Woods offers a view into the secretive workings of the regime. The picture emerges of an Iraqi regime that never believed itself defeated since the Iraqi army stood up to a superpower and then withdrew without being destroyed. With an unprecedented look into the planning, occupation, defense, and finally retreat from Kuwait, this book is essential to understanding the Gulf War.

After a rapid overview of the book’s purpose, sources, and chronology from the coalition perspective, Woods begins his analysis with a case study entitled “The ‘Victory’ at Al-Khafji.” Two themes emerge that continue throughout the book. The first is how a well-known event can have an entirely different interpretation by your opponent. The battle of Khafji illustrates this point. Quoting a regime history, Khafji showed “the world that Saddam was one of [the] most outstanding military strategists of our
time” [15]. The idea seems implausible, but Woods reveals an entirely believable alternative analysis that the Iraqis developed. Iraqi documents, particularly the operations order for the raid, call into question the coalition interpretation, and hence, lessons of Khafji. Rather than coalition air power forcing two of the three divisions to return to their start positions, the plan was for these two divisions to draw coalition air power away from the main effort, allowing the third division (5th Mechanized) to seize the town. The Iraqi corps was able to execute its plan and then withdrew the 5th Mechanized Division in the face of coalition air power. Saddam Hussein’s regime interpreted this battle as a success since, despite the heavy losses, Iraqi forces could attack, defend, and then withdraw. In Hussein’s view, he could still influence events.

A second theme emerges of a military struggling to improve its performance under a dictatorial regime. Transcribed discussions show a properly intimidated military leadership trying to learn and function within highly restrictive limits. Probably the most compelling chapter, because it is unexpected, is “The Iraqi Lessons Learned,” which chronicles the Iraqi efforts after the Gulf War to learn from their experience. Beginning as early as May 1991, various commands held multiple conferences and wrote studies until nearly the start of the 2003 war. The idea of the Iraqi military as a learning organization is surprising. The process began with Saddam and his senior leaders imposing their personal interpretation on the events, which not surprisingly hampered later discussions. Yet within these confines, the picture emerges of a professional force grappling with its defeat. While many solutions were off limits because of the political implications, some insights emerged. The author chronicles one issue in depth, defeating attack aviation. The March 2003 ambush of V Corps Apaches may have been a direct result of these efforts to find a solution to the Apache helicopter problem faced in 1991.

The book’s strength is the insights it provides into the strategic thinking of Saddam Hussein’s regime. Unfortunately, little light is cast on lower levels. Even key commanders such as the Republican Guard Forces

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Command are faceless, nameless individuals. If tactical level commands get any attention, it is when they influence the strategic level. The decision to ignite the Kuwaiti oil wells is an area misunderstood by the coalition and led to decisions based on faulty interpretations. Understood in the West as an act of deliberate sabotage by Hussein’s order, in reality, Hussein delegated this to divisional commanders. The decision to ignite the wellheads was to cover their units’ positions from air attack and had strategic ramifications. It doomed the last Soviet peace efforts prior to the ground war and confirmed in President George H.W. Bush’s mind the rationale for the ground campaign.

While the book’s strength is a first glimpse into the regime’s inner workings, the weakness, surprisingly, is the coalition narrative that places too much emphasis on minor actions while ignoring the main effort of VII Corps’ fights. Read the book for the Iraqi perspective and not the coalition operations. Our enemies come from a different perspective, and our interpretation of an event may materially differ from theirs. Woods helps us to see that perspective through Iraqi words and documents. This book is highly recommended for those working on the Gulf War and is an essential first step in gaining an accurate understanding of the interaction between the two sides. I hope that Woods will delve further into this subject and expand the understanding of Iraqi operational and tactical commanders and decisions.
Current Areas of Interest and Engagement

Al-Qaida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘ Abd Al-‘ Aziz Al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerrilla War.’ Translated and analyzed by Norman Cigar. (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009. Pp. 224. $44.00 cloth; $21.56 paper.)

Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, al-Qaeda’s leader in the Arabian Peninsula, was killed by Saudi security forces in June 2004. Besides being a key commander in the al-Qaeda terrorist network, al-Muqrin was a serious strategic and ideological thinker and writer. Norman Cigar provides a timely and relevant translation and analysis of an important al-Qaeda doctrinal work that is designed to facilitate, for English-speaking readers, an understanding of how one of our major adversaries thinks. Such an understanding, based on studying al-Qaeda’s own manuals (written for their followers) and accompanied by analysis to provide a cultural and political context, can help students and practitioners in the U.S. military, as well as U.S. government policy makers and analysts, gain a better understanding of the mind-set and tactics of Islamic extremism.

The translation of the Arabic doctrinal text forms the second half of this book and is preceded by Cigar’s overview and detailed analysis of al-Muqrin’s work. As described on pages 13-14, al-Muqrin’s doctrinal writings on guerrilla war first appeared as a series of articles in successive issues of

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Mu’askar al-Battar (“Al-Battar Camp”), the online military journal of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (QAP), which al-Muqrin helped to establish and edited. After al-Muqrin’s death, these articles were grouped together and republished as a book by QAP.

In the foreword, Julian M. Lewis, a member of the British Parliament and Great Britain’s shadow defence minister, highlights al-Muqrin’s recognition of the crux of the conflict, that “this is a battle of ideas—with doctrine underpinning the will to win. The inability to win militarily must be compensated for by the ability to defeat psychologically—to cause the mental collapse and capitulation of the enemy” [x]. Cigar, in his analysis, adds that “al-Muqrin understood the value of ideas and of the information effort. . . . One press source estimated that under al-Muqrin, half of the QAP’s effort was devoted to media operations” [10]. Cigar clearly respects al-Muqrin’s thinking, both his writing style and the breadth of his knowledge of other irregular warfare concepts that support it, observing that “al-Muqrin’s Guerrilla War deserves high marks as doctrine. It is not just a checklist of tasks, but relies both on a descriptive approach, when it deals with strategic and operational issues, and a more prescriptive one, when it deals with detailed TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures]” [14]. Al-Muqrin was well read in “foreign doctrinal material, including U.S. Army field manuals” [12] and the teachings of Carl von Clausewitz and particularly Mao Zedong, according to Cigar, but also “sometimes incorporates some Vietnamese concepts” [20-22].

The first half of the book contains valuable analysis of al-Muqrin’s thoughts on subjects such as the strategic and operational levels of war; tactical considerations such as different environments, assassinations and hostage-taking, leadership, the role of the people, civil-military relations, and technology; Islamic culture and morality; and applying these ideas in practice. Cigar also highlights al-Muqrin’s “considerable emphasis on intelligence (and counterintelligence) throughout his book.” What is just as noteworthy, however, are the things that al-Muqrin does not address in his writings, such as suicide attacks as a technique, the use of weapons of mass destruction, and attacks using conventional explosives.

Cigar’s analysis greatly benefits from his extensive use of original radical Islamist sources, which include not only a wide variety of al-Muqrin’s writings, but also key related works of other radical Sunni thinkers. The book is well organized and is laid out so that the doctrinal thinking of QAP (and in a larger sense, al-Qaeda) can be clearly understood and easily related to its media operations and operational art. Cigar succeeds in enhancing insights into the war-fighting doctrine, as well as the supporting ideology, of radical Islamists.

What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq makes a significant contribution to the understanding of the challenges facing women in Iraq today. Using an impressive combination of more than 100 interviews, statistics from many government and nongovernment sources, and current scholarly articles, authors Nadje al-Ali and Nicola Pratt trace Iraqi women’s experiences from the 1940s to the present, with a particular emphasis on conditions since the U.S./Coalition invasion in 2003.

Challenging stereotypes of Iraqi woman as historically oppressed by traditional Islamic society, the authors paint a much more complex picture over time. They point out that early Ba’athist policies were rather liberal (by Muslim standards) for women, encouraging their education and entrance into the workforce. However, as the result of three wars, twelve years of international sanctions, and the increasingly oppressive policies of Saddam Hussein, the women’s situation has steadily declined. Al-Ali and Pratt argue that, rather than blaming Islam, readers should view Iraqi women’s oppressive situation as the result of conflict, poverty, the breakdown in infrastructure and security, and correspondingly, decreasing opportunities for education and employment. The authors carefully disaggregate data on “the Iraqi woman”
by taking into account the important influences of women’s class, generation, location, religion, and ethnic identity on their opportunities and rights.

Although the focus of the book is on gender, *What Kind of Liberation?* provides a wealth of otherwise difficult-to-obtain information on recent political, social, and economic changes since the 2003 invasion. Chapter three, “Engendering the New Iraqi State,” is especially relevant for political scientists and policy makers. The authors do a superb job of explaining how the rapid efforts to create an interim government and constitution, the removal of the Ba’ath Party, and the decision to follow a proportional representation system in elections have inadvertently led to increasing divisions along sectarian and ethnic lines, resulting in the “Lebanonization” of Iraq. The many quotes from interviews with Iraqi women and governmental and nongovernmental organization officials provide an immediate and detailed image of daily reality that statistics cannot offer. Readers should be cautioned however, that due to security concerns, the authors only traveled to the Kurdish areas of Iraq, conducting most of their interviews in the United States and United Kingdom with expatriates or upper-class, educated Iraqi women who were out of the country to attend conferences. Thus the voices of the poor, illiterate, and younger generation of women are not included in this book.

The authors openly hold an anti-“U.S. imperialist” and anti-military stance throughout the book, which may deter some readers from getting past the introduction to the important material in the text. It is unfortunate that while al-Ali and Pratt are careful to deconstruct the “Iraqi woman” and examine the many social, cultural, and economic factors affecting different women’s experiences, they stereotype the U.S.-international and military communities in the very “black boxes” against which they rail for women. Both of the authors are British, and while their critique of U.S. policy is vocal, they fail to hold the United Kingdom accountable for many of the decisions in which it and other members of the international community also took part. Likewise, while they do not fall into the trap of declaring that women are naturally peacemakers, they stereotype the military as masculine and aggressive, failing to recognize the immense complexity and diversity within the U.S. military or the increasing role the military plays in humanitarian and peacemaking activities in the absence of state or nongovernmental ability to provide stability.

Despite these concerns, *What Kind of Liberation?* is a critical text that should be read by anyone working in or studying Iraq, not only regarding issues of gender, but also efforts to develop a stable and sustainable Iraqi state and society.

Despite the importance and longevity of Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, no major books have appeared in English presenting scholarly analyses of this occupation. Neve Gordon, a senior lecturer in politics and government at Ben-Gurion University, finally has provided such a study in the work under review here. Gordon’s purpose is not to provide a detailed, descriptive account of the occupation from its inception in June 1967 until today, but rather to offer a theoretical explanation of Israel’s “controlling apparatuses and practices” [4] and how these affected Israeli policies toward the occupied Palestinians and their land. The result is a sophisticated work that looks at the modes of control employed by Israel in the occupied territories, and that notes how the occupation’s structural forms of control shifted over the years as Israel’s initial policy of “normalizing” the occupation gave way in the 1990s to the “separation principle.”

To do this, Gordon begins by noting an interesting statistic: during the entire period from June 1967 through December 1987, only 650 Palestinians were killed by Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza—an average of thirty-two per year. These were the years in which Israel sought to

“normalize” the occupation and let the inhabitants “live their lives.” During the years from December 1987 through September 2000, the era of the first intifada and the Oslo peace process, the number of Palestinians killed rose to 1,491 (106 per year). Starting with the second intifada in September 2000 through December 2006, 4,046 Palestinians were killed (674 per year) as Israeli policy shifted to the “separation principle.”

Why did the lethality of the occupation rise so precipitously as a result of this shift? In answering this question, Gordon is careful to note that the specific forms of Israeli control over Palestinians have remained largely the same over four decades. What changed, and what thus led to greater violence against Palestinians, were the “modes of power” that informed how the apparatuses of control are practiced. By modes of power, he is referring to the modes of power discussed in the work of Michel Foucault: disciplinary, bio-, and sovereign power. As these have changed, in no small way as a result of the interaction with the occupied population, so have Israeli attitudes toward life in the territories.

After detailing the occupation chronologically, Gordon brings recent events under scrutiny. The Oslo peace process led to what he describes as Israel’s “outsourcing the occupation” to the Palestinian Authority (PA) starting in 1994. The PA controlled the people, while Israeli land confiscations and water policies allowed it to control as many resources as possible. In analyzing the rise of Hamas among PA voters after 1994, Gordon points out that the “excesses and contradictions produced by Israel’s controlling apparatuses and practices can also help explain the increasing popular support for Hamas”[218].

*Israel’s Occupation* ultimately offers more than an excellent and incisive study of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza; it demonstrates how the very “Israeli model” of pacification and occupation that some people in the United States view as a successful model for replication in places like Iraq and Afghanistan has proven disastrous, and how it has led to what he calls the “politics of death.”
While much has been written on the Palestinian property claims against Israel, including two books by the author of this work, Michael R. Fischbach, very little has been written by historians and legal scholars on Jewish property claims against Arab countries. The need for such unbiased scholarship to address this area is critical toward fostering reconciliation among all of the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. *Jewish Property Claims Against Arab Countries* had the potential to illuminate this long-neglected area of scholarship. However, it does not deal with the difficult issues of refugee status as well as the ethnic cleansing of Jews from Arab countries. These issues are particularly important since Jews from Arab countries often could not speak out freely since many of their relatives resided in countries such as Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq. In some cases, the continued presence of relatives in these countries still prevents them from speaking freely. Also, in the Persian (non-Arab) country of Iran, there are presently 25,000 to 30,000 Jews. These Jews remain vulnerable to anti-Semitic attacks.

To address property claims, one must first analyze the reason for these claims, including the acknowledgment that both groups are in fact refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Indeed, Fischbach’s previous scholarship indicates that this refugee status is
integral to understanding property claims of refugees. As in two previous books by the author, Records of Dispossession: Palestinian Refugee Property and the Arab–Israeli Conflict (2003) and The Peace Process and Palestinian Refugee Claims: Addressing Claims for Property Compensation and Restitution (2006), the title of the book under review should include the term “refugee.”

Rather than acknowledging refugee status, the current book is filled with references to Jews who “left the Arab world en masse” [12] or Jewish “emigration,” “émigrés,” and “emigrants” [20]. It posits that “unlike Palestinian refugees, these Jewish emigrants have not clamored for return to their former homes” [4]. It asserts that instead of “clamoring for return to their homes,” most of these Jewish emigrants “were integrated into Israel and other countries of refuge and have remained so until today.” Again, one wonders why the phrase “countries of refuge” is used unless these Jews are indeed refugees. If so, what does “clamoring” for return of their homes mean when there is no one willing to listen? Arab governments, international organizations, and national and international courts have shown a reluctance to negotiate or adjudicate the issues of refugee status, human rights claims, or property claims. Indeed, Bigio v. Coca-Cola Company (2006), which Fischbach mentions, is an example of the inability to receive redress in Egyptian or U.S. courts.

Given these facts, the first area of inquiry for a work such as this one should be the examination of whether the property was abandoned by will or taken through law, threat, or intimidation. The nature of the loss of property is fundamental to the act of seeking redress. This process involves an exploration of human rights violations and, ultimately, ethnic cleansing. As the book notes, there was a “virtual” extinction of Jews living in Arab countries “within three decades.” These words connote the possibility of human rights violations and ethnic cleansing leading to this population disappearance. Yet instead of examining the reason for this disappearance, the author immediately states that “most of these Jews ended up immigrating to Israel” [10]. “Immigrating to Israel” does not negate refugee status if the cause of the immigration is human rights violations and ethnic cleansing.

Further, the issue of linkage between the Palestinian refugees and the Jewish refugees from Arab countries, which the book repeatedly raises, cannot be dealt with appropriately without acceptance of the refugee status of the Jews from Arab countries. Whether this linkage is appropriate or not cannot be examined through the perspective of a scholar who apparently does not believe that Jews from Arab countries are refugees.

*Shi‘ite Lebanon* considers the multiple ways in which Lebanese Shi‘ite identity has been forged, contested, and reproduced over the course of the late twentieth century. Through historical analysis and participant observation, Roshanack Shaery-Eisenlohr traces the web of interconnections that link religion, nationalism, and transnationalism in the context of the dynamic and multivocal Lebanese Shi‘ite community. The cast of characters engaged in making and propagating Shi‘ite identity that are analyzed in this book attests to the diversity of Lebanese Shi‘ite identity and politics in the late twentieth century—political Shi‘ite movements, parties, and individuals such as Hezbollah, Amal, and Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah (often misrepresented as the “spiritual advisor” to Hezbollah, but who appears in this book as a decidedly independent actor), as well as the cultural institutions and activities associated with what the author calls “official” Iranian presence in Beirut, namely the Iranian Cultural Center in Beirut (ICC).

Part one, “The Nation in the Making,” examines how public intellectuals, “ethnic entrepreneurs,” and ordinary people have constructed a specifically Shi‘ite form of Lebanese nationalism. Chapter one follows

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the rise of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the rise of his “Movement of the Deprived” and Amal Party, soon joined by Hezbollah and the charismatic leader Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah within the context of concerted attempts to both appropriate and undermine a dominant “Maronite narrative” of Lebanese history and identity that had excluded the Shi’ite community from the national fold. Shaery-Eisenlohr identifies historical narratives as one tool for “rooting” Shi’i-ness within the Lebanese nation, elaborated further in chapter two through discussion of the establishment and activities of both Lebanese and Iranian Shi’ite-run educational institutions. The practices and politics of civic education are also aimed at breaking down Maronite hegemony, contributing to crafting a new kind of Lebanese Shi’ite citizen. Within this dynamic milieu of educational institution building and ideological formation, “a multiplicity of Shi’ite voices” both compete and coexist.

Part two, “Transnational Debates and Local Struggles,” turns to doctrinal and ideological debates set within both national and transnational frames. One of Shaery-Eisenlohr’s most provocative critiques of conventional accounts of Shi’ite politics in Lebanon from a culturalist position is to argue that competition among both Lebanese and Iranian political Shi’ite movements and actors in Lebanon “over a central position in the Shi’ite world and their claims to Shi’ite authenticity have not been limited to military combat, diplomatic negotiations, and political statements and speeches” [118]. Chapter three addresses the question of Shi’ite piety as it has been appropriated and articulated vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause in Lebanon, within the framework of Lebanese Shi’ite cultural politics and national identity. Chapter four looks at how religious ritual and theological-legal debates also sharpen lines of division among competing visions and agendas of Lebanese Shi’ite identity and culture. Differences among these various actors become more apparent regarding issues of sacred history and the contemporary usage of Jabal ‘Amil, the Shi’ite “heartland” in south Lebanon, as well as through discourses on and about the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn during ‘Ashura.

The cultural dimensions of struggle over what it means to be Shi’ite in Lebanon influence the tack taken by the Iranian regime, as evinced by chapter five, in which Iranian cultural politics in Lebanon have served to “set in motion certain ideologies and practices justifying Iran’s official presence there, among both Shi’ites and non-Shi’ites,” but simultaneously “aimed at de-territorializing Lebanese Shi’ite identities by emphasizing
themes specifically important to the Lebanese Shi‘ite experience” [159]. In other words, “official” Iran seeks to downplay ethnic or cultural differences between Lebanon and Iran even as it seeks to play up its unique cultural, religious, and, hence, political role in an attempt to position itself as the “Vatican of Shi‘ism.” Consequently, Hezbollah appears as a “partner” to the Iranian regime rather than as a “puppet.” But the establishment of Iranian “authenticity” vis-à-vis the Palestinian and Lebanese causes may also translate into enhanced Iranian political influence. This reader is left wondering what relative weight Shaery-Eisenlohr would attribute to Iranian cultural politics in Lebanon vis-à-vis the logistical, financial, and military support that Iran provides to various actors, movements, and institutions in Lebanon, issues that are mostly sidestepped in this book. But this is a minor criticism.

Shi‘ite Lebanon is a major contribution to the field of Lebanese studies and deserves a wide audience for complicating simplistic yet persistent misunderstandings of Shi‘ite identities and cultural politics in the contemporary Islamic world.