Cover: NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium. On 14 October 1953, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted its emblem. The blue background represents the Atlantic Ocean. The four-pointed star symbolizes the organization's guiding compass, and the circle represents the unity binding the 14 member countries together. Photo courtesy of NATO.

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In memory of
Dr. Stephen S. Evans
1954 – 2014
President’s Foreword

U.S. armed forces must react and interact in a variety of situations, proving the importance of not just experience but also of an educational foundation that supports today’s military, one confronting tighter budgets and a constricted force structure, utilizing greater technology, and facing increased ambiguity and international crises. Professional military education means more than fostering leadership in our best and brightest. Our goal at Marine Corps University is to serve as a dynamic institution capable of educating joint and combined forces to handle the complex realities of the twenty-first century. Several of these current realities, as well as past incidents that influence the present, are the focus of this issue of the Marine Corps University Journal.

The United States has extended the American idea of democracy so far afield that its reach can be felt across the globe. There are those who argue that we have stretched our resources and our forces beyond their limits, while others claim that our interactions with other cultures enrich both domestic and foreign populations. As evidenced by situations such as the Bizerte Incident in Tunisia and the Arab Spring, we still have much to learn from our global interactions today and in the not-so-distant past.

The lead article in this issue examines the Bizerte Incident and its repercussions. This 1961 incident in Tunis was not the first time that a foreign government has reached out to the United States during desperate times, nor will it be the last. After finally gaining its independence from France, Tunisia was determined to see the remaining French troops depart, particularly from the bustling French naval base in Bizerte. When that goal was not reached in what the Tunisian government felt was a timely manner, President Habib Bourguiba deployed troops to the base, where they were quickly outmaneuvered and outgunned by French forces, leaving hundreds wounded or dead. Bourguiba appealed to both the United Nations (UN) Security Council and to U.S. President John F. Kennedy, who had just weathered the Bay of Pigs incident and was also facing the Berlin Crisis.
The article’s author, Vernie Liebl, concludes that the UN resolution and the United States’ failure to offer swift support may have contributed to Tunisia’s growing resentment, even as it improved relations with France. Unfortunately, the Jewish and European communities in Tunisia paid the highest price for what the government considered a slap in the face; by the end of 1962, only 20,000 Jews remained in the country, and nearly all Europeans had left by 1963. While the Bizerte Incident was quickly overshadowed by the Cold War and U.S.-Soviet tensions, it does highlight the short- and long-term ramifications for U.S. involvement in international affairs.

Alessandra Pinna continues with an in-depth look at international affairs through the process of democratization. Pinna’s article likens the spread of democracy to a viral outbreak, whereby the previous political system and its authoritarian actors are undermined by the “infection” within their political system. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, however, significant threats to the formation of democracies—terrorism and the strength of capitalism in Russia and China—have become more powerful than the original virus. While democracy promotion can be supported via soft or hard means, both political scientists and politicians agree that violence may not be the most efficient or appropriate way to encourage a democratic system in a region already suffering from decades of internal strife.

These divergent perspectives on diplomatic relations have far-reaching impacts, particularly for countries focused on improving their transatlantic relationships. Aylin Noi assesses the problematic relationship between the United States and the European Union (EU) as it relates to the Middle East and North Africa Initiative. Noi attributes much of the conflict between these transatlantic partners to each countries’ approach to foreign policy—America prefers a rapid transformation supported by military power, while the EU favors a gradual transformation based on civilian power. In this instance, however, the democracy promotion efforts of these two powers had little bearing on the political reality of the Middle Eastern
and North African countries in question and inevitably damaged the image and credibility of those attempting to make positive gains.

Gayane Novikova argues that these relationships (e.g., United States, the EU, and Russia) and regional activities (e.g., Arab Spring) affect more than just the reputations of the countries in question, particularly in areas such as the South Caucasus where internal and external security is already an issue. The South Caucasus’s security issues may be tied, in part, to pressure from the disparate political and economic interests of Russia and the EU, but also from the United States shifting its focus to the Far East and Southeastern Asia. Additionally, most of these developments are occurring in the midst of armed conflicts throughout the Middle East and regions closest to the South Caucasus states. Novikova asserts that these states’ processes cannot experience significant change in a regional security system because each internal actor holds such a limited amount of space to maneuver.

As we prepare for an uncertain post-Afghanistan future, we can use this time to reflect on American efforts over the last 13 years and use those hard-won lessons as a springboard for progressing into the future. This collection of articles, while covering a broad swath of history not specifically military-centric, clearly highlights issues that will at some point affect how we operate in the global landscape, regardless of whether in traditional areas of Marine Corps involvement, such as Tunisia, or in new areas where we must apply our lessons learned and our intellect, such as the South Caucasus. Education is the one constant that will make a difference over the next several years as the drawdown becomes reality and budgets continue to shrink.

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Brigadier General, U.S. Marine Corps
President, Marine Corps University
The Bizerte Incident: 1961

by Vernie Liebl

From 19 July to 23 July 1961, French and Tunisian forces fought over the French military base of Bizerte, Tunisia, an unresolved colonial legacy after Tunisian independence. This battle, termed the Bizerte\(^1\) Incident, occurred approximately 41 miles (66 kilometers) northwest of the capital, Tunis. Casualties were significant—a combined estimate of at least 2,000—with most being Tunisian, and approximately 700 of the Tunisians having been killed.\(^2\) Few readers may have heard of this brief but savage battle, yet this incident was important in a North African, European, and Cold War context. It defined sides and loyalties, and determined who was prepared to tolerate what to obtain either credibility or alliance. It also showed exactly how unimportant “marginal” countries such as Tunisia were in the broader context of a potential nuclear showdown between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union, and that a critical European country such as France could be forgiven or excused in a “mere colonial” matter.

Tunisia was a sovereign nation, legally independent as of 1956. Governed by the Neo-Destour Party and led by Habib Bourguiba,\(^3\) Tunisia was a moderate state with pronounced Francophile sympathies and a generally Western orientation. Although used as a political sanctuary by the Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front) and

\(^{1}\) Also written as Bizerta.

\(^{2}\) Some estimates put the total combined casualty count at approximately 3,000 with around 1,000 Tunisians killed; some Tunisians maintain that the death toll alone was approximately 3,000.

\(^{3}\) Bourguiba ruled Tunisia from 1956 to 1987 and organized the Neo-Destour Party in 1934 to seek independence from France. An excellent organizer, Bourguiba enabled the Neo-Destour Party to function despite persistent French arrests. Captured and imprisoned in France, he was removed from Vichy French custody and moved to Rome where he was put under great pressure from both the Italians and Germans to align the Tunisian independence movement with the cause of the Axis powers. He resolutely refused but was nonetheless allowed to return to German-occupied Tunisia in May 1943. After the Allies concluded their North African campaign, Bourguiba approached the Free French and proposed to support them in exchange for a gradual progression toward autonomy (and independence). Given short shrift, he was eventually arrested by the French in 1952 and only freed in 1954 when France decided to grant Tunisia (and Morocco) autonomy to consolidate French authority in Algeria.
a provider of a very small amount of support for the insurgents, Tunisia mostly tried to remain separate from the struggle in Algeria. The siren song of Arab nationalism from Gamal Nasser in Egypt held some appeal but was not very useful in any real political sense. Tunisia as well as Algeria and Morocco were not targeted by the Soviet Union as potential anti-NATO supporters due to their colonial legacy. In fact, the Soviet Union considered them to be almost completely in the pocket of the West, whatever the outcome in Algeria, and thought that Islam was far more compatible with Western values and mores than with Soviet Communism’s ideals and goals.

Tunisia had two outstanding issues remaining with France from its colonial past. The first was the undefined southern border with Algeria (and to a much smaller and less contentious extent with Libya) in which Tunisia wanted its “share of the Sahara.” This claim was based on a 1910 Ottoman-Tunisian accord in which the French Tunisian territory (a protectorate at that time) was noted as “extending south to Borne 233 and beyond.” Tunisia felt that it could

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4 Harold Nelson, ed., *Tunisia, A Country Study* (Washington, DC: American University, 1988), 53–55. In spite of its many links to the West, Tunisia basically took a nonaligned stance in its foreign policy. Bourguiba was intensely suspicious of appeals to Arab unity and avoided a close identification with regional blocs, such as the United Arab Republic. After gaining independence, more than 3,000 French officials remained behind to assist in the transition, providing technical assistance and staffing schools and medical facilities. Simultaneously, the FLN/Algerian government-in-exile was hosted in Tunis and approximately 25,000 Algerian FLN combatants were based in Tunisian “sanctuary bases.”

5 Jacob Abadi, “Great Britain and the Maghreb in the Epoch of Pan Arabism and the Cold War,” *Cold War History* 2, no. 2 (January 2002): 125–60. In fact, in a 1959 British Foreign Office cable written to the U.S. State Department in response to Bourguiba requesting arms and economic aid, the British author of the paper argued that Bourguiba had been a staunch supporter of the West, minimized any Soviet influence, and curbed the subversive activities of both Nasser and the FLN in Tunisia. The British, unable to provide for all of Tunisia’s needs, were requesting that the United States step in and supplement the British aid effort. The British ambassador was also urging London to support Tunisia as a means to encourage Tunisia toward Western orientation and to counter the Soviet threat. Ultimately, Britain did not provide the arms, and the United States supplied only a minimal amount so as not to risk alienating the French. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan later stated that it had been a mistake not to support Tunisia’s request and that it would have been wiser to risk some Soviet infiltration rather than try to please the French, which ultimately failed.

6 Yahia H. Zoubir, “U.S. and Soviet Policies Towards France’s Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in North Africa,” *Canadian Journal of History* 30, no. 3 (December 1995): 439–66. An additional reason for Soviet “indifference” is that they considered France a potential ally against the United States and therefore did not want to antagonize France over its colonial policies. Additionally, the Soviet Union was more intent on combating American efforts to supplant France in North Africa and thus put their support toward keeping France in North Africa.

achieve a greater share of the Sahara if it could negotiate with a free Algeria, thus the support and sanctuary provided to the insurgent Algerian FLN. Tunisian claims and pressure resulted in the French bombing of Sakiet Sidi Youssef, Tunisia, in February 1958. Remarkably, the resulting 68 dead and 100 wounded Tunisians did not sour most Tunisians on France and its liberal ideals, the action being shrugged off as an isolated French “colonial action.” The issue did, however, become somewhat interlinked with Tunisian support to the Algerian FLN; this issue did not go away after Algerian independence in 1962 but was finally resolved amicably between the two countries in 1983. The immediate effect was that French troops were temporarily confined to their bases in Tunisia, a strictly preventative move to preclude any potential trouble.

**France Goes Slowly**

The main issue for Tunisia was the French military base of Bizerte. Officially granted to the French by the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, Bizerte was called the most European city in Tunisia. Founded 3,000 years ago by the Phoenicians, its location close to Cape Blanc—the northernmost point of North Africa—and its large naval harbor (built by the French) make it a fairly strategic location in the Mediterranean littoral. As part of the independence protocol signed between France and Tunisia in

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8 There had been an earlier clash near the same location from 26 May to 2 June 1957 that involved only French and Tunisian ground forces. Numerous smaller and less intense “incidents” occurred as well, none of which reached major diplomatic “visibility.”

9 This treaty was based upon the June 1955 agreement between French and Tunisian representatives that provided for “internal autonomy.” Werner K. Ruf, “The Bizerta Crisis: A Bourguibist Attempt To Resolve Tunisia’s Border Problems,” *Middle East Journal* 25, no. 2 (1971): 201–11.
March 1956 that granted “principles” of autonomy, Bizerte was acknowledged as remaining in French possession; further negotiations would then lead to complete French evacuation at some point in the future. However, each side interpreted the principles differently. Tunisia interpreted the agreement to mean that France would evacuate Bizerte—all of it—in a reasonably short time that, even allowing for the complex evacuation of personnel and materiel, certainly meant no more than a few years, if not sooner. The French, on the other hand, understood the intent of “future” evacuation to be precisely that, in the indeterminate future and to be determined by France, not Tunisia.

French evacuation of Tunisia was lengthy and time-consuming, taking nearly two years. In an exchange of letters between Tunisia and France in June 1958, two years after independence, France agreed definitively to withdraw all French troops from Tunisia within four months. France carefully omitted mention of its current troop deployments in the disputed southern areas of Tunisia/Algeria, but it explicitly noted that the status of the French base of Bizerte, to be temporarily retained by France, would be discussed and resolved by negotiations. France then made it a point to evade any discussion or negotiations on Bizerte with Tunisia, stonewalling Bourguiba for four years.10

Bourguiba tried to link the issues—that of the southern frontier (regarding Tunisian retention/ownership of the oil wells at Edjele or for potential oil fields in the region) and that of the status of Bizerte—but the French maintained that they were separate issues, referring to the 1955 pre-independence convention as the legal basis for the French presence in Bizerte. Simply put, Tunisia was trying to consummate its independence by removing the French and all vestiges of its colonial past from its soil. France, on the other hand, was deliberately delaying its departure or even talk of departing from Bizerte to retain, from its perspective, a strategically vital military base. In addition, French political leaders under Charles de Gaulle were anticipating the eventual loss of Algeria but were aiming to retain

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10 Ibid.
the large and important French naval base of Mers el-Kébir there. If France were forced to leave Bizerte, such an event would provide legal justification to any ensuing Algerian government to force France to turn Mers el-Kébir over to the Algerians.\footnote{Matthew Connelly, \textit{A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 257–58.}

Bourguiba constantly sought to engage France in an effort to resolve both the southern border issue and the Bizerte issue. In 1958, Bourguiba imposed a loose “blockade” on Bizerte in response to the Sakiet Sidi Youssef incident, although it was quite porous and generally friendly in intent. Withdrawn four months later, after the May 1958 coup brought de Gaulle to power and the establishment of the Fifth Republic in Paris, it partially succeeded as the French agreed to close five French bases in Tunisia and withdrew an estimated 50,000 French personnel—but Bizerte was untouched.\footnote{UN Publications, \textit{Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Chapter VIII: Security Council Consideration of Questions Under the Council’s Responsibility for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security} (New York: United Nations, 1956–58), 115–16.} In February 1959, Bourguiba offered to cede Bizerte permanently to the French in exchange for Algerian independence, but the offer went unanswered.\footnote{Daily Brief, Central Intelligence Bulletin dated 1 March 1958 (declassified and approved for Freedom of Information Act release on 19 November 2002), 3–4.} Another “blockade” of Bizerte was organized to begin in early 1961 but was called off when word spread of an uprising of Algerian \textit{colons} (or colonists) with tacit support from the French military. Bourguiba let it be known in Paris, via diplomatic channels, that he did not want to weaken de Gaulle’s hand at such a critical juncture by distracting him. In return, the French agreed to restrict the personnel complement of the Bizerte base in October 1960 to only “needed” technical personnel as well as the soldiers of the 8th Infantry Regiment,\footnote{The population consisted of approximately 6,000 total personnel, but the infantry regiment itself was battalion-sized and had approximately 800 troops, assuming it was a type-107 unit (infantry battalion). Peter Jackson, “French Ground Force Organizational Development for Counterrevolutionary Warfare Between 1945 and 1962” (masters thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2005); and Jean Mabire, \textit{Commando de Chasse} (Paris: Pocket, 1978), table titled “Bataillon D’Infanterie–Type Afrique du Nord dit ‘107.’”} but the eventual status of Bizerte remained unchanged.

Yet even as Tunisian frustration grew each year, Tunisians still retained a fond attachment to and idealization of France, despite clear
evidence of military (and paramilitary) atrocities being committed in nearby Algeria.\textsuperscript{15} Although the customs union between them was abolished in 1959, Tunisia was allowed preferential tariffs and remained in the Franc Zone, and it was encouraged, with French support, to pursue “associated status” in the European Economic Community (EEC). Then, on 8 January 1961, a majority of voters declared they were in favor of Algerian self-determination in a referendum organized in metropolitan France. Interestingly, the one million French colons in French Algeria were excluded from the referendum, although deployed French military personnel, including those in Algeria (and Tunisia), and expatriate French, including those in Algeria, were allowed to vote.\textsuperscript{16}

In February 1961, in the political wake of the French Algeria referendum, Bourguiba met de Gaulle in Rambouillet, France. Both Bourguiba and the Tunisian press believed that the meeting was an attempt to mediate between the French and the Algerian FLN, while de Gaulle and the French categorically rejected such intent and aimed to work at resolving the issue of the Saharan borders. It seems that de Gaulle wanted the Sahara to be considered an “inland ocean” and not a possession of the Algerians.\textsuperscript{17} The outcome of the meeting was a joint communiqué that stated both presidents had agreed not to resolve their disputes before Algeria gained its independence. Despite this apparently unsatisfactory outcome, Bourguiba returned to Tunisia and announced over the radio that the problem of Bizerte would be solved by negotiations already in progress.\textsuperscript{18} The Tunisians felt that

\textsuperscript{15} In addition to numerous small frontier incidents along the Algerian/Tunisian border, tensions actually decreased between the two in 1959 and 1960. One nonfrontier incident in March 1960 occurred when, in La Marsa, a suburb of Tunis, a wall around the French ambassador’s residence was demolished in the course of a public works project. French Ambassador Jean-Marc Boegner departed Tunis immediately for Paris, apparently in protest, but the Tunisian ambassador remained in Paris.

\textsuperscript{16} After Paris, the second largest “French” city was Algiers; by the end of 1962, that honor would fall to Marseille.

\textsuperscript{17} Being considered an “inland ocean” would have raised some interesting future questions vis-à-vis the Law of the Sea Treaty and “archipelagic waters,” such as the Tibesti or Atlas Mountains. Also, the FLN claimed not part of the Sahara but rather all of it as Algerian, something not amenable to the Tunisians, Libyans, Moroccans, or the Sahel countries to the south, while France presumably wanted to keep its sites for nuclear weapons testing. Ruf, “The Bizerta Crisis,” 201–11.

\textsuperscript{18} The Tunisian government was involved in negotiating the acquisition of approximately 250,000 acres of Tunisian land belonging to French citizens. The French landowners were to be compensated, in part, by the Tunisian government and, to a considerably greater degree, by the French government. Some of this land was around Bizerte.
this Franco-Tunisian détente would soon settle the Bizerte issue in their favor. The French, for their part, evacuated most of their barracks in the city of Bizerte, but retained the base facilities while remaining noncommittal.

Then on 21 April, expressing a violent rejection of the importance of the secret negotiations between the French government and the FLN, and especially vehement disagreement with the French referendum on Algerian self-determination, elements of the French military acted. In an effort to keep Algeria as an integral part of France, four retired high-ranking French generals (Maurice Challe, Edmond Jouhaud, André Zeller, and Raoul Salan) aimed to depose the de Gaulle government. Although some mutinous French soldiers, primarily paratroopers, temporarily seized the city of Algiers, the attempted coup d’état failed, and the largely loyalist French forces suppressed the smaller number of rebellious French soldiers in their midst. A major upshot of this failed coup was an explicit French effort to resolve the Algerian conflict by openly acknowledging that Algeria would be granted independence vice self-determination. Thus, in May 1961, the first open meeting between the French government and representatives of the Algerian FLN took place at Evian, France. The most significant unresolved issue, which ended the meeting in June, was a disagreement over the future of the Sahara, an issue in which Tunisia took great interest.

Sovereignty Demanded

At this point, Bourguiba seemed to lose patience with France and committed Tunisia to a confrontational policy over the twin issues of

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19 As the four generals were all ostensibly on the retired list, de Gaulle marginalized them politically in the minds of French voters and, more importantly, French soldiers, by referring to them derisively as “the retired generals quartet.”

20 The coup was supposed to be executed in two phases: first, the Algerian cities of Oran, Algiers, and Constantine were to be seized; second, strategic airbases in and around metropolitan France were to be seized by paratroopers led by Colonel Antoine Argoud. However, the loyalist military commanders in Oran and Constantine refused to follow Challe’s ultimatum, while the second phase was immediately frustrated by the simple “grounding” of flights into and out of all French airbases and airports (presumably the French Air Force was given orders to shoot down any aircraft heading toward France from Africa). Additionally, for the first time in history, a great majority of troops in an army, in this case the French, had access to transistor radios, and many of those that listened to the government of France then refused to go along with the rebels.
the southern border and Bizerte. Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour Party “invited” the people of Bizerte to organize a large demonstration against the French presence. In the following days, youthful members of the Neo-Destour Party began to arrive in Bizerte and erect barricades. On 14 July, Bourguiba decided to use the issue of a French runway extension—an extension that exceeded the agreed-upon base perimeter by two meters—at Bizerte as the “provocation.” In a speech on that day and another one on the 17th, Bourguiba iterated Tunisia’s position: since France refused to negotiate the issues pending since 1958, he was now forced to solve them otherwise.

Bourguiba then promulgated the actions to be taken. First, the French would not be permitted to move beyond the limits of the base proper. Second, the Tunisian Army would advance in the south up to the French outpost at Garat el-Hamel, maintaining their advance “under all circumstances.” Third, in conjunction with the personnel restrictions at Bizerte, a blockade would be established on 17 July, physically isolating Bizerte. Simultaneously, to diffuse any potential hostile situations, a special emissary was sent to France requesting immediate negotiations.

For France and the 8th Infantry Regiment (responsible for base security and defense), the situation quickly became critical because of the nature of the base at Bizerte. Bizerte was not a single compact geographic entity, rather it was a main installation with numerous separate satellite facilities, many located amid the civilian quarters of the city of Bizerte and all dependent on the civil road network of Bizerte and its environs for land communication. Thus any militarily “enforced” blockade of the base by Tunisians would isolate the smaller outposts from resupply/reinforcement. Without the friendly aid and assistance of the Tunisians, Bizerte would become untenable for the French.

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21 He addressed a letter to de Gaulle on that day, specifically referring to a linkage of the two issues. Published in La Documentation Française, Série Articles et Documents, no. 1126, 3 August 1961.

22 However, many later press accounts state that the extension reached 10 meters in violation; even Le Monde noted that distance in its coverage.

23 Ruf, “The Bizerta Crisis,” 201–11.

24 Ibid.
French diplomats responded immediately, agreeing to open negotiations on the future status of Bizerte but refusing to discuss the border issue; de Gaulle did not respond. Tunisia insisted that its rights to a “natural Saharan extension” should be recognized. Then de Gaulle responded, stating “no negotiations under pressure.”²⁵ By this point, the Tunisian ambassador to France and the French chargé d’affaires in Tunisia had both been recalled. This move handicapped both nations in the coming days and left the United States as the go-between.

On 17 July, the Tunisians activated the blockade, popularly termed the “battle of evacuation.” Unfortunately for the Tunisians, most of the Tunisian Army was in the south, advancing into the sandy wastes of the Sahara. Therefore, the blockade would be enforced primarily by three battalions of national guard (militia) paramilitary forces supplemented by an extensive augmentation of volunteers. These volunteers, estimated at around 6,000 in number, were mostly Neo-Destour organization members from such entities as the trade unions, student unions, youth organizations, and even an organization of orphans called Children of Bourguiba.²⁶ The initial activities were fairly benign, with the civilian volunteers mostly digging trenches or erecting barracades around the French base. Relations between the “blockaders” and the French were friendly, with French troops even providing water to thirsty Tunisians on occasion.

On 18 July, de Gaulle responded formally to Bourguiba, stating that, in effect, Tunisia would be held responsible for any attempt to forcibly change the French position in either Bizerte or the south. An integral part of this French position would include the free intercommunication among the various parts of the base at Bizerte. For the Tunisians, the choice was to present a porous “blockade” of Bizerte akin to the one conducted in 1958, primarily to harass and impede the French or to actively enforce a physical isolation of the base. The critical nature of the south was beginning to recede, but re-

²⁶ Ruf, “The Bizerta Crisis,” 201–11.
mained to fog the centrality of Bizerte to the French until other events took precedence.

**The Killing Begins**

On 19 July, French troops began to flow into Bizerte as reinforcements. Tunisian outposts, having just received orders that morning to fire on all aircraft violating Tunisian airspace, first fired on a French helicopter (purportedly shooting it down) and then on other aircraft landing at the airbase or circling in observation. The Tunisians then began to fire on French troops moving between French outposts. Only at this time did French forces receive orders to return fire. During the night, Tunisian forces launched a small attack against the main base complex, which apparently accomplished little other than to provide additional provocation of the French. On the 20th, French forces were parachuted from Nord Noratlas transport aircraft into the base and surrounding city, coming under heavy, if inaccurate, Tunisian rifle and light automatic weapons fire.

French forces then smashed their way out of the main base complex to link up with the isolated outposts, while French paratroopers continued to execute combat jumps into tactically significant locations. French troops were ferried by landing craft across the harbor, and light tanks provided support. French military objectives included securing access to Bizerte harbor and reestablishing secure communications between the various parts of the base, thus securing the base itself. Operation Short Plough was underway.

It appears, however, that French forces on the spot, all under the command of Vice Admiral Amman, drastically exceeded these

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27 Reportedly, the Tunisians shelled the base with 105mm artillery, one of the rounds actually hitting the headquarters of the base commandant, VAdm Maurice Amman.

28 The name Short Plough may have been a mocking French reference to the Moroccan government’s effort to raise agricultural productivity. This effort, called Operation Plow, which had begun in 1957, aimed to reform the Moroccan land tenure system more efficiently and to find a way to mitigate the harsh agricultural climate. The goal was to raise native Moroccan agricultural productivity to more modern levels typified by the French colonos. It failed. Herman J. Van Wersch, “Rural Development in Morocco: Opération Labour [Plow],” *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 17, no. 1 (October 1968).

29 The forces were brigaded into an ad hoc unit called the 1st Brigade, nominally of the general reserve.
orders. French forces roared out of Bizerte, sending armored forces to the outskirts of Menzel Bourguiba, 9 miles outside of Bizerte, and to locations as far as 15 miles from town. Artillery (up to 105mm) and rocket-firing aircraft were employed in support of forces within the city, dramatically increasing both damage and civilian casualties. Three French warships stood by just outside the city harbor, and French naval Vought F4U Corsairs were launched from the aircraft carrier *Arromanches* (R 95)\(^{30}\) to silence the Tunisian artillery. French forces, using massive fire support and brutally effective combat methods learned during the colonial fighting in Algeria, rapidly took the entire city, although large pockets of Bizerte (civilian areas such as the Casbah [the Arab quarter]) were surrounded and contained.

Approximately 7,000 French troops soon arrived in Bizerte as reinforcements, primarily from Algeria. They were some of the most combat-capable units in the French order of battle: the 2d Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment and the 3d Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment, and elements of the 3d Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment and the 8th Regiment of Hussars.\(^{31}\) Given complete freedom of action, they secured all objectives with a maximum of violence, in a minimum amount of time, and with a minimum cost in French lives (yet arguably with the greatest cost in Tunisian lives). French naval forces imposed a blockade of the Tunisian ports and harbors.

Tunisian forces, although heavily outnumbering the French, were completely outclassed in training, tactical competence, and armaments. Many Tunisian civilians joined the fight against the French, but far more civilians were caught in the crossfire. There were numerous incidents of French forces maintaining a heavy volume of fire while Tunisian forces held their fire to avoid hitting civilians who were struggling to flee the violence. Needless to say, many of the civilians were hit.

\(^{30}\)The *Arromanches* was the ex-HMS *Colossus* of the Royal Navy; she had seen service in the Pacific theater off Japan and then was leased to France in 1946 for five years. France then bought her outright. She participated in the Franco-British Operation Musketeer in 1956 to seize the Suez Canal. Her main strike force included French-variant F4U Corsairs of WWII fame.

\(^{31}\)The 8th Regiment of Hussars (8th RH) was a light tank battalion equipped with AMX-13 light tanks. Like most of the other Bizerte intervention units, the 8th RH came from Algeria; however, its duties were generally associated with securing the French nuclear test sites in Algeria—Gerboise Red and Gerboise Green.
The same day, as the French were conducting their ferocious counterattack, the Tunisians took their case to the United Nations (UN) Security Council, charging the French with aggression in the region of Bizerte. The U.S. representative, Charles W. Yost, appealed to both Tunisia and France for an immediate cease-fire. In Washington, DC, Secretary of State Dean D. Rusk called the Tunisian ambassador, Habib Bourguiba Jr., and the French chargé d’affaires at the French embassy, M. Claude Lebel, and stated that the United States saw the need to end the fighting and urged negotiations for an immediate cease-fire. Secretary Rusk also expressed his doubt that the United States would be able to assist in a settlement of issues in any subsequent negotiations. He expressed that America felt particularly pained to see France and Tunisia, both of whom had been on friendly terms, in such a situation. Secretary Rusk then told Chargé Lebel that the current “difficulties” in Bizerte gravely prejudiced France’s ability to be forthcoming with Algeria at the Evian negotiations, and that the entire matter would open up opportunities for adversaries of both the United States and Tunisia. Tunisia was then asked to reconsider its decision to take the matter to the UN—a request rejected by the Tunisian ambassador—and the French were urged to facilitate these steps (a cease-fire and negotiations).\(^{32}\) Secretary Rusk specifically noted that this incident between nominal friends and Western allies, occurring as it did during the Berlin Crisis, certainly limited the United States’ freedom of action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

The Algerian FLN broke off negotiations in Evian. The Soviets and Egyptians both offered their support, to be further defined at a later date. Needless to say, Bourguiba was disconcerted by the crisis and even more so by the reaction of the United States, whom he had

\(^{32}\) Department of State memorandum from deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs (Tasca) to Secretary of State Rusk, 20 July 1961, State Department Central Files, 330/07-2061, Washington, DC.
counted on for support. He wrote directly to President John F. Kennedy, invoking their personal friendship and telling Kennedy that he was counting on him. Tunisians quickly rallied behind Bourguiba, and protestors in Tunis marched on the U.S. economic meeting chanting, “Down with America. Down with Colonialism. These are your cannons, these are your shells that slaughter us.”

President Kennedy was angry with Bourguiba for putting him in such a position, as de Gaulle had proven steadfast in his support of the United States during the recent Bay of Pigs incident, as well as the ongoing Berlin Crisis. He knew that de Gaulle, in the wake of the attempted “generals coup” and uprising, faced “an explosive disciplinary situation” even without making further concessions in North Africa. Additionally, while Kennedy did not want to alienate a valued new ally over an unwanted base, he realized that to support Tunisia would remind everyone of the somewhat similar situation of the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay and Cuba’s desire that the United States depart Cuba (i.e., voluntarily vacate its lease). This would ostensibly present the Soviets with a perfect opportunity to rally the Third World against America and the West. Kennedy sought to escape this dilemma by adopting the same “middle-of-the-road” foreign policy of Eisenhower that he had ridiculed in his 1957 Senate speech on North Africa as “tepid encouragement and moralizations to both sides, cautious neutrality on all the real issues.”

In Bizerte, 21 July brought a lull in the fighting with the French consolidating their positions and the Tunisians desperately scrambling to mobilize forces and to aid the wounded and refugees. At the UN, discussion was underway with competing proposals being formed. The United Arab Republic wanted an immediate cease-fire with a rapid evacuation of French forces from all of Tunisia. The United Kingdom and the United States pushed for swift negotia-

33 Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution*, 252.
34 Ibid.
35 Territorially speaking, as the United States did have a legal “leasing agreement,” even if it was with a previous Cuban government and not the current Castro regime.
tions for a peaceful settlement, with all forces freezing in a preconflict status quo. Surprisingly, Liberia played a critical “brokering” role. Tunisia wanted repatriation for all Tunisian troops currently involved in the UN operation in the Congo, and also specifically asked the United States to support its UN request for a speedy withdrawal of all French forces from Tunisia. Tunisia stated that if the United States was truly was against colonialism, as it had claimed, now was the time to show it.

The 22d of July saw fighting resume as the French attacked the Casbah, a closely packed and primarily residential section of Bizerte. The terribly outclassed Tunisians resisted valiantly but futilely, taking enormous losses in the brutal close fighting. One group of four Tunisians managed to hold up an entire French company for four hours, only succumbing when two tanks (AMX-13s with 90mm guns) were called in to obliterate the house they were in. The French did, after the fact, acknowledge the great valor of these and many other Tunisians. Much of the Tunisian resistance was conducted from rooftops, followed inevitably by the destruction of the building and any resistance. Artillery and air strikes were called in on areas of the city despite French understanding that the use of heavy weapons in urban areas was an ill-advised action that created the potential of heavy civilian loss of life.

During this period, Tunisians accused the French of committing atrocities against their population. The French were accused of using napalm against civilians, of committing outrages upon the corpses of Tunisians, and of deliberately desecrating mosques. Subsequent investigations showed that French aircraft had not dropped napalm-type ordnance and that the charred corpses had apparently suffered their injuries when the gas tanks of burning vehicles exploded and the flames engulfed them. Only a single corpse appeared to have been “outraged,” having the OAS symbol of the Celtic cross traced on

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37 Organisation de l’Armée Secrète, literally “Organization of the Secret Army” or “Secret Armed Organization” in French, was a far-right French nationalist underground organization that was very militant and short-lived. It was formed in Madrid in January 1961 as a response by some French politicians and military officers to the de Gaulle-initiated 8 January 1960 referendum on Algerian self-determination.
his chest. Additionally, only a single mosque showed evidence of desecration. Although these single incidents were reprehensible, none of them reach the level of “atrocities” or a plethora of war crimes when taken within the context of the widespread fighting and movement of troops.

As the killing continued, the UN, Britain, and the United States defeated a joint Liberian/United Arab Republic–sponsored Security Council resolution that would have called for a cease-fire and French negotiations for a prompt withdrawal from Bizerte. A U.S. and British-sponsored resolution for a cease-fire and then negotiations for an eventual resolution also lost. Finally, a Liberian-sponsored interim solution was adopted, calling for an immediate cease-fire and a return of all forces to their original positions. This UN resolution and the lack of effective and swift U.S. support for Tunisia created great disappointment and resentment in Tunisia. France, however, felt quite pleased at the outcome.

By the morning of 23 July, the fighting had ended with an agreed-upon cease-fire, and French forces were in complete control of Bizerte and its approaches by both land and sea. Casualties reported immediately in the wake of the four-day incident were highly disproportionate, even as the totals remained vague. French casualties were reported as 19 dead and more than 100 wounded, while Tunisian losses were put at 700 dead and 3,000 wounded. Some counts later claimed more than 1,000 Tunisian dead and nearly 4,000 wounded, but there is no definitive count (some counts put total casualties at 7,000). What remains clear, however, is that the indiscriminate use of overwhelming firepower by the French and Tunisia’s lack of planning prior to the conflict account for the extremely high Tunisian casualty rate. Despite ensuing indictments of the French as having prosecuted a campaign of deliberate terror and atrocity, the evidence shows that the battle-hardened French forces executed a bru-
tally efficient shock action with a casual disregard for collateral damage and deaths, but not a deliberate policy of terror. The arrogance of the French was noted, specifically in their looting. In keeping with practices acquired in Algeria, French troops would systematically strip Tunisian homes of any valuables, and what could not be carried away was wantonly destroyed.38

Diplomatic Maneuvers

There were important developments in the wake of the fighting at Bizerte. On 24 July, Tunisia requested that the United States honor its commitment to airlift Tunisian troops from the Congo back to Tunisia. France wanted the United States to refuse this request and to ask the Soviet Union to provide the lift. America sidestepped the issue by agreeing to the airlift, but offered U.S.-flagged civilian air carriers instead of U.S. military aircraft. On 27 July, Tunisia requested that the UN Security Council convene on the grounds that the French had not complied with the interim resolution of 22 July. The French responded quickly, informing the Security Council that its troops had not refused to obey the cease-fire and that Tunisia had not accepted French proposals for talks concerning procedures to restore normal conditions at Bizerte. Therefore, the French no longer felt bound to participate in or be subject to any further Security Council actions.39 Simultaneously, the French government issued a statement to the press that it preferred direct negotiations with Tunisia regarding the status of Bizerte.40

In the following days and weeks, various diplomatic and political maneuvers occurred in Tunis; Paris; Washington, DC; and New

38 “C’est Fini!,” Time, 4 August 1961, 17.

39 They actually boycotted a general assembly special session from 21 to 25 July, a session that saw the adoption of a nonbinding resolution by a vote of 66-0 with 30 abstentions. In brief: recognition of the sovereign right of Tunisia to call for the withdrawal of all French armed forces on its territory without its consent, that the presence of French armed forces on Tunisian territory against the express will of the Tunisian government and people is a violation of Tunisian sovereignty, and that the governments of France and Tunisia enter into immediate negotiations to devise peaceful and agreed-upon measures in accordance with the principles of the charter of the UN for the withdrawal of all French armed forces from Tunisian territory.

40 Telegram from State Department to the embassy in France, 25 July 1961, State Department Central Files, 332.70G/7, Washington, DC.
York. These actions resulted in a withdrawal of Tunisian forces in the south, a limited reinforcement (approximately 2,000 soldiers) of Tunisian forces around Bizerte, and a gradual withdrawal of French combat forces. The United States remained involved while the UN worked on various draft resolution proposals, all of which failed. France maintained that, as long as the world situation remained tense, France must be the judge of when it would be safe to leave Bizerte. The French did state that they would not stay in Bizerte “forever” and were quite prepared to discuss the future of the base with Tunisia, but maintained that they would not do so under pressure.

On 4 August, the French showed exactly how they felt about the UN. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld flew to Tunisia and drove to Bizerte under a UN flag, with Tunisian troops presenting arms and rendering honors as he passed. At approximately 1540, he was flagged down by a paratrooper (a private) at a French vehicle checkpoint. Apparently unimpressed by the entourage (Hammarskjöld was accompanied by an unsolicited convoy of press vehicles) or the UN flag, the paratrooper poked his head inside the car and ordered the chauffeur to open the trunk, looked for weapons, and then demanded to know “who is this personage?” Livid with anger, Hammarskjöld snapped, “You are probably unaware of the fact that I have diplomatic immunity.” The paratrooper replied, “I have my orders.” As nearby French troops grinned at this exchange, a paratroop lieutenant stated aloud, “Who is Hammarskjöld, anyway?” After he passed through the checkpoint, Hammarskjöld requested permission to meet with Vice Admiral Amman but was denied. French President de Gaulle was making it clear to the secretary general that the UN should keep its nose out of what France considered its own affairs. Hammarskjöld, rebuffed, subsequently sent a message to de Gaulle proposing a private meeting in Paris. A Quai d’Orsay spokesman replied for de Gaulle, brusquely stating things as only the French can: “The Secretary General has been informed of the point of view of

42 De Gaulle frequently referred to the UN as *ce machin*—literally translated as “thingamabob.”
the French government by a note which will render his voyage to Paris unnecessary.”

The Bizerte issue was then rapidly overshadowed by the ongoing Cold War. U.S.-Soviet tensions escalated over Berlin, with sabers rattling and troop levels rising. Among the many measures related to this rise in tensions, President Kennedy authorized doubling the size of the U.S. military draft and provided funding for fallout shelters and the necessities for stocking them.

In August, after a mass demonstration in West Berlin against the East Germans and Soviets, the Soviets had the East Germans erect the Berlin Wall over a two-day period and began constructing a permanent intraborder barrier the length of the German demarcation line separating West Germany from East Germany. The world teetered on the brink of a conventional and possibly nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union as NATO and Warsaw Pact forces glared at each other over open gun sights. Tensions begin to ebb slowly only to escalate in October, the venue again being Berlin. French support for the West and NATO against the Soviets in a potential nuclear confrontation and the marginal importance of Tunisia to that confrontation ensured that the Bizerte Incident was forgotten by the United States.

Maghreb Aftermath

In Tunisia, many French educational and cultural missions were closed, most permanently. The 180,000 European nationals still residing in Tunisia suffered few consequences, although approximately 300 French civilians were taken into custody as “hostages” but quickly released at the direction of the Bourguiba government. There were repercussions, however, for the Jewish community of Tunisia as some Tunisians searched for scapegoats. Accused by some of aiding the French in Bizerte, approximately 5,000 Tunisian Jews had left by De-

43 “Tunisia: Calculated Insolence,” 17.
44 The demonstration reportedly contained approximately 250,000 West Germans.
In 1962, Tunisia also blocked phone contact and withdrew postal service with Israel and began arresting some Jews. Subjected to de facto and obvious discrimination and harassment (e.g., restrictions on businesses), another 15,000 Jews emigrated. By the end of 1962, only 20,000 Jews remained in Tunisia, and many of those would depart after 1967. Nearly all the Europeans in Tunisia had also departed by the beginning of 1963.

Bourguiba’s popularity in Tunisia was diminished by the Bizerte Incident. Although still strong internally, he generally remained favorable to the West but was isolated from the revolutionary Arabic leaders of Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, whom he feared would stir up trouble inside Tunisia at some future date. De Gaulle, who epitomized the intransigence and arrogance of France toward Tunisia during the incident, was the target of a failed OAS assassination attempt on 22 August 1961. After France withdrew from Algeria in 1962 and after the “calming” of European rivalry caused by the rift between the Soviets and the United States, France declared it would withdraw from Bizerte, which it did completely on 15 October 1963.

Between 1961 and 1970, the major players in this incident either excelled in their regions or were no longer a part of the political landscape. Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash in Northern Rhodesia in September 1961. President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964. De Gaulle remained in power until 1969, leading France out of NATO and toward a foreign policy separate from any superpower or alliance. The U.S. ambassador to Paris, retired Army Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, had proven so inept prior to, during, and after the Bizerte Incident that he was quickly recalled and replaced. France did manage to retain its Algerian base at Mers

45 Many Jews were forced to leave with only a single suitcase and a dinar [the basic monetary unit in Tunisia]; many had their suitcases broken into, toothpaste smeared onto their clothes, and every man, woman, and child was subjected to humiliating searches “in case” they were hiding valuables. Any Tunisian Arab could report a Jew to the police for “denouncing Bourguiba.” Some Tunisians told the Jews, “You will be gone soon and we will have your homes and shops.” Comment posted by Bataween to the Jewish Refugees Blog, http://jewishrefugees.blogspot.ca/2006_03_61_archive.html.
el-Kébir,46 and Tunisia resolved its southern border issues with Libya (in 1961) and Algeria (in 1970) on its own.

Cold War Postscript

Two important comments, both U.S. observations made directly after the Bizerte Incident, need to be mentioned since this incident occurred within the context of the Cold War. First, on 18 August 1961, a U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff appraisal was made of the military potential of Bizerte to the Western Alliance (NATO) in the wake of the French actions to retain it and their (French) justifications of its criticality to the West against the Soviets.

From Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric to Secretary of State Rusk:

In view of the present difficulties, which have arisen between the French and Tunisians over Bizerte, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made the following appraisal of the military potential of that base to the Western Allies. The Bizerte base has the following military potential for maritime operations:

a. It contains a Naval air facility capable of providing support for anti-submarine warfare, reconnaissance, mining, and seaplane operations.

b. The port of Bizerte is capable of supporting conventional submarines, minesweeping operations, local craft, an amphibious staging area for landing craft, and minor naval units.

c. Geographically, the port is located strategically for both the conduct of submarine operations and the establishment of a defensive barrier line between Tunisia and Sicily. Such operations would assist in the control of sea lines of communication between the Eastern and Western Mediterranean.

46 Under the Evian Agreements of March 1962, the French were to withdraw completely from all of Algeria except for Mers el-Kébir; there, the French were granted 15 years before they needed to depart. As it turned out, almost all the European inhabitants departed the port city in 1962, and the French had departed completely by 1968, waiving the remainder of the time they were allowed to stay by treaty. France also continued its nuclear tests in the Sahara, retained its airfields there for five years, and agreed to continue its economic activities in the Saharan oil fields. France agreed to continue technical and financial aid to Algeria for at least three years as well. France adhered to its agreements with Algeria more closely than to its agreements with Tunisia.
While recognizing that the United States faces a political dilemma in how to reconcile its need to support NATO France and still maintain a satisfactory political relationship with the government of Tunisia, I concur with the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, if politically feasible, it would be desirable to have the use of the Bizerte facilities available to the Free World after the present difficulties have been resolved.

I recommend that the above comments be considered in political discussions or negotiations incident to the efforts toward settlement of the problem of the Bizerte base.47

The second was a statement made by President Kennedy’s special assistant on Latin American affairs, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., to Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. representative to the UN. On 23 August 1961, Schlesinger observed,

Everyone forgets how shaky de Gaulle’s position is. A group of generals revolted against him a few weeks back; and the mishandling of the Tunisian affair might well have precipitated another and more effective military revolt leading conceivably to his overthrow and to the replacement of his government by a regime of ultras. With all his defects, de Gaulle represents the only hope of gaining a solution in Algeria. Our sympathy continues to be with the nations throwing off the bonds of colonialism; but the cause of anti-colonialism will not be helped by the overthrow of de Gaulle; and this seems to us a possible and even likely consequence of too aggressive American support for the Tunisian regime.48

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47 Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to Secretary of State Rusk, 28 August 1961, State Department Central Files, 772.56311/18–2861, Washington, DC.

48 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to the Representative to the United Nations, Princeton University Library, Stevenson Papers, Embassy Files, Tunisia, 23 August 1961.
The Portuguese sought to overthrow Estado Novo on 25 April 1974 via peaceful means in what became known as the Carnation Revolution. Photo courtesy of Radio & Television of Portugal, RTP.
The International Dimension of Democratization: Actors, Motivations, and Strategies

by Alessandra Pinna

The Genesis of the International Dimension of Democratization

The Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974\(^1\) initiated the third wave of democratization—a remarkable spread of democracy due to an increasing quantity and geographical expansion of new democratic regimes (see table 1). The worldwide growth of democracy eventually illustrated that democratization cannot be theoretically relegated to a domestic sphere, since the international dimension is an important component that cannot be underestimated.

At the epistemological level, the academic consensus on the two-dimensionality of democratization was reached after a long and intricate analytical process. Although Dankwart A. Rustow stated in 1970 that “foreign influences are almost always present” in democratic transitions, for about 20 years the development of democracy was analyzed by political scientists as an exclusively domestic transformation, and the issue was completely ignored by international relations scholars.\(^2\) The first authors acknowledging the existence—even if merely as an afterthought—of the international dimension of democratization were O’Donnell and Schmitter in the concluding

\(^1\) The Carnation Revolution was a largely bloodless coup in 1974 that overthrew the regime of Estado Novo, which had dominated Portugal for almost 50 years. After a brief period of turmoil, a democratic transition began, and Portugal emerged as a democratic country.

chapter of *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. However, the external factors of democratization were only adequately considered by academics after the end of the Cold War.

The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the conclusion of a four-decade era that profoundly molded the international order and conditioned domestic politics all over the world. The collapse of such an invasive phenomenon affected the worldwide expansion of democracy. It generated a new international reality characterized by a global systemic environment exceptionally favorable to democracy diffusion, as well as an overall engagement of many international actors in democracy promotion. Those changes pushed academic thought toward a reconsideration of the previous theoretical assumptions on democracy and its development. During the 1990s, some scholars conducted significant studies focused on the international dimension of democratization. Their findings attributed a much more impor-

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tant function to external factors than the negligible or subordinate role formerly ascribed to them. Within academia, this new awareness affected both the international relations and democracy studies fields. With regard to the first discipline, new research was encouraged on two specific issues: the impact of democracy proliferation on the international systemic structure and democracy promotion policies of very powerful countries, especially the United States.4 Within democracy studies, political scientists broadened and reconfigured regime transition theories on actors, strategies, and actions of democratization.5

Democracy Diffusion in the International System

The process of democratization has both domestic and international dimensions, each with differing characteristics. A key difference between the two dimensions is that the domestic dimension requires conscious actions on the part of domestic actors, whereas democratization at the international level can be supported or brought about by factors and conditions not specifically created to favor the spread of democracy, but that aid in democratization nonetheless. In this case, the external dimension of democratization takes the form of a spontaneous diffusion that can be well explained by the metaphors of contagion and dominoes. Like a virus, democracy infects other political systems, undermining their authoritarian characters. When the democratic germ eventually prevails and the contagion is widely diffused, a democratic political regime extensively and sequentially broadens across countries like a falling row of dominoes.6


The engine of democratic contagion is *emulation*, meaning that domestic actors use other democracies as models of inspiration to transform their own political systems. Emulation only occurs on the condition that external democratic institutions are perceived as opportune potential means for adequately managing domestic problems and improving political performance. Democratization, as a consequence of demonstrative effect, can be realized in two different ways. First, consolidated democracies can generically transmit democratic values and content by simply behaving according to the main principles of democracy. Their attitudes can be assumed by non-democratic countries as demonstrative examples of what democracy is, and when they are considered attractive, they are emulated. Second, successful democratizations can unwittingly generate political changes in other states due solely to the manifestation of their own positive experiences. Usually, geographic and cultural proximity play a favorable role, especially in those cases where past legacies and current political problems are very similar. Both types of democracy diffusion can take the form of the mere transmission of ideas or voluntary lesson drawing. The first kind of contagion is quite spontaneous, so the scarce consciousness and vagueness of actions make its existence and relevance difficult to empirically prove. However, the second type of democratization by example occurs via a set of explicit emulative sequences that can be empirically detected and explained.7

The demonstration effect has played a significant role since the beginning of the third wave, but it definitely acquired more importance after the fall of the Berlin Wall, particularly when analyzing the chronological sequence of democratizations across countries (see table 2). During the 1974–88 phase, Portuguese democratic devel-

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the democratic contagion affected Southern Europe and, afterward, Latin America, without entailing any other geographical area. It was only after 1989 that the phenomenon became so widespread that it generated the perception that democratic diffusion was becoming an overwhelming and unstoppable development. Between 1990 and 1991, democratic transitions culminated in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and in former Soviet Union (FSU) countries: 10 authoritarian regimes collapsed one by one and then a democratic process started. Afterward, democracy moderately developed in two other regions—Africa and Asia—which were, until that moment, notably reluctant toward a democratic transition. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, a democratic breach was opened by way of six democratizations in Africa—Namibia, Benin, Cape Verde, São Tome & Princípe, South

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According to Freedom House data, Peru and Brazil attained the “free” status in 1980 and 1985, respectively, but in the following years both fell back to a nondemocratic regime, and only in the early 2000s did their political systems become democratic again. Due to their reverse transitions, table 2 counts these two countries within 2001–12 democratizations. Freedom House, Freedom in the World (New York: Freedom House, multiple years).

According to Freedom House data, democratic transitions took place in 1990 in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia; during the following year, they occurred in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. Among the CEE states, excluding the Western Balkan countries, Romania (1996) was the only one that became democratic later than 1991.
Africa, and Mali—and four in Asia—Samoa, Vanuatu, Mongolia, and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{10}

The close timing of the CEE and FSU democratizations can be explained by the fact that a successful regime change in some countries possibly produces a \textit{cross-fertilization impact}, conditioning political transformation in other states. In all these transitional regimes, the desire to “return to Europe” became the main symbol of a definitive break with the Communist past and an assurance for a democratic future within the European framework.\textsuperscript{11} However, the following expansion of democracy—even with only minor intensity—in Africa and Asia pointed out that explanation based on contagion by cultural and geographical proximity is not exhaustive. To understand the extraordinary spread of democracy during the 1990s, one must also take into account several international systemic factors that created an overall environment favorable to democracy diffusion: a new structure of the global system, a widespread faith in liberal political and economic principles, and an incredible expansion of globalization.

The end of the Cold War represented a point of paramount significance for the international order’s transformation from a \textit{bipolar} to a \textit{unipolar} system. Before 1989, international reality was based on the division of the world into two clearly defined blocks, each of which pivoted on a superpower: the Western Hemisphere deferred to the United States and the Eastern Hemisphere to the Soviet Union. The international equilibrium was guaranteed by the containment and global power balance between the two different spheres of political and ideological influence. The demolition of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union crumbled the illiberal Communist model and marked the beginning of the unipolar international system dominated by America. Hence, the disintegration of the Soviet power locked the United States into a position of supremacy. Its military, economic, diplomatic, and cultural resources

\textsuperscript{10} In \textit{Freedom in the World 2013}, Mali drastically declined from “free” status to “not free” due to a military coup that overthrew the elected government in 2012.

guaranteed American strategic control over political affairs, international markets, and technological development.12

During the 1990s, policy makers used their power to create an international system based on open economy, democratic government, and multilateral institutions to preserve American interests and influence. In the post–Cold War asymmetric order, the United States never behaved as a unilateral hegemonic power acting in complete isolation. Instead, it performed as an exclusive and dominant leader of a combination of countries to proliferate liberal values for the construction of international stability. This faith in democracy and the free market was encouraged by two different events. First, there was a lack of an anti-hegemonic coalition that could act according to equilibrium logic. This occurred because the preeminent states that potentially could do it—mainly Western European countries and Japan—preferred to support, instead of oppose, the United States by virtue of their common political and cultural democratic roots.13 The second event corresponds to the initial political and economic liberalization of the Soviet Union and, later, Russia. The fact that the previous colossal enemy of the Western block was orientating its political system toward a path sympathetic with the democratic model fomented the liberal optimism.

The détente and flexible structure of the new international system favored a rapid acceleration of globalization that coincided with an intensification of worldwide relations. These cross-border ties relate distant areas of the globe that condition each other so that, as Giddens argues, local developments are no longer shaped only by parochial components, but also by events occurring many miles away.14 The breakdown of ideological and political barriers, which split the world into two noncommunicative hemispheres, gave rise to an intense evolutionary process of state interconnection as the international system became a historically unique and exceptionally complex environment. The propelling forces nourishing this shift belong to the economic,

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technological, and cultural sectors. International trade, capital fluxes, and high immigration rates combined with digitalization, fiber optics, and the Internet increasingly minimized territorial distance and projected individuals onto an international stage. Therefore, removing restrictions on the transnational transfer of people, goods, and ideas conditioned the development of democracy. The extended exposition of political regimes to liberal values generally contributed to the expansion of a form of liberalization—only in some cases followed by a full democratization—of authoritarianism and propelled the institutional, economic, and social consolidation of new democracies.15

Table 2 illustrates that during the 2000s—in contrast to the previous decade—the process of democratic contagion dramatically declined. The three regions where a small group of states achieved “free” status include Latin America (Peru, Brazil, Antigua Barbuda, Trinidad, and Tobago), the Western Balkans (Serbia and Montenegro), and the Asia-Pacific region (Indonesia and Tonga). These democratizations do not seem to be linked to any international systemic demonstrative effect. Instead, it is more plausible to consider that these regime changes were tied to local conditions in their specific geographic areas. Did the process of democratic contagion end because the international context drastically changed and new threats prevented further democratic development or because all countries suitable to democracy were already democratized? Both hypotheses are neither completely true nor false, and one can formulate more explicative assumptions through their combination.

The excessive faith in democracy during the 1990s became a mere illusion in the early 2000s. The opening event of the new millennium, namely the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, put an end to the veil of optimism that had prevented the majority of politicians and scholars from clearly seeing that the worldwide reality was changing. After that dramatic occurrence, it became evident that democratic expansion was standing at a negative juncture due to the emergence of new threats: the growth of Islamist

terrorism across areas resistant to democracy, the reversion of Russia to a more authoritarian regime, and China’s remarkable economic growth under authoritarianism.

Islamist terrorism presents some exclusive and innovative characters that mark its sui generis essence, which is carried out by national ideological movements connected at the transnational level. Adopting worldwide violent strategies, these groups undermine the essence of national security to radicalize Islamic fundamentalist power. The enemies of these cells are always state entities—Western democracies, but also Arab and Asian countries—however, the terrorist usually injure them indirectly by cruelly attacking their civil societies. Thus, Islamist terrorism has knocked down the traditional separation between public and private violence.

Regarding the other two threats, challengers to democracy are much more clear and definite due to their state nature and traditional approaches. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the already low number of democratic Russian political institutions deteriorated, and in 2004, the country passed from “partly free” to “not free” status in Freedom House’s classification. The reversion dissolved any illusion that Russia, the historical antagonist of democracy, would finally choose a democratic political solution and become a trusted ally. Only its economy did not abandon the liberal path. In contrast to Russia, China has never introduced significant political democratic reforms, and the Tiananmen Square massacre and the more recent violent repression of Tibetan monks patently illustrated its oppressive nature. However, in past decades, China’s closed economy progressively opened to the free market, and recently its annual gross domestic prod-

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16 On 4 June 1989, Chinese troops stormed Tiananmen Square in Beijing, killing and wounding thousands of pro-democracy protesters.
uct growth rate has been, on average, higher than 9 percent. The Russian and Chinese threats to democracy can be combined under Carothers’s label authoritarian capitalism. In the past, both were political regimes driven strongly by a strict political ideology, but currently their power is primarily guaranteed by their economic success, which is based on energy resources in Russia and on labor-intensive industrial production in China. Moreover, their presence at the international level is strengthened by the fact that they are both nuclear powers.

The explosion of Islamist terrorism and the tightening of authoritarian capitalism in Russia and China represent serious threats for the democratic advance of transitional regimes. All these caveats are placed in regions—the Middle East and North Africa, the FSU, and Asia-Pacific—that can be described as areas highly immune to the democratic virus. In fact, states across these impervious regions present significant obstacles to democracy. The great majority are stable authoritarian regimes governed by despotic leaderships; they cannot be undermined by democratic legacies due to the complete absence of previous democratic experiences. Most of the FSU and Middle Eastern countries are rentier states; elections are banished or mere instruments for growing rulers’ legitimacy. Unresolved state issues are common; the middle class is often barely educated and underdeveloped. Moreover, the proximity of strong authoritarian powers can further increase nondemocratic attitudes, creating the effect of a reverse contagion with respect to democracy diffusion.

The mere demonstrative effect by itself has never produced democratic transformation. Domestic struggles, possibly supported by international proactive aid, have always been needed, but current

20 According to Freedom House, Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East and North Africa; among the 15 FSU countries, democracy is established exclusively in the three Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania); in Asia-Pacific, besides very small democratic islands, there are only five large democracies: Japan, South Korea, India, Mongolia, and Indonesia.
nondemocratic regimes represent obstacles very difficult to demolish. They clearly require intensive efforts because, as argued above, they present strong factors obstructing democracy at the domestic level, while at the international level, they are more likely subject to the emulation of authoritarian models rather than democratic alternatives. This does not mean that these political systems will never democratize. The recent mass protests in the Maghreb and the Middle East, as well as the constant attempts of authoritarian governments, especially China, to control the international flux of information, show that these regimes are not impermeable monoliths that cannot ever be crushed. However, their democratization will be very difficult, and it unquestionably would require an extensive process in terms of time and resources. Consolidated democracies cannot rely exclusively upon their demonstrative effect to increase the possibility of future democratic openings in the most contested regions of the world. Instead, they should largely implement ad hoc policies of democracy promotion.

Democracy Promotion: Actors and Motivations

To understand the international dimension of democratization, consider the crucial intentional activities of democracy promotion by clarifying who takes part in the process, why this occurs, and how it happens.

According to Schmitter and Brower, democracy promotion consists of “all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes, democratization of autocratic regimes, or consolidation of democracy in specific recipient countries.”21 This definition traces a clear line that excludes not only contextual international factors of democracy diffusion, but also covert activities (e.g., undercover actions of diplomacy and secret services) and indirect actions (e.g., literacy campaigns, socioeconomic development projects, and so forth).

21 Philippe C. Schmitter and Imco Brouwer, Conceptualizing, Researching, and Evaluating Democracy Promotion and Protection (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, 1999), 14.
With regard to the actors of democracy promotion, scholars agree that states play an extensive, but not exclusive, role as intergovernmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) carry out important functions as well.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the sharp engagement of many Western countries (e.g., the United States, United Kingdom, and Germany), not every old, established democracy has specific agencies for promoting democracy, nor are all of them directly involved in the issue. Some governments prefer contributing to democratizations abroad by supporting multilateral bodies. Since the 1990s, almost all major international and regional organizations (e.g., the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, European Union, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) played an effective role in democracy promotion. Alongside the nongovernmental actors, most of these organizations do not manage private economic resources, so they depend on public funds. This does not, however, prevent NGOs from influencing democratizations to a considerable degree. Competencies and responsibilities are currently well distributed among the different types of international actors: states and intergovernmental organizations are usually in charge of political decisions, while civic associations carry out the operative implementation of those decisions. This modus operandi apparently deprives governmental agents of part of their prerogatives, but in reality it has created a well-balanced, synergic, and efficient relationship among several actors of democracy promotion.

Democracy has always been an integral part of Western countries’ identity. This is particularly marked in the United States where democratic constitutionalism, individualism, and meritocratic egalitarianism have traditionally been the pillars of the \textit{American’s Creed}. Self-image cannot be underestimated in determining actors’ behavior abroad because, especially in the case of powerful states, it conditions international purposes and the activities for achieving them.\textsuperscript{23}


The collapse of the Communist alternative enhanced the relevance of democratic identity as Western countries started to behave as normative powers, actively spreading their own political system and principles around the world through concrete public policies.\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, the remarkable commitment of international actors in democracy promotion, combined with the high level of domestic receptivity of target countries, advanced a revisited interpretation of the concept of democracy. It ceased to be only a system of government and instead began to coincide with an expanding universal value capable of overtaking geographic, cultural, and religious barriers.\textsuperscript{25}

The connection between democracy and a fair level of human rights, as well as the positive correlation between democracy and socioeconomic development, seems clear. However, it is ingenuous to think that international actors promote democratic growth as an exclusive and supreme end in itself for the noble purpose of improving the political, economic, and social conditions of developing states. This does not mean that the beneficial consequences of a democratic expansion in recipient countries do not play any role in the decision to carry out external prodemocracy activities, but certainly they are not the only factors taken into account by international actors. According to Risse, democracy promotion is only one of several goals of foreign policy, but not the principal one; rather, these are stability and security.\textsuperscript{26} When these three ambitions move in the same direction, they reciprocally reinforce one another. In contrast, when they collide with each other, international actors usually give prominence to stability and security, while democracy promotion is put on the back burner. In fact, democratic activism is a trade-off outcome between strategic constraints and advocacy efforts.

\textsuperscript{24} Before 1989, Western democracies chose their allies on the basis of an anti-Communist stance in order to contain Soviet power. After the fall of Communism, the United States and European countries no longer feared that political transitions could alter the precarious balance between the two blocks, so they started to directly intervene, favoring democratizations, providing more resources than even before. See Amichai Magen and Michael McFaul, “Introduction: American and European Strategies to Promote Democracy: Shared Values, Common Challenges, Divergent Tools?,” in Magen, Risse, and McFaul, Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law, 5–6.


\textsuperscript{26} Risse, “Conclusions: Towards Transatlantic Democracy Promotion?,” 263.
Like every political decision, democracy promotion is made by a dialectic choice between interests, defined in terms of power, and ideas, founding the core of national belief systems. The convergence between interests and ideas is the key explicative factor of the prodemocratic involvement of Western countries and international organizations after the end of Cold War. As soon as the Berlin Wall fell, democratic institutions and values were estimated to be the best protection against serious threats to domestic security and global peace as well as the best incentive for national and international economic development. This argument is rooted in the Democratic Peace Thesis, which was popularized by Michael Doyle in two groundbreaking 1983 articles, on the basis of Immanuel Kant’s “perpetual peace.”

According to this theory, liberal democracies create a kind of “oasis of happiness” where the use of violence is implicitly banished. The basic claim is that democracies never go to war with one another, and when they come into conflict, they opt for a peaceful means of resolving disputes. Presently, this regularity is empirically demonstrated, and there are substantially three interlinked explanations. First, the recourse to violence by democratic states is compelled by such institutional constraints as separation of powers through a checks and balances system, principles of transparency, and mechanisms of accountability. Second, democracies are inclined to externalize the domestic norm of peaceful dispute resolution in their mutual relationships with other democratic governments. Third, economic freedom establishes the so-called spirit of commerce among democracies, and this interdependent economic system likely develops solid cooperative political interactions as well. These institutional, normative, and economic ties generate the foedus pacificum (“league of peace”) also by way of a trustworthy cooperation within international organizations. Thus, democracies develop peaceful, durable, and institutionalized relations with each other that would be impossible with or among nondemocracies.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the spread of an international *foedus pacificum* through democracy promotion was adopted by Western countries as a priority purpose of foreign policy to defeat the new challenge of Islamist fundamentalism. In the past decade, the connection between democracy and security interests became much closer and more explicit than during the 1990s. This change of intensity—followed by a partial variation of democracy promotion strategies—occurred across all long-established democracies, but it was particularly apparent in the United States during the two-term George W. Bush administration. During his first term, President Barack H. Obama also recognized the relationship between democracy abroad and domestic security, but he adopted a multilateral approach supporting, instead of imposing, democracy.

**Democracy Promotion: Strategies and Actions**

International actions promoting democracy differ in terms of actors, global context, and domestic conditions, but one can generalize that they always use *power,* specifically *hard* and/or *soft power.* The propensity for one or the other determines international actors’ aptitude for a specific strategy of democracy promotion. Hard power corresponds to the ability to induce another agent to perform a course of action through the adoption of coercive means. Exercising this power in its purest form makes exclusive use of threats, leaving out any space for incentives. Democracy promotion based on hard power takes place

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29 This is evident looking at President Bush’s speech in his second inaugural address. The speech is available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4460172.

when international actors compel a democratic political change by force. In contrast, soft power leverages the capacity to mold someone else’s preferences by exercising the influence of fascination and seduction. To be successful, soft power actions must stimulate a high level of attraction toward some ideas and values, and consequentially, a conscious desire to get them into one’s own system. In terms of democracy promotion, international actors exercise soft power when they are able to attract agents of other countries toward their democratic values and institutions insomuch as domestic actors get involved in changing their own political systems.

The application of hard and soft power represents two opposite approaches of democracy promotion that differ in terms of both strategies and actors. Internal factors do not play any role in democratization based on hard power. In contrast, soft power requires both consensus and the participation of domestic agents to generate positive outcomes. Power, in its polar hard/soft forms, is a functional criterion for identifying similarities and differences between several strategies of democracy promotion. On the basis of this distinctive element, figure 1 displays a classification able to filter the complex reality of international democracy promotion. According to this classification, democracy can be fostered by three strategies, and their implemental actions move along the continuum of hard/soft power:

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31 Nye, *Soft Power*.

coercion, conditioning, and attraction. Coercion limits the use of power to only the hard form and takes place through military interventions. In contrast, conditioning adopts mixed strategies, which is particularly evident in its instrumental actions: democratic conditionality is based on a prevalence of hard power, intrusive measures use two types of power equally, and prodemocratic public diplomacy is predominantly a soft strategy. Finally, attraction is realized through pure soft power democracy assistance activities.

Coercion

International pressures toward democratization by coercion represent the pure use of hard power. They are realized through military interventions imposing democracy from the outside, which is a de facto clash with the Westphalian concept of state sovereignty as far as international actors exercising an invasive control over the political development of target countries. As Pei and Kasper argue, three substantial characteristics distinguish prodemocratic violent interventions from ordinary military operations: first, external actions are directed at a democratic regime change or the endurance of a democratic system that would otherwise collapse; second, large numbers of ground troops are deployed, usually for long periods of time; and third, inter-
national military and civilian personnel are employed in the political administration of target countries.\textsuperscript{33}

Violent actions force the establishment—never the consolidation—of democracy after causing an authoritarian collapse. Analyzing 198 cases of institutional imposition, John M. Owen detects two recurrent peculiarities.\textsuperscript{34} First, states imposing their own political regime \textit{manu militari} are mainly great powers, much stronger than the target countries. Second, the impact of institutional imposition increases when transnational ideological tensions become highly intense. A third consideration can also be added. Democracy promotion is never the main motivation for a military intervention because armed conflict is usually provoked by geopolitical and strategic issues connected with national and international security.

The recent international interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq showed a fair correlation to these conditions. The main external actor involved, namely the United States, is militarily stronger than the two target countries, and violent operations have represented the apex of an ideological battle between liberal democracy and Islamic fundamentalism. In both cases, promoting a democratic regime was not the main motivation of military operations. The war in Afghanistan broke out as a unified response by the international community to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In contrast, the Iraq War (sometimes called the Second Gulf War) was almost unilaterally carried out by the United States due to the suspected presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and collaboration between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{35}


\textsuperscript{35} By 2004, the two pillars that motivated the U.S. invasion had fallen: weapons of mass destruction were never found, and connections between Saddam Hussein and Islamist terrorism were never proven. Thus, President Bush progressively emphasized that the last remaining justification that coercive democratization of a rogue state would be the best solution for vanquishing terrorism and favoring American security. See Joseph Nye, “Transformational Leadership and U.S. Grand Strategy,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 85, no. 4 (July–August 2006): 139–48.
Since then, political scientists and politicians started questioning the appropriateness and efficacy of violent methods of promoting democracy. These criticisms have often been a combination of moral and substantive arguments. The main point is that the instrument of imposition contradicts the core principles of democracy, so military interventions often produce resistance instead of compliance. This assumption fits the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq but does not explain the positive results of international interventions in Germany, Italy, and Japan after the Second World War. These dissimilar outcomes may be a result of domestic factors—the European countries had previous democratic experience as well as strong bureaucratic bodies, educated societies, and industrialized economies. Moreover, they all accepted their defeat in WWII and gave full power to Allied forces when deciding their political futures. In contrast, Afghanistan and Iraq have a long authoritarian tradition, a low level of bureaucracy and state capacity, and a weak middle class. Furthermore, a significant segment of their populations resisted the military commitment of foreign powers.

Conditioning

Conditioning is the second strategy of democracy promotion and entails both hard and soft power insofar as it makes use of both threats and incentives. Conditioning takes place through actions unilaterally formulated and adopted by international agents without making use of force. To be effective, this strategy must be embraced and put into practice by domestic actors. Conditioning influences decisions of target countries on democracy through three different actions that progressively move along the axis ranging from a prevalence of hard to soft power: democratic conditionality, intrusive measures, and pro-democratic public diplomacy.

Democratic Conditionality

Democratic conditionality occurs when international actors link the threat or imposition of sanctions, as well as the promise of or grant-
ing of rewards, to specific democratic standards to protect or promote democracy abroad.\textsuperscript{37} The definition clearly highlights the duality of the phenomenon. \textit{Negative conditionality} refers to nonmilitary political, diplomatic, and economic costs imposed for inducing another state to cease democratic violations. \textit{Positive conditionality} involves democratic reinforcement by rewards, such as economic aid, debt relief, closer bilateral relations, and membership in regional or international organizations.

Negative conditionality is usually employed against authoritarian regimes infringing on fundamental rights and against unstable liberal systems experiencing a lapse in their democratic performance. Sanctions have never led to democratic transitions, but they certainly made illiberal governments more costly to preserve. Moreover, they indirectly pushed weak democracies toward stabilization to avoid international punishments. Positive conditionality, on the other hand, anchors its beneficial measures to some democratic criteria, and when the required conditions run out, the rewards expire. Therefore, it promotes democracy exclusively in those countries that have already embarked on democratization. Due to its inapplicability to regimes infringing upon basic democratic principles, positive conditionality can only indirectly affect authoritarianisms obliquely stimulating their democratic transition to get future rewards. This type of international interference is particularly helpful where rulers are weak and democratic development is contested, essentially because democratic conditions provide some guidelines to politicians about the substance and priority of reforms; positive conditionality is not interpreted as a coercive imposition as it leaves domestic actors free to choose whether and how to meet international conditions; and rewards can be used by policy makers as an excuse for justifying unpopular decisions.

During the last two decades, positive conditionality progressively became one of the most relevant tools used by international organizations directly or indirectly committed to democracy development.

For example, over the last 15 years, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund subjected their loans, debt relief, and financial aid to complex medium-term institutional changes in accordance with democratic principles. With regard to regional organizations, positive democratic conditionality has long been in operation in Europe and the Americas. In fact, only democratic regimes can enjoy the membership and benefits of the European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Council of Europe, Organization of American States, and Common Market of the South (or Mercosur).

The EU definitely represents the most emblematic case and its success has been documented in the literature for some time.\(^{38}\) Since its creation, the EU has been attractive for nearby countries not included in the community, and its membership has always been constrained to the acquiescence of political, financial, and juridical criteria including democratic principles. Moreover, the EU has progressively expanded the use of democratic conditionality, submitting all its contractual relations and economic assistance programs to the same standards required for the membership. For Börzel and Risse, the EU policies of democratic conditionality developed through an incremental process of “learning by doing,” which finally culminated in an “our size fits all” approach.\(^{39}\) Even if the adoption of similar conditions across different geographic areas shows little sensitivity for national peculiarities, implementation differs depending on specific elements, such as interests of the EU and target states, EU collaboration with other prodemocratic international actors, and domestic democratization factors on the ground.

Democratic conditionality is usually exercised by international and regional organizations, but the United States is one of the few countries to employ this strategy—in this case by granting aid to the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The program was established in

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2004 to reduce global poverty, stimulate economic growth, and encourage good governance. Its major limitation is that the reward does not have immediate political implications insofar as the economic aid is often not aimed at purposes directly connected to democracy. Nevertheless, the U.S. initiative should be positively considered because, for the first time, a state has systematically linked part of its development assistance to fulfilling democratic standards.

**INTRUSIVE MEASURES**

Intrusive measures correspond to fact-finding missions, mostly monitoring human rights and electoral competitions, which are conducted by international experts via observation, inspection, and evaluation. These actions of democracy promotion are adopted by international actors, who send groups on fact-finding missions to some countries to investigate actual circumstances in specific situations.

Intrusive measures always make use of some form of international hard power because they are exclusively formulated, and often also implemented, by foreign actors. However, the exercise of hard power is attenuated by the weak punitive capacity of the missions, as they rarely provide binding punitive consequences for negative evaluations. To be effective, it is not sufficient that intrusive measures publicly denounce the violation of democratic norms; they should also condition domestic actors, discouraging autocratic practices and favoring compliance with democratic principles through the *name and shame logic* of soft power.

When external actors are not considered attractive by domestic agents/actors, intrusive measures produce only marginal results because they are interpreted by domestic agents as inappropriate external interference and an international abuse of hard power. Usually, fact-finding missions are likely to be effective at promoting democracy

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42 Refers to the concept of “attraction” as described under “Democracy Promotion” above.
across countries that are installing or consolidating their democratic regimes. In contrast, authoritarian governments are generally indifferent to this type of pressure because their international behavior is irresponsible and disregards other states' esteem. Sometimes intrusive missions even produce the opposite result, ultimately strengthening the authoritarian regime. This usually occurs when dictators use negative international evaluations to prove a general conspiracy against their states. In the short term, this autocratic expedient works well since it increases popular domestic legitimation, but in the long term, it is much less convincing. Intrusive measures usually break the harmony of the regime even if this does not necessarily correspond with democratic opening.

Fact-finding missions are at the core of the international commitment to both human rights and electoral competitions. The level of respect for human rights and the degree of freedom and fairness of elections can be assessed only through in loco investigations collecting information, creating accurate reports, and disseminating findings to protect and promote vital aspects of democracy.43 A host of international actors monitor and evaluate these situations, including the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the EU, the Organization of American States, the United States, Western European countries, and a great number of NGOs.

PRODEMOCRATIC PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Prodemocratic public diplomacy refers to a combination of activities that seek to influence opinion and mobilize the public in ways that support interests and policies of foreign states associated with democracy promotion.44 Traditional diplomacy is an effort between governments, while public diplomacy is a combined action of governmental agencies and private partners that aims to capture the hearts and

43 This type of international involvement in human rights and elections should not be confused with education programs on the same topics. The former encourages domestic actors to conform their system to democratic principles through mechanisms that merely perform an examining function. The latter penetrates domestic reality where domestic change agents disseminate knowledge on issues related to human rights and free and fair elections.

44 Peter G. Peterson, “Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 81 (September–October 2002): 84.
minds of the general public in recipient countries. Prodemocratic public diplomacy applies the conditioning strategy insofar as it exercises both hard and soft power. Its actions are autonomously decided and implemented by international agents, but to succeed, foreign inputs should produce domestic benevolence. Public diplomacy is a two-directional dialogue: first, international actors launch prodemocracy information, acting in the immaterial territory of perceptions; second, domestic actors conform their attitudes to democratic principles because they are persuaded of their goodness.

Strategic communication represents the essence of public diplomacy, and it is propagated by the West through two different types of mass media interventions. International broadcasting works via government-owned radio and television stations and Web sites based in Western countries that target a foreign audience. Communication, usually in the language of the owner state, strives to transmit neutral information, even if most of it is dedicated to the official position of the affiliated state. International broadcasting is often considered by recipients to be a political megaphone of Western governments. Western mass media, on the other hand, broadcasts in local languages within authoritarian regimes. This type of media is well versed on the situation in specific geographic areas and often gives direct voice to banished democratic oppositions. Almost all powerful democratic states employ international broadcasting, such as Voice of America, BBC World Service, Deutsche Welle, Radio France Internationale, Radio Canada, and Radio Australia. In contrast, Western mass media is much less common, and the most active media—such as Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio and TV Martí, Radio Sawa, and Alhurra Television—are established in the United States.

**Attraction**

Attraction is a soft power strategy of democracy promotion based entirely on *persuasion*. International actors strive to induce democratic development in target countries as a consequence of a free transfer of

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liberal ideas, values, and practices. By transmitting democratic contents, foreign agents aim to persuade domestic actors about the benevolence of democracy so that they will actively commit their resources to political change. To succeed, this strategy, more than previous strategies, requires the cooperation of domestic agents.

International actors accomplish the strategy of attraction through actions of democracy assistance, which correspond to all aid activities deliberately carried out by international actors to support, incept, and induce democratic practices and institutions in recipient countries. Foreign agents provide advice and training programs as well as equipment and other forms of material support to promote fundamental aspects of democracy, namely the empirical dimensions delineated by Diamond and Morlino: rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, horizontal accountability, freedom, equality, and responsiveness.

Over the past 30 years, democracy assistance rapidly spread and its appearance changed. During the 1980s, it emerged for the first time as an autonomous category of external aid in U.S. foreign policy, although originally it was only a marginal element of the American anti-Communist security strategy. During the following decade, it swiftly mushroomed in terms of both monetary amounts disbursed and quantity of actors engaged. By this point, the multitude of recipient countries rapidly enlarged, and the number of donors increased so substantially that democracy aid could be found within a broad community of established democracies and international organizations. Over time, democ-

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racy aid programs evolved extensively. Traditionally, democracy assistance activities were implemented *in loco* by Western NGOs with expertise in specific fields of democratic development. Recently, international actors have more often funded prodemocratic programs put into effect by the collaboration between Western countries and domestic NGOs. This phenomenon can be explained in two ways. First, local organizations functionally help international actors in correctly taking into account the contextual variable. Second, being integrated in the domestic environment, local organizations inspire more confidence than foreign actors in the eyes of the people. Since domestic NGOs frequently play a key role in guaranteeing the success of the international push toward democratization, authoritarian governments usually strive to limit and obstruct their activities, and sometimes also prohibit local groups from taking foreign funds.

International democracy assistance activities are targeted at the main arenas of democratic development. According to Burnell, democratization is a movement toward a composite reality consisting of three different elements: a set of *institutions* based on legal-constitutional principles, a *political society* made up of a plurality of competing political parties, and a *civil society* founded on democratic behaviors and values. Carothers defines these three components as the essential parts of a “democracy template,” and they represent the principal categories of domestic beneficiaries. As figure 2 illustrates, the term “institutions” includes various beneficiaries, such as the government, parliament, judicial system, military forces, bureaucracy, and state agencies. In contrast, political parties are the only component of the political society category, and the civil society cluster involves NGOs, interest groups, professional associations, and the media.

The core of democracy assistance activities essentially revolves around *advice, technical assistance*, and *financial programs*, but they certainly vary depending on the nature of the beneficiaries. Figure 2 illustrates the systematization of the overall ensemble of these pro-

Figure 2. Democracy assistance activities based on recipient domestic actors

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<td><strong>Recipient Subdomestic Actors</strong></td>
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<td>Institutions</td>
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<td>Government</td>
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<td>Parliament</td>
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<td>Judicial system</td>
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- Support democratic constitutional and legal reforms
- Aid institutional accountability development
- Supply training and monitoring activities
- Donate financial and technical resources
- Professional training of parliamentarians and party leaders
- Support to party development:
  - Internal democratization
  - Financial reform
  - Organizational development
- Socialization of members and staff to democratic standards and rules
- Professional training of members and staff
- Donation of financial and technical resources
- Electoral assistance

Democracy actions, but in general terms, they can be distinguished as top-down and bottom-up activities. The former are focused on institutions, while the latter are centered on civil societies. The activities addressed to political societies are in the middle of this spectrum, as parties represent the intermediary bodies between the state and its citizens. The choice for one perspective or another mainly depends on the phase of democratization of the recipient country. During the preparatory interlude to an authoritarian crisis, a bottom-up strategy is preferable due to the general adversity of state authorities toward democracy. During the democratic consolidation, foreign assistance to both state elite and society is useful to push democracy from more than one direction.

51 For more on the strategic importance of international aid to civil societies in order to bring about a prodemocratic electoral revolution, see Valery Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Post-Communist Electoral Revolutions,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 3 (September 2006): 283–304.
Democracy Assistance Activities Addressed to Institutions

Institutions are the backbone of democracy because of their functions, competencies, capacities, and resources. They are responsible for formal state decisions, checks and balances among powers, and receptiveness toward citizens’ demands. Thus, institution building is essential for a democratic transformation of political systems. This process starts in the early stages of democratization, but it becomes an urgent priority during consolidation. Foreign assistance aims to strengthen institutions, making them more efficient, transparent, and responsible to guarantee the development of three fundamental dimensions of democracy: the rule of law, horizontal accountability, and responsiveness. International aid is realized through top-down activities that help domestic actors to adopt constitutional and legal reforms that will protect political, social, and civil rights; to strengthen horizontal accountability institutions to prevent, adjust, and punish illegitimate actions committed by public authorities; to supply training and monitoring activities to increase the level of professionalism of the ruling class, legal apparatus, police forces, and bureaucracy; and to procure adequate financial and technical resources to ensure political, judicial, and administrative efficiency.

Democracy Assistance Activities Addressed to Political Society

Political parties are fundamental pillars of democracy because they organize citizens’ participation, develop policies and programs, recruit political leaders, and run elections. Hence, these actors are essential for developing participation and competition, which are crucial aspects of democracy. International agents help political par-
ties become more competent, organized, accountable, and responsive through three different activities.

The first is professional training of party leaders so that political groups can be guided by competent people with a strong sense of leadership. Second, international actors train and advise practitioners in three fundamental arenas: internal democratization (transparent instruments for choosing leaders, recruiting candidates, making decisions, and formulating policies); financial reform (innovative strategies for fundraising, monitoring financial donations, and managing resources); and organizational development (a professional staff able to carry out multiple tasks). Third, foreign agents grant electoral assistance, helping political parties select candidates, manage political campaigns, and organize electoral monitoring. Because political parties participate in elections to acquire ruling incumbents, international actors tend to assist pro-democratic parties to bring about a crisis in an authoritarian regime and to encourage a democratic transition. During the following phases, they give general support to all parties and avoid targeting their aid to specific political groups as this would manipulate the balance among domestic political forces.

Democracy Assistance Activities Addressed to Civil Society

Civil society represents the social fabric nourishing the entire political system, so international actors pay special attention to this variegated and composite entity. To simplify this complexity, one can identify four major components of civil society: private organizations of voluntaries (agents committed to services and development activities for the community); NGOs (bodies with advocacy purposes on
public issues); interest groups and professional associations (organizations that pursue the interests of their members); and independent media (autonomous channels of communication outside of state control). Since these groups are involved in specific advocacy activities concerning human rights, liberties, civic education, and good governance, they play a key role in the development of democracy. Because of its relevance, civil society is largely assisted by international actors mainly through three bottom-up activities: socialization of members and staff to democratic standards and rules to build an internally democratic body capable of pursuing its purposes and being an example for the rest of society; professional training to develop specialized skills (grant proposal writing, financial accounting, curriculum development, program evaluation, computer networking, public opinion polling, etc.); and donation of financial and technical resources to supply civic groups with the material assets they need.

Conclusions

This article analyzed the international dimension of democratization from the dual perspectives of international relations and democracy studies. Freedom House data highlighted the worldwide evolution of democracy throughout the past four decades. Four factors brought about the diffusion of democracy in the 1990s: contagion by cultural and geographical proximity, the new unipolar international system, the widespread faith in liberal principles, and the expansion of globalization.

Since the early 2000s, the development of democracy has stagnated as a result of three main causal factors: the growth of Islamist terrorism, the authoritarian reversion of Russia, and the remarkable economic growth of Chinese authoritarianism. Democracy promotion clarifies who takes action, why it happens, and how it occurs. The
power exercised by international actors is an essential criterion of differ-
entiation, and depending on its hard/soft use, democracy is pro-
moted through *coercion* (military interventions), *conditioning* (democratic conditionality, intrusive measures, and prodemocratic public diplomacy), and *attraction* (democracy assistance activities).
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, 1 April 2014. Photo courtesy of NATO.
The Transatlantic Relationship from 1945 to the Post–Arab Spring Era

by Aylin Ünver Noi

The Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) has become the central focus of U.S. and European Union (EU) diplomatic relations. The parties’ different perceptions and divergent—yet sometimes complementary—interests have shaped their approaches toward this region and affected their transatlantic relationship. Although the security interests of the EU and the United States were quite similar during the Cold War and the post–Cold War periods, one can identify differences in perceptions and divergent interests that affected their approaches to the region. Some examples that in turn led to transatlantic rifts that, from time to time, loosened transatlantic solidarity\(^1\) include the following:

• The European Community’s (EC’s) Middle East approach after the oil crisis of 1973;

• The United States’ Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) and the EU’s refusal to implement those sanctions;

• The EU’s Iran policy based on “engagement,” which was contrary to the United States’ “isolation” and “containment” policy after the first decade of the 1979 Iranian Revolution;

• U.S. efforts to keep the EU outside of the process of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference of 1991;

• The initiation of the Barcelona process in 1995 without inviting the United States as an observer (as the EU’s response to being excluded);

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• The United States’ “unilateral” war in Iraq;
• The launch of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) Initiative by mentioning only one line about the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (an initiative launched nine years prior with similar objectives); and
• The EU’s unwillingness to take an active role in BMENA projects, so as to not be associated with the George W. Bush administration’s failed strategies in the region.

Different perceptions and divergent interests regarding the MENA sometimes led to rivalry between the EU and the United States, although this has been mostly denied by both parties. Since Nicolas Sarkozy became president of France in 2007, however, transatlantic rifts, which were clear during former French President Jacques Chirac’s and former U.S. President George W. Bush’s terms, were bridged, paving the way for the revival of transatlantic solidarity between the two countries. Pro-American German Chancellor Angela Merkel also contributed to this solidarity. These close transatlantic relations facilitated common approaches to the MENA during the Arab Spring. Socialist French President Françoise Hollande’s election came with a new agenda that will indicate whether he will embrace his predecessor’s foreign policy approach, particularly regarding the transatlantic relationship and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or lessen the magnitude of this partnership.

This article assesses the transatlantic relationship between the EU and the United States by focusing on their involvement in the MENA from 1945 to the post–Arab Spring era. In the first section, a brief historical background of this transatlantic relationship and the effects France’s changing leadership had on the relationship are evaluated. In the second part, the Arab Spring and its effects on the transatlantic partnership, along with other developments such as President Hollande’s approach to the transatlantic partnership and NATO, are analyzed to find an answer to the question: is it still possible to maintain transatlantic solidarity between the United States and the EU, which had flourished during President Sarkozy’s term?
A Brief History of the Transatlantic Relationship Concerning the MENA

The creation of the EC was seen as an essential element of the post–World War II peace settlement and as an important contributor to the security of Western Europe during the Cold War. In the initial years of the transatlantic alliance, European member states of NATO were highly dependent on the United States for security and economic growth. Antagonizing the United States by challenging its ascendancy in NATO was the last thing Western European countries—who also depended on U.S. military protection—wanted. Although the French president at the time, Charles de Gaulle, could afford to do so by withdrawing France from NATO’s integrated military structure and ordering U.S. military personnel to leave the country in 1966, no other country in the EC followed his lead.²

After the Second World War, Britain’s and France’s power and influence in the MENA declined. The United States’ urgent need to set up a new security system to counter the Soviet Union’s (USSR’s) threatening postwar expansionist policy made America the major actor in the region and filled the vacuum that emerged with the decline of Britain’s influence. Another factor in the U.S. ascendancy as the major power in the region was the need for energy to carry out the reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Europe under the Marshall Plan (officially named the European Recovery Program).³

Although the first plans to create a front against the expansion of Communism and the control over Middle Eastern oil had been launched in 1952,⁴ America’s actual involvement in the Middle East

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3 Geir Lundestad, East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 65.
during the Cold War period began with the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957) following the Suez Crisis of 1956 in which Britain, France, and Israel failed to reverse Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration then dissociated from its British and French allies. Eisenhower believed that the failure to reverse the nationalization of the Suez Canal had left a “vacuum” in the region that the USSR would fill unless the United States took action. Some developments, such as military and economic agreements signed between Egypt and the USSR and Syria and the USSR, verified his argument. Fearful that Arab countries would soon follow the Egyptian and Syrian examples, the U.S. government prepared the Eisenhower Doctrine to prevent Soviet expansion by promising military and economic aid to any Middle Eastern country that needed help resisting Communist aggression. The United States would try to strengthen conservative Arab regimes like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Libya and reinforce their pro-Western tendencies. The doctrine largely failed because “Nasser’s power quickly rose by 1959 to the point where he could shape leadership outcomes in neighboring Arab countries, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia.”

The Middle East conflict of 1973 strained the policy of détente. Insufficient support of the USSR during the Yom Kippur War led to Egypt’s return to a pro-Western course. Since 1973, the United States had become the leading power in the Middle East peace process,

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1 The Eisenhower Doctrine was a declaration that the Middle East was to be regarded as an area of vital interest to the United States. See Graham Evans and Richard Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations (London: Penguin Reference, 1998), 146.
4 Lundestad, East, West, North, South, 101–2.
whereas the EC held a secondary role as a “payer” rather than a “player.”

The EC member states’ lack of influence with Israel, which made the EC unattractive to Arabs, also contributed to the result.

The end of the Cold War changed the context of U.S.-EC relations. The United States determined the essence of “New Atlanticism” as preserving NATO regardless of the changes ahead, appreciating the role of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and recognizing the EC’s importance as a political and economic anchor in post–Cold War Europe. Other priorities of this “New Atlanticism” included the transformation of the greater Middle East, new approaches to strategic stability, transatlantic homeland security, and new models of transatlantic governance.

The EC’s political importance and changing U.S. policy toward the EC provided background to the “Transatlantic Declaration,” also known as “The Declaration on U.S.-EC Relations,” which was signed by the U.S. president and the presidents of the European Council and Commission in November 1990. Accordingly, a new factor—“the accelerating process by which the EC is acquiring its own identity in economic and monetary matters in foreign policy and in the domain of security”—was added. It also allowed for regular consultations on important matters of common interest with a view toward bringing their positions as close as possible, without prejudice to their respective independence.

Political links between the United States and the EU were deepened and institutionalized with the “New Transatlanticism.” However, sources of conflict in relations appeared due to the emergence of distinct features of international relations after the Cold War. For example, the disappearance of a Soviet threat as a force for unity in

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10 The EU’s role more or less increased in the Middle East peace process with the creation of the “Quartet,” which was composed of the United States, the EU, the United Nations, and the Russian Federation, in 2002.

11 Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 605.


13 Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 616.
Western foreign policies, which led to Europe’s dependence on U.S. security guarantees, eliminated Europe’s need for compromise and conciliation in transatlantic disputes. Moreover, emergence of new threats, such as environmental degradation, widening disparities between wealthier northern and poorer southern states, terrorism, organized crime, and failed states, changed the existing security understanding of the EU because military power is not more effective in solving these issues.14

Transatlantic relations became strained in 1993 as a result of developments in EU security and defense issues. The EU’s efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defense Identity—which are based on a “neo-Gaullist approach” seeking to enhance Europe’s identity by distinguishing it from the United States and potentially undermining the role of NATO by the creation of a European army—is one factor that contributed to the loosening transatlantic solidarity in the post–Cold War period.15 Ultimately, the EU member states, which could not agree among themselves, drew back in the Maastricht Treaty (or Treaty on European Union, signed in 1992) from acquiring an independent defense capability for the EU and opted to use the Western European Union as a bridge between the EU and NATO.16

In signing the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1995, the United States and the EU added broad areas in which to make joint efforts. Some of these areas included promoting peace, stability, democracy and development; responding to such global challenges as terrorism

16 The Maastricht Treaty created the European Union (EU), which consists of three pillars: the European Communities (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Europa Summaries of EU Legislation, “Treaty of Maastricht on European Union,” http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm. In 1999, the Western European Union was incorporated within the EU. In 2003, the EU and NATO announced “Berlin-Plus” arrangements allowing the EU to access NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations. NATO and the EU are working together to prevent and resolve crises and armed conflicts in Europe and beyond. NATO, “What is NATO: An Introduction to the Transatlantic Alliance,” http://www.nato.int/welcome/brochure_WhatIsNATO_en.pdf; and Dinan, Ever Closer Union, 619.
and international crime; expanding world trade; and promoting closer economic relations.\textsuperscript{17} The scope of the transatlantic partnership was thus expanded to allow for a dialogue between the EU and the United States on many foreign policy issues and cooperation on international global challenges. Moreover, this dialogue reinforced the convergence of the parties’ analysis and the perception of their common interests and allowed them to act jointly and efficiently to enhance global stability and prosperity.

Yet, this partnership does not prevent diverging assessments of the impact of some policies that sometimes overshadowed the prospects of the transatlantic alliance. For instance, the U.S. policy of “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq was not supported by the EU, which preferred a policy of “engagement.” The EU policy concerned the United States because of its potential to undermine Western deterrence of these two “rogue states.”\textsuperscript{18} The EU also refused to join the economic sanctions against Iran under the ILSA. Moreover, the EU complained to the World Trade Organization about America’s insistence that the EU follow its lead in sanctions (ILSA) and claimed this insistence was illegal and contrary to freedom of international trade. This complaint led to friction between the EU and the United States.\textsuperscript{19}

The cooperative spirit and intense dialogue within the New Transatlantic Agenda framework helped the EU and the United States address these differences in a constructive and forward-looking manner. We can credit the Quartet (United States, EU, Russian Federation, and United Nations [UN]) as a substantial joint effort that brought the United States and the EU together to revive the Middle East peace process.\textsuperscript{20}

Fighting terrorism had become a priority for the EU and the United States before the 9/11 terror attacks. By the June 2001 EU-

\textsuperscript{17} Dinan, \textit{Ever Closer Union}, 619.
U.S. Summit for Transatlantic Cooperation, both sides had already identified antiterrorism as one of five priority areas. The EU worked with the United States to build a global coalition against terrorism and to establish joint initiatives to combat international terrorism.\(^{21}\)

The George W. Bush administration perceived terrorism as the main security threat and believed it could only be dealt with through military means. The United States first used its military power to fight terrorism in Afghanistan right after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The Bush administration’s second target was Iraq, with the United States claiming that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and that America was fighting for Iraq’s freedom.\(^{22}\) This U.S. policy was viewed by the EU as being unilateral because “the Bush administration was more skeptical of existing international institutions including the U.S.’s Cold War alliance, and far more willing to ‘go it alone’ in foreign affairs.”

The large, diverse U.S. economy gave it considerable political leverage and enabled the United States to create and equip a formidable military force and make it the dominant military power.\(^{23}\) Technological advances and enhanced military force projection capabilities enabled the United States to develop more military options.\(^{24}\)

The EU viewed the 2003 invasion of Iraq (without a UN mandate)—contrary to the 1990 U.S. war on Iraq under a UN mandate—as violating the UN resolution and international law, which led to a transatlantic rift. Many Europeans saw the 2003 war as a risky mistake and an unnecessary move.\(^{25}\) Germany and France took an anti-U.S. stand due to the unilateral American war on Iraq. Large public demonstrations were held against U.S. unilateralism in Italy, Spain, and Britain, although their governments did side with the United

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\(^{21}\) Ibid.


States.26 This region became the most problematic sector in transatlantic relations, since the main tenets of the Bush administration’s U.S. National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy were oppositional. The U.S. strategy was based on “unilateralism” and “preventive war” in order to impose its values from the outside, whereas the European Security Strategy was based on the presumption that backward economic, social, and political conditions in this region increased threats or risks to its security.27 In other words, the U.S. foreign policy, based on “military power” and “hard power,” was opposed to the EU’s foreign policy approach, based on “civilian power,” “normative power,” and “soft power.”28

One of the reasons behind the conflicting U.S. and EU approaches toward MENA was that the U.S. foreign policy approach focused on “rapid” transformation of the region through use of its military power, contrary to the EU’s “gradual” transformation of the region through use of its “civilian power.”29 These conflicting approaches regarding the use of force may explain the widening gap between the military doctrine (preemptive and preventive war) and capabilities of the United States and those of the EU. U.S. defense expenditures were almost equivalent to what three major powers of the EU (Britain, France, and Germany) had spent in 2000;30 this is an important factor of the U.S. focus on its military power to make regime changes to unfriendly regimes in the region.31

The divergences of the United States’ and the EU’s foreign policy approaches and perspectives on the issue of power—the efficacy,
morality, and desirability of power—might be well explained by Kagan’s description of Europe as “Kantian” and America as “Hobbesian,” or more descriptively as “Americans from Mars and Europeans from Venus,” which was used by Jervis. Kagan states that the United States is “exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and the use of military might.” According to Kagan, “Europe is turning away from power, . . . or it is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a posthistorical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant’s ‘perpetual peace.’”

When President Nicholas Sarkozy and Chancellor Angela Merkel were elected in France and Germany, respectively, the rift that had emerged during the administrations of President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was bridged. The changes in the United States’ approach toward MENA under Barack Obama’s administration, along with France’s changing stance toward the United States and NATO, not only helped eliminate the transatlantic rifts between them, but also contributed to greater collaboration in the MENA. For instance, until President Sarkozy’s election, French involvement in NATO was limited. Sarkozy ended France’s existing NATO policy by reintegrating France into the NATO military structure in 2009. These developments paved the way for the emergence of the 2010 Strategic Concept that notes, “Therefore the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. . . . Close cooperation between NATO and the European Union is an important element in the development of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to crisis management and operations.”

The European Security and Defense Policy can foster a more equitable transatlantic security partnership.

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35 NATO, “What is NATO.”
The Transatlantic Relationship in the MENA in the Wake of the Arab Spring

The regional interests of the EU and the United States largely converge when it comes to core issues, such as promoting energy security, stability, and prosperity through democratization and liberalization; maintaining a secure flow of oil and gas at a reasonable price; selling their goods in these liberalized markets; and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Promotion of democracy and economic liberalization, which were determined to be one of the main goals of both the U.S. National Security Strategy and Europe’s Security Strategy (2003), has been supported by both parties through such initiatives as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Middle East Free Trade Area initiative, and the BMENA initiative.

Through these projects, both parties’ democracy promotion efforts concentrated on institutions and processes that had little to do with the political reality of the respective countries. Their “prescription and deadline,” “top-down,” and “wholesale import of Western-style democracy” approaches did not work, and the dual standards implemented by the EU and the United States in this region damaged both their image and credibility in the eyes of Arabs. For example, they supported authoritarian regimes by neglecting opposition and civil societies in MENA countries, while at the same time promoting economic liberalization and democracy. The transatlantic partners’ former policy of backing authoritarian regimes also increased anti-Western sentiment among revolutionists during the Arab Spring.


The Arab uprisings, which started in Tunisia with the Jasmine Revolution on 5 January 2011 and spread rapidly to other countries in the region, caught all concerned unprepared. These unexpected developments and their previous relationships with these countries made both the United States’ and the EU’s reactions to the changes inconsistent. As a result of these developments, the transatlantic partners faced a dilemma: supporting the uprisings’ call for a democracy promoted by both the EU and the United States through several projects in the region, or supporting dictators with whom both entities had good relationships. The uprisings in countries with whom the partners had good relations put them into a difficult position. For example, the uprisings in Yemen made anti-American groups popular, and those in Bahrain had the potential to bring Shiites—supported by Iran—to power. Issues of geographic proximity, previously close relationships, and maintaining national interests and positive relations with Saudi Arabia and Gulf Cooperation Council member states all made the United States’ and the EU’s approaches toward the uprisings in the Arab world lack coherence.

The Arab Spring raised concerns in the EU over regional stability due to several factors, including the possible resurgence of terrorism, immigration from south to north, the rise of radical Islam, and the spillover effects to the EU. Realities of the geographic proximity of the EU to this region and the abundance of immigrants of North African origin in EU member states led to an increased sense of concern and encouraged the EU to reconsider and revise former policies and take new initiatives, both civil and military, including serving as a NATO partner.

In comparison to the United States, EU institutions and member states reacted quickly by providing funds to strengthen the capacities of their border patrol missions, or Frontex, when immigration from the south rapidly increased in the spring of 2011. In addition, the EU was bound to maintain its economic ties with the countries

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39 This issue received little Western attention compared with the uprisings in Libya and Syria.
40 Asseburg, “Coordinating the Transatlantic Response to the Arab Uprisings,” 129.
of this region, like Tunisia, to prevent the economic insecurity that transformation would bring.\textsuperscript{41}

Developments in the region indicated that continuing with existing projects would not be advisable due to their limited impacts and the need for revisions according to new developments and requirements. When the Arab uprisings broke out in Tunisia, the EU decided to revise the ENP to focus more on assistance programs consisting of economic and humanitarian aid rather than on a coherent defined program designed to promote external democracy.\textsuperscript{42} Developments in the MENA region also made intensive debates on the aims and means of a future policy toward the region essential not only nationally—i.e., among Europeans—but also at the transatlantic level.\textsuperscript{43}

In January 2011, NATO Secretary General Anders F. Rasmussen said, “The Arab Spring has underlined the need to elevate our dialogue and partnerships to a new level, and our new strategic concept calls for such enhanced cooperation.”\textsuperscript{44} When the Arab Spring reached Libya, the EU and the United States decided to act together. U.S. foreign policy had shifted from “unilateralism” and “military power” to “multilateralism” and “smart power,” which combines the use of both “hard power” and “soft power.” In other words, this new foreign policy stance mixes diplomatic, economic, military, political, and cultural strategies in the approach toward the Arab uprisings. The EU also had shifted from its earlier “civilian power” approach toward the uprisings to a “smart power” approach.

Following Muammar Qaddafi’s targeting of civilians in Libya, the UN Security Council first adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011, which imposed an arms embargo on the country. Deterioration of the situation in Libya led to the adoption of UN Security


\textsuperscript{42} Tobias Schumacher, “New Neighbors, Old Formulas? The ENP One Year after the Start of the Arab Spring,” in Schmidt and Hartmann, The Arab Spring: One Year, 90.

\textsuperscript{43} Asseburg, “Coordinating the Transatlantic Response to the Arab Uprisings,” 130.

\textsuperscript{44} NATO, “What is NATO.”
Council Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, which introduced active measures, such as a no-fly zone, to protect Libyan civilians. After the adoption of resolution 1973, several UN members took immediate military action to protect civilians under Operation Odyssey Dawn, which was conducted by a multinational coalition led by the United States on 19 March 2011. Secretary General Rasmussen announced that NATO would take over command of military operations on 27 March 2011.

France’s complete reintegration into NATO during the Sarkozy presidency led to diplomatic and strategic cooperation among France; the United Kingdom; the United States; and, later, other allies in response to the rebel uprisings against the Qaddafi regime. The NATO operation in Libya was the first coordinated transatlantic action in the MENA since the Arab uprising commenced. France and the UK were the most vocal proponents of taking action against Qaddafi; they pushed the EU to quickly adopt sanctions against the Qaddafi regime. Thus, for the first time since the Second World War, the United States took a backseat to the EU in laying diplomatic groundwork for joint military action in the MENA.

Although America and the EU member states met their military objectives during the first weeks of operations, divergent views on the aims and future direction of the mission emerged. France and other allies expressed their concerns related to the NATO-led mission in Libya, since its mission heightened criticism of Western motives in the region. Public perception of a NATO dominated by the United States could erode support for the mission within the Arab countries.

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50 Ibid., 18.
Before the Arab Spring, problems with Syria had contributed to the rift between the transatlantic partners. Although both parties had the same aims, such as halting Syrian support for Hezbollah and terrorist access to Iraq via Syrian territory and democratizing and liberalizing the country, their approaches toward Syria were different. The EU preferred a policy of engagement through the EU-Syria Association Agreement, whereas the United States preferred a policy of isolation.\(^{51}\) Since the Arab uprisings reached Syria, however, the EU has taken a number of restrictive measures, including an arms embargo, a ban on travel, freezing assets, and suspending bilateral cooperation programs between the EU and Syria. The transatlantic partners are thus acting together to topple Bashar Assad’s regime. Their coordinated actions via the UN Security Council and active policies supporting opposition forces through several agreements have shown close transatlantic solidarity on Syria.\(^{52}\) France’s new president, the Socialist Françoi[ss] Hollande, has continued with Sarkozy’s policies on Syria.\(^{53}\)

Subjects outside the Arab Spring, such as Afghanistan and Iran, also illustrate the transatlantic partnership regarding the MENA. Former President Sarkozy’s pro-Israel and anti-Iran stance contributed to transatlantic solidarity by facilitating joint actions or furthering actions on Iran’s nuclear issue. For instance, one of the EU’s actions to revive transatlantic solidarity harmed during the Iraq War was the adoption of further sanctions in July 2010 that went beyond those imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1929 against Iran.\(^{54}\)

Prior to NATO’s meeting in Bucharest, Romania, on 3 April 2008, President Sarkozy announced that France would increase the size of its contingent in Afghanistan by approximately 1,000 troops. He also added that France would not reduce defense expenditures

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despite current budget problems.\textsuperscript{55} Yet, the Socialists’ reservations about the NATO missile defense system, their opposition toward Sarkozy’s decision to rejoin NATO’s integrated military command, and recently elected President Hollande’s Afghanistan policy raised some doubts about the French commitment to NATO.\textsuperscript{56} Hollande came into office with an agenda to withdraw French troops from Afghanistan in 2012, one year prior to the date set by former President Sarkozy. A possible interpretation of this decision may be that he is willing to make some slight changes instead of removing the entirety of his predecessor’s efforts.

Yet, President Hollande’s comments during his visit to Washington, DC, on 11 February 2014 indicated signs of continued close transatlantic solidarity in both the affairs of the MENA and the world: “We stand together with the United States to address the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons; together to solve the crises faced by the Middle East; together to support Africa’s development; and together to fight global warming and climate change.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Conclusions}

Disagreements between the EU and the United States were fueled by divergences in their approaches and the European desire for both independence and unity, even during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{58} The United States had been the predominant power in the Middle East since the Sec-


\textsuperscript{58} Kagan, “Power and Weakness,” in Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy, 103.
ond World War, and the EU desired to be accepted by the United States as a “partner on equal terms.” As the EU member states emphasized in the European Security Strategy (2003), “The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our [the EU’s] aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the United States.” The transatlantic relationship between the EU and the United States in the MENA—which was based on competition for influence—shifted toward more cooperation when pro-American President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel were elected in France and Germany, respectively.

Events in the changing international environment—for example, emerging economic powers such as BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) and Russia’s return to its ambitious policies and presence in the MENA—facilitated the shift from competition to cooperation in the transatlantic relationship. In this emerging international environment, BRIC countries were able to act together, which left little room to maneuver for the EU and lessened its impact when acting alone. The EU’s deep financial and economic crises might also have been another factor that hindered it when acting alone. The Obama administration, which focused on more conciliatory approaches rather than confrontation, had already shifted away from the Bush administration’s foreign policy approach of unilateralism and hard power to multilateralism and smart power to achieve its foreign policy goals in the MENA and left more room for cooperation rather than competition in the transatlantic relationship.

Yet, the United States’ decreasing dependency on Middle East oil, which could end completely by 2035 because of declining demand and the rapid growth of new petroleum sources, led to argu-

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60 Economic and financial crises that the EU is trying to overcome and the rise of emerging countries made possible the rapprochement between the EU and the United States. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership was launched by the United States and the EU to boost economic growth in America and the EU. Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Transatlantic Trade and Investment (T-TIP),” 17 June 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-transatlantic-trade-and-investment-partnership-t-tip.
ments that U.S. attention and resources had shifted from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. Increasing U.S. economic interests, strategic opportunities, and concerns about the Asia-Pacific region led to the Obama administration’s “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific, which focused on regional security and an adjustment of the U.S. military presence from Europe to the Asia-Pacific in November 2011. This foreign policy became more visible with the August 2013 negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement between the United States and the countries that have coastlines on the Pacific—Vietnam, Canada, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, Peru, and Japan—but not the world’s second biggest economy, China.

America’s shift in foreign policy has been criticized by its European allies, who claim that the United States gives priority to the Asia-Pacific countries rather than to its Atlantic alliances. Furthermore, trust among allies has been eroded due to revelations of spying by the U.S. National Security Agency, which has led to Europe’s growing frustration with the transatlantic relationship.

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Despite these issues, the United States’ ties with the EU seem to remain a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy, not only due to the shared values and principles of the two sides but also because of the need for the division of labor and a partnership for a joint approach to the MENA.
More than 30,000 people died in the Nagorno-Karabakh War; one million were displaced from their homes; and many more live with the ongoing effects of this unresolved conflict. Photo by David Stewart-Smith/Getty Images.
Maintaining Security in the South Caucasus

by Gayane Novikova

The security system of the South Caucasus region has changed significantly over the last six years.¹ Several causes are apparent for this. First, a sharp shift appeared in August–September 2008 when Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia transformed these two unrecognized de facto states into de jure semirecognized states.² Second, the instability across the perimeter of the Middle East, which was provoked by the Arab Awakening (also called the Arab Spring), directly influenced developments in the South Caucasus. Third, Western Europe and the United States are exhibiting a decreasing interest in the South Caucasus, and this region is being increasingly handed over to Eastern European surveillance. Fourth, Russia is making serious efforts to integrate the region into its global economic and military projects. Fifth, unsuccessful attempts to “reset” the U.S.-Russia relationship and the developments


² For more information on these two breakaway states, see the ICG’s South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition, Crisis Group Europe Report No. 205 (Brussels: ICG, 2010) and Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence, Crisis Group Europe Report No. 202 (Brussels: ICG, 2010).
in the Ukraine since the end of November 2013\(^3\) complicate multilateral and bilateral relations throughout Eurasia, including those in the South Caucasus. Sixth, Turkey is turning its political and diplomatic focus toward the Middle East. Although Turkey’s involvement in the South Caucasus is secondary among its foreign policy priorities, it is increasingly concerned about maintaining stability in this region. Finally, Iran is attempting to restore its role in the region and is making significant efforts to become more open to the world.

Furthermore, compared with the previous six-year period, internal developments in each state and state entity of the South Caucasus now increasingly impact the joint—regional—security system. Overlapping various internal and external processes ambiguously influence the dynamic of the region’s security. This article analyzes the impact of the dynamics of nonregional developments upon each regional actor. It also investigates the converse impact.

**Western Europe and the United States are exhibiting a decreasing interest in the South Caucasus, and this region is being increasingly handed over to Eastern European surveillance.**

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*The External Actors: New Trends in Interaction with the South Caucasus States*

Russia remains the main external actor for the South Caucasus. It openly demonstrates its readiness to protect its strategic interests through both hard and soft security measures. Among Russia’s most

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\(^3\) On 21 November, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych ended an agreement that would strengthen ties with the European Union, inciting protests in the capital of Kiev. On 17 December, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Moscow will buy $15 billion in Ukrainian government bonds for a cut in the price Ukrainians pay for Russian natural gas. By 22 February, Yanukovich had fled the country but was quickly replaced by Oleksandr Turchinov. The final days of February saw pro-Russian protesters take to the streets in Crimea, while Vladimir Putin ordered military exercises in western Russia along the Ukrainian border. On 28 February, armed men in Russian military uniforms took control of key airports in Crimea, and Russian Marines surrounded a Ukraine Coast Guard base in Sevastopol. By 2 March, Russian forces had taken over a military base amidst dire warnings from the Barack H. Obama administration against Russia’s military intervention. On 16 March, residents of Crimea, up to 60 percent of whom are Russian, were given a choice of either joining Russia or opting for more autonomy from Ukraine under the 1992 constitution. They voted overwhelmingly to join Russia. By 17 March, Putin had officially recognized Crimea as a sovereign independent state.
serious soft security initiatives are the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union. These two projects allow Russia to dominate in the post-Soviet area through direct mechanisms that influence and control internal developments in the member states and define the main directions of their foreign policy. Adoption or rejection of these initiatives by the South Caucasus states is directly related to their internal and external security. Moreover, Russia’s interaction with other external actors—in regard to the South Caucasus—such as the United States, the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Turkey, influences the security system of the entire region.

Despite the fact that increasing confrontation characterizes overall bilateral Russia-U.S. relations, the intensity of their confrontation on some issues related to the post-Soviet area—particularly in the South Caucasus—is diminishing. In this regard, Georgia’s NATO aspirations come to mind, as does the likely tenor of U.S.-Russia interactions in the Central Asia region after the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. It is worth mentioning that this change is a result

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4 The Eurasian Economic Community Customs Union, whose members include Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, was established on 1 January 2010 and entered into force in July 2010. The customs union was launched as a first step toward forming a broader EU-type economic alliance of former Soviet states. The member states plan to continue with economic integration and were set to remove all customs borders between each other after July 2011. On 19 November 2011, the member states created a joint commission to foster closer economic ties, planning to create a Eurasian Union by 2015. Since 1 January 2012, the three states have become a single economic space, or Common Economic Space, to promote further economic integration. The Eurasian Economic Commission is the regulatory agency for the customs union and the Eurasian Economic Community. Armenia announced its willingness to join the customs union in September 2013. See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Armenia Ready to Join Russia’s Customs Union by mid-April,” 1 March 2014, http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia-ready-to-customs-union/25281668.html; Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry? (London: Chatham House, August 2012), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_dragnevawolczuk.pdf; and Armenia Publishes Accession Roadmap to Russia-Led Union, http://en.ria.ru/world/20140204/187165922/Armenia-Publishes-Accession-Roadmap-to-Russia-Led-Union.html. The Eurasian Economic Union is a proposed economic union of post-Soviet states. On 18 November 2011, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia signed an agreement setting a target of establishing the Eurasian Union by 2015. The agreement included the roadmap for the future integration and established the Eurasian Commission (modeled on the European Commission) and the Eurasian Economic Space, which started work on 1 January 2012. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have also expressed interest in joining the organization. The idea was first proposed as a concept by the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, during a 1994 speech at a Moscow university. Later, in October 2011, it was brought up again by the then-prime minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin. See also “A Brief Primer on Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Dream,” Guardian (London), 18 February 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/feb/18/brief-primer-vladimir-putin-eurasian-union-trade; and Joanna Lillis, Putin Turns Attention to Eurasian Union, Eurasianet.org, 5 March 2014, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68106.
not so much of Russian pressure, but rather a consequence of the clear focus of the United States on domestic problems and a shift of its foreign interests—at least before the recent crisis in Ukraine/Crimea, given its implications for the NATO alliance—to the Far East and Southeastern Asia.

The EU, despite its economic stagnation and the accompanying social unrest in almost every member state, is attempting to maintain and deepen its relations with Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The main direction and focus of EU activity remains low-cost spheres initiated within a soft-power agenda, aimed to further democratization of the South Caucasus states. Conversely, these programs allow each state in the region to build relations with the EU in the fields deemed most urgent for the particular recipient. However, EU financial assistance depends upon the fulfillment of preconditions and requirements. In addition, the EU is looking for spheres of activity where all three South Caucasus states can cooperate. Unfortunately, the initiation of regional projects in the foreseeable future offers little chance of success owing, above all, to the contradictory political interests of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan.

Even two or three years ago, EU programs did not raise strong disapproval inside Russia. However, currently the political and economic interests of Russia and the EU regarding the South Caucasus stand in open confrontation. Moreover, because the EU has chosen a passive form of cooperation—the Eastern Partnership Program—Russia is able to place pressure on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia through a series of effective mechanisms, namely those involving economic and military assistance and the manipulation of the Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian diasporas in Russia. It has even

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5 These programs are implemented on the “more for more” principle. For more information, see http://eeas.europa.eu/armenia/index_en.htm; http://eeas.europa.eu/azerbaijan/index_en.htm; http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/the_eu_and_azerbaijan_beyond_oil; and http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/index_en.htm.

6 In fact, these same difficulties plague the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was initiated in 2004 and engages a large number of countries to the EU’s south and east. For more on the ENP, see Stefan Lehne, *Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy* (Brussels: Carnegie Europe, 2014).

7 Six post-Soviet states—Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and the South Caucasus states—are the beneficiaries of the EU Eastern Partnership Program. For more information, see http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm.
felt emboldened to implement change-of-power scenarios in the aforementioned states.

For its part, NATO has begun to conduct a more careful and balanced policy in the South Caucasus, above all in regard to Georgia’s membership. In spite of the fact that the current Georgian government has clearly announced and confirmed that memberships in NATO and the EU remain priorities, the United States and other NATO and EU member states have been recently less enthusiastic in discussions on this issue. This posture was evident up until the eruption of the Crimea crisis. It is likely that, against the background of developments in and around Ukraine and Crimea, NATO—and to some extent the EU—will reevaluate their relationships with the partner states, including those in the South Caucasus and, mainly, with Georgia.\(^8\) NATO continues to develop partner relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia through a number of significant initiatives and programs in security sector reforms, peacekeeping operations, and other projects within the framework of both the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace, including those implemented with representatives of civil society in NATO partner states.\(^9\) In the meantime, NATO has declared that it does not intend to be involved either in peacekeeping processes or in the resolution of South Caucasus conflicts. However, NATO has also made clear its willingness and readiness to participate in postconflict rehabilitation in the region.

During the last six years, substantial changes have occurred in Turkey’s foreign policy. Due largely to the Arab Awakening and its subsequent impact, Turkey has intensified its activity in the Middle East. This development creates a new spiral of complications in Turkish-Iranian relations, exacerbates the Kurdish issue,\(^10\) and increases con-

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\(^8\) In particular, William Lahue, the NATO liaison officer for the South Caucasus, mentioned an increasing interest by NATO in its South Caucasus partners at the conference, “NATO’s Partnerships and the South Caucasus: A Strategic Approach to Regional Security,” organized by the Spectrum Center for Strategic Analysis in Yerevan, Armenia, 20–21 March 2014, http://www.spectrum.am/subpages-en/2014/03/3183/.

\(^9\) Among the very recent initiatives is the previously mentioned NATO-sponsored international conference in Yerevan.

\(^10\) For a recent overview, see the ICG’s *Crying “Wolf”: Why Turkish Fears Need Not Block Kurdish Reform*, Europe Report No. 227 (Brussels: ICG, 2013).
vergence with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Furthermore, the developments in Syria demand the earliest resolution of problems in bilateral relations with Israel that have existed since 2009.\textsuperscript{11} The United States considers Turkey not only as its strong strategic ally and partner in the region, but also as the only possible obstacle to increased radicalization of processes throughout the broader Middle East. Thus, the role of Turkey in this area is growing tremendously.\textsuperscript{12}

A reevaluation of the priority of the European dimension in Turkish foreign policy has also taken place. For the first time in many years, Turkey announced in 2013 its readiness to concentrate its efforts not on a vague hope for EU membership, but on a strengthening of partnerships with Russia and China. Turkey hopes to elevate cooperation with these two states to a new strategic level, one that will include possible membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.\textsuperscript{13} It is possible that, because of this new trend in Turkish foreign policy, as well as the French leadership changes and the eurozone’s slow recovery, both France and Germany may soften their positions on Turkey’s EU membership.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} Note that normalized relations with Turkey are critical for Israel. It is not by chance that, immediately after President Barack H. Obama’s visit to the region on 22 March 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu gave his apology to his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. See http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/netanyahu-phones-erdogan-to-apologize-for-deaths-of-turkish-citizens-on-gaza-flotilla.premium-1.511394.


\textsuperscript{13} The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a Eurasian political, economic, and military organization founded in 2001 in Shanghai by the leaders of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Except for Uzbekistan, the other countries had been members of the Shanghai Five, founded in 1996; after the inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001, members renamed the organization. Turkey was granted dialogue partner status in the SCO at the group’s 2012 summit in Beijing. Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan stated that he has jokingly discussed the possibility of abandoning Turkey’s EU membership candidacy in return for full membership in the SCO. Note, in particular, Erdogan’s statement: “If we get into the SCO, we will say good-bye to the European Union. The Shanghai Five (former name of the SCO) is better—much more powerful.” Ariel Cohen, “Mr. Erdogan Goes to Shanghai,” \textit{National Interest}, 18 February 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/mr-erdogan-goes-shanghai-8113. For a recent, wide-ranging treatment of the SCO, see Michael Fredholm, ed., \textit{The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives, and Challenges} (Copenhagen: NIAS [Norwegian Institute of Asian Studies] Press, 2012).

Turkey’s relations with the South Caucasus states can be summarized in now-familiar terms: it seeks to maintain an advanced strategic partnership with Azerbaijan and Georgia and to avoid establishment of diplomatic relations and opening the borders with Armenia. However, there are several new developments:

• The pragmatic approach of the current Georgian government vis-à-vis its direct neighbors—namely, Armenia and Russia—creates tension between Azerbaijan and Turkey, on one side, and Georgia, on the other.

• The absence of diplomatic relations with Armenia neither prevents bilateral Turkish-Armenian contacts along the second track diplomacy nor precludes a continuation of some positive developments—and even some improvement—in the economic and tourism spheres. According to most Armenian experts, Turkish initiatives in these directions are related to the approaching 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire. However, Turkey’s “turn” to the Middle East should not lead us to underestimate its interest in maintaining stability in its neighborhood and in strengthening its strategic position in the South Caucasus. Within the context of Turkey’s South Caucasus politics, every step that demonstrates its willingness to improve relations with Armenia will be perceived positively, particularly by the United States and the EU.

• Over a long period, Turkey (with the support of Azerbaijan) unsuccessfully tried to play an active role in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The United States’ “exit” from the South Caucasus and its bet on Turkey as a major nonregional actor and possible mediator (from the viewpoint of some representatives in American political circles) will likely lead to new initiatives to change the format of negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh. However, such initiatives will in all likelihood be viewed as unacceptable to the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh parties.

15 Direct flights between Yerevan and Van were scheduled to operate twice a week beginning 3 April 2013; however, this route was cancelled by the Turkish partner.


to the conflict. Furthermore, they will oppose Russia’s interest in the area. Finally, the United States will not openly support Turkey’s initiatives in this direction.

Iran must be seen as a significant actor in the South Caucasus. It is trying to play a more active role in the region, also offering mediation efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, its influence, owing to serious domestic developments that are aggravated by economic sanctions and to increased tension with Azerbaijan, remains circumscribed.

In spite of internal difficulties and attempts to mitigate the impact of U.S. sanctions, Iran is trying to broaden economic cooperation with all three South Caucasus states. Under these circumstances, Armenia could play a bridging and transitioning role. Nonetheless, any elevated involvement of Iran in the Armenian economy could have negative political consequences for Armenia.18

In broad terms, there is an apparent trend toward even greater militarization in the South Caucasus; the unresolved conflicts in this area contribute substantially to an arms race. As part of this trend, Russia’s military presence is increasing in Armenia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, and the supply of Russian arms to Armenia and Azerbaijan is growing.19 The latter has intensified its military cooperation with Israel. The U.S. military presence in Georgia and Azerbaijan is also gradually growing.20

18 Among the issues discussed during the hearing on Iran in the U.S. Congress in December 2012 was the question of whether to increase pressure on the South Caucasus states to force them to join the U.S. sanctions against Iran. See *Iranian Influence in the South Caucasus and the Surrounding Region*, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 112th Congress, second session, 5 December 2012.


It is important to stress that all of the developments mentioned above are occurring against the background of armed conflicts throughout the Middle East and in the immediate vicinity of the South Caucasus area. The events in Syria already affect some developments in Armenia\textsuperscript{21} and, indirectly, in Azerbaijan. Any aggravation of the situation in and around Iran will lead to the inevitable deterioration of the economic and political situation in Armenia and Azerbaijan and will pose a direct threat to their national security. A strengthening of the Islamic factor poses a direct threat to the Ilham Aliyev regime in Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{22} Additional uncertainty has been added by Russia’s actions in Crimea, which have revived discussions regarding the possible recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) by Russia.

\textit{The South Caucasus: Choosing Landmarks}

Against the background of these diverse and competing interests of the main nonregional actors, complex processes are occurring in each South Caucasus state and state entity. Political, economic, social, and demographic trends force each actor to make difficult decisions directly related to security issues.

\textbf{Azerbaijan: Playing a Regional Power}

Azerbaijan claims, according to all its strategic parameters, a role as a regional power. Clearly, this state does not confront a choice between Russia and the West for the simple reason that it is capable of conducting the complementary policy required as a consequence of both interest in its energy resources and the possibilities for transit across its territory of Turkmenistani gas and Kazakhstani oil. The latter factor plays a significant role in Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia and with a number of eastern and southeastern European states. Moreover, the dependence of some European states upon Caspian

\textsuperscript{21} According to different evaluations, the number of refugees from Syria who are ethnic Armenians varies between 9,000 and 14,000.

\textsuperscript{22} Arif Yunusov, “Islamskiy Factor v Azerbaijane” [Islamic Factor in Azerbaijan], Baku, Adilogli, 2013, in Russian.
energy sources allows the Azerbaijani leadership to completely ignore the demands of some European and American human rights organizations for improvement in this sphere and for an implementation of those parts of European programs defined within the frameworks of soft power. Because the financial equivalent of these programs is only approximately 3 percent of Azerbaijan’s gross domestic product, any threat of a reduction does not constitute real leverage against the Azerbaijani authoritarian regime.

All internal political processes in Azerbaijan are under the control of the Aliyev regime; the secular opposition has almost been completely destroyed. Ilgar Mammadov, the leader of the Republican Alternative Party and one of the potential candidates for the presidency in the October 2013 elections, has been jailed since January 2013. He was sentenced to seven years in prison in March 2014 for “organizing mass disturbances” and “resisting the police.” The persecution of journalists is frequent and politically motivated; rallies are, in fact, banned in the region. Attempts to organize a wave of civil disobedience actions through social networks have been unsuccessful. Finally, the activities of several international nongovernmental organizations (the Washington, DC–based National Endowment for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute and the Oslo–based Human Rights House Network) are either banned or limited by the Azerbaijani government. The government has also reduced the status of the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) European office in Azerbaijan.

It is important to note that the role of the Islamic radical opposition in the country is growing, which is a significant development in light of the Arab Awakening. However, ongoing developments in Azerbaijan contribute further to this society’s increased radicalization. In particular, the growing number of deaths under noncombat conditions among soldiers in the Azerbaijani Army has caused a wave of indignation; demonstrations in Baku in January 2013 were dispersed by the police. If massive antigovernmental protests are held, a high probability exists that they will, at least in part, stand under the influence of Islamic slogans. In April 2011, for instance, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan posted calls on Facebook to hold a large-scale demonstration after the 8 April prayer in Baku.26

One of the main puzzles in the domestic and foreign politics of Azerbaijan relates to the processes surrounding the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and contains several components. First, the Azerbaijani leadership understands well that several resolutions on the recognition of the NKR,27 the visit of a parliamentary delegation from Uruguay to NKR, and the appearance of the “Parliamentary Group of Friendship with Nagorno-Karabakh” on the official Web site of the Lithuanian parliament28 demonstrate that, against the background of several accelerating secessionist processes even in prosperous Europe, the idea of international recognition of

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27 In 2012, the parliament of New South Wales, an Australian state, called upon the Australian government to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh. In the United States in May 2012, the Rhode Island House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on President Obama and the U.S. Congress to recognize the NKR. In August 2012, the Massachusetts House of Representatives passed a similar resolution. In April 2013, the Maine House of Representatives and the Maine State Senate passed a resolution accepting Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence and urging President Obama to do the same. In May 2013, the Louisiana State Senate passed a resolution accepting Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence and expressed support for their efforts to develop as a free and independent nation. In May 2014, the California State Assembly adopted a joint resolution in support for the NKR’s efforts to develop as a free and independent nation.

the NKR is becoming more and more acceptable. The Commission on Security & Cooperation in Europe (also known as the U.S. Helsinki Commission) organized an interesting discussion in 2011, during which participants stressed the urgency of establishing direct contacts with the legitimately elected NKR leadership.29

This trend toward the international recognition of NKR might provoke Azerbaijan to resume hostilities in the conflict zone. Doing so would defuse internal political tensions and project widespread social discontent onto an external enemy. Resuming this war would also temporarily neutralize the growing Islamist opposition. It now, in step with the Arab Awakening, begins to threaten the Aliyev regime.

Second, there were discussions among representatives from Armenian and Azerbaijani political and analytical circles regarding the possibility of war resuming in the Nagorno-Karabakh area in the event that an attack against the Iranian nuclear facilities occurred. However, the probability of connecting these two events is not very high because of several factors: Azerbaijan will face an uncontrolled flow of refugees from Iran; the United States considers Azerbaijan one of its reserve bridgeheads in the event of a military attack against Iran; and finally, reduced tension around the Iranian nuclear program and some positive shifts in the Geneva talks with the P5+1 group30 will contribute to further stabilization of the situation around Iran. Should war resume in Nagorno-Karabakh, there is a high probability that the United States will try to prevent further escalation of tension or another crisis in areas bordering Iran.

Third, Azerbaijan is visibly intensifying its military-technical cooperation with Israel.31 The amount of military contracts with Israel

30 China, France, Russia, the UK, and the United States are the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council that are, along with Germany, participating in nuclear talks with Iran. See “Nuclear Talks with Iran Productive: Wendy Sherman,” http://www.payvand.com/news/14/mar/1174.html and http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/03/27/356197/eu-us-back-iran-nuclear-talks/.
31 At the end of February 2012, an agreement in the amount of $1.6 billion was signed between the Israel Aerospace Industries and the Azerbaijani government; see http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-officials-confirm-16b-Azeri-defense-deal.
is higher than the amount of contracts with Azerbaijan’s traditional partners, such as Ukraine and Turkey. However, this cooperation does not yet influence the military capability of this South Caucasus state qualitatively.

Fourth, Russia as a major nonregional actor in the South Caucasus area, on the one hand, cannot allow itself to be defined unambiguously as favoring one of the parties in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; its relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan are of strategic importance. Conversely, its recognition of Crimean independence, the accelerated inclusion of Crimea into the Russian Federation, and the reaction of world powers tremendously complicates Russia’s position on Nagorno-Karabakh. It has international obligations in accordance with the Protocol to the Bilateral Russian-Armenian Treaty on the Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia. This treaty determines the provisions of the functions of this base.32

Finally, if an open military confrontation occurs in the Nagorno-Karabakh area, the direct involvement of Turkey on the side of Azerbaijan is unlikely. However, Turkey provides political and diplomatic support to its partner and will provide even more.

Thus, when we pose the question of a possible resumption of military actions in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, several factors could constrain Azerbaijan, particularly the existing political-military balance in the region and the awareness of unavoidably high material and human losses, including the high probability that the Armenian side could destroy oil and gas pipelines. A Nagorno-Karabakh war will not be a blitzkrieg; it will be immediately transformed from a local to an international conflict and spill beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh.

One cannot completely exclude the possibility that, in the course of growing internal political tension, the Azerbaijani authorities will aggravate tensions not only along the border with Nagorno-Karabakh

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but also with Armenia. Any progress toward conflict resolution should not be expected in the near future. Furthermore, private discussions with Azerbaijani colleagues suggest that contact between parties to the conflict along second track diplomacy will be increasingly limited.

This analysis may be summed up in the following manner:

• Azerbaijan's interest in reducing tension in the area of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not evident. However, the possibility for overt conflict resuming, in light of the aforementioned processes in the broader region and against the background of the Ukraine-Crimea-Russia crisis, is slightly reduced.

• Azerbaijan's energy resources allow for smooth inclusion into the state budget of huge outlays for direct and indirect military spending.33

• Azerbaijan's geopolitical location and general developments in the Middle East allow Azerbaijani authorities to ignore negative evaluations by all international organizations and bodies regarding human rights violations and the lack of legal frameworks either in state governance or in the fight against corruption. External political, economic, or legal levers to influence internal political processes in Azerbaijan are absent. However, the peaceful change of power in neighboring Georgia has introduced the idea of implementing a similar “new person in power” scenario in Azerbaijan.

“The Georgian Dream”: Where to Go Next?

In Georgia, where a peaceful change of power occurred in October 2012, the situation is different. Russia's involvement in the recent shift of power cannot be excluded completely; however, it is obvious that widespread disappointment among the majority of Georgians for President Mikheil Saakashvili and for his methods of governance contributed to the results of recent parliamentary elections. The political course of the current Georgian government has become significantly different from the political course of the Saakashvili team.

33 In February 2013, President Aliyev of Azerbaijan stated that the military budget for the current year would be $3.7 billion. He mentioned once again that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be resolved by military means if progress was not achieved in a reasonable period of time. Associated Press, “Azerbaijan Sharply Increases Military Spending,” Atlantic Council, 1 February 2013, http://www.acus.org/natosource/azerbaijan-sharply-increases-military-spending.
Speculation regarding an imminent rapprochement with Russia and the formation of a pro-Russian political course is groundless; the contradictions between the two states are systemic and rooted in the semirecognized status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia’s Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili (2012–13) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Maia Panjikidze have stressed this point in every statement related to Georgia’s foreign policy. Although the “Georgian conflicts” are now in a “deep freeze,” thereby deadlocking Georgian-Russian relations, it is apparent that the Georgian government has abandoned the statements and actions capable of infuriating Russia. Russian-Georgian relations have achieved some positive results: access of Georgian wine and mineral water to the Russian market has been reestablished, and Georgia participated in the Sochi Olympic Winter Games in 2014. The issue of the genocide of the Circassian people (North Caucasian ethnic group) and a corresponding resolution adopted by the previous Georgian parliament in 2011 aimed at undermining the Olympics has been removed from the Russian-Georgian agenda. These developments in bilateral relations—insignificant at a glance—will determine the dynamics of regional processes and directly affect Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Armenia.

On the regional level, the most serious discussions were related to the prospect of opening a railroad through Abkhazia. This project would demand a certain critical approach and courage, particularly from the Georgian side. It is worth mentioning that, for Armenia, the exploitation of this railroad as a resource is of high strategic importance. It could provide Armenia with a direct connection to Russia and could transform Armenia into a transit road for Iran and the other Middle Eastern states concerned.

For Russia, a fully functioning Abkhazian railway would provide supplies to its military base in Gyumri, Armenia, at a low cost. This very fact, it must be emphasized, causes a negative reaction in Azer-

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baijan, since this base is one of the constituent elements in the national security system of Armenia. Furthermore, Russia’s position in Abkhazia would be significantly strengthened and, in parallel, bilateral trade with Turkey\(^{36}\) would be increased.

Unlocking the railway would also provide wide transit possibilities for Georgia. It would positively influence Georgian-Armenian, Georgian-Russian, and Georgian-Abkhazian relationships (despite Georgia’s measurable fear of increasing Russian influence in the region). At the same time, any shifts in Georgia’s foreign policy that could theoretically provide some benefits to the Armenian economy would cause—and have already caused—a negative reaction in Azerbaijan. Yet, such benefits would be welcomed to some extent in Russia. Thus, opening the railroad through Abkhazia and the further inclusion of the Armenian railroad net will be the subject of long-term bargaining between Russia and Georgia.

Although there have been some shifts in Georgian foreign policy, a Russian agenda is not of high priority. At all political levels, the Georgian leadership is committed to integrating Georgia into Euro-Atlantic institutions and considers NATO, in particular, the only guarantor of its security. A clear message to Georgian society is apparent: NATO membership is a strategic goal that requires extended time and strong efforts. The prospect for Georgia’s EU membership is likewise vague. However, both the United States and the EU will increase their economic and political support to Georgia as a consequence of its geostrategic location, transit possibilities, and contribution to demo-

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cratic developments in the region. Georgia’s cooperation with NATO is increasing significantly, and it is the most advanced relationship among the South Caucasus states. The visible positive shift in EU-Georgia relations was introduced in the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in November 2013. Against this background, Georgia’s surge of activity in the region appears very symptomatic: the Georgian leadership has already issued several statements expressing its readiness to mediate disputes among its neighbors.

Despite several enduring bilateral issues with respect to other regional actors, the South Caucasus track remains probably the most feasible one for Georgia. Only at the regional level, despite existing complex relations with Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, Georgia remains—from both economic and political perspectives—a most attractive state for foreign investors. The trend toward reduced tensions with Russia will positively influence not only Georgia’s image and the flow of external investments, but also its internal political climate.

We can make the following conclusions:

• Georgia has tried to play a more active role in the South Caucasus. The features of its regional activity became visible during the March 2013 visit of Defense Minister Irakli Alasania to Armenia. In January 2013, Prime Minister Ivanishvili and part of his economic and social issues team visited Armenia. The same team visited Azerbaijan in March 2013. The newly elected president of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili, visited Armenia on 26–27 February 2014, confirming his nation’s interest in improving bilateral relations between the two states and peoples. Among the recently signed regional agreements, the broad trilateral Georgian-Azerbaijani-Turkish cooperation agreement signed in Batumi, Georgia, on 31 March 2013

37 For more information, see the official documents related to Georgia-NATO bilateral relations at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm.

must be mentioned. This agreement increases Georgia’s role in the region, but it actually isolates Armenia more from regional economic projects.

- Relations with Russia are developing within a format of meetings between Zurab Abashidze, the special representative of the prime minister for Georgia-Russia relations, and Grigori Karasin, the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia. The Georgian position in negotiations, which involves “dialogue without a restoration of diplomatic relations,” implies opportunities for cooperation with Russia in a variety of economic and humanitarian areas, despite the fact that restoring diplomatic relations in the foreseeable future remains questionable. The Georgian side has clearly indicated that recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia constitutes a “red line” that divides the two countries.

- Abkhazia and South Ossetia are important for Georgia to restore the trust of both populations of these semirecognized state entities. Implementing joint economic, cultural, and social programs could serve a pivotal bridging function. The EU could play a positive role in supporting these programs.

- Georgia’s policy in regard to NATO and EU memberships will be more balanced. The new leadership aims to exploit the image of this nation as “a beacon of freedom” and to continue its privileged status as a recipient of Western investments; however, it does not wish to irritate Russia.

Armenia: Anticipating Changes

Interesting and strongly interrelated processes are currently underway in Armenia. The parliamentary elections in May 2012 revealed seri-

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40 The appointment of Paata Zakareishvili, a well-known scholar of national minorities issues, as a minister of reintegration (2012–present) and minister of reconciliation (2014–present) and the renaming of the Ministry of Reintegration as the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality on 1 January 2014 demonstrated the seriousness of Georgia’s intentions. See also “Our Approach Is Peaceful,” interview with Georgia’s minister for reintegration, Paata Zakareishvili, 4 April 2013, http://www.commonspace.eu/eng/opinions/6/id2636.
ous contradictions inside the parties in power, which resulted in a split of the ruling coalition. The presidential election in February 2013 aggravated the situation further. It has become apparent that the unstructured opposition lacks not only the potential required for significant changes, but also the programs to attract a large share of the protest vote. In fact, the election process has been discredited; the segment of society prepared to deliberately vote against the person in power was repelled. Thus, this group—a section of the developing middle class—will embark upon personalized solutions; an increase in emigration and a deterioration of the demographic situation must be expected. The flow of Syrian Armenians into Armenia in the aftermath of the Syrian uprising will not play a substantial role.

The second negative aspect of Armenia’s current political situation involves discrediting the opposition. However, the steaming protest mood in this society creates fertile ground for different civic initiatives demanding significant changes. The presidential elections of 2008 and 2013 clearly indicated that a growing segment of the population—22 percent and 36 percent, respectively—anticipates serious changes across a wide spectrum of issues. The process of forming a civic society in Armenia has recently become invigorated.

The third aspect directly influencing internal developments relates to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which remains one of the determining factors in Armenia’s national security system. The complexity of the situation for Armenia is defined by its need to make a difficult choice. First, Armenia was openly offered (after a degree of pressure) membership in two organizations dominated by Russia: the Customs Union and the just-forming Eurasian Union. Second, Armenia was involved in negotiations with the EU on the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, including a reduction of visa regulations for certain categories of Armenian citizens. Nonetheless, these issues possess no clear political and economic content. Both parties—Russia and the EU—have attempted to implement a carrot-and-stick policy and to place significant pressure on Armenia.
Taking into account the spectrum of problems facing Armenia today, it is obvious that Russia remains its strategic partner, and the EU is not prepared to save the Armenian economy or to guarantee its security. However, Armenia will need to utilize all opportunities that cooperation with Euro-Atlantic institutions provides. Cooperation with NATO involves certain restrictions,\(^{41}\) while intensified contact with the EU allows Armenia to undertake reforms aimed at furthering democratization in which, at least verbally, all parties are interested. At the same time, the EU, as a pan-European structure, and its member states should understand and accept the reality that Armenia—facing serious economic, demographic, and social difficulties—needs greater injections of economic aid.

Armenia could not freely maneuver between Russia and the EU for a longer period. The complementarity policy can be continued only in the event of increased interest by the EU in the South Caucasus, and only if it is based on substantial financial investments and consistent implementation of good-governance reforms. However, even amid these circumstances, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains the main factor determining the dynamics of Armenian foreign policy. Thus, it follows that, until its settlement, Russia will remain the most serious guarantor of Armenia’s security, as well as—indirectly and unofficially—of the NKR. Unfortunately, Armenia’s failed attempt to synchronize both EU and Russian directions\(^ {42}\) provides a vivid example of their unwillingness to share areas of influence and strategic interests that, based on recent developments in Ukraine, are becoming mutually exclusive.

\(^{41}\) For more detail, please visit http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48893.htm, as well as www.mil.am.

\(^{42}\) On 3 September 2013, during the official visit to Russia, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan announced the decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union. Armenia did not initiate the Associative Agreement with the EU at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November 2013, although it was negotiating this agreement during the last three-and-half years and was prepared to move forward with its cooperation with the EU. In the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, it was stressed that “the EU and Armenia have today reconfirmed their commitment to further develop and strengthen their cooperation in all areas of mutual interest within the Eastern Partnership framework, stressing the importance of reviewing and updating the existing basis of their relations. In the framework of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, the Summit participants reaffirm the sovereign right of each partner freely to choose the level of ambition and the goals to which it aspires in its relations with the European Union.” See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139765.pdf for the complete text.
Another limitation in Armenia’s space of maneuvering must also be noted: Turkish and Azerbaijani participation in regional processes will prevent Georgia and, partly, Russia, from engaging Armenia in large-scale economic projects.43

Development in Armenia will largely depend on

- whether growing, although still segmented and nonstructured, civic movements44 will gain momentum;
- how adequate the response to demands for change will be, as supported by Armenian society generally, and how successful efforts to reduce intensive emigration will be; and
- whether Armenia will begin to receive international loans and whether they will address the consequences of the economic crisis and create a favorable investment climate.

Armenia’s foreign policy issues will depend on constructive cooperation with regional and external actors, particularly in the following ways:

- Improved relations with Georgia that enable compensation for the losses that Armenia has suffered from the closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey. A strategic sphere of cooperation between Armenia and Georgia could involve joint programs for development of the Javakhk-Samtshke-Javakheti region.45 Cultural and educational cooperation will also have a positive impact.
- Preservation of the available lines of cooperation with Turkey while preventing its active involvement in negotiations on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- Cooperation with Iran.
- Cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic structures on a wide spectrum of concerns, including a more active explanation of the Armenian position in regard to the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

43 For this reason, any special hopes for opening the Abkhazian sector of the railroad cannot be entertained in the midterm future.


Conclusions

The Euro-Atlantic organizations are unable to offer Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia qualitatively new programs; they avoid direct involvement in the Abkhazian, South Ossetian, and Nagorno-Karabakh issues. Russia has consolidated its military presence in the South Caucasus and continues to enlarge its economic presence. This allows Moscow to increase and strengthen its political positions throughout the region. Despite the fact that Turkey is unable to play the role of a stabilizing regional power because of internal and external problems, it is still a secondary—after Russia—key actor in the South Caucasus. Turkey continues to strengthen its position, actively involving Georgia and Azerbaijan in its economic and military projects. Azerbaijan has also become increasingly involved in Turkish-Israeli military cooperation through its bilateral relations with both nations.

What are the trends in the security dynamic of the South Caucasus in the not-too-distant-future? To answer this question, we must acknowledge that the dynamics of internal processes in state entities cannot lead to qualitative changes in the regional security system for the simple reason that each regional actor possesses only a very limited maneuvering space.

The Abkhazian, South Ossetian, and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts comprise significant internal and external threats for all state entities and, to varying degrees, serve as indicators of their security. The current military and political balance of forces, and the participation of all regional actors in various mutually excluding security alliances, all constitute containment factors that prevent another war in the South Caucasus. Given this context, most actors are interested in preserving the status quo. As a result, the impact of all unexpected developments will be minimized.

Georgia will seek to maximize cooperation not only with NATO, the EU, and the United States, but also with Armenia and Azerbaijan; it also will continue low-intensity contacts with Russia. At the same time, and despite Georgian ambitions, expectations for breakthroughs on the regional level cannot develop. This nation’s substan-
tial economic dependence on Azerbaijan and Turkey narrows the framework for cooperation with Armenia; however, Georgia’s system-defined conflict with Russia significantly limits possibilities for normal relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On this plane, Russia’s and Georgia’s competing interests will prevent Georgia from implementing projects that restore viable economic and political contacts with these semirecognized state entities. Georgia will instead need to reduce their confrontations with Russia. In this context, processes in the North Caucasus are quite important. Cooperation against the activity of terrorist organizations in this region would improve bilateral Russia-Georgia relations, which would have a positive impact on developments in the South Caucasus.

Abkhazia must preserve its semirecognized independence—also from Russia—to accelerate development of its agrarian and tourism sectors. However, their negative demographic situation creates a serious challenge for Abkhazian security. Internal destabilization cannot be ruled out in the event of an intensified struggle for power.

South Ossetia faces the danger of depopulation and the possibility that it may become transformed into a territory for a Russian military base. For Azerbaijani authorities, they must focus on suppressing Islamist opposition. High rates of corruption combined with a readiness to enlarge military cooperation with Israel and the United States, as well as inflamed militarist moods, could lead to an intensified wave of social protest under the banner of religious slogans.

For Nagorno-Karabakh, the most critical objective is to preserve democratic reforms and to distance itself substantially from Azerbaijani authoritarian rule. The region must also make good use of recent precedents in support of self-determination to demonstrate that the NKR will not fall into the ranks of failed states.

Armenia must find a middle ground whereby a balanced foreign policy program allows domestic political reforms to be carried out. Unfortunately, Armenia will not be able to overcome negative consequences from the global economic crisis without significant foreign assistance. Currently, only Russia has offered support, which
implies a significant increase in Armenia’s political dependence on this state. Such a narrow space for economic and political maneuvering, based on the full engagement of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, foreshadows a limited scope of cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic structures and an even tighter orientation to Russia. Conversely, the Armenian state likely will not be able to carry out humanitarian and good-governance reforms without strong assistance—and pressure—from the West.

The external actors understand the delicacy of this balance and that Armenia’s leaders, given regional configurations, must remain prudent and cautious. However, recent developments, including those involving Ukraine, reduce Armenia’s ability to balance between the global powers in the midterm perspective.

Finally, the slow recovery of the world economy, as well as growing instability beyond the South Caucasus, presents a real threat to all the states and entities of this region. They can, by weakening social constellations, challenge internal stability in each state within the region, even up to a critical point. Additionally, an uncontrolled exodus of professionals is taking place in all these states, creating an unfavorable environment for the formation of a middle class that will provide a stable societal base.

Various aspects of currently existing national security strategies represent direct and/or indirect threats to relations among Armenia and Azerbaijan and Turkey, and also for relations between Georgia and Russia. Under existing conditions, however, regional integration cannot even be discussed. With EU guidance, different ideas and fields for cooperation can be considered across the South Caucasus nations. The EU could play a significant and positive role with respect to financial support and political orientation. Unfortunately, no visible and tangible shifts in this direction exist. Thus, the regional cooperation that might serve to overcome the potential crises mentioned above is lacking as a consequence of both objective and subjective reasons.
Ideas do matter. This is the main concept that this fascinating book revolves around. Perfectly balancing historical facts and biographical information, Michael Ryan gives a precise analysis of the work of some al-Qaeda strategists, revealing a strong influence of leftist ideological concepts.

Starting with the global jihad’s vision as historically originated and afterward engulfed by al-Qaeda’s mentality, then introducing Salafist and Wahhabist influences, the author leads us through Osama bin Laden’s and Ayman al-Zawahiri’s relationship, emphasizing the latter’s strategy as detailed in his post-9/11 *Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner*: “a microcosm of the jihadist strategy al-Qaeda followed over the next decade and continues to follow today” (p. 82). Chapter three underlines the revolutionary aim of jihad and the history and work of Abu Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin on strategy. A comprehensive analysis of *The Administration of Savagery* by Abu Bakr Naji follows in chapter four. Chapter five portrays Abu Musab al-Suri’s...
personal experiences and global military doctrine, which reject secrecy and promote open-front jihad and small/one-man cells.

Claiming that the roots of al-Qaeda plans and tactics targeting the United States lie in available texts and already laid-out strategies, Ryan allows jihadist strategists to speak for themselves by analyzing their own work (Qutb’s *Milestones*, Naji’s *The Management of Savagery*, al-Muqrin’s *A Practical Course for Guerrilla Warfare*, al-Qurashi’s *Revolutionary Wars* and *Fourth Generation Warfare*—both translated in the appendix—and al-Suri’s *Call to Global Islamic Resistance*). These analyses show there is no classical Islam or religious argument behind jihadist ideology, but rather a combination of secular sources of twentieth-century guerrilla warfare. According to Ryan, the theories of Mao, Che Guevara, Régis Debray, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro, and Carlos Marighella influenced al-Qaeda strategic thought, along with the thinking of classic Western and Chinese military strategists.

A great number of the main points describing the jihadist movement are covered in the book: the dilemma between classic (defensive) jihad and global jihad; the rejection of the nationalist stance in favor of the international approach and a global *ummah* (community); the marginalization of Muslim religious figures by al-Qaeda to support its endemic manipulation of the Islamic religious message; the rejection of Muslim official rulers and the need for jihadists to learn the political game; the concept of chaos (created or preexisting) in freed areas; and the desperate need for al-Qaeda to recruit experts in administration to effectively manage those areas of “savagery.” The author also underlines the main elements that compose al-Qaeda’s appeal: Muslim humiliation and oppression and classic crisis zones used as unifying banners.

The ease of accessing hardcopy or electronic copies of the work that compose the ideological legacy of jihadist strategists is what makes a military defeat of al-Qaeda in the battlefield hardly definitive. The author, in fact, brings in the important concept of *deep battle*, described as an ideological battle substantially different from close battle at the combat and tactical levels (more dependent on asymmetrical conditions). Because this represents a clash of ideas, recruitment and radicalization enter the picture as battlefields. The author argues the importance of developing a counternarrative that clearly depicts reality and exposes ji-
hadist ideology’s inconsistencies and weaknesses. He claims that, while al-Qaeda strategists apparently learn from past lessons, they fail to apply their own strategies. Besides a strategic contradiction affecting al-Qaeda’s thought (a global antinational construct versus a territorially based Caliphate), the strategists he cites often write while on the run, lack a proper religious education, target people who did not study Islamic law in detail (e.g., Faraj), and point at universal laws as real grounds for fighting (e.g., Naji, al-Suri, al-Muqrin)—all important points to raise.

Revolutionary aspects of jihadist ideology, three-stage guerrilla warfare, and secular reasoning in the background combine with al-Qurashi’s concept of asymmetric, fourth-generation warfare in which a small number of people manage to achieve a larger effect. This leads us to leftist journalist Robert Taber’s War of the Flea (translated as The War of the Oppressed in Arabic), which depicts a revolutionary war where the weak defeat the strong, inflicting several wounds (like Mao’s “death by a thousand cuts”), and considered by Ryan to be one of the most useful books to understand the jihadists’ approach toward insurgency and guerrilla warfare.

Ryan concludes by stressing the need to expose the a-religious, secular background of jihadism as a modern, revolutionary ideology unable to fight a close battle but skilled in the deep battle of ideas. The war being fought is more ideological than military, and we need to fully engage in it with a compelling counternarrative, inhibiting recruitment and restoring respect for the United States through actions and the appropriate use of mass media.
Joshua Gleis and Bernadetta Berti’s book aims to provide an in-depth view of two of the most popular, active, and feared radical Islamist groups in the world: Hamas and Hezbollah. The work explores these two Islamist movements in a comparative manner and analyzes their roles in both a domestic and global context. These aspects of research are increasingly relevant not only to those interested in matters related to the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also to those seeking to better understand international security and the fight against terrorism in general. The authors have conceptualized and understood Hamas and Hezbollah through a reductionist interpretation of the organizations. In doing so, they have identified the multilayered and complex organizational, ideological, and operational structure of Hamas and Hezbollah. This was achieved by tracking the organizational development of both groups. The analytical description of the creation and evolution of Hamas and Hezbollah provides the reader with the tools to better grasp each of the group’s unique aspects while also providing the reader with the ability to recognize the commonalities that exist between the groups in terms of their organizational, ideological, and operational structures. The book highlights the complexity of both organizations, thus providing a context that allows the reader to understand the longevity as well as the struggles of both groups.

Overall, the book provides a detailed analysis of the key players in Hamas and Hezbollah, allowing the reader to build an in-depth understanding of the organizations from an internal and external perspective.
Throughout the analytical description and general arguments developed in the book, it appears that rather than moderating its stance, Hezbollah has evolved and adapted without ever relinquishing its revolutionary ethos and its main objective to wage jihad against Israel. This simplifies the aims and motivations of the organization a bit too much, but for those readers who have little background in the area, this book does allow them to establish a detailed foundation of knowledge from which to build. Hamas, the authors argue, has also demonstrated a similar multifaceted and complex nature, developing simultaneously as a religious and a social movement, as a political organization and as an armed group. In the comparative context, the authors do highlight the fact that, while firmly in control of Gaza, Hamas has not risen to the same level of power and strength as its Lebanese counterpart.

Another important theme of the book worth highlighting is the importance of grasping the multifaceted ideological belief systems of Hezbollah and Hamas; yet, it is noted that at their core, both organizations draw on Islam to shape their identities and their goals. In this context, the authors argue that both groups have adopted a broad political and military agenda that is both outwardly and inwardly focused. In this context, they note that, with respect to their two constituencies and societies, Hezbollah and Hamas have, since their founding, shared a common objective—the taking of power and the creation of an Islamic state.

One of the overall messages that emerges from the book is that the strength of these groups extends beyond the theater of military action. Instead, the authors argue that, as political parties, these groups have had real leverage and influence on local political processes within Lebanon and Palestinian territories; thus, they have had the opportunity to directly shape the political courses of their countries as well as the progress of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Additionally, the argument that...
evolves throughout is based on the notion that the strength of Hezbollah and Hamas is also a function of their positions as social movements and direct providers of goods and services to their populations. This, in turn, contributes to maintaining their constituency as well as diversifying their bases of legitimacy and support. An interesting argument that is put forward in this book is that both groups’ ideologies have had an important role in shaping both Palestinian and Lebanese attitudes toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and are also a main factor behind the ongoing process of Islamization of the Palestinian and Lebanese Shiite populations. This idea again challenges the reader’s knowledge and provides an excellent point of focus for further research within the field, especially for students of international relations.

One of the central points that becomes apparent through reading the case-specific chapters is that, unlike al-Qaeda after 9/11, Hezbollah has not seen a loss of its state sponsorship or area of operations; both have grown significantly. The chapter that focuses on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is extremely interesting and provides the context of how Israel has tried to combat Hamas and Hezbollah, which is a welcome perspective. Throughout the central chapters of this work, which focus on the role and impact of Hezbollah and Hamas, it becomes obvious that the political, social, and military strength of these groups has broad significance not only within Lebanon and Palestinian territories, but also regionally and globally. Overall, the book provides a more nuanced understanding of both groups while allowing the reader to grasp the ideological and organizational commonalities that exist between them. There are a few issues with regard to the level of content and, in this regard, the book would be classified as more of a beginner-to-intermediate level read than an advanced one. However, overall this book provides an excellent insight into Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as into the comparative and global contexts of their role in global terrorism.

Africa has experienced colonial and independence struggles that over time have produced a respectable volume of literature in English, French, Belgian, Spanish, Portuguese, German, Italian, and Afrikaans. The recent formation of the U.S. Africa Command demands a new focus on the “dark” continent that, except for Cold War specialists at the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, had been lacking in the past. In terms of strategic location and human and natural resources, Africa deserves more attention than it has received from Americans and the U.S. Marine Corps.

With the Global War on Terrorism and the Marines’ continued overseas contingency emphasis, the Corps lacks the resources to address the present regional situation. Is there more to the story than the extremes presented in Haggard’s King Solomon’s Mines and Conrad’s Heart of Darkness? Despite the ebb and flow of generational divergences, is there a middle ground? Deane-Peter Baker and Evert Jordaan’s recent anthology may offer some insight. South African scholars and military professionals provide a view of the world from southern Africa’s powerhouse that challenges outside views. With the Republic of South Africa’s transition to majority rule in the 1990s, the concerns for internal and external se-

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curity were put on hold as the nation redefined its part in regional influence and defense needs. While conventional menaces appeared obvious, more subtle threats needed scrutiny.

This South African anthology addresses these topics in four parts: political and social contexts of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; historical perspective; case studies; and finally, how to prepare for these events. The historical chapters about the South African response to its challenges during the apartheid era are useful to understand how political and military efforts are often intertwined or even reversed. The discussions as to why counterinsurgency was put aside after independence are also insightful, particularly when we consider that Namibia and South Africa negotiated settlements rather than accept outright victory or defeat. As a result, both sides of the conflict needed truth and reconciliation to come to terms with their respective pasts.

As with most scholarly works, every selection from the anthology received independent peer review. The sophistication and breadth of this consideration are worth noting, when compared with other attempts to address similar topics. As professional literature, the anthology compares favorably with the Australian Chief of Army’s 2006 *An Art in Itself: The Theory and Conduct of Small Wars and Insurgencies* and Marine Corps University’s 2008 *U.S. Marines and Irregular Warfare, 1898–2007*. Note that the theoretical basis for the study of counterrevolutionary war was taught by the University of South Africa–Pretoria’s professor D. F. S. Fourie, based on the views of French strategist André Beaufre and American tactician John J. McCuen.

All and all, *South Africa and Contemporary Counterinsurgency* is a worthwhile anthology for the specialist and generalist alike. It should be required reading for Marines assigned to the U.S. Africa Command for insights into sub-Saharan Africa and its relevance in the world order, which requires continued engagement rather than a more limited focus on global terrorism.
Eliot A. Cohen argues that “outcomes in irregular warfare are blurry; these wars end not with a bang, but with a haggle.”* The “haggle” that Cohen speaks of is the subject of Joshua L. Gleis’s *Withdrawing Under Fire: Lessons Learned from Islamist Insurgencies*, a study of how great powers have struggled to extricate themselves from fighting insurgencies. Gleis examines why some powers have been able to withdraw from insurgencies in good order while others have left in a confused fashion, often with catastrophic consequences. While the author makes a number of trenchant and thoughtful conclusions about these historical events, his efforts to transform these observations into contemporary policy recommendations neglect the circumstances that made these particular historical events unique.

Gleis selects six examples to serve as case studies: the British withdrawal from Iraq, the French withdrawal from Algeria, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, and the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

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Strip. Gleis argues that a variety of factors led to difficulties and setbacks as major powers struggled to extricate themselves from insurgencies: unrealistic declarations, downgrading military capabilities, losing the media and propaganda war, and allowing “mission creep” to undermine achieving clear objectives. These factors have often come together to make withdrawing from an insurgency a protracted, bloody experience that vitiates whatever aims the power hoped to achieve by entering the war in the first place. To counteract these potential problems, Gleis argues that great powers need to conduct withdrawals in clearly defined phases, control the borders of those countries wracked by insurgencies, develop effective psychological warfare programs, set “red lines,” and establish realistic goals.

Several themes percolate and shape the text. The most prominent is the challenge a democracy faces when it tries to conduct a counterinsurgency while also maintaining civil liberties both at home and in the state facing the insurgency. As Gleis demonstrates, changing attitudes about imperialism, the rise of globalization, and the increasing influence of the mass media on the battlefield have all had a radical impact on insurgencies and on the options states conducting counterinsurgency have at their disposal. For example, the British were able to use fairly heavy-handed tactics against the Iraqi insurgents during the 1920s and subdue the country with little international outcry, whereas the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Israelis in Lebanon confronted accusations that they were aggressive occupiers. Consequently, public relations and the media have gained ever-greater influence over recent insurgencies, and states have failed to grasp this fact at their peril.

Gleis’s scope is ambitious, and he demonstrates considerable versatility in analyzing the different political, social, and cultural contexts of each war. His analysis will be valuable to anyone seeking a broad understanding of these major upheavals. While his account of each insurgency is well written and coupled with excellent analysis, Gleis’s efforts to draw out lessons and recommendations for current policy makers are less successful. The use of historical vignettes to illustrate current policy challenges is a tried and true aspect of books on security and policy studies. However, this approach can become problematic as authors overlook characteristics that make certain historical events exceptional in favor of more general, common features. For example, Gleis’s assertion that the
British counterinsurgency in Iraq was an example of a successful withdrawal works only if we recognize Britain’s transfer of authority to King Faisal as the end of British involvement in the country. Yet, Britain maintained a military presence in the kingdom over the course of the next three decades before the Hashemite Dynasty was violently overthrown in 1958. That dynasty was deposed, in part, because of accusations that it was too beholden to British interests. Extending the timeline provides evidence that Britain left a largely unsustainable political structure in Iraq and that its survival relied entirely on the support of an outside, hegemonic overlord. Shortening the time frame, as Gleis does, makes Britain’s operations in Iraq seem more successful.

Some of the author’s recommendations are sound: waging effective psychological warfare and establishing realistic goals are both highly important, and the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have been replete with examples where failure to set achievable objectives and to compete with Islamist propaganda proved costly. Other recommendations are more difficult to imagine being put into action in an age where the citizens in democracies tend to oppose excessive losses and aggressive action; controlling border regions and declaring “red lines” are two particular examples. Public pronouncements are also meaningless if they are not backed up with force. The Obama administration’s failure to enforce its 2013 warning against the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons on its population attests to this point.

In some sections, Gleis also demonstrates quixotic thinking regarding the ability of democracies to wage effective public diplomacy campaigns to buttress counterinsurgency efforts. Campaigns such as the U.S. Office of War Information’s propaganda war against Nazi Germany and the United States Information Agency’s offensive against Soviet Communism succeeded because their messages resonated with significant segments of their target populations. It is difficult to imagine that a film by Martin Scorsese or a message from Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie would increase support for the Afghanistan War or that such actions would not be perceived as manipulative and heavy-handed propaganda.

These issues aside, Gleis has written a clear and well thought-out analysis of counterinsurgencies and how various states have struggled to extricate themselves from them. Indeed, the breadth of his examples
attests to the sobering fact that, all too often, major powers become readily embroiled in long conflicts without a clear sense of what their major objectives are, how they can achieve them, and how they will ultimately be able to withdraw if those objectives are never achieved.
This collection of in-depth articles and analyses by prominent authors, under the editorial supervision of recognized experts James Sperling and Victor Papacosma, offers a picture of the challenges that the most successful alliance in history—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—still faces decades after the end of the Cold War. The past, present, and the future of NATO development is analyzed and divided in three different sections: Collective Defense, Nuclear Deterrence, and Operations; NATO’s Global Reach; and NATO and Institutional Overlap: The UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), EU. These topics arose as important issues during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of NATO, when heads of states and governments held a summit in Strasbourg-Kehl to discuss the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, to address the last round of NATO enlargement—with Albania and Croatia completing the accession process—and to witness the reinvolve of France in NATO.

_NATO after Sixty Years_ positions NATO as a strong security actor in the international environment, whereby governments of allied countries respect the underpinning values of democracy, rule of law, and individual liberty. The introductory chapter by James Sperling examines...
NATO’s position in the twenty-first century, describing three crises that confront the alliance and concluding that it is up to the governments of the allied countries to decide whether NATO will remain a relevant political and military security actor in today’s world.

In the first chapter, Sean Kay investigates ways of resolving concerns about the commitment to collective defense while also meeting the evolving nuclear challenge. By exploring NATO’s post–Cold War operations in Europe (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia), Mark Webber determines that those were examples of NATO’s representative operational character in out-of-area missions. When looking into out-of-area missions, Stanley Kober critically explains how the Afghanistan mission challenged NATO’s superiority by sending troops to the field unprepared. He also stresses that this mission demonstrates a lack of solidarity among alliance members, which is especially apparent in relations between the United States and the European Union (EU).

NATO demonstrates its global reach and positions itself as a global security player when reaching out toward partner countries. The second section begins with Melvin A. Goodman discussing the Russian problem regarding practical political life after the collapse of the Soviet Union and whether NATO should reach out to the former Warsaw Pact countries. He suggests that NATO should end the enlargement process and instead focus on regrouping as a political military alliance. Yannis A. Stivachtis presents a critical examination of NATO’s policy in the southern and eastern Mediterranean and the reasons for a lack of success in efforts toward regional cooperation. Stivachtis offers suggestions on how to produce better results for the future success of the Mediterranean Dialogue. Stephen J. Blank claims the new frontier of European security in the Black Sea region has not been well protected, either by NATO or the European Union. Sharing ideas about how NATO should engage more effectively in this region, Blank examines whether NATO is committed enough to defend its members’ neighboring countries from Russian threats. Nathan Lucas expresses skepticism in his essay, pointing out that significant measures have not been taken by NATO in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, where it is running only small military operations.

In the book’s final chapter, the authors explore whether NATO’s global role overlaps that of three other institutions—UN, the OSCE,
and the EU—in the new security environment. Lawrence S. Kaplan traces how NATO and the UN created a closer relationship after the end of the Cold War, during the Balkan crisis, when NATO illustrated its supremacy in solving security problems while the UN was not decisive enough. The United States played a large role in the development of their relationship, in spite of its conflicts with the UN over Iraq and Afghanistan, which led to turmoil within NATO. Despite the disputes, these organizations had good relations in the past and will continue to have them in the future. Problems could present themselves in the form of China and Russia, permanent members of the UN Security Council whose interests do not comply with those of NATO countries, and certainly not with those of the United States. However, the UN and NATO have always found ways to work more effectively.

American involvement in European defense is clear through NATO. By developing common security and defense policies within the EU (Common Security and Defense Policy), one of the authors questions whether NATO will become redundant, as its primary role has always been to protect European security. Nevertheless, the United States and NATO have supported the Europeans in developing stronger security concepts, albeit for different reasons, as Stanley R. Sloan reflects. Having a more independent European pillar in the transatlantic alliance and cutting down on defense expenditures are only a few of these reasons, and they were particularly relevant after the Americans realized that strengthening European security reinforced the effectiveness of NATO. In the conclusion, Jamie Shea traces what NATO’s new strategic concept says about the future of the alliance. It leaves the reader with the impression that Europeans and Americans will use NATO to coordinate the transatlantic relationship, which will ensure that NATO remains the primary security institution.

This extraordinary anthology, composed during the celebration of 60 years of NATO, offers insights on the past, present, and future of the alliance. The authors, with an awareness of actual political events, share the opinion that NATO is becoming a globalized alliance. At the same time, they agree that, while NATO transforms all the time, the United States still plays the major role in decision making. The transatlantic institution, with its global missions, has positioned itself as a global actor in a new security environment. Its allies have stayed committed to col-
lective defense, enhancing the new roles of NATO, as the instrument of collective security. When NATO once again attempts to improve its image, this collection of essays will be an important assessment for policy makers, military planners, scholars, students, and others concerned with transatlantic and global security.
As Kenya’s influence in Africa rises, the country is forced to look within to rid itself of forces that threaten to alter (and not in a good way) its advancement as an emerging democracy. Daniel Branch’s *Kenya between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011* is, on its face, a historical account that documents the founding of the republic, its key political actors, and its politics and governance. Beneath the patina of this comprehensive political history, however, the author delves into the elements that led to the postelection violence that marred Kenya’s political landscape after the 2007 election.

Branch begins by looking at Kenya’s precolonial past, carefully describing the status quo at independence and how Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, galvanized support among the Kikuyu community, abetting their ascent and influence in the country’s financial realm. Branch also explores the politics of Daniel arap Moi, summarizing Moi’s 24 years at the helm as a continuation of Kenyatta’s policies, only on a grander scale. While President Kenyatta’s government instituted single party rule under Kenya African National Union (KANU), Moi’s government grew into a dictatorship that deflated freedom of expression and concentrated power in the hands of powerful KANU henchmen. The author does the reader a great service by describing in cordial terms...
other key personalities in Kenya’s political history—including Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Tom Mboya, J. M. Kariuki, and Raila Odinga—and how their ethnic, regional, and African views on national development have influenced the country’s current political economy.

*Kenya between Hope and Despair* also addresses the root cause of conflict in Kenya—land. Land was at the core of the struggle for independence, and Kenyatta’s government failed to fairly and equitably distribute land to Kenya’s new citizenry after independence in 1963. Branch discusses the issue of land and how the adjudication of land-related matters was typically shrouded in corruption, political interference, and bureaucratic fiefdoms. Legal redress of claims was not accessible to locals, whose cumulative frustration eventually caused them to lose faith in the country’s vital political and legal institutions, and so they turned to violence to settle these claims. To be sure, Branch casts the East African Rift Valley as the crucible for the persistent political ills that plague Kenya—namely, the politicization of the land issue and pervasive corruption in the issuance of title deeds. He also notes that mass violence has revisited the country every election year in certain parts of the Rift Valley.

The book also chronicles the struggle for a multiparty system, constitutional reform, and the transition of power from President Moi to Mwai Kibaki in 2002. The 2002 election was a landmark in Kenya’s history for two other salient reasons: the transfer of power was relatively peaceful, and the citizenry—regardless of tribal affiliations—felt included. Many viewed this election as an opportunity to rid the country of the ghosts of the past. Kibaki’s administration, however, was not immune to scandal. Genuine leadership was lacking, and the corridors of power were full of the same old characters who operated in previous regimes. The moment of reckoning came with the flawed results of the 2007 election that precipitated violent protests in Nairobi, Kisumu, and Eldoret, along with other towns in the Rift Valley, leading to the death of more than a thousand and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. Branch keenly captures this fraught period in Kenya’s history and narrates the events leading to the formation of a coalition government that forced the two major parties into a power-sharing agreement.

*Kenya between Hope and Despair* also examines the country’s approval of a new constitution and the role of civil society in the expan-
sion of the country’s democratic space. However, the book falls short in addressing the role of Kenya’s media—previously used as an instrument of the state, it has since evolved into an independent voice driving public debate on issues like corruption. The media has been in the midst of the struggle for democracy and is still a dominant player in Kenya’s political and social space.

Branch’s book is both informative and engaging. It depicts Kenya’s true face and its struggle for democracy. The content is relevant when it comes to understanding the issues that plague Kenya’s politics and the second- and third-order effects on the country’s relatively fledgling polity and economy, its social structure, and its variegated belief/identity system. The 2013 election under a new constitution—though contentious—was peaceful, which is a credit to the reforms underway.
The first widespread use of helicopters across the battlefield by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps occurred during the Vietnam War—their use was so widespread that the helicopter became an iconic symbol of the conflict. The American military leadership saw the Vietnam conflict as the perfect place to experiment with their emerging air mobility doctrine, founded on the helicopter’s unique abilities, which promised to alleviate the difficulties posed by Vietnam’s nascent road network and difficult terrain.

Dick Camp’s *Assault from the Sky: Marine Corps Helicopter Operations in Vietnam* covers the history of Marine helicopters from the opening actions of Operation Shufly in 1962 until the final evacuation of Operation Frequent Wind in 1975. Each of the book’s 16 chapters vividly describes Marine helicopter actions against Communist Vietnamese forces, interspersed with sidebars describing aircraft, weapons, and award citations. The book is well illustrated and includes clear maps and diagrams, some coming directly from primary sources. The author’s writing style is engaging and colloquial, and the quotes are numerous but dramatic. This brisk writing style, however, becomes bogged down by the numerous unabridged award citations.

*Assault from the Sky* offers three appendices, including an essay on Marine helicopter development. The author does not use scholarly footnotes, choosing instead to cite most sources directly in the text and in the bibliography. Aside from award citations, the work draws heavily on
oral history interviews, command chronologies, secondary sources, and personal interviews.

Camp’s work draws the reader in, and the exciting tales of each operation easily maintain the reader’s interest. Unfortunately, while entertaining, the work fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of Marine helicopter operations during the Vietnam War. Instead, it provides an anthology of anecdotal “war stories.” On virtually every mission, some award for valor is earned, but everyday operations or times in which the helicopters are destroyed are rarely mentioned or described. There is also a large information gap between 1969 and 1975, with no mention of the withdrawal of major Marine units in 1971.

After the opening chapter’s discussion of Operation Shufly, the work describes Sure Wind 202 in support of the South Vietnamese military and the Viet Cong assault on the airfield at Chu Lai. The author goes on to examine actions during Operation Hastings and some of the special landing force’s helicopter operations off the coast of South Vietnam. Dramatic rescues of special operations soldiers at Lang Vei and elsewhere complement an account of the dramatic attempt to extract Team Boxcar’s Reconnaissance Marines. The “super gaggle” concept developed to resupply the hill positions around Khe Sanh is described alongside numerous anecdotal accounts of helicopter operations in the battle. The final third of the work is devoted to an examination of Operation Frequent Wind.

In the prologue, Camp declares that the book will “provide the reader with examples of the bravery, dedication, and sacrifice of Marine Corps aircrews in support of their infantry brethren.” The work certainly accomplishes that mission.
The “water wars” hypothesis—asserting that the confluence of rapid population growth and dwindling freshwater supplies, if left unchecked, will inexorably generate conflict—has long circulated in both the academic and policy-making communities. Whereas previous studies have focused on regional disputes, often in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, Brahma Chellaney’s *Water: Asia’s New Battleground* ambitiously tackles the broader hydropolitical affairs of Asia as a whole, arguing that widespread water scarcity is set to become the continent’s “defining crisis by mid-century” (p. 1). Chellaney, a professor at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, suggests that Asia represents “the most likely flashpoint for water wars” in the coming decades as water emerges as an increasingly precious commodity in the region (p. 4). Only through the development of cooperative institutions, he maintains, can Asia forestall the imminent threat of inter- and intrastate conflict.

Chellaney devotes most of his attention to water scarcity in eastern, southern, and southeastern Asia; the Middle East and Central Asia figure only briefly in his analysis. In turn, he argues that the Tibetan Plateau—the origin point for the Yangtze, Yellow, Mekong, Brahmaputra, and Indus Rivers—will prove critical to both geopolitical and environmental security in Asia in the years ahead. Perhaps unsurprisingly, China emerges as a key player in these riparian relations, unilaterally diverting water from the Tibetan Plateau and leaving water-stressed downstream states like India with diminished and/or degraded river flows. As Chellaney observes, “Between nuclear-armed, continental-
sized China and India, the water bomb is no less potent than the nuclear bomb” (p. 175). As growing concerns about water scarcity exacerbate existing conflicts over territory, identity, and ideology, the author calls for the creation of institutions aimed at establishing a transparent system of riparian rights and responsibilities and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation. “Only collaborative paths that embrace all stakeholders and break free from the business-as-usual approach,” Chellaney concludes, “can help unlock solutions” (p. 297).

Chellaney’s analysis of the Tibetan Plateau in general and hydropolitical relations along the Brahmaputra River in particular are unquestionably the book’s greatest strengths. The cases are thoroughly researched, drawing on an impressive body of interdisciplinary knowledge from the environmental sciences, geography, international law, and international relations to illustrate the precarious nature of riparian relations in the region. That said, while Chellaney advances a logically, consistently, and deductively plausible case for the potential threat of water wars in Asia, the causal link between water scarcity and violent conflict remains untested and largely speculative. An alternative perspective might convincingly argue that the costs of contemporary conflict are so high that riparian states in Asia have, if nothing else, a powerful economic incentive to peacefully manage transboundary freshwater resources rather than resorting to more contentious alternatives. Furthermore, while the solutions proposed in the text demonstrate an expert understanding of the challenges of interstate cooperation and the unique geopolitical and hydrological context of Asia, the notion of collaborative arrangements grounded in rights and responsibilities is a relatively common theme in the institutionalist literature. Notably, Chellaney’s diagnosis of the inadequacies of existing institutional arrangements in Asia offers valuable insights from a policy-making stand-
point; nevertheless, his proposals for addressing such deficiencies would benefit from further development.

In many regards, Chellaney’s central argument is a familiar refrain, closely mirroring the Malthusian logic of “water wars” literature. It also exhibits many of the same limitations associated with that body of research, specifically an inclination toward reductionism and a lack of evidence to support the causal link between scarcity and conflict. Moreover, the solutions Chellaney proposes—fostering cooperation by promoting new norms and creating institutional mechanisms to govern shared freshwater resources—are far from groundbreaking in a theoretical or practical sense. Nevertheless, *Water: Asia’s New Battleground* paints a vivid portrait of the interconnected nature of political, economic, and environmental security in contemporary Asia.

In an area of research dominated by studies of the Middle East, Chellaney provides a timely and extraordinarily thorough treatment of hydropolitics in eastern, southern, and southeastern Asia. Although *Water: Asia’s New Battleground* does not necessarily mark a major turning point in the study of water scarcity and conflict, it remains an ambitious effort that adds a fascinating dimension to, among other subjects, China’s rise to prominence and its tenuous relationship with India. In this regard, Chellaney’s text undoubtedly deserves a spot on the shelf of any scholar or policy maker with an interest in water politics in Asia.
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