IWO JIMA AND THE BONIN ISLANDS IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

American Strategy, Japanese Territory, and the Islanders In-between

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This is the book I never planned to write. My research on the Bonin Islands—I kept telling myself and friends—was supposed to end with an article or two and perhaps a few public presentations. My main field was U.S.-Japan relations and Okinawa, not the small and insignificant group of islands known by historians as the Bonins but administratively and officially known today as the Ogasawara Islands.¹

Or so I thought.

The opportunities to introduce my research findings grew exponentially, as did the number of trips to Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, and Iwo Jima,² and I found my interest in the subject expanding, too. Having completed books on Okinawa at the time of the peace treaty with Japan and the reversion of the Amami Islands, and successfully helped organize symposiums in Chichi Jima and published one book on the Bonins (edited by Daniel Long), it became apparent that a similar, in-depth study of the reversion of the Bonin Islands was necessary.

It was necessary both to complete the trilogy, so to speak, that I found myself doing—Okinawa, Amami, and now the Bonins—all groups of islands that the United States administered in one form or another and for different lengths of time in the postwar period, as well as to fill the curious void in the literature on U.S.-Japan relations and the postwar history of the Bonin Islands. (Friend and socio-linguist Danny Long’s occasional prodding, including telling Nanpo Shinsha, our Japanese publisher, to expect a book from me, did not help my resolve not to publish.) And so, after much reconsideration, I came to the conclusion that a study like this was indeed necessary.

Like my two other books about security and territorial issues in the U.S.-Japan relationship, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952³ and The Return of the Amami Islands: The Reversion Movement and U.S.-Japan Relations,⁴ this is first and foremost a study on the “intra-alliance” dynamics in which one country, the United States, continued to occupy and administer islands that were recognized as Japanese territory but, for a number of reasons, the United States and its wartime allies felt necessary to continue to administer. The longer this control continued, the more unnecessary it was seen by increasingly larger segments of the public and government of both countries due to the political erosion of the relationship caused by this friction. The question for policy makers and political leaders was finding the balance between security concerns, reversion demands, and national sentiment (in both countries), particularly as it related to the memory and sacrifices at Iwo Jima, in an effort to maintain friendly and cooperative relations. Eventually, the U.S. government agreed to Japanese requests to return the islands and this was done on 26 June 1968, a full four years prior to the even more problematic, but strategically important, Okinawa.
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations

I first started to take a strong interest in the Bonin Islands in the fall of 1999 after I had completed my doctoral dissertation at Kobe University's Graduate School of Law (under the care of diplomatic historian Dr. Iokibe Makoto) and submitted it for publication (it appeared as *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, mentioned above, in 2001). I learned of an American scholar and long-time resident of Japan, Dr. Daniel Long, who was looking at language use in the Bonin Islands, mixed as it is between Japanese and English. Dr. Long had compiled a helpful bibliography and numerous documents on the islands. He had recently moved from Osaka to Tokyo, but he kindly responded to my initial inquiry and eventually took the lead in organizing a successful interdisciplinary symposium I proposed in Chichi Jima the following year, which resulted in a nine-chapter book he edited entitled *Ogasawaragaku Koto Hajime* (An Introduction to Ogasawara Studies). After that he put together another conference, as well as two research groups (of which I was asked to join) studying diversity in the islands, in addition to numerous other projects on coexistence and language usage. It is not only scholars who are indebted to him, but the large number of tourists who make the 26-hour journey to the islands on the 6,700-ton Ogasawara Maru—he coauthored the popular *Ogasawara Handbook* (Nanpo Shinsha, 2004) complete with many colorful photos and brief discussions of the places, history, tropical life, and other encounters waiting there. He also coedited the *Ogasawara Kotoba Shaberu Jiten* (Talking Dictionary of the Bonin Islands Language) with Hashimoto Naoyuki, also by Nanpo Shinsha (2005), and published *English on the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands* in 2007. As the above work suggests, his contribution alone to Bonins (and Japan) studies has been huge.

I began presenting my findings on the Bonin Islands around the time of our first symposium in Chichi Jima in August 2000 and continued to do so at numerous seminars and conferences, including at the PhD Kenkyukai at the International House, Tokyo, in November 2000; the U.S.-Japan Relations Study Group (*Nichibei Kankei no Renzokusei/ Hirenzokusei Kenkyukai*) at Doshisha University, chaired by Professor Hosoya Masahiro, in January 2001; Professor Roger Dingman’s international history seminar at the University of Southern California in June 2001; and a subsequent symposium in Chichi Jima in late August 2002 before I was interrupted with other projects. These included getting the Okinawa book ready for publication in Japan, and Japanese and English versions of my book on the reversion of the Amami Islands, all three of which came out in a six-month period between the summer of 2003 and early 2004. Fortunately, I was able to continue with my Bonins research somewhat when Danny organized an interdisciplinary study group on the islands and received funding from the Japanese Ministry of Education and Science. For that project, I examined the U.S. naval administration of the islands, which forms the basis of chapter 5 in this study. We presented our findings at the Asian Studies Conference at Sophia University in Tokyo in June 2003 and published our collective work in *Ogasawara Kenkyu* (Ogasawara Research), a journal published by the Ogasawara Research Committee of Tokyo Metropolitan University (*Shuto Daigaku Tokyo Ogasawara Kenkyu Iinkai*). I was also fortunate enough to present a paper on the secret nuclear weapons agreements in both the Bonin and Okinawa reversions at the annual conference of the Society for the Historians of American Foreign Policy in northern Virginia in June 2007, which was subsequently published in *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*. Also, I had the opportunity to present about the Bonins, Okinawa, and the Amami Islands and the influ-
ence of the Cold War before the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University during my time there in the summer of 2008 as a visiting associate professor. Finally, upon moving to Okinawa in September 2009, I discussed a comparative history of the reversion processes of both Ogasawara and Okinawa at the 23d public lecture of the Okinawa Hosei Kenkyusho (Okinawa Institute of Law and Politics) of Okinawa Kokusai Daigaku (Okinawa International University) on 22 December 2009.

In addition to Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, my interest in Iwo Jima, farther to the south, began to grow when I had the rare privilege, in March 2003, of attending the commemoration ceremony marking the 58th anniversary of the Battle of Iwo Jima on the island, flying with U.S. Marines and some Ground Self-Defense Force personnel from Okinawa on a military transport plane out of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, Ginowan City, Okinawa. The ceremony was dignified and moving, a true “Reunion of Honor.” With this, I began to think how I could incorporate the story of the Battle of Iwo Jima—the place that most vividly symbolized the clash of strategic interests and sacrifice—with the overall bilateral history of the Ogasawara Islands. A subsequent visit to Iwo Jima in April 2007, again with U.S. Marines (as part of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s Professional Military Education program) from Okinawa, deepened my understanding of that horrific battle, as did two additional trips in February and March 2010 as part of the 65th anniversary of the battle and the accompanying bilateral Reunion of Honor. Meeting with U.S. Iwo Jima veterans over the years helped me to learn what the island meant to them and to my country. While there were several veterans who had opposed the return of Iwo Jima to Japan in 1968, most of them thought it was not only inevitable but also the right thing to do. They truly were the “greatest generation.” Keeping in mind the bravery shown by Japanese forces on that isolated island, the same could be said of many on the Japanese side as well.

My interest in Iwo Jima only continued to grow after I had the opportunity to do a sabbatical as a scholar-in-residence at the headquarters of U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, at Camp H. M. Smith in Oahu, Hawaii, from September 2004 to August 2005, then under the command of Lieutenant General Wallace C. Gregson. While there, I learned more of the importance of Iwo Jima for the Marines, and was befriended by Alice and Sefton B. Clark, chairpersons of the Pacific War Memorial Association (PWMA) in Hawaii. I joined the association’s board in 2005, and traveled that August to Camp Tarawa on the Big Island, which served as the critical training location for the 5th Marine Division in preparing to take Iwo Jima. An incredible bonus came when the unpublished diary of a Navy corpsman attached to the 28th Marines of the 5th Marine Division was donated to the PWMA before Memorial Day 2005 and I was given the opportunity to transcribe it and use it for my research. Alice and I published a portion of it in the Marine Corps Gazette the following spring. Through Alice, I met the late Major General Fred E. Haynes, mentioned in the acknowledgments, who was a Marine captain in the Battle of Iwo Jima and served on the association’s board with us until his passing in March 2010. Later, I got to know a member of the 5th Division, Iwo veteran Charles W. Tatum, who served as an 18-year-old machine gunner in the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, and was in the battle’s first assault wave. He and I later coedited and published the memoirs of the late Imperial Japanese Army major, Horie Yoshitaka.
Over the years, I have been fortuitous enough not only to visit many of the places I was writing about, as well as to travel to nearby locations such as Hawaii, Guam, and Saipan to examine the comparative Pacific island cultures, but also to interview many of the policy makers and military and civilian officials involved in implementing that policy, as well as others who were involved in the history in one way or another.

This book, therefore, is a product of the above experiences. When beginning, I initially was interested in examining five questions: How and why did the United States come to occupy and administer the islands? What was the Navy’s administration like for the islands? How did the Japanese government feel about the islands being under U.S. control? How and when did the United States decide to return the islands? How were the negotiations over the reversion agreement handled?

The more I studied the postwar period, the more I became interested in the prewar and wartime history to better understand the islands’ background as well as their political, diplomatic, commercial, military, and strategic importance. I eventually decided to look not only at the postwar period but to include several chapters on the prewar as well. In doing so, I discovered that the story of the Bonins and Iwo Jima is not only a bilateral U.S.-Japan history, but an international one as well. Namely, the islands were first discovered by European sailors, explored by Japanese, settled by people of Western descent, claimed by Japan, occupied (in the postwar) by the United States, and then returned to Japan. In other words, the islands are at the center of Western—in particular American (and British)—interactions with Japan and the Pacific. As mentioned earlier, the Battle of Iwo Jima in 1945 perhaps best symbolizes the strategic clash of American and Japanese interests. At the same time, its return in 1968 also symbolized the degree to which the diplomatic and political partnership had matured. The structure of the book seeks to capture this interplay and the development of the bilateral relationship.

There will undoubtedly be different opinions and feelings with regard to that history, especially as they relate to the Battle of Iwo Jima, something I have felt over the course of numerous interviews with veterans of both sides and their supporters. It is also something that was captured in a published interview with Nishi Yasunori, the eldest son of Baron Nishi Takeichi, a 1932 Olympic equestrian gold medalist, and a tank commander at Iwo: “Japanese and Americans feel entirely differently about Iwo Jima. For us Japanese, it is an island mourning the dead. For the Americans, it is an island for glorifying their victory.” Moreover, for many Japanese, the Battle of Iwo Jima is not yet over: only about one-third of the remains of Japanese soldiers and sailors have been recovered and thus many more still need to be found. The author is American, but I sympathize with the Japanese families who have, for a variety of reasons, not been able to recover the remains of their loved ones and pray that they have found some repose. The same can be said of the U.S. side as well—thousands did not return alive from that battle and approximately 250 are listed as missing in action.

This book is an attempt to both bridge the gap—and show the similarities—in understanding this issue on both sides, as well as to examine the dynamics of the interplay between the United States and Japan over the destiny of the islands, mentioned above. It is not only a historical study of U.S.-Japan relations and Japanese political and diplomatic history but is also an attempt to contribute to Bonin- and Iwo Jima-related studies.
I realize that readers come from different backgrounds and academic disciplines, but I hope you are satisfied with the results.

On a final note, this book was first published in Japanese in August 2008, and in preparing it for publication in English, I have continued to gather materials and conduct interviews as well as present my findings at gatherings in Tokyo, Kyoto, Hokkaido, and Okinawa. I have also since resigned from Osaka University to join the U.S. Civil Service, serving proudly as the deputy assistant chief of staff, G-5, at U.S. Marine Corps Base, Japan (now known as G-7, Marine Corps Installations Pacific), in Okinawa. The views expressed in this book are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the command to which I belong.

Robert D. Eldridge
Futami Bay, Chichi Jima, Japan
26 June 2008 (40th anniversary of reversion)
Chatan, Okinawa, Japan
19 February 2012 (67th anniversary of start of battle)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Over the many years doing this research, I have been helped by a number of people. I wish to acknowledge them here.

As always, I wish to express my indebtedness to my mentor, Professor Iokibe Makoto, currently president of the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan, who served as my advisor at the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University. Always generous with praise, he is equally willing to share his insights into the dynamics of the relationship that brought our two countries together and which make them interact the way they do.

Second, thanks go to my “compass in life,” my wife Emiko, and to my children, Ami Mary and Kennan Thomas, who did not complain when I went on trips to the Bonin Islands (known in Japan as the Ogasawara Islands), Iwo Jima, and my many other research journeys around Japan and the United States. I only wish I could have taken them on all of my travels.

Third, my gratitude to Dr. Daniel “Danny” Long of Tokyo Metropolitan University, for his friendship and mentoring on Bonin studies and for the introductions made and hundreds of documents and articles shared with me over the years. Through Dr. Long, I was able to become a visiting researcher at the Ogasawara Research Committee of the same university from 2007–8, which provided a stimulating research environment, particularly at its facility on the islands. Moreover, Danny invited me to participate in two multidisciplinary research projects on the Bonin Islands, one from 2002 to 2004, and the other from 2007 to the time of this writing, funded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Grant-in Aide for Scientific Research, B1 #14390043, and a Suntory Foundation Humanities and Social Science Grant respectively.

Fourth, I wish to thank retired Marine Corps Lieutenant Generals Wallace C. Gregson and George J. Trautman, who both kindly arranged for me to visit the usually off-limits Iwo Jima in March 2003 and April 2007, respectively, as part of the research for this book and to expand my understanding of the United States Marine Corps. As discussed in the preface, both trips were very special experiences, made all the more special due to the ability to travel with them and their Marines. Retired Colonel Dan L. Melton—who served as the Marine attaché at the U.S. embassy in Tokyo (2006–8) and now works for the Joint Pacific Accounting Command in Hawaii, visited Iwo Jima a number of times including with the first-ever mission of the Joint Prisoners of War/Missing in Action Command in July 2007, and himself lost a great-uncle in the battle—kindly shared his insights into the history of the battle and complicated dynamics of Iwo Jima’s position in U.S.-Japan relations.

Fifth, I wish to thank the many individuals from or living on the Bonin Islands who have assisted my research over the years through the granting of interviews, the provision of documents and photos, the personal tours of specific sites, and hosting me for both formal and informal functions there. Ohira Rance provided several fun evenings and many insights
during conversations at his Yankee Town bar, as did his friends who were back visiting for the summer. The dive shop, Kaizin, provided equally exciting marine experiences. Speaking of maritime experiences, Murata Tokushiro personally led me on tours of wartime sites and weaponry along the sea in his boat and into the caves of the island over two full days. But especially, I wish to thank Shimada Kinuko and Savory Takashi (Jonathon Savory) of the Ogasawara Board of Education for their generosity.

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Seventh, I wish to thank the staffs at the numerous archives I have visited over the years, including the U.S. National Archives at College Park, Washington National Records Center, U.S. Naval Operational Archives, Chester M. Nimitz Library at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Marine Corps History Division, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Richard B. Russell Library at the University of Georgia, Princeton University’s Seeley G. Mudd Library, Virginia Historical Society, Pusey Library at Harvard, State Library of Massachusetts, Minneapolis Historical Society, Okinawa Kyokai (Okinawa Association), and the Institute for Okinawa Studies, Hosei University. I would also like to thank retired U.S. Marine Corps Colonel Richard Camp, formerly with Marine Corps History Division and now vice president of the Marine Corps Heritage Foundation, for his active assistance.

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Ninth, I am appreciative for the numerous opportunities to present my findings at academic conferences and various seminars and symposiums and for the comments and criticisms generated by the fellow panelists, discussants, and audiences.

Tenth, I wish to acknowledge Mukohara Takashi, the publisher of the Japanese version of this book, which appeared prior to the English one. Mukohara, who was dissatisfied with the fact that most Japanese publishing houses are concentrated in Tokyo, took a dream more than 15 years ago—the desire to publish quality books on regional and local issues in Japan from a provincial area (in this case, his hometown of Kagoshima)—and built it into a successful publishing firm, Nanpo Shinsha. Mukohara published our first book on the Bonin Islands (Daniel Long, ed., Ogasawaragaku Koto Hajime [An Introduction to Ogasawara Studies], Nanpo Shinsha, 2002) and the Japanese edition of my book on Amami (Amami Henkan to Nichibei Kankei [The Reversion of Amami and U.S.-Japan Relations], Nanpo Shinsha, 2003), and even attended the 2002 symposium in Chichi Jima. He has since created an “Ogasawara Series,” the Japanese version of this book being the fifth in it. Congratulations Mukohara-san for realizing your dream, and thank you for helping us to realize some of ours.

Finally, I wish to thank the director and staff at the Marine Corps University Press for the interest they showed in making this book a reality and for the dedication and professionalism they showed throughout the project.
The moral of the story of the Bonin Islands is plain for all to see. Mutual Anglo-American mistrust and petty jealousies were responsible for handing over the Bonin Islands to the Japanese.

—Robert Standish, *Bonin: A Novel*

The Bonin Islands, known in Japanese as the Ogasawara Islands, are comprised of four groups of islands—the Muko Jima (5 islands, 2.6 sq. mi.) group, the Chichi Jima (10 islands, 15.2 sq. mi.) group, the Haha Jima (9 islands, 10.6 sq. mi.) group, and the Volcano (Kazan) Island group (3 islands, 10.8 sq. mi.)—and three separate and quite isolated islands, for a total of about 30 islands, most of which are uninhabited. Together, the islands comprise a land area of approximately 40 sq. mi.

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The Bonin Islands, the largest of which are Chichi Jima (9.47 sq. mi.) and Haha Jima (8.2 sq. mi.), lie between latitude 27°45' and 26°30' north (at longitude 145°18' east), which means they are about 600 miles south-southeast from Tokyo (536 miles in the case of Chichi Jima). The Volcano Islands, the largest of which is Iwo Jima, lie a farther 125 miles southwest of the Bonin group (Iwo Jima is 147 miles from Chichi Jima). They are included in the Bonin (officially, Ogasawara) Islands for administrative purposes and extend from latitude 25°26' to 24°14' north (longitude 141°18' east). Marcus Island, also known as Minami Tori Jima and Weeks Island, lies 669 miles east of Chichi Jima and is located at latitude 24°17' north and longitude 153°58' east.

The name “Bonin” is believed to derive from a misreading of the Chinese characters for the Japanese name of the islands, “Mujin,” which evolved into “Bujin” and then “Bunin,” all of which mean “no man” or uninhabited. The Bonin Islands, of which Chichi Jima and Haha Jima are now inhabited, are accessible only by boat (a journey that takes about 26 hours). The 6,700-ton *Ogasawara Maru*, with a capacity for 1,043 passengers, runs about once a week between Tokyo and Chichi Jima, and the *Haha Jima Maru*, a smaller vessel, runs between Chichi Jima and Haha Jima daily. Irregular freighters, such as the *Kyosho Maru*, also take passengers to Chichi Jima. In emergencies, a seaplane, such as those operated by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) and the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG) can be mobilized to transport patients. Although Iwo Jima has an airfield, its use is essentially limited to military aircraft and the occasional charter flight for commemoration events. While JMSDF personnel and base workers stay on the island for extended periods of time, no civilians permanently live there today.
As seen in figure 1, the Bonin and Volcano Islands form two of the three larger groupings of islands (*rettō*) making up the Nanpo Shoto island chain that runs southward from Tokyo Bay to within 300 miles of the Mariana Islands. The first group is the Izu Shoto, where many of the Bonin islanders, displaced during and after World War II, would eventually settle. This study concerns the latter two groups, the Bonin and Volcano Islands, which were administratively separated from the Japanese mainland during the occupation of Japan (1945–52) until 1968, when the islands were returned to Japan.\(^\text{25}\)

The numerous islands making up these groups, having been discovered (and “rediscovered”) and settled by Westerners but also explored and later settled by Japanese as well, over time came to possess several names.\(^\text{26}\) Figure 2 provides a comparative list of the different names for the same places.
The sovereignty and settlement of Iwo Jima were never really contentious international issues in the prewar period, so the author generally uses “Iwo Jima” and “Volcano Islands,” unless discussing their initial discovery and naming by Western explorers and sailors, at which time Iwo Jima was called “Sulphur Island.” Of course, as discussed earlier, the Japanese government recently decided to officially recognize the old appellations used by the islanders, renaming Iwo Jima, Kita Iwo Jima, and Minami Iwo Jima as Iwo (Io) To, Kita Iwo (Io) To, and Minami Iwo (Io) To. It is uncertain how long it will take for the reemergence of their old names to be used popularly again, as most people, on both sides of the Pacific, are more familiar with the reading “Iwo Jima” and may have never known that it was also pronounced “Iwo (Io) To” in the past.
Lying within range of the warm Japan Current/Stream (otherwise known as the \textit{Nihon Kairyu} or \textit{Kuroshio}) and having a subtropical marine climate, the Bonin Islands are a lush green group of islands with fresh drinking water. While the Bonins are volcanic in origin, having been formed in the Eocene epoch and ending before the Miocene by successive lava flows from submarine volcanoes\textsuperscript{27}, the soil is quite fertile (made up of andesitic lava called “Boninite,” sedimentary agglomerate tufaceous rocks, and layers of coral limestone\textsuperscript{28}), and the annual mean temperature is in the mid-70s (Fahrenheit), 73 degrees in the case of Chichi Jima and 78 for Haha Jima, 32 miles farther south. The hot season, from April to November, raises the temperature into the 80s. Rainfall averages about 62 inches per year.\textsuperscript{29}

The Volcano Islands, on the other hand, as the name implies, are an actual volcano with sulphur springs and other thermal activity. The shape of the island continues to change annually, and rise in height. These islands fall in the tropical zone. They are actually comprised of three islands, two of which—Iwo Jima and Kita Iwo Jima—were inhabited prewar. Iwo Jima, which serves today as the JMSDF base (with occasional use by the U.S. military for the U.S. Navy carrier air wing’s field carrier landing practice and other purposes), is the main one of the group, at 4.5 miles in length and 2.5 miles in width at its widest point (8 sq. mi.). The second largest island is Kita Iwo Jima, 40 miles north of Iwo Jima. It is approximately 2 sq. mi. in area. The third is Minami Iwo Jima, 36 miles southwest of Iwo Jima, with an area of 1 sq. mi.

Iwo Jima’s most famous natural feature, found in the southernmost part of the island, is its partially active volcano, the 556-feet-high Suribachiyama, or Mt. Suribachi. Being a volcano, Iwo Jima is sulphuric, with a grayish-black volcanic sand covering much of the island, making it difficult (but not impossible) to farm or even live. Indeed, a productive community emerged there as the soil was suitable for the production of sugar cane and sulphur mining grew as an industry. Other crops, however, would have difficulty growing and it would probably be difficult to support a large community.

Nevertheless, people started to travel and live on the islands in 1875, about 50 years after Chichi Jima was originally settled by Westerners and around the same time that the Bonins were being settled by Japanese. With drinking water scarce, prewar settlers relied primarily on rain water. Sixty inches of rain falls annually.\textsuperscript{30} Temperatures range from 63 to 70 degrees Fahrenheit from December to April, and 73 to 80 degrees between May and November. In the height of the summer, temperatures sometimes go as high as 95 degrees.\textsuperscript{31} One famous quote, “Iwo did not need the battle to be Hell,” said by numerous Marine veterans, captures the environment perfectly.

The islands are believed to have been formed 10 to 40 million years ago. Despite being so old, it is only in the last 170-plus years that people have been living there, although some excavations in Kita Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima, and Haha Jima suggest that people, likely from the nearby Marianas Islands, had at least visited at one point during the Stone Age.\textsuperscript{32}

The later-named (or misnamed) Bonin Islands were sighted in 1639 by Dutch sailors (Spanish explorers had discovered the nearby Volcano Islands in 1543), and investigated by Japanese authorities in 1675. However, the islands were not settled, and did not become of interest internationally until the second quarter of the 1800s when American and British
whalers began stopping for refuge and supplies. They would next gain international attention when Iwo Jima became the site of one of the most horrific battles in World War II.

The Bonin and Volcano groups have been a part of Japanese territory officially and without incident since 1876, except for two decades after World War II when they were administered by the United States. And, even during that time, Japan still retained “residual sovereignty” over the islands. The discovery and exploration of these two groups of islands, particularly the Bonins group, is a complicated tale and intertwined between foreign discoverers and settlers and Japanese explorations and claims. The islands were first sighted by foreigners, first explored by Japanese, first settled by foreigners, and then later first successfully claimed and annexed by Japan. One writer would later lament that “the moral of the story of the Bonin Islands is plain for all to see. Mutual Anglo-American mistrust and petty jealousies were responsible for handing over the Bonin Islands to the Japanese. So anxious were Britons that the islands should not be American, and vice versa, that both contributed much to make the Japanese claim appear valid.”

Chapter 1 examines this international history, describing the discovery, exploration, settlement, ownership, and development of the islands to provide the setting for why one of the fiercest battles in World War II took place, and why the United States believed it necessary to occupy the islands for 23 years after the war. Being for the most part not easily accessible, then and now, several myths and legends have evolved over the centuries about the islands. However, based on the writings of subsequent historians, anthropologists, and other scholars (who, too, more often than not have differed factually in several places), and several trips to the islands and elsewhere for research and interviews, the author has tried to recreate the history of the islands’ discovery and settlement, including that of Iwo Jima. This book is not so much a social history as it is one about the diplomacy surrounding the islands and the people who have shaped that history. Because of this, the author chose not to describe in detail the daily lives of the people living on the islands, with the exception of how their lives were impacted by the various international dynamics, including the coming of war, their subsequent evacuations, and the long-term occupation of the islands.

Chapter 2 looks at Iwo Jima and the war in the Pacific, discussing not only the horrific battle and the American planning and strategy behind taking it (as well as Japanese plans to defend Iwo), but also at the supreme irony of the island being commanded by Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi, an officer educated abroad who had long argued against the folly of war with the United States. It also looks at how on the battlefield the two sides came to view, and sometimes respect, one another amid the fighting and how both sides now look at the battle.

Chapter 3 moves 180 miles to the north to see how the Bonins, in particular Chichi Jima, was affected by the war and looks at the tragedy of downed U.S. pilots who were abused, murdered, and eaten by some of their sadistic Japanese captors. This chapter contrasts the leadership of Kuribayashi on Iwo, who has earned some respect in both Japan and the United States, with that of the local commanding general, Lieutenant General Tachibana Yoshio, later sentenced and executed for war crimes, and highlights the careful work of the U.S. commander, Marine Colonel Presley M. Rixey, and his staff in uncovering what he called the camouflage by “old Tachi.” It includes primary documents from the investi-
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gation, including a two-day interview conducted by the author with the lead investigator, then-Marine Major Robert D. Shaffer, and a review of his extensive collection of personal papers.

Chapter 4 examines the disposition of the Bonin and Volcano Islands at the time of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty and the competing views of the U.S. military and the State Department on their handling. It also looks at how the Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, tried to respond to the prospect of losing control and perhaps sovereignty itself over the islands, despite Japan’s not having diplomatic rights at the time.

Chapter 5 explores the U.S. Navy’s occupation and administration of the islands, and life on Chichi Jima, for the initial 126 islanders of Western descent who were allowed to return in October 1946 after having been evacuated in the summer of 1944 by the Imperial Japanese government. In addition to looking at how islanders interacted with U.S. Navy authorities and personnel, the chapter examines their efforts to seek U.S. citizenship and, by at least some of them, to prevent the return of the former inhabitants of Japanese descent (which, as I uncovered for the first time, appears to have been done at the instigation of Navy authorities), as well as the concerns they had as a result of the decision to revert the islands.

Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the bilateral issues that emerged following the Treaty of Peace with Japan going into effect on 28 April 1952, looking first at the question of reversion, followed by that of repatriation for the approximate 7,700 islanders of Japanese descent who were not being permitted to return to Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, Iwo Jima, and Kita Iwo Jima. When neither reversion nor repatriation was possible, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed to a compensation package for the islanders who could not return. Another demand—that of visiting the graves of ancestors located on the islands—would also be an issue, taking many years to resolve. Moreover, this chapter discusses the failed efforts by Japanese families and other representatives to locate the remains of fallen Japanese soldiers on Iwo Jima, more than 40 years after the return of the island.

Chapter 8 focuses on the bilateral discussions leading to the decision to return the islands and the negotiations for the reversion agreement of April 1968, including the assumption of regional defense commitments by Japan, and examines in detail the two major bilateral problems with the reversion—nuclear weapons storage rights and the status of the Iwo Jima memorial on Mt. Suribachi.

The concluding chapter describes the end of the era and the significance of the return of the islands, looking at the official reversion ceremony on 26 June 1968, held on Chichi Jima, the smaller one on Iwo Jima, and the celebratory events in Tokyo, and also briefly looks at Japanese and U.S. efforts to ease the transition of the islands and islanders back to Japan.
NOTES

1I have chosen to use the historic name of the islands (i.e. the Bonins or the Bonin Islands) throughout most of the text unless there are specific reasons to use “Ogasawara,” such as when it is used in the title of a book or document, an office, or as part of a particular discussion.

2As I was writing this book, the Japanese Geographical Survey Institute (Kokudo Chiri In) announced on 18 June 2007, that the name of Iwo Jima was going to be changed to Iwo (or Io) To, with maps using the revised name to go on sale on 1 September. In addition, Kita Iwo Jima became Kita Iwo (Io) To, and Minami Iwo Jima became Minami Iwo (Io) To. The name changes were done at the request of Ogasawara municipal government and made after studying the issue in the Coordinating Committee for Unifying Geographical Names (Chimeito no Toitsu ni kansuru renraku kyogikai), which is comprised of the above institute and the Japanese Coast Guard’s Maritime Information Directorate (Kaijo Hoancho Kaiyo Johobu). For more, see “Iwojima, Site of Fierce Battle, is Officially Renamed Iwoto,” Japan Times, 19 June 2007. According to the Ogasawara village government, former inhabitants of the islands had used Iwo To, and had long requested that the name be changed back to Iwo To, as Iwo Jima had become so widely and commonly used. In March 2007, the village assembly passed a resolution calling for the name change and this resolution was sent to the Geographical Survey Institute for its review. For more, see the village government’s announcement at http://www.vill.ogasawara.tokyo.jp/topics/information_000057.html. For an informative discussion on the historic name of the island, see Takeichi Ginjiro, Iwoto: Kyokugen no Senjo ni Kakomareta Nihonjin no Tamashii [Iwo To: The Spirit of the Japanese Captured in This Extreme Battleground] (Tokyo: Omura Shoten, 2001), 12. I have chosen to use the more common name of the islands, i.e., Iwo Jima, throughout most of the book unless “Iwoto” or “Ioto” is specifically used.


5The bibliography is available on his website at http://nihongo.human.metro-u.ac.jp/~long/default.html.


11For more on this trip, see Robert D. Eldridge, “Honoring the Dead: A Trip to Iwo Jima,” Kansai Time Out, no. 316 (June 2003). The annual ceremony known as the “Reunion of Honor” officially began in 1985 through the sponsorship of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Division Associations of the United
States Marine Corps and the Iwo Jima Association (Iwo Jima Kyokai), based in Yokosuka, Japan. For the 1985 reunion, see “The Return to Iwo Jima: You Can Almost Feel the Ghosts,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 21 February 1985; and Peter Carlson, “Forty Years After the Battle, 200 Marines Make a Return Trip to the Sands of Iwo Jima,” People Magazine, 11 March 1985, 99–100, 105. According to the authors of Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo [The Tragic End of the Soldiers Sent to Ogasawara], the president of the 5th Marine Division, Charles Early, had called for a reunion of the veterans of both sides to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the battle, but opinion in Japan was heavily divided, particularly over the question of whether survivors and those captured in the battle should be considered heroes or not. In the end, the Japanese side did not participate in previous attempts to meet. See Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo [The Tragic End of the Soldiers Sent to Ogasawara] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1969), 119. However, on 19 February 1970, survivors of the battle on both sides did in fact meet on the top of Mt. Suribachi. See “Iwo Jima de 25 Nen Buri Saikai: Nichibei Ikinokori Shohei ga Godo Ireisai” [Meeting Again After 25 Years: Japanese and American Survivors Conduct Joint Memorial Ceremony], Asahi Shimbun, 20 February 1970. It appears that the next large ceremony was not held until 1985. After 1985, it was not held again for some time but was subsequently restarted in 1993. See Kamisaka Fuyuko, Iwo Jima Imada Gyokusai Sezu [Iwo Jima Has Yet to Perish] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1993), 242. Also see Eldridge and Tatum, eds., Fighting Spirit, particularly the editors’ preface, for more on Major Horie’s efforts and promoting these exchanges.

12For more on the PWMA, see http://www.pacificwarmemorial.org/.


16“Japan and U.S. Have Distant Views of Iwo Jima,” Asahi Shim bun, 17 March 2005. Also see Paul D. Scott, “Flagging Battles,” Kansai Time Out, no. 360 (February 2007), 65, for a discussion on the cinematic views of Iwo Jima, in which he discusses the two recent movies, Flags of Our Fathers and Letters from Iwo Jima, which provide different perspectives on the battle.

17Interviews with Endo Kiyoshi, president of the Iwo Jima Association, 18 July 2007, Yokosuka, Japan, and Ogawa Chikako, the daughter of the founder of the same association, the late Wachi Tsunezo, 5 June 2008, Kunitachi City, Tokyo, Japan. Chapter 7 discusses the early efforts (late 1940s–1960s) to recover the remains of those on the Japanese side who died on Iwo Jima. For an accounting of the postreversion recovery efforts of the remains, see Iwo Jima Ikotsu Shushu Kirokushi Hensan Iinkai, ed., Iwo Jima Ikotsu Shushu Kirokushi [A Record of Recovering Remains on Iwo Jima] (Chichi Jima: Ogasawara Village, 1999); and Ogasawara Shoto Henkan 30 Shunen Kigyo Jikko Iinkai, ed., Ogasawara Shoto Henkan 30 Shunen Kinenshi: Kako to Genzai to Mirai o Tenbo Suru [Publication on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of the Reversion of the Ogasawara Islands: Looking to the Future from the Past and Present] (Ogasawara: Ogasawara Shoto Henkan 30 Shunen Kigyo Jikko Iinkai, 1998), 287. As of 1997, some 8,027 remains were recovered, but only a handful were identified. According to a Japanese government report, by the middle of 2010, 8,715 remains had been returned, based on 77 official searches of 1,158 locations. See “IWOTO KARA no Ikotsu Kikan no tame no Tokumei Chiimu Chukan Torimatome [Interim Report by Special Team to Return Remains from IWOTO], 26 August 2010. These remains included those of a Japanese soldier killed on Iwo Jima who was identified in December 2009 using DNA testing. It was the first
positive match since DNA testing began in fiscal year 2003. See “Iwo Jima Soldier Identified/DNA Test Confirms For 1st Time ID of Remains Found Outside Siberia,” Daily Yomiuri, 12 December 2009. In early August 2010, the new Japanese prime minister, Kan Naoto, who had served more than a decade earlier as the minister of Health and Welfare, the agency in charge of the recovery of remains, established a special government team mentioned above called the 

*Iwoto kara no Ikotsu Kikan no tame no Tokumei Chiimu.* Using documentation from the United States National Archives and other sources, the Japanese government’s special team was able to locate the site of mass “enemy cemeteries” near the airfield that currently is used by the Self-Defense Forces. See “U.S. Archives Document Mass Graves on Iwoto,” Daily Yomiuri, 1 August 2010; “New U.S. Documents Pinpoint Sites of Iwojima Burials,” Japan Times, 19 August 2010; “Kan Takes in Iwojima Graves Hunt,” Japan Times, 15 December 2010. Kan personally visited the islands on 14 December that year after some remains had been excavated at two sites and participated in a memorial service while there. For the address he gave, see “Address by Prime Minister Naoto Kan at the Memorial Service for the War Dead in Ioto, 14 December 2010,” available on the Cabinet Office’s website.

18See “American Team on Iwo Jima Searches For Marine Who Filmed Iconic Flag-Raising,” International Herald Tribune (Asia-Pacific version), 22 June 2007. The United States reportedly has a total of 88,000 MIA from World War II.


21The three separate islands are Marcus Island or Southern Island (Minami Torishima), the easternmost island of Japan; Okino Torishima (Remote Bird Island), the southernmost island (or reef) of Japan; and Nishinoshima (Western Island, also known as Rosario Island). The islands are not geographically part of the Ogasawara Islands but are administered under them through the Ogasawara village office.

22See 1n in the preface for an explanation of the recent (June 2007) name change from Iwo Jima to Iwo (Io) To.

23For more on the location and table of distance for the islands, see Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Civil Affairs Handbook: Izu and Bonin Islands, OPNAV 50E-9, 10 July 1944, 3.

24Tanaka Hiroyuki, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara: Obei no Hogaisein de Sasaeta Midori no Shima [Ogasawara during the Bakumatsu Years: The Green Islands that Prospered by Western Whalers] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1997), 22.

25The Izu Islands were administratively separated from mainland Japan in late January 1946, as were many other islands, such as Okinawa, Amami, and the Bonins, but unlike those islands, Japanese administration over the Izus was returned two months later in March 1946 due in part to their lack of strategic value, among other reasons.

when the first permanent settlers would arrive, the islands had gone through several name changes as mentioned above. These changes are best captured in the map appearing in the work of Lionel B. Cholmondeley, a British missionary in Tokyo attached to the British embassy who visited the islands almost two dozen times during his 34 years in Japan. The documents he referenced when writing his book were unfortunately destroyed during World War II. See Tanaka, Bakumatsu, 42; and Lionel B. Cholmondeley, A History of the Bonin Islands from the Year 1827 to the Year 1876 (London: Constable and Co., 1915). For more on Cholmondeley, see Hamish Ion, “Lionel Berners Cholmondeley: A Chaplain in Tokyo 1887–1921,” in Ian Nish, ed., Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits, vol. 2 (London: Japan Society of London, 1997), 180–89.


29Ibid., 8.


31Ibid.


33For more on the residual sovereignty formula, see chapter 4. Also see Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, particularly chapter 7.

34Robert Standish, Bonin: A Novel (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944), ix. Standish was the pen-name of the British novelist, Digby George Gerahty.

35It is interesting to note, for example, how the language being used by the residents has changed from English to Japanese to English and back to Japanese again, depending on who was administering the islands. Socio-linguists, such as Daniel Long, have dedicated much of their research to examine language acquisition and merger in the islands. In addition to Long’s coedited dictionary cited above, see Daniel Long, et al., “Ogasawara in Okeru Nihongo Shutoku no Rekishi—Navy Sedai no Obeiikei Tomin no Gengo Seikatsu Chosa Kara” [A History of the Acquisition of the Japanese Language in Ogasawara Based on a Survey of the Language Used by the Islanders of Western Descent in their Daily Lives during the Years of the Navy Administration], Ogasawara Kenkyu Nenpo [Ogasawara Research], no. 28 (March 2005), 87–122; Daniel Long, ed., “Ogasawara Shoto no Tagengo Jokyo ni Kansuru Jittai Chosa Hokoku” [Multiple Language Usage on the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands: A Field Survey Report], Ogasawara Kenkyu [Ogasawara Research], no. 32 (March 2007), 21–103; and Abe Shin, Ogasawara Shoto ni Okeru Nihongo no Hogen Sesshoku: Hogen Keisei to Hogen Ishiki (Kagoshima: Nanpo Shinsha, 2006).

36Different sources cite the numbers 129 and 135, among other figures, as the number of actual returnees, but this author will use 126 (63 males and 63 females) based on a list prepared in Japanese by the Ogasawara village office in 1985.
CHAPTER 1

HISTORY OF THE ISLANDS TO THE PACIFIC WAR

They wanted to be regarded as Bonin Islanders . . . they wished to be left alone in undisturbed possession of their holdings, and the less that was said about nationality or protection of any kind the better.

—Interview with Maria Savory by British diplomat Russell Robertson, November 1875

While much has been written about the “discovery” and early settlement of the islands by Westerners and Japanese, and the general outline is known, the details, however, are often vague or left out altogether, and in some cases, the narrative is based on legend or faulty research. As a result, a large portion of what has been written contains numerous errors, with these mistakes regularly repeated. Even today, fact and fiction tend to be intertwined, creating an image of the islands as being “mysterious.” The difficulty in accessing the islands only adds to their mystery, as does the mixed ethnic make-up of the islanders when compared to the so-called “homogeneous” Japanese.

Hyman Kublin, who did some of the most meticulous historical research on the islands a half-century ago, and Tanaka Hiroyuki, in recent decades, contributed immensely to clarifying fact from fiction, truth from legend. Getting at the heart of the matter, Kublin observed that due to the interests—commercial, strategic, or territorial—of England, Russia, Japan, and the United States in the islands, “investigation and speculation concerning the discovery of the islands were colored more by self-interest and actual ignorance than by impartial consideration of the facts.”

DISCOVERING THE BONIN AND VOLCANO ISLANDS

The early accounts of the discovery of the Bonin and Volcano Islands remain shrouded in a veil of legends, myths, and imperfect descriptions. “Imprecise methods of navigation and cartography,” Kublin explains, “the loss, destruction, and actual concealment of many of the relevant records, and the lack of interest of early merchant explorers in lands which had no obvious commercial value have made for a series of most difficult historical problems.” Similarly, being so far from mainland Japan, which had adopted a self-imposed seclusion policy known as sakoku, the islands were unknown to, or at least unexplored by, the Japanese until well into the seventeenth century. A story promoted by an opportunistic ronin (masterless samurai) that first circulated in 1727 in which Prince Ogasawara Sadayori had discovered them and named them munin (uninhabited, literally “no people”) in 1593 was later found to be untrue.

In fact, the discovery of at least some of the Bonin Islands (actually, the Volcano Islands) dates back even further to the sixteenth century when Spanish explorer Bernardo de la
The author generally uses the names “Bonins” for the sake of consistency, but occasionally uses Ogasawara depending on the context. Japanese names for the individual islands are generally used unless otherwise noted. Figure 3, circa 1915, introduces the traditional local place names, employing some of the Japanese names as well.
Torre, captain of the San Juan and a member of the exploring expedition of Ruy López de Villalobos, sighted some uninhabited islands in the area of north latitude 25 in early October 1543. Having recently crossed the Pacific Ocean from the New World (Mexico) in search of the Spice Islands (those comprising northern Indonesia and the southern Philippines), de la Torre had left Sarangani in Mindanao (part of present-day Philippines) on 26 August and headed in a northeastward direction looking for the legendary islands of Rica de Oro (Gold Island) and Rica de Plata (Silver Island) and instead came across the Volcano group. Lacking enough food and water, the San Juan did not land, but de la Torre did name the island he saw with a volcano on it “Los Volcanes.” This island was probably Iwo Jima. He also discovered a few more islands nearby, naming one of them—likely Kita Iwo Jima, based on the coordinates written at the time—“Farfana” or “Forfana.” It is important to mention that, although later, the Volcano Islands administratively become a part of the Bonin Islands, the islands de la Torre discovered were the Volcano Islands and not Chichi Jima or Haha Jima.

Considering the fact that the Pacific Ocean in this period was “well-nigh a Spanish lake,” the discovery of the islands by the Spaniards was, in retrospect, no surprise. Interestingly, however, there is “little concrete evidence,” according to Kublin, that the Bonins were sighted by the Spanish at all in the sixteenth century, even though a regular route between the Philippines and Mexico that went “in the vicinity of the Bonin Islands” was traversed by Spanish galleons for many years. Instead, it was the Dutch who are believed to have discovered the Bonins.

In 1639, Dutch explorers Abel Janszoon Tasman of the Graft and Hendricken Mathijs Quast on the Engel, sailing from Batavia (present-day Jakarta, Indonesia) in search of the legendary Gold and Silver Islands at the request of Antonio van Diemen, governor-general of the Dutch East India Company, came across the Bonin Islands on 21 July but could not land, as they were unable to “see any opportunity by which a boat could be put ashore.” Instead, they named the first island they approached “Engel Island” (Haha Jima) and “Graft Island” (Chichi Jima) and recorded the locations on their sailing charts, which they brought back to Europe with them. As a result, the two Dutchmen are generally credited with having discovered the Bonin Islands, as well as Tasmania, New Zealand, and northwestern Australia. The two, however, were unsure of the originality of their discovery considering that they were using Spanish maps with indications of nearby islands (likely the Volcano Islands or Northern Marianas). Likewise, as Bonins scholar Tanaka Hiroyuki suggests, because their objective was reaching the islands of Gold and Silver, they probably did not show that much interest in the islands (the Bonins) they actually did find. Their employer, however, chose to consider the islands new discoveries. Ironically, as well, their discovery would be unknown for almost 200 years in Europe, although numerous Spanish vessels would again sail through the island chain in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Instead, accounts of Japanese discoveries, both fact and fiction, would emerge in later years.

Japan’s initial interest in the islands began a few decades after the visit by Tasman and Quast when a ship carrying mikan (tangerines) from the Arita area of Ki-shu (present-day Wakayama Prefecture) drifted off course in a storm and shipwrecked on an unknown island
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(later named Haha Jima) on or about 20 February 1670, after 72 days at sea. The next morning, the captain of the ship was found dead, having apparently died in his sleep. After spending 52 days on the island recovering and rebuilding their vessel, as well as exploring the island, the remaining six members of the crew traveled northeast about 35 miles to Chichi Jima. They spent about five or six days there and a couple of days at Muko Jima, before leaving for the mainland. It took 8 days to reach Hachijo Jima, where they spent another 10 days before heading to the port of Shimoda to the southwest of Edo. There they reported the incident to local officials and told of the fertile island with the warm climate far to the south of the Izu Islands. Theirs was the first chronicled discovery by Japanese of the Bonin Islands.

The Tokugawa Shogunate, or Bakufu, had imposed a seclusion order (sakoku-rei) in 1635, which in addition to closing the country and prohibiting people from leaving, had also limited the size of ships that could be built. Only small boats for coastal trading were permitted, but these vessels did not fare well in stormy weather and many went adrift or were shipwrecked, particularly as their captains had little experience in deeper seas. The crew of the boat that landed on Haha Jima was not punished, and indeed the Bakufu used the information gained to plan an expedition to learn more about these islands.

In contradiction to its own sakoku policy, the shogunate had already decided back in 1668 that a larger type of vessel was needed. After consulting with Shimaya Ichizaemon, a Nagasaki ship owner, and others in the area, it had the Fukkokuju Maru specially built, modeling it on Chinese trading vessels that were permitted under the seclusion act to trade out of Dejima in Nagasaki. Taking nine months to build, the vessel was completed in February 1670 and was used for shipping between Nagasaki and Edo, when in May 1674, the Bakufu appointed Shimaya to lead a secret expedition to the uninhabited islands. After a failed attempt in June 1674 and another in February 1675, when it was forced to wait at Shimoda for favorable winds, Shimaya’s expedition departed the port in the spring of 1675 and traveled along the Izu Islands before reaching the still-unnamed (from a Japanese perspective), uninhabited islands on 29 April.

With a crew of about 30, Shimaya spent a month surveying and mapping the islands. He departed on 5 June and successfully returned to Edo, bringing various unique specimens of plants, rocks, fish, and shells back with him which he submitted along with a full report. While there, Shimaya had named each of the islands by kinship terms, such as Chichi (Father), Haha (Mother), Ani (Older Brother), Ane (Older Sister), Ototo (Younger Brother), Imoto (Younger Sister), and Mei (Niece). In addition, his team named local places on Chichi Jima that survive until today—Omura, Okumura, and Susaki, among others. They also established a base of sorts on Chichi Jima and built a small shrine honoring three gods, with a sign next to it proclaiming their mission and dates of arrival and departure as well as the fact that this island was a part of Japan.

Upon receiving the report, the Bakufu decided to name the islands Munin-to, or uninhabited (no-man’s) islands, and placed them under the jurisdiction of the daikan (magistrate) of Izu. Still determined to maintain the seclusion policy, the shogunate had no intention of developing or expanding into the islands and actually scrapped the Fukkokuju Maru.
Reports of the initial discovery and exploration of the islands by the crew of the Japanese cargo vessel that went adrift became news in other parts of Japan in later years as the story was written about by the Confucian scholar Ito Togai in his Yuken Shoroku (Reports from the Courier’s Coaches) and in other writings. It is likely that the subsequent Shimaya expedition was seen as even greater news, although initially it was kept a secret. In the meantime, at least three other Japanese vessels also went adrift and landed on the Munin Islands (most likely Chichi Jima) over the next few decades before returning to the mainland.

News of the Japanese discovery, or better put, “rediscovery” of the Munin Islands found its way to Europe, too, when The History of Japan by Engelbert Kaempfer was published posthumously in London in 1727. Kaempfer was a physician for the Dutch East India Company who was assigned to Nagasaki in 1690 and stayed in Japan for two years. In the book, he mentions the islands but inaccurately transcribes the name for them as “Bune Sima,” or the Island Bune. A century later in 1817, a French scholar of Chinese studies, Jean-Pierre Abel-Remusat, further butchered the reading of it when he mistransliterated it as “Bonin Islands” in an article in the Journal des Savants, of which he was editor.

A second work, Mémoires Relatifs à l’Asie (Memoirs Relating to Asia) by Julius Heinrich Klaproth, an Oriental scholar from Berlin who eventually settled in Paris and was “Remusat’s foremost European rival in the field of Oriental Studies,” further employed the use of “Bonin” rather than Munin. From essentially that point on, the Munin Islands were known in the West as the Bonins.

Klaproth erred in another way, too. Both he and Abel-Remusat had apparently used Hayashi Shihiei’s Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu (A General Survey of Three Nations with an Illustrated Description), published in 1785, when they were writing their respective works. Hayashi, a student of “Dutch Learning” (Rangaku), was a military specialist and somewhat controversial for having been so bold as to point out inadequacies in Japan’s coastal and maritime defenses against foreign powers, particularly England and Russia. Referring to the past expedition of the Bakufu to the Munin Islands, he urged the Bakufu to preemptively colonize the islands. This was based on his knowledge of a Dutchman (likely Superintendant of Trade at Dejima Arend Werley Veit, otherwise known as Arend William Feith), who had transmitted information relating to the Bonins’ appearing on Spanish maps on the islands’ importance while in Nagasaki in 1777 or 1778. Because Hayashi criticized the Bakufu, he was eventually punished in 1792 and his Sangoku Tsuran Zusetsu and another book, Kaikoku Heidan (Arguments for an Armed Maritime Nation), were banned.

It should be pointed out that Hayashi was not the only one who would note the Bonins’ strategic importance over the coming half-century in vain. Sato Nobuhiro, a strategist who lived until 1850 and was seen as the father of the Greater Co-Prosperity Sphere of Japan’s later militarism, would note the “deserted islands of the southern seas, the so-called Ogasawara Islands” in his “Plan for Assimilation and Conquest” (Kondo Hisaku), a set of strategies for overseas domination. Moreover, Watanabe Kazan, chief retainer of the Tahara domain (present-day Aichi Prefecture), later expressed doubts about the ability of Japan to maintain the closed country policy, noting that the British had already begun inhabiting the islands. Finally, Confucian scholar Tōjo Shinko from the Takada domain in Echigo (present-day Niigata Prefecture) warned in 1848, that if the Bonin Islands were left ne-
glected, the Westerners would use the islands as a base to threaten the Izu Islands, and then mainland Japan.\(^\text{40}\) (The prophecy of Hayashi, Tojo, and Sato would come true: Westerners would later use the Ogasawara Islands to pressure or threaten Japan, 5 years later in the case of Commodore Matthew C. Perry and less than 100 years later in the case of the seizure of Iwo Jima.) Instead of heeding this warning, the Bakufu placed Tojo under house arrest and suppressed his publication like they did with Hayashi at the end of the previous century.

Klaproth translated the section on the Bonin Islands in Hayashi’s book in full. Hayashi had revived an old—but since disproved—legend of the discovery of the islands by Ogasawara Sadayori in his book. And through the translation by Klaproth, who was unaware that it was no more than a legend, and an incorrect one at that, the myth came to be accepted as a true event by scholars and readers in Europe and elsewhere.\(^\text{41}\) Kublin, writing in 1955, states, “As a result of the work of Remusat and Klaproth, not only were Europeans familiar with Japanese knowledge of the Bonin Islands, but they also became party to the errors and illusions of Hayashi Shihei. Some of these misconceptions have unfortunately persisted to the present day.”\(^\text{42}\) As mentioned earlier, many works still unwittingly cite it today.

The legend, mentioned above, was that the islands were first sighted by Prince Ogasawara Sadayori, a regional lord at Fukashi in Shinshu (near present-day Matsumoto City), who, after receiving permission from his master, Tokugawa Ieyasu, to search for new lands, sailed south of the Izu Islands in 1593 and discovered three uninhabited islands that he named “Ogasawara.” This account was provided by a masterless samurai, or \textit{ronin}, named Ogasawara Kunai Sadato, when he petitioned the Bakufu in 1727 to allow him to visit the uninhabited islands. He included a book that discussed the islands, \textit{Tatsumi Muninto Ki} (A Record of the Munin Islands in the Southeast), as the basis for his claim, explaining that he was the great grandson of Sadayori’s son Nagatada, who had also traveled to the islands. Due to the 1639 seclusion order, travel beyond coastal waters had been prohibited and as a result his family had not been able to go to the islands, he claimed. After investigating the claim, the Bakufu gave Kunai permission to visit the island and take some settlers if colonization was found to be feasible. In 1731, Kunai sent one of his nephews to the islands, but the unfortunate nephew never returned, likely a victim of a shipwreck. Under suspicion that it was a scam, Kunai was not permitted to send a second ship to search for the lost vessel and its crew. The Bakufu subsequently arrested Kunai for fraud, having discovered seven years after he had made his claim that he in fact was not related to Sadayori. It is likely as well that he was the source for the book on which he based his claim.\(^\text{43}\) In other words, the story was probably an elaborate fabrication. It was also the same story that was mistakenly picked up verbatim by Western scholars.

Nevertheless, in the meantime, Kunai’s story had spread throughout Japan and people began to call them the “Ogasawara Islands.” And in one of the great ironies, 140 years later, the Meiji government formally adopted the name “Ogasawara” for the islands and even used the fiction about Sadayori’s discovery and colonization of them as one of its arguments when explaining internationally their annexation in 1876.

It was shortly after the publicity the islands received in the West that the first Western settlers began to arrive, but not before the islands, somewhat comically, would be given a few more name changes. Having not been visited for close to a century, a British whaler, the
Transit, captained by the American James J. Coffin of Nantucket, Massachusetts, “rediscovered” the islands in 1824. Arriving at the southern group (the Haha Jima group) on 12 September that year, he proceeded to name the two largest Fisher’s and Kidd’s Islands after his employer, Fisher, Kidd, and Fisher of Bristol, England, and the bay—Coffin’s Bay—after himself.

Coffin’s visit was related to the search for whales in the Pacific, whose blubber was the source of oil for lamps and an important product. While his was a British-registered ship, American whalers would eventually number about 80 percent of the vessels in the North Pacific, or some 400 of the 500 there. The industry, however, began to decline in the latter half of the nineteenth century with the 1859 discovery of petroleum in Pennsylvania. The islands would come to be known as an “ideal calling-place, from the whaling captain’s point of view.”

With the increase in whaling activities in the Pacific, other vessels came to the island, as did new names for it. In 1825, another British whaler, the Supply, sailed into the bay at Chichi Jima and left a sign stating they had been there. The next year, a British ship, the William, also came, but was shipwrecked in the bay. Two crew members elected to stay on and salvage the cargo, while the others departed on another whaler, the Timor, which happened to have arrived. Planting vegetables, raising pigs, and building a hut to live in, these men were the first island “settlers.”

Imagine the surprise, therefore, when on 9 June 1827, HMS Blossom, captained by Frederick W. Beechey, sailed into the same bay and found two Europeans already living on the island. Beechey was engaged in a four-year expedition of the Pacific islands and the polar areas. The Blossom stayed for nearly one week at Chichi, surveying it and its neighbors. Beechey named the bay “Port Lloyd” (after the late Bishop of Oxford), Chichi Jima “Peel Island” (after Sir Robert Peel, the Secretary of State for the Home Department), Haha Jima and its surrounding islands the “Bailey Islands” (after a former president of the Astronomical Society), as well as several other names for the smaller islands and sites. In addition, noticing the sign left by the Supply a couple years before, he took formal possession of the island on behalf of King George, nailing a copper plaque to a tree describing his claim.

In his subsequent report on the visit, he explained he had been aware of the Japanese account of the Bonin Islands as it appeared in previous Western literature (Remusat’s article and Klaproth’s book), but wrote that he doubted the islands he visited were in fact the Bonins: “their description is so very unlike anything that we found in these islands, that if the Japanese are at all to be credited they cannot be the same, and if they are not to be believed, it may be doubted whether Bonin-sima is not an imaginary island.” Indeed, Beechey said the islands seemed to correspond with the group known as the Yslas del Arzobispo. British diplomat Russell Robertson, describing the visit 40 years later before the prestigious Asiatic Society of Japan (after he himself had traveled there in early 1876), surmises that the islands Beechey visited were in fact the Bonins, and that if there was a discrepancy, then the islands the Japanese in the 1670s had visited probably were the Bailey or Coffin groups.

The two European men living on the island did not return on the Blossom and so they were still there when Russian explorer Frederic Lutke arrived in 1828 on the warship Senniavin. They told Lutke, who was of German descent, that the islands had already been
claimed by Beechey on behalf of Great Britain. Lutke had been impressed with the islands, thinking it possible to build a naval base with little expense or labor, and thus was greatly disappointed at the news that the British had already been there. The two European settlers, nevertheless, cooperated with Lutke’s exploration of Peel Island (which included participation by two scientists he had brought with him), and decided to leave the island on 15 May with him on the Seniavin after almost three years. The Bonins were thus once again without inhabitants, and without formal confirmation of Great Britain’s possession of them. It had been 153 years since the Bakufu had placed the islands under the Izu domain’s jurisdiction, but without the means, authority, or interest in truly staking its claim militarily, diplomatically, or even financially.

**Western Settlement of the Islands**

Word of the Blossom’s visit to the Bonin Islands spread to the Sandwich Islands (present-day Hawaiian Islands), approximately 3,300 nautical miles to the east. Particularly during the whaling era, Hawaii had become one of the major through-points for ships coming and going. Its major port at Honolulu, A. Grove Day writes, “became the business capital of the Pacific, and its harbor held merchant ships from China, Peru, Mexico, California, Great Britain, and the Atlantic coast of the United States.” It was in this environment that several individuals, of completely different nationalities and backgrounds, learned of the Bonin Islands and decided to try their luck by settling there.

One of them, Matteo Mazarro, a Genoan who claimed to be a British subject, and John Millichamp, also a British subject, approached Richard Charlton, a “hard drinking, greedy former ship captain turned trader” who had served as the British consul in Honolulu since 1825, about settling on an uninhabited island in the Pacific in early 1830. Charlton recommended the Bonins, which he had recently learned had been taken possession of by Beechey on behalf of the British and was told about it by Beechey himself. Others expressed a desire to go, including Nathaniel Savory, an American from Bradford, Massachusetts, who had missed his ship while in Hawaii due to the medical care he required after losing a finger in an onboard firing mishap; Aldin B. Chapin, another American; and Charles Johnson from Denmark.

Charlton eventually organized the party and placed Mazarro, who was illiterate and reportedly prone to violence, in charge. The schooner Washington was fitted for the journey and included livestock and seed. The hodgepodge group of approximately 25 colonists (5 Westerners and about 20 Hawaiian men and women), departed Honolulu on 21 May 1830, and arrived at Peel Island, as the British called Chichi Jima, on 26 June.

Upon arrival, the group hoisted the British flag that Charlton had given Mazarro and began to develop the island. It looked as if the Bonins were finally going to become British territory in fact as well as name. However, the lack of follow-up by the British made their claim weak and disappointed the new colonists, some of whom wished to see the islands made British; others just wanted the protection of a naval power that “ownership” would bring.

Over the years, the colonists built an essentially self-sufficient community and traded with visiting American, British, Russian, and French whalers by supplying fresh food and
water. Between January 1833 and mid-1835, for example, 24 vessels visited the islands, 22 of which were whalers. The islanders, however, were always at the mercy of the sailors who landed and sometimes caused trouble, including thefts, abductions, and rapes. Appeals to the British government for protection fell on deaf ears, with the Colonial Office and the Board of Trade responding that no promises of protection could be given as the islands are “beyond ordinary assistance” and “beyond the limits to which British Cruizers [sic] ordinarily go.” In fact, this answer was not entirely true as many British vessels would indeed visit the islands.

The islanders had also begun to fight internally. With no formal laws, problems increasingly became difficult to resolve civilly, especially when the “leader” Mazzaro was a violent man himself. Fortunately, on 15 July 1836, the American warships USS Peacock (1828) and Enterprise (1831) arrived and helped the settlers with formulating a written code that had, among other items, “all disputes [to be] decided by the majority.” This involvement would be the first formal one for the American government (military or civilian), but not the last, in helping draft the local laws and regulations governing the Bonin Islands. A report after the visit by HMS Larne (1829) in late 1838 to early 1839 shed further light on Mazzaro’s bizarre behavior.

Although the islands were nominally British-owned, at least two of the islanders considered themselves American citizens. Nevertheless, many of the Bonin islanders saw their colony as an independent venture and were not concerned about the question of sovereignty, only protection, as they were often at the mercy of the captains and crews of visiting whalers and other commercial vessels. Mazarro, on the other hand, emotionally insecure against the more respected Savory, went to Hawaii in the fall of 1842 to report on the progress of the settlement to the British acting consul, Alexander Simpson, whom Charlton had left behind as his successor and whom Day described as “a man of devious mind, a lover of intrigue.” In addition to recruiting additional settlers and laborers, Mazarro’s real purpose seems to have been getting Simpson to certify that Mazarro was the official head of the settlement. The acting consul agreed to do so, signing a document recommending Mazarro as the head until a duly appointed British government official was placed over the islands. Simpson also gave Mazarro another Union Jack to take back to the islands, which he would fly, as would the proud Savory with the Stars and Stripes on special occasions. The British influence, nevertheless, would continue to decrease on the island, symbolic of the decline of the British in the Pacific on the one hand, and its growing interest in China over Japan on the other. Mazarro’s compatriot, Millichamp, had also left Peel Island, heading instead for Guam. He, on the other hand, never returned (having established a shipping business there). Mazarro would die in 1848, leaving a young wife from Guam, whom Savory married in 1850.

The lack of British follow-up over the years is curious. Strategically, there had been interest in the islands as a secondary base for the British in their war against China (Opium War). One British dispatch from 1837 argues that “no time should be lost in the formation of a small naval station at the Bonin Islands [and] that this and other parts of the coast of China should be visited very frequently.” That interest seems to have declined, however, when the British succeeded in opening China to trade. There were also numerous public
appeals by scholars and missionaries for the islands’ protection and development and official recommendations by diplomats and military men along the same lines, but to no avail. The same would also be true for the American side, although a highly respected U.S. Navy officer did his best to generate American interest in the islands.

THE PACIFIC STRATEGY OF COMMODORE PERRY

On 14 June 1853, Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived in Port Lloyd with the USS Susquehanna (1850) and Saratoga (1842). He had just visited the Ryukyu Islands (then known abroad by a version of their Chinese reading, the Lew Chews, and today known as Okinawa), some 800 miles to the west and south, and was on his way to Edo, the seat of the Shogunate, as part of an expedition to “open” Japan to foreign intercourse. While these modern and threatening “Black Ships” would shock Bakufu officials and the Japanese people upon their arrival in Tokyo Bay in August, the islanders had been long used to the comings and goings of American and other warships. Between 1837 and 1850, for example, a handful of U.S., British, and Russian men-of-war stopped in Port Lloyd. Unfortunately, they were not nearly as frequent as the many more commercial vessels that visited the islands, whose purpose was often to plunder them and abduct their young women. Perry’s visit and interest in the islands caused inflated hopes that the United States would be able to provide both protection and perhaps sovereignty to the islands.

Perry’s visit to the Bonin Islands was part of a comprehensive strategy he had envisioned for the region by which a sea route linking Hawaii, the Bonin Islands, the Ryukyus, and Formosa would be developed, with appropriate refueling stations and bases to provide security. In particular, he believed the islands required friendly settlements, if not outright colonies, along this route. The existing settlement on the Bonin Islands provided just the right location.

He was not the first U.S. Navy official to argue the importance of the Bonins, however. Three years before his arrival, the USS Porpoise (1836), en route from Hong Kong to San Francisco, stopped off at Port Lloyd in September 1850, the first U.S. warship to visit there since 1836. Its captain, Lieutenant Thomas J. Page, noted the potential advantages that Port Lloyd could offer as a coaling station in a report to Secretary of the Navy William A. Graham on 28 November 1850. He also observed that the islands were “in the possession of no Nation.”

Echoing the maritime policing role the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps team still performs today, Page was also concerned about the safety of the islanders, as they had often been harmed by the crews of visiting ships and pirates. A particularly gruesome incident had happened just before his arrival. A Hong Kong-based ship, the brigantine Vanguard, led by a Captain Richards, arrived at Port Lloyd on 20 July 1850, and “stole one female from off the beach, and carried her away in the vessel . . . as females are in great demand” at the ship’s next destination. Page, who took depositions on that and other crimes against the islanders, suggested “an occasional visit by our Men of War, to the different islands of the Pacific where the spirit of enterprise has led our countrymen, either to reside, or trade, would have a most salutary effect, in protecting them from depredations of the natives, and
also from the marauding incursions of those sea-faring persons, who are but little removed in their character and habits, from pirates themselves.”

On the day after arriving in the harbor, Perry sent two parties led by Bayard Taylor and Dr. C. T. Fahs ashore to explore Peel Island, and sent a third party to inspect the coasts of the two northern islands, Buckland (Ani Jima) and Stapleton (Ototo Jima). While these parties were exploring the islands, Perry met with the islanders, especially Savory, who had clearly established himself as the leader of the community in the wake of Mazarro’s death five years before.

At Peel, Perry purchased a plot of land (approximately 12.3 acres) along the bay for $50 at a place called Ten Fathom Hole, which would allow for the storage of coal. Savory, the only survivor of the original Western settlers, was charged by Perry to be his agent and placed on the “books of this ship for pay and provisions, and you are consequently attached to the Navy of the United States and possessed of all the privileges and immunities to be derived therefrom.” Seaman John Smith, a member of Perry’s crew, stayed on Peel Island to assist Savory with the work. It is unclear what became of Perry’s title to the land when the Japanese took possession of the islands.

Although he was only there four days, Perry’s strong interest in the islands psychologically and practically made up for the neglect American authorities had shown toward the two expatriates over the years. Perry helped draft a simple constitution comprising three articles and 13 sections that was called the “Organization of the Settlers of Peel Island,” under which Savory was elected chief magistrate, with James Maitley, a London native and former British Navy seaman who arrived around 1844, and Thomas H. Webb, a native of Wallington, Surrey, England, who had come to the island in 1849, as councilmen. The settlement was given a name, “The Colony of Peel Island,” although there was no indication whose colony it was. Perry also left behind four head of cattle, five sheep, and six goats as gifts. Savory was so happy with the arrangements made for government, the purchase of land, and the gift of livestock, he named his son (born to him by his new Chamorro wife, the former Mrs. Mazarro) after Perry.

Perry not only gave the residents the impression of a strong American interest in the islands, but he followed up on it when he was departing the Ryukyus for Hong Kong by sending Captain John Kelly in the USS Plymouth (1844) back to the Bonins to visit the colonists and survey the southern group (the Bailey Islands, otherwise known as the Haha Jima group). Kelly did, and acting on Perry’s instructions, “took formal possession of them in the name of the United States, and gave them their proper name of Coffin,” after another American, Captain James Coffin, who had been there some 30 years before. Kelly reestablished claim to the islands by attaching a copper sign on a tree on the main island. This time, however, settlers were now there. A couple of years before the Plymouth’s arrival in 1851, a small group of inhabitants from Peel Island had moved to Bailey Island to establish a new settlement. It would eventually grow to a couple thousand people in the pre–Pacific War period.

While Perry was in the Ryukyus, he had written of the islands to Secretary of the Navy James C. Dobbin, expressing his belief that they were of “the highest importance to the
commerce of the United States and of the world.” Perry later expanded on his views with regard to the Bonins in the following way:

My visit to the Bonin Islands forcibly impressed me with the idea of their importance as a point of rendezvous for vessels navigating that part of the Pacific ocean in which they lie, and especially as offering a port of refuge and supply for whaling ships resorting to those regions, as well as a depot for coal for a line of steamers which, ere long, must unquestionably be established between California and China, via Japan . . . To render this part of the ocean in all respects convenient to our whaling ships, something more is wanted, and that is a port of resort, which shall be in all respects free for them to enter and depart, without the restraints of exclusive laws and national prejudices; for though . . . the ports of Hakodadi and Simoda [Hakodate and Shimoda], in Japan, to which we may add Napha [Naha], in great Lew Chew [the Ryukyus], are by treaty open to American vessels, a long time may elapse before the people of those ports will probably divest themselves of the jealousies which they have hitherto entertained against strangers; and it is well known that the crews of whaling vessels visiting the ports of the Pacific, are not remarkable for their orderly behavior or conciliatory deportment, hence my argument in favor of an establishment at the Bonin Islands is strengthened. My plan is to establish a colony at Port Lloyd, Peel Island, the principal of the Bonin group, leaving the question of sovereignty to be discussed hereafter . . . The right of sovereignty undoubtedly belongs to Japan, as the earliest known occupant of the islands; beyond this claim the present settlers have unquestionably priority of jurisdiction.

Perry’s visit to Peel Island and his purchase of land for a coaling station caught the attention of the Russians, whose ships visited there a few weeks after Perry in July 1853, and the British, who had been aware from as early as April 1853 that Americans were planning to acquire an island base in Japanese (or Chinese) waters. Simpson, who had been the acting consul in Honolulu, read of the purchase while he was in Scotland and immediately wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Lord Clarendon to protest the action on the basis of British claims to the islands. Clarendon in turn instructed Sir J. George Bonham, chief superintendent of trade in Hong Kong, to ask Perry for “an explanation of his designs.” When Perry’s squadron arrived in Hong Kong, Bonham visited Perry aboard the Susquehanna to inquire about his actions in Port Lloyd and his intentions for the islands. Bonham pointed out that they had been taken possession of in the name of King George 30 years earlier.

Perry responded that he preferred to give his answer in writing, and did so in a letter to Bonham dated 23 December 1853. Despite his personal desires to the contrary, Perry correctly explained that the transaction was a private matter out of necessity to secure ports of refuge and supplies, as well as to establish a line for mail steamers that would be traveling across the Pacific in the future. He acknowledged that he had not made the purchase under any special instructions from the U.S. government and did not know whether his actions would be approved or not. Perry went on to argue that he did not believe the British had sovereignty over the islands as Americans made up the majority of the nationalities of Westerners present. He proposed that the two countries create an open port at Peel Island.
In the end, Bonham and Perry agreed to let their home governments deal with the issue of sovereignty, although Perry would never come to accept British claims (which it was unable to enforce due to events in other parts of the world, such as the Crimean War). In the meantime, the following year, Perry sent Captain Joel Abbot in the USS Macedonian (1836) back to Peel Island with gifts of seed and farming implements, and also gave the islanders a new Stars and Stripes to raise when ships entered Port Lloyd (as the United States had grown to 31 states in the union by this point). He was careful to point out that the question of eventual sovereignty had yet to be decided and that his interest was related to the advantages of general commerce.

This commerce was becoming more and more important to the United States. In 1854, for example, the U.S. whaling fleet numbered 668 vessels with an aggregate displacement of 208,399 tons, or 12 times more than the combined whaling fleets of all other countries in the Pacific. In addition, New England clipper ships were setting new records for speed in reaching China. Trade with Japan was next. It just had to be opened.

Despite the importance of this trade, Perry had difficulty convincing the U.S. government that the islands were strategically important. Arguing that the British were “accidental visitor[s],” he wrote in his narrative that the “English have not a particle of claim to priority of discovery . . . the inhabitants practically disown the paternity of the English sovereign.” In a March 1856 speech before the American Geographical and Statistical Society of New York, Perry spoke more forcefully of the strategic importance of the islands. He distrusted Japan’s intentions to live up to the treaties he and others would sign and stressed the need for a “port of refuge.” Interestingly, this is essentially the same argument the U.S. military would use in favor of retaining the islands after the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 100 years later in 1951.

In the end, the opening of numerous ports in Japan and their generally unimpeded use, including those at Shimoda, Hakodate, Naha, and others, negated the need for a coaling station in the Bonins. In addition, the Democrats, who replaced the Whigs in the 1856 presidential elections, were uninterested in commercialism and imperialism. Perry’s death on 4 March 1858, removed from the scene the main advocate of possessing or developing the Bonins. Moreover, America was increasingly becoming divided internally, and civil war was approaching. The war’s outbreak in 1861 basically ended the possibility of American annexation of the Bonins for the time being. Into that vacuum stepped not Britain but Japan.

**Japan’s Growing Interest in the Islands**

Opportunities to clarify Japan’s position on the Bonin Islands, on which dozens of non-Japanese had been living for more than 30 years, had appeared on numerous occasions prior to Perry’s visit. In April 1840, for example, the Bakufu received an in-depth report from the captain of the Chukichi-maru, a ship from Mutsu no Kuni (present-day Takata City in Iwate Prefecture), that had been blown off course in February and landed at Peel Island. It was the first Japanese ship known to have been there since the late 1600s. The captain and his crew of six sailors spent one month there and were cared for by the small
Western community. The sailors told Bakufu authorities that the islanders were kind and numbered around 30, and introduced some 50 words of the language (primarily English and some Hawaiian) that was used on the island. The Bakufu, however, did nothing with this information. Indeed, although the incident was recorded in its *Tsuko Ichiran Zokushu* (Compilation of Documents Concerning Relations with Foreign Countries, Continued), according to historian Tanaka, its misfiling under “Ikokubu, Yon, Hyoryu (Foreign Waters, Section Four, Disablings)” suggested that the Bakufu did not note that the islands the sailors had been stranded on was the Bonins.

The Bakufu also did nothing when warned by the manager of a Dutch factory at Dejima, who had informed the Nagasaki magistrate’s office in April 1846 that, while his government was aware the Bonins were a territory of Japan, it was curious about Japan’s policy of standing idly by while English and Americans colonized the islands. To do so, he warned, would be to invite disaster in the future. Already increasingly weak, the Bakufu could probably do little about it.

This cycle of indecision and inaction would begin to change following Perry’s arrival. Japan would have to review its policy, something not easy to do in such tumultuous times and the great debate in Japan over opening the country.

Perry’s mission to Japan, which included the arrival of the Black Ships in 1853 followed by the signing of the Treaty of Kanagawa in 1854, was eventually successful in that it opened treaty ports for trade without causing a war. The use of Port Lloyd as a rendezvous point and a place of information gathering about Japan and the intentions of other countries in the region had been an important part of this success. For the leadership of Japan, on the other hand, Perry’s use of Naha and Port Lloyd exposed Japan’s vulnerability to foreign incursions from these areas.

This fact was first reinforced with the opening of Hakodate and Shimoda in March 1855, as per the Treaty of Kanagawa, to foreign trade. Several whaling ships began anchoring in Port Lloyd in anticipation of the opening of Hakodate. Takeuchi Shimotsuke no Kami Yasunori, the first magistrate of the newly developed Hakodate, heard of this from the captains of the vessels and informed Abe Ise no Kami Masahiro of the Council of Elders in Edo on the level of development in Port Lloyd for the “transport and storage of coal for sea-faring ships of all nationalities, and also facilities for re-provisioning.” He also mentioned that the islands were called the Bonins in English and that as many as 80 people of different nationalities were living there.

The importance of Port Lloyd and the Bonins in trade was confirmed a couple of years later when Japan learned of Perry’s views from the report of his trip given to the U.S. Congress in 1856 entitled *Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan: Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy, by Order of the Government of the United States*. Although it is commonly believed that the first copies of the *Narrative* to make it to Japan were the five given by President James M. Buchanan to Japanese envoys sent to the United States in 1860 to exchange ratification documents concerning the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, the first copies of this two-volume, 624-page report actually arrived in Japan sometime between 1857
The Bakufu immediately translated it and read Perry’s high evaluation of the Bonins, islands that the Bakufu had ignored for the past 200 years. They also learned that Perry believed Japan’s claims to the islands were stronger than those of Great Britain.

The third prod in Japan’s review of its policy, or lack thereof to date, was the request made by Sir Rutherford Alcock, the minister plenipotentiary at the British mission in Japan, to purchase customs-free coal in exchange for carrying the Shogunate’s mail to and from Nagasaki. The request was eventually denied, and a record of the deliberations reveals the real reason for denying it. Namely, the superintendent in charge of foreign countries raised the following point concerning British (and U.S.) interest in the Bonins:

In recent years we have seen news of developments on the Bonin Islands in the Nihon Kiko [Perry’s Narrative] and there have been allegations from the Dutch as well. It seems that people of the English race have moved to said islands and have made a coal depot there ... If we were to grant Alcook’s request and hand over large quantities of coal virtually without any customs levied, it is certain that he would take it to said islands and use it to support their development. If we would but increase the naval capabilities of our own country, we would be able to develop the place with the sole commodity of coal, and there would be a prospect for making it a territory of Japan. To put it another way, by handing over large quantities of coal we would, so to speak, be doing something tantamount to lending soldiers to our enemies, and English rascals could become our enemies in a moment’s time. Were we to do this, it is arguable that the damage could extend to the seven islands of Izu. If we take all the above into consideration, the infinitesimal profits are hardly worth risking a conflict.

The fourth impetus for the Bakufu to review its policy came as a result of the dispatch of envoys to the United States in 1860 for the exchange of ratification documents. Upon their return, the delegation advised the Bakufu to “recover (kaishu)” and develop the islands.

The Bakufu was finally convinced and decided to act in 1861. Eventually, it would not only claim the islands but settle them as well. First, it organized an expedition to repossess them led by Foreign Magistrate Mizuno Chikugo no Kami Tadanori. The ship to be used was the Dutch-built Kanrin Maru, the same one that brought the envoys to the United States in 1860. The Bakufu next informed representatives of other countries, including Alcock and the American minister, Townsend Harris, of its intentions to occupy and develop the islands in November 1861. The shogunate received no immediate response from Alcock, and only a request by Harris, who had forwarded the letter to Secretary of State William H. Seward (who did not comment on it), that the rights of American settlers in the islands be respected. The Bakufu interpreted this statement as U.S. recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Bonins, at least in principle.

Theoretically, this would have been an appropriate time for England and the United States to cooperate and force Japan to back down on its claims to the islands, but both countries saw each other as rivals, and England, in particular, saw Russia, not Japan, as the greater challenge, and in the end, the two countries—the United States of which only
had commercial and not territorial interests—did not challenge Japan’s claims. Indeed, the United States was already almost a year into its tragic Civil War.

After eight months of preparation, the Bakufu’s expedition departed in January 1862 and arrived in Port Lloyd later that month on the 19th. For four months, Mizuno and the 90 or so other Japanese officials in his party built roads, a warehouse, a shrine, and a temporary office, as well as drew up new rules regulating use of the harbor and land and established a monetary system. Mizuno also surveyed the existing properties and confirmed their ownership. Before departing on 7 April, he resurrected the Japanese names of the islands and important places originally given to them by members of the Shimaya expedition in 1675.

But convincing the Westerners on the island to accept Japanese rule was the most important work of the expedition. After having a letter from E. L. C. Portman, a member of the American mission who had traveled with Perry to the Bonins, delivered to Savory; Mizuno, one of Japan’s most skilled diplomats, called on the island’s leader with Nakahama “John” Manjiro as interpreter. Nakahama was once a shipwrecked sailor who had been brought to America at the age of 14 and spent the next 10 years there becoming fluent in the language and extremely knowledgeable about the culture. In their meeting, Savory raised the fact of Beechey’s visit 35 years earlier, but Mizuno responded that the islands had been discovered by Japan some 200 years before that and explored by Japan and that the government was planning now to have settlers come to the islands. He explained that the rights of the islanders would be protected. Savory had no choice but to acquiesce. If Mizuno knew the Ogasawara legend to have been untrue, he did not let on. Having read Perry’s writings and those of others, he surely knew the legend was widely believed in the West and probably used it to his advantage to convince Savory and the other settlers that the islands historically belonged to Japan.

Mizuno met with the rest of the islanders and told them of Japan’s intentions to enforce its jurisdiction. He said that he would permit the islanders to leave if they so desired, and that the Japanese government would offer fair payment for their land and housing should they choose to go. No one wanted to leave, and they expressed in writing their desire to stay and obey Japanese laws. Savory and the other community leaders, such as Webb, also agreed to become Japanese subjects. Mizuno then distributed gifts to the islanders, including sake, plates, toys, and other items. The islanders were reportedly quite pleased.

Mizuno, it appears, did his best in other ways as well to alleviate the concerns of the islanders and to make the relationship go well. He was fair in his dealings and dispatched a doctor to the household of Savory, now quite old, on several occasions, perhaps in an effort to win over the island’s most respected elder.

It is likely, too, that some of the islanders were already favorably disposed to the Japanese. As mentioned earlier, 20 years before in 1840, seven Japanese crew members spent two months on the island recovering from 60 days adrift at sea. Although a language barrier existed, the friendship and assistance given by the residents were genuine. The islanders all went to the port to see the vessel off when it departed in April that year. Having been at the mercy of pirates and unruly crews of other Western vessels, and unsuccessfully requesting the protection of British and American authorities for three decades, one can surmise that Mizuno’s offer of protection to the islanders was highly welcome.
Development of the Bonin Islands—Japan’s False Start

Mizuno’s team returned to Edo in late March 1862, and subsequently submitted a report on the islands and their expedition. Their report was detailed, filled with more than 150 pages of maps and drawings of aquatic life, geography, and fauna, and 600 pages of text. There were also drawings of a canoe, hut, and other items found on the island.

Based on this report, the Bakufu decided to develop the islands and send colonists there. Settlers were recruited from Hachijo Jima, the southernmost of the Izu Islands. Because of overpopulation, these volunteers had petitioned the Izu domain to allow them to emigrate to the mainland, but eventually they were persuaded to go to Ogasawara. The Bakufu provided the 30 settlers with everything they would need to get started on Chichi Jima, including land, housing, food, clothing, and farming tools.

They arrived in August 1862 and settled in Ogiura, which was then undeveloped, on the other side of the bay from the Okumura area, inhabited by the early, primarily Western settlers. By the end of the year, they had constructed offices, storehouses, homes, and had cleared more than 8,000 tsubo [6.5 acres] of land for cultivation. They only rarely mixed with the original settlers, as all necessary transactions were done between Savory and a commissioner sent with the group, Obana Sakunosuke.

There was one event around this time that became the first case of extraterritoriality exercised by the United States of an American citizen in Japan and threatened to become a larger problem than it probably should have been. The event (occurring in April 1863) has been called the “Horton Incident,” but it began with a person other than George Horton. Horton, a British-born American who had arrived in the islands with Perry in 1853 and left his service as a result of old age, was accused of piracy off of Ani Jima. He was taken to Chichi Jima where he was implicated in the attempted theft of some items off a ship, the Ichiban Maru, commanded by Nakahama, who had been the interpreter at Chichi Jima the year before. William Smith, who had asked Horton to take back some of “his possessions,” was working for Nakahama at the time, having come on his whaling vessel in 1862. Nakahama had been aware of Smith’s bad reputation; indeed, he was a fugitive who had twice escaped from Russian vessels. Described as “an incorrigible kleptomaniac,” Smith had probably taken advantage of Horton with whom he was living. In any case, when Smith and Horton were confronted and accused of stealing, Horton’s pistol was found and the two men were arrested for “piracy” and brought to Japan for trial. Smith, an Englishman, was found guilty. Horton, on the other hand, was not, and the new U.S. minister resident in Kanagawa, Robert H. Pruyn, demanded that Japanese authorities either return Horton to Chichi Jima or pay an indemnity of $2,000 for his expenses incurred in Yokohama. Horton protested to the Japanese government, “is a poor, trembling, paralytic old man of eighty-five years of age . . . You have answered that he was taken away because it was dangerous to leave him there. I have seen him, and will not waste time in further reply . . . I regard his expulsion as entirely unwarranted.” Unlike Harris, his predecessor, Pruyn was more willing to work with England and play hardball with Japan. A settlement was reached whereby $1,000 would be paid by the Shogunate to Horton, who chose to stay on the mainland. He died the following year at the age of 85.
The issue was complicated at the time by the fact that Pruyn was unhappy with some of the regulations and harbor rules that had been drawn up by the Japanese for the islands, some official acts, and even felt the question of sovereignty was unresolved.¹³⁰ Pruyn was told about these regulations on 26 July and expressed his objections on 14 August.¹³¹ The following day, he informed Secretary Seward, who simply acknowledged the despatch in early December and wrote that a definitive answer could not be given until he had had an opportunity to confer with Senator Ira Harris of New York, a close friend and his successor as senator.¹³² The answer was never sent, probably due to America being embroiled in the Civil War.

Although it appeared as if it was going to be a successful colonization, the Bakufu ordered Obana, in May 1863, to abandon the project and return to Edo with the settlers.¹³³ They had been there only nine months. There are several explanations for the sudden withdrawal, such as financial difficulties and the inability of the colony to grow rice there. But, the official reason for the withdrawal given by the Bakufu was that it expected British retaliation following the (Charles L.) Richardson Affair (also known as the Namamugi Incident or the Kanagawa Incident). In this, a member of the Satsuma Daimyo’s procession killed a British citizen and seriously injured two others for a perceived slight in Yokohama in September 1862. The British retaliated and bombarded Kagoshima the following year. Their ships also gathered in Yokohama, and the Bakufu, fearing further retaliation, apparently did not want any additional humiliation on the remote Bonin Islands.

However, according to Okuma and Tabobashi, the actual reason was more complex—namely the existence of a serious internal conflict in which the balance of power within the Bakufu had shifted to a more antiforeign posture because of pressure by radical patriots calling for “revering the emperor, expelling the barbarian (sonno-joi).” Chief Councillor Ando Nobumasa was attacked by radicals and almost died, and the capable Mizuno was disgraced and demoted. In light of this situation, the Bakufu was unable and unwilling to continue to support the development of the Bonins.¹³⁴ Obana did as he was told, and within four days, he and his fellow Japanese workers evacuated the islands. He left the buildings, food, and other items to Savory and the other residents for their use and care, but explained that the Japanese were not abandoning the sovereignty over the islands or their property rights, and thus the properties would have to be surrendered when they returned. It was unclear at the time, however, when and even if they would return.

**Japan Officially Claims the Islands and Restarts the Settlement**

In 1875, following the creation of the Meiji government and its early attempts to modernize the country, Japan decided once again to reclaim and resettle the island. However, in the decade-plus that had passed since its abandonment of the settlement, it was only natural that doubts had arisen among the powers and the islanders as to what Japan’s real intentions were.¹³⁵

Several governments, including the German in 1872¹³⁶ and the British and American in 1873,¹³⁷ asked about the status of the islands, but in light of the internal difficulties of the
new state, no one in the Japanese government knew what the situation was or would brave making such a decision.

Captain Benjamin Pease, who had taken up residence on Peel Island around 1870, visited the U.S. legation in Yokohama in April 1873, “at the request of a large portion of the residents,” to “find out under what governmental protection the residents of that group of islands were.” Pease explained to the consular officer that there were 25 Americans on Peel Island, among a total of 68 residents, and 2 more Americans, 1 on Parry Island and the other on Bailey Island. He also gave an overview of the history of the islands, and noted that “there are about twenty-six children between the ages of five and sixteen living there wholly uneducated, as no one can be induced to locate there and teach, as the country is governed wholly by lynch law. That frequent disputes arise, and no means of obtaining redress for wrongs exist.” It is unclear to what extent Pease’s description is true, as a law code had been established in 1836 when the USS Peacock and Enterprise visited and again at the time of Perry’s visit in 1853. Pease was likely biased—being unpopular himself and possessing a “deep-rooted hatred” or jealously of Savory. By 1873, Savory’s health had declined, and perhaps he was no longer able to enjoy the authority he once had or arbitrate the disputes anymore. A tidal wave that struck Peel Island in the fall of 1872 had damaged Savory’s home and destroyed his personal papers, diaries, and some communal papers (although others were recovered), and likely left him further saddened.

C. E. de Long, the consular official Pease met with, wrote to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to ascertain if in fact the U.S. government had in the past “asserted any jurisdiction over or claim to the islands, and if not, if [he] should recognize Japanese jurisdiction, (if still asserted,) and if so, whether [he] should appoint Captain Pease, or some other resident American, consular agent for the United States.” Fish received de Long’s letter on 23 May, and wrote back the following week after confirming, apparently with the Department of the Navy and Congress, and within his own department, that neither Congress nor the U.S. government seems to have approved of Perry’s actions 20 years before. Perry’s taking possession of the islands on behalf of the United States, Fish wrote, “has never been expressly sanctioned by Congress, and we are not aware that any other act of the Government has since taken place which would show a disposition to support the claim of the naval officer adverted to [Captain Pease].” Fish went on to inform de Long that the American residents of the islands were basically on their own:

If the citizens of the United States have repaired to those islands for the purpose of taking up their abode, this has been done without any promise, express or implied, that this Government would protect them in their pursuits. By resorting to such remote spots on the globe’s surface, under such circumstances, they may fairly be held to have deliberately abandoned the United States without a purpose of returning, and therefore have relinquished the rights as well as the duties of citizens.

This would probably have been news to the original settlers, and is certainly not the traditional way the U.S. government deals with its citizens who live abroad for commercial or other purposes.

Although it is uncertain if de Long shared Fish’s response with Pease or not, it is clear that de Long showed it to Japanese government officials and encouraged them to clarify the
situation. De Long met with Soejima Taneomi, the foreign minister (who had succeeded Iwakura Tomomi in the latter’s absence on the Iwakura Mission), showing him a copy of Fish’s instructions. Soejima later reported it to Iwakura, since made minister of the right (Udaijin). Iwakura had returned in September that year from his two-year mission abroad, and was instrumental in overturning an August decision made in his absence in support of the dispatch of forces to the Korean Peninsula. Soejima, “an ardent expansionist” in the words of a historian of this period, was on the side of the proponents of the so-called Seikanron (literally, “advocacy of a punitive expedition to Korea) to invade Korea, and was forced to leave government as a result of their defeat in the debate.

Little came of de Long’s gesture at this time, which historian Tanaka surmises was done to force Japan to stand up to the British on the issue. In addition to the problems over Seikanron, which gutted the government of passionate, albeit shortsighted people, the Japanese government in 1874 had to deal with the uprising in Saga led by some of the proponents of the Seikanron among others; the issue of dispatching forces to Taiwan to deal with the murders of fishermen from the Ryukyus, which the Japanese government had made a domain of Japan in 1872; and the passage of a treaty with czarist Russia over the Kuriles and Sakhalin (in May 1875); but by the fall of 1875 it was ready to take up the issue of settling Ogasawara. Indeed, it had already begun discussing the issue in earnest in March, if not the previous year. One study suggests that as far back as April 1873, the Japanese government began “harden[ing] its attitude towards the question of sovereignty” when a special study concerning the settlement of the islands and the development of whaling there was presented to the government.

In October 1875, the government made the decision to send a group of 10 officials, including Tanabe Taiichi from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Foreign Ministry), Hayashi Masaaki from the Finance Ministry, Lieutenant Nezu Seikichi from the Navy Ministry, and Obana Sakujo from the Home Affairs Ministry, and so informed the representatives of the United States and Britain. The U.S. side had no objection, but the British government was interested in the Japanese reasons for claiming sovereignty over the islands. On 2 November and again on 5 November, Sir Harry S. Parkes, who had been in Japan almost a decade by this point, met with Foreign Minister Terashima Munenori, who had succeeded Soejima in October 1873, to ask about the Japanese government’s intentions. In their latter meeting, Parkes challenged Japan’s ability to claim the islands “just because they are nearby. That means that you don’t have any rights to islands far away, such as the Ryukyus, which, if your argument is used, means that China can claim them because they are close to China.” Terashima replied that the government had undertaken the proper steps, and had already sent officials some 10 years before, to which Parkes countered “so did the United States, Russia, and Britain.” Terashima asked if they were by command of their governments, and Parkes answered in the affirmative (of course, as we know, in none of the cases were they there for claiming or colonizing the territories per se). Terashima informed Parkes that Japan was the last country to do so, and because it would not be good to leave islands so close to Japan unattended, the government had decided to settle the islands. Parkes, while not happy, said if that was the case, no other country could really argue.
Still, Parkes was not sure what Japan’s final intentions were. A few days later, he wrote to Minister Terashima and asked him when the Japanese vessel was going to sail to the islands, what the name of the ship was, who was going to be on it, and “whether the object of their mission is to establish Japanese authority in the Bonin Islands.” 154 After consulting with the other ministries, Terashima responded on the 12th that the ship would probably leave on the 16th, but in fact it would not be for another five days. On that day, 21 November 1875, commissioners from the four ministries involved in Bonin Islands affairs—the Foreign Ministry (Gaimusho), the Navy Ministry (Kaigunsho), the Home Affairs Ministry (Naimusho), and the Finance Ministry (Okurasho)—sailed to Chichi Jima Ogasawara aboard the Meiji-maru to reestablish the colony. 155 After arriving in Port Lloyd, now called Futami-ko, the commissioners gathered 13 of the leading settlers, including Horace Perry Savory, the eldest son of Nathaniel Savory who had passed away on 10 April 1874, at the age of 80. They informed the settlers that Japan intended to reestablish the colony and asked them to pledge again their allegiance to Japanese laws and regulations. The islanders agreed to do so and signed a document to that effect. 156

Not everyone was happy with the arrangement, however. Parkes ordered Russell Robertson, who had been in Japan since February 1860 in a number of diplomatic posts, to follow the commissioners to Chichi Jima on the HMS Curlew. Robertson left the day after the departure of the faster Meiji-maru, commanded by an Englishman named Richard H. Peters, 157 but by the time he arrived at Futami-ko, it was too late to do anything. The islanders had already pledged allegiance to the Japanese. Symbolic of this, Captain Edmund Church of the Curlew purchased the copper plate first attached to a tree by Beechey from a person in Susaki (otherwise known as Clarkson Village), but said he was doing so because it was an object of curiosity rather than a relinquishment of Britain’s claim. 158

Yet, Robertson seems to have accepted the situation as a fait accompli, for he subsequently gave an objective and detailed presentation in March 1876 on the islands before the Asiatic Society of Japan, established a few years before in 1872. He did, however, note the special situation in which the islanders found themselves in his closing remark, which bordered on cautious optimism and concern:

I trust that if communication comes to be established with these islands with anything like regularity that the claims of settlers on the sympathies of the foreign communities of Yokohama and Yedo will not be overlooked, and that an attempt at ameliorating their condition will be made from one or both these settlements if not indeed generally from the open ports in Japan. I can vouch for it that kindly sympathy expressed either in word or deed will not be inappreciated there, and that in spite of many drawbacks, there are as warm hearts on the Bonins as any that beat among ourselves. 159

The experiences of the original residents throughout the decades of the nineteenth century—courted, and in some cases engaged by the powers but never officially married in the eyes of international society—had obviously led to some bitterness or frustration. When Robertson asked Maria Savory, the widow of Nathaniel, what she and her family thought about protection by any particular power, she responded that “they wanted to be regarded as Bonin Islanders . . . that they wished to be left alone in undisturbed possession
of their holdings, and the less that was said about nationality or protection of any kind the better.” Gradually, however, the residents came to realize that the Japanese government was serious about developing the islands and one by one they requested to be naturalized as Japanese citizens. In order to encourage the foreign residents to adopt Japanese nationality, the Japanese government decided to provide a loan of up to 100 yen without interest for 10 years and to provide tools and other items valued up to 25 yen for free to those who became citizens. By 1882, all had naturalized.

**THE ISLANDS UNDER JAPANESE CONTROL**

In the meantime, the Japanese government had officially declared the Bonin Islands, now known as the Ogasawara Islands in Japan, to be a part of Japan in December 1876, and informed other countries. Neither the United States nor England protested the move, but their officials in Japan did raise questions about the rules and regulations regarding ports and customs. Specifically, their questions concerned the fines for those who violated the regulations, which they said went against the extraterritoriality clauses of previous treaties. Terashima explained that, in the case of minor infringements, it would be impractical to bring those accused before the consulates and asked for their understanding. Neither Bingham nor Parkes was satisfied with the response, but they did not seek further clarification.

The islands were placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs, and in December, an office from that ministry (Naimusho Ogasawara Shucchoshosha) was established at Ogiura. Obana Sakunosuke (his name now abbreviated to Sakusuke) once more was placed in charge of the island government. In 1880, the islands were placed under the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Prefectural (later Metropolitan) Government, as no international problems had occurred when claiming the islands. More bureaucratic changes would occur over the coming years. In 1884, administrative headquarters were transferred from Ogiura to Omura, and two years later, the Bureau of Ogasawara Islands (Ogasawara Tocho) was established and a governor appointed from Tokyo. The bureau was transformed into the Tokyo Prefecture Ogasawara Branch Office (Ogasawara Shicho) in 1926, when local government systems were reorganized. In the late 1930s, the islands would increasingly come under military control until they became one big base by the mid-1940s.

Emigration was initially slow, numbering only around 35, as only Japanese citizens were allowed to settle there (even after the revision of the treaties had permitted foreigners to travel and reside throughout Japan). An 1878 Home Affairs Ministry report found there to be 252 people on the island, of whom 194 were Japanese settlers (a ratio of more than 3 to 1). However, as a result of the passage the year before of the “Rules to Permit Stipend Payments to Those Who Relocate (Ijumin Kyuyo Kisoku),” which gave 80 yen to each family that resettled there as well as providing land and household supplies and other things, resettlement began in larger numbers.

Unfortunately, many of those resettlers were in it simply to earn a quick yen and had no long-term commitment to developing the islands or being productive citizens there. Thus the government stopped emigration temporarily in 1879, and then allowed people only with a government permit to settle there. Despite the government support, the early de-
cades in the islands for the new settlers were quite difficult. Figure 4 shows the population changes between 1875 and 1944 (when the islanders were evacuated again).

Complicating this situation was some of the high-handed approaches to the islanders in the early years and instances of corruption, both locally and by government officials, that angered the islanders and caused some friction in relations between the officials and the locals.\textsuperscript{166}

The new islanders experimented with growing coffee beans, gum trees, cotton, and indigo, with workers being recruited from the Izu Islands and the Shizuoka and Tokushima Prefectures.\textsuperscript{167} Although sheep and pigs were raised on the island of Ototo Jima and other places with some success, most crops were found to be unsuitable for cultivation there. Eventually, sugarcane was successfully grown in the 1880s, with an expert being brought in from Kagawa Prefecture in Shikoku,\textsuperscript{168} and did well until the worldwide crash in the sugar market in the 1920s. Unfortunately, during that time, much of the forests on the islands, particularly Haha

<table>
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<td>1,379</td>
<td>4,463</td>
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(Adapted from Ogasawara Kaiun Kabushiki Kaisha, ed., \textit{Ogasawara Kero Zembi}, 68)
Iwo Jima, were cut down with very little regulation to accommodate the new cash crop of sugar cane.\textsuperscript{169} Conservation, as practiced by the original islanders, was ignored in favor of profit and resulted in environmental destruction and the rise in fuel prices due to the lack of sustainable trees. With the successful development of sugarcane, whaling and sea turtle hunting followed. Again, traditional conservation was abandoned in favor of profit.\textsuperscript{170}

The Japanese acquisition of the Pacific Islands that were Germany's possessions after World War I made Chichi Jima a stopover between the Mandates and mainland Japan, and saw more workers come to the islands. Plantations were dissolved into smaller farms and neighborhoods developed. By 1887, the number of residents had jumped to 999, and then 4,360 in 1897. In 1921, more than 5,000 were on the islands, and when they were evacuated in 1944 as war approached, there were a total of 7,711 people in 1,379 households.

The population of the original islanders increased as well, but only slightly. In 1875, at the time of Robertson's visit, he discovered there to be 69 residents; 66 on Chichi Jima and 3 on Haha Jima. Thirty-seven were male, and 32 female. There were approximately 20 children under the age of 15. Of the males, five were Caucasian.\textsuperscript{171} By 1912, the number of original settlers and their descendants had increased to 112, or about a ratio of 40-to-1 vis-à-vis the Japanese settlers. In 1913, about 40 left for Guam, which had been under U.S. control since the end of the Spanish–American War in 1898. After that the number remained constant; in 1944, there were 87. (see figure 4 for more on the population and occupation on the islands.)

“We got along all right,” 91-year-old Charlie Washington (Kimura Saburo) told researchers in 1971.\textsuperscript{172} “That is, we did business with the Japanese, but the two groups stayed separate.”\textsuperscript{173} He continued, “When we boys left Yankeetown to go to Omura, we never went alone. The Japanese taunted us, called us ‘barbarians’ or worse and a fight usually followed. We were taller and stronger and could lick them. The islanders never felt inferior to anyone!”\textsuperscript{174}

Despite the hard work of Mizuno and Obana in the 1860s and the goodwill engendered during the shipwrecked Japanese sailors' stay in the islands in 1840, the relationship between the original residents and the new residents (who would greatly outnumber them) became strained over property disputes, prices, and other frictions. Moreover, subsequent Japanese authorities also took a less accommodating approach to the unique background of the original settlers, and they would be subjected to discrimination in later years, particularly as war approached. During the war years, the islanders of Western descent had to adopt their Japanese names (as mentioned above, by the early 1880s all had naturalized as Japanese citizens and presumably chosen Japanese names at this point). Even with this, they were later distrusted and in some cases not permitted to work in military factories. They were also occasionally abused locally by military authorities and on the mainland, after they were evacuated there, by those suspicious of them.

Over the years, the island would continue to produce sugar cane, fish, etc., but overall the economic importance of the islands was insignificant. They were strategically important, however, as a link in Japan's communications and transportation with Hawaii and North America, as well as its newly acquired territories in the Pacific as a result of World War I when Japan was placed in charge of the former German territories.
In 1906, Chichi Jima was made a station on the undersea cable laid between San Francisco and Tokyo through Hawaii, the Marianas, and the Bonins. In 1914, the Japanese built the Naval Communication Center on Chichi Jima, and began to fortify the island by establishing a base headquarters and developing the port area and other infrastructure such as roads. Other fortifications were rushed to completion prior to the start of the Washington Naval Limitation Conference in 1921–22, which would prohibit further fortification of islands in the Pacific and limit Japan’s naval power to the status quo. They were completed in November 1921. On 22 February 1922, the Japanese Foreign Ministry announced that “in conformity with the spirit of [Article XIX of the Treaty], the Japanese government have decided forthwith to discontinue work on the fortifications in the Bonin Islands and Amami Oshima.” Chapter 3 describes in more detail the fortifications and efforts by Japan to skirt the treaty.

Following the outbreak of war with China in 1937 and the lapse of the treaty, Japan began to build an extensive network of bases in the Pacific. Both the Japanese Navy and Army began to arrive in greater numbers “transforming the whole area of Ogasawara Shoto into a restricted military zone.” Chichi Jima was one of several islands fortified along the chain that included Izu, Bonins, Iwo Jima, Saipan, and Tinian, which was to provide outer

<table>
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<th>Occupation</th>
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<th>Haha Jima</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial</td>
<td>Households</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>Households</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Households</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1419</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Households</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>3140</td>
<td>1788</td>
<td>4928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tokyoto Ogasawaramura, Ogasawara Shoto Kyosi Sokai Kara 50 Nin Kirokushi, p. 252.

Figure 5. Occupation by households/population in Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in 1935.
layers of protection for Japan. The Bonins would be used primarily as a supply base, storing ammunition and food in caves, and as a radio transmission facility, taking advantage of its high peaks. The islands were placed under martial law at this point. In the meantime, the few foreign visitors seemed to have stopped coming around 1930.179

“Before the war we used to get along with the Japanese on Chichi,” Miriam Savory said in an interview, “but when the war started they began putting us down. We heard about Pearl Harbor over the radio. ‘The war will be over in 10 days,’ they told us. ‘Your people can never win.’”180 Richard Washington explained that school authorities and the police “asked the school children what language their parents spoke at home. If the answer was ‘English,’ they called us up for questioning.”181 He added, “They beat us up . . . We were watched all the time.”182 One of Nathaniel Savory’s grandsons decided that in this tense atmosphere, it was wise to burn his grandfather’s effects, and did so, “even burned the flag Commodore Perry [had given] Nat.”183 Speaking of her time evacuated in Yokohama, Miriam Savory said, “I think if the Japanese had won they would have killed all the Bonin Islanders.”184

As the war intensified, the government decided in February 1944 to evacuate all civilians from Ogasawara, and the evacuation was started in April. U.S. air attacks on the islands on 15 June led to a speeding up of the evacuation. Figure 6 shows the dates, numbers, vessels used, origins, and routes for these evacuations. Ships arriving from the mainland with troops and supplies destined for Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, and Iwo Jima were used to send the islanders back to the mainland once their cargo was dropped off.185

Eventually, 6,886 of the 7,711 civilians were evacuated; 825 healthy males were ordered to remain behind to produce and supply food for the military, including four of the descendants of the original settlers: Simon and Jimmy Savory, Frank Washington, and Jeffrey Gilley. Simon would witness the beheading of an American pilot, and Gilley said he saw two decapitations.186 Others were drafted into the military to serve in other parts of Japan and China and were injured during the war.

THE SETTLEMENT OF IWO JIMA AND THE ISLAND ON THE EVE OF THE BATTLE

Spanish explorer Bernado de Torres first sighted Iwo Jima in 1543, and others came through the area, but it was an Englishman named Gore in 1673 who had gotten close enough to be able to give the remote island the name “Sulphur Island” for its pungent smell (a name that was later retained by the Japanese, translated as Iwo Jima).187 It would not be for another 100 years, however, before the islands were mapped and drawn. This was done by the crew of Captain James Cook during their third and final voyage exploring the Pacific in 1776 when HMS Discovery and HMS Resolution sailed near the still uninhabited island.188 A couple of decades later, Russians approached the islands in 1805. As activity increased in the Pacific because of whaling and the search for routes to China, interest in the area grew, but because of their lack of a natural harbor, the Kazan Islands were essentially bypassed and would not be settled until late in the nineteenth century. Iwo Jima’s rough sea approaches would make some of the later landings difficult at the time of the battle.
Figure 6. Forced evacuations from Ogasawara and Volcano Islands in 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evac. No.</th>
<th>Date (1944)</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
<th>Port of arrival*</th>
<th>Chichi Jima**</th>
<th>Haha Jima***</th>
<th>Iwo Jima</th>
<th>Kita Iwo Jima</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4/4</td>
<td>Shibazono Maru</td>
<td>Hachijojima (on 4/6)</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>711</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shibaura (on 4/9)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5/30</td>
<td>Shibazono Maru</td>
<td>Hachijojima (on 6/1)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tateyama (on 6/3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Shibaura (on 6/4)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>Kyushu Maru</td>
<td>Yokohama (on 6/18)</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>Yaei Maru</td>
<td>Tokyo (on 6/18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>Tatsuei Maru</td>
<td>Yokosuka (on 6/18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6/14</td>
<td>Dai 10 Unkai Maru</td>
<td>Yokosuka (on 6/18)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7/1</td>
<td>Noto Maru</td>
<td>Tokyo or Yokohama (on or about 7/4)</td>
<td>1,263</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7/10</td>
<td>Shibazono Maru</td>
<td>Tokyo (on 7/14)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>124</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7/16</td>
<td>Tonegawa Maru</td>
<td>Yokosuka (on 7/19)</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>1,229</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35</td>
<td>157</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7/23</td>
<td>Kyushu Maru</td>
<td>Tateyama (on 7/26)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>483</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yokosuka (on 7/27)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>7/29</td>
<td>Shibazono Maru</td>
<td>Shibaura (on 8/2)</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>8/4</td>
<td>Tonegawa Maru</td>
<td>Sunk off of Chichi Jima (13 died)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6,886</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Recreated by author from Tokyoto Ogasawaramura, ed., Ogasawara Shoto Kyosei Sokai Kara 50 Nen Kirakushi, 257–58)

*All departures were from Futami Harbor, Chichi Jima, and Okimura, Haha Jima.

**Where there are two numbers in a block, the top number is that of evacuees from the village of Omura, and the bottom one represents the number of evacuees from Ogiura.

***Where there are two numbers in a block, the top number is that of evacuees from the village of Okimura, and the bottom one represents the number from Kitamura.

****Figures from original table; actual totals were 1,570 (Haha Jima) and 663 (Kita Iwo Jima).
Unlike Chichi Jima, Iwo Jima took three-quarters of a century longer to be inhabited. In 1887, the governor of Tokyo Prefecture visited the Bonin Islands and included Iwo Jima, the territorial status of which was still undefined, in his itinerary. Then on 9 September 1891, the Japanese government officially claimed the islands and placed them under the Ogasawara Branch Office that year.\(^{189}\) Although the islands were opened up for development, it was not until 1904 before the first permanent settlers arrived. Around this time, the Japanese government imposed a ban on foreign settlement and, as a result, Iwo Jima became entirely closed off to the outside world.\(^{190}\) Despite this, the island population grew to 1,164—all Japanese—in 219 households.\(^{191}\) There were six hamlets—Motoyama, Higashi, Nishi, Kita, Midori, and Chidori—but most people lived in Iwo Jima’s only “town,” Motoyama. Overall, the island’s volcanic ash and black sand made it an inhospitable place, but the sulphur mine and refinery provided employment, as did the growing of sugar cane that was refined in 12 sugar mills around the island.\(^{192}\) Approximately 500 people worked in the sulphur plant in Motoyama. Many of them would also assist in the sugar mills during the February to May harvest time. Cotton had been unsuccessfully cultivated but the residents were able to grow a number of small crops, such as coffee, cocoa, bananas, corn, and other vegetables, primarily for local consumption. Commercial fishing was attempted, but this too was unsuccessful due to the lack of a supporting harbor and infrequent ship arrivals, and only enough for local consumption was yielded. Ships arrived every two months from Tokyo, and a local boat traveled once a month between Ogasawara and the Kazan Islands.\(^{193}\)

Because of its volcanic and sulfuric make-up, the availability of drinking water was always a problem on Iwo. Most potable water, therefore, was collected during the rainy season between April and June. It was enough to sustain the villages, but as the population grew by 5 and then by 20 times in the months prior to the battle, many problems emerged.

Being a subtropical climate, the islanders lived initially in raised huts constructed of wood frames with roofs of tin and walls of palm-like leaves until more permanent dwellings were built. Despite the simple existence, Motoyama offered a small inn used by visiting government officials; a bar serviced by young women, including those from Korea and China; some general stores; a police station; a government survey office; a grade school; and a high school.\(^{194}\) Radio and mail by ships were the primary means of communication between the mainland and Iwo.

In 1940, a civilian construction company (Mabuchigumi)\(^{195}\) from Yokosuka began building the island’s first airport, the incoming workers increasing the local population slightly. The airport’s purpose was military in nature, however, and in the spring of 1941, half a year prior to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, an Imperial Navy detachment of 93 men was sent to set up defensive guns around the new base.\(^{196}\) In March 1944, Imperial Navy Captain Wachi Tsunezo, who would have a near 50-year connection with Iwo Jima afterward, arrived as the garrison commander along with 1,000 sailors and Japanese Marines, followed by Imperial Japanese Army Colonel Atsuchi Kanehiko with 1,000 soldiers.\(^{197}\) The ultimate role of Iwo Jima was still unknown to the islanders.
NOTES


3Kublin, “The Discovery of the Bonin Islands,” 27.

4The *ronin* said his name was Ogasawara Sadato, a descendent of Sadayori, and presented a document called *Tatsumi Muninnto*, believed to have been written around that time, to corroborate his story. The request was granted, and, in December 1733, a group departed for the islands, never to return. When the *ronin* reapplied to make the trip himself in 1735, he was discovered as not being related to the Ogasawara family. He was accused of being a fraud and severely punished by the Bakufu authorities. For more, see Tanaka Hiroyuki, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara: Obei no Hogeisen de Sakaeta Midori no Shima* [Ogasawara during the Bakumatsu Period: The Green Islands that prospered as a result of the Western Whaling Vessels] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 1997), 9–14; Tabata Michio, *Ogasawarato Yukari no Hitobito* [People with a Connection to Ogasawara] (Ogasawara-son: Ogasawara-son Kyokuin Kinkai, 1993), 7–12; and Tanaka Hiroyuki, “Edo Jidai ni Okeru Nihonjin no Mujinto (Ogasawarato) ni taisuru Ninshiki” [The Ogasawara Islands in Tokugawa japan], *Kaijishi Kenkyu*, no. 50 (June 1993), 30–44, which is translated by Stephen Wright Horn as Tanaka Hiroyuki, “How the Japanese of the Edo Period Perceived the Ogasawara Islands,” *Nihongo Kenkyu Sentaa Hokoku* [Japanese Language Research Center Reports], vol. 6 (June 1998), 31–58. In most works concerning the Bonin Islands, the date 1593 will appear followed by a description that Ogasawara Sadayori discovered them. Although the story later turned out to be a hoax (and the perpetrator of it punished in 1735), many continued to believe it or at least perpetuate the story, and some later works include the supporting (but forged) documents to the 1727 petition without comment as if they were true (see editorial n3 by Tanaka in his 1993 article). A shrine was built and dedicated to Ogasawara Sadayori in the prewar era (first being built in Omura’ Otaki, and then moved to the base of Suzumiyama in Oura in 1899. It was rebuilt in 1981, having been burned down during the war). See Tabata, *Ogasawarato*, foreword (p. 14); and for photos see Kurata Yoji, ed., *Ogasawara: Hakken kara Senzen made* [Ogasawara, From Discovery to the Prewar] (Kamakura-shi: Abokku-sha, 1983), 8–9; Ogasawarason Kyoiku Kinkai, ed., *Hirakeyuku Ogasawara* [Ogasawara Opening Up] (Ogasawarason: Ogasawara-son Kyoiku Kinkai, 1985), 58; and Ogasawara Henkan 20 Shunen Jikko Kinkai Kinenshi Hensan Shitsu, ed., *Me de Saguru Ogasawara* [Looking for Ogasawara Through Pictures] (Ogasawarason: Ogasawara Henkan 20 Shunen Jikko Kinkai, 1991), 26, 99. Similarly, historians and other writers continue to retell the legend as if it were fact. (This includes the Japanese government, which, in later years, despite having exposed the story as untrue, used this date and story as a reference when claiming sovereignty over the islands.) Despite the research of scholars such as Tanaka Hiroyuki, the myth still continues to be believed. The Japanese Foreign Ministry’s encyclopedia entry for the Bonin Islands, for example, introduces the story without noting that it was found to be a hoax. See Hanabusa Nagamichi, “Ogasawara Kizoku Mondai” [The Problem of Ogasawara’s Sovereignty], in Gaimusho Gaikoshiryokan Nihon Gaikoshi Jiten Hensan Kinkai, ed., *Shinpantai Nihon Gaikoshi Jiten* [An Encyclopedia of Japanese Diplomacy, Rev. ed.] (Tokyo; Yamakawa Shuppan, 1992), 113. In the early 1990s, the Ogasawara Board of Education
sponsored the publication of two books as part of the celebration for the “400th Anniversary of the Discovery of the Ogasawara Islands” [Ogasawara Shoto Hakken 400 Nen Kinen], suggesting its support of the legend (Tabata’s book above, and a collection of essays called the Ogasawara Shoto Hakken 400 Nen Henkan 25 Shunen Kinen Ronbun-Sakubun Konkuuru Nyusho Sakuhinshu, published in 1994). Hal Buell’s Uncommon Valor, Common Virtue: Iwo Jima and the Photograph that Captured America (New York: Berkeley Caliber, 2006), 1, makes the same mistake, as does Derrick Wright, The Battle for Iwo Jima 1945 (Phoenix Mill, England: Sutton, 2006), 1, and another book in Japanese, while acknowledging the story to be a legend, introduces the readers to it as if it were fact. See Yamaguchi Ryoko, Ogasawara Kurnokikuru: Kokkyo no Yureta Shima [Ogasawara Chronicles: The Islands Shaken by (National) Borders] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho La Clef, 2005), 21–22. The otherwise helpful Historical and Geographical Dictionary of Japan (by Edmond Papinot, which was first published in 1910 and subsequently reprinted by Charles E. Tuttle Company beginning in 1972), similarly errs (p. 473). Numerous other newspaper and magazine stories also regularly mistake the legend for fact.

There are at least three different factual errors that have emerged with this discovery. Some writers, including Lionel Berners Cholmondeley, A History of the Bonin Islands from the Year 1827 to the Year 1876 and of Nathaniel Savory One of the Original Settlers (London: Constable and Co., 1915), attribute the discovery of the islands to Villalobos, but this is incorrect. Kublin (“The Bonin Islands,” 2–3), citing the work of Ione S. Wright, explains, “A mere study of his trans-Pacific route will quickly reveal the invalidity of this claim.” See Ione S. Wright, “Early Spanish Voyages from America to the Far East, 1527–1565,” in Adele Ogden and Engel, eds., Greater America: Essays in Honor of Herbert Eugene Bolton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), 57–58. Second, Cholmondeley and others write that the islands discovered were the Bonin Islands. Technically, that is correct if the fact that the Volcano Islands are, in modern times, seen as part of the Bonin Islands, but they are a separate group. Third, the islands were said to be the Arsopispo Archipelago, but this was a name given well after the age of Villalobos/de la Torre, and thus it was unlikely that these were the same islands. This is supported by Tanaka (Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 16–17). Incidentally, both Tanaka (Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 16–17) and Kublin (“The Bonin Islands,” 3) believe it was the Volcano Islands that were discovered, but the ever-cautious Kublin describes the story as “still inconclusive.” In another article, Kublin suggests that “de la Torre sighted the Northern Marianas and, possibly Iwo-Jima” (emphasis added). See Kublin, “The Discovery of the Bonin Islands,” 38.

Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 16.

Cholmondeley, A History, 7; and Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 16. Also see, James Burney, A Chronological History of the Discoveries in the South Sea or Pacific Ocean, Part 1 (London: G. and W. Nicol, 1803), 239.

Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 16, and Antonio Galvano, The Discoveries of the World (London: Haklut Society, 1862), 234–35. Burney, A Chronological History (p. 239), has it written as “Forfana.”


A few years after their visit in 1643, another Dutch explorer, Maarten Gerritsz de Vries, is reported to also have sighted the islands. See Okuma Ryoichi, *Rekishi no Kataru Ogasawarato* [The Ogasawara Islands as Told by History] (Tokyo: Nanpo Doho Engokai, 1966), 29.


Kublin writes that the log of their journey was not discovered and published until 1843 by P. F. von Siebld. See ibid., 39.

Ibid., 41.


The boats, called *Yamatogata sen* (Japanese-style boats), were to be no larger than 42.3 feet in length, 18.7 feet in width, and 6.2 feet deep, and were quite common during the period of seclusion. They easily took on water and were considered dangerous and weak. For designs and other relevant information, see Ogasawarason Kyoiku Iinkai, ed., *Hirakeyuku Ogasawara*, 60.


As part of the seclusion act, the Bakufu had destroyed all large ships for trading, including the Shuinsen vessels that had been permitted by Toyotomi Hideyoshi back in 1592. See Ogasawara-son Kyoiku Iinkai, ed., *Hirakeyuku Ogasawara*, 56; and Tabata, *Ogasawarato Yukari no Hitobito*, 29–30.


Ibid., 29–30; and Tanaka, *Bakumatsu to Ogasawara*, 7–9.


According to Arima, the Bakufu subsequently attempted an expedition to the Munin Islands in 1722, and again in 1782, but was unsuccessful both times likely due to the limited navigational skills of the crew and the size of the vessel.


Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 28. According to Kublin, Hayashi’s manuscript, which had been translated into Dutch by local Japanese scholars and Isaac Titsingh, the Dutch superintendent of trade at Dejima, and brought back to Europe in 1806 (along with the original Japanese), was acquired by Remusat when Titsingh died.
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations


37Tanaka, “How the Japanese of the Edo Period,” 35–36. Tanaka (and Tabata, Ogasawarato Yukari, 33–38), provide a detailed description of Hayashi’s references to the islands in their writings. The three countries referred to in Hayashi’s work were Ezo (Hokkaido), Chosen (Korean Peninsula), and the Ryukyus.

38Ibid., 38.

39Ibid., 38–39.

40Ibid., 43.


44The visit to the islands by Coffin, who was from Nantucket, Massachusetts, was discussed in the Nantucket Inquirer on 10 November 1827. It is reprinted as appendix iv in Kublin, “The Discovery of the Bonin Islands,” 671–72, and 681. It is also discussed in Edmund Fanning, Voyages and Discoveries in the South Seas, 1792–1832 (New York: Collins and Hannay, 1833). According to Kublin, who cites W.T. Brigham, An Index to Islands of the Pacific Ocean: Memoirs of the Bernice Pauahi Bishop Museum (Honolulu, 1900), 46, the Bonin Islands may have been visited by another American, John Ebbets, who was serving as an agent of the fur trader and millionaire John Jacob Astor in Hawaii, in 1824. Kublin was able to ascertain that Ebbets was in Oahu in 1824 but was unable to confirm if he had in fact made it to the Bonins during that year. See Kublin, “The Discovery of the Bonin Islands,” 681–82.


48For more on the whaling industry and the Bonin Islands, see Tanaka Hiroyuki, “Ogasawarato to Hogeisen” [Ogasawara and Whaling Vessels], in Ishii Kenji, ed., Nibon Kajishi no Shomondai:
According to the account of Capt Frederick W. Beechey, who came upon the two sailors, an earthquake and tsunami had hit the island in January 1826. It seems that the date is a typo, however, as Beechey writes, the sailors had been on the islands for eight months, and Beechey had arrived in June 1827. It is probably correct to assume that the date was January 1827. See Frederick W. Beechey, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific and Bering's Strait* (London, 1831), 228–40. Beechey only gave the name of one of the men, Wittrein. Lutke’s account, later, supplies the name of the other man, Peterson. See Frederic Lutke, *Voyage Autour du Monde, 1826–1829* (New York: De Capo Press, 1971). For more on the voyage of Beechey, see George Peard, *To the Pacific and Arctic with Beechey: The Journal of Lieutenant George Peard of H. M. S. Blossom, 1825–1828* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).


His trip and talk before the ASJ are described later in this chapter. The ASJ was formed in 1872 in Yokohama by British and American diplomats, businessmen, and missionaries to learn more about the country in which they were residing, sponsoring monthly lectures and the publication of the annual *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan.*

Robertson, “The Bonin Islands,” 117. Due to his country’s interest in the islands, Robertson was probably trying to stress his country’s claim to the island by explaining that, although Beechey did not think he had arrived at the Bonins, he in fact did, and in Robertson’s argument, it was the Japanese who were mistaken about earlier claims.


The two earliest accounts of this period use different spellings. Robertson writes the name as Millichamp, and Cholmondeley uses Millinchamp. As British records, introduced below, use Millichamp, the author will employ that spelling as well. Cholmondeley suggests that he may not have been an Englishman. Both Robertson and Cholmondeley use the name “John,” but it appears from other Guam-related genealogies that the man may have been in fact Richard M. Millinchamp, an English sea captain who had lost his ship around the Cape of Good Hope and was picked up by a French merchantman before finding his way to Hawaii.


Ibid., 33. Buell, in his brief history at the beginning of *Uncommon Valor*, has the Savory arrival as 1827, but that is incorrect.


Dobson, “A Chronology of the Bonin Islands,” 23, citing “Francis Stavers to Colonial Office, 10 April 1834,” and “Colonial Office to Stavers, 16 April 1834.”

Dobson, “A Chronology of the Bonin Islands,” 23, citing Ruschenberger, William Samuel Waithman (1838) *Narrative of a Voyage around the World, during the Years 1835, 36, and 37; Including a Narrative of an Embassy to the Sultan of Muscat and the King of Siam* (London: Richard Bentley, 1855), 298–313. This code was not good enough for the illiterate, nominal leader of the group, Mazarro, who apparently plotted to have Savory, and perhaps Chapin, murdered in 1838. There was a British ship of a similar name, HMS *Enterprize*, that also visited the islands, but that visit was 15 years later. See Richard C. Collinson, *Journal of the H. M. S. Enterprise* (London: Sampson Low, 1889); and Richard C. Collinson, “The Bonin Islands in 1851,” *The Nautical Magazine*, vol. 21 (March 1852), 135–38.


Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 34.

Savory’s first wife had been abducted by the crews of British vessels, *Maid of Australia* and *St. Andrews*. See Dobson, “A Chronology of the Bonin Islands,” 25, citing Taylor, Bayard (1855) *A Visit to India, China and Japan, in the Year 1853* (London: Sampson Low, Son & Co., 1855), 394. Savory also lost his livestock, clothes, and savings of around $2,000. Savory’s sad story is also retold in Cholmondley, *The History of the Bonin Islands*, 26–27.


See, for example, T. Horton James, “The Sandwich and Bonin Islands. A Letter to a Noble Lord on the Importance of Settling the Sandwich and Bonin Islands, in the North Pacific Ocean, on the plan of a proprietary government; together with Hints on the probability in that case of introducing British Manufactures into the Great Empire of Japan,” (London: W. Tew, 1832); and G. Tradescant Lay, “Trade with China. A Letter Addressed to the British Public on Some of the Advantages that would Result from an Occupation of the Bonin Islands,” (London: Royston and Brown, 1837), both cited in Dobson, “A Chronology of the Bonin Islands,” 28–29.

“Letter from Lt. T. J. Page to Secretary of Navy, November 28, 1850,” cited in Dorothy Richard Pesce and L. Gordon Findley, A History of the Bonin–Volcano Islands, 1830–1958, 9–10, unpublished manuscript, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. The manuscript is actually two parts, Book I, which covers the period from 1830 to 1950 and was written by Pesce, and Book II, which covers the remaining years and was written by Findley. They are referred to as Pesce, Book I, and Findley, Book II, hereafter. Pesce and Collinson (1852) both write that vessel’s name was Dolphin, but that was the name of the class. The ship’s name was actually the Porpoise, and had been long involved in anti slavery patrols before becoming part of the United States Exploring Squadron and service in the U.S.-Mexican War.

Collinson, “The Bonin Islands in 1851,” 137.

Pesce, Book I, 10.


Hawks, Narrative, 242.

Letter from Perry to Savory.

Findley, Book II, 286.

As the deed to it states that the rights would pass to Perry’s “heirs and assigns forever,” the case could be made that the land still technically belongs to Perry’s descendants.

Robertson writes “Motley” and that he died on the Bailey Islands in 1870, while Cholmondeley uses “Moitley” and writes the date of his death as 1866. Collinson also uses “Moitley.” As his article was published in 1852, it does not cover the period of his death.


With the exception of the goats, which thrived and “swarm” all over the islands, the sheep died and the cattle were stolen by visiting whalers. See Robertson, “The Bonin Islands,” 122.

Morison, Old Bruin, 312.


Hawks, Narrative, 332.

Ibid. Robertson writes that one of the Plymouth’s cutters was lost in rough seas off of Chichi Jima, and 14 of its crew died. Robertson, “The Bonin Islands,” 122.

Hawks, Narrative, 242. Dobbin had been instrumental in getting President Franklin Pierce nominated as the Democratic Party candidate for the presidency, and then elected president. As a reward for his service, Pierce named the North Carolinian native secretary of the Navy. Dobbin believed in a strong navy and helped modernize its ships during his four years in office. He also helped arrange the Perry visit to Japan. Ironically, a ship named after him, the USS Dobbin (AD 3) was present at Pearl Harbor when it was attacked by Japanese forces on 7 December 1941. See Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, vol. 2, 282–83.
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90 Hawks, *Narrative*, 244–45.

92 Admiral E. V. Puchachin, who commanded the Russian Far Eastern Fleet, visited Peel Island on his way to Nagasaki on 3 July and stayed for 10 days, departing on the 13th. He was the third Russian to visit the islands, after Ivan Fedorovich Kruzenshtern (born Adam Johann Ritter von Krusenstern of a Baltic German family), in 1805, who spotted Iwo Jima, and Lutke, in 1828, discussed above.

91 For an insightful discussion of British internal discussions regarding the Perry visit to the Bonins, see W. G. Beasley, *Great Britain and the Opening of Japan, 1834–1858* (London: Luzac and Company, 1951), 94–96.

92 “Letter from Alex Simpson and H. N. Lay to Lord Clarendon, October 1, 1853,” cited in Hawks, *Narrative*, 352. The fourth Earl of Clarendon’s real name was George Frederick William Villiers.


95 A few years later, Beechey, in a speech in London, echoed Perry’s plea for open ports: “The right of possession from priority of discovery is a question of which nations are naturally jealous; but I trust that not only in respect of these islands, but in all other cases, our relations will be such, that our ports will be mutually open for the general benefit of navigation and commerce.” See F. W. Beechey, “Address to the Royal Geographical Society of London, May 26, 1856,” *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, no. 26 (1856): 228. Beechey had become president of the RGS in 1855.

96 Pesce, *Book I*, 18. Some tales, including this one by Navy historians, has the ship’s name as *Macedonia*, but it is actually *Macedonian*. For more, see James T. de Kay, *Chronicles of the Frigate Macedonian* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).


99 Perry, “The Enlargement of Geographical Science.”


104 Ibid.

105 Ibid., 44; and “A Written Statement of Information Privy to Myself Concerning the Bonin Islands.”

106 Hawks, *Narrative*.

107 Tanaka Hiroyuki, “Ogasawara Shoto wa Naze Nihon no Ryodo” [Why are the Ogasawara Islands Japanese Territory], in Gejo Masao, et al., eds., *Shitte Imasuka, Nihon no Shima* [Do You Know Japan’s Islands?] (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokuminsha, 2002), 79; and Tanaka, “How the Japanese of the Edo Period,” 46. The superintendent in charge of foreign countries refers to Perry’s *Narrative* in a discussion (mentioned below) in 1859, suggesting that the *Narrative* had already made its way to Japan and was translated.
For more on this time, see Sir Rutherford Alcock, *The Capital of the Tycoon: A Narrative of Three Years Residence in Japan* (London: Longman and Green, 1863).


Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 41. Curiously, although ordered to call at the islands either on his way to or from the United States to make observations, the naval magistrate, Kimura Settsu no Kami Yoshitake, for reasons unclear, did not do so. Tanaka, “How the Japanese of the Edo Period,” 47–48.


Tanaka, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara*, 127.


Ibid., 42–43.

For the records of his conversations with the islanders of Western descent, see “Ogasawarato Jumin Taiwasho,” Obana Sakujo Kankei Shiryō.


Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 42.

Ibid., 42. According to Arima (p. 47), “Webb was the only literate man who performed marriage and burial services.”

Yamaguchi, *Ogasawara Kuronikuru*, 41.

Ibid., 42–43.


Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 44.

See Robertson, “The Bonin Islands,” 122.


Kublin, “The Ogasawara Venture,” 280–81. Horton was born in Boston, England, but served for 18 years in the U.S. Navy. Coming to the Bonin Islands in 1854, he decided to retire there and bought a tract of land and settled down.
A tidal wave hit the islands in 1872, striking more fear in the residents. It was at this time that Savory lost his diary that he had been keeping since the establishment of the colony. Although some papers were recovered, his diary was likely the one thorough and most reliable record kept at the time covering the previous 42 years. Dobson, “A Chronology of the Bonin Islands,” 27. Savory would die a little later on 10 April 1874.

The German government’s request for clarification seems to have been made in response to the description of the islands in a British government publication (China Seas Pilot) as being British territory. For more, see Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 239–41.

Pease’s appeal was also noted in the British press and seems to have been the direct catalyst for the British government’s request to the Meiji government to clarify its intentions with regard to the islands. The London Times reported on it in 1873, and shortly after that, British representative Parkes told his Japanese counterparts, “If Japan continues to leave the islands as is, they will become British territory.”

“Ibid., 636. Ironically, Pease reportedly would meet a similar fate. On 9 October 1874, Pease departed Ogiura by boat but never returned. A few days later, his empty boat drifted ashore at David’s Beach (present-day Yakiba Kaigan). According to Tabobashi, a worker of Pease’s named Spencer was having an affair with Pease’s wife, Susan Robinson, and Spencer was suspected of being involved in the disappearance but no charges were brought “as no one missed Pease’s death.” See Tabobashi, “Ogasawara Shoto no Kaishu, 4,” 22. According to Shepardson, Pease’s suspected murderer was “murdered in turn” and Susan was said to have married the murderer, a Thomas Tewrbab. See Shepardson, The Bonin Islands, 105.

Cholmondeley, The History of the Bonin Islands, 62.

This was the second tsunami to hit Chichi Jima in two decades, the earlier one being in December 1854 (as a result of the Ansei Tokai earthquake). For more, see Tsuji Yoshinobu, “Ogasawara Shoto no Tusnamishi” [History of Tsunamis in the Bonin Islands], Rekishi Jishin, no. 21 (2006), 65–79. Another destructive tsunami hit in May 1960, as a result of the Chilean earthquake. For more, see Suzuki Takahiro, “Beigun Shihaika no Ogasawara Shoto to Chiri Jishin Tsunami” [The Ogasawara Islands under U.S. Military Control and the Tsunami from the Chilean Earthquake], Tokyo Toritsu Ogasawara Koto Gakko Kenkyu Kiyo, no. 6 (1992), 22–56.
eign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress, With the Annual Message of the President, December 7, 1874, 637.

141 Ibid., 637.

145 Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 241–42.

146 Ibid., 242.


148 Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 242.

149 Ibid.

150 Dobson, “Chronology,” 27.

151 Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 242.


154 “Document No. 159, November 8, 1875, Eikoku Koshi Yori Terashima Gaimukyo Ate: Ogasawarato e Nihon Kanin Haken Shui Narabini Haken Kanin no Seimei nado ni Kanshi Shokai no Ken” [Letter from British Minister to Foreign Minister Terashima on Dispatch to Ogasawara of Government Officials, the Purpose of Their Visit, and Their Names], Gaimusho, ed., Nihon Gaiko Bunsho, 363.


156 One person who the Japanese government feared would cause problems at this point was Captain Pease. See n.139. See Tanaka, Bakumatsu no Ogasawara, 247.


158 Pesce, Book I, 23.

159 Robertson, “The Bonin Islands,” 140.


162 Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 47.
Interestingly, an idea was introduced in September 1872 to place the Bonin Islands under the administrative control of the Ryukuban (Ryukyu Domain) but it was not accepted. See Tsuji, *Ogasawara Shoto Gaishi*, 69.


Ibid.

Tanaka, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara*, 251–53.

Ibid., 255; and Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 48.

Tanaka, *Bakumatsu no Ogasawara*, 255.

Ibid., 255–58.

Ibid., 258–59.

Robertson, “The Bonin Islands,” 128.


Ibid.

Ibid.


According to the U.S. Navy, the last known foreigner to visit Chichi Jima in the prewar era was a German named W. Gundert, who made a brief vacation trip there in 1930. See Navy Department, *Civil Affairs Handbook*, 45. However, according to Shepardson, who cites an interview with an islander, the English brother-in-law of Richard Washington visited Chichi Jima before the war in the late 1930s. See Shepardson, *The Bonin Islands*, 169. Upton Close (“Japan’s Stronghold in the Pacific,” *New York Herald Tribune*, 26 February 1933, 8), also incorrectly writes that the last foreigner to conduct research on Chichi was a German named Dr. Richard Goldschmidt, who studied the genealogical composition of the islanders in 1926 and published his findings in 1927, but he was followed by F. Wagenseil (date unknown) who conducted similar research. (See Kimura Masafumi, “Ogasawarato Konketsusha no Haigusha Sentaku to Jinko” [Selection in Marriage and Population in the Mixed Blood People on the Bonin Islands], *Jinruigaku Zasshi*, vol. 67, no. 5 (1960), 12–22.) The U.S. Navy apparently did not know about Wagenseil’s visit when completing the *Handbook*. It did have the names, occupations, and addresses of those Americans known to have visited the islands, which it included in the report. Moreover, according Willard Price, a Canadian-born American and prolific writer about Japan and the Pacific, an unnamed American diplomat, and two friends visited Haha Jima in 1931, accompanied by a military policeman who was “ostensibly a ‘guide’.” See Willard Price, “Springboards to Tokyo,” *The National Geographic Magazine*, vol. 76, no. 4 (October 1944), 393. Price himself mentions his own visit, but does not give a date, although it was probably in 1935. One historian suggests he was an intelligence officer, but does not provide the evidence to support the claim. Laurie Barber, “Willard Price: Uncle Sam’s Spy?” *WaiMilHis*, vol. 1, no. 4 (July 1999), http://www.waikato.ac.nz/wfass/subjects/history/waimilhist/1999/willardprice.htm.

Ibid., 9–10.

Shepardson, _The Bonin Islands_, 169.

Hammond and Shepardson, “Uncle Charlie,” 10. Without explicitly contradicting Washington, Shepardson, in another work, writes that the flag was “taken by the Japanese and never returned.” Shepardson, _The Bonin Islands_, 166. It contains a description of the burning of the papers by Samuel Savory in 1942, which was originally published by Audrey Bordallo in the May 1965 edition of _Pacific Profile_.


Horie Yoshitaka, _Tokon Iwo Jima: Ogasawara Heidan Sanbo no Kaiso_ [Fighting Spirit, Iwo Jima: The Memoirs of a Staff Officer, Ogasawara Forces] (Tokyo: Kojinsha NF Bunko, 2005), 89–91, 96–97, 134–35. According to Horie, who was in charge of the evacuation, “About 50 or 60 of the islanders remained on Chichi Jima up to the end of August 1944 because these people wanted to stay very urgently, and since I was busy because I went to Iwo Jima and Tokyo, I was not very careful.” Kuribayashi, who was on Iwo Jima, was very angry and fired off a telegraph: “According to some rumors, some civilians have remained at Chichi Jima. Don’t you know that they encumber the armed forces in case of battle. Reply immediately. Kuribayashi.”

Ibid., 10, and Shepardson, _The Bonin Islands_, 174.

Graff, _Strike and Return_, 7. According to Graff, survivors from a three-masted Italian merchant ship that had been destroyed in a typhoon briefly lived on the inhabited island.

Cook was murdered in Hawaii in February 1779 during an altercation with locals on the island of Hawaii (Big Island). Graff, _Strike and Return_, 7. Graff was uncertain of the exact date, but Buell, _Uncommon Valor_, 2–3, introduces a map that was drawn in 1786.

Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 118.

Graff, _Strike and Return_, 8.

“Iwojima no Kako to Genzai” [Iwo Jima’s Past and Present], Ogasawara Kyokai, ed., _Ogasawara_, vol. 43 (25 December 1997), 12.

Graff, _Strike and Return_, 7.

Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 118.


Today, the company, still based near Yokosuka in Yokohama, is known as Mabuchi Construction, and uses the acronym Mzec.

Wachi, who returned to Tokyo in October 1944, became a Buddhist priest in the postwar period and was active in the collecting of the remains of fallen soldiers, establishing the Iwo Jima Association, and working toward good relations between the United States and Japan. His activities are discussed more in chapter 7. For more on Wachi, see Kamisaka, _Iwo Jima Imada Gyokusai Sezu_.

51
Iwo Jima has come to be called the “Inevitable Island” by a number of writers. It was *Time* magazine, in its 5 March 1945 issue, that first used the expression.¹ As U.S. forces made their way westward across the Pacific, the militaries of both countries were destined, it seems, to clash on the tiny island of Iwo Jima, located strategically as it was on “Japan’s doorstep.” The seizure of that volcanic hot spot would bring American forces to within 700 miles of the mainland, the closest they had come in any great numbers. It had been a long and hard-fought journey for them following the attacks on Pearl Harbor, 3,100 miles away, some three years before on that quiet Sunday morning of 7 December 1941.

The resulting clash on Iwo Jima cost many lives on both sides. Almost all of the 22,000 Japanese defenders were killed; only 1,083 (867 Imperial Japanese Army; 216 Imperial Japanese Navy) survived, and few voluntarily. On the U.S. side, the battle caused more than 26,000 casualties, including 6,800 deaths. Of those, 5,931 U.S. Marines were killed and 17,372 wounded in action.² It was the first battle in which there were more casualties on the U.S. side than on the Japanese side.³ Iwo Jima was the bloodiest battle in the history of the Marine Corps, “the toughest fight in the 169 years of our Corps,” Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, who was the senior Marine in the planning phase and in theater as commanding general, Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56), sadly noted.⁴ An assault that was expected by some planners to take only a few days actually took more than a month. As a result of the battle, American military and political leaders reexamined their thinking about Japan’s willingness and ability to fight as U.S. forces got closer to their enemy’s homeland. They decided it was important to try to avoid having to invade the Japanese mainland.

There was then, and continues to be, a debate in the United States as to whether it was worth the price.⁵ Some, such as Smith, split the difference by arguing it was indeed necessary to take Iwo, but that the number of casualties could have been fewer had there been more pre-invasion bombardment by the Navy as he and his staff had requested on numerous occasions.⁶ Nevertheless, “Howlin Mad” Smith wrote in his memoirs, “In fighting a war to win, you cannot evaluate the attainment of an objective in terms of lives, or money, or material lost. I said ‘Yes’ to this question [about the need to seize Iwo Jima] before we laid plans to take Iwo Jima, and I say ‘Yes’ today.”⁷

One Marine veteran observed that Iwo Jima “was as close to Hell as you could get.”⁸ Another intimated that it was worse than that: “I know I’m going to Heaven. I put in 36 days in Hell.” Why then would Americans, the 70,000 Marines of the landing forces and
150,000 others supporting the operation, go there, a place they knew only as “Island X” and “Workman” before their departure for the battle?

The reasons for taking Iwo Jima were numerous and can be summarized as follows:  
(1) American “very long range” bombers (Boeing B-29 Superfortresses) could fly closer to Japan before being detected; (2) bombers would not have to avoid flying near Iwo and thus would require less fuel and could carry more bombs; (3) it would serve as a base for fighter planes (primarily the long-range North American P-51 Mustang) that could escort the bombers to and from mainland Japan; (4) it would provide an important midway point for damaged bombers and other aircraft to land and get repaired; (5) search and rescue operations could be done from Iwo more easily than from the Marianas for pilots and crews of bombers and other planes that crashed in the sea; (6) the capture of the runways would stop it from serving as a base from which Japanese aircraft could harass U.S. operations and bases in the Central Pacific; and (7) the capture of Iwo Jima, Japanese territory—indeed, a part of Tokyo Prefecture—would, hopefully, send an important psychological blow to Japan that the end was near.

Japan, on the other hand, not only wanted to delay that end as long as possible but make the United States pay such a punishing price for Iwo Jima that it would rethink any plans to invade Japan proper. The loss of the Mariana Islands—the northernmost of which had been under Japanese control since World War I as a mandate of the League of Nations—in the summer of 1944 shocked the Japanese leadership, leading to the resignation of Prime Minister Tojo Hideki, who had always told Emperor Hirohito and the people of Japan that the Americans were soft and lacked the courage to fight.  
That November, the Marianas, only 1,500 miles from Japan, would be used by U.S. B-29s to bomb Japanese cities and industrial centers. As long as Japan held on to Iwo Jima, those bombing runs would be less successful than the U.S. Army Air Forces desired or expected. The United States, therefore, had to be prevented at all costs from seizing Iwo and turning it into its own “unsinkable aircraft carrier.”

Ironically, Iwo Jima’s inherent value to Japan was limited to an early warning site and a base for fighter-interceptors. Indeed, writes Joseph Alexander, a former Marine and expert on amphibious operations, “On the larger scale, the island was a strategic liability to the Japanese.”  
An idea seriously studied at one point by Major Horie Yoshitaka and others at the headquarters of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi on Iwo Jima was to blow the island up (or “sink it”) in order to render it unusable by U.S. forces. This idea was supported by some in the General and Naval Staff Offices. After consulting with demolition experts, however, Kuribayashi and his staff realized they did not have enough dynamite to do so. However, regardless of its value to Japan, the more reasons the United States had to seize the island, the greater the necessity for Japanese forces, led by the 54-year old Kuribayashi, to prevent that from happening.

Despite the inevitability of the clash, Iwo Jima was actually a “latecomer as a potential objective” for U.S. amphibious operations, as a U.S. strategy championed by General Douglas A. MacArthur, had been to approach Japan through the Philippines, Formosa, and Amoy. Because Formosa, in particular, was seen as a slow, exhaustive, and bloody route, U.S. military leaders endorsed the faster route through Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
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THE U.S. DECISION TO SEIZE IWO JIMA

Despite the Bonin Islands having received little attention as part of a series of war plans with Japan developed in the 1920s and 1930s, they did get the consideration of the staff of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, commander in chief, Pacific Forces, in late 1942 when it developed a study on the seizure of Chichi Jima. With its fine harbor and small airfield, Chichi Jima, in the Navy's opinion, could serve as a combined fighter and bomber base and port facility. The Navy, however, showed little interest in Iwo Jima, due to its lack of harbors. Distracted by other more pressing operations, it would be about nine months before the feasibility of seizing the Bonin Islands could be examined at higher levels.

Believing that the Bonins would be an important point in the defense of Japan after the fall of the Marianas, U.S. planners further examined the question of seizing them in mid-September 1943. Despite their “important strategic position in the Central Pacific area,” the study by the Joint War Planning Committee (JWPC), a planning group under the Joint Staff Planners, which in turn was under the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), argued that “their potential value as an offensive base is limited.” It noted that the terrain “decidedly favor[ed] the defense,” and warned that “operations planned herein are likely to entail heavy losses, and to divert out of all proportion to the anticipated value of these islands to us.” The JCS decided to shelve the plan.

During the summer of 1944, Nimitz’s forces seized Saipan (from mid-June to early July), Tinian (late July), and Guam (late July to early August). Significantly, Guam had been U.S. territory since the end of the Spanish-American War, and thus it was the first American territory retaken from Japanese control. The other land battles in the Pacific, including Saipan, were for Japanese protectorates. The victory in Guam therefore was a significant morale booster for the United States and an equally large symbolic—and strategic—loss for Japan. Its outer perimeter had been breached, and a panic ensued in planning headquarters in Tokyo. The next campaign would likely involve historically Japanese territory.

Shortly after the beginning of the campaign in Saipan, several U.S. planners turned their attention to altering the plan to next retake Guam and instead pursue “the immediate occupation of Iwo Jima.” JWPC planners had learned through intelligence, correctly in retrospect, that the defenses at Iwo Jima were at this point poorly organized, and completed a study urging the seizure of the island on 24 June. With the Japanese fleet heavily damaged in the largest carrier battle in history between the U.S. and Japanese navies in the Philippine Sea on 19 and 20 in what became known as the Marianas Turkey Shoot, planners thought Iwo Jima could be seized quickly and made into an air base for the two bomber groups of Consolidated B-24 Liberators and an equal number of fighter groups. Guam could then be reconquered afterward. Unfortunately, the leadership of the JWPC disagreed with the proposal, believing that Iwo Jima would be logistically difficult to maintain. They also argued that changes in the plans would throw “months of planning out of sequence” and doubted that “plans and current operations could be altered in time to take advantage of it.”

Navy photoreconnaissance and other intelligence turned out to be correct—Iwo Jima and the rest of the Bonin Islands remained far from prepared. The breaching of the outer perimeter to the “Inner Vital Defense Zone” had simply been too fast and expectations by
the Japanese leadership of the Japanese fleet to survive too high. Japanese officers later said the United States could have easily taken Iwo Jima at this point. Unfortunately for U.S. forces, waiting another eight months to invade Iwo allowed Kuribayashi the time to make it into one of the most heavily fortified islands ever. Charles W. Tatum, who was in the first landing force on Iwo Jima, lived to write critically later that “indecision [of the JCS] in not targeting Iwo Jima sooner was a tragic flaw which would cost thousands of American lives in February–March 1945, when the island was finally invaded 30 days behind the original JCS timetable.” Although not the subject of this study, the case could probably be made that had Iwo been successfully taken in the summer of 1944, the war would have been over much earlier and perhaps the use of the (not yet completed) atomic bombs could have been avoided.

This does not mean that Iwo Jima and the Bonins were ignored at the time. Indeed, they were becoming all the more significant. The staffs at the newly created 20th Air Force Headquarters, Washington, DC, and those at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in Hawaii, were all taking a new look at their importance as the situation had changed in several respects, including the capture of “many of Japan’s outer defenses” and the fact that “Japan is no longer a far distant group of islands; it is a number of specific islands which are now appearing over the horizon.” On 29 June, for example, the 20th Air Force prepared a study of the feasibility of providing fighter escort for its “very long range (VLR) bombers,” or B-29s, from Iwo Jima, and recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Iwo be seized as a base for fighters.

It would be no exaggeration to say that planning for the seizure of the Bonin Islands, or one of them, was “inextricably interwoven” with the development of the B-29 long-range bombers. Known as “Superfortresses,” the B-29s had their origin in 1939 when Chief of the Army Air Corps, General Henry H. Arnold, requested the experimental development of a four-engine bomber with a range of 2,000 miles. Eventually, the plane that was produced had a range of 4,400 miles, without a load, and 3,500 miles when carrying four tons of bombs. It had a wingspan of 141 feet and length of 99 feet, with four engines of 2,200 horsepower each, allowing it to fly at 361 miles per hour near a service ceiling of 38,000 feet. An experimental group of 100 B-29s operated from airfields in China during the latter part of 1944 in an effort to test their combat effectiveness and develop and refine tactical doctrine while enhancing the administrative and logistical support necessary for them. With the capture of the Marianas, a B-29 offensive from those islands was to be launched as soon as the airfields there could be completed in the fall. Iwo Jima, lying halfway between the Marianas and Tokyo, looked to be the ideal place to station fighter escort for those planes as they were likely to be vulnerable in their missions over Japan.

The Joint Staff Planners, on the other hand, did not believe Iwo could be used to station the escorts for the B-29s as “the distance to Tokyo for present fighters is too great,” and thus did not support the 20th’s recommendation. However, the planners looked at the Bonins as a possible step following an invasion of Formosa, scheduled for 15 February 1945, and known as Operation Causeway. They recognized that in addition to Iwo, five islands—Haha Jima, Chichi Jima, O Shima, Hachijo Jima, and Nii Jima—in the Nanpo Shoto chain could sustain airfields, but they tended to regard the Bonin Islands as being of
only limited use to U.S. offensive strategy. Of them, it was Chichi Jima, not Iwo, that was most appealing for the reasons mentioned above.

Arnold was unhappy with the position of the Joint Staff Planners and wrote to them on 14 July to argue the usefulness of Iwo as a P-51 Mustang fighter escort base for the B-29s. A week later, on 21 July, he wrote again to the planners that in view of the expected need to protect his “very long [range] bombers” over Japan, “plans for the defeat of Japan include operations to capture and develop fighter bases on the Bonin Islands.” Arnold wanted Iwo taken.

In the meantime, the Navy continued to look at the possibility of seizing islands in the Bonins group, but its conclusion—and just lukewarm at that—remained that only Chichi Jima and Haha Jima offered “sufficient size and import to warrant consideration for advance base development.”

With no consensus in sight on whether to move ahead with a seizure of the Bonins and which specific islands to develop facilities on, the JWPC completed a plan in mid-August and submitted it to the Joint Staff Planners calling for their capture. It described the action as a desirable “operation for opportunity” in that it would: (1) provide fighter cover for our air effort against Japan; (2) deny these strategic outposts to the enemy; (3) furnish air defense bases for U.S. positions in the Marianas; and (4) provide fields for staging heavy bombers against Japan. Importantly, the planners, in a subsequent meeting on August 16, based on Arnold’s arguments, contended that Iwo Jima was the only practical objective in the Bonins as it was the only island that could support a large number of fighter aircraft and be softened up by aerial and surface bombardment.

While the specifics had yet to be determined, Iwo Jima was to be the objective if an invasion of the Bonins were to take place. A larger problem existed, however, in that MacArthur, for political and other reasons, still wanted to go through the Philippines and Formosa rather than the faster route through the Nanpo Shoto. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had already accepted MacArthur’s argument that it was symbolically important to return to the Philippines and liberate it from Japanese control at their meeting in late July on Saipan. However, there were several military officers who favored the latter approach. Some of them were senior Army leaders, such as Lieutenant General Millard F. Harmon, commanding general, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, and Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr., commanding general, Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas. Both had begun to question the wisdom of moving against Formosa and called instead for striking the islands of the Nanpo Shoto.

Perhaps the most important voice of doubt about the Formosa operation, and biggest believer in the importance of seizing Iwo Jima, was Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet, who had just returned to Hawaii in early September from the Marianas. Spruance, uncertain of his next assignment, called on Nimitz at the latter’s headquarters in Makalapa. When Nimitz told him the next operation was going to be Formosa and Amoy and suggested that Spruance should take a short vacation to see his family in California beforehand, Spruance responded that he did “not like Formosa.” When asked by Nimitz what he would do instead, Spruance said: “I would prefer taking
Iwo Jima and Okinawa.” Spruance had been advocating the Iwo Jima-Okinawa route for some time, believing Japan could be blockaded into submission, and had told Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, who was visiting Saipan in mid-July (but not attending the Roosevelt-MacArthur-Nimitz meeting), that the Formosa plan should be abandoned in favor of Okinawa. Simply put, he considered the Formosa idea so bad that it was not worth serious study. He was surprised, therefore, when Nimitz, thinking of King’s order, told him, “Well, it’s going to be Formosa.”

Nimitz, however, seemed to have his concerns, too, disagreeing with MacArthur’s plan to go through Formosa. In an attempt to reconcile their different approaches, Nimitz invited the general to Hawaii, but MacArthur, who had been told by the JCS to begin planning Operation Causeway, the invasion of Formosa, hoped that the Iwo Jima invasion would subsequently be scrapped and told Nimitz he was too busy to go. This did not stop two senior Army officers—Harmon and Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner—from showing up. Buckner, who headed the Tenth Army, joined Harmon and Richardson in opposition because in terms of logistics and manpower, it would be difficult to conquer the heavily fortified Formosa. They supported, instead, a drive through the Nanpo Shoto, with Iwo Jima being the southernmost of the islands.

On the morning of 7 September 1944, Nimitz and his staff, as well as Buckner and Harmon, met to discuss Iwo Jima. Whether he realized it or not, for Nimitz, 7 September was a special day—43 years before, then 16-year-old Texas-born Chester had entered the U.S. Naval Academy as the youngest plebe in his class, not knowing the bow of a ship from its stern. Today, however, the 59-year-old four-star literally had the weight of the world—or at least a large area of it—on his shoulders as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area (CinCPOA). One September later, this weight would be removed when Japan surrendered at a ceremony in Tokyo Bay on board the USS Missouri (BB 63), the flagship of Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., commander of Third Fleet, which had participated in the bombardment of Iwo Jima and in the strikes on mainland Japan just before that.

The meeting ended shortly before noon. Encouraged by the support of the two Army generals, Nimitz decided to raise the issue directly with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get them to make a decision in favor of Iwo Jima rather than the Formosa operation. This was necessary because, as the war in Europe was still the priority, there was a shortage of combat supplies and manpower for the Pacific, and if these limited supplies had to be contested over by Nimitz and MacArthur then the planning and actual operations would not go well. There simply was not enough to sustain two simultaneous campaigns. It would have to be Iwo or Formosa. Nimitz intended to convince the JCS to support the plan to seize Iwo. In order to do so, he needed Spruance’s help and asked him to meet at San Francisco’s Treasure Island, where a conference with Chief of Naval Operations King had been arranged for the end of September.

When Spruance arrived in the federal building on 29 September, the staffs of Nimitz and King were already there awaiting the arrival of their bosses. Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, head of the Fleet War Plans Division, handed Spruance the summary of the position paper he had prepared on Nimitz’s behalf. It stated that CinCPOA did not have enough forces to seize Formosa but did have enough to capture Iwo and Okinawa, and rec-
ommended that Formosa be abandoned in favor of the latter course. Sherman asked Spruance to “read it carefully and tell me what you think of it.” With obvious satisfaction that his arguments had carried the day, Spruance responded, “I wouldn’t change a word of it.”

Shortly thereafter, Nimitz arrived, followed by King. Nimitz handed the paper to King, who “frowned as he read it.” Nimitz and Sherman laid out the strategic rationale for dropping the Formosa plan and seizing Iwo Jima instead, introducing the endorsements of Buckner and Harmon, who argued that the United States might suffer 50,000 casualties in an invasion of Formosa. Spruance was quiet throughout the discussion. King asked him why he was silent. Spruance replied that Nimitz and Sherman were presenting the case so well, he had nothing to add.

The meeting took five hours, but when it was over, King was convinced. The presentation by Spruance and Sherman was, according to Nimitz, “a masterful job that carried the day.” The “Monks of Makalapa,” as Nimitz’ team was known, had won the debate. King promised to recommend to the JCS that Iwo Jima and Okinawa, not Formosa, be attacked. Back in Washington, the sleep-deprived King submitted on 2 October a proposed directive for future operations, specifically calling for the occupation of Iwo Jima in January 1945 to allow fighter support for the B-29s operating from the Marianas. The JCS accepted it immediately, and the following day, issued a new directive, ordering CinCPOA to “occupy one or more positions in the Nanpo Shoto, target date 20 January 1945.” Nimitz and Spruance, who had both returned to Pearl Harbor on the morning of 3 October, received their orders from the JCS the next day for the seizure of Iwo Jima.

**Planning Operation Detachment**

By 7 October, Nimitz and his staff had prepared a joint staff study for preliminary planning issued for subordinate commands. While not a directive, it did spell out the objectives of Operation Detachment, the name given the operation to seize Japanese assets in the Bonins. The larger purpose of the operation was “to maintain unremitting military pressure against Japan” and “to extend our control over the Western Pacific.” With the anticipated seizure of Iwo Jima and the development of an air base on the island, the study pointed out that the United States would be able to attack the Japanese Empire; protect its bases in the Marianas; cover its naval forces and conduct search operations in the approaches to the Japanese Empire; and provide fighter escort for very long-range operations. To do so, the study added, it was necessary to “destroy enemy naval and air strength in the Bonins” and “reduce Japanese naval and air strength and production facilities in the Empire.”

The staff study and a directive from Nimitz ordering the seizure of Iwo Jima was given to Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, commanding general, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, as the Marines would have the main job of taking Iwo Jima as they had with many other islands in the Pacific. The directive also named Smith commanding general, Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56); Admiral Spruance as operation commander (Task Force 50); Vice Admiral Richard Kelly Turner Joint Expeditionary Force commander (Task Force 51); and Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill as second in command, Joint Expeditionary Force. According to Marine Corps historians Garand and Strobridge, these men being chosen to
command the important Iwo Jima operation was “not accidental . . . All of them had shown their mettle in previous engagements.” They were, an earlier account explains, “the very men who had perfected the amphibious techniques from Guadalcanal to Guam. Nearly every problem, it was believed, had been met and mastered along the way, from the jungles of Guadalcanal up through the Solomons, and across the Central Pacific from the bloody reefs of Tarawa to the mountains of the Marianas.”

Iwo Jima was to be a naval operation in the assault phase, with the Marines providing the bulk of the fighting force and the Navy the lift and early firepower, and then the Marines would turn over the island to the U.S. Army after its capture. For Smith, who was approaching his 63d birthday, this would be his last operation after a career spanning 39 years in the Marines.

Smith has been called the “indisputable apostle of amphibious assault,” whose “prickly insistence on amphibious preparedness and realistic training” was crucial to readying the United States for the Pacific War. He knew instinctively that Iwo Jima would also be a tough fight for the Marines.

Without delay, Smith started planning in conjunction with the other commanders involved in the operation, and on 14 October issued a letter of instruction that designated Major General Harry Schmidt, commanding general, V Amphibious Corps, as commanding general of the Landing Force. Schmidt and his deputy, Brigadier General William W. Rogers, were to assume responsibility for preparing and executing all of the plans for the Landing Force. Upon completion of the plans, Schmidt was to submit them to Smith for approval.

The 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions were assigned to the Landing Force for planning, training, and operations. The 3d and 4th Divisions, commanded by Major Generals Graves B. Erskine and Clifton B. Cates (a future commandant) respectively, were veteran units, having seen action in Saipan and Tinian (in the case of the 4th) and Guam (in the case of the 3d). The 5th Division, commanded by Major General Keller E. Rockey, was to experience its first combat as a unit, but contained many seasoned individuals who had participated in other battles in the Pacific. In short, the three divisions were experienced and well trained.

Schmidt at this point had been on Guam, where he had located his V Amphibious Corps command post. In order to facilitate planning for Iwo, he moved his headquarters to Pearl Harbor on 13 October. With the exception of the 3d Division, which was located on Guam, all the major staffs were now in the Hawaii area to allow for close coordination and joint planning. As an added benefit, most of the staffs’ members knew each other, having worked together on earlier operations.

There was one tricky aspect of the command relationship, however, that neither Smith nor Schmidt liked—namely Smith “outranking” Schmidt. Smith’s position as commanding general of expeditionary forces was called by Marine historian Alexander a “contrived billet” in this case, as it was one amphibious corps attacking one island. Both Smith and Marine Corps Commandant A. A. Vandegrift saw “Iwo Jima as a corps task which Schmidt should handle without anyone looking over his shoulder.” As commander of the
amphibious corps, Schmidt would head the largest force of Marines ever committed to a single battle (a three-division landing force with 70,000 men). However, he would always be resentful of Smith “stealing his thunder.” It no doubt affected their personal relations at the time. In any case, Smith was aware of the problem and tried to keep out of Schmidt’s way. “I guess they sent me along,” Smith would later say, “just in case something happened to Harry Schmidt.”

Smith’s role was actually larger than that. While he and Turner would not exercise any immediate tactical control over the fighting forces, they would be strategic commanders. Among his many jobs, Smith would act as a counterweight to Turner’s presence and insurance if Schmidt and his headquarters were lost. Smith’s high-profile presence would allow Schmidt to fight the fight without distraction; Smith “baby-sat” high-level visitors, such as Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, who had shown up to watch the landing, and met with the press to provide them with a “reality check” about the potential causalities resulting from the battle. “This is going to be a rough one,” he predicted before combat correspondents gathered before D-Day on the flagship, “we could suffer as many as 15,000 casualties.” No one believed his pessimistic prediction, but even Smith and his staff had underestimated the number. Back in Hawaii, Smith (and Turner) would also be responsible for the strategic aspects of the operation, approving or disapproving plans coming up the chain of command.

Despite the potential for serious problems that the complicated structure presented, the planning began rather seamlessly and the first tentative operational blueprint for the landing force, a guide for subordinate commanders, was issued by Schmidt on 19 October, less than a week after his staff had set up shop in Hawaii. The next day, Smith issued a directive to Schmidt in which troop assignments for training, planning, and operations were designated, and that also directed Schmidt to have the V Amphibious Corps ready for combat by 15 December—five weeks before the scheduled start of the seizure of Iwo Jima on 20 January.

Over the next two months, planners continued with their preparations, revising Operation Detachment in light of new intelligence and other information, such as ship and equipment availability. Drafts of the plan were published on the following dates: 25 November (CinCPOA Operation Plan, 11-44), 23 December (VAC Operation Plan No. 3-44), 27 December (Joint Expeditionary Force Operation Plan No. A25-44), and 31 December (Fifth Fleet Operation Plan No. 13-44).

Similarly, the respective divisions in the landing force underwent their training and were refitted as necessary. The training and rehearsals took place on Guam for the 3d Marine Division, Maui for the 4th, and Camp Tarawa on the big island of Hawaii for the 5th. According to Alexander, the physical separation of the three divisions interestingly “had no adverse effect” on the preparatory training. This would be the fourth major assault landing in 13 months for the 4th (“The Fighting Fourth”), and one veteran noted that “we had a continuity there of veterans that was just unbeatable.” Similarly, although the 5th Division (“Spearhead”) was fighting for the first time as a unit, more than half of the men and officers were veterans. Equal confidence was found in the 3d Division (“The Fighting Third”) as well—“we were in good shape, well trained, well equipped and thoroughly supported.”
Despite the extensive training, planning, and the expertise gathered at higher levels, Smith began to have strong reservations over the number of casualties that would be inflicted on his force in light of new intelligence obtained on an increasingly regular basis from the air and sea. As the frequency of reconnaissance flights increased in the fall of 1944 with growing interest in seizing one or all of the Bonin Islands, the monitoring of Japanese radio transmissions, and captured documents in Saipan and elsewhere indicated, it became clear that Japan was quickly fortifying the island. This was particularly true when the June and October photos were compared. However, there were at times extended gaps between flights, and much of the fortification was taking place underground, out of sight of the reconnaissance aircraft and submarine periscopes.

U.S. intelligence on the island suffered in other ways, primarily because visitors, foreign or Japanese alike, to Iwo were restricted in the years leading up to war. Any “trespassing, surveying, photographing, sketching, modeling, etc., upon or of these premises” was punishable under the Military Secrets Protection Law (Gunki Hogoho). Initially, the United States had been able to acquire a somewhat fuzzy photograph dated sometime prior to 1931 taken by someone standing on the eastern side of Iwo Jima with 556-foot Suribachiyama, or Mount Suribachi, in the background on what would become the landing beaches during the battle, and a topographical side-view drawing from the 1920s, which somewhat inaccurately portrayed the height of the plateaus in the northeast part of the island. But this picture and drawing were from Japanese sources; no Caucasian had been to the island since the early 1900s. Later, as battle planning progressed in 1944, the lack of human intelligence caused the United States to be unaware that the civilians had for the most part been evacuated by the end of July that year. It was assumed, furthermore, that because of the lack of fresh water on the island, it could not support more than 12,000–13,000 troops, but in fact Kuribayashi had more than 20,000 men. Moreover, U.S. planners did not know who the highest ranking military officer was on Iwo Jima. It was not until some nine days into the battle that they learned Kuribayashi was in fact on the island.

Despite these limitations, the U.S. Navy was able to compile a Civil Affairs Handbook for the Bonin Islands, which included a fairly detailed description for different aspects of Iwo Jima and its neighboring islands. However, this was not of much use in battle planning and estimates of the military capabilities on the island, especially as many of their capabilities were developed in the late summer and fall of 1944 after the Handbook was completed. Thus, the Americans were forced to rely on air and then later submarine reconnaissance for much of its intelligence. On the eve of the battle, underwater demolition teams, the “half-crazy, half-seals” teams of divers, would do a last-minute check of beach approaches.

“My own study of early air photographs,” Smith wrote, “indicated that a situation of an incredible nature existed on the island. It was plain that Iwo Jima had fortifications of the like and extent of which we had never encountered . . . My opinion was that naval gunfire was needed on an island five times the size of Tarawa, with many more times the number of defenses, most of them deep underground.” For Smith, there was a direct correlation between knocking out the defenses and limiting the number of U.S. casualties: “I could not forget the sight of Marines floating in the lagoon or lying on the beaches at Tarawa, men who died assaulting defenses which should have been taken out by naval gunfire. At Iwo
Iwo Jima, the problem was far more difficult. If naval guns could not knock out visible defenses, how could they smash invisible defenses except by sheer superabundance of fire?\textsuperscript{89}

Even before the latter reconnaissance photos, Smith, who had not been consulted about the decision to invade Iwo Jima, was reluctant to take the island and told Spruance so, just as Spruance had once informed his superior, Nimitz, about his reservations regarding the Formosa invasion. “It will be the toughest place we have had to take,” Smith told Spruance.\textsuperscript{90} “I don’t know what anybody wants it for, but I’ll take it.” According to Spruance’s biographer, Smith’s pessimism worried the admiral.\textsuperscript{91} The Marine general’s warnings “had a profound impact on Spruance,” who later noted that they “left certain doubts in my head as to whether Iwo Jima would be worth what it cost us.”\textsuperscript{92} The admiral in charge of Operation Detachment “began to doubt whether the costs of taking the island would be worth the gains, and the uncertainty troubled him throughout the three-month planning period.”\textsuperscript{93}

Smith had shared his concerns with Marine Commandant Vandegrift, whose own son, a lieutenant colonel, would be part of the landing force and later wounded in the battle. In a letter dated 12 January 1945, Smith told Vandegrift,

\textit{As you know, I have nothing to do with the great strategy in the Pacific and only express myself when called upon for a statement. I believe that the operation is not worth the casualties we will suffer. On two separate occasions I protested that naval gunfire is insufficient, with the result that it has been increased to some extent, but not enough, in my opinion, to suffice. I can only go so far. We have done all we could do to get ready . . . and I believe it will be successful, but the thought of the probable casualties causes me extreme unhappiness . . . would to God that something might happen to cancel the operation altogether.}\textsuperscript{94}

Vandegrift did not agree with Smith’s doubts, but admits his letter “aroused my qualms.”\textsuperscript{95} He did relay Smith’s complaints to King and naval planners and asked for all possible support. “King assured me Nimitz was doing the best with what he had,” the Commandant wrote in his memoirs, “I am convinced this was true.”\textsuperscript{96}

Smith’s staff, especially Schmidt, also shared his concerns about the need for greater naval bombardment prior to the invasion. The original provision, drawn up by planners in Nimitz’s headquarters, was for eight days of naval fire by a cruiser division, plus three days by older battleships.\textsuperscript{97} On 24 October, Smith forwarded a request by Schmidt for 10 days of bombardment by a cruiser division and battleships on to Turner, who in turn responded that not only was this impossible due to “limitations on the availability of ships, difficulties of ammunition replacement, and the loss of surprise,” but that the eight-days’ bombardment had been abandoned and instead the cruiser division would fire on Iwo at irregular intervals starting on 15 December and be subjected to only three-days’ bombardment by heavy ships immediately prior to D-Day.\textsuperscript{98}

A Marine naval gunfire expert, Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Weller, was disgusted. “The issue was not the weight of shells, nor their caliber, but rather time. Destruction of heavily fortified enemy targets took deliberate pinpoint firing from close ranges. Iwo Jima’s 700 hard targets would require a lot of time to knock out, a lot of time.”\textsuperscript{99} Schmidt tried again. On 8 November, Smith forwarded to Turner another proposal prepared by Schmidt
requesting nine-days’ bombardment. Two weeks later, Turner replied in the negative, and reaffirmed that the bombardment would only be for three days. He did promise, however, to conduct the bombardment as accurately as possible and use heavier caliber shells. In their massive study on Marine Corps amphibious operations, historians Jeter A. Isely and Peter A. Cowl noted grave contradictions in Turner’s arguments. “Turner was avoiding the central issue,” they wrote, “which was the length of time allowed for deliberate, destructive fire at point blank range, rather than the tonnage of projectiles expended.”

“I was never so depressed in my life,” Smith later wrote. “We had to haggle like horse traders, balancing irreplaceable lives against replaceable ammunition . . . Three days were totally inadequate but the decision was out of our hands, although we had presented all conceivable evidence, backed by photographic evidence of the island’s defenses. The lack of naval gunfire, so vital to the success of a landing, struck at the very heart of our enterprise.”

Smith and Schmidt decided to request at least another day’s bombardment, making four instead of three. Turner approved the new suggestion and forwarded the request to Spruance, “provided there was no objection based on the general strategical situation.” Unfortunately, that was the reason Spruance rejected it.

The “strategical situation” Spruance would cite was a strike by the ships of Task Force 58 on mainland Japan simultaneous to the beginning of the bombardment of Iwo Jima. Spruance wanted to take advantage of the element of surprise and prevent Japanese aircraft from launching kamikaze attacks against his ships gathered near Iwo. Another purpose of the mission was to strike at the Nakajima Aircraft Company to stop its ability to manufacture planes. The task force, comprised of 16 fleet carriers, 8 battleships, 15 cruisers, and 77 destroyers—almost all built since the attack on Pearl Harbor—eventually did undertake two series of strikes on 15 and 16 February, but bad weather forced it to cancel the third strike on the 17th. Instead it turned around and headed for Iwo Jima and arrived in time to participate in the final stages of the pre-invasion bombardment. In retrospect, Isely and Cowl observe, “in view of Japan’s light air reaction over Iwo it is hard to see how Spruance’s attacks on the home islands greatly benefited the assault.”

As expected, Smith was beside himself. “Naval insistence upon the priority of the strike against Japan at the cost of fire support for our assault on Iwo Jima was incomprehensible. To take the better part of the fleet away ignored the principal aims of our mission . . . [by] weaken[ing] the power we could use at Iwo Jima . . . The operation was planned for the capture of Iwo Jima, but Spruance permitted the attack on Japan to overshadow the real objective.”

In one final effort to make the best use of the limited bombardment, Schmidt forwarded a proposal dated 2 January 1945, requesting concentrated firing on landing beaches and Motoyama No. 1 airfield, the places he needed it the most. This, too, was rejected—with no hint of irony—because other areas, in Spruance’s opinion, would receive too light fire coverage, a fact that the Marines were all too aware and which precipitated the request for more days of naval bombardment in the first place. “Thus,” Smith lamented, “were we defeated—a group of trained and experienced land fighters, our full realization of the necessity for naval gunfire based on many previous island operations—again overridden by the naval mind . . . We had tried our best to enlighten the high command, feeling that our judgment would be respected, but naval expediency won again.”
Sadly for the assaulting forces, the problems with naval bombardment did not end, due to a change in plans by Spruance. Ships allocated for the pre-D-Day bombardment of Iwo were unavailable and substitutions made, and other ships were withdrawn at the last minute to join Task Force 58 in its attacks on mainland Japan. While apologetic, Spruance insisted they were necessary to ensure the successful outcome of that mission. Even Turner protested against this sudden change, pointing out to his chief that “fire support already had been seriously diminished and would be reduced dangerously without [the services of] the USS Washington (BB 56) and the USS North Carolina (BB 55).” Spruance wrote to Smith to tell him he “regret[s] this confusion caused in your carefully laid plans, but I know you and your people will get away with it.”

To Smith, “this pat on the back was cold comfort against the loss of great modern ships, with 16-inch guns we knew could rip apart Japanese pillboxes and tear the heart out of concrete bunkers.” What’s worse, bad weather prevented the full use of the limited days allotted for the bombardment and made firing accurately difficult. According to Isely and Crowl, due to these and other problems, despite there being more than 34 hours of daylight between 16 and 18 February, the main batteries of the large warships fired an average of less than 13.5 hours.

Nevertheless, some 90 percent of the allotted medium- and heavy-caliber ammunition was used against Iwo. “No previous target in the Central Pacific,” Isely and Crowl continue, “had received such a volume of preparatory shelling per square yard of terrain—or had any other gone into the assault phase with so many of its defenses intact.” Spruance, who did not leave memoirs, felt justified in overruling the request for the extra days of bombardment and deciding that a three-day bombardment was enough. Two weeks after the invasion began, he went ashore for the first time and looked at the Japanese fortifications closely. He concluded, according to his biographer, “that only a Marine with rifle and flamethrower ultimately could eradicate enemy soldiers on Iwo, regardless of the amount of air and naval gunfire.” In the admiral’s opinion, therefore, naval pre-invasion bombardment was irrelevant against the fortifications on Iwo.

Were Kuribayashi alive to take part in this debate, he probably would have agreed with Smith on the importance of naval bombardment by reading from an undated report he had telegraphed during the battle to Chief of the Army General Staff Umezu Yoshijirō: “We need to reconsider the power of bombardment from ships. The beach positions we made on this island by using many materials, days, and great efforts, were destroyed within three days so that they were nearly unable to be used again . . . Nearly all Army and Naval guns placed near the beach for firing on landing craft and troops were destroyed by the bombardments from ships before the enemy landed.”

As Spruance’s biographer has written, the dispute over the question of pre-invasion bombardment still simmered for years afterward and will probably never be satisfactorily resolved. What is clear, however, is that the failure of the Navy to live up to the initial plans, and Spruance’s unilaterally modifying plans on the eve of the invasion certainly impacted the preparations Smith and Schmidt had to make and the execution of that battle. Combined with the effects of bad weather discussed above, the result was “like throwing human flesh against reinforced concrete.”
These changes were not the only adjustments they had to make to their plans. The operation itself had to be postponed twice due to the failure of MacArthur to release ships planned for the Iwo assault that had been supporting the Luzon operation in the Philippines. The original date for the attack on Iwo was 20 January and was moved to 3 February. It was further postponed to 19 February. The invasion of Okinawa was planned for no later than 1 April, and some of the shipping, men, and equipment would be needed for that assault as well, and thus the operation against Iwo, which was essentially squeezed between two other operations, could wait no longer. With or without the desired naval gunfire, the invasion had to take place. As a result, it can be said that Iwo Jima was a victim of a tight timeline and the Marines would pay the price.

Despite this, Smith and Schmidt and the other commanders had done all they could to prepare for the invasion. They were well aware of the challenges, self-imposed or otherwise, on their operations. But what they did not know, however, was the strategy of the Japanese commander and his plans for his defending forces of 21,000.

**Defending Iwo Jima**

By the spring of 1944, U.S. advances in the central Pacific had necessitated a reevaluation of Japanese plans. Its outer perimeter had been breached, and the mainland was in danger. The war had been going against Japan's favor for some time but the implosion of its outer defenses suggested the situation was about to turn desperate.

The commanding general eventually chosen to defend the Bonins at this dismal point was Kuribayashi Tadamichi, a 1914 graduate of the Imperial Japanese Army Academy. Although he was of samurai heritage, Kuribayashi wanted to become a journalist or diplomat and applied to the Shanghai Toa Dobun Shoin Institute, but eventually chose a career in the Imperial Army due, in part, to financial reasons. After promotion to second lieutenant, he studied for a year at the Cavalry Academy, and rose to the rank of lieutenant. He next entered the Imperial Japan Army War College in 1920, and graduated in November 1923. Earlier that year, he had been made cavalry captain. In March 1928, he left Japan for the United States where he would serve as deputy military attaché at the Japanese embassy in Washington, DC, and study at numerous institutions in the United States, including a short time at Harvard (May–August 1928), Fort Bliss (January–August 1929), and Fort Riley (August–December 1929). After returning to Japan via London, Paris, Berlin, and Siberia in July 1930, he became the first military attaché to Canada in August 1931, where he served for more than two years. Following assignments in Japan, China, and Hong Kong, he became the commanding general of the Second Imperial Guards Home Division, which included the protection of Emperor Hirohito and the Imperial Palace, in June 1943. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general at this point; he was 52 years old.

Perhaps because of his long service in North America and knowledge of its industrial power, Kuribayashi did not think Japan should go to war against America. During his two years in the United States, he traveled extensively with a car he purchased after having been taught by an American military officer how to drive, and gained a great understanding for the country and respect for Americans, whom he described as “energetic and versatile.”
He was particularly impressed with American industrial might as evidenced, among other places, in Detroit. He felt that in an emergency, the American people would show a real fighting ability and the economy could be turned into a powerful war machine. History proved he was right. He wrote to his family during the trip that “The United States is the last country in the world Japan should fight.”\footnote{117} In this sense, he can be compared to another former attaché, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who planned and executed the attacks on Pearl Harbor while being aware of the odds against Japan. Few people in the xenophobic Japanese Army knew the United States as well as Kuribayashi; indeed, most of them had never even been abroad. It may have been for that very reason he was chosen to command the forces in Iwo; Japan’s leaders probably hoped he could anticipate how the United States would approach its attack on Iwo Jima, by far the most important enemy assault in the war to date.\footnote{118}

In late May 1944, the Imperial General Headquarters, or Daihonei, decided to reorganize the order of battle for the 31st Army, which had been created on 25 February 1944, under the command of Lieutenant General Obata Hideyoshi. It was to defend the four large areas of Truk, Marianas, Palau, and the Bonin Islands, by establishing a separate command to focus on the defense of the Bonins (to include Iwo Jima and Marcus Island).\footnote{119} The existing army garrison forces comprising the Chichi Jima Fortress (Chichi Jima Yosai), which came into being on 7 December 1941, and strengthened in February and March 1944, were to be consolidated under a newly established 109th Division (Dai 109 Shidan).\footnote{120} The Chichi Jima Fortress commander, Major General Osuga Kotau, who arrived on 4 March, was under the command of the 31st Army in Saipan, which in turn, was under the newly established Central Pacific Fleet (Chubu Taiheiyo Homen Kantai). Eventually, because of difficulties of command and control, the order of battle would have to be revised.\footnote{121}

Along with these changes, Osuga created the Iwo Jima Ishitai under the command of Colonel Atsuchi Kanehiko on 23 March.\footnote{122} It was comprised of about 4,880 infantry soldiers and engineers. The men were transferred to Iwo Jima between 20 and 23 March.\footnote{123} Their strategy for defending the island was to meet the enemy at the water’s edge and thus began preparing their fortifications along those lines.\footnote{124}

Also in March, the Imperial Navy established the approximately 1,000-man Iwo Jima Keibitai under the command of Captain Wachi Tsunezo. It was placed under the navy’s Chichi Jima Homen Tokubetsu Konkyo Chitai, originally established in October 1941 and renamed in June 1942.\footnote{125} Under separate commands, the two organizations were to cooperate in preparing the defense of Iwo Jima. Incidentally, U.S. estimates of the total Japanese troop strength in the spring—about 5,000—were fairly accurate.

On 27 May, the day after the 109th was officially established, Emperor Hirohito appointed Kuribayashi to assume command of the division.\footnote{126} When he gave Kuribayashi the Emperor’s orders, army General Tojo Hideki, who was also serving as prime minister, told Kuribayashi that “The entire army and the nation will depend on you for the defense of that key position . . . Only you among all the generals are qualified and capable of holding this post.”\footnote{127} Kuribayashi was not so confident. He apparently had been aware of the rumors that at least one other distinguished officer had been offered the position but had managed to talk his way out of it.\footnote{128} Although he initially did not tell his wife and children,
Kuribayashi did inform his brother, Yoshima, that “I may not return home alive from this assignment, but let me assure you that I shall fight to the best of my ability, so that no disgrace will be brought upon our family.”

Kuribayashi left Tokyo for Iwo Jima on 8 June from Kisarazu Air Base in Chiba Prefecture with his aide, Lieutenant Fujita Masayoshi. At the time, some within the command believed that the headquarters should be positioned in Chichi Jima, being located between the mainland and Iwo Jima as it was. However, Kuribayashi decided that the fight was probably going to be for Iwo Jima, with its airfield, and thus he decided to establish the headquarters of his command there. The fact that he had to borrow a room in the home of a resident, Sakurai Naosaku, and use it as a headquarters for a few days suggests the lack of preparations that awaited him.

One week after his arrival, the Americans launched air strikes against the Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima, to prevent Japanese combat aircraft based there from interfering with the Saipan invasion. The strikes were carried out by Navy Task Force 58 under the tactical command of Rear Admiral Joseph J. “Jocko” Clark, who had arrived the evening before the Saipan invasion (14 June 1944) to “hammer Iwo Jima for the first time.” Some 60 carrier planes struck Iwo on the afternoon of the 15th, and another 100 the following day. Approximately 10 U.S. planes were shot down. Almost all of the Japanese planes were destroyed, along with about 40 people killed. In addition to those losses, the school, located in Motoyama, was damaged as was the home of one of the teachers.

As a result of this attack, the Yokosuka Air Wing was ordered to prepare the air defense of Iwo Jima, but was only able to spare 30 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters. The pilots were ordered to go immediately, and did not have time to say farewell to their families. However, poor weather forced the group back to Yokosuka each day for four consecutive days. It was not until 20 June that they landed on Iwo. Upon arriving, they discovered that the runways were lined by planes and there was no room for parking on the first airfield. They had to taxi to another field for apron space. “I felt ridiculous as I jockeyed the Zero along the road,” fighter pilot Sakai Saburo wrote in his memoirs.

This was my first—and my last—experience climbing the side of a mountain in a taxiing fighter plane. And in a convoy of thirty fighters. A battalion of Army troops watched our queer convoy with its clouds of dust and blattering motors, their mouths gaping laughing loudly and jeering. It was hardly funny to us. Taxiing the Zero up that tortuous slope with a fighter in front of me and a whirling propeller immediately behind, while we all tried to negotiate the hairpin curves, was as hazardous as maintaining tight formation in a thick fog.

After arriving, Sakai recalled that “for three days the war spared Iwo . . . Not that it was a place any sane man would voluntarily want to remain,” he continued.

It was as dreary, hostile, and uncomfortable as Rabaul, if not more so. But we were left to our own devices, and took advantage of the lull in the fighting to soak in the hot springs which bubbled through the rocks from one end of the island to the other. The war never seemed stranger to us. We knew by now that our fleet had been shattered in the Marianas sea fight and that practically all of the carrier pilots
in the battle had died. There was no doubt that the overwhelming might of the
American invasion forces, supported by many hundreds of planes and thousands
of heavy guns on the ships, would annihilate our troops on Saipan to the last man.
And we soaked in hot baths on Iwo Jima.

This did not mean that the pilots were not aware of the need for help on Saipan nor that
they did not wish to strike at U.S. forces on and near Saipan. “We could not sit comfortably
. . . while our friends were blasted to bits,” one pilot wrote, “but what could we do? A mass
assault by our fighters would have only a temporary and meaningless effect . . . [and] if we
left Iwo Jima unattended by dozens of fighters ready for an instant flight, then the Ameri-
cans could—in those unguarded hours—storm the island’s defense and move in against
weak opposition.”

Most Japanese planners and Iwo Jima’s few defenders expected an attack at any time.
“The fact that Iwo Jima was not invaded in the summer of 1944 surprised us all,” Sakai
recalled. “The island was barely able to defend itself! A fraction of the force which took
Saipan could have stormed Iwo’s beaches and crushed the token resistance which our skel-
eton forces then on the island could have mustered. . . . That was all! Yet no invasion came.
We considered this turn of events nothing less than a miracle.”

At this point, there were still civilians on the island, although instructions had been giv-
en earlier in the year to complete the evacuations by 30 May. By chance, some 230 people
had left Iwo Jima the day before the raid, on 14 June. On 16 June, Kuribayashi ordered the school closed and the children evacuated to
the mainland. Following the raids on the islands, the central government recommended
the evacuation of all people under the age of 15 and over the age of 60; all women; and all
others who did not need to be there. The remaining civilians on the islands were evacu-
ated between 1 and 29 July. The mayor left on 7 July, with the second large evacuation.
While the Japanese government was avoiding one potential tragedy by wisely evacuating
the residents, it ended up creating a new, albeit lesser, tragedy for them, as the former resi-
dents of Iwo Jima were never allowed to live again on the island (even today, at the time of
this writing).

The personable Kuribayashi seems to have enjoyed speaking with the residents with
whom he came into contact. However, for both humanitarian as well as tactical reasons, he
was probably glad to see them depart. As seen in the letters to his wife, son, and daughter,
Kuribayashi was a family man and certainly did not wish to see noncombatants, especially
women and children, caught on the island when the American assault eventually came.
Tactically speaking, with water and other supplies already low due to the limited capacities
of the island, Kuribayashi did not want noncombatants (with the exception of able-bodied
men who could help with growing food, tunnel construction, and other projects) on the
island as their presence would serve no useful purpose and would be a drain on resources.
“To him,” Kuribayashi’s counterpart, General Holland M. Smith, wrote after the war, “Iwo
Jima was solely a military base.” This included having “comfort women” evacuated.
Kuribayashi even later refused extra forces seeing them as taxing the already low water
supply.
Until shortly after his arrival, Kuribayashi continued to assume that as long as the Japanese Combined Fleet was intact, supplies could be expected to be delivered. But he learned from his subordinate, Major Horie Yoshitaka, who had arrived in late June and had served as an army liaison to the navy in Tokyo, that the Imperial Navy had effectively been destroyed in the Battle of the Philippine Sea on 19 and 20 June. Kuribayashi was in a state of disbelief: “I did not know of these things.” Shortly thereafter, he cut water rations and restricted his own hygiene requirements to one cup per day. Horie was impressed with his “strong will,” guessing it probably came from “the blood of the Kuribayashi family.”

His leadership abilities and austerity were seen in other ways as well. According to Smith, writing in his memoirs, “[Kuribayashi’s] personality was written deep in the underground defenses he devised for Iwo Jima and in the island’s resistance, which made us fight for every yard. Iwo Jima was the only island where organized resistance did not collapse after the first few days, but continued to the end.” Kuribayashi, Smith goes on to observe, “permitted none of the illicit pleasures of camp life to undermine the morale of his men. No women were found on the island . . . he permitted no mad charges inspired by the sake bottle. We found no large stocks of liquor on Iwo Jima, as we did on Guam and Saipan. As a matter of fact, I fail to recall that anyone picked up a single bottle on the island.”

Using the troops and supplies he had, Kuribayashi began to undertake a masterful defense plan and ambitious construction project. He started by studying the island and walking around it. He flung himself down on the beaches, as if he were the enemy and had just disembarked from landing craft. Horie, who went with Kuribayashi on these walks, recalled the general, holding his walking stick like a rifle, declaring, “The enemy must come here. There will be no alternative.” It was the same beaches, northeast of Suribachi, that the Americans did in fact assault.

After hearing regular status reports about the fighting on Saipan, Kuribayashi understood that taking on the enemy at the shores was not enough—the inner parts of the island had to be fortified and defended. On 20 June, he instructed the Ishitai to begin making those preparations. That same day, he also ordered Major General Osuga, who had been placed in charge of the 2d Mixed Brigade, to come to Iwo Jima and bring his men with him. Osuga arrived on the 25th, and the next day, assumed the Ishitai’s work. As one member of Kuribayashi’s staff said after the war, “in those days we did not have any strong defense fortification on this island and it was as hazardous as a pile of eggs. At that time, if American forces had assaulted Iwo Jima, it would have been completely occupied in two or three days.”

While U.S. forces did not land at this time, they did mount numerous air raids on Iwo and the nearby Bonins. One on the 24th, met head on by the Zero fighters, resulted in the loss of 40 Japanese planes. Further raids took place on 2 and 4 July. An attack from the sea, “a thundering salvo . . . at point blank range,” by 16 warships was seen in early July, too. One Imperial Navy flyer captured the scene in the following way:

For two days we cowered like rats, trying to dig ourselves deeper into the acrid volcanic dust and ash of Iwo Jima. For forty-eight hours the warships cruised slowly back and forth, their sides livid with flashing fire, belching forth masses of scream-
ing steel which shook the island from one end to the other. Never have I felt so helpless, so puny, as I did during those two days. There was nothing we could do, there was no way we could strike back. The men screamed and cursed and shouted, they shook their fist and swore revenge, and too many of them fell to the ground, their threats choking on the blood which bubbled through great gashes in their throats. Virtually every last structure on Iwo Jima was torn to splintered wreckage. Not a building stood. Not a tent escaped. Not even the most dismal shack remained standing. Everything was blown to bits. The four fighter planes which had returned from our last sortie were smashed by shells into flaming pieces of junk. Several hundred Army troops and naval personnel were killed, and many more injured. We were virtually without supplies. We were short on ammunition. Iwo lay dazed and helpless. The men's ears rang shrilly from the ceaseless detonations of the thousands of shells which had shrieked onto the small island. There remained on hand to defend the vital island of Iwo Jima less than a battalion of Army troops. These men walked about in shock, stupefied by the bombardment they had suffered. Their brains were addled; they spoke incoherently. Iwo Jima lay naked. Equally dazed was the small group of naval fliers who had survived the terrible shelling. We were few in number, but we were determined to defend our island against the invasion which every man believed was but perhaps hours away, perhaps days at the most. We formed a tiny “Iwo Marine Company” of pilots without planes. Our pathetic little group vowed to fight to the last man alongside surviving Army troops. We received weapons and ammunition, and accepted that our cause was lost.\textsuperscript{161}

In the meantime, with Saipan about to fall and the decision against retaking it made, Imperial General Headquarters (IGHQ) issued Directive No. 1038 on 26 June, which said effective 1 July, the Ogasawara Area forces (\textit{Ogasawara Chiku Shudan}) would become the Ogasawara Corps (\textit{Ogasawara Heidan}) and would be placed directly under the IGHQ as it was becoming impossible for the 31st Army to be in effective command.\textsuperscript{162} In essence, the headquarters decided to give up its plan of repossessing Saipan and instead chose to reinforce Iwo Jima.\textsuperscript{163}

The following week on 30 June, the 31st Army, based on the lessons learned from the fighting in Saipan and under instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters, ordered Kuribayashi to do all he could “to make sure the enemy was not able to use the airfield.”\textsuperscript{164} Kuribayashi decided to make Suribachi and the Motoyama districts his strongholds.

Imperial General Headquarters began dispatching forces in July to Iwo as Kuribayashi would need more men to help with the construction as well as prepare the defenses. One ship, the \textit{Nisshu Maru}, filled with members of the 26th Tank Brigade and others would have its difficulties. It tried to depart Tokyo Bay on 10 July, but had to turn back because of engine problems. On the 14th, it successfully left Yokohama Port only to be attacked by the submarine USS \textit{Cobia} (SS 245) about 18 miles northwest of Chichi Jima. Although there were few reported deaths, 28 tanks of the brigade of Lieutenant Colonel (and Baron) Nishi Takeichi, a Los Angeles Olympic equestrian, were lost.\textsuperscript{165} Marines would be forever grateful to the crew of \textit{Cobia}, launched just eight months before in November 1943, for prevent-
ing those tanks from arriving on Iwo.\textsuperscript{166} Had all of these tanks been successfully landed, the casualties on the U.S. side would certainly have been that much higher.\textsuperscript{167}

Numerous pleas by the navy pilots for planes and other reinforcements on Iwo were also made: “We begged for more fighters. We begged for anything which could fly! Yokosuka could do nothing. . . . There were no more. Chaos reigned within the high command in Tokyo.”\textsuperscript{168} When several transport ships appeared over the horizon, the men on the island ran down to shore in excitement. However, the ships erupted in “geysers of flames and water, sunk before our very eyes by American submarines which had waited in anticipation of just such a move.” To Sakai, who witnessed this,

This catastrophe was decisive. It was obvious to us all that we could offer only token resistance, that within an hour or two after a landing the Americans would control Iwo. Who then, of all the men on the forsaken hump of volcanic ash, with its bubbling sulphur springs, could have foreseen the actual turn of events? Who among us would have dared to prophesy that the Americans would throw away their priceless opportunity to take the island with minimum casualties on their side? We felt we had but a few days in which to remain alive.

Over the next six months, the forces on the island were gradually increased to the point where, by the beginning of February, army personnel numbered 13,586.\textsuperscript{169} Individuals also left, due to illness and being relieved of their commands. Kuribayashi eventually replaced 33 of the staff officers who did not support his defense plans, and brought in many younger and more flexible men.\textsuperscript{170}

Relations with the Imperial Navy were also sometimes difficult, particularly when it came to tactics, strategy, and command relations, necessitating an agreement between the two services on the command issue in late August.\textsuperscript{171} The need for such an agreement was particularly clear after a visit by a staff officer of the navy’s 3rd Aircraft Fleet, Commander Urabe Kiyoshi who called for the building of pillboxes around the first airfield, also known as Chidori. Kuribayashi’s staff did not agree with the navy’s idea, and Kuribayashi himself was not satisfied with it, but only concurred when told it was higher headquarters’ decision and that all the supplies and weapons would be provided by the navy, and any extra materials and weapons the army could use.\textsuperscript{172} According to Horie, Kuribayashi may have agreed to it in order to draw the enemy fire to the less important installations and fortifications, allowing him to protect his real assets at Suribachi and Motoyama.\textsuperscript{173} If so, Sun Tzu would have been proud. In the end, the amount of cement and the number of 25mm machine guns that actually arrived was modest, and did not have the intended effect on combat operations.\textsuperscript{174} After the war, Horie, who had close relations with the Imperial Japanese Navy, was quite critical of that decision, writing: “In fact, this airfield was trodden by American forces in only two days. If we had infused this great strength, many materials and three months of labor which were used on the airfield, into the defense of Motoyama District and Mount Suribachi, we could have been able to make these areas much stronger.”\textsuperscript{175}

As Kuribayashi watched the war progress in the Pacific, he became convinced that the United States would attack after October, and ordered on 13 October that defense preparations be completed by the end of the month.\textsuperscript{176} In these preparations, Kuribayashi was aided
in getting supplies and men through the help of Major General Sanada Joichiro, the Operations Chief of the Army General Staff, who visited Iwo Jima in mid-August. Sanada had been surprised at the lack of combat readiness he observed there, and recorded in his diary, “Kuribayashi warns that if an American task force the size of the July 4th fleet returns with a division and a half of troops he could sustain the defense for at best a week to ten days.”

In addition to more troops, weapons, and ammunition, the influential Sanada was able to provide mining engineers, quarry experts, fortress units, and labor battalions. Sanada also helped Kuribayashi by carrying back a secret message (eventually unsuccessful) to the Imperial General Headquarters that relayed “what I really think,” namely that it was necessary for Japan to “urgently appraise the fighting power of American forces, and the economic strength of the United States, and make efforts to conclude peace after the fall of Saipan.”

Cave specialists from Japan were flown in to advise Kuribayashi on the fortification building and important considerations, such as ventilation, made all the more difficult for the heat and high sulfur content that the volcanic island produced. Because of the fumes and heat, work was slow, but the 15,000 men who were eventually mobilized to work around the clock for this intensive building program had several advantages—the soft pumice-like volcanic rock could be cut relatively quickly even with hand tools and the volcanic ash mixed well with cement to provide a readily available building material that, when reinforced with steel wire, could provide thick defensive protection.

The plan was to make, according to Horie, as many as 28,000 meters [17.4 miles] of tunnels, but it is unclear exactly how far the building had advanced. In the nine or so months that Kuribayashi had to prepare the defenses, an amazing complex of tunnels, caves, gun emplacements, pill boxes, command posts, hospitals, etc., were built, mostly underground. Some of the tunnels and command posts, linking positions hundreds of yards apart, went 75 feet deep, and included wiring for electricity and communications. Spider traps, in which Japanese snipers would pop up out of one hole, often beyond what was thought to be the frontline, were common threats. Marines advancing on pillboxes sometimes got shot in the back from a Japanese soldier peering out from one of these holes. “There was no cover from enemy fire,” one account relates. “Japs dug in reinforced concrete pillboxes laid down in interlocking bands of fire that cut whole companies to ribbons. Camouflage hid all enemy positions. The high ground on either side was honeycombed with layer after layer of Jap emplacements . . . Their observation was perfect; whenever a Marine made a move, the Japs would smother the area in a murderous blanket of fire.”

During the nights, Marines could hear sounds and voices underneath them, as Japanese troops rested or moved in the tunnels below their lines. The defenders, in other words, were not on Iwo Jima, they were “in Iwo Jima,” goes one oft-repeated quote of the battle. Richard Wheeler, who served in the 28th Marines, added, “This was surely one of the strangest battlefields in history, with one side fighting wholly above the ground and the other operating almost wholly within it . . . The strangest thing of all was that the two contestants sometimes made troop movements simultaneously in the same area, one maneuvering on the surface and the other using tunnels beneath.”

According to military historian Robert Leckie, Kuribayashi became convinced of the need for a fight to the death, a last stand after the Marianas fell. Kuribayashi knew Iwo Jima was
impossible to defend over the long run, realizing he could not prevent the Americans from landing there—as the United States had too many ships, equipment, and men for that—or its eventual fall. But he could delay their final victory and planned to make the battle a costly one for the Americans. It would be a battle of attrition that might impress upon U.S. forces the troubles that would await them if they attempted to invade the mainland. To ensure this, Kuribayashi issued the “Iwo Jima Courageous Battle Vow,” which read, “Above all else we shall dedicate ourselves and our entire strength to the defense of this island. We shall grasp bombs, charge the enemy tanks, and destroy them. We shall infiltrate into the midst of the enemy and annihilate them. With every salvo we will, without fail, kill the enemy. Each man will make it his duty to kill ten of the enemy before dying. Until we are destroyed to the last man, we shall harass the enemy by guerrilla tactics.” In undertaking this type of fighting, Kuribayashi hoped to delay as long as possible the U.S. invasion of the mainland. Perhaps he wished to see a diplomatic solution reached in the meantime before such an invasion took place. Ironically, the great losses suffered by U.S. forces in Iwo Jima and later in Okinawa instead caused American political and military leaders to use the atomic bomb.

Kuribayashi studied American strategy and in particular Marine Corps tactics in previous battles, especially the battles for Guadalcanal (1942–43), Tarawa (1943), Kwajalein (1944), Peleliu (1944), and the Marianas (1944). He saw how the Marines had learned from past mistakes and refined their assaults. He was also aware that U.S. industry had now given the nation the largest navy in the world, with an almost unending quantity of supplies, equipment, and highly trained personnel. Equally important, Kuribayashi also knew traditional Japanese strategy for defending islands, or better put, the failure of that strategy. In the past, Japanese strategy had been to “fight the enemy at the water’s edge,” which meant trying to prevent enemy forces from landing. If the enemy did make a successful landing, which was always inevitably the case, Japanese forces would attack them with a bayonet charge during the night screaming “banzai.” The banzai charges never succeeded in removing or killing off the enemy. Indeed, as a result of these wasteful attempts, the commanders would not have enough troops alive to defend the island. Kuribayashi correctly saw that approach had been too costly and would not help in his efforts to delay the Americans and make them pay the ultimate price for Iwo Jima. Instead, he decided to do the opposite. He would first let the Americans land essentially unopposed, and then after the men, landing craft, equipment, and ammunition had assembled and been crowded together on the beaches, attack them from numerous points with all the weapons he had around the island.

A similar strategy had been employed earlier in Peleliu by Lieutenant General Inoue Sadao, who himself had been influenced by Colonel Tada Tokuchi, considered one of the most original strategists in the Imperial Army. The commander had conducted a retreat into the Umurbrogal Mountains and fought a battle of attrition in the caves, valleys, rocks, and gorges. The strategy called for taking advantage of terrain, previously prepared and planned positions, and strong counterattacks before the enemy could begin to consolidate its men and equipment. (A similar strategy had been pursued on Tarawa in November 1943, and later on Okinawa in April 1945.) It was meant to delay and punish, as victory was impossible against America’s overwhelming force.
Adopting this approach, and firing any and all senior officers who disagreed with him, Kuribayashi transformed Iwo Jima into "one of the strongest fixed positions in the history of warfare." Lieutenant General Smith's staff was aware of Kuribayashi's skill; an aide said "Let's hope the Japs don't have any more like him." Writing some time after the battle, Lieutenant General Harry Schmidt called Kuribayashi "one of the most resolute and professionally able soldiers of the Japanese Army, a master of defensive tactics." Yet another said he was "the best damn general on this stinking island." After the battle, Smith unsuccessfully spent a whole day looking for Kuribayashi's body to pay his respects and to perform a proper burial.

A Marine colonel said with grudging admiration, "You might say that he served his country well." This respect was transferred to Kuribayashi's troops as well. A U.S. Navy official in Japan, during a visit to Mt. Suribachi 60 years after the battle, mused, "What went through the minds of the Japanese defenders stationed on that same hill in 1945? They must've looked out at the panoramic view of the ocean and seen the hundreds of U.S. warships surrounding the island on all sides . . . What a lonely, sinking feeling the Japanese must have had—they knew there was no escape, they knew they were going to die . . . To fight on, as hard as they did, after that, really says something about human courage in the face of utter hopelessness."

It was this strategist and this strategy that the United States would face.

The Battle

After the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions finished their training, the joint expeditionary force began assembling in January at Oahu prior to departing for Saipan where they were to conduct final rehearsals for the landing operations and rendezvous with the 3d Division. Just prior to assembling, the Honolulu Advertiser had, in a "glaring breach of security," published two photographs released by the Army Air Corps over an island target, which for those who were familiar with the layout of "Island X," now knew their destination was Iwo Jima. As a result, counterintelligence officers were forced to spread different rumors in the Honolulu bars and hotels that Formosa was actually the next target. Despite the security precautions, the Japanese, including the infamous and tragic Tokyo Rose, were able to identify the specific units headed for Iwo.

The day after departing Hawaii, the men on the ships had finally been told where they were headed. "Iwo Jima? Where the hell's Iwo Jima?" the Marines in one group said in unison. Talking about the landing, another explained that Iwo "had been bombed 60 straight days by the Air Force. It's going to be a cakewalk, the Navy says we should take it in four days. Then we'll be held in reserve for the next invasion, which was going to be Okinawa. No problem at all." One Marine doubted this, telling a surgeon with the 27th Marines, "Don't let them hand you a snow job, Doc. Right now the Nips are settled down deep in their cave system having a pleasant dinner of curried rice washed down with sake. They'll pass the evening hours sharpening their trench knives and sorting out their ammunition." While the island's defenses would eventually succumb to the invasion force, the battle would take far longer than expected.
By the early morning of D-Day, 19 February, the 485-ship armada carrying the V Amphibious Corps had assembled off the coast of Iwo Jima. Anyone seeing the pictures and documentaries of the ships’ arrival today cannot help but be surprised at the overwhelming force that was brought to bear on the island. It would be necessary, for as described above, Iwo Jima had become perhaps the most heavily fortified place on earth.

At 0645 that morning, Vice Admiral Turner gave the order, “Land the Landing Force.” Many of the men had only a fitful sleep, knowing it might be their last day alive. Others were awoken by the big naval guns that began shelling the island from about four in the morning. After having a traditional breakfast of steak and eggs, the men lined up to get in to their various landing craft, which carried between 18 and 36 [LVT-1, 24; LVT-2, 18; LCVP, 36] Marines, corpsmen, and their equipment and wait to hit the beaches. Upon getting into one of them, the men found a message painted with a heavy brush in bold letters on the inside of one of the ramps: “TOO LATE TO WORRY.” Indeed it was, but they were still worried, despite attempts to joke about the situation. One short, freckle-faced lieutenant said “it was a pity we couldn’t settle these real estate squabbles by legal means.” Yet another described the landing by writing that Japan was about to face “a major immigration problem!”

The day before D-Day was a Sunday. Many of the Marines and sailors on board the USS Eldorado (AGC 11), the command ship of Vice Admiral Turner, had been given a card by the ship’s chaplain, Curt Junker, which included a prayer from the year 1645 composed by one of Oliver Cromwell’s generals, Sir Thomas Astlie, before he went into battle: “Lord, I shall be very busy this day. I may forget Thee, but do not Thou forget me.” God certainly came through for one Marine, Second Lieutenant Patrick F. Caruso, a rifle company officer with K Company, 9th Regiment, 3d Marine Division, whose Bible in his left breast pocket saved him from serious injury or death when a bullet struck him there.

In a further attempt to make sure that some survived by man-made means, the landing beaches were softened up before the Marines landed when 120 carrier planes attacked at 0800, using napalm among other weapons. At 0825, the final naval bombardment began, and over the next 30 minutes a total of 8,000 shells hit the island. At exactly 0830, Marines waiting in 68 armored track landing vehicles (LVTs), left the line of departure, formed an hour before. Some two minutes after the naval bombardment of the beaches ended at 0857, they began their landings at 0859 and the Navy shifted its firing farther inland. Within 45 minutes, 9,000 Marines were on the sands of Iwo Jima.

According to Marine historian Jerome T. Hagen, the “soft, sucking sand started to swallow the feet of the heavily loaded Marines” after about 50 yards. The weight they carried varied—a mortarman carried 122 pounds of equipment, a corpsman about 51, with everyone else having packs in between those two weights—but they were heavy and the sand made maneuvering difficult, even for tracked vehicles. The men “just flopped down where they were and waited for orders,” according to Hagen. With the volcanic sand so soft and granular, they could not dig foxholes. It was “like trying to dig a hole in a barrel of wheat.”

Offering little resistance initially, Kuribayashi waited until the Americans were congested on the beaches before he fully let loose, all according to plan. With several thou-
sand Americans on the beaches, it meant there were about two Marines for every yard of beach.\(^{218}\) It became a killing field. In the barrage and firefights that ensued that day, thousands were wounded and killed. In the words of *Time* and *Life* magazines’ reporter Robert Sherrod, “They all died with the greatest possible violence. Nowhere in the Pacific War had I seen such badly mangled bodies. Many were cut squarely in half.”\(^{219}\)

In another surreal scene, the landing beaches were also covered in Valentine cards, “so out of place scattered among the dead. We had received our last mail call on St. Valentine’s Day,” Private First Class Otis Thomas of the 5th Marine Division recalled, “and the fellows had stuck them in their pockets to read again.”\(^{220}\) Many wouldn’t have that chance. “The Japs were determined not to let us leave that beach area,” one Marine recalled.\(^{221}\) “They wanted to hold us there until they pounded us into oblivion with their shelling. We were just as determined to escape that fate, and so we charged ahead to meet them on more equal terms.”\(^{222}\) Another Marine explains what drove them forward:

> It is in situations like this that Marine Corps training proves its value. There probably wasn’t a man among us who didn’t wish to God he was moving in the opposite direction. But we had been ordered to attack, so we would attack. And our obedience involved more than just a resignation to discipline. Our training had imbued us with a fierce pride in our outfit, and this pride helped now to keep us from faltering. Few of us would have admitted that we were bound by the old-fashioned principle of “death before dishonor,” but it was probably this, above all else, that kept us pressing forward.\(^{223}\)

Despite the damage inflicted on the invaders, one battle historian suggests that Kuribayashi made his “only serious mistake of the battle . . . he had waited too long to counter-attack.”\(^{224}\) Tatum, who was in the first wave, agrees with this statement, although if it had been any other way, he might not have been alive to hold this opinion. “A powerful and sustained enemy counter-attack in the first hour of the American assault,” the former machine-gunner in the 27th, writes, “could have driven our confused troops pinned on the shore line back into the surf. Until the morning of D+1, the Marines’ hold on Iwo’s beaches was as fragile as a pie crust.”\(^{225}\) Tatum adds that the failure of the Japanese forces “to defend Iwo’s invasion beaches cost its commander . . . the battle for Iwo Jima.”\(^{226}\)

If Iwo Jima was hell, then the first night of the battle could only be described as a “nightmare in Hell.”\(^{227}\) That first day, the Marines succeeded in putting ashore more than 30,000 men. But it had been a bloody day; they had suffered 2,312 causalities. When told of the initial casualty figures, President Franklin D. Roosevelt shuddered. “It was the first time in the war, through good news and bad, that anyone had seen the president gasp in horror,” one associate at the time said.\(^{228}\)

> It must be remembered, however, that Smith had anticipated the difficulty all along. “There was no hope of surprise, either strategic or tactical. There was little possibility for tactical initiative; the entire operation was fought on what were virtually the enemy’s own terms,” he acknowledged, continuing:

> The strength, disposition, and conduct of the enemy’s defense required a major penetration of the heart of his prepared positions in the center of the Motoyama...
Plateau and a subsequent reduction of the positions in the difficult terrain sloping to the shore on the flanks. The size and terrain of the island precluded any Force Beachhead Line. It was an operation of one phase and one tactic. From the time the engagement was joined until the mission was completed it was a matter of frontal assault maintained with relentless pressure by a superior mass of troops and supporting arms against a position fortified to the maximum practical extent.  

Smith, however, had expected a banzai-like countercharge during the night or in the early days of the fighting. “We will be ready for an early counterattack in one of three places. We welcome a counterattack. That is generally when we break their backs,” he said. When it did not come, Smith noted to reporters, “I don’t know who he is, but the Jap general running the show is one smart bastard.” In the end, there was no formal organized counterattack, and instead U.S. forces had to drive ahead, foot by foot, yard by yard.

That does not mean that there were not individual counterattacks or nighttime attacks. On the evening of the first night, things began to get quiet. “Our assault force was . . . digging in and preparing to defend the ground that had been taken from the enemy during the daylight hours. I knew what the Japanese were doing too, [as] we had been trained to expect them to begin their counterattacks now that it was dark. They would rush our positions, attempt to disrupt communication lines, take prisoners for interrogation and try to kill our higher ranking officers . . . that’s exactly what happened.” “We sat there for the rest of the night,” a Navy corpsman explained, “and we could hear the Japanese moving around, trying to mark our positions for an artillery bombardment the next day. The Japs would call out to us, ‘Dirty Marine Bastards’ or ‘Marine Son-of-a-bitch’ they would say, hoping to get an answer so that they could throw a grenade toward us.” In typical American bravado, the “doc” whispered to the sergeant next to him: “They don’t mean me, I’m a U.S. Navy hospital corpsman!”

The nighttime infiltration attacks were particularly frightening for the Marines, corpsmen, Seabees, and later Army forces on the ground, but at the same time, an air attack on the ships gathered off Iwo by the Second Mitate (“Sacred Shield”) Special Attack Force on 21 February caused both great fear and damage. Reconnaissance conducted by the 5th Air Fleet of the Japanese Navy on 15 February had sighted the U.S. carrier fleet south of Iwo Jima. A new 32-man group designated Unit 2 Mitate was formed on the 18th, consisting of 12 fighters, 12 carrier bombers, and 4 carrier torpedo-bombers, among others. The unit departed Hitori Air Base, and after refueling at Hachijo Jima, struck at dusk, sinking the escort carrier Bismarck Sea (CVE 95), and damaging the USS Saratoga (CV 3), USS Lunga Point (CVE 94), USS Keokuk (AKN 4), and LSTs 477 and 809. Several hundred men were killed in the attacks.

With the beaches still piled with bodies, supplies, and damaged equipment, the invading forces felt like sitting ducks, and progress was all too slow. Morale, however, significantly picked up when the Stars and Stripes was raised on Mount Suribachi on the cold drizzly morning of D+4 or 23 February. Marines all over the island and sailors from their ships watched the ascent. One said, “those guys oughta be getting flight pay.” When the first flag went up at 1020, cheers, sirens, and whistles were heard throughout the island and offshore from the ships. Significantly, of the 40-man patrol responsible for the first flag-raising, 36 were killed or wounded in later fighting on Iwo Jima.
An important visitor who witnessed the initial flag-raising was Secretary Forrestal, the first civilian Navy secretary to appear on the front line of an overseas battle. Forrestal’s diary account of his visit to Red Beach on the morning of 23 February was terse; the editor of the diary explains that Forrestal “was not a vivid descriptive writer, and his diary notes . . . hardly do justice to the occasion.” Nevertheless, when he saw the flag-raising, Forrestal, “proud as hell to be wearing my Marine dungarees,” turned to Smith and said “the raising of that flag means a Marine Corps for another 500 years.”

In his time with Forrestal, Smith had also come to respect the secretary with the two of them talking for hours onboard the Eldorado. “He astonished me with his knowledge of combined operations and his grasp of technical matters,” Smith wrote, adding, “It was evident the secretary had delved deeply into the theory and practice of combined operations . . . ‘Mr. Secretary,’ I told him one day, ‘you missed your calling. You should have been a Marine. You would have had a great career.’” Forrestal responded that he had at one point considered it, but banking caught his interest first, and then added, “anyhow, thanks for the compliment.”

In his memoirs, Smith added prophetically, “After my experience with Secretary Forrestal, I hoped that other civilian members of our Government would see the services under actual wartime conditions, instead of sitting back in Washington, relying upon official dispatches and their service aides to enlighten them. How much sense of reality is lost between a battleground and a glistening Washington desk!”

Back on the beaches, a loudspeaker used by the beachmaster to direct the unloading operations blared “Mount Suribachi is ours. The American flag has been raised over it by the 5th Marine Division. Fine work, men. We have only a few miles to go to secure the island.” “Only,” one Marine repeated, “only . . . ”

One of the things that made the fighting difficult for the Marines was the fact that the Japanese defenders were hidden. A Marine in the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines, complained, “How the hell can you fight something you can’t see?” Another noted, “the thing that made it so tough was the Japs were completely concealed in caves, pillboxes carved out of the rock, or crevasses and there were so many of them you could never tell where the next shot came from.” Death came from all directions on Iwo. A BAR [Browning Automatic Rifle] man in the 4th Division who was wounded by shrapnel in the face on his third day in the battle and taken to a hospital ship stated “during the whole of my time on Iwo Jima I never saw a Jap.”

An example of not seeing the Japanese was experienced in trying to get the Japanese military leadership on the island to surrender. Major General Clifont B. Cates of the 4th Division called out via loudspeakers for Major General Senda Sadasue, commander of the 2d Mixed Brigade, to surrender:

You have fought a gallant and heroic fight, but you must realize the Island of Iwo Jima has been lost to you. You can gain nothing by further resistance, nor is there any reason to do [so] when you can honorably surrender and live to render valuable service to your country in the future. I promise and guarantee you and the members of your staff the best of treatment. I respectfully request you accept my terms of honorable surrender. I again appeal to you in the name of humanity—surrender without delay.
Unfortunately, Senda did not give up. Another officer who did not surrender was Colonel Ikeda Masuo, commander of the 145th Imperial Infantry and in charge of the western sector. Major General Erskine entrusted a two-page note typed in English on the left and handwritten in Japanese on the right to two Japanese soldiers who had been captured, stating,

> Our forces now have complete control and freedom of movement on the island of Iwo Jima except in the small area now held by the valiant Japanese troops just south of Kitano Point. The fearlessness and indomitable fighting spirit which has been displayed by the Japanese troops on Iwo Jima warrants the admiration of all fighting men. You have handled your troops in a superb manner but we have no desire to completely annihilate brave troops who have been forced into a hopeless position. Accordingly, I suggest that you cease resistance at once and march, with your command, through my lines to a place of safety where you and all your officers and men will be humanely treated in accordance with the rules of war [Geneva Convention].

Although one of the soldiers got cold feet, the other, nicknamed “Smith-chui,” or Lieutenant Smith, passed the note to someone standing guard at the cave and saw to it that it got to Ikeda. Ikeda and his forces apparently chose not to give up, and the battle, death, and suicides continued.

By 9 March, a patrol with the 3d Division had reached Iwo’s northern end. They filled a canteen with sea water and sent it back to General Schmidt with a note: “For inspection, not consumption.” It had taken 18 days to reach that point. There was still much fighting to go.

That night, Kuribayashi wrote to Tokyo explaining that “all surviving units have sustained heavy losses,” and added that he was “very sorry that I have let the enemy occupy one part of Japanese territory, but I am taking comfort in giving him heavy damages.” Indeed he was causing extensive damage to U.S. forces as his purpose was to delay their advance as long as possible and make the Marines pay for every yard.

Among those landing with the assault forces were some 4,000 Seabees, whose job with their heavy equipment was to get the airstrips in working order in the shortest amount of time and to transform the island into an American base amid all the fighting. The Seabees, in the words of William Bradford Huie who wrote about their role in World War II, were a “construction army,” one that “carried with it many more shiploads of equipment than the Marines carried; an army composed of the country’s most skilled machine-users; an army fully capable of mopping up all the Jap stragglers while it worked. When 1,000 Seabees per square mile moved onto an island with the kind and volume of equipment that they carried, and when they began using 10-ton bulldozers where the Japs used hand carts, then the real superiority of America became apparent.”

Troops heading to the back lines and beach landing area did not recognize the landscape after the Seabees had begun their work. An 800-foot runway was built and 20 miles of roads constructed, including a two-lane road up to the top of Suribachi. “[You] might as well level the whole damned island off, blacktop it, and then just paint the airstrips in,”
one reporter joked with one of the commanding officers. In addition, using former Texas oil-rig workmen, wells were dug to get fresh water, and harbor specialists worked to create piers to handle all the cargo and equipment. One Seabee explained how all this was done: “It is easy when you’ve got the organization and the men and the machines. This kind of war is right down the American alley . . . I say we won this war when we built Boulder Dam, the TVA projects, the skyscrapers, and all the other big things we’ve got. While we were building our country we trained the men and developed the machines and acquired the know-how to do just the kind of job we have to do here on Iwo Jima.”

The first aircraft to use the captured airstrip were two light observation planes from Marine Observation Squadron (VMO) 4 based on the escort carrier USS Wake Island (CVE 65), on 26 February, and several more the next day. Sixteen additional aircraft from that unit and VMO-5 arrived on 1 March. Advance elements of the Army Air Forces VII Fighter Command arrived on 27 February, and 28 P-51 Mustangs of the 47th Fighter Squadron arrived on 6 March. The first B-29, Dinah Might, landed on 4 March. In terms of American morale,” Alexander writes, the arrival of the Dinah Might “could not have come at a better time.” The next day, Schmidt ordered a general standdown to enable the Marines to rest and take on replacements.

It was around the same time that Kuribayashi wrote to Imperial Headquarters, “I am not afraid of the fighting power of only three American Marine divisions, if there are no bombardments from aircraft and warships. Send me these things, and I will hold this island. Without them, I cannot hold.” Some days before, the Diet had passed a resolution cheering Kuribayashi on, but what he really needed was not so much the words of encouragement but rather the military equipment to hold off the U.S. assault. Nevertheless, with or without this equipment, he was exacting a heavy toll on the Marines and American public opinion as well.

While there was strong support for the war in the United States and for the advancements being made in the Pacific and Europe, there was also increasing concern about the high costs in human life. When the War Department released casualty figures for the Battle of Iwo Jima, a public outcry, led by pro-MacArthur newspapers, was heard over the unprecedented casualties for the little piece of real estate. Smith was labeled a “cold-blooded murderer, indiscriminate waster of human life” by Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, who had joined with others of the “pre-Pearl Harbor isolationist lobby” to promote MacArthur over his military rival, Nimitz.

With the battle still going on, all Smith could do at this point was ignore the criticism and carry on. This does not mean that he was not affected, however. Observing the horrific fighting at Cushman’s Pocket on 14 March, he turned to General Erskine and said, with tears streaming down his face, “this is the worst one yet, Bobbie.” In his memoirs, Smith added, “I was not afraid of the outcome of the battle, I knew we would win—we always did. But contemplating the cost in lives caused me many sleepless nights.”

Ironically, 14 March was the day that the island was declared “secure” by Admiral Nimitz in what appears to be a bow to public opinion. That morning, a little north of Suribachi, an honor guard of 24 Marines (8 from each division) oversaw a flag-raising ceremony amid
the sounds of gunfire. With fighting still going on, an officer on Schmidt’s staff, Colonel David A. Stafford, read from a prepared statement:

I, Chester William Nimitz, Fleet Admiral United States Navy, Commander-in-Chief of United States Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean area, do hereby proclaim as follows: United States forces under my command have occupied this and other of the Volcano Islands. All powers of government of the Japanese Empire in these islands so occupied are hereby suspended. All powers of government are vested in me as military governor and will be exercised by subordinate commanders under my direction. All persons will obey promptly all orders given under my authority. Offenses against the forces of occupation will be severely punished. Given under my hand at Iwo Jima this fourteenth day of March 1945.

The ceremony atop the demolished bunker to witness the official raising of the flag was over in five minutes. Iwo Jima became U.S.-occupied territory at this point.

In Washington, Roosevelt received word of Nimitz’s proclamation when he was on Capitol Hill reporting to Congress about his meetings with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Soviet Union Premier Joseph Stalin at the Yalta Conference. Turning to the Pacific, Roosevelt said, “The Japanese warlords know they are not being overlooked. They have felt the force of our B-29s and our carrier planes. They have felt the naval might of the United States. The Japs know what it means that ‘the United States Marines’ have landed. And I think I may add, having Iwo Jima in mind,” Roosevelt continued, adding a familiar and beloved Marine Corps expression, “that the situation is well in hand.” Essentially it was, but the battle would rage on for almost another two weeks, with Japanese stragglers being picked up for days, weeks, months, and in at least one case, years later on the island. Nimitz’s proclamation was timely politically, but premature militarily, as many more casualties would be had been.

The period after this was officially called “mopping-up operations.” On the 17th, Nimitz declared that Iwo Jima had officially been secured at 1800 and Japanese resistance was at an end. “If this damn place has been secured,” one incredulous Marine asked, “where the hell is all this gunfire coming from?” Despite Nimitz’s statements that the end was near, the fighting continued to be brutal and bitter. Perhaps because things were in its final phase that those Japanese still alive, including Kuribayashi himself, were resisting to the extent they were.

Kuribayashi had learned of Nimitz’s proclamation by radio broadcast from Tokyo. The announcer implored Imperial forces on Iwo to “Hold out to the last man as valiant sons of Nippon, killing repugnant Americans as you die for Emperor and homeland.” Schoolchildren from Kuribayashi’s hometown in Nagano closed the special broadcast by singing the “Iwo Jima Song,” written at one point by the men on the island:

Where dark tides billow in the ocean / a wink-shaped isle of mighty fame / guards the gateway to our Empire / Iwo Jima is its name. We brave men who have been chosen / to defend this island strand / filled with faith in certain triumph / yearn to strike for Fatherland. Thoughts of duty ever with us / from dawn to dusk we train with zeal / bound by Emperor’s commanding to bring the enemy to heel. Oh, for
Emperor and homeland / there’s no burden we won’t bear / sickness, hardship, filthy water / these are less to us than air. Officers and men together / work and struggle, strive and trust / till the hated Anglo-Saxons / lie before us in the dust.277

Kuribayashi, obviously moved, wrote back his message of thanks to the “brave and gallant people of Japan” sending it to the Imperial General Headquarters, which subsequently released an edited version to the press. In the original version, he stated:

The battle is entering its final chapter. Since the enemy’s landing, the gallant fighting of the men under my command has been such that even the gods would weep. In particular, I humbly rejoice in the fact that they have continued to fight bravely though utterly empty-handed and ill-equipped against a land, sea, and air attack of a material superiority such as surpasses the imagination. One after another they are falling in the ceaseless and ferocious attacks of the enemy. For this reason, the situation has arisen whereby I must disappoint your expectations and yield this important place to the hands of the enemy. With humility and sincerity, I offer my repeated apologies.278

Kuribayashi also called for the island to be “retaken,” saying Japan would “never be safe” if Iwo Jima was not, and said he hopes “my soul will be a spear-head for the future renewed attack.”279

On 21 March, Kuribayashi wrote again to Tokyo, “We have not eaten nor drank for five days but our fighting spirit is still running high. We are going to fight bravely till the end.” That same day, effective 17 March, Kuribayashi was promoted to full general.280 His chief of staff, Major Horie, who monitored the fighting on Iwo, tried communicating this over the next couple of days, but he received no reply. The efforts to send the message “were probably in vain,” Horie said after the war, “because the wireless on Iwo Jima was hurrying too much to send their messages and did not try to receive our telegrams.”281 The last message Kuribayashi had sent was the one on 23 March: “To all friends of Chichi Jima, Goodbye.”282 Although Horie tried to communicate with Kuribayashi for several days afterward, there were no more messages from the Japanese defenders on Iwo Jima at that point.283

One private first class with the 4th Division wrote,

The Japs were good fighters, they had good equipment. We beat them mainly because we overpowered them. They had some terrific sights. When we got up in the hills, and took their guns, their artillery pieces could almost pick out a button [on] a man’s pants on the beach. It was just hand-to-hand, you just had to fight for everything you got. They didn’t give up easy. But you still did what you had to do. I don’t know what makes you do this. We Americans, we fight because we have to. We were fighting the Japanese, they were different. When they got killed, they’d take as many [Americans with them] as they could. We were fighting to kill, but we were trying to fight to stay alive. There’s a big difference when you’re fighting somebody with that type of a background, where they’ll die for their emperor, as they were doing. They were good fighters. They fought hard.284

The battlefield deaths became numbing, however. “Dead Japanese soldiers became fly spots to us,” one American wrote.285 He continued,
They mattered not at all except for the annoyance of having them lying too close to us when we lay prone or crawled by. I noticed that we passed by a number of the dead, who suffered severe damage to their lower jaws and hands. I wondered what kind of weapon we had that did that to them. Eventually, we came to learn the injury was caused by them holding a live grenade to their throats and exploding it in order to die quickly. It was said they were afraid of being tortured if taken alive. I don't believe there were tortures. Americans don't like to torture, kill maybe, but not torture.  

Sadly, in the heat of a “war without mercy,” several stories of abuse of Japanese prisoners and unjustified shootings emerged. Richard E. Overton, a participant in the battle, writes of being in an engagement in which a Japanese soldier, whose white flag had been tied to the end of a rifle and was visible, had been shot, likely by the nearby Marines, as he emerged out of the shell crater. While admitting that he felt “no remorse over [the soldier’s] death” as he had just lost a comrade himself, Overton observed “the hatred that developed in our troops toward the Japanese showed itself clearly beginning immediately after our landing on the island. The feeling intensified as each day came and passed and that hatred interfered with the military tactic of capturing the enemy for interrogation.”

The hatred was in part spurred by the anger over the killings of U.S. Marines and others taken prisoner, sometimes in a particularly cruel way, whose bodies were found by comrades later, or due to similar experiences on other islands in the Pacific over the past three years. As a result, many wanted to exact revenge. There are other Marines, however, who deny there was any hatred. “No, I have no hatred. I have no hatred for the Japanese whatsoever. I had no hate then or now.” Another, speaking of his childhood, said, “I grew up with Japanese as friends and I liked them. I am told we’re supposed to fight them. That’s what my country says. That’s what I tried to do.” A third Marine looking back stated “I don’t think we knew what hate was. It was more a battle of survival.”

Despite the intensity of the killing, there were moments when humanity and compassion emerged, if only briefly, before the mission was resumed. After Marines shot a Japanese soldier who had lobbed a grenade at them, they removed his helmet and found a picture of his family in Japan in the top. “He was standing erect with his helmet under his arm, wife and six children—cute-looking little children. Even after all we went through, all these tough Marines started to tear up a little bit . . . they choked up seeing that.”

James S. Vedder, a surgeon with the 27th Marines, wrote of a Japanese sailor who had blown himself up nearby.

His billfold contained ninety-five yen and several photographs. One poignant photo showed our recent adversary dressed in a white uniform of the Imperial Navy. He appeared as a handsome young man seated in a formal Japanese garden. Two small boys, each in the three- to five-year range, balanced happily on either knee as they fixed their adoring attention in their father’s direction. Behind them stood a smiling young woman dressed in a gay, flower-patterned kimono. It was hard to believe that the mutilated corpse at my feet was the same individual, though not so hard for me to identify with his family. The husband would never return to his wife,
and the children would never get to know their father. My thoughts then turned to my wife and two boys waiting for me back in San Diego. If fate had so ordained, our roles could have easily been reversed. I gave silent thanks to God that my children were not yet orphaned or my wife widowed. The body was disposed of in a nearby shell hole and covered with the rubble that had been excavated from our foxholes yesterday. A plasma box propped up at the end of a broken bayonet [bore] this epitaph, “Here lies one good Jap.” Although the grave site lay in the center of our medical working area, my men avoided trampling on or desecrating his last resting place in any way.  

A Navy corpsman wrote of the aftermath of an attack by a Japanese soldier whom he killed in the altercation. “I crawled out [of my foxhole] to examine [him],” Richard E. Overton began.  

“The man was young, I’d guess that he was about eighteen years old, and I felt a jolt hit me in my chest. He looked very much like a Japanese-American friend of mine back home. I wondered what this young soldier’s mother was doing right now in their home in Japan and how she would react when informed of her son’s death.”  

One machine gunner with the 9th Marines, 3d Division, spoke of spotting a Japanese soldier who was pinned down by U.S. gunfire. “Every time he tried to make a move, we cut loose,” the Marine said. “But very clearly, I can remember thinking at that point, I wonder how old he is? I wonder if he’s married?”  

One Marine in K Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment of the 3d Marine Division, had similar thoughts:  

I remember searching the enemy dead for possible valuable military information . . . I hoped for military data, but most often what struck me would be the pictures contained in their wallets. I would think, he belongs to someone back home: a wife, children, parents, all probably waiting for him just as our families were hopeful of ours. Yet just minutes before these men were trying to take our lives. I then visualized that “someone” in Japan would soon receive notice that their loved one was killed in combat and not returning. It did not make sense.  

That Marine’s introspection did not end here. Wounded while on Iwo Jima, he was eventually taken to the naval hospital at Aiea Heights in Hawaii (the future site of Camp H. M. Smith), which contained facilities to treat wounded Japanese prisoners of war:  

A short time ago we had been in combat trying to kill each other. Now the enemy was receiving medical care from our doctors and was protected by our own military police. It was conceivable that we might have met on Iwo through each other’s rifle sights. Now we could see them receiving blood plasma donated by American citizens and intended for the use of our own wounded . . . I had to pass the prisoners’ barrack on the way to the mess hall. It didn’t take long before I began to recognize some of the faces as they peered through the windows, our eyes meeting through that barbed wire. Over a period of time, a faint smile or a reluctant gesture of acceptance passed between us. Eventually, this recognition was manifested in a
distant and deliberate wave of the hand. Within days, our means of communication had changed from rifles and bullets to smiles and waves. I thought that, after all, they as individuals did not want the war any more than we did; they merely had followed orders. Though there was no exchange of words, I felt that each of us, through silent communication, was acknowledging that the other was also human. Perhaps we sensed a spark of hope for the future along with a measure of mercy for the enemy.

This “measure of mercy” or respect was found in another scene from the battle. In one of the accounts of surgeon Vedder, he recalled an interrogation of a Japanese prisoner by an American interpreter who had been born in Osaka of American missionary parents and spent 15 years there. The interpreter said the prisoner “feels it is a bad mistake for the Americans and Japanese to be fighting each other. With the many American planes and ships, plus the superior fighting qualities of the Japanese soldier, we should join forces . . . and together we could conquer the world.” Vedder agreed, telling the interpreter as he finished his interrogation: “I sure hope the Nips will be fighting on our side when the next war comes along.”

A Marine from New Jersey had this to say in his memoirs, a quote that best captures the essence of the human element behind the clash on Iwo:

We had a gross misconception of the enemy before we encountered them. Since the bombing of Pearl Harbor and throughout the war, our media created a distorted image of the Japanese fighters and their leaders . . . These image molders led us to believe we were fighting a third-rate, ill-trained enemy with outdated equipment and ineffective weaponry. None of this was true. To the contrary, the Japanese fighters were well-trained, combat-wise, expert marksmen, well disciplined, ingenious, uncanny, crafty, and programmed to fight and die for their ultimate purpose: their duty to their emperor. We certainly underestimated their ability and misunderstood their extreme loyalty and dedication to their emperor. They were not at all what our image molders back home made them out to be. They were not jokes; they were not inept. We hated them enough to kill them, but we did respect their ability. I often thought if we had to go to war again, I would want them on our side.

THE COST AND SIGNIFICANCE OF IWO JIMA

This foul-smelling, ash-covered, barren, ugly place was to others, especially B-29 pilots and their crews, the “sweetest little island in all the world.” A crewmember told a Seabee, who had helped construct the runway, “All shot to hell, we couldn’t have stayed aloft another ten minutes. Now we are as good as new. Yessir, that’s a sweet place.” The B-29 crews would jump out of their damaged planes to hug and kiss the ground. Iwo was, in short, “the difference between life and death” for many of them.

Iwo Jima, in the end, was also “the most expensive piece of real estate the United States ever purchased . . . We paid 550 lives and 2,500 wounded for every square mile of this volcanic rock.” America’s ability to “purchase” the island, albeit expensively, being a given because of the superiority in industrial capacity, military equipment, and training, was echoed
by Erskine, one of the commanders who participated in the fight. “Victory was never in
doubt. What was in doubt in all of our minds was whether there would be any of us left to
dedicate our cemetery at the end, or whether the last Marine would be knocking out the
last Japanese gun and gunner.” It probably felt like that as well to the men fighting on
Iwo. A battle that was supposed to take only a few days ended up lasting more than five
weeks. At the end of the battle, a total of 6,821 Americans had been killed, and 19,217 were
wounded (Marines 5,931 dead, 17,272 wounded; Navy 881 dead, 1,917 wounded; Army 9
dead, 28 wounded).

On the Japanese side, while the figures vary, about 20,000 were killed. The most reliable
number, that by the Ministry of Health and Welfare, lists 20,129 deaths (12,723 for the
Imperial Japanese Army and 7,406 for the Imperial Japanese Navy). Had medical services
been available, and the injured been evacuated, many more would have survived, one Japa-
nese veteran of World War II reminded the author. According to the Iwo Jima Kyokai,
the remains of some 13,000 have yet to be recovered.

Erskine’s 3d Marine Division Cemetery was officially dedicated on 14 March 1945, with
the battle still not over. Prior to the invasion force’s departure for Iwo, pre-painted white
crosses had been loaded onto the ships, out of the Marines’ sight. These crosses would be
immediately necessary with the start of the battle, although most bodies had to be left where
they fell in the first few days because of the dangerous conditions that existed. Those that
could be were “reverently collected” and laid in rows under ponchos. Nevertheless, the
graves registration teams, who were responsible for recording and burying the dead, were
shortly on the scene, with the first team arriving on D-Day with their own bulldozers.

Based on experiences from previous battles, military planners had preselected sites where
cemeteries were to be built. Those for the 3d and 4th Divisions, complete with a special
corner for war dogs killed in action, were located off the runway of Airfield No. 1. The 5th
Division had its cemetery on the southern end of the same runway, “under the shadow of
Mt. Suribachi.” Before they could be built, however, the designated areas had to be first
clered of mines and unexploded ordnance, and then bulldozed level—all this while being
exposed to enemy fire. As fighting shifted to the northern part of the island and the airfield
situation had stabilized, the Seabees built stone arches at the entrances to the cemeteries,
with fences made from wood salvaged from packing cases ringing the perimeter.

There was a specific burial process for those killed. One dog tag was removed and the
other left with the body. If the body had an index finger, a fingerprint was taken, but if there
were no fingers, the bodies were identified by clothing, tattoos, birthmarks, scars, or any
other possible methods, such as items carried. The body was wrapped in a blanket or pon-
cho and placed in a six-foot trench, three feet from those on either side. Each row, placed
three feet apart, contained the bodies of 50 Marines. It was through these cemeteries
filled with their fallen comrades that Marines, who could walk or were carried, passed as
they left the island.

At the 5th Division memorial service also held on 14 March, a Jewish chaplain from
New York City, Roland B. Gittelsohn, stated,
This is perhaps the grimmest, and surely the holiest task we have faced since D-Day. Here, before us lie the bodies of comrades and friends. Men who until yesterday or last week laughed with us, joked with us, trained with us. Men who were on the same ships with us, and went over the sides with us as we prepared to hit the beaches of this island. Men who fought with us and feared with us. Somewhere in this plot of ground there may lie the man who could have discovered the cure for cancer. Under one of these Christian crosses, or beneath a Jewish Star of David, there may rest now a man who was destined to be a great prophet—to find the way, perhaps, for all to live in plenty, with poverty and hardship for none. Now they lie here silently in this sacred soil, and we gather to consecrate this earth in their memory. It is not easy to do so. Some of us have buried our closest friends here. We saw these men killed before our very eyes. Any one of us might have died in their places. Indeed, some of us are alive and breathing at this very moment only because men who lie here beneath us had the courage and strength to give their lives for ours. To speak in memory of such men as these is not easy. Of them too can it be said with utter truth: “The world will little note nor long remember what we say here. It can never forget what they did here.” These men have done their job well. They have paid the ghastly price of freedom. If that freedom be once again lost, as it was after the last war, the unforgivable blame will be ours, not theirs . . . Too much blood has gone into this soil for us to let it lie barren. Too much pain and heartache have fertilized the earth on which we stand. We here solemnly swear: This shall not be in vain! Out of this, and from the suffering and sorrow of those who mourn this, will come—we promise—the birth of a new freedom for the sons of men everywhere. Amen.\(^{311}\)

The dedication ceremony was concluded. “They raised the flag and then ordered it to half-mast. Everybody broke up and just sort of wandered through the cemetery looking at crosses to locate members and buddies they knew. There were a lot that I knew. Serving so closely, united so to speak, part of a team—there is a love that is hard to explain. I cried. It was pretty touching to think you were among the living, and all my close friends were no longer around. I still reflect on that day,” one Marine said years later.\(^{312}\)

It was these memories—for some it was the first time they realized how large of a sacrifice had been made to take the island—and the related memorials later built on the island, that made the return of Iwo Jima to Japan 23 years later such an emotionally and politically trying experience. One saying about the Marines goes, “To find a true Marine, you have to dig for him.”\(^{313}\) There were a lot of true Marines who paid the ultimate price on Iwo Jima.

There were 27 Medals of Honor awarded for Iwo Jima, the highest number ever given in one battle. Only 14 of the recipients survived the combat, 13 were honored posthumously. Of these recipients, 22 were Marines, 4 were Navy corpsmen, and 1 was a naval officer.\(^{314}\) Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson stated, “The price has been heavy. But the military value is inestimable. Its conquest has brought closer the day of our final victory in the Pacific.”\(^{315}\) Iwo Jima’s loss meant that the invasion of the homeland was not far off. Only Okinawa had to be taken in the meantime, a couple of weeks later.
When the war was finally over, President Harry S. Truman said at the end of a Medal of Honor award ceremony at the White House on 5 October 1945, “We have won two great victories and we face another fight, a fight for a peaceful world. The fight for peace is necessary so we won't have to go to war again, so we won't have to maim the flower of our young men and bury them. Now let us go forward and win that fight, as we have won these two victories, and this war will not have been in vain.”

Truman’s quote was not as famous as that by Nimitz at the end of his 17 March statement when he observed, “Among the Americans who served on Iwo Island, uncommon valor was a common virtue.” The same thing could easily be said for the Japanese side as, although without the success of the 2006 movie, Letters from Iwo Jima, the story of the Japanese defenders would have remained known to only their families, military historians, and a relatively few others.

For the Japanese, an equally emotionally trying aspect has been the inability, at the time, to properly bury their dead, and in later years to recover early on, and in some cases, not at all, their dead. Today, family members and friends still travel annually to Iwo Jima to help search for the bones and personal objects in what is known as ikotsu shushu (bone collection). For them, the return of Iwo Jima in 1968 was less a political statement than it was the ability to help give a final resting place to Japan’s own warriors. For more than 10,000 Japanese soldiers whose remains have yet to be found or excavated, their final resting place has yet to be provided.

NOTES


2Robert A. Aquilina, “Marine Corps History: ‘Uncommon Valor Was a Common Virtue’,” Marines, February 1985, 24–25. Various figures are used for the number of U.S. casualties. The author refers to the figures cited by Aquilina, former head of the Reference Branch of the Marine Corps History Division, to whom the author is indebted for his generous assistance in this research.

3This claim needs to be clarified: more Japanese soldiers and sailors died than Americans, but in terms of overall casualties (dead and wounded), there were more among U.S. forces. Many of the Japanese forces died due to the inability to receive proper medical care. The United States was able to employ its full resources in treating its fallen and wounded, including evacuation to hospital ships offshore and facilities in Saipan and Guam (where 5,000 hospital beds were readied), Hawaii, and the continental United States. Japan, due to the lack of men and materials, was unable to do the same, although it had medical facilities in the caves and a limited number of medics among the troops. However, as Joseph H. Alexander points out, the “luxury of having first-rate medical assistance so close to the front lines took a terrible toll [on the U.S. side],” as 23 doctors and 827 corpsmen were killed or wounded at Iwo Jima, or twice the casualty rate as Saipan. See Joseph H. Alexander, Closing In: Marines in the Seizure of Iwo Jima (Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1994), 38–39.

The War and the Battle of Iwo Jima

Robert S. Burrell, *The Ghosts of Iwo Jima* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006) and his earlier article, are the most recent contributions to the debate. His controversial book won the Marine Corps Historical Foundation Award in 2007. Burrell’s argument was first introduced in his article, “Breaking the Cycle of Iwo Jima Mythology,” *The Journal of Military History*, vol. 68, no. 4 (October 2004): 1143–86, which also attracted interest. See Max Boot, “Rethinking the Iwo Jima Myth,” *Los Angeles Times*, 10 March 2005 (around the time of the 60th anniversary of the battle). The author is indebted to Burrell, now a major and until a few years ago, stationed in Okinawa, for the numerous conversations about his research by e-mail and in person in Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Although he was exposed to much criticism by former members of the Marine Corps for challenging the literature on Iwo Jima, the author believes he was personifying what Marines as individuals and as an organization do best—challenge the status quo with thought-provoking insights and arguments.


Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 226.


Maj Yoshitaka Horie, “Explanation of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Iwo Jima, January 25, 1946,” Folder: Exploitation of Japanese Documents, Iwo Jima Papers, Marine Corps History Division. This document appears as appendix II, in Eldridge and Tatum, eds., *Fighting Spirit*. Some of the U.S. planners had an equally bold idea—to use poison gas on Iwo Jima to eliminate the need for a forced seizure of the island. Neither Japan nor the United States had signed the Geneva Protocol (Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare), signed in 1925 and going into force in 1928, against the use of poison gas, and the United States had some stockpiles of mustard gas in the Pacific theater in light of Japan’s alleged use of it in its war on China. Nevertheless, President Franklin D. Roosevelt considered poisonous gas a barbarous weapon and, while willing to use it in retribution, did not want the United States to be the first to do so. He thus did not support the Joint Chiefs’ studying its use on Iwo. For more, see Alexander, *Closing In*, 48. Moreover, as the battle raged on, a newspaper in Washington, DC, called on the president and the military to “Give our Boys a Break—Gas the Japs.” Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 265.


“Memorandum from Capt William A. Corn, USN, to Navy War Plans Division on the Seizure of Chichi Jima, December 19, 1942,” Strategic Plans, Boxes 40 and 153, Record Group 38.2.4, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland.
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19 Japanese forces had overrun Guam in December 1941.


21 Ibid. Also see Burrell, The Ghosts of Iwo Jima, 27–28.


23 Joint Chiefs of Staff 924, “Operations against Japan Subsequent to Formosa,” 30 June 1944, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1941–1945, reel 9, 4.


26 Ibid.

27 Joint Chiefs of Staff 924 and “Operations against Japan Subsequent to Formosa,” 11 July 1944, in Bartley, Iwo Jima, 20.


32 Nevertheless, MacArthur and his staff in Australia, dissident members of the JCS, Army leadership, and some congressmen and senators were not happy with the decision. Unfortunately, their opposition was based less on military or strategic rationale than on the political desire to see MacArthur named as supreme allied commander in the Pacific. Ross, Iwo Jima, 14.

33 Bartley, Iwo Jima, 21.

34 Makalapa is the name of the area of Hawaii near Pearl Harbor, where Nimitz’s headquarters was located. Today, the headquarters of Pacific Fleet remains there, although the Pacific Command headquarters is located just above Makalapa in Aiea Heights at Camp H. M. Smith. Camp Smith is named after “Howlin Mad” Smith, who served as commanding general of the expeditionary troops
for the seizure of Iwo Jima. The author had the pleasure of working there at the colocated headquarters of the United States Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, as a scholar-in-residence in 2004–5 during his academic sabbatical.


36Buell, *Quiet Warrior*, 305.


40Ironically, both men would end up dying before the end of the war. Harmon would later go missing in action a week after the Battle of Iwo Jima started, when his plane disappeared in a noncombat-related flight on 26 February 1945, and Buckner would be killed in action in Okinawa on 18 June 1945.

41Ross, *Iwo Jima*, 16.

42Ibid., 3.


44Ross, *Iwo Jima*, 16.


46Buell, *Quiet Warrior*, 309.


48Buell, *Quiet Warrior*, 310.

49Ross, *Iwo Jima*, 16.


53Nimitz and Spruance, as well as Turner, introduced below, were so close that they are buried together near San Francisco Bay. See Buell, *Quiet Warrior*, 426, 428.


55Ibid., 24.


The Army Air Forces, for whom the island was to be seized, helped soften the island up by bombing it for several weeks ahead of the assault.

Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 21, 223, and 243. He had been commissioned a second lieutenant in 1906.


Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 232.


Ibid., 24–25. The 4th Division had recently returned to its camp on Maui, and the 5th Division was at Camp Tarawa on the big island of Hawaii.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

The author is grateful to Alice Clark for providing a tour of the former grounds of Camp Tarawa and the memorial there during the author’s visit to Parker Ranch in August 2005.


Ibid.

Ibid., 7.

For more on prewar understanding of the Bonins, see Price, “Springboards to Tokyo,” and Hachisuka Masauji, “A Journey to the Bonin Islands,” Bulletin of the Biogeographical Society of Japan, no. 1 (1930), 69–80. Also see the reports, begun in 1927 and updated every several years, by the Department of Intelligence, Naval War College, “Studies of Strategic Areas: The Guam-Bonin Line (Int. 5-35), June 1935,” Folder: “Studies of Strategic Areas: The Guam-Bonin Line (Int. 5-35), June 1935,” Box 33, Naval War College Instructional Materials, Records of the Strategic Plans Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, National Archives II.

Graff, Strike and Return, 8.

Ibid., 7–9.

Ibid., 8.

Alexander, Closing In, 27.

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Civil Affairs Handbook: Izu and Bonin Islands OPNAV 50E-9, July 1944.

For more on the UDTs, including Team 15, which suffered the heaviest losses of any team in the Pacific, see Wyatt Blassingame, The Frogmen of World War II (New York: Random House, 1964), 108–21; and James Douglas O’Dell, The Water is Never Cold: The Origins of the U.S. Navy’s Combat Demolition Units, UDTs, and SEALs (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2000).

Smith, Coral and Brass, 233.

Ibid.

Buell, Quiet Warrior, 315.

Ibid.

Burrell, Ghosts, 36.

Buell, Quiet Warrior, 315.

Vandegrift, Once a Marine, 281–82. The “something” was a reference to the atomic bomb.

Ibid., 281.

Ibid., 282.

Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 441.

Smith, Coral and Brass, 233–34.


Isely and Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, 442.

Smith, Coral and Brass, 234.

Ibid.

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105 Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 238. There were four major considerations for the Navy’s rejection of Marine requests: (1) the initial surface bombardment must be simultaneous with the first carrier attack upon the Tokyo area by the Fast Carrier Task Force (TF 58) in order to prevent Japan from launching air attacks against U.S. invasion shipping off Iwo; (2) the limitations on the availability of ships and difficulty of replenishing ammunition; (3) the Navy’s plan for three days of bombardment would accomplish all the desired objectives; and (4) protracted air bombardment might be considered at least as effective as one day of additional surface bombardment. See Bartley, *Iwo Jima*, 40.

106 Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 238.

107 Ibid.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid., 239.

110 Isely and Crowl, *The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*, 464.


112 Buell, *Quiet Warrior*, 339.


116 Richard Wheeler, *Iwo* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 10. Kuribayashi appeared fascinated by the size of New York City’s buildings and that of some American women. In Buffalo, New York, a tattooed woman who ran a boarding house he stayed at was “bigger than a sumo wrestler,” he recorded. She was also big-hearted, helping him during his time there.

117 Ibid.

118 “Taidan Senka no Iwo Jima Chinkon Imada Iezu [Dialogue: Ravages of War, Repose of Souls Yet Fulfilled], *Kaiho: Iwo Jima Kyokai* [Bulletin of the Iwo Jima Association], no. 37 (2007), 43. The transcribed conversation, which originally appeared in a pamphlet about the release of the movie, *Letters from Iwo Jima*, was conducted between Endo Kiyoshi, president of the Iwo Jima Kyokai, and Shindo Yoshitaka, grandson of Kuribayashi. The comment about the general was made by Endo, who was a former Imperial Navy lieutenant, and said he had met the general once on Iwo Jima, but did not have the chance to speak to him.


120 Ogasawarason Kyoiku Inkai, ed., *Ogasawarason Senseki Chosa Hokokusho* [Report of War Rem-


125 Ibid., 12–13.


128 Wright, *The Battle for Iwo Jima 1945*, 37. Another rumor, unsubstantiated, was that Tojo sent the generals he did not like or those he thought close to the United States to commands destined to be annihilated. See “Attsu Shima no Yoni Yatte Kure,” 22.


130 Takeichi, *Iwoto*, 42. Ogasawara Senyukai (p. 35) wrote the date as 10 June, but most accounts have the 8th. U.S. intelligence had apparently picked up information that the commanding general was going to arrive in the area in late June. Had the United States had actionable intelligence, it is possible that an ambush, like the one done against Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, might have been carried out.

131 Takeichi, *Iwoto*, 42.


135 Sakai, *Samurai!*, 199.

136 Ibid., 200.

137 Ibid., 201.

138 Ibid., 198.


140 Iwo Jima had a prewar population of approximately 1,164, and Kita Iwo Jima of about 450.
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145 Yoshida, *Picture Letters from the Commander in Chief*.

146 Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 246. According to Smith, rations for about 1,500 civilians had been prepared, but the Americans subsequently learned that almost all had already been evacuated.


150 Ibid., 41.

151 Ibid.

152 Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 245.

153 Ibid., 246.


156 Ibid., 45.


158 Sakai discusses the engagement in great detail in *Samurai!*, 202–12.

159 Ibid., 212–18.

160 Ibid., 235.

161 Ibid., 236.


165 Ibid., 54–55.

166 For more on the *Cobia*, see the website of the Wisconsin Maritime Museum, where the *Cobia* is on display, http://www.wisconsinmaritime.org/sub.htm.

167 Discouraged, Nishi, who was already in Chichi, did go back to the mainland to request more tanks, 22 of which he did receive by the end of August. These were subsequently buried. See Take-
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168 Sakai, *Samurai!*, 236.


171 The agreement, signed on 27 August, is introduced in Takeichi, *Iwoto*, 62–63.


174 Ibid., 62.


176 Takeichi, *Iwoto*, 70.


182 Ibid., 7.

183 Ibid., 6.

184 Alexander, *Closing In*, 23.

185 Ibid., 23.

186 Alexander, *Closing In*, 31, citing Wheeler.


188 Ibid., 15.


192 Ibid., 4.


195 LtGen Harry Schmidt, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps Land-
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ing Force, Iwo Jima, “Iwo Jima (undated),” Iwo Jima collection, Reference Branch, USMC History Division. At the time of the battle, Schmidt was a major general.

196Wright, The Battle for Iwo Jima 1945, 45.

197Ibid.


199U.S. Navy official in Japan to author about a visit to Iwo Jima, e-mail correspondence, 17 March 2003.

200Ross, Iwo Jima, 41.

201Camp, Leatherneck Legends, 161, citing Howard M. Conner.

202Ross, Iwo Jima, 42.

203Shively, The Last Lieutenant, 55.


205Ibid., 39–40.


207Newcomb, Iwo Jima, 93.

208Camp, Leatherneck Legends, 162.

209Henri, et al., The U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima, 37.

210Tatum, Iwo Jima, 143.

211Smith, Coral and Brass, 245.


213Hagen, War in the Pacific, II, 279.


215Hagen, War in the Pacific, II, 279.

216Ibid.

217Cited in Alexander, Closing In, 19.

218Hagen, War in the Pacific, II, 282.

219Cited in Alexander, Closing In, 28.

220Wright, The Battle for Iwo Jima 1945, 58.

222 Overton, *God Isn't Here*, 159.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., 80, citing Sherrod.
229 Alexander, *Closing In*, 52.
233 Ibid., 188.
234 Ibid.
236 Alexander, *Closing In*, 27.
239 Ibid.
241 Alexander, *Closing In*, 27.
242 Smith, *Coral and Brass*, 242–43.
243 Ibid., 243.
244 Ibid., 242.
246 Ibid.
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248Ibid.
252Senda is believed to have committed suicide or died in an unsuccessful charge. One unverified account says his remains were found in 1983.
256Ibid.
258Ibid., 59–60.
259Ibid., 59.
260Ibid., 61.
261The 26th of February was the same day that the first raid by carrier aircraft and fighters from Iwo (approximately 1,200 planes in total) took place. See Akira Yoshimura, *Zero Fighter* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 195.
263Alexander, *Closing In*, 34.
265Wright, *The Battle for Iwo Jima 1945*, 24. MacArthur, who was made supreme commander for the Allied Powers for the occupation of Japan, did not invite Smith to the surrender ceremony aboard the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September. Characteristically, Smith was less worried about the personal slight than the affront it caused to the Marines who had done so much to change the tide of war against Japan in the central Pacific. The Army also reportedly was bitter about Smith's having relieved two of its generals of command for their “lack of aggressiveness” and thus certainly was not saddened by the attacks on Marine Gen Smith.
266Indeed, perhaps the criticism was off the mark if the Navy had done the proper bombing.
268Ibid., 25.
269Ibid., 202.
270Nimitz was busy with a planning session for the attack on Okinawa (Operation Iceberg) and could not be there but eventually visited Iwo on 23 March. See Hoyt, *Nimitz and His Admirals*, 474.
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272 Ibid., 323.

273 For the holdouts who finally surrendered in January 1949, see chapter 7.


275 Ibid., 205.


278 Kakehashi, *So Sad to Fall in Battle*, xviii–xix. According to Kakehashi, there are several discrepancies in what was actually printed in the press.

279 Horie, *Tokon*, 157. This appears in chapter 13 of Eldridge and Tatum, eds., *Fighting Spirit*.


281 Ibid.

282 Ibid., 40.


286 Ibid., 276.


288 Overton, *God Isn't Here*, 275.


290 Interview with Frank Caldwell, 1st Parachute Battalion, 26th Marines, 5th Marine Division, in O'Donnell, *Into the Rising Sun*, 251.


292 Overton, *God Isn't Here*, 244–55.


295 Ibid., 116–17.
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297 Ibid.


299 Huie, *From Omaha*, 63.

300 Ibid., 63.


302 Huie, *From Omaha*, 59.


305 Author’s interview with Endo Kiyoshi, president of the Iwo Jima Association, Yokosuka, Japan, 18 July 2007.

306 Ibid.


308 Ibid.

309 Ibid.


313 The remains of Marines who had been buried on Iwo Jima during the battle were returned between 1948 and 1951 to the United States and the cemeteries on Iwo Jima closed. The marker of at least one cemetery remains.

314 R. R. Keene, “Medals of Honor, Iwo Jima,” *Leatherneck*, vol. 78, no. 2 (February 1995): 56. For the account of the youngest Medal of Honor recipient, a boy who had turned 17 five days before the Battle of Iwo Jima began, see Lucas, *Indestructible*.


CHAPTER 3
THE BONIN ISLANDS DURING THE WAR

I accept these swords in the name of the United States of America. The raising of the American flag and surrender of all officers’ swords signifies the actual termination of Japanese rule over all islands of the Ogasawara group . . . We shall demilitarize these islands for all time. We shall destroy all evidence of war. I hope these islands will be rebuilt into a peaceful land.¹

—Colonel Presley M. Rixey, USMC, commanding officer of the occupation forces for the Bonin Islands, December 1945

While Iwo Jima would be remembered—actually, revered—as a place of honor for the heroism displayed by both sides as well as the ferociousness of the battle, the Bonin Islands in the latter days of the war would go down in history as the site of some of the most sadistic behavior by the leadership of its defending forces, leading to war crimes trials in Guam after the war.

“The worst atrocities in the Pacific, even cannibalism, were committed on Chichi,” one islander who assisted in the investigation and trials and who would eventually emigrate to Guam, Frederick Savory, told interviewers in 1971.² The tragic fate of downed flyers was first widely reported in September 1946 by Time magazine in an article appropriately titled “Unthinkable Crime,” and in the local press, the Guam News, where the trials were being held.³ The Time story did not hold back on the shocking details, although the names of the captured flyers were not reported. Nevertheless, word got back to the families of missing flyers and their mothers began writing to President Harry S. Truman about the fates of their sons.⁴ The administration decided to ban all stories that spoke of cannibalism. In addition, those attending the trials were forced to abide by a gag order put in place.⁵ Over the following decades, the families of the pilots said to be “missing in action” traveled to Washington and wrote letters, but they were never told the truth.⁶ Robert Sherrod, in a section of his History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II entitled “A Study of Depravity,” wrote of it without revealing the names of the U.S. pilots.⁷ Anthropologist Mary Shepardson also discusses it in her chapter in The Anthropology of Power,⁸ but no names were reported. At least one other American scholar actually knew the names of the flyers based on his research but chose not to disclose them in his book published in 1991 out of consideration for the families.⁹

By this point, shortly after the return of the Bonin Islands in 1968, Japanese veterans had already begun to discuss what happened on the islands and recorded their recollections about their time there and what happened to the flyers.¹⁰ A decade later in 1979, Teraki Tadashi, a battalion surgeon who had been involved in dissecting some of the executed flyers published his memoirs about this crime, probably to clear his conscience.¹¹ Horie Yoshitaka, then a major serving first under Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi and...
then Lieutenant General Tachibana Yoshio, who helped write the 1969 book, subsequently wrote an article in 1984 specifically about the cannibalism incident drawing on Teraki’s account and his own experiences. In the early 1990s, the respected historian Hata Ikuhiko also addressed the issue in a series on the Showa Era (1925–89) in a Japanese journal, Seiron. More recently, an article in Bungei Shunju by a biographer of Kuribayashi Tadamichi has helped to further remind Japanese audiences of the actions of its forces in the last year of the war.

Fortunately, the story of what happened on the islands was not lost to censorship or age on the U.S. side. Thanks largely to an unpublished manuscript, Japanese Camouflage, by Colonel Presley M. Rixey, a career Marine born in Yokohama, Japan, in 1904, who served as head of the occupation forces in the Bonin Islands and worked to reveal the truth about the captured flyers, many researchers would not have known about what had happened to those men. Along with the declassification of the transcripts and other records of the Guam War Crimes Commission, it finally became possible to recreate the story of the tragedy on the Bonins.

In 2003, the sad story of the pilots and their crews finally came to be revealed in the United States to a general audience through the publication of two works. The first was a national bestseller—Flyboys: A True Story of Courage by James Bradley, author of Flags of Our Fathers. The second was by military historian Chester Hearn titled Sorties into Hell. President George H. W. Bush (who narrowly escaped being captured by Japanese forces on Chichi Jima when his TBM Avenger was shot down) endorsed it as being on “my list of must-read books.”

However, in the Japanese and U.S. accounts, both sides seem to be unaware of the existence of the writings on the same period and events “by the other side” and thus there appears to be numerous gaps in the literature.

The Military Role of the Bonin Islands and Their Fortification

The Bonin Islands, rugged, hilly, and heavily fortified, might have escaped the war if not for their supporting role of operations in the central Pacific, including Iwo, with their navy base and harbor at Futami Bay and small airfield at Susaki, and the existence of numerous naval monitoring systems that picked up U.S. communications and endangered U.S. operations in the area. Chichi Jima’s naval communications stations on Mount Yoake and nearby Mount Asahi were the critical link between Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo and Japanese forces in the central Pacific. The powerful short- and long-wave receivers had to be destroyed or else U.S. military activities in the area, including the flights of B-29 bombers to the mainland, could be monitored and Tokyo forewarned of attacks. With advance warning, defenses in Tokyo would be manned and the ensuing antiaircraft fire and aerial attacks by interceptors sent up to meet them much more effective. The result was an increase in damaged or downed American planes and the wear and tear on material, men, and morale of the American airmen. The radio facilities were so important, according to a member of the Tokyo air defense command, that “antiaircraft gunners were transferred from the Aka-
saka Palace of Emperor Hirohito” to Chichi Jima to defend them. As early as November 1941, Navy code breakers at Pearl Harbor had begun to receive messages from the Chichi Jima communication stations, but it was not until mid-1944 that the United States was able to locate the radio towers through reconnaissance photos. By this point, the U.S. Navy had already given Chichi Jima a code name—“Visionary.”

The Bonin Islands, being 150 miles closer to the mainland than Iwo, also served as an important transshipment point for men and material destined for the strategically critical islands. Haha Jima, between Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima, in turn, performed a similar function. Interdicting these activities would leave Kuribayashi’s forces less well-supplied and thus more vulnerable. Similarly, a small airfield begun in November 1932 (nominally for agricultural purposes) and completed on 1 June 1937, across the bay in Susaki would also need to be disrupted or U.S. forces would be susceptible to reconnaissance and harassment by Japanese planes.

It does not appear, however, that the United States had any intention to actually invade or take Chichi Jima or Haha Jima, although an assault on the islands had been considered at one point since they were the next in the road to Tokyo after Iwo. It is probably good that they were not assaulted by sea as the fight would have been extremely bloody and long with guerrilla activities extending for months or even years. Iwo Jima had approximately 21,000 defenders for its fairly flat surface on an area of eight square miles. Chichi Jima, on the other hand, had as many as 25,000 men stationed there, with rugged, mountainous terrain and very little flat land. Every feasible approachable beach was heavily defended by machine guns and other weapons. As the island’s beaches and bays curve inward, most of the fortifications faced inward as well and could only be seen once boats and other landing craft entered the kill zone. By then, it would have been too late, particularly with all of the anticipated crossfire. U.S. forces would be drawn in and then slaughtered, with little ability to reinforce them. High terrain (Mount Mikaeri) on neighboring Ani Jima, to the north, for example, would have allowed Japanese forces to wreak havoc on American forces gathered in Futami Bay like sitting ducks. “Iwo was hell,” one veteran told Bradley, “[but] Chichi would have been impossible.” It may not have been impossible, but it certainly would have been difficult, costly, and bloody with as many or more casualties as there were on Iwo Jima.

The Americans had intelligence about the islands through reconnaissance missions and other materials, but most of the fortifications were so well integrated into the landscape that many were found only after stumbling upon them after the war. While much of the build-up was done in the last year or so of the war after the central Pacific became endangered, the restrictions on visiting the islands after 1937 created gaps in U.S. understanding of the extent of the fortifications.

The military build-up of the Bonin Islands began in the early 1900s after the Russo-Japanese War when Vice Admiral Shimamura Sokuo’s 2d Fleet was sent to investigate Chichi Jima’s geography and suitability for construction in 1909. The following year, the same fleet was sent to further investigate the capacities of Futami Bay and the ability to protect it against attack. With the start of World War I in July 1914, Japan, allied to Britain since 1902, joined the war in August on the side of the Allied powers against Germany in Au-
The following month, the Imperial Japanese Navy established the Chichi Jima North Watchtower and began communications operations in November. In December 1917, the navy built a coaling station and, in June the following year, a wireless radio station was constructed to facilitate communications. The watchtower was the first military facility in the Bonin Islands.\(^\text{26}\)

The new naval base was increasingly becoming an important interim base and, as a result, the decision was made in December 1919 to have the Imperial Japanese Army build a base there to protect the naval facility. In August 1920, the army established a detached office led by Major Monda Chokoe, an army engineer, to build the army’s fortifications. In October, his office began buying up land from the residents. As construction of the fortifications was a military secret, Kempeitai (military police corps) officials were sent to the island, with an Ogasawara Kempei branch office established under the command of the Tokyo Kempeitai Kojimachi Detachment.\(^\text{27}\) In order to preserve these military secrets, certain activities, such as photography, near military facilities in Chichi Jima and Haha Jima were banned beginning in March 1921.\(^\text{28}\) As war became imminent in December 1940, the respective limits were trebled for the different types of existing perimeters and bans.

Construction on the fortifications began in June 1921 with the No. 1 and No. 2 Coastal Artillery Battery in Omura begun in July and No. 3 and No. 4 in December. In February 1922, Japan signed the five-power Washington Treaty (Conference on the Limitation of Armament), along with the United States, Great Britain, Italy, and France. As a result of the treaty’s Article 19, which called for the maintenance of the status quo of territories and possessions in the Pacific, construction on the fortifications temporarily stopped.\(^\text{29}\) In the latter part of the 1920s, however, as tensions increased with China, military officials responsible for the Bonins visited the islands and discussed how to fortify them without violating the treaty. In February 1928, about six months after Emperor Hirohito visited the islands, the navy built fuel facilities in Futami Bay for its ships as a fueling point. In the meantime, the army continued to develop its fortifications under the guise of “repair and replacement.”

In 1932, construction began on Susaki Airfield, designated as “Tokyo Metropolitan Agricultural Experimentation Site No. 1.” Site No. 2 was the airfield on Iwo Jima, with construction begun the following year.

In December 1936, the Washington Treaty of 1922 expired, removing restrictions on fortifying possessions in the Pacific. The navy built an airfield on Minami Tori Shima, expanded its runways on Iwo Jima, and completed the construction on the 500-meter (1,640-foot) Susaki Airfield, which required filling in part of the bay between Chichi Jima and an outer island. In April 1939, the Chichi Jima Naval Air Wing was created and placed in charge of the airfield. Prior to this in June 1937, the communications facilities were expanded on top of Yoake and Asahi, and sometime later a few of the buildings next to them were labeled as schools. A school gate and statue of Ninomiya Sontoku, a peasant boy who studied while he labored and a symbol of the importance of working hard in Japan, was placed in front to throw off reconnaissance planes and bombers.\(^\text{30}\)

In the meantime, the army continued developing its fortifications and, as part of this expansion, increased restrictions were placed on photography and other activities. To handle
these restrictions, as well as to deal with the increase in forces into the islands, the kempeitai presence was also expanded. Moreover, photography on Ani Jima, on which numerous weapons were being placed, was also banned.

Japan was clearly bracing itself for war as 1941 approached. Construction and expansion of facilities continued throughout the early 1940s and picked up again after the advances made by the United States in the Pacific in mid-1944. In early 1944, the army decided to increase its forces in Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, and Ani Jima and dispatched several groups in February and March. To prepare for the defense of the middle Pacific, the army established the 31st Army (under the command of Lieutenant General Obata Hideo) and placed the Ogasawara Garrison Force (Ogasawara Heidan), led by Major General Osuga Koto, under it. The 31st Army, in turn, was placed under the Japanese Navy’s Central Pacific Fleet’s command, led by Vice Admiral Minamikumo Tadaichi.

In May 1944, the army formed the 109th Division comprised of two combined brigades and numerous supporting units, which would be responsible for the defenses of the Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima. As explained in the previous chapter, Kuribayashi was chosen to head this division and decided to locate its headquarters where the main fighting would be—Iwo Jima. A detached headquarters, led by Major Horie Yoshitaka, was maintained on Chichi Jima for communication, intelligence, logistics, and other purposes. According to Horie, Kuribayashi did not think Tachibana was a capable commander (and might have had other reservations about him), and thus appointed Horie to represent him on the island and order the appropriate directives under his name to the army and navy.31

In the Bonins themselves, the Ogasawara Garrison Force was formed on 26 June. Its exact number is unclear, but there were more 13,355 army troops repatriated from Chichi Jima at the end of the war.32 Additionally, 7,659 navy personnel were repatriated for a total of 21,014 of which 756 were conscripted workers. In the late fall, the garrison force began gearing themselves for a land battle, and that anxiety grew as Iwo Jima was assaulted and finally taken. One of the defenders, Major Horie, assumed that Chichi Jima (or Haha Jima) would be invaded the same time as Iwo.33 The Japanese did not know U.S. military leaders had already made the decision not to take Chichi Jima and instead try to neutralize and isolate it.

Chichi Jima and the surrounding islands were divided into several zones. The 304th Regiment was located on Ani Jima, immediately to the north of Chichi Jima across the Ani Jima Strait. The 308th was placed in the northwestern most part of Chichi Jima, and the 305th in the southeastern-most area. The 306th was located directly north of the 305th, and the 307th was found immediately to their left, responsible for the southwestern area of Chichi Jima. The navy was responsible for the central areas, where most of the naval facilities such as the harbor and communication towers were found.34

At Haha Jima, after the start of construction of antiaircraft artillery on Furiwakeyama and Kiyose Ridge on Chichi Jima in May 1941, the Imperial Navy began work in June on coastal batteries to defend Oki Port at Shizusawa.35 In March the following year, four British manufactured Armstrong guns were sent there. At the same time, barracks, an ammunition storage area, and electric power station were constructed.36 In the words of one
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations

researcher, “this is when the real build-up of Haha Jima had begun.” In the meantime, the island’s Oki Port had been the rendezvous point in late November 1941 for ships destined to go to Guam for the attack on the American-controlled territory. The men of the army’s 144th Infantry Regiment (based at Kochi Prefecture) and the navy’s 5th Basic Force (located in Saipan) practiced amphibious landings in and around Haha Jima prior to departing on 4 December for the Guam strike scheduled on the 8th.

Intelligence about the fortifications had been gathered, but it was not as detailed as was hoped. After the war and the surrender ceremony, when the Marines had the chance to inspect the fortifications, they were amazed. Colonel Rixey, who headed the initial occupation force and had seen the defenses at Tarawa and Iwo Jima firsthand, wrote,

Nothing previously seen can compare with the coast and artillery defenses surrounding Chichi harbor. Concrete emplacements high in the mountains with steel door openings are too numerous to count. Artillery and machine gun fire which could have been placed on the airfield would have prevented any ... attempt at landing there. With camouflage as practiced by the Japanese in place, [naval gunfire] spotters would have had a very difficult time locating these cleverly placed positions. . . . The emplacements have to be seen to be appreciated. The Jap plan was to permit an entrance into the harbor or onto the airfield, then to give us the “works.” Most of these positions are inaccessible and many could not have been reached by [naval gunfire] as they are situated on narrow slopes facing east.

Rixey’s account was echoed by another Marine who served in the occupation force. Describing the island’s fortification as “an impenetrable defense system,” he flatly states that “no amphibious landing assault could survive the fire from that armament. This was a bypassed island, thank God. There wasn’t a better one to skip.”

The above accounts and others differ from that of Admiral Radford who, in his posthumously published memoirs, noted that Chichi Jima had been “fortified to ward off an invading fleet . . . Little emphasis had been laid on air defense. Once again, Japanese strategy was in error. As U.S. air strikes began to hit the islands, attention was directed toward meeting this threat, without much success.” In reality, several of the radio towers remained standing, and hardly a dent was made in the fortifications by the air campaign. Not only would Rixey and the others likely disagree with Radford’s description, but so probably would the downed pilots and their crews if they were still alive to speak about it.

THE AIR CAMPAIGN AND THE TRAGEDY OF THE DOWNEP FLYERS

Despite being on different and sometimes distant islands, the battlefields of the Pacific were very much interconnected and mutually supportive. Iwo Jima, for example, first became a target not in and of itself but because of the nearby invasion of Saipan, scheduled for 15 June 1944. Saipan was, as one history of air power in the Pacific War describes, the “impetus for the U.S. Navy to finally hammer Iwo Jima for the first time.” In the same way, it was also the driving force to hit Chichi Jima as well. Similarly, as Iwo Jima was invaded the following year, the airfield and radio towers on Chichi Jima also were attacked in an attempt to limit the ability of Japan to harass the operations.
The first of the bombing runs by Navy and Marine pilots against Chichi Jima took place on 15 June 1944, the same day that Operation Forager, the amphibious assault on Saipan, began. The attacks had been ordered by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, who directed two carrier units under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher be used for an independent operation against Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima, and Haha Jima. The units included Rear Admiral Joseph J. “Jocko” Clark’s Task Group 58.1, comprised of the USS Hornet (CV 12), Yorktown (CV 10), Belleau Wood (CVL 24), and Bataan (CVL 29), and Rear Admiral William K. Harrill’s Task Group 58.4, which included the USS Essex (CV 9), Langley (CVL 27), and Cowpens (CVL 25). Initially the attacks were scheduled for a one-day hit on 16 June, but Clark and Harrill believed that would not be enough and started it a day early on 15 June.

In this strike, no Japanese aircraft were encountered in the sky and most of those that were on the ground were destroyed. The fortress headquarters (Yosai Shireibu) in the hills above Futami Bay was seriously damaged and heavily burned as were several seaplanes. In addition to the military damage, the police station and elementary school were burned and 14 civilians killed. Due to the punchbowl shape of the bay and the horrific crossfire, at least four Navy planes were shot down during the raid. Two flyers, Lieutenant (junior grade) Calvin D. Terry and Petty Officer Oscar Long Doyle, bailed out safely and were captured. Being the first American airmen captured on Chichi Jima, the kempeitai were initially unsure what to do with them. After being incarcerated at Omura Radio Station, the captives were sent to Yokosuka Naval Base a few days later.

Rear Admirals Clark and Harrill had scheduled a second day of strikes the following day, but the weather prevented it, and due to the tight timeline given by Mitscher, they were unable to return at this point. They instead concentrated on hitting Iwo Jima’s Chidori Airfield, an attack that allowed the 54 Grumman F6F Hellcats to destroy the 63 Japanese planes on the ground. After rejoining Mitscher’s Task Force 58 to participate in the so-called “Marianas Turkey Shoot,” which essentially destroyed Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo’s battle fleet of 5 heavy carriers, 4 light carriers, 5 battleships, 13 cruisers, and 28 destroyers, Clark brought his group northward for another attack on the “Jimas” on 24 June. Although a Japanese patrol plane, likely based out of Chichi Jima, spotted the fleet and alerted the radio control center there, the Japanese lost about 60 of the aircraft that had recently arrived from Japan for the defense of Saipan in the ensuing two-day dogfight.

Clark was so obsessed with his mission against the Bonin Islands, including Iwo Jima, that the surrounding islands would become known in Navy circles as “Jocko Jimas.” Proclaiming “choice locations of all types in Iwo, Chichi, Haha, and Muku Jima,” naval aviators created mock “Jocko Jima Development Corporation” stock certificates. Admiral Chester Nimitz received Share No. 1 and the second was given to Clark.

Clark launched another attack on the “Jimas” on the Fourth of July. Fortunately, Chichi Jima’s harbor was congested and full of targets when the attacks began in the early morning. In addition, few Japanese planes were able to respond and most of those—Nakajima A6M2-N floatplane fighters—were shot down because of their poormaneuverability.

The raid was not without American casualties, however. Pilot Ensign Owen M. Hintz died when his Curtiss SB2C Helldiver was blown apart in the ensuing antiaircraft fire,
a barrage that one pilot had described as lighting up the sky “like the Fourth of July fireworks at the local park.” Aviation Radioman Second Class Lloyd Richard Woellhof, who accompanied Hintz, survived, only to be captured and bayoneted in the shoulder by three Japanese soldiers when he swam ashore.

That same day Lieutenant (junior grade) Hershel C. Connell, a pilot, was captured when he lost control of his two-seat dive-bomber and bailed out into Futami Bay. His gunner, Ben Wolf, did not survive. After floating in the bay for about 45 minutes, the pilot from the USS *Hornet* was picked up by a small Japanese vessel with about 10 men who slapped and kicked him after they dragged him on board. They may have wanted to beat him even sooner but they had to wait to be sure that the bombing was done for the day before they went out to pick him up.57 After being blindfolded and bound to a tree and then to another for much of the day, Connell was eventually transferred to Tachibana’s headquarters where he spent the next six days. “They weren’t trying to kill me, but it was sure uncomfortable.”58 Terrorize him they did, however, with the occasional gun pointed at his head. On the seventh day, he was transferred to Iwo Jima and then on to Ofuna Prisoner of War Camp near Tokyo. He was the last known American off Chichi Jima alive.

One of the reasons for this seems to have had to do with a change of command that took place that summer. Major General Osuga Koto, who headed the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade and had let the flyers live and be sent to the mainland for interrogation and other purposes, moved to Iwo Jima to assume command under Kuribayashi. In his place, Major General Tachibana Yoshio, a hard-drinking and abusive veteran of the war in China, had assumed command of Chichi Jima’s defense. Not only did he treat his subordinates cruelly, he also had no respect for the lives of civilians, such as those in China, or enemy troops who came into his custody. The more the situation in Chichi Jima became desperate, the greater his willingness to seek revenge by killing the defenseless American airmen, who under the rules of warfare were to be afforded protection.59

According to Horie,

Lt. (jg) Connell, who had been shot down by our anti-aircraft guns and become a prisoner of war, was brought to me. According to him, Rear Adm Clark with his task force decided to launch raids on the Bonin Islands from the *Hornet* and *Enterprise* on this, the U.S. Independence Day. He said this attack was done ahead of the forthcoming invasion of Guam. However, it was difficult for me to catch everything he said. With difficulty, I could understand his main points when he wrote them down. Through the above conversation, I discovered just how poor my English knowledge was. Out of necessity I started practicing English conversation with the prisoners becoming my teachers. Thus my special English study began on the afternoon of 4 July 1944, with the help of Lt Connell. Later instructors #2 and #3 came … The three of them taught me diligently. One of them became the chief instructor and the other two became assistant instructors in turn. I studied for at least three hours every day. When the enemy air raids came, we went into the air raid shelter [and] started our English study. Many of [the] Japanese officers and men laughed out loud at me when I got stuck on words and had trouble with pronunciation . . . [The prisoners] were worry-free. They joked and hummed songs to
themselves. They told me that as soon as the U.S. forces would land on Kyushu the war would be over and they could return home. They said if they did return home, they would be treated as heroes and be promoted. They felt their accumulated earnings would all be paid at once and they could use the money for their honeymoons. They even wanted to teach me to dance. One prisoner, an ensign, told me his father had died when he was young and his mother, who worked as a hairdresser, had sent him to college. He said he would like to get married as soon as [he] got home and please his mother. Nothing had ever surprised me as much as the psychology of the prisoners of war from a democratic country. It was diametrically opposite from the psychology of Japanese troops.60

During the summer of 1944, attacks on the airfields and other facilities on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima (what Navy pilots called “heckler attacks”)

became a regular occurrence, particularly after the U.S. airfield on Saipan, Isley Field, became operational on 14 July. That day, the first Consolidated PB4Y Liberator bombers from Navy Bombing Squadron (VB) 109 arrived and after that a series of raids against “the Jimas” began in earnest to prevent any interference by Japanese forces during the invasions of Guam and Tinian in the latter part of July.62 By 21 July, D-Day for Guam, the Liberators had, in the words of Hearn, “reduced the airfields on Iwo and Chichi to piles of rubble.”63 However, they were quickly rebuilt.

Isley Field would serve another important function during this time as well, becoming the base of operations for Marine pilots flying North American PBJ bombers—the Navy and Marine Corps version of the Army Air Forces B-25 Mitchell—on reconnaissance missions in the Bonin Islands. With six-man crews per plane, three aircraft would participate in the missions to search for supply convoys traveling to and from Chichi Jima at night, which was the only relatively safe time that the Japanese found they could reinforce the islands. One plane flew in the area around Iwo, another around Haha Jima, and a third around Chichi Jima and when a convoy was spotted, three other planes loaded with bombs and on standby would be notified with the coordinates of the convoys and instructed to attack. These interdiction missions inflicted much damage on the Japanese military’s ability to fight. For example, in July 1944 Japanese troop ships carrying the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 17th Mixed Infantry Regiment (Dokuriitsu Konsai Dai 17 Ryodan) were sunk while en route to Iwo. Those who survived and made it to Chichi Jima were never able to join the 3d Battalion on Iwo. Another attack—this one by a submarine—in the middle of July sank the transport vessel Nisshu Maru off Chichi Jima, sending 28 tanks destined for Iwo to the bottom of the sea. As mentioned earlier, there is no doubt that if they had reached Iwo, not to mention the two extra battalions, the cost to the American side in life and injuries would have been much higher.64

One of the more damaging attacks on Chichi Jima itself came on 4 and 5 August when members of then-Major General Tachibana’s 307th Battalion were killed.65 On the U.S. side, a Navy Liberator was downed at night on 5 August off of Chichi Jima.66 Only one of the aviators survived, the navigator whose identity has only recently been learned, Ensign Warren A. Hindenlang.67 At the time of his capture, he was ordered executed by the bitter Tachibana so quickly that his Japanese captors did not learn his name and he remained unidentified in the records.
Hindenlang and Woellhof, who were still on the island, were tied to trees in front of Tachibana’s headquarters. Hitting the two airmen, Tachibana ordered their execution the next day as revenge for the air raids and demanded that all orderlies and clerks not required to perform other duties would be required to attend. Captain Higashigi Seiji, the senior adjutant to Tachibana, surmised the reason for this strange order to attend the executions: “The general mentioned that while he was a battalion commander in Manchuria, the execution of prisoners of war helped to build the fighting spirit of the troops.”

Taken to the 307th Battalion’s rifle range near the pristine John Beach in the southernmost part of Chichi Jima, Woellhof and Hindenlang were walked up a small hill around 0800. They had not been told their fate, but if they had any doubts about that they were removed as they watched the stakes being pounded into the ground. After being lashed to the stakes and blindfolded with circles drawn around their hearts (not to make the target clearer but to show where not to stab in order to prolong the deaths), they were bayoneted repeatedly in the lungs and midsection. “They did not cry out or yell; they only groaned,” one eyewitness recalled later.

While still alive, they were then beheaded by Lieutenant Colonel Ito Kikuji, who had been placed in charge of the executions. Their bodies and heads were thrown into a hole that had been prepared nearby.

The next concentrated carrier attacks on the islands occurred at the end of August and early September when Rear Admiral Ralph E. Davison’s Task Group 38.4 undertook a three-day air and naval bombardment. The strikes, meant primarily as a diversion to the invasion of Peleliu, included the plane piloted by 20-year-old Lieutenant (junior grade) George H. W. Bush. Bush’s plane was shot down on the morning of 2 September after a bombing run at the radio stations. After releasing the bombs on target, Bush ordered the crew to evacuate the damaged plane. He was the only one to survive. After landing in the waters to the northeast of Chichi Jima, the tide began to carry him back toward the island. Using a one-man life raft dropped from another plane, he began furiously paddling with his hands away from Chichi. Small boats had been sent out to capture him and would have if not for the USS Finback (SS 230) that had been standing by for this sort of emergency and the planes that swooped down and shot at the approaching boats. Bush had been aware of the fate of Australian and American prisoners of the Japanese and, although worried about the fate of his crew, was “happy to be aboard” the submarine.

After this, the Bonin Islands were not the subject of a concentrated attack by air for some time, with the exception of the heckling runs of night sorties that would drop their ordinance if they did not find any shipping convoys to strike. Most of the fighter aircraft in the region were being used to assist in the recapture of the Philippines, which began in October. In the lead-up to the Battle of Iwo Jima, however, Rear Admiral Allan E. Smith’s Cruiser Division 5, composed of the heavy cruisers USS Chester (CA 27), Pensacola (CA 24), and Salt Lake City (CA 25) and six destroyers, began making regular visits to the Bonins starting in early January 1945 to look for convoys in the area. Subsequently, a few days before the Battle of Iwo Jima began, then-Rear Admiral Arthur W. Radford’s carriers from Task Group 58.4 approached the Bonins on 16 February and launched fighter-bomber sweeps that disabled the airfield, destroyed numerous fortifications, and damaged several ships in Futami Bay. Two days later, two more carrier groups under the commands of Rear Admirals Davison and Frederick C. Sherman launched day-long attacks on Chichi Jima, causing the defenders to stay in air raid shelters for most of the time.
The attacks were not without problems, however. Seven Avengers and one Helldiver were knocked down with a number of pilots and their crews lost between Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. One of the reasons for the losses was due to the presence of a highly trained unit with radar-aiming antiaircraft batteries of the Emperor’s Imperial Guard (originally designated for Iwo), who had recently arrived on Chichi. This unit possessed “unsurpassed marksmanship” and clearly earned its reputation that day. (This fact makes Radford’s claim, introduced above, about the weakness of Japan’s air defense all the more curious.)

The downed fliers had been listed by the Navy as dead, but in fact several of them landed on or around Chichi Jima. Of the eight shot down on 18 February, those who survived only to be captured included Aviation Radioman Third Class James W. Dye Jr., Aviation Ordinanceman Second Class Glenn J. Frazier, Ensign Floyd E. Hall, Aviation Radioman Third Class Marvie W. Mershon, and Aviation Ordinanceman Third Class Grady A. York. Several of them had had premonitions they would not be returning. For Hall, it had been his first (and last) time in battle. They had been told to expect “limited opposition” during their strikes on Chichi Jima’s airstrips, but the intelligence had been wrong.

Hall, Mershon, and Frazier parachuted out of their aircraft and landed between Chichi and Ani Jima, to the north, Frazier swam to the uninhabited Ani Jima while Hall and Mershon swam to Chichi’s shores where they were rescued by a local fisherman and Warrant Officer Soya Saburo. They were eventually brought to the 308th Battalion Headquarters to be kicked and slapped. Frazier eventually surrendered on 23 February to two fishermen, one of whom had rescued Hall and Mershon. Frazier had been without food since the 18th and, after having been exposed to the elements for five nights, was so weak his captors did not bother to tie him up. He, too, was taken to the 308th.

Two other fliers who crashed on the 18th, Dye and York, were captured by the 275th Battalion and taken to Tachibana’s headquarters. The next day, they were moved to Major Horie Yoshitaka’s headquarters, where they were interrogated. Hall and Mershon were brought to Tachibana’s headquarters and then moved to Horie’s as well that day. As Hall and Mershon came from the USS Randolph (CV 15) and Dye and York were attached to the USS Bennington (CV 20), they did not know each other.

Iwo Jima’s invasion happened to be the same day, 19 February. Carrier support was lent to the landings and thus Chichi Jima was spared any air attacks, but on the following day, 20 February, Chichi and Haha Jima’s defenses were hit again. Over the next three days, aircraft from the carriers in Task Force 58 flew 545 sorties in 27 missions, dropping more than 116 tons of bombs and launching 1,331 rockets.

On 23 February, Marine pilot Second Lieutenant Warren E. Vaughn, on his first mission over Chichi, did not return. After his plane was hit, he parachuted into the same strait as had Hall, Mershon, and Frazier. Swimming to shore, Private Ishiwata Yukutaro of the 307th Battalion threw him a rope and pulled him out of the chilly waters. He was brought to Tachibana’s headquarters. This was the same day that Frazier eventually surrendered and was taken to the 308th Battalion Headquarters of Major Matoba Sueo as well as the day that Mershon was executed.

Some time after the start of the recent wave of attacks on Chichi or perhaps after the start of the Battle of Iwo Jima, Tachibana had decided to execute the flyers, with the en-
listed men—Dye, York, and Mershon—going first. A feeling of hatred was running high in the 308th Battalion and at Major General Tachibana’s headquarters,” Matoba told to investigators later. Adding to this “hatred” was the sense of anxiety among the Japanese forces on the island. Not aware that the United States had decided to bypass Chichi Jima and Haha Jima for Iwo Jima and would limit its attacks to the shipping and the small airfield, many Japanese “thought we were the next to die” and essentially were approaching “something like a nervous breakdown.”

Mershon was turned over to Lieutenant Sueyoshi Jitsuro for execution, who in turn passed the duty on to Lieutenant Morishita Hironobu. Morishita decided the island’s cemetery above Omura village, the same cemetery in which the island’s original Western settlers were buried, was the best place to “dispose” of the prisoner. With a working party of soldiers carrying shovels and a samurai sword by Morishita’s side, Mershon most likely realized his fate. After having a final cigarette, he was told to kneel at the edge of his freshly dug grave and awaited his destiny. A few moments later, Morishita decapitated the 19-year old.

As if this was not enough, one of the most despicable acts in World War II occurred the following day when Mershon’s body was exhumed and his liver removed and parts of his thigh cut off to supply a sake and sukiyaki party held by Tachibana and Matoba. Tachibana had told his guests that “One had to have enough fighting spirit to eat human flesh” and Matoba echoed, “you have to eat this kind of meat to become a strong fighter.” While Tachibana was the more senior of the two, it was Matoba who has been called the “Tiger of Chichi Jima” for his actions. He often bragged about his beheadings of Chinese in Singapore and Nanking, as well as participating in the rapes and killings of women in the latter location. He also admitted he had grown fond of eating the flesh of prisoners when he was in China.

A couple of days later, Tachibana directed that the three other flyers at his headquarters—Dye, York, and Vaughn—should be sent away to be executed by the respective battalions that suffered casualties. York was the next to be killed. Captain Yamashita Masao of the 307th was ordered to do the execution. York, also 19, was tied to a telephone pole while his grave was dug in front of him. He was then bayoneted numerous times in the chest over the next few minutes. He did not cry or groan. His executor admitted later, “He also did not show any tears from start to finish. He struck me as being a very brave man.” York’s mother was in church praying for him when a telegram from the Navy arrived to inform the family that their son had been shot down and was missing.

As York was being executed, Dye was transferred to Mount Yoake where he was supposed to assist in monitoring radio transmissions. He had spent a couple of days there when navy Captain Yoshii Shizuo ordered Dye to be executed. “For Yoshii,” explains Tamamura Fumio, a Japanese-American (born and raised in San Francisco) who was serving in the Japanese Navy as a radioman at Yoake, [executing the prisoner] was an effort to raise morale. He had to prepare everyone for dying. We were all going to die, we thought. We knew the American instruments of death were going to come at us and that we had no hope. We were all going to die together; the prisoner would go first. “It can’t be helped,” everyone thought. It’s a mass hysteria, wartime hysteria. It’s impossible to analyze it unless
you were in that bizarre situation. The reactions of a cornered rat are not normal. And besides, when the Americans came and we were all going to die, how could we hold on to a prisoner?\textsuperscript{91}

At 1600 on 28 February, Dye was escorted out of the radio station where he had just been talking to Tamamura. Trying to put the flyer at ease, Tamamura told him he was just going to be paraded around by Yoshii. However, Dye no doubt realized something was up when he was walked to the edge of a large hole and told to kneel. Yoshii ordered his men to take turns at decapitating the young man from New Jersey. Saluting the prisoner before doing so, they did as told but clearly did not enjoy it. After Dye had been killed, “there was just silence.”\textsuperscript{92}

Unfortunately, not only was Dye executed, but he became the second victim of cannibalism, this time by Yoshii, who had heard about it from Matoba. It was a premeditated decision—Yoshii had talked about it previously and had instructed the unit’s doctor Sasaki Mitsuyoshi to dissect the body and remove the liver. Yoshii consumed it that night at a drinking party and ordered his disgusted subordinates to do so as well.

Yoshii was not satisfied with this one execution, however. The next day, having learned Horie still had two prisoners in his custody, Vaughn and Hall, the captain informed Tachibana he wanted another prisoner, initially for interrogation purposes. Tachibana assented and allowed him to take one. Yoshii chose Vaughn, and brought him to the radio station atop Mount Yoake.

Vaughn had been on his first combat mission and did not possess or at least share particularly important or relevant information. He was kept alive for a few weeks more, protected in a sense by several people along the way, including Tamamura and Iwatake Nobuaki, also an American citizen by birth (Hawaii),\textsuperscript{93} and Horie. It was Vaughn who heard the announcement on 14 March that all organized resistance on Iwo Jima had ended and informed the other radio monitors.\textsuperscript{94} Quoting Iwatake, Bradley writes of the irony of the situation: “Warren told us the news calmly, but inside he must have felt differently. Tamamura-san was with us, so he gave the message to Captain Yoshii.” Yoshii immediately passed the message up the chain to imperial headquarters in Tokyo. So in all probability, the emperor learned that Iwo Jima was lost as a result of a message intercepted by a Flyboy on Chichi Jima.\textsuperscript{95} Three days later, Vaughn was executed.

The Marine pilot, who was part Cherokee, seemed to know his time was up when the navy truck came up the mountain to get him. He was taken down to the torpedo boat squadron headquarters at Futami Bay, and after stating he had no last words while Rolling down his own collar in a show of defiance, was beheaded in front of approximately 150 Imperial Navy personnel. The crowd had probably been forced to assemble by Yoshii, who had ordered the execution. When asked for volunteers to do the beheading, no one stepped forward.\textsuperscript{96} Iwatake, who had remained up at Yoake, was devastated by his newfound friend’s brutal execution. He later adopted the name “Warren” in his honor.

After the killing, the unit doctor, Matsushita Kanehisa, was ordered by Yoshii to remove the liver for the meal that evening. One rumor afterward suggests that other parts of his body were cut up and put in the soup for the men as well.
With Vaughn's beheading, only one flyer—Hall—remained on Chichi Jima. He and Horie had become particularly close, but the closer they were, ironically the more vulnerable Hall became. As long as Horie was Kuribayashi’s representative on Chichi Jima, Hall—who was called “Horie’s pet” by others on the island—was probably safe, but after the fall of Iwo Jima, his situation became precarious. Tachibana was promoted to lieutenant general on 23 March and replaced Kuribayashi as commanding officer of the 109th, and with this, Horie’s detached command was integrated into Tachibana’s hierarchy. Horie, in fact, became the new chief of staff. With Kuribayashi gone, he was no longer protected and thus could not protect Hall himself.

In the meantime, Hall’s death sentence had already been issued by Matoba on 9 March and on 24 March, the day after the above changes in the command structure were made, Hall was transferred to Matoba’s 308th Battalion Headquarters. Horie implored the battalion’s Captain Kanmuri Yoshikaru, who had been ordered to carry out the execution, to do it “humanely.” The next morning, Hall was beheaded. He had continued to talk and joke with his captors until the end, perhaps not wanting to believe that his death was near. Several of them refused orders to decapitate the flyer; one even went AWOL.

Like some of the others, Hall’s body was dissected and his liver and thigh meat removed by Doctor Teraki. Matoba had the liver prepared for a party at Admiral Mori Kunizo’s headquarters that evening. At the party, Mori talked about how the human liver was eaten in China by Japanese forces. Matoba later stated that with the fall of Iwo Jima, “no one on [Chichi Jima] had the least idea of returning to Japan alive. Therefore it was just an understanding that all captured flyers were to be executed.”

Hall was the last American on the island until Colonel Rixey and his men came to effect the surrender of the Ogasawara garrison force some seven months later in October. In March, two planes—a TBF and a P-51—went down but their crews were said to have died in the crashes. All in all, more than 100 Navy and Marine airmen went down in the area of Chichi Jima. According to the author of the well-researched *Sorties into Hell*, only 10 were ever identified by investigators afterward.

During the early spring, Horie began to feel that with the occupation of Iwo and the invasion of Okinawa, Chichi Jima would be “by-passed,” but he wanted the islands to be protected in any case against a “sudden attack” by the United States. By the summer, however, it was clear that Chichi Jima would not be invaded. Additionally, it was clear that the war was lost, especially following the reports of the late July Potsdam Conference and the Soviet entry into the war on 8 August. Horie heard of the Soviet entry two days later on 10 August and that day requested Tachibana to approve the ending of rationing and allow the men to eat full meals again. To raise morale and pass the time, Horie and his staff also announced a summer *O-bon* dance competition for the next day (11 August) at Susaki airfield between the men of each prefecture with a *Shidanchosho* (Division Commander Award) going to the best prefecture. On the 14th, word came that there would be an important announcement the following day at noon and that everyone should listen to the radio. Horie told the staff that whoever wanted to listen to it was free to do so, but he said there was no point in listening to the announcement; in his opinion, “the war was already over a year ago on June 19.”
Organizing these activities was not the only thing Horie was involved in, however. With the end of the war approaching, he suggested that he, Tachibana, and Mori meet to share information on the number of flyers captured and their fates, and to map out a strategy to avoid “a reprisal” by U.S. occupation forces when they eventually came. His proposal approved, the three met shortly after that and agreed to say that interrogations were done at the detached command and the prisoners were held at the 308th Battalion, where they were all killed by a bomb near the Kiyose caves. Furthermore, the story was to be, Matoba—who Horie wanted to be repatriated earlier to avoid punishment but who Tachibana said he needed with him—had their bodies cremated and buried in a cemetery. Those who were not a part of the dispatched headquarters or the 308th were to say they “saw nothing and heard nothing.” Nevertheless, during the summer, rumors began to spread on the island about what had happened, including the planned cover-up. “All I could think about in my position at this point,” Horie wrote, “was how to reduce the burdens of those to be accused of war crimes.”

THE SURRENDER CEREMONY AND EARLY OCCUPATION

On 31 August, a few days before the official and main surrender ceremonies for Japan were held in Tokyo Bay on board the USS Missouri, representatives from the American and Japanese militaries met on the destroyer, the USS Dunlap (DD 384), to prepare the documentation and logistics of surrendering control of the Bonin Islands to U.S. forces scheduled for 3 September. Perhaps distrustful of diehards among the still-armed Japanese forces who might engage in sabotage or even in their despair undertake a last-minute ambush, the Dunlap anchored about three miles off Chichi Jima when making these arrangements and conducting the surrender ceremony.

The first issue to arise was the fate of the flyers who had parachuted around Chichi Jima. Horie, who headed the Japanese delegation, told his counterpart that they had “all perished.” The U.S. Navy official apparently did not follow up, but Horie noticed another member of the staff, a Marine lieutenant colonel glaring at him.

The surrender ceremony was held the next day. Exactly one year prior on 3 September 1944, the 341-foot Dunlap was preparing to participate in the bombardment of the American territory of Wake Island, captured by Japanese forces in late December 1941. Now on her fantail, Commodore John H. Magruder Jr., and his staff were preparing to accept the surrender of the Japanese island chain more than 1,000 miles west of Wake. World War II had officially come to an end. The same day, a smaller surrender ceremony took place on Haha Jima when Colonel Masaki Hitoshi surrendered to his American counterpart.

The Japanese delegation, led by General Tachibana as chief delegate, and Admiral Mori as the vice chief, and the other members of the group were ferried out to the Dunlap in a small landing craft in the morning and boarded it shortly before 0900. By 0905, Tachibana, acting “in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government, and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters,” had signed the instrument of surrender entitled “Unconditional Surrender of the Japanese Held Islands under the Command of the Senior Japanese Imperial Forces Base in the Bonin Islands.” Magruder, on behalf of the United

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States “and in the interest of the other United Nations at War with Japan,” accepted it and added his signature at 0906. The nine-point document, among other requirements, called on all Japanese forces to “surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control,” but unlike the surrender document for the Amami Islands a few weeks later, it did not spell out the geographical area of the islands. After the ceremony, several members of the U.S. and Japanese staffs met in the *Dunlap’s* wardroom to go over additional details. Indeed, there would be many details to work out, including repatriation, demilitarization, and destruction of fortifications.

It would be necessary to wait until a U.S. Marine battalion arrived to begin the demilitarization and demolition of the island’s fortifications. The Marines eventually came in mid-December but in the meantime, on a cloudy afternoon on 6 October, the commander of the occupation forces, Colonel Presley M. Rixey, leading an advance command element of Marines, arrived on board the USS *Trippe* (DD 403), a 1,500-ton *Benham*-class destroyer built in Massachusetts, the area from which Nathaniel Savory, one of the original settlers described in chapter 1, had hailed. Rixey, who was described as “tall, handsome, intelligent, and a ‘Poster Marine,’” was a veteran of the Tarawa and Saipan campaigns where he had commanded the 1st Artillery Battalion, 10th Marines, 2d Marine Division. His intellect would be necessary to deal with the particularly complex situation that Chichi Jima presented.

After the *Trippe* arrived in Futami Bay, several Japanese representatives, including Horie, boarded her to discuss the arrangements for fulfilling the September surrender terms. Tachibana, who after the surrender ceremony had returned to his headquarters and ordered that all articles belonging to the downed flyers be thrown into the sea, and Mori, who seemed to wish to avoid any responsibility whatsoever, did not attend the meeting in the *Trippe*’s wardroom. This probably angered the formal Virginia gentleman that Rixey was.

After discussing the issue of repatriating Japanese forces on the island, Rixey asked “the poker-faced” Horie about the fate of the flyers. To his “utter surprise,” Horie responded, “Yes, we captured six. All Navy, I think. They received very kind treatment. Two were sent to Japan by submarine. The last four were unfortunately killed by your own bombs in an air raid against these islands during the capture of Iwo Jima in 1945. They were blown up by a direct hit. I was very beloved of them and wished them no harm. We buried what remained of the bodies after cremation. This is a Japanese custom.” Rixey was surprised at the directness of Horie’s answer because he admitted that they had been captured. He and the Navy had had no specific information, and the Navy had assumed the flyers had gone down in the sea, particularly after Horie had told the Navy representatives the month before that they had all perished. Rixey guessed that Horie thought the United States had more information than it did. But as we know now, Horie was simply following the script that he, Tachibana, and Mori had devised in August before the surrender.

Rixey thought that Horie’s explanation “seemed plausible” as there had been air raids against Chichi Jima, and he and the three others on his team “nodded our heads in belief.” Rixey, however, felt that “somehow the story did not ring true” and he noticed that even the Japanese interpreter, Cadet Oyama Shigeyasu, who had been raised in Hawai‘i, blinked nervously whenever the flyers were mentioned. “[Oyama] had learned,” Rixey surmised, “too many Occidental ways and American fair play in Honolulu.”
Prior to the meeting, Tachibana had apparently taken Horie aside and reinforced what was to be said at the meeting. Although Horie spoke some English, he was told to use only Japanese and that interpreter Oyama should deflect questions as best as possible. They were not to mention the prisoners or give any information unless asked.

Rixey let the members of the Japanese mission believe that he had accepted their story but he did request that the man who had been in charge of the prisoners, Matoba, be brought to the wardroom the following day for follow-up questions. After leaving the Trippe, Oyama told Horie that they had not fooled the Americans, and warned him, “They are thorough and you will hear more of this from them. I have lived among them.” Horie countered that “it was done. We must stick to our words. I believe our prepared story will deceive them. They will find no evidence. Bones and belongings have been thrown into the sea by orders of General Tachibana.”

Oyama’s words were prophetic. The next day’s meeting with Horie and Matoba, who had according to Rixey the “most cold-blooded eyes I had ever seen,” raised additional questions and necessitated further meetings with individuals charged with guarding the prisoners. When asked about the burial of the flyers, Horie said a large cross had been placed on the grave and that military honors had been rendered. Rixey informed Horie they would go ashore to view the grave and take photos for his report to the commander of the Marianas at Guam.

The next day, 10 October, Rixey and his staff arrived at the Bobitai naval base with about 20 military policemen. Noticing Tachibana and Mori were not there, Rixey sent for them and they arrived shortly after that in their staff cars. Rixey and the others were driven to the civilian cemetery above the town of Omura high in the hills where they found a “neat grave covered with small rocks. Placed upright in the plot was a three-foot cross. Everything was in order as had been said—but—the cross itself was of new wood with no sign of having been exposed to the elements longer than the afternoon before . . . Now I knew that something was amiss! It had been erected over-night!” Later that same day, the testimony of the six-man machinegun squad was found to be odd, particularly because each account was identical—they had been given a script by Matoba to memorize and been coached by him. While all could repeat certain information, other questions, such as the color of the prisoners’ clothing, drew blank stares—Matoba had forgotten to coach them on that information.

With this, Rixey knew that a cover-up was occurring but he had difficulty learning new information. “Old Tachy was trying hard to cover his footprints,” Rixey said about the man he had come to dislike and distrust. However, he decided to wait until the rest of the Marines scheduled for occupation duties arrived before beginning an official investigation. He continued quietly to gather information, however. Rixey organized nightly parties with the 750 Japanese officers. Each evening, his senior staff would dine with about 15 or so. He would supply the meat and alcohol, and after dinner would play a movie.

During the day, there were numerous projects for Japanese forces’ (or their Korean laborer’s) participation, such as cleaning, salvage, and demolition. In addition, the issue of repatriation to the mainland had to be addressed.
Repatriation had gone slowly. The Japanese had few ships to spare for moving military personnel. Those returning from the Marianas would stop by Chichi Jima and help in the repatriation but they were few and far between. Moreover, the United States did not assign any of its own ships for this purpose until its own men had been returned to America as part of Operation Magic Carpet, a year-long effort that began after V-E Day (Victory in Europe Day) to move home the approximately eight million troops stationed abroad. Comfort women, many from Korea or China, who had worked near Tachibana's headquarters on the other side of Futami Bay in Nigyo, were among the first to leave Chichi Jima. In a further effort to cover his tracks, Tachibana had personnel involved in the flyers’ executions and cannibalism inserted into the repatriation lists in order to get them back to the mainland quickly and away from Rixey.

Finally, on 13 December, three LSTs arrived carrying a reduced battalion of 500 Marines. Some were quite unhappy to be there—they had expected to be repatriated, but were given this additional task of disarming and demobilizing Japanese troops and destroying the fortifications. For Rixey, the Marines could not have arrived sooner. He immediately had them clean up at their new camp (erected by the Japanese under the supervision of Rixey’s staff) and report to the headquarters for the official flag-raising ceremony.

The Japanese garrison, which included the officers and about 800 enlisted men representing the 20,000 on the island, had begun to assemble at 1000 on the grounds of the camp. The officers wore their finest uniforms and carried their swords for the last time. “The Japs loved a ceremony,” Rixey wrote, “even if they were on the losing end.” Across from them was the Marine battalion. One of the participants, Corporal Bill Monks, recalled that it was “an eerie sensation. There just a few yards from us were those God damn sons of bitches, out in the open at last . . . They appeared so small and harmless, yet we knew what a horrible fate we would have faced if the situation had been reversed . . . These bastards had never shown any mercy to their captives. Yet here they were: docile, compliant, and behaving like they had come to participate in a grand and festive event.”

Monks went on to explain the feelings of some of the Marines who landed that day: “All our knowledge of the Japanese added up to a fearless enemy who showed no mercy. We rejected them as if they were not human. We wanted payback for the utter misery they had caused us. The atom bomb was not personal enough. I would not have been surprised when we landed on Chichi if some guy had yelled out ‘GET A ROPE.’” Fortunately, no problems emerged.

At 1015, the Rising Sun was lowered, and a two-person Japanese color guard presented the folded flag to Rixey, who then returned it to Tachibana. At 1025, the Marine drum and bugle section sounded colors and the Stars and Stripes were raised as both U.S. and Japanese forces saluted. Captain John H. Kusiak, the operations officer under Rixey, read the occupation proclamation that suspended all powers of the government but promised that all existing customs, religious beliefs, and other rights would be respected. Horie then read the same message in Japanese. The Japanese officers then stepped forward to surrender their swords individually, as per Rixey’s instructions. “All Japanese officers together with 800 picked enlisted men,” Rixey recorded, ‘viewed the proceedings with visible emotion.”
Monks remembered the event in a slightly different way: “Emotions you might say were mixed . . . Frowns were deep set on most faces. The military careers and ambitions of these men were now at an end. This realization was emphasized a moment later when all Japanese officers present, led by Major General Tachibana and Vice Admiral Mori, stepped forward in single file to surrender their ‘Samurai’ swords.”

Upon the surrender of the last sword, Rixey stated,

I accept these swords in the name of the United States of America. The raising of the American flag and surrender of all officers’ swords signifies the actual termination of Japanese rule over all islands of the Ogasawara group. The establishment of United States occupation of Muko Jima Retto, Chichi Jima Retto, and Haha Jima Retto, is hereby proclaimed at ten minutes to eleven on 13 December 1945. We shall demilitarize these islands for all time. We shall destroy all evidence of war. I hope these islands will be rebuilt into a peaceful land.

Navy chaplain Lieutenant James T. Sanders followed with a prayer in memory of those who died at sea and on land, and then a Marine bugler played taps. The ceremony was over, but the aftermath of war was not.

**Investigation**

With the arrival of the Marines, the investigation could now proceed but Rixey had no new information to go on, particularly as much of the evidence had been destroyed and no records apparently kept. Then on 16 December, the first of two breaks occurred that not only made the investigation of the mistreatment and executions of the flyers possible but brought new and disturbing information. Namely, not only were the prisoners abused and killed, but some of them had been eaten as well.

The first break was the arrival of an old Japanese coast guard cutter at the navy pier at Bobitai; five men were standing on the cutter’s deck: Frederick A. Savory, his three uncles, Samuel, Roger, and William, and a cousin, Richard B. Washington, all former inhabitants of the island. As soon as Fred disembarked, he asked to speak to the commanding officer. He was taken to the “White House,” a building near the navy base that had survived the air attacks, which served as Rixey’s headquarters. Rixey and his staff sat down with Fred, who was the son of Daniel Savory and the great-grandson of the original pioneer to the islands, Nathaniel.

Fred had gone to school at St. Joseph’s College in Yokohama (now St. Joseph’s International School) and worked temporarily for American companies (Ford Motors Company and R. H. Macy’s and Company) in Japan before returning to Chichi Jima in 1940. Evacuated in 1944, he worked in the Nagoya area as a painter before moving to Yokosuka at war’s end. “His New England features and knowledge of his forebears,” Rixey explained in his account of this time on Chichi Jima, “was enough to convince [us] of his sincerity and loyalty toward the United States.” Like many of the bilingual islanders, Fred worked for the occupation forces. In his case, he had been working for the U.S. Marines. He spoke “excellent English” with what Rixey detected was “a bit of a British accent” and would later
serve Rixey as an interpreter during part of the investigations into the fate of the flyers. He began,

Sir, in Japan, I heard certain rumors talked about by soldiers whom you have shipped from Chichi. These stories are not nice ones. I must tell you what I have heard and believe. They are saying that their officers on Chichi executed perhaps 15 American flyers. Some had even witnessed these executions. I have heard that two men were tied to stakes and bayoneted after having been speared by bamboo sticks. And, sir—there is a rumor most prevalent that in the area of the 306th Battalion, a Major Matoba ordered his medical officers to remove the aviator’s liver after execution and deliver it to his orderly. A member of this battalion believes that Matoba and a few of his officers ate this liver at a saki [sic] party the next day. From my knowledge of the Japanese military caste, I too believe this true. I am here to assist the Americans in bringing punishment to these officers. They have been cruel to my family and other Bonin natives of white blood. I will remain here on Chichi, my native land, as long as I can be of help. I am familiar with all areas and at one time served in the Japanese Army here when I was conscripted as a “gunzuko” [sic] (construction worker) during the seizure of Saipan and Guam. I interviewed an American naval flyer here but never learned his name. When the flyer refused to answer a question, the officer struck the American in the face with the scabbard of his sword.\textsuperscript{137}

Rixey and his team were “flabbergasted.”\textsuperscript{138} Rixey wrote they had “suspected beheadings, of course. But never cannibalism! What manner of men were these? Polite and cooperative, obedient soldiers, brave and fearless, but beneath this veneer, barbarians and worse. We renewed our efforts now with added zest. It became a ‘must’ to uncover full facts. The world would know—must know—what bestial principles lay hidden under the cloak of ‘bushido.’”

The second break in Rixey’s investigation had been set in motion the day before, on 15 December, when Horie complained that he was having problems with the Koreans who did not want to work and who said that President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had promised before he died that Korea should be free and all Koreans liberated. Horie explained that “one bad troublemaker” wished to meet Rixey and present the Koreans’ case. Rixey met with the instigator and allowed those Koreans who wished to, move into the American occupation zone and work on projects that Rixey directed under their own leaders. The Koreans were given special privileges, and soon made friends with the Marines.

The “troublemaker” happened to be a Methodist divinity student before leaving Korea, Ahn Pyungchi. A few days after arriving in the American sector, Ahn spoke with Rixey’s intelligence officer, and after several conversations, asked to meet again with Rixey. Ahn explained that he had “created a situation” with the Japanese in the hope to meet the colonel and provide “information of value.”\textsuperscript{139} Speaking in English, Ahn “almost shouted” the stories he had heard when he met with Rixey one evening at his sleeping quarters at the weather station on the top of the hill above Omura.

I have heard of an execution of an American flyer near Okimura in July 1944. It is said that Colonel Ito supervised the beheading and that there were about 100
Japanese troops at the scene. The American was very brave. He refused a blindfold. He was smoking a cigarette while they tied his feet. I believe he was an officer but I never heard his name. Other Koreans have heard of other executions. One at the wireless station high in the mountains supervised by Commander Yoshii who was sent to Japan seriously wounded in 1945 and another killed by the torpedo boat squadron near Ogiura. I have heard that in Major Matoba’s area, he ordered his doctor to cut out the liver of an American aviator after the beheading. This liver was cut into small pieces after drying and Matoba’s adjutant placed the pieces in the soup eaten by the enlisted men. I am sure that Matoba has eaten human flesh. He served it as a substitute for goat meat at the admiral’s mess. Many of the navy officers vomited when told of its true character. Rumor says that the major bragged about this trick on the navy. His men hate him. He kicks and hits them with his fist. They are afraid and will not talk.

Although Ahn’s account, like Savory’s, was based on hearsay, the fact that these stories from completely different sources had made it to Rixey’s ears was significant and could not be ignored. “We began piecing together each bit of information,” Rixey explained, “hoping to draw the net tighter around those Japanese who had violated all human ethics and principles of treatment of captured prisoners.” However, Rixey still lacked “positive proof” of those identified as well as the names of all those involved.

The slow evacuation of Japanese forces happened to be a blessing in disguise, as Rixey had been ordered to “button up” Chichi and return to Guam after the repatriation and demolition work had been completed and U.S. had been troops evacuated. Nevertheless, he still needed more time, and requested a postponement of the return to Guam to allow for an investigation. His request was granted, but he was aware that with pressures for American demobilization, time was running short—“something had to be done and done quickly.” Rixey decided to play his “ace in the hole,” Major Horie, by befriending him through private conversations and gaining his confidence.

Rixey had to be especially careful not to let anyone know what he was doing, with the exception of his immediate staff, or else the “trap” would fail. “I could not take all into my confidence,” Rixey wrote, “and as a result, I know there were officers and enlisted men in my command who severely criticized my actions of friendship toward Horie. However, their silent censure did not change us from our planned course of maneuver. There was a higher prize to be reaped and we disregarded the stares of our associates in a determination to get to the root of the evil which hung over the dark mist of Chichi Jima.”

The stares that Rixey got were actually more severe than that. There were many under his command who were angered by the “Jap-loving” Rixey’s embracing of the Japanese. One flare-up occurred prior to one of the movie screenings, when as Rixey and some Japanese officers entered the building that had been converted into a theater, all the Marines walked out. Rixey had all the men “fall out on the black top” but being late at night and dark, Rixey was called names as the men felt he had “betrayed” them and “disgraced the uniform.” Rixey in turn accused them of mutiny and promised punishment. Sometime later, some of the men began to understand what Rixey was doing: “Things are done in the dark that have to be done in the dark. I’m sure the whole episode could have been avoided if
the Colonel had found it feasible to reveal to us his strategy of obtaining witnesses against the cannibals."

Horie fell for the trap after a horseback ride and over drinks with Rixey on 31 December. Rixey told Horie that he viewed the investigation as a “crusade” and would not “rest until I know the full truth.” After Rixey appealed to Horie to come clean with the facts “as a true and brave soldier,” Horie “slowly and deliberately” replied,

Yes, Colonel, I have known that you must know all things soon. Cadet Oyama warned me. The Savorys and the Koreans must have told you something. Now you are my friend and I believe as you do. I am not a war criminal. I was beloved of your aviators. They were brave men. I tried to save them but the devil was in my general. He ordered all executions in retaliation for Japanese troops killed in your bombings. There were 11 total. Now give me a pencil and paper and I shall write for you all the names of those guilty of crimes on these islands. I shall go with you to arrest them tonight.

Horie wrote out the names of everyone involved, with Tachibana heading the list. The next day, New Year’s Day, 1946, those listed were apprehended.

Horie was in some ways an opportunist, but in other ways he has been seen, and correctly so, as “Chichi Jima’s only conscience.” His view of the treatment of prisoners was not an abstract legal view, but a universal moral one about good leadership and true courage. While in the Army War College, one of his military history instructors told the class that “abusing a defenseless prisoner is not an act of bravery, but a cowardly deed.” Unfortunately, not everyone in the Japanese military felt that way.

On 6 January, Rixey instructed Major Robert D. Shaffer, who was in charge of the Marine battalion and who had been involved in arresting some of the accused, to convene a Board of Investigation to clarify the facts and make recommendations for the war crimes commission to be established in Guam. As part of his work, Shaffer even quietly traveled to the mainland to interview witnesses, some of whom had already committed suicide. The board met for the following six months conducting numerous interviews and presented its more than 1,000-page findings to Rixey in early June. On 6 June, he forwarded the information to the commander of the Marianas at Guam and recommended that the war crimes commission try the accused. Subsequently, he sent the 31 accused officers and enlisted men to Guam for trial and “buttoned up” Chichi.

By the time the accused left for Guam, most of the other troops on the island had been repatriated. When Rixey and his forces left that summer, the Bonins once again became a no-man’s land. However, it would remain so only for a few months as plans had been in the works to repatriate the islanders of Western descent back to Chichi Jima. This was, in part, because of the discrimination they faced on the mainland and the fact that some of them had assisted in bringing charges against the Japanese military leadership on Chichi.

In the meantime, the trials in Guam began on 5 August 1946. Unlike the more famous Tokyo and Nuremburg trials, those in Guam garnered little attention. After receiving the Chichi Jima Board of Investigation’s recommendations, Rear Admiral Arthur G. Robin-
son, USN, who presided at the War Crimes Commission, decided to reduce the number of those to be tried from 31 to 25. He further decided to divide the prisoners into two groups and to hold two trials, as the numbers were too great.  

Robinson demanded details rather than “damning tales” and as a result, the trial on Guam became the longest war crimes trial on record, after those in Germany and Tokyo.  

Sixty-six witnesses were called and thousands of pages of new testimony created. These documents are now declassified.  

The second trial, which included that of Tachibana, Mori, Yoshii, and Matoba, was the one that generated the most interest. In the first, the defense argued that Japanese moral standards were different and therefore the accused should be acquitted. In the second trial, a number of excuses were given for the cannibalism, including the lack of food, although testimony from Marines who had arrested Tachibana and the others said he was overweight at that point and that they had found stocks of food and sake in the caves.  

Numerous pleas of clemency came for the defendants from Japan, but only one each for Tachibana and Matoba, the two most hated men on Chichi. Eventually, Robinson’s commission set four free.  

Although the evidence supported convicting the men of cannibalism, the commission encountered difficulties in so charging the men. The Geneva Convention did not provide a penalty for cannibalism or cooking human flesh, as the delegates probably could have never envisioned such acts in war. As a result, no international or other law existed by which to punish them, nor was Rear Admiral John D. Murphy, Director, War Crimes, able to find any previous cases in which cannibalism was treated as a war crime. Thus, the defendants were charged and found guilty of murder and the prevention of honorable burials, with cannibalism as a matter of aggravation.  

Of the 21 defendants, 5 were hung without ceremony or publicity. Eight were convicted of eating human flesh or cooking it, but received lighter sentences, “perhaps for no reason other than to establish a precedent.” The other defendants received light sentences, ranging from 5 to 20 years, including those with the additional charge of “failing to provide proper burial for deceased prisoners of war.”  

In Hidden Horrors, Japanese historian Tanaka Yuki uses detailed statistics to demonstrate the horrific mistreatment of Allied POWs by Japanese forces. Looking at the number of POWs and number of deaths country-by-country for Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, United States, and Holland, Tanaka finds that the average death rate was 27.1 percent. In the case of the United States, second only to Australian prisoners in the study, the percentage increases to 32.9 percent. When we look at the percentage of those on Chichi Jima who were executed, the number jumps to a ghastly 75 percent.  

One often hears the phrase “victor’s justice” used almost exclusively in a derogatory tone. The negative connotation of this phrase clearly does not apply to the situation on Chichi Jima. Victory made justice possible, as the horrors committed on the island were likely to have remained unknown had the investigation and trials not been conducted. Uncovering the truth about what happened on Chichi Jima during that dark time was, if anything, the victory of justice.
NOTES

1Chester Hearn, Sorties Into Hell: The Hidden War on Chichi Jima (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press, 2003), 47.


3“Unthinkable Crime,” Time, 16 September 1946.


6Bradley, Flyboys, 5.

7Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation, 350–56.

8Shepardson, “Pawns of Power,” in Fogelson and Adams, eds., The Anthropology of Power, chapter 8. She and Blowden Hammond and Mary Shepardson also discuss it in their unpublished paper, “Uncle Charlie Washington” (1973). Ten years later, Shepardson was able to interview Maj Horie (introduced in chapter 2) in 1984 and writes about the incident in her unpublished book-length manuscript, The Bonin Islands: Pawns of Power (175–76) and includes the names of three of the airmen.


10Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo, particularly 207–45.


12Horie, “Chichi Jima Jinniku Jiken,” 120–35.

13Hata Ikuhiko, “Showashi no Nazo o Ou: Jinniku Jiken no Chichi Jima Kara Seigan Shita Bushu” [Looking Into the Mysteries of Showa History: How Bush Returned Alive from the Cannibalism Incident at Chichi Jima], Seiron, no. 228 (August 1991), 382–95. This article was part of a series that was eventually published in a two-volume book, Showashi no Nazo o Ou [Looking into the Mysteries of Showa History] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1993). Volume 2 included the chapter on Chichi Jima.


15Col Presley M. Rixey (USMC), Japanese Camouflage: We Penetrate a Prepared Story in the Occupation of the Bonin Islands (unpublished, undated manuscript), papers of BGen Presley M. Rixey, General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico, VA. Rixey died in 1989. A Japanese nurse whose family name was Hori relocated to the United States with Rixey’s family after he was born and lived with the family a long time, and thus Rixey grew up with a slight Japanese influence.
Japanese who knew him on Chichi Jima said he was pro-Japanese, despite the war. This attitude, however, raised the ire of subordinates, many of whom lost friends in the battles in the Pacific against Japanese forces. See Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., *Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo*, 206.

In addition to these materials, then-Maj Robert D. Shaffer carefully preserved one of only three copies of a three-volume 960-page report of the investigation that he led under Rixey. The author visited with the 92-year-old retired Marine Corps lieutenant colonel at his home in Salt Lake City in August 2009. See “Record of Proceedings of a Board of Investigation Convened at Headquarters of the Commander, United States Occupation Forces, Bonin Islands, Chichi Jima, Bonin Islands, by Order of the Commander, United States Occupation Forces, Bonin Islands, to Inquire into the Circumstances involving the Deaths of Allied Prisoners of War in Custody of Japanese Military Forces, Chichi Jima, Bonin Islands,” and hundreds of pages of other related files and personal records, including numerous photos and an unpublished diary, “Bonin Island Occupation Force.” Copy in possession of author.

Bradley, *Flyboys*, and Hearn, *Sorties Into Hell*. Bush himself visited Chichi Jima on 18 June 2002, along with Bradley who was working on *Flyboys* at the time. For more on Bush’s connection to Chichi Jima, as well as his visit there, see the following accounts at http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq10-3.htm and http://www.fleetsubmarine.com/ss-230.html. The story of Bush’s connection to Chichi Jima also formed the backdrop to *Kataki: A Novel of Revenge* by Hank Searls, an Annapolis graduate, who visited the island in the 1980s to research the book. Author’s interview with Hank Searls, August 2000, Newport Beach, California. It also was the climax to Robert B. Stinnett’s biography about Bush entitled *George Bush: His World War II Years*, particularly parts 7–9.

For example, while Kakehashi writes of Bradley’s book, she seems to be unaware of the more detailed accounts by Hearn. Furthermore, to the author’s knowledge, no Japanese writer on this issue has accessed the trial records of the Guam War Crimes Commission or knows about the short memoirs by Col Rixey, *Camouflage*, cited above. Similarly, while Bradley includes Horie’s edited book in his bibliography, he does not seem to be aware of Teraki’s account or Horie’s article. Hearn was aware of none of the Japanese language works it seems, as he does not reference any of them.


For a glossary of U.S. naval code words, see the Naval Historical Center website at http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq79-1.htm.


The author visited every beach on Chichi Jima by boat and personally saw the extent of the defenses during a long stay on the islands in August 2007, and also spent several days inspecting each of the known fortifications by land. Murai Tokushiro, a local expert on the island’s fortifications, guided the author. For more on the fortifications, see Ogasawaramura Kyoiku Iinkai, ed., *Ogasawarason Senseki Chosa Hobokusho* [Survey on War Remnants in Ogasawara Village] (Chichi Jima: Ogasawaramura Kyoiku Iinkai, 2002), and Machijima Ryo, *Ogaswara Senseki Ichiran* [A List of Ogasawara War Remnants] (Tokyo: Soeisha, 2003).

Bradley, *Flyboys*, 5.
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26 Ibid., 9–10.


29 The relevant section of the article read, “The maintenance of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall be established in the territories and possessions specified; that no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval facilities for the repair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territories and possessions above specified. This restriction, however, does not preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and equipment as is customary in naval and military establishments in time of peace.”

30 The statue and gate remains on Yoake Hill. Inexplicably, the Ogasawara Board of Education, in its explanation of the statue at its base, does not mention the fact that there was no school in the area, instead writing that the statue was relocated to avoid damage. It does not explain why the statue was removed to the site of the area to be bombed, namely the radio stations.

31 Horie, “Chichi Jima Jinniku Jiken,” 121.


34 Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo, 140.

35 Ogasawarason Kyoiku Inikai, ed., Ogasawarason Senseki Chosa Hokokusho, 12.

36 Machijima, Ogasawara Senseki Ichiran, 77.

37 Ibid.

38 Ogasawarason Kyoiku Inikai, ed., Ogasawarason Senseki Chosa Hokokusho, 12.

39 Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 44.


42 Graff, Strike and Return, 11.

43 Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 2.

44 Ibid.


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47 Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 3.

48 Ibid., 26. Accounts vary as to whether that was done by plane or submarine.

49 Ibid., 3.

50 Ibid., 2.

51 Ibid., 4.

52 Graff, Strike and Return, 18.

53 Ibid.

54 Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 4.

55 Bradley, Flyboys, 185.

56 Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 4.

57 Bradley, Flyboys, 186–87.

58 Ibid., 188.


60 Horie, Tokon, 90–91, 148. This discussion appears in chapters 8 and 13 in Eldridge and Tatum, eds., Fighting Spirit.

61 Ibid., 4.

62 Ibid., 5.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid.

65 Bradley, Flyboys, 189.

66 Initially, the plane was misidentified as a B-24 Army Air Forces plane by Japanese forces on the island. The B-24 and the Navy Liberator (PB4Y-1) were made by the same company, Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, and had identical wingspan and other dimensions, as well as the same nickname. While there were slight variations between the Navy and Army models, Bradley (338) writes, “the misidentification is similar to mistaking the burned hulk of a Buick for an Oldsmobile.”

67 Until Bradley was told of the identity of this man by a friend of Hindenlang, John Luke, he was simply referred to as the “unidentified airman” in all the records and accounts of this period, including the original edition of Flyboys. For more, see the “Afterword to the Paperback Edition,” in ibid., 337–39.
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Ibid., 190.

Ibid., 191.


Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 8.

The fates of four others, ARM2c Carroll C. Hall, USN; ENS Rudolph F. Rolfing, USN; Joseph E. Notony (rank and service unknown); and an unsubstantiated flyer by the name of Todd, are unknown. See Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 199–200.

Bradley, Flyboys, 205.

Ibid., 204.

Ibid., 204–5.

Ibid., 206–7.

Ibid., 220–21.

Ibid., 209.

Hearn, Sorties Into Hell, 8.

Bradley, Flyboys, 219.

Ibid.

Ibid., 219–20.

Ibid., 220.

Ibid., 224. A year later, Morishita committed suicide at his home in Wakayama City, Japan, after he had received a summons from investigators.

Ibid., 226–9. Also see Teraki, Kokubaku no Ishibumi.

Bradley, Flyboys, 226.

Ibid., 228.

Ibid., 200–201.

Ibid., 235–36.

Author's interview with Tamamura Fumio, 5 June 2008, Yokohama, Japan.

Bradley, Flyboys, 239–40.

Ibid., 244–45.


Bradley, Flyboys, 281.
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95Ibid.
96Ibid., 281–82.
97Ibid., 285.
98Ibid., 286–87.
99Ibid., 285.
100Hearn, *Sorties into Hell*, 166.
101Ibid.
106Horie, “Chichi Jima Jinniku Jiken,” 129.
107Ibid.
108Ibid.
109Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., *Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo*, 204.
110Ibid., and Horie, “Chichi Jima Jinniku Jiken,” 129.
111Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., *Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo*, 205.
112The surrender document, prepared by the Commander, Marianas, United States Pacific Fleet, http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/g380000/g386393.jpg.
113For more on the Amami surrender, see Eldridge, *The Return of the Amami Islands*, xv–xvi.
114According to one source, Rixey arrived with 650 Marines for duty on Chichi Jima. An additional 250 Marines were assigned to work on Haha Jima. See Ogasawara Šenyukai, ed., *Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo*, 205.
115Hearn, *Sorties into Hell*, 32.
117Ibid.
118Ibid.
119Ibid.
120Ibid., 3.
121Hearn, *Sorties into Hell*, 40.
123Ibid.
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125 See photo of their repatriation in Hearn, *Sorties into Hell*, 32. For the background to their arrival on Chichi Jima, see George Hicks, *The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), 112. Some photos of the women and Japanese troops can be found in Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., *Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo*, 167, but the purpose of their being there is unclear.

126 Hearn, *Sorties into Hell*, 43.

127 Rixey, *Camouflage*, 5.


130 Rixey, *Camouflage*, 5.

131 Monks, 17. Each Marine who commemorated the surrender was given a sword the next day.

132 Hearn, *Sorties into Hell*, 47.

133 Ibid., 51.

134 See Gilbert Cant, “Home to Chichijima: Yankee Trader’s Descendant Welcomes U.S. Flag,” *Life Magazine*, 24 June 1946, 19; and Martin Sheridan, “Sunday Telegram Writer Finds a Bit of New England in the Pacific,” *Worcester Sunday Telegram*, 17 October 1948, 8. In the prewar years, St. Joseph’s, which was run by the Brotherhood of St. Mary, had a faculty that was almost 90 percent American. See Sheridan, “Sunday Telegram Writer,” 12.

135 Rixey, *Camouflage*, 5.


138 Ibid., 6.

139 Ibid., 7.

140 Ibid., 8.


142 Ibid., 2.

143 Ibid., 7.

144 Rixey, *Camouflage*, 10.


146 Ogasawara Senyukai, ed., *Ogasawara Heidan no Saigo*, 218.

147 For a discussion of the cannibalism, vivisection, and mutilation of civilian and military prisoners committed by Japanese troops, including those on Chichi Jima, see Lord Russell of Liverpool, *The
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148 Author’s interview with Robert D. Shaffer, Salt Lake City, Utah, 17–18 August 2009.

149 Appendix B in Hearn, Sorties into Hell (201–2), provides a list of the men recommended for trial.

150 Ibid., 181.

151 Ibid., 182.


153 Ibid.

154 Hearn, Sorties into Hell, 189.

155 Ibid., 192.

156 Tanaka, Hidden Horrors, 2–3.
The United States currently possesses strategic control of the Pacific by reason of our necessary and extremely costly conquest of the islands and areas in question. This control can be relinquished, weakened, or in any way jeopardized only at the expense of our security.

—Joint Chiefs of Staff memo to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 11 July 1946

When the Allied occupation of Japan, led by the United States, began in early September 1945 with the signing of the Instrument of Surrender on board the USS Missouri (BB 63) in Tokyo Bay, it is likely that no one in Japan anticipated that the Bonin Islands would be separated from their country at the time of the future peace treaty and placed under the administrative control of the United States over the next two decades. Similarly, few of the displaced islanders of Japanese descent probably expected that most of them would be prevented from returning to their homes in Chichi Jima and Haha Jima for almost 25 years and never again for those from Iwo Jima and Kita Iwo Jima.¹

The decision not to allow the return of most of the islanders was an early one, made in 1945 after the end of the war. The indefinite administrative separation of the islands from Japan, first announced in late January 1946, would be confirmed through the San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 1951, and finalized through actual policy in the immediate posttreaty period.

U.S. Policy Regarding Japanese Territory on the Eve of the Surrender

The United States had begun its studies on the postwar period prior to its entry into World War II following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Its guiding principle toward the ongoing war in Europe and Asia with regard to territorial issues was made clear with the announcement of the Atlantic Charter on 14 August 1941. In it, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that the two countries “seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other” as a result of the war, “desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,” and “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.”²

While Japan eventually was allowed to retain sovereignty over the Bonin and Volcano Islands, as per Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, the United States would continue to exercise administrative control over them (as well as the Ryukyu Islands) for some time,
permitting the United States to fortify the Bonin Islands as a “secondary base area.” While the clash that eventually emerged was not as severe as that over the disposition of Okinawa—there were at least two different factors at work: the absence of a large “Japanese” population on the Bonin Islands and the proximity of the islands to the Pacific Mandates, and thus some in the State Department were more amenable to the security arguments—there were differences that emerged between the State Department and the military over the best way to handle the Bonins. The State Department would come to seek their retention by Japan, with the U.S. military desiring their keeping by the United States.

As noted, the U.S. government began studying the postwar period well before it was a full participant in the war that would eventually involve much of the entire world. In late 1939, Secretary of State Cordell Hull approved the creation of a committee to study the “Problems of Peace and Reconstruction” for the postwar, which would look at territorial, economic, military, political, and other issues. The committee, called the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, and its three subcommittees, came into being in January 1940. Due in part to the lack of resources and personnel, as well as the fact it met infrequently without an agenda, the committee was ineffective. This situation changed following the attack on Pearl Harbor and America’s entry into the war. Three weeks after the attack, President Roosevelt “heartily approved” the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. The new committee, which began its activities on 12 February 1942, served as an advisory committee for the president and entire government and comprised members from the State Department, Council on Foreign Relations, military, and non-governmental organizations.

One of the subcommittees formed under this second advisory committee was the Territorial Subcommittee, or TS. Dr. Isaiah Bowman, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and president of Johns Hopkins University from 1935 to 1948, headed the TS. According to Harley A. Notter, a career diplomat who was instrumental in the postwar planning and author of a detailed organizational history of this period and their work, the Territorial Subcommittee defined “territorial” in two ways. The first was as “land with people on it” and thus “boundaries could not . . . be ignored.” Notter explained that boundaries “still meant what they always had, only to a lesser degree. Aviation and other modern developments of a military and economic nature had modified the significance but not entirely removed either the security or the economic implications of boundaries. These boundaries afforded, in particular, a reduced but still strategically vital period of military warning.” Second, “territorial” included the historical and contemporary economic, social, and political situation in a given country, as well as the area or region in which it was located, and thus the subcommittee “focused upon the requisite conditions for peace and stability both within and among countries.”

It was primarily in this subcommittee that the disposition of the Bonin Islands was initially discussed. However, there were others, such as the Security and Political Subcommittees, which had an interest in the outcome of those discussions. Indeed, it was the Political Subcommittee, led by Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, which first examined Japan’s modern history of territorial acquisitions in an effort to determine which territories...
Japan had gained through “aggressive action.”11 The Bonins were found not to have been seized aggressively, and as a result, the subcommittee was “inclined, at present, to leave these islands under Japanese control.”12 However, there was the added concern about security and thus the subcommittee’s opinion was conditioned on the Security Subcommittee’s agreement that there were no “strategic reasons why this should not be done.”13

The Security Subcommittee took up the question of Japan’s territories at the request of the Political Subcommittee on 21 August 1942, and one member, Japanese speaker Major General George V. Strong, argued that “Japan should be deprived of the Bonin and Marianas Islands due to their proximity to Guam,” and that the Bonins could serve as one area in a “ring of ‘police posts’” that would counter “potential Japanese aggression.”14 Norman H. Davis, a former chief delegate to the disarmament conferences in London and Geneva who chaired the Security Subcommittee, countered that if the “fortifications [on the Bonin Islands] are destroyed, and if the peace treaty prevented their rearmament by Japan, and if this treaty is implemented by adequate provisions for inspection, he felt that no advantage would be gained through the removal of Japanese sovereignty.” Several members of the subcommittee agreed with Davis, arguing that the issue was disarming Japan rather than separating the outlying island areas from Japanese rule. Even Stanley K. Hornbeck, a special advisor on Far Eastern problems normally known for his pro-China, anti-Japan views, stated that it is “important to the future peace and security of the Pacific not to deprive Japan of any more territory or economic opportunity than is necessary to insure adequate security. If extensive territories are taken away from Japan, and if the Japanese are deprived of fishing rights, the resulting situation will encourage Japan to contemplate another war. It was much better,” he continued, “to base a Pacific peace plan upon the effective disarmament of Japan than upon other territorial and economic restrictions.” According to the minutes of the meeting, this view was approved by several subcommittee members. The body decided to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for their views as well.

Admiral William D. Leahy, chairman of the JCS, responded on 15 September. His letter was read at the 18 September meeting of the Security Subcommittee. In it, the JCS argued,

It is imperative that Japan be prevented from controlling the sea and air routes across the Pacific and the western Pacific and conversely, that these routes be controlled by the United Nations. This indicates the necessity of depriving Japan of all islands south of latitude 30°. This includes . . . the Bonin and Marianas Islands . . . The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should not commit herself as to the ultimate disposition of any territory suitable for air and/or naval bases of which Japan may be deprived until the strategic situation likely to exist after the war has been determined.15

The JCS evaluation was reflected in the Security Subcommittee’s recommendations, which were submitted to the Political Subcommittee for its reference on 22 September.16 That subcommittee, in turn, tentatively concluded on 1 October that strategically important areas should be placed under international control.17 It was unclear what form this “international control” would take, however.
Meanwhile, until early 1943, the Territorial Subcommittee had been involved in researching European problems and thus was not able to address Pacific issues. As a result, it was not until 25 May 1943, before the TS completed its study on the Bonin and Volcano Islands. The third in a series of studies and entitled “T-323, Nanpo Shoto (Bonin and Other Islands), Japan,” this secret report explained that “postwar adjustments of Japanese territory will involve consideration of the question of possible detachment of all or part of the islands known as the Nanpo Shoto.”

The six-page paper briefly examined the history, government, education, and economy of the Nanpo Shoto Islands before turning its attention to the question of their disposition. While recognizing the islands to be “administered as an integral part of Japan” and “belong[ing] historically and ethnically to the Japanese Empire,” the paper noted that who controlled the islands would “depend on the weight given to the factor of security.” It then gave four “alternative solutions” for their disposition:

1. **Retention by Japan**

   This solution would give recognition to Japan’s historical claims to the islands, and to their cultural, administrative, and commercial association with Japan proper. If the mandated islands to the south are detached from the Japanese Empire, and if provision is made for the disarmament of Japan and for the demilitarization of the remaining outlying possessions, those islands should not constitute a threat against the security of other nations. This would be the case especially if arrangements are made for an overall Pacific security system.

2. **Partial Retention by Japan**

   For purposes of security, Chichi Jima, in the Bonins, and possibly other islands which have been utilized for naval and military purposes, might be detached while the remaining islands might be retained by Japan. The detached islands might be placed under the jurisdiction of a North Pacific Council or some other international agency to be established with authority in this area. The actual administration of the islands might be patterned after whatever arrangements may be made for other strategically important islands in the Pacific. Provision might be made for the continuation of Japanese commercial enterprise in any islands which pass to international control.

3. **Detachment of Ogasawara and Kazan Islands and Marcus Island**

   For reasons of security Japan might be deprived of all insular possessions south of 30° North latitude. If this arrangement is followed, the Ogasawara and Kazan island groups, and Marcus Island, would be detached and Japan would retain possession of all of the Izu group, with the exception of an uninhabited rock called Sofu Gan (Lot’s Wife—29° 49’). This solution raises the problem of the disposition of the islands to be detached. If a North Pacific Council or other international agency is established, the islands might be placed under its jurisdiction. The administration might
be based on the arrangements to be made for other strategically important Pacific Islands. Since the principal purpose of international administration would be to prevent Japan from employing the islands for military use, such administration might be limited to supervising and inspection. It might be possible accordingly to utilize Japanese personnel for normal administration purposes. Provision might be made also for the continuation of commercial enterprise in the islands.

(4) Conditional Retention by Japan

If Japan is permitted to retain the islands, provision might be made for dismantling all military and naval fortifications and for the establishment for such a period, as may appear adequate, of a system of periodic investigation by an international agency in order to prevent the utilization for military purposes of such facilities as may be required for legitimate commercial enterprise.

The paper, prepared by John Masland Jr., a professor of political science and international relations at Stanford University who had joined the Far Eastern Unit of the Division of Special Research in 1943, did not conclude with a recommendation, but simply spelled out the different courses. It would be another year and a half before the territorial disposition of the Bonins could be studied in greater detail and specific recommendations appear.

In the interim, Secretary Hull realized by the summer of 1943 that “the results of our discussions to date be brought together in the form of documents which can serve as the basis of a more specific consideration of policies and proposals” and decided to dissolve the Advisory Committee and create the Post-War Programs Committee (PWC).20 The PWC would meet 66 times during 1944 prior to the establishment of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (in November that year). It was chaired by Secretary Hull, and comprised all the senior officials in the State Department. Because of the high rank of the committee, once it approved a recommendation, it became State Department policy, and needed only presidential approval to become official U.S. policy for that area unless coordination with the military was necessary.21

Underneath the PWC were the Country and Area Committees (CAC)—what the leading historian of this period Iokibe Makoto has described as the PWC’s “backbone”—which had come into being in the summer and fall of 1943.22 One such committee was the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (IDACFE), which came into being in October 1943. It was in this committee that territorial issues were further studied and specific policies formulated for the Far East, including the disposition of the Bonin Islands.

The IDACFE was headed by Dr. George H. Blakeslee, an authority on the history and international relations of the Far East, who had chaired the Far Eastern Unit of the Territorial Problems Group within the Division of Special Research. Dr. Hugh Borton, a Japan expert at Columbia University, who had worked as a missionary and later studied in Japan in the 1930s, served as secretary.23 The committee first addressed the question of the territorial disposition of the Bonins in October 1944, a year after its formation. The first draft appeared on 6 October 1944, which coincidentally was the same week that Admirals
Chester W. Nimitz and Ernest J. King had decided to develop plans to seize Iwo Jima, as examined in the previous chapter.

Like the earlier paper prepared by Masland in the Territorial Subcommittee, this study, entitled “Japan Territorial Problems: Bonin and Volcano Islands (CAC-304 Preliminary)” and written by Blakeslee, recognized that “Japan has a strong claim to the Bonin and Volcano islands on the basis of long-time possession, propinquity, nationality, and cultural, commercial, and administrative attachment to Japan proper.” In addition, Blakeslee (who had long-followed the issue of the Mandates), argued that if the islands were demilitarized and Japan were deprived of the Mandated Islands and Formosa, Japan would probably not constitute a threat to the security of other nations.

Suggesting that perceptions about the strategic value of the islands had changed noticeably in the past year, the paper pointed out that the “strategic location of these islands and their suitability for naval and airplane purposes are so outstanding,” however, “that it may appear advisable to use at least one of them for bases for the United Nations.” Blakeslee suggested that one or more of the bases could be used by the United Nations as part of what he called a “general security system in the Pacific.” Discussing the administration of the bases, the paper stated that it could be placed directly under the international organization or that the areas could be assigned or leased to one state, such as the United States, which would be in charge of the base under the supervision of the international organization. Other members of the United Nations would be permitted to use the base as well. Along these lines, the paper also suggested that one or more of the islands could be “transferred” to the United States “in full sovereignty” with the condition that naval and air stations be made available for use by the other members of the international organization.

Blakeslee pointed out that there were considerations against the United States acquiring sovereignty and as his recommendation, introduced later, shows, he felt these reasons strong enough to discourage the United States from acquiring sovereignty.

The first reason had to do with his concern that the acquisition of sovereignty would be seen as a violation of the “no territorial aggrandizement” provision of the Atlantic Charter and the similar one in the Cairo Declaration. The second consideration is that the use of a trusteeship for the islands would weaken the “principle of trusteeship,” which Blakeslee defined as helping “certain territories which may be detached from the present enemy states” become independent. The third reason was his concern that the United States would be forced to pay “a substantial price” for sovereignty, namely the “corresponding nationalist demands” of other states in the region, such as, interestingly, Australia and New Zealand, “for hegemony in wide areas of the South Pacific.” The final consideration mentioned was that “even after the establishment of a government devoted to peace,” Japan would likely see “foreign national bases in close proximity” to it “as a military menace.”

In light of the above concerns, Blakeslee recommended that Japan be permitted to retain the Bonin and Volcano Islands, conditioned on their being demilitarized. However, he also hedged by saying that “if developments should raise officially the question of the suitability of transferring from Japan some area in the islands for security purposes,” the United States should give “careful consideration” to this possibility.
Blakeslee and Borton met a couple of weeks later with representatives of the Navy to find out its thinking with regard to international bases. At the 18 October meeting where they were shown a Joint Chiefs of Staff map, the two State Department officials learned that the Navy planned to establish a “blue base” in the Bonin Islands. This referred to a base that would be under “exclusive United States control” rather than joint administration under an international organization, the details of which were being worked out as part of following the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Admiral Harold C. Train, who headed the Office of Naval Intelligence, explained that the base would probably be on Chichi Jima and that since the island was small, it would probably include the entire island. Furthermore, he pointed out, a base in the Bonins would necessitate control of all the islands in the Bonin and Volcano groups by the United States. Since the “small civilian population would be largely destroyed or dispersed after the fighting,” Train stated the two island groups should probably be “united to the Japanese Mandated Islands,” and placed under the sovereignty of the United States. Essentially this is what would happen in the latter 1940s—the islands would be separated from Japan and administered as an “appendage” of the Trust Territory by the United States, although a form of nominal sovereignty would remain with Japan.

It would not be until the end of December before the eight members of the IDACFE were able to discuss the Bonins again. Blakeslee began the 28 December meeting by saying that he had recommended in the earlier (6 October) paper against U.S. sovereignty over the islands, and that his views were supported by the Security Group of the Council on Foreign Relations as well as by Eugene Dooman, who had served as Counsellor of Embassy from 1937 to 1941 under Ambassador Joseph C. Grew and had joined the IDACFE when it was created in 1943. Blakeslee had drafted the recommendations, he said, “so that [the islands’] permanent retention by Japan would be possible.” Almost all of the members agreed with him; only one unnamed member did not vote.

The committee also discussed the question of the type of base—international (a base for use by several countries or established by the United States for that purpose) versus American (a base established unilaterally)—in the Bonin Islands, and voted five-to-two in favor of international bases. On a third question, whether the bases should be temporary or permanent, the committee was divided—two members argued the bases should be there for “a period of control following the period of occupation,” two members believed they should be there longer than the period of control but not permanently, one member believed that the base should be permanent, and one member “opposed the establishment of bases of any kind on the islands.” On a final question, the committee voted four-to-three in favor of the return of the islands to Japan in the future if conditions permitted such a transfer. Furthermore, bases established should be both temporary and international in nature.

One thing was apparent—committee members were of different minds on the various issues concerning the islands. Blakeslee’s summary showed as much: “The problem of the disposition of the Bonin and Volcano Islands greatly perplexed the Committee . . . The Committee concluded that the problem of the disposition of these islands needed further study.” Essentially, however, the committee was united on the question of the United States not acquiring sovereignty over the islands, but unsure about whether Japan should be allowed to keep them.
At a follow-up meeting on 4 January 1945, the committee reaffirmed its recommendation of the inadvisability of the United States to acquire sovereignty, approving in a vote of seven-to-two that it would be inadvisable to accept for inclusion in the paper the proposal that an exclusive U.S. base be established on the islands. Instead, the committee recommended that the islands be placed under the projected international organization which would designate the United States as administrator of the islands and grant it exclusive authority over the base. Under this arrangement, the base would be made “exclusively American,” but other powers could use it. The committee also felt that in the event the islands were placed under the authority of an international organization, the arrangement would not prejudice the sovereignty of the islands.

The committee came up again the following week at the IDACFE’s next meeting held on 9 January. The principal question concerned whether Japan should be required to place the islands directly under the authority of the international organization, which the committee preferred, or to cede them to the principal victorious states which would then place them under the international organization. In debating the issue, the question was raised about sovereignty and whether placing the islands under international control “would imply a transfer of sovereignty.” Borton, who chaired that day’s session, did not answer the question directly, but instead said it was “his understanding that the committee did not want sovereignty to remain with Japan.” It is unclear why he said this as the committee’s 28 December meeting notes show that while three members were against sovereignty remaining with Japan, four were in favor of it. In other words, the majority were in favor of Japan retaining sovereignty. However, the vote was close and no decision was made at that time. Noting this, Dooman chimed in and said that “there would be considerable nuisance value in settling the question of sovereignty once and for all and that it would be better to leave the matter open.” As a result, no decision was taken and the chance for Japan to retain sovereignty over the Bonins remained.

Over the next couple of weeks, the committee met several times to discuss the legal issues and language of the final paper and recommendations. On 11 January, the committee decided that the United States “would have exclusive authority over an area larger than the base area.” Dooman also informed the group that the Department of the Interior had demanded the administration of all Pacific Islands as soon as they were occupied, but the committee “thought this would raise serious complications and would tend to give the impression that the islands were already acquired by the United States.” In its next meeting on 17 January, the committee discussed “at length” the question as to whether U.S. sovereignty over the islands would be “detrimental to our influence in the Far East.” No consensus was reached on the issue, but the chairman was asked to draft a paragraph that suggested “annexation might well create a suspicion among Far Eastern people that the United States was embarking on an imperialistic policy and the fact that United States sovereignty would make us vulnerable to propaganda which seeks to make Far Eastern peoples believe that we are imperialistic.”

On 23 January, the committee held its 185th meeting, which was devoted to considering the question as to what U.S. policy should be in the case an international organization was created without adequate trusteeship functions. The committee believed in that case,
the State Department would have to “recommend that the areas concerned be held in some other status.”35 A few days later, the committee met and “finally decided” to bring the recommendations for the Bonin Islands “as closely as possible in line with” the recommendations for the Japanese Mandated Islands.36 The committee approved the following solution to do that:

1. Japan be required to renounce all her rights and titles over the Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus Islands in favor of the leading victorious powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union if it enters the war against Japan.

2. These leading powers place the islands as a trust area under the international organization by an instrument or instruments which shall contain a provision that the United States:

   a) shall be the permanent administering authority and

   b) shall at all times be free to establish for security purposes at such points within the islands as it may determine, bases over which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters affecting the security of the bases.37

As a result of this “long and careful consideration” by the IDACFE on the question of the disposition of the Bonins and other groups of islands, the secretary’s staff committee prepared the final position of the State Department on 17 April 1945, about three weeks after the end of the Battle of Iwo Jima, in a document titled “The Disposition of Certain Islands Controlled By Or Under the Sovereignty of Japan.”38 It prefaced the section on the Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus Islands by writing that the recommendations were necessarily tentative because the projected international organization had yet to be established and its function with regard to the trust areas undetermined. Noting that the value of the islands “is almost entirely strategic,” and the desire of the JCS as well as the War and Navy Departments to annex the islands altogether, the Staff Committee believed the following recommendations would “best serve the political interests” in regard to bases in the Pacific:

1. Japan shall be required to renounce all her rights and titles over the Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus Islands in favor of the leading victorious powers—the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union if it enters the war against Japan.

2. These leading powers shall place the islands as a trust area under the projected international organization by an instrument or instruments which shall contain a provision that the United States:

   a) shall be the permanent administering authority, and

   b) shall at all times be free to establish for security purposes at such points within the islands as it may determine, bases over which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters affecting the security of the bases.

3. The American government should initiate negotiations with the other leading powers to make certain that they agree upon taking the action outlined above.
4. The Department of State shall submit the above recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration prior to the final acceptance of these recommendations as the policy of this government.

5. If other leading United Nations should decline to place under the projected international organization areas of comparable strategic importance to them which have been taken from enemy states, the United States government should review the whole question of the disposition of the Bonin, Volcano, and Marcus Islands.39

In the meantime, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had also been considering “the politico-military problems which now, or soon will, confront the United States,” and began a series on “territorial adjustments” later given the designation “SWNCC 59” and named “Disposition of Areas to be Removed from Japan’s Sovereignty.” On 13 March 1945, SWNCC’s Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE) submitted the paper “Disposition of Areas to be Removed from Japan’s Sovereignty” to the committee’s secretariat. In it, the SFE pointed out that any future paper on territorial adjustments should examine “the political and security interests of the United States in the future status of certain areas of the Japanese Empire, such as . . . the Bonin and Volcano Islands,” and recommended that the committee have the State Department prepare a paper on the subject.40

It was not until June 1946, however, before the State Department was able to complete the study and submit it, due in part to the “hectic period . . . prior to Japan’s surrender”41 and also because of the fact that territorial adjustments usually did not take place until the time of a peace treaty which was still a far way off. Another reason was the fact that the trusteeship system under the United Nations was still being discussed (and would not be officially established until early 1947). In the meantime, the JCS continued with its studies of overall base requirements and control over the Japanese islands, building on a March 1943 study that argued the United States “in the Pacific, should select, equip, and fortify a line of naval and air bases west from Hawaii to and including bases in the Philippines and Bonins . . . [which] are essential to the defense of our position in the Far East, and valuable for international military purposes.”42

President Harry S. Truman furthered the discussion by stating in a radio broadcast on 6 August 1945, that

though the United States wants no territory, or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace. Bases which our military experts deem essential for our protection and which are not now in our possession, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.

The president followed this statement with a second one at the Navy Day celebration on 27 October 1945, in New York in which he said, “We have assured the world time and time again—and I repeat it now—that we do not seek for ourselves one inch of territory in any place in the world. Outside of the right to establish necessary bases for our own protection, we look for nothing which belongs to any other power.”43 A few months later, on 15 Janu-
February 1946, Truman reiterated, “The United States would insist that it be sole trustee of enemy Pacific Islands conquered by our forces and considered vital to this country’s security. Other former enemy islands now held by us but not considered vital to this country will be placed under United Nations Organization Trusteeship, to be ruled by a group of countries named by UNO (United Nations Organization).”

The Navy in particular was quite sure of the need for a number of bases in the Pacific, a view it also explained publicly around this time. Immediately after Japan’s surrender, Assistant Secretary of the Navy H. Struve Hensel announced at a press conference in Washington, DC, what the Navy considered were the “absolute minimum” number of bases necessary in the Pacific. Iwo Jima was one of several Pacific areas the United States “should intend to maintain and which are susceptible to defense.”

Drawing on the lessons from the past war, and fearful of a possible new one with the Soviet Union, Hensel also stated that the Navy would recommend more bases be kept in order to “prevent them from being used by any other nation.”

Hensel’s comments were certainly a reflection of the discussions going on within the government at the time. That same month, in September 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved JCS 570/34, later revised as JCS 570/40, “Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights,” which designated the Bonin-Volcano Islands as a “secondary base area,” and noted that “All Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan, including the Bonins and Ryukyus, will be brought under exclusive United States strategic control.”

A “secondary base area” was one deemed “essential for the protection of and/or for access to primary bases and for the projection of military operations.” With JCS 570/40’s approval on 25 October 1945, the chiefs requested through SWNCC that the State Department seek the necessary international arrangements through its diplomatic channels, noting that “the comprehensive base system which will result from obtaining the desired rights is not only an inescapable requirement for United States security in the event of a failure of the United Nations Organization to preserve world peace, but that the provision of this system will contribute materially to the effectiveness of that organization in maintaining peace throughout the world.”

JCS 570/40 did not define what sort of strategic control was envisioned, and it would be left undefined for three months until 17 January 1946, when the JCS, responding to a request the day before by the new Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, directed the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) to restudy the question of strategic control over the Nansei and Nanpo Islands with reference to Article 82 of the UN Charter, which concerned trusteeships. In JCS 570/50, approved on 21 January, the joint chiefs informed the secretary of State that they “considered it essential to our national defense that the United States have strategic control of the Japanese Mandated Islands by assumption of full U.S. sovereignty; and that the United States have strategic control over the Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto, and of Marcus Island through trusteeship agreements designating those islands as strategic areas.” The document became SWNCC 249/1 the next day.

Although the trusteeship system was still being discussed in early 1946, there were many individuals in the U.S. government, particularly in the military, who doubted whether a trusteeship would be able to safeguard U.S. strategic interests. Moreover, there were oth-
The Peace Treaty and Island Disposition

ers, such as those in the State Department, who thought it unwise to place Japanese ter-

ritory under U.S. control following a peace treaty as it would damage the prestige of the

United States by making it look like it sought to acquire territory. These concerns would

continue over the following year and as a result, although the United States successfully

submitted its request for a strategic trusteeship over the Japanese Mandated Islands with

the United States as the sole administering authority after the trusteeship agreement was

approved on 2 April 1947, it did not submit a request for trusteeship over the Nanpo and

Nansei Islands at this point.

The military, nevertheless, continued to view the Bonin Islands as strategically impor-

tant. In a report prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on “Strategic Areas

and Trusteeships in the Pacific,” the Nansei and Nanpo Islands were described as “vital . . .
as regards our need and our ability to deny them to a future potential enemy. In short, the

Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto are areas which must be denied to any enemy to prevent

his harassing our own vital line of communications, which can be maintained only by un-

questioned strategic control in the former Mandates.”

JCS 1619/1, a report prepared by the joint staff planners in collaboration with the Joint

Strategic Survey Committee and dated 24 May 1946, explained the thinking further in

paragraphs 11 and 12:

11. The keystone upon which the entire U.S. base system in the Pacific, as approved

by JCS 570/40, is built is the assumption that all Pacific islands formerly un-
der mandate to or sovereignty of Japan, less Formosa and the Kuriles, will be

brought under U.S. exclusive control. Such strategic control can be gained ei-

ther by acquisition of sovereignty or by being granted a United Nations trustee-

ship, in which the United States is the sole administering authority, over these

territories, collectively or severally.

12. The purpose of U.S. strategic control over the subject Pacific islands is twofold:
a) to provide for the establishment of military bases thereon, considered neces-
sary for the security of the United States; b) to prevent the military utilization

of these territories by any other nation. The most positive means of ensuring

the fulfillment of these two objectives would be for the United States to acquire

sovereignty over the subject islands. The United States, however, is committed

to promoting the principles of the United Nations, and, in all instances where

applicable and where it will not seriously affect her security, should offer for

trusteeship those former Japanese islands which she now controls.

The same report stated that a trusteeship for the Nanpo Shoto,

under sole U.S. administration, with the Volcanos and Bonin Islands designated as

a strategic area would be preferable from the military point of view; although the

designation of only the island of Iwo Jima as a strategic area would be acceptable. (em-
phasis added) There would be no objection to continued Japanese sovereignty over

the Izu Islands, even to include Sofu Gan to the southward, if they be permanently

demilitarized. Marcus Island, being uninhabited and, as far as is known, without

economic value, should be acquired under full sovereignty of the United States.
1619/1 goes on to explain that

The Bonin-Volcano Islands are designated in JCS 570/40 as a secondary base. However, except for possible air warning installations, Iwo Jima of the Volcanos group (southernmost) is the only island intended for military base development. This position protects the primary base in the Marianas. Of the Nanpo Shoto, the Bonins (Ogasawara Gunto) and Volcanos (Karzan [sic] Retto) are sparsely populated by natives of British, American, and Hawaiian origin, descendants of an early whaling colony, whereas the Izu Island (northernmost) natives are of Japanese stock. Except for Iwo Jima, only the first objective of paragraph 12 [see above] must be attained in the Nanpo Shoto. However, because of the British and American origin of the inhabitants of the Bonins and Volcanos, it does not appear that there could be any question of their mistreatment by an American administration and because of the sparseness of the population, their preparedness for independence is not foreseeable in the future. Thus, a U.S. trusteeship over the Nanpo Shoto, with the Volcano and Bonin Island groups designated as strategic areas, appears the preferable solution from the military viewpoint, but the strategic area could be reduced to only the island of Iwo Jima, if necessary, and still be acceptable. Moreover, the United States has no particular military interest in the Izu Islands, and, because of their geographical and cultural nearness to Japan, these could be left demilitarized under that government, if such action appears propitious.56

After some revisions, JCS 1619/4 was approved on 27 June and submitted to SWNCC for its consideration. A few days earlier, the State Department had completed its own study, “Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan,” and submitted it to SWNCC, where it became “SWNCC 59/1.” The State Department paper concluded that “The Japanese Mandated Islands, and Marcus and the Bonin and Volcano Islands, should be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations as soon as practicable, with the United States as administering authority” and that “separate trusteeship agreements should be prepared for the Japanese Mandated Islands as one unit and for Marcus and the Bonin and Volcano Islands as another unit.”57 It further recommended that

These islands have been under the full sovereignty of Japan. The United States as military occupant should draft the terms of trusteeship, and should consult with the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China as the co-acceptors of the Japanese surrender, and with France, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands in view of their participation in the war and their security interests in the region. The United States should seek the concurrence of these states in the terms of trusteeship and in the proposal that the “states directly concerned” referred to in Article 79 of the Charter should be defined as narrowly as possible, and preferably should be limited to the United States alone. It would be particularly important to secure the concurrence of the co-acceptors of the Japanese surrender in the event approval of the trusteeship agreement is sought prior to the negotiation of a peace treaty with Japan.58

The JCS reviewed the State Department’s paper, and while it was satisfied with the recommendations for the Nanpo Islands, it was extremely concerned about those for the Nan-
sei Islands (which were to be left with Japan) as well as the Mandated Islands, which would become a strategic trusteeship but the United States would not be granted sovereignty over them. The disagreements would necessitate the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee on Trusteeship Agreements under SWNCC in July, which would continue its discussions through the fall.

The JCS arguments used in the committee for the need for control over the Ryukyus, Ogasawara, and Marcus Islands could be summarized as follows:

The wholly essential strategic control that has now been obtained in the ex-Japanese Mandates does not make control in the Ryukyus, Nanpo Shoto, and Marcus any less necessary. On the contrary, lack of control in these places would depreciate the value of our Mandates position. Our security status in the Mandates is so vital that, in all consistency, we must protect that area by advanced bases in the direction of the most probable future danger if we are to provide the cushion in time and distance that will be more than ever essential in future war.

Eventually, President Truman said, in a statement to the press at the time of the release for publication of a “Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands,” that the United States “is prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese islands for which it assumed responsibility as a result of the second World War.” However, with the exception of the U.S. government’s moving ahead with the trusteeship arrangements for the Mandated Islands (following the 2 April 1947 approval of the Security Council and its going into effect in July that year), Truman did not make a decision at this point on the final disposition with regard to the Nansei and Nanpo Islands, which unlike the Mandated Islands, were clearly Japanese territory.

Before considering how that issue was later resolved and Japanese responses to the possibility it would lose some of its historic territory, it is important to briefly look at a couple of other decisions made in these years (1945–46) regarding the Bonin Islands that would affect U.S. policy and bilateral relations with Japan for two decades afterward, namely banning the return of the islanders and the later exception made for those of Western descent.

**The U.S. Decision**

Shortly after the end of the war, the U.S. government decided to prohibit the return to the islands of civilians evacuated to mainland Japan during the spring and summer of 1944 by the Japanese government. This decision was made on 7 November 1945, in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, an executive body created in 1944 to coordinate policy in Washington, DC, between the State Department and the Army and Navy.

SWNCC based its decision, formalized in the document SWNCC 240/1, on the lack of local resources to support a civilian population and the desirability of continuing unrestricted military use of the islands. On 1 December 1945, it communicated its decision to the commander-in-chief, Pacific, located at Pearl Harbor. This decision was reflected in the Navy’s official military government policy toward the Bonin Islands, announced shortly
after that on 12 December 1945, in a directive from the commander-in-chief, Pacific/Commander in Chief Pacific Ocean Areas.  

One month later, on 29 January 1946, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) announced that it was limiting Japanese administration to the main islands of Japan and some smaller offshore islands, and that Okinawa, Amami, Izu, and the Bonin Islands, among others, would be placed under direct U.S. military government control. “The Imperial Japanese Government,” SCAPIN 677 stated, “is directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or administrative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any government officials and employees or any other persons within such areas.”

This move would come as a great shock to the islanders, one more in a list of many following their forced (but, wise) relocation by the Japanese government from the islands in 1944, and made them realize that action was necessary. Prior to this, because of the chaos of the immediate aftermath of the war, and the fact that many of the islanders were spread out in different parts of Japan, as well as those having served in the military were now starting to be repatriated, it was not until the early spring before they were able to take any concrete and unified action regarding their return. In April 1946, Yokota Tatsuo, Maeda Sadamu, and Okuyama Tadashi from Haha Jima submitted a petition to allow the return of 150 islanders, claiming that life on the mainland was difficult for them. According to Kikuchi Torahiko, the petitioners waited and waited, but they never received a response. Adding insult to injury, Kikuchi writes, was the fact that 129 islanders of Western descent were permitted later that year in October to return to Chichi Jima. “Although it made us angry,” he later wrote, “it also gave us some hope that we would be allowed to return as well.” Unfortunately, that would not happen for another two and a half decades causing the launch of a repatriation and island reversion movement in 1946, known initially as the *Ogasawarato Iwo Jima Hikiagesha Renmei* (League for Ogasawara and Iwo Jima Evacuees) and later as the *Ogasawara Iwo Jima Kikyo Sokushin Renmei* (League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation).

**Japanese Planning for a Peace Treaty**

Around this time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Foreign Ministry) Research Bureau (*Chosa Kyoku*) had completed a study on how the Bonin Islands came to be Japanese territory, referencing both foreign and Japanese historical works. While considered “confidential” in nature, it did not recommend any specific policy options at this point.

The report was part of Japanese plans for the future peace treaty, which began about two months after the signing of the Instrument of Surrender. The Foreign Ministry, as the agency in charge of relations with the occupation authorities, took the lead in preparing studies on the significant issues likely to emerge in the treaty or during the discussions leading up to it. One of those issues was the territorial one.

The Japanese government realized it would lose its former colonies and mandated islands, but it hoped—or assumed—that its own territory, including the outer islands, would remain intact. It carefully studied previous statements by the United States and other Allies to see what the policies with regard to Japan's territory were for any clues on which to confirm this view.
After meetings with the top leadership within the Foreign Ministry in November 1945, the respective study groups began their work in early 1946 and continued through the year. The Foreign Ministry was unsure, however, how receptive SCAP and the Allies would be to a Japanese statement of its views on the territorial issue. As a result, it sought to test the waters by having the Research Bureau conduct “scientific” studies on the territorial problems and submit the results to SCAP.\(^71\) Yoshida Shigeru, who was both foreign minister and prime minister at this time, recalled that,

> It was necessary for [American] leaders to be put in possession of all the facts concerning postwar Japan and for those facts to be presented in a form that would make them comprehensible to the U.S. authorities in Washington, who were still ignorant of many problems. Especial pains were taken in compiling data concerning such integral parts of Japan as Okinawa, Ogasawara . . . alike from the historical, geographical, racial and economic points of view, and . . . explained in detail the circumstances that made them an integral part of Japan. The material thus presented in regard to the territorial question alone filled seven volumes.\(^72\)

One of these studies was of the Bonin Islands, which was completed that summer. Unfortunately, for reasons unclear, it still remains classified today by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.\(^73\) It is not certain if it was presented that spring or summer to the U.S. side.

Another more important memorandum was prepared by Vice Minister Okazaki Katsuji in mid-July 1947, which called for the Allies to recognize the islands as Japanese territory while proposing a “modus operandi” if they were viewed as necessary for security arrangements: “As to these islands, it is hoped that, in view of the historical and economic relations in the past, they are also allowed to remain as Japanese territory. In regard to such parts thereof as would be strategically required by the Allied Powers as in the case of the Okinawa Islands, it would be possible to make appropriate arrangements in a similar manner.”\(^74\) Namely, as with the Okinawan and Sakishima islands, the paper stated,

> Should areas . . . be required by the Allied Powers from the strategic point of view, it would fully be possible to make such arrangements with the Japanese government as would adequately meet their requirements. The desire on the part of Japan is only to see a modus operandi so devised that she is entrusted with the common affairs of administration of the inhabitants such as education, economy and culture—a measure which would naturally conform with the racial and historical background.\(^75\)

Essentially, the Okazaki Memo suggested an arrangement with the Allies that granted them use of bases and facilities on the islands but allowed Japan to keep both administrative rights and sovereignty over them. Although this memo was not presented to the U.S. side at this point, it paralleled later thinking in the United States on this question, particularly for Okinawa, but also for the Bonins.

A few days after this memorandum was prepared, the State Department issued invitations for an early peace treaty conference in Washington, DC. This was prompted by a 17 March pronouncement by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at an on-the-record luncheon at the Foreign Correspondents Club of Japan that an early peace was necessary.\(^76\) As a result, the Japanese government decided to prepare a summary of its treaty expectations
to relay to the United States and Allies. This study, known as the Ashida Memorandum, was completed on 24 July and submitted to MacArthur’s political advisor, George Atcheson, and Major General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Government Section. The memo first noted “it is expected that the peace settlement will be made in accordance with the established principles of international law. We trust that the spirit of international equity and fair play which pervades the Atlantic Charter will be made the guiding spirit of the peace settlement with Japan.” Regarding territorial questions, the memorandum stated that “the Potsdam Declaration leaves to the Allied Powers the disposition of the minor islands adjacent to the four principal islands of Japan. It is desired that in the determination of their territorial status full consideration will be given to the historical, racial, economic, cultural, and other relations existing between these islands and Japan proper.” It did not specifically mention the Bonin Islands, but the desire for their retention by Japan was very much implied.

Because of continuing hostility of the Allied Powers toward Japan, the Ashida Memo was returned by Atcheson and Whitney for fear that some Allies would be angered by Japan presenting its requests. It was another three-and-a-half years before the United States was prepared to listen on behalf of the Allies to Japan’s concerns on territorial matters.

U.S. Peace Treaty Planning

Parallel to the Foreign Ministry’s study of the issues related to the peace treaty, the State Department was preparing an early draft of the peace treaty in time for the treaty conference scheduled for August. Eventually, one, written largely by Hugh Borton, was ready on 5 August 1947, and was submitted to other offices in the State Department and to the military for review and comment.

Peace treaty preparations had been in the works for almost a year. Regarding the disposition of the Nanpo Shoto, the draft being formulated reflected the JCS view that the islands should be separated from Japan. A November 1946 treaty working group memo, for example, stated,

No valid reason can be perceived why, considering the recently announced decision with regard to the Mandates, the Department should not agree to the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Nanpo Shoto (the Bonin and Volcano Islands), except for the Izu Islands as far southward as Sofu Gan which would be demilitarized and left with Japan, and Marcus Island, should be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations as strategic areas under sole U.S. administration. Announcement of this decision, also, should be made at the first suitable opportunity.

A mid-March 1947 draft of the peace treaty had the Bonin Islands separated from Japan. A subsequent draft, prepared in time for the planned hosting of an Allied conference in August in Washington to discuss the Japanese peace treaty, stated that although the Ryukyu Islands would be retained by Japan, the Bonin Islands and islands south of Sofu Gan would not. In the end, the peace treaty conference was not held, and a review of U.S. policy took place led by George F. Kennan, director of the newly created policy planning staff, and by others in the department and Pentagon.
One critically important opinion emerged from the legal office of the State Depart- ment in a December paper that looked at the question of “the extent to which U.S. policy objectives in Japan could be accomplished in the absence of a treaty of peace.” Dr. Ruth E. Bacon, a legal expert with experience in Far Eastern policy matters, argued that “the objective of detachment of the Bonin and Volcano Islands from Japan with a view to their being placed under United States strategic trusteeship . . . could not be attained directly.” She added that the objective could, however, be substantially attained indirectly. The islands could not be legally detached from Japan nor could the United States ask for a trusteeship over the islands prior to the conclusion of a peace treaty. The islands in question are now oc- cupied [sic] by United States forces under CINCFE Command. Our forces could continue to remain in occupation, and this Government could take steps to make it clear that it was our intention to remain in control of the islands.

As a result of the review, which included Kennan making a near one-month trip to Ja- pan in February-March 1948, a decision on the final disposition of the islands was put off until a future peace treaty. The treaty itself was delayed for several years until a consensus was reached between State and Defense to proceed with one.

In the meantime in the spring of 1950, in order to ensure bipartisan support for the treaty, John Foster Dulles, a leading Republican foreign policy specialist, was appointed advisor to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, and subsequently as special ambassador. Following a trip to Japan in the summer and discussions between the State and Defense Departments in the summer, an agreement was worked out on the desirability of proceeding with negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty and the general principles for it on 4 Sep- tember. One of the principles regarded territory, and it stated that “Japan would . . . agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonins.” These principles were later distributed to the Allies, being announced officially on 14 Sep- tember, and known as the Seven Points of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The recommendations prepared by Acheson and Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and known as NSC 60/1, “Japanese Peace Treaty,” were submitted to the president on 7 Sep- tember. Truman approved it the next day. On 11 September, Dulles had a draft treaty prepared that stated, Japan would agree to the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947, extending the trusteeship system, with the United States as the adminis- tering authority, to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan. The United States will also propose to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the administering authority, the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island, and pending affirmative action on such proposal the United States will have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory of these islands.

With this in hand, Dulles and his assistant, Japan specialist John M. Allison, undertook discussions with the Allies. They also took the draft with them to Japan in January 1951.
Not everyone within the State Department was satisfied with the territorial clause, however. The Office of Far Eastern Affairs was concerned about the territorial provision, as was the political advisor's office in Tokyo, particularly as it related to Okinawa and the Bonin Islands. William J. Sebald and his staff, for example, writing from Tokyo, argued,

The Mission regards the deep-seated and widespread opposition of the Japanese people to the cession of such outlying island possessions as the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Kuriles as a political factor of primary importance which cannot be over-looked in our approach to the problem of a Japanese peace treaty. More specifically, the Mission believes that the long-term importance of this factor imposes upon the United States and the nations associated with it an obligation at least carefully to explore the feasibility of territorial provisions which, while allowing the retention of effective control over such areas as may be directed by security considerations, would avoid the appearance of an outright alienation of sovereignty from Japan, with a consequent rise of irredentism of considerable and possibly dangerous proportions.\(^87\)

Several in the State Department agreed with Sebald's concerns and eventually Acheson supported the revision of the territorial portion of the treaty as it related to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, stating that they “would be returned to Japan provided that the provisions of any military security arrangement apply to these territories in the same manner as to Japan proper.”\(^88\) Acheson requested the JCS's views on this on 18 December, and the JCS in turn asked for MacArthur's comments. MacArthur, the leading advocate in separating Okinawa from Japan, responded,

Leaving the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands under Japan's sovereignty is highly objectionable from a military point of view. The Japanese are fully resigned to the loss of these areas as a penalty for waging war. They form a vital segment of our lateral defense line and our control thereof is formally established and universally recognized. It would be unthinkable to surrender control and render our use of these areas, fortified at United States expense, subject to treaty arrangement under Japanese administration. It would but be to transform strength to weakness without the slightest moral or legal reason for so doing.\(^89\)

The JCS responded to the State Department the same day pointing out they “strongly disagree to any relaxation of the terms” of U.S. policy with regard to the islands.\(^90\) The JCS went on to write that they “fail to perceive any reason for such a gratuitous concession,” and instead “consider that exclusive strategic control of those islands must be retained by the United States in order for us to be able to carry out our commitments, policies, and military plans in the Pacific in peace or war... The JCS, therefore, consider the proposed concession to be entirely unacceptable, and they firmly adhere to the minimum requirements of the pertinent approved U.S. policy as stated in NSC 60/1.”\(^91\)

The JCS views were repeated at a 3 January 1951, meeting with Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and Allison. There General of the Army Omar N. Bradley argued that the islands should be kept under U.S. strategic control and Japanese sovereignty “not restored.”\(^92\) The State Department representatives reluctantly agreed that “if this was the Defense Department’s position, it will do its parts in achieving this objective.”\(^93\)
Tokyo, Sebald was still unsatisfied with the results of the discussions in Washington and worried about their effect. “While agreeing with specifications regarding necessary control over [the] Ryukyu and Bonin Islands,” Sebald wrote, “I believe [the] same objective might be accomplished without unduly antagonizing Japanese public opinion, or doing violence to previous public commitments regarding no territorial acquisitions to resort to formula which, while allowing retention [of] effective strategic control over [the] Ryukyus and Bonins, would avoid appearances of outright and irrevocable alienations.”

In his role as special ambassador, it would be up to Dulles to balance the views of the State Department on the one hand, with those of the military and the Allies on the other.

**Peace Treaty “Negotiations” and Japan’s Requests**

Dulles and his staff arrived on 25 January in Tokyo to begin what he called “consultations” but which were in many ways “negotiations.” Two days before, a close confidante of Prime Minister Yoshida, Shirasu Jiro, called on Robert A. Fearey, a member of Dulles’ delegation who had arrived earlier, and warned Fearey that “transferring title” of Ryukyu and Bonin Islands from Japan “would be a serious mistake, greatly reducing the benefits which may otherwise derive from a treaty.” Shirasu added that because Japan was “prepared to give the U.S. all required military rights there for as long as necessary,” the people of Japan would not “understand why these peacefully acquired islands, populated, as they consider, by people as Japanese as any other, should be taken from them. Such action would be a continual source of bitterness shared by himself and other educated Japanese no less than by the masses.”

Fearey did not need any convincing. Indeed, he himself had consistently recommended that basing arrangements, rather than the assumption of sovereignty over the islands, were enough to satisfy U.S. security interests.

As alluded to by Shirasu above, the Japanese government had arrived at a similar conclusion—namely by granting the United States base rights, Japan might be able to retain sovereignty over the islands. As explored in more detail in the author’s *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, the Foreign Ministry continued with its studies on the peace treaty despite the Allies’ initial criticism of such planning. By the end of 1950, the Japanese government was very much worried that the United States intended to place the islands under a trusteeship, and sought to get the United States to reconsider. A 27 December 1950 paper stated the Japanese government’s position in the following way:

According to point 3 [of the so-called Seven Principles], the Okinawa and Ogasawara islands are proposed to be placed under a U.S. trusteeship. We understand the military requirements of the United States and are prepared to meet the requests [of the United States] in any manner. However, the separation of these islands would be hard for the sentiments of the [Japanese] people to bear. We hope that this point will be reconsidered. This is a point to consider in order that both countries are able to build a close relationship in the future. How this problem [may or may not be] solved will likely be used by the Communist camp as a pretext to prevent the establishment of good relations. With this in mind, it should
be made clear at the earliest possible opportunity that points 3 and 4 [of the U.S. draft] are not intended to ignore the ideas of the Japanese people when deciding the stationing of troops in Japan and the disposition of the Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands.98

Yoshida received this paper on 28 December and his comments were incorporated into a new draft on 5 January. His revision included, “If it cannot be helped that the islands are to be placed under a trusteeship, we desire that the areas necessary for military purposes are limited to the greatest extent possible, that Japan can be a joint administrator, and that it is made clear that when the situation that necessitates a trusteeship no longer exists that these islands are to be returned to Japan.”99

A later version of the position paper included a separate document entitled “Measures to be Taken in the Case of U.S. Insistence on Trusteeships for Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands.” It began by stating that “If Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands are placed under a trusteeship, the permanent loss of these islands would likely be the most irritating thing to the people [of Japan]. In order to lessen this problem, the following measures are considered:

1. Limit the Duration of the Trusteeship

As an example, the former colony of Italy, Somaliland, is to be placed under trusteeship for a period of 10 years. After that, it is to be granted independence. In this way, limiting the number of years for a trusteeship is most desirable. If that is found to be difficult, the following phrase should be added: “These islands will be placed under trusteeship limited to the period which the situation requires.” When that situation disappears, the decision for the final status of the islands should be handled in accordance with Article 76 (listing the basic objectives of the trusteeship) and “the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned,” as is clearly defined in the trusteeship agreement (Article 76 [b]). There are no legal problems expected with this proposal since it is consistent with the provisions of the [UN] Charter. In addition, it would be prudent to secure a written understanding outside any agreement from the United States that these islands will be returned to Japan once the need for a trusteeship disappears.

2. Make Japan a Joint Authority

An example where a joint authority system exists for a trusteeship area is the case of Nauru Island in which Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand have joint authority. Moreover, Italy as an administering authority over Somaliland is an example where a former enemy state became [in 1950] an administrator. If Japan were to become joint administering authority with the United States, by being in an equal position with the United States, the sentiments of the [Japanese] people would be satisfied with regard to the [question of the eventual] reversion of the islands, the administration of the islands, the authority regarding the residents. (The idea for a joint authority was in fact mentioned by a State Department of-
Moreover concerning the citizenship of the residents, according to related parts of the Trusteeship System as established by the UN Charter, the residents would fall in a special situation. They would not receive citizenship of the administering country or countries, they would not receive United Nations citizenship, nor would they retain the citizenship of the country that the trust territory once belonged to [in this case Japan]. (According to precedent, they would have the citizenship of the trust territory.) It is stated that the administering authority would be responsible for diplomatic and other protection when the inhabitants of the trust territory travel outside the territorial limits. Therefore, it will be difficult to request that the inhabitants of the island be allowed to retain their Japanese citizenship.

In addition to the two main points listed above, we should request that the following points be considered concerning a trusteeship:

1. The relationship between these islands and the Japanese mainland should be allowed to continue as usual to the greatest extent possible. Above all the people of both areas [the mainland and the islands] should be allowed to travel back and forth freely, and for customs purposes, the islands should be considered a part of Japan.

2. The people of the islands of Ogasawara and Iwo Jima, brought to the mainland during the war by Japan and after the war by the U.S., should be allowed to return to their home islands.

The above paper was completed on 26 January. Yoshida later adopted these ideas into a presentation to Dulles’ delegation in the form of a memo entitled “Suggested Agenda” in English, and Wagakkenkai (Our Views) in Japanese that was forwarded to the U.S. side on 30 January. Regarding the territorial issues, the memo stated,

1. It is proposed that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands be placed under UN Trusteeship with the United States as administering authority. While Japan is ready to meet in any manner American military requirements, and even to agree to a lease under the Bermuda formula, we solicit reconsideration of this proposal in the interest of lasting friendly relations between Japan and the United States.

2. We ask that the following points be considered in the interest of the last American-Japanese friendship.

   A) It is desired that these islands will be returned to Japan as soon as the need of trusteeship disappears.

   B) They be allowed to retain Japanese nationality.

   C) Japan will be made a joint authority together with the United States.

   D) Those inhabitants of the Bonin Islands and Iwo Jima who were evacuated to Japan proper, either during the war by Japanese authorities, or after
war’s end by U.S. authorities, who number about 8,000, will be permitted to return to their respective home islands.  

Yoshida and Dulles met on 29 January, followed by a second meeting on the 31st. At a U.S. staff meeting on the 30th, Dulles told his group that while the U.S. government might reexamine the question of the disposition of Japanese islands, “it would do so for its own reasons” and the Japanese government would “not be allowed to re-open the issue since [it] agreed in the surrender terms to the limitation of their territories to the four main islands and such other islands as the Allies might determine.”  

Because of this, Dulles said he would tell Yoshida that the islands were not open for discussion.

At the same time, Dulles, like his State Department colleagues, was not convinced that the United States should place Japanese islands, especially Okinawa, under a U.S. trusteeship. He observed at the same meeting that there were aspects of the problem beyond those pertaining to the military, which had probably not been given sufficient discussion and that the United States should “give back what [it] could.” Others agreed with Dulles and suggested that the issue required high-level consideration. Dulles concurred and said they “should take up the question at home and not permit the Japanese to build a fire under us.”

As expected, Dulles took a hard line with Yoshida in the meeting on the afternoon of the 31st and “emphasized to Mr. Yoshida the undesirability of allowing a campaign about the [islands] to get under way.” He noted the following day at the staff meeting that Yoshida “seemed to accept this position” but in fact, as a colleague of Yoshida, Director of the Foreign Ministry’s Treaty Bureau (Joyakukyoku) Nishimura Kumao later recorded, the prime minister’s silence was more of shock than acquiescence.

Later, Dulles’ principal deputy Allison acknowledged the strong appeal of the Japanese desires. “We were deeply impressed by the Japanese plea for the restoration of the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands. While we could not grant their wishes at the time, I believe it was then that Dulles conceived the idea, which he later announced at the San Francisco Peace Conference, that Japan should retain residual sovereignty over the islands, but that they would be administered by the United States.”

Yoshida’s position was supported by public opinion polls conducted after Dulles’ trip to Japan. A Mainichi Shimbun poll asked, “What do you think of the report that the United States will control the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands Under a United Nations Trusteeship?,” to which 43 percent of pollees answered, “We hope they are returned to Japan,” and 42 percent said, “It can’t be helped but we hope they are returned to Japan after a certain period.” The results of this poll, that a large majority favored the islands’ immediate or eventual return to Japan, were a reflection of the attitudes that the State Department had been aware of for quite some time, as Sebald’s telegram six months prior had shown. Furthermore, on 2 June, both houses of the Diet passed resolutions calling for the return of Japan’s outer islands. This had followed numerous appeals by the heads of the respective political parties to Dulles during the latter’s trip to Japan in January-February.

In addition to Japanese requests, Dulles had to consider not only the opinions of the State Department and Congress (some of whose members felt the United States would be vulnerable to “charges of imperialism”), but also the requirements of the U.S. military. In
addition, Dulles also had to consider the views of the Allies, all of whom were distrustful of Japan and believed that the United States should not only retain a presence in the area through trusteeships and other arrangements but also, in the case of New Zealand, that “Japan should be specifically required to renounce sovereignty over the Ryukyus, Bonins, and the Volcano and Marcus Islands.” On the other side of the equation, there were also nominal “Allies,” such as the Soviet Union, who would likely oppose any attempts to strengthen the U.S. security position in the region and place Japanese territory under a trusteeship. It was with all of these competing ideas and interests that Dulles had to work out a formula for the so-called Article 3 islands for the peace treaty.

During a trip to the United Kingdom, Allison explained to his British counterparts that the United States “did not want to annex the islands . . . [but] regarded a United Nations trusteeship as a headache.” He added that the U.S. government thought at “some time sovereignty might be returned to the Japanese” and thus “may” was used in the following draft when discussing proposing a trusteeship.

The United States may propose to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the administering authority, the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela, and Marcus Island. Japan will concur in any such proposal. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters. [Emphasis added]

After reviewing the U.S. treaty draft, Robert H. Scott, undersecretary of the British Foreign Office, in an expression of the distrust of the British toward Japan, cautioned Allison against “leaving points of friction with the Japanese . . . [or] trusting them too much.”

A joint U.S.-U.K. draft, based on “Commonwealth thinking,” was prepared in April. Close to the final version that appeared in the peace treaty, it removed “may” from the earlier U.S. draft and instead stated “Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority.” Importantly, Japan was not required to renounce sovereignty over the islands, as had been requested by some of the Commonwealth countries. (The United Kingdom continued to feel that Japan should be required to renounce sovereignty over the islands as well, but decided that the issue was “essentially an American one” and decided not to pursue it further in favor of other more pressing issues.)

Japan noticed that unlike the clauses for Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, the Mandated Islands, the Kuriles, and other territories, the March and April drafts “did not require that Japan renounce sovereignty” over the Nansei and Nanpo Islands. This point was emphasized by the U.S. side as well in April during Dulles’ visit (following MacArthur’s dismissal), and gave the Japanese government some measure of hope. During a trip to Japan in June, Allison told the Japanese side that Dulles “had ‘stood firm and successfully’ for a non-restrictive, non-punitive, and liberal treaty” during the talks in London, which “visibly pleased” Yoshida.
Another thing that probably pleased Yoshida was an exchange he had with Allison a couple of weeks later on 28 June when the prime minister decided to make some requests of the U.S. side regarding the nationality of the islanders. The day before, Yoshida had told Vice Minister Iguchi Sadao (later ambassador to the United States) that “he wanted to see the nationality of Japanese in the trusteeship areas (namely, the Nansei and Nanpo Islands) be kept the way it is (i.e., that they be allowed to retain Japanese citizenship),” and had him prepare a memorandum to give Allison. In the meantime, Yoshida raised the question of nationality of the islanders if the trusteeship were pursued and stated that he would like to see them retain Japanese nationality and be allowed to retain close economic connections with Japan. Allison explained that the question of the disposition of the islands was, as Dulles had pointed out earlier in the year, “only for Allied consideration,” the U.S. government is “willing [to] receive” the opinions of the Japanese government “regarding practical details,” and that he would be willing to receive any comments that the Japanese side had. Yoshida quickly responded that he would be able to furnish a memorandum prior to Allison’s departure. This was the memorandum that he had asked Iguchi to begin working on, having correctly anticipated the U.S. response.

The document was ready to be shown to Yoshida on 1 July, who reviewed it and made some minor additions. Most of it concerned the inhabitants (all 900,000 of them) in the Amami and Ryukyu Islands, but the memorandum also related to the Bonin Islands as well.

This is not intended as a request for modification of the principles stipulated in the peace treaty. Only in the hope that those principles may be put in force as smoothly as possible for desiderate of the Japanese government are submitted hereinafter for the consideration of the American government. The Nansei Archipelago, the Bonins and other islands have always been Japanese territory, inseparably tied to Japan proper; and their inhabitants are Japanese, the same in every respect as those of Japan proper. These islands in this regard differ fundamentally in character from the other areas placed under trusteeship following World War II. It is therefore desired that this special nature of the islands will be born in mind, and that in establishing a trusteeship the American government will avoid incorporating in the basic instruments, including the trusteeship agreement, any provision that might preclude the realization in future of Japanese aspirations.

(1) Status of the Inhabitants

The Japanese having their homes on these islands today number some 900,000. Practically all of them want to retain their Japanese nationality. And Japan desires to continue to treat these people as Japanese nationals. Actually there about 300,000 people from these islands, who reside in Japan proper, and of whom 100,000 are domiciled therein. These 300,000 people have stayed, without availing themselves of the opportunity offered them to return their home islands following the war’s end, simply because they want to remain as Japanese. There are also some 50,000 people from these islands, who are living in third countries. They have gone out as Japanese, and a great majority of them desire to remain Japanese.
(2) Economic relations

It is desired that the economic bonds that have subsisted hitherto between Japan proper and these islands will not be arbitrarily cut off. Accordingly, it is desired that the trade between Japan proper and these islands be allowed to go on as “frontier trade (kokkyo boekiteki no mono)” free of all custom duties on either side. As far as Japan is concerned, this is the arrangement currently in force under the Law in effect as from May 1, 1951. (See Note. [author has chosen not to include it here]) It is hoped that it will be made a principle not to impose any trade restrictions and a free movement of capital be permitted as far as possible. It is also desired that the freedom of capital be permitted as far as possible. It is also desired that the freedom of coastal fishing and the use of coastal fisher bases be mutually recognized, as well as the freedom, in principle, of travel and movements of ships either way.

(3) Cultural Relations

At present these islands are permitted to carry on the education of children according [to] the Japanese school system and curricula with a view to enabling them to enter high schools in Japan proper. It is desired that this education policy be continued after the establishment of trusteeship, and that Japan proper and these islands be allowed to recognize mutually corresponding study courses, graduation qualifications, and public examinations of various kinds in connection with advancing to higher institutions or obtaining employment.

(4) Bonins and Iwo Jima Resettlement

Some 8,000 inhabitants of the Bonins and Iwo Jima were forced to evacuate to Japan proper during and after the war. These people have not yet been permitted to return to their home islands. In view of their ardent desire to go back to their native islands, the American government is requested to consider their resettlement at their earliest possible date.122

Allison forwarded it to Dulles that same evening for his consideration.

The same time Allison was meeting with Yoshida, Dulles was back in Washington calling on Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall to get the support of the Defense Department on Japan being allowed to retain sovereignty over the islands. The JCS had been concerned about the formulation of the territorial clause and reemphasized their strategic interests in the islands by stating in their comments on the joint U.K.-U.S. draft that “for reasons of national security the United States must retain absolute control of the former Japanese islands . . . at least until favorable action is taken by the United Nations on the United States for a strategic trusteeship.”123 In order to convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the arrangement would meet their security concerns, Dulles argued that the phrase that the United States would have the right to “exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction” complied with the provision that the treaty “should secure...
to the United States exclusive strategic control.” Eventually, the JCS acquiesced, but in doing so they would do everything they could to maintain the status quo in both the Nansei and Nanpo Islands.

On the other hand, Dulles and the State Department were somewhat hopeful that the islands would be left with Japan not only in name but in fact as well and would pursue this course, albeit unsuccessfully, in the months following the peace treaty. This view was reflected in a telegram sent from Dulles to Sebald in early August where he asked the political advisor to explain to the Japanese government that flexible arrangements and interpretations were possible for the islands. Dulles added that the question of the final arrangements for them would be for later consideration by the United States, based on a study of the islands and administration, likely to be conducted between the signing of the peace treaty and its ratification. Dulles also asked Sebald to reemphasize that the “treaty grants Yoshida’s plea to me that Japanese sovereignty should not be renounced.”

Dulles’ telegram was particularly timely, as public attitudes and the critical voices among the opposition parties in Japan toward the territorial provisions had the potential to threaten overall support for the treaty, the draft of which had been published on 10 July. Yoshida was expected to go before the Diet in mid-August, prior to his trip to San Francisco, to explain the government’s views. The Foreign Ministry was charged with drafting the speech, and wanting to calm the fears and anger that the islands would be stripped from Japan, hoped that Dulles would allow Yoshida to state directly that Japan was not surrendering sovereignty over the islands. It prepared a translated draft of the relevant section and shared it with Richard B. Finn, who worked with Sebald in the political advisor’s office. Sebald in turn forwarded it to Dulles for his comments, and after receiving them, Sebald’s office worked with the Foreign Ministry to refine the draft, which Yoshida read before the 11th Extraordinary Diet session on 16 August:

In Chapter II there are provisions concerning the disposition of certain territories. In this connection we must bear in mind that Japan unconditionally accepted the surrender terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the four main islands “and such minor islands as we determine.” There is, therefore, no room for Japan to seek a change in these terms. However, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, while Japan is to renounce all right, title, and claim to the territories listed in Article 2, it is not specifically so stated in Article 3 which provides for the disposition of the Nansei Islands and other southern islands. This wording of Article 3 is deemed not without significance in that residual Japanese sovereignty remains. The flexible provisions of Article 3 leave room for us to hope that subject to strategic control by the United States in the interest of international peace and security some practicable arrangements might be worked out to meet the desires of the inhabitants of these islands concerning intercourse with the homeland of Japan, nationality status of inhabitants, and other matters.

Yoshida’s speech, however, did not really mollify the concerns that the Japanese public and the islanders had with the treaty’s territorial provisions. Protests in the Amami Islands, including hunger strikes, greatly angered Dulles, who called, in his meeting with Yoshida in
San Francisco on the eve of the conference, such incidents “shocking . . . when it has already been said that the islands would be considered as a part of Japanese territory.” Dulles went on to point out to Yoshida that

America is to administer the . . . islands because of their strategic necessity—they are not to become our territory. It is exactly as I have often told you. It is clear that not only sovereignty will be left with Japan but other arrangements as well [can be worked out]. We want to think more about how it will be possible to realize the desires and requests you have made concerning allowing the inhabitants to keep their Japanese nationality. The demonstrative movements, like the hunger strike, put the United States in a very difficult position. America is not going to take your wealth. The United States did not place any restrictions on Japan's maritime transportation or other economic relations [with the islands]. The United States has taken into consideration many other things on behalf of Japan. The American people will not accept nor understand the demonstrations by the Japanese people. We hope for some self-restraint by the Japanese now.

Yoshida told Dulles he felt that the delegation had understood and accepted the provisions and would support the treaty, but it was clear that more than ever both governments would have to try to seek an agreement on “practicable arrangements” after the peace treaty conference.

At the outset of the conference, Dulles observed that the treaty with Japan was meant to be a “step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war-victory-peace-war,” that the countries gathered would be making “a peace of justice, not a peace of vengeance,” and then explained the provisions of the treaty to the assembled delegates. When explaining Article 3, the text of which is below, he noted that Japan would have “residual sovereignty” over the Article 3 islands, as they came to be known, although the provision itself did not include the phrase.

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

At the end of the conference prior to Japan's signing, Yoshida described the treaty as “an instrument of reconciliation” and “fair and generous.” However, he pointed out that that there were “certain points which cause us pain and anxiety,” and explained he would be “remiss in my obligation to my own people if I failed to call your attention to these points.”

One of them was the matter of territorial disposition. Yoshida expressed gratitude for the recognition of Japan's residual sovereignty yet added, “I cannot but hope that the administration of these islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not distant future with the reestablishment of world security—especially the security of Asia.”
A Practicable Arrangement Formula

The treaty was eventually ratified by the Lower House in the Diet on 26 October, and by the Upper House on 18 November. A few weeks later Dulles arrived in Japan for further talks, primarily on the China question—the desire that Japan recognize the Republic of China government on Taiwan and not the communist one on the mainland. Taking advantage of Dulles’ visit, the Foreign Ministry developed its own proposal for a “practicable arrangement” for the treaty islands on 10 December, the same day Dulles landed at Haneda, and submitted it along with a one-page introductory statement on 13 December. The statement explained that Japan was “most grateful that the Peace Treaty leaves the . . . islands as Japanese territory and their inhabitants as Japanese nationals. We understand that the reason America wants to administer these islands lies in the military necessity for safeguarding the peace and security of the Far East. We earnestly hope that as far as this military necessity permits, the desire of the inhabitants will be considered” in the final disposition of the islands. Asking for America’s “sympathetic consideration,” the accompanying memorandum listed the following points:

1. The U.S. confirms that the Southern Islands remain under Japanese sovereignty and thus the inhabitants remain Japanese nationals.

2. The U.S. agrees to restoring the previous relationship between Japan proper and the Southern Islands as far as military requirements allow; in particular, the U.S. recognizes that the islands will be treated as a part of Japan with regard to moving and traveling between Japan proper and the islands, trade (no custom or duty imposed), financial transactions, fishing, monetary (the Japanese yen is to be the legal tender in the Southern Islands).

3. The U.S. admits that the Southern Islands are to be treated by Japan as a part of its territory in any economic, social, and cultural agreements or treaties the Japanese Government enters into. Japan will exercise its protective authority over the inhabitants of the islands who reside abroad or are to travel abroad and issue passports for them.

4. The U.S. declares its intention to permit self-rule of the inhabitants in matters of civil administration and to allow complete self rule in educational matters and juridical jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases among the inhabitants themselves.

5. The U.S. recognizes the property rights in those islands which belong to Japanese nationals in Japan proper and will facilitate the resumption of their business activities.

6. The U.S. abstains in favor of Japan from exercising administrative, legislative, or juridical powers over the inhabitants of islands which it does not presently see any military necessity to administer.

Dulles apparently willingly accepted the proposal, implying he would give it his consideration. The next day in a speech before a joint meeting of the American and Japa-
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Dulles reemphasized his hopes for a fair arrangement to be worked out: “Residual sovereignty in the islands was left with Japan due to the strong desire of Japan. We hope and believe that a future administration of these islands can be worked out in a friendly way which will combine the natural desires of the inhabitants with the requirements of international peace and security.”

Sebald’s office found the Foreign Ministry’s memorandum to be “further evidence of the strong pressure in Japan for action which will clarify the relation of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands to Japan and clear the way for eventual restoration of the islands to Japan.”

Sebald and his staff felt that the “close relations between Japan and the Nansei and Nanpo Islands along the lines” of the ministry’s memorandum “should be encouraged and facilitated by the United States,” and noted that even MacArthur’s successor, Commander-in-Chief, Far East, General Matthew B. Ridgway, believed that “security protection could be adequately obtained by arrangements similar to those embodied in the Security Treaty with Japan without involvement in any form of exclusive control by the United States.”

However, the JCS discounted Ridgway’s views, countering that “strategic control of the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto has been and continues to be vital to the security interest of the United States” with “the necessity for such strategic control . . . greater now than ever.” As such, the JCS recommended that “no change in United States policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East.”

Nevertheless, the State Department was not about to give up. On 24 March 1952, Acheson asked the new assistant secretary of state, Allison, to confirm if the interested offices still believed the United States should not seek a trusteeship for the Ryukyus and Bonins, but instead pursue bilateral arrangements with Japan “for the return of the islands to Japanese control” conditioned on the United States “retaining control over such military facilities therein as are deemed essential by the JCS.”

Allison confirmed this and laid out the department’s view of the issue in the following way in a memorandum a week later:

Such an arrangement with regard to the Ryukyus and Bonins would not only remove a potential major irritant in United States-Japanese relations but would also relieve the United States of a burden of administrative and financial responsibility for an area and population historically tied to Japan and wholly Japanese in outlook. At the same time, the arrangement would safeguard United States strategic interests in the islands by providing for the retention of military, naval and air installations and areas on a long-term basis . . . . The term would be specified rather than left indefinite as in the United States-Japan Security Treaty, and any special arrangements with the Japanese made necessary by the peculiarly strategic nature of these bases would be specifically included.

A meeting a few days later at the Pentagon with the JCS—in which the State Department was represented by Allison, Sebald, and Robert D. Murphy, soon to be sent to Japan as ambassador—proved inconclusive, agreeing only to set up a joint working group between officials of the State and Defense Departments.
Okinawa, but there was one exchange at the end that hinted at the way the Navy and JCS would attempt to maintain the status quo with regard to the Bonin Islands. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William M. Fechteler raised the issue of the Bonins by asking the level of political pressure for the islands' return. Sebald, who had just returned from Japan a month earlier, answered somewhat curiously and incorrectly that there was “no real pressure, it’s just sentimental.” When Fechteler emphasized that the “Bonins are of real value to the Navy,” Myron M. Cowen, a consultant to the secretary of state, countered that “a naval base does not go into the interior of the island.” Chairman of the JCS, General Omar Bradley, summarizing the concerns that the chiefs had with regard to Okinawa, the Amami Islands, and the Bonins, as well as his general unease about the status of the U.S. military in Japan after the peace treaty in general, asked rhetorically, “if you give back all places except a few, wouldn’t you be under pressure constantly to give up the rest[?]”

This would be a dilemma that challenged officials in the State Department who sought to return the islands in the interest of better U.S.-Japan relations and for the United States to avoid being labeled as territorial aggrandizers. Unfortunately, they were unable to convince the JCS to go along prior to the treaty’s going into effect on 28 April and would have to wait for discussions between the two departments to begin sometime afterward.

Several scholars of international law criticized the territorial clause of the treaty in later years, but it did not take a law specialist to realize that there would be many people disaffected by it, not only in the Bonins, but in Okinawa and Amami as well. In earlier writings, this author has positively appraised the compromise worked out, although, unfortunately, through a number of circumstances it would be nearly two decades before the Bonins and Okinawa were returned (Amami was returned in late 1953). The author’s praise for the 1951 compromise did not disregard the feelings of those who lost out, however temporarily, as a result of it. Nevertheless, the twin facts that there were people affected by Article 3 of the treaty and many in Japan were unhappy with it (despite the allowance of Japan to retain sovereignty) cannot be overlooked. This dissatisfaction would form the basis for the movement to see the islands returned, or at least, the islanders be permitted to return.

NOTES

1Their story is told in the second half of the book. For those from Iwo, see Nakamura, Iwoto: Mura wa Kieta; Ogasawarason, ed., Ogasawara Shoto Kyosei Sokai kara 50 Nen Kirokushi; and “Iwo Jima Mondai no Keika Gaiyo” [An Overview of the History of the Iwo Jima Problem], Ogasawara, no. 30 (March 1985).


3A secondary base area was that which is “essential for the protection of and/or for access to primary bases, and for the projection of military operations.” See Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 28, and JCS 570/40, “Over-all Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights, October 25, 1945,” Section 9, CCS 360 (12–9–42), JCS 1942–1945, Record Group 218, National Archives II, College Park, MD.
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7 Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 78.

8 Ibid., 122.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.


17 Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 49.


19 “T-323, Nanpo Shoto (Bonin and Other Islands), Japan, May 25, 1943.”

20 Notter, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 164; and Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 58.


22 Iokibe, ed., The Occupation of Japan, iv.


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25Blakeslee, for example, had written about the Mandates in one of the first issues of Foreign Affairs. See George H. Blakeslee, “The Mandates of the Pacific,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 1, no. 3 (September 1922): 98–115.

26Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, “CAC-304 Preliminary,” 2.

27“Memorandum of Conversation, Admiral Train and Captain Ruble with G. H. Blakeslee and H. Borton, October 18, 1944, 9:30–10:30 a.m.,” Annex A to IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 170, November 30, 1944,” in Iokibe, ed., The Occupation of Japan, Microfiche 2-B-151.

28Ibid. As mentioned in chapter 2, it appears that U.S. officials were not aware that most of the civilians had been evacuated by this point. Those that remained there began working for the military.

29IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 180, January 4, 1944,” in ibid., Microfiche 2-B-161.

30Ibid.

31IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 181, January 9, 1944,” in ibid., Microfiche 2-B-162.

32IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 182, January 11, 1944,” in ibid., Microfiche 2-B-163.

33Ibid.

34IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 184, January 17, 1944,” in ibid., Microfiche 2-B-165.

35IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 185, January 23, 1944,” in ibid., Microfiche 2-B-166.

36IDACFE, “Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 186, January 26, 1944,” in ibid., Microfiche 2-B-167.

37Ibid.

38“SC-102 (CC-41a), The Disposition of Certain Islands Controlled By Or Under the Sovereignty of Japan, April 17, 1945,” in Iokibe, ed., The Occupation of Japan, Microfiche 5-C-6.

39Ibid.


44Ibid.

166

46Ibid.

47Ibid.

48JCS 570/40. This view was reiterated in SWNCC 38/25, “Overall Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases, November 8, 1945,” which stated “the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific islands detached from Japan including the Bonins and the Ryukyus should be brought under exclusive United States strategic control.”

49Ibid.

50Ibid.

51Article 82 reads, “There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies, without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.”


53Ibid.

54Ibid.

55Ibid.

56Ibid.

57SWNCC 59/1.

58Ibid.

59SWNCC 59/3. For more on the disagreement between the State Department and the JCS on the Ryukyu Islands, see Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, chapter 4.

60“Memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy on Review of United States Control Needed over the Japanese Islands, September 13, 1947,” CCS 360 (9 December 1942), Section 30, Box 88, JCS 1942–1945, RG 218.

61SWNCC 59/8.

62According to Adm Radford, one of the reasons that the islanders of Western descent were relocated to mainland Japan away from Chichi Jima was that the Japanese garrison commanders believed that they were acting as spies for U.S. forces and communicating with them in some way. See Radford, *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam*, 259. This may not have been paranoia on the Japanese side. According to statements Fred Savory gave to interviewers later, he *did* try to contact U.S. naval craft. See “Home to Chichijima,” 19. He also told a newspaper writer in 1948, “Before the war I met several American naval officers on [Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet] Adm [Harry E.] Yarnell’s staff at the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo. I asked if I could talk with them in private and furnish intelligence information about the Bonins and their defenses. Although we’ve been Japanese nationals, we have never stopped considering ourselves Americans. Naturally my sympathies were with the United States all the time and I wanted to help out. But I never heard from the officers.”

63“Briefing Paper on Bonin-Volcano Islands for Secretary of Navy (January 1965),” Folder: Bonin

64Cited in Pesce, *Book I*, 27.

65The directive was labeled “CincPac-CinCPOA ltr ser 52855 (December 12, 1945),” cited in ibid., 26.

66SCAPIN 677, “Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, January 29, 1946.” Izu was placed under Japanese control again a couple of months later.


68Kikuchi, “Nanpo no Mon.”

69Ibid.

70Chosa Kyoku Dai San Ka, “Ogasawara Gunto, Iwoto Retto [The Ogasawara Group of Islands, Iwoto Islands],” 1–33.


73A Foreign Ministry Archives official said he could understand if the files on the contentious Northern Territories issue were not all available, but that it is “very strange” that this document on the Bonin Islands is still classified, when most of the other materials in the collection from that opening (7th Opening) are available. E-mail correspondence with Foreign Ministry records office official, 17 October 2007.


75Ibid.

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77“Achison Oyobi Hoittonii Shosho to Kaiken, Oboegaki Henkyaku no Ken” [Meeting with Atcheson and General Whitney and the Returned Document], Microfilm reel number B'-0008, Flash Number 3, Kowa Kankei Juyo Kaidan Kiroku [Records on Important Meetings Relating to the Peace Treaty], slides 0046-0050, DRO-MOFA. The English version of the memorandum lacks a date, title, and signature but has been called by one of the participants, “The Japanese Government’s Desires and Expectation [sic] Relative to the Peace Settlement.”

78For more on this exchange, see Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 132–34.

79“Memorandum on Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands, November 25, 1946,” located in NEA Micro C0044 reel 5 but attached to 1 October 1947, records of the State Department, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59), National Archives II, College Park, MD.


81“Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, August 5, 1947.”

82“Extent to which United States Objectives in Japan could be accomplished so far as Legal Considerations are Concerned in the Absence of a Peace Treaty (undated),” Roll 6, NEA files, RG 59.

83Ibid.

84Ibid.


90JCS 2180/2, “Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on United States Policy toward Japan, December 28, 1950,” ibid., 1391.

91Ibid.


93Ibid.

94“The U.S. Polad (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, January 6, 1951,” ibid., 786.

95“Memorandum by Fearey for Dulles and Allison, January 25, 1951,” ibid., 810–11.

96Ibid.

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98“D Sagyo Dares Shi Honichi ni Kansuru Ken [Project D-Concerning the Dulles Trip to Japan], December 27, 1950,” Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B’0009, Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Sagyo Kankei, 0158-0180, DRO-MOFA.

99“D Sagyo (Teiseiban) Dares Shi Honichi ni Kansuru Ken (Project D [Revised Version] Concerning the Dulles Trip to Japan), January 5, 1951,” Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B’0009, Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Sagyo Kankei, 0182-0217, DRO-MOFA.

100Nishimura, San Furanshisuko, 86–89.

101“Undated Memorandum on Suggested Agenda by the Prime Minister of Japan,” FRUS, 1951, 833–35.

102“Minutes-Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 31, 10:00 a.m.,” ibid., 838–40.


104“Minutes-Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 31, 10:00 a.m.”

105“Minutes-Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, February 1, 10:00 a.m.,” FRUS, 1951, 835–38.

106Ibid. For more on this exchange and the different perceptions, see Eldridge, The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 305–6.


111Ibid.


113“Memorandum of Conversation on the Japanese Peace Treaty by the Second Secretary.”

114“Editorial Note,” FRUS, 1951, 1021.


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118Diary entry for 15 June 1951, *Sebald Diary*.

119Nishimura, *San Furanshisuko*, 156.

120“Telegram 2261 from Sebald [Allison] to Secretary of State [for Dulles], June 28, 1951,” *FRUS, 1951*, 1163. Also see “1951 Nen 6 Gatsu Gogo no Sori Arison Koshi Kaidanroku [Memo-

121“Telegram 2261.”

122“Shintaku Tochi ni Kansuru Yosei [Request Concerning the Islands to be Placed under Trustee-
ship], July 2, 1951,” Flash Number 6, Reel Number B’0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, Daisanji Kosho kankei* (Daiikkan), DRO-MOFA, 0097-0108.


124“Memorandum Re Ryukyus by the Consultant to the Secretary [Dulles], June 27, 1951,” ibid., 1152–53.

125The JCS had also proposed two changes in the wording of the text, one minor and the other more substantive. The latter change included the word “sole” before “administering authority” in order to prevent any other nation, including Japan, from lawfully interfering in the control of the islands. For more, see Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, 317.

126“Secretary of State [Dulles] to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP, August 2, 1951,” *FRUS, 1951*, 1235.

127*(Draft of) Prime Minister’s speech (August 7, 1951),” Flash Number 8, Reel Number B’0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Oyobi Nichibei Anzen Hosho Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho Kankei*, DRO-MO-
FA, 095.


129Ibid., 191.


131“9 Gatsu 7 Nichi no Yoshida Sori no Judaku Enzetsu (Eibun)” [English Version of Prime Minis-

132Ibid.

133Ibid.

134“Nanpo Shoto ni Kansuru Jissaiteki Sochi Dares e no Teishutsu” [Practicable Arrangements for the Southern Islands {Proposal} Submitted to Dulles], December 10, 1951,” Flash Number 9, Reel Number B’0009, Daisanji Dares Raiho Kankei [Documents Relating to Dulles”Third Visit], DRO-
MOFA, 0029-0041.
“Nanpo Shoto ni Kansuru Jissaiteki Sochi Dares e no Teishutsu.”

“Letter from Dulles to Horo Izumi, December 18, 1951,” Chronological JFD November, December 1951(3), Box 3, JFD-JMA Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS.


Ibid.


Ibid.


“Memorandum from Assistant Secretary Allison to Secretary Acheson, March 31, 1952,” ibid.

“Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Held in Washington, April 2, 1952, 11 a.m.,” ibid.

Ibid., 1227. It is unclear why Sebald, who was strongly in favor of Okinawa’s return to Japan and worked hard in the direction while political advisor in Japan, took a less-than-enthusiastic view of Japanese desires to be repatriated to the islands. Having left Japan on 28 February, he may have been unaware of it, but the Foreign Ministry forwarded a petition from the League of Bonin Evacuees to SCAP on 5 March (Foreign Ministry letter no. 321/A5) requesting favorable consideration of their petition. Reading the letter, it is quite clear that the requests are more than just sentimental in nature. See “Letter from Foreign Minister Okazaki to Ambassador Murphy, June 23, 1952.”
Although geologically ancient, the islands have only been populated for about 170 years. Some excavations, however, indicate that they have had visitors since the Stone Age. This is Chichi Jima’s Futami Bay.

Mt. Suribachi, at the southern end of Iwo Jima, is the island’s most prominent feature.
In June 1853, the USS *Susquehanna* and *Saratoga* anchored in Port Lloyd on Peel Island (Chichi Jima). The expedition’s official artist, Wilhelm Heine, drew this view—titled “Natural Tunnel, Port Lloyd, Bonin Islands”—of caves around Futami Bay that was used in Commo Matthew C. Perry’s official report.

In 1853, Peel Island (Chichi Jima) was inhabited by people of many different origins, including Europe and the Kanakas (Sandwich islanders). This lithograph, by Wilhelm Heine, shows a Kanaka village in the background with expedition members and a local resident relaxing around a cascading stream.
Townsend Harris (3 October 1804–25 February 1878), a New York City merchant, was the first U.S. consul general to Japan and negotiated the Harris Treaty between the two countries. He is credited with opening the Japanese empire to foreign trade and culture in the Edo period.

In addition to playing a leading role in opening Japan to the West, U.S. Navy Commo Matthew Calbraith Perry (10 April 1794–4 March 1858) commanded six ships over his 49-year career. He served in the War of 1812 and Mexican-American War.

Hamilton Fish (3 August 1808–7 September 1893) is considered one of the best secretaries of state in U.S. history. He also served as the 16th governor of New York, a U.S. senator, and representative.
One of Perry’s “Black Ships,” possibly the side-wheel steam frigate USS Susquehanna, is shown during the commodore’s first landing at Kurihama, Japan, on 8 July 1853. The watercolor, painted by a Japanese artist of that period, is a portion of a scroll.

One panel of a silk-bound scroll by an anonymous Japanese artist depicts the American squadron led by Commo Perry entering the Bay of Edo (Tokyo) and Japanese boats sailing out to meet it. The American ships are deploying surveying boats with U.S. flags flying. The Japanese boats fly either a black and white flag, the imperial colors of the Tokugawa shogunate, or Hinomaru, the flag of the rising sun.
Adm Ernest J. King, center, visits the Marianas Islands on board the USS Indianapolis (CA 35) with Adm Chester W. Nimitz, left, and Adm Raymond A. Spruance on 18 July 1944.

Born into a lower class samurai family, Gen Kuribayashi Tadamichi (7 July 1891–c. 26 March 1945) was a haiku poet, diplomat, and officer of the Imperial Japanese Army. He commanded the Japanese garrison during the Battle of Iwo Jima.

Two days after Dinah Might’s arrival, 28 North American P-51 Mustangs of the Army Air Forces’ VII Fighter Command landed to begin long-range escort operations with the B-29s. Here, two of the fighters, one named My Girl, are directed to take off positions on Iwo Jima.
Marines landing on Iwo Jima encountered a beach of soft, black volcanic ash into which they sank ankle deep, making forward progress all the more difficult with their heavy packs. Here, the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, assault Beach Red 1.

Bodies of dead Marines were wrapped in a blanket or poncho and placed in a six-foot trench, three feet from those on either side. Each row, placed three feet apart, contained the bodies of 50 Marines.
Waves of assault craft approach the landing beaches along the southeastern shore of Iwo Jima, much of which is shrouded in smoke.

U.S. Marines cheer after raising the American flag on Iwo Jima. Four of the flag raisers (Bradley, Hayes, Sousley, and Strank) appear with their jubilant buddies. Strank, Sousley, and many of these boys would soon be dead.
Marines crowd around the first Boeing B-29 Superfortress—*Dinah Might*—to divert to Iwo Jima as a safe haven on the bombing route from the Marianas Islands to Japan. Its arrival on 4 March, as the fighting was still raging, was barely two weeks since the initial beach assault.

The Boeing B-29 Superfortress was the key to the air war against homeland Japan. This type, the longest ranging and largest of U.S. bombers, generated the fire storms, which devastated Japan’s major cities, and later dropped the nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Three Japanese soldiers emerge from their hiding place to surrender on 5 April 1945.

Iwo Jima literally proved to be the difference between life and death for many B-29 aircrews. This bomber was one of nine from the same 10 March 1945 mission over Tokyo to land on the island. None would have made it back to their home base.
The 4th Marine Division cemetery on Iwo Jima was located off the runway of Airfield No. 1.

Buried at the 5th Marine Division cemetery are some of the 4,189 U.S. Marines killed during the battle of Iwo Jima. The flag at half staff on 25 April 1945 is in tribute to the late President Roosevelt, who had died two weeks previously. Mt. Suribachi can be seen in the background.
Japanese Army LtGen Tachibana Yoshio (24 February 1890–24 September 1946) was commander of the Japanese troops in Chichi Jima, and held responsible for war crimes involving torture, extrajudicial execution, and cannibalism of Allied prisoners of war.

Japanese Army LtGen Tachibana Yoshio signs the surrender document on board the *Dunlap* off Chichi Jima. From left are U.S. Navy Lt David C. McMillion and Cdr John H. Magruder Jr., and behind Tachibana are Japanese officers LCdr Shinoda I., Maj Horie Y., Capt Sato J., and Capt Terasawa S.
The USS *Dunlap* (DD 384), shown in May 1942, was the scene of the Japanese surrender of the Bonin Islands.

Maj Horie Yoshitaka, shown here during the surrender ceremonies on the USS *Dunlap*, served under LtGen Kuribayashi Tadamichi and later LtGen Tachibana Yoshio on Iwo Jima.

John Foster Dulles (25 February 1888–24 May 1959) was U.S. secretary of state in the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration from 1953 to 1959.
A deceptive “school gate” and statue of a peasant boy were erected in front of communications facilities on Chichi Jima to deceive enemy aircrews into believing the buildings were a school.

Yoshida Shigeru (22 September 1878–20 October 1967) was a Japanese diplomat and politician who served as both foreign and prime minister of Japan from 1946 to 1947, and as prime minister from 1948 to 1954.

RAdm Charles A. Pownall (4 October 1887–19 July 1975) was the U.S. commander for the Marianas and governor of Guam, but also the deputy military governor for the Bonin Islands.
Adm Arthur W. Radford (27 February 1896–17 August 1973) was, in May 1951, commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. Previously he had served as vice chief of naval operations, and later, in 1953, became the second chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In 1958, the Navy built a five-room school named the Admiral Radford Elementary School.

View of the Admiral Radford Elementary School.
This view overlooking Chichi Jima’s Futami Bay features the area occupied by the former U.S. naval facility.

These coastal defenses were constructed beginning in June 1941 on Chichi Jima to defend Oki Port at Shizusawa.
Near the village of Kiyose are copper-lined vaults later used for nuclear weapons storage.

Chief of Naval Operations Adm William M. Fechteler, second from right, speaks with senior officers upon his arrival at Haneda Air Force Base, Tokyo, in July 1952. From left are Gen J. Lawton Collins, USA; commander of naval forces, Far East, VAdm Robert P. Briscoe, USN; Fechteler; and Commander in Chief, Far East Command, Gen Mark W. Clark, USA.
In February 1952, Buddhist priest Tsunezo Wachi, a former Japanese Navy captain, conducted ceremonies at the dedication of the peace monument at the base of Mt. Suribachi.

This bust of Fukuda Tokuyasu (13 October 1906–7 August 1993) honors the former chairman of the Ogasawara Association and Liberal Democratic Party Diet member.

The current monument atop Suribachi features the cast bronze 48-star U.S. flag.
In the early 1950s, these markers honored the Japanese soldiers who died in the Battle of Iwo Jima.

U.S. Marine Corps History Division
LtGen Victor H. “Brute” Krulak (7 January 1913–29 December 2008), as commander of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, was ultimately responsible for the Iwo Jima memorial, and approved the use of a cast bronze flag.

National Archives and Records Administration
U. Alexis Johnson (17 October 1908–24 March 1997) was a career diplomat with 42 years service who began working for the State Department in 1935. He was consul and later consul general at Yokohama, Japan, from 1945 to 1949. From then to 1953, he served in various positions in the Far East Bureau, focusing on Japan and Korea.
Among the first memorials on Iwo Jima was this relief carving based on Joe Rosenthal’s famous photograph. The nearly life-size work was carved into a cliff in July 1945 by PO1 Waldon T. Rich, USN, of the 31st Naval Construction Battalion using a bayonet as his primary tool.
In the wake of World War II, the United States occupied and administered the Bonin Islands from 1945 until 1968, when the islands were returned to Japan. While there is much literature on the occupation and administration of Okinawa, little exists on the occupation of the Bonin Islands, which met in many ways the same fate as the larger island group to the west.²

While the occupation was undertaken for strategic reasons, much like that over Okinawa, there were several differences in the way that the occupation and administration of the Bonin Islands was organized. First, unlike Okinawa, which was invaded and witnessed the start of military government amid a land battle, the direct administration of Bonins, which experienced no such invasion by U.S. ground troops, did not begin until 1951 with the placement of a full-time naval officer on the main island of Chichi Jima who wore two hats—officer in charge of the Navy’s facility and military government representative—just prior to the peace treaty conference in San Francisco. Second, the U.S. Navy was in charge and not the U.S. Army, as was the case in Okinawa for the period after 1 July 1946 until 15 May 1972, and Amami until 24 December 1953. Third, only those of Western descent and their spouses regardless of ethnicity and nationality were allowed to return to Chichi Jima. Former residents of Japanese descent were denied permission to return for more than two decades. Fourth, education and local government was undertaken in English and not in Japanese as in Okinawa and Amami.³ Finally, there was a strong, concerted yet unsuccessful effort made by high Navy officials to encourage the permanent separation of the islands from Japan and the adoption of U.S. citizenship by the islanders.

RETURN OF THE ISLANDERS OF WESTERN DESCENT AND THEIR EARLY LIVES BACK ON CHICHI JIMA, 1945–46

When the U.S. government decided in March 1946 to permit the return of 129 islanders of Western descent to Chichi Jima, it had been more than two years since they were first...
evacuated by Japanese forces to the mainland where they never did settle in. Indeed, it had been a particularly difficult period for them—with physical differences and without real roots on the mainland—amid the chaos before and following the end of the war.

“We had arrived from Chichi with what clothes we could carry and our bedding,” Miriam Robinson Savory told anthropologists Mary Shepardson and Blodwen Hammond for their unpublished study on the islands. Miriam stayed in Yokohama until the fire bombings of that city burned her and many others out of their dwellings and then they evacuated to the Sea of Japan and later Saitama Prefecture (near Tokyo). Another islander, “Uncle” Charlie Washington, remembered that the farmers were “sometimes . . . mean to us. They wouldn’t sell us anything.” Moses Savory corroborated his story: “We all had a hard time during the war. The farmers wouldn’t sell to us because we looked like foreigners.”

Rogers Savory spoke of having a hard time during the war due to his height. Working in the countryside after being evacuated to Japan, people were suspicious of him thinking he “had been dropped from a parachute.” His daughter, Lizzie Savory, then about 12 or 13 years old, described an incident in which her father was almost killed.

We didn’t have enough food. One day my father went to the country to buy food. An American airplane had been shot down the day before. Two crew members had parachuted out. One was captured but one escaped. The people were searching for him when my father came along. He was so tall they thought he was an airman. They stuck him with bamboo poles with sharpened ends . . . He was stuck in two places. They kept him in the police station for two days while they called the company he worked for. The company officials said he was a good man, a good worker. So the police apologized and let him go.

Washington mentioned an altercation with the police, who thought he and his fellow islanders, Fred and Jerry Savory, were spies because they were speaking English.

One of them asked me where I came from. “Chichi Jima,” I said. Then he said he’d never heard the name. “Well,” I says to them, “You fellows are way behind the door.” Kind of made me mad, you know, so I kind of insulted them. One man said, “There is no such place.” “Well,” I says, “Oh yes there is. You’re living in darkness. I’m telling the truth and now you want to contradict me.” Well, he scratched his head. “Never mind, that will do.” . . . I says to them, “You fellows don’t know your own country. You’re regular country people,” I says. I let everything right out. I did not hesitate at all. So then they looked up the map and found there was such a place. So then they put white arm bands on us, so nobody would bother us again.

These are just a sampling of the stories; there are many other similar personal accounts.

After the war, these bilingual men and women were in high demand by the occupation forces, working at hospitals, post exchanges (PXs), police stations, cemeteries, military installations, shops, recreation centers, and as house servants. They were better off in these positions than they had been for some time, but they still wished, understandably, to return to Chichi Jima.
In late 1945, some of the islanders of Western descent began to approach U. Alexis Johnson, the newly appointed U.S. consul who had returned to Japan to reopen the consulate, “claiming to be American citizens” and requesting to be allowed to return to Chichi Jima with a petition drafted by Frederick A. Savory. He was the great grandson of the original pioneer to the islands, Nathaniel Savory, and had been educated at an international school and worked for American companies in Japan prior to returning to Chichi Jima in 1940 before he was evacuated in 1944. Despite his and his fellow islander’s Western names, such as Washington and Robinson, U.S. Consul Johnson had his doubts. “Most were third generation Boninites who had intermarried with Japanese, spoke English poorly if at all, and had very tenuous ties with the United States.” Johnson noted, however, that “the group was small and its desire was straightforward,” so he agreed to take up their case with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who was in charge of the occupation of Japan as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). At the same time, Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), who had been informed of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee’s (SWNCC) decision on 1 December by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), had in turn requested the Chief of Naval Operations to reconsider the case of Savory and other families of American and European descent. His request was refused, however, pending decisions concerning the future status of the islands.

In the meantime, Savory was able to go to Chichi Jima in mid-December to assist Marine Colonel Presley M. Rixey, the commanding officer of the occupation forces, as an interpreter and then on to Guam for the start of the war crimes trials. While working with Rixey (who obviously found his English ability better than that of Consul Johnson), he was able to convince the colonel to request that the islanders be returned, which Rixey did believing that islanders “could live happily without any outside assistance whatsoever.” At the same time, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and CINCPAC were also discussing the islanders’ plight with authorities in Washington. On 19 March 1946, SWNCC finally revised its decision to permit the return of islanders of Western descent who had been forcibly relocated to the mainland and were, having lost their livelihoods and island-lifestyle of living, facing economic difficulties and social discrimination in the harsh times of the immediate postwar months. On 29 March, the Chief of Naval Operations notified CINCPAC of Washington’s decision to allow their return.

The decision to permit the return of this unfortunate lot was reported in Guam’s newspapers. Learning of this, Frederick Savory, who was still in Guam assisting in the trials, wrote to the U.S. Navy commander in the Marianas and included the names and addresses of 93 others who wished to return to Chichi Jima. They did not wish to stay any longer in mainland Japan, where they were having serious trouble surviving, and were willing to go to Tinian or Saipan to await their return if necessary. In the end, the islanders were permitted to return directly to Chichi Jima, rather than through the former Mandated Islands.

Shortly after Savory’s letter was received at General Headquarters, SCAP, in Tokyo, to which it was forwarded, the International Red Cross contacted the islanders of Western descent with instructions to compose a list of those who wished to return. “The Bonins have been cleared of Japanese rule and, at least until final disposition of the Bonins is decided, the descendants of Nathaniel Savory will live under the Stars and Stripes,”
magazine wrote at the time. Nevertheless, they were still technically considered “enemy nationals” by U.S. military authorities.

A large number of islanders desired to return with this repatriation. As it was SCAP policy to not separate families, Japanese spouses were also allowed to go having already been screened and cleared by SCAP, bringing the number to 125. As one researcher observed years later, “The group that gathered for embarkation . . . had been uprooted and scattered. They wanted to find one [an]other. They had been mistreated as aliens and as ‘spies.’ They were an ethnic group, never able to merge completely into Japanese society although they discharged their duties of citizenship. But they shared a common historical experience, kinship ties, religion, the use of two languages, and a place of origin.”

The returnees eventually left the port of Uraga south of Yokosuka on board a former Imperial Japanese Navy destroyer, the Keyaki Maru, and arrived in Futami Bay on 17 October. Although the ship was “extremely dirty, rusty, and foul smelling,” the morale of the passengers was high. “Chichi is my mother,” one of the returnees, Isaac Gonzales, said.

Despite this high morale, it had been a bleak situation when the islanders arrived home, one of “almost complete destruction . . . at the time of surrender, practically every animal had been killed by the Japanese troops for food,” Shepardson wrote, “American bombers had reduced most buildings to rubble. They had leveled the Episcopal Church of St. George as well as the Shinto shrine. Only two houses, those of Charles Washington and his [older] brother Rufus, were left standing. U.S. occupation forces [in 1945–46] completed the demilitarization by demolishing all power plants, docks, and like facilities.”

Meanwhile, military government authorities had earlier sent two ships, the LCI(L) 1067 and PC 1546, from Guam, via Saipan, with personnel and two months of provisions to help the returning islanders reestablish themselves. Also on board were the Savorys and Commander Vernon B. Hagenbuckle, who had recently been appointed officer in charge of the Bonins by the Chief Military Government Officer, Saipan. They arrived on 8 October. “The trip took us three days and the weather was fine,” an ensign and member of expedition wrote at the time. “Even though we did hit Chichi at night,” he continued, “we came in the harbor under the guidance of the Savorys and the other two Bonin islanders who know the place cold.” Hagenbuckle, like many of the islanders’ ancestors, came from Massachusetts, hailing from the town of Bourne on Cape Cod. On the same day of their arrival, he established the U.S. Naval Military Government Detachment, Bonins. Because the islanders were unable to arrive as scheduled on the 9th, the crews began work repairing the Quonset huts left by the Marines who had departed that April, and other unoccupied buildings, building bathrooms and showers, and cleaning up beach debris on their own. The Navy doctor, Mike Polka, checked the drinking water and sanitary conditions. Most buildings had been destroyed during the last months of the war and the subsequent defortification process by the Marines who “behaved as if Chichi Jima and Japan were still military threats [by] destroy[ing] every visible means of support on the island.” As a result, much work had to be done in order to rehabilitate the islands. Indeed, in addition to the two houses mentioned earlier, only three concrete buildings had escaped destruction. To make matters worse, while the detachment was there, one of Chichi Jima’s infamous typhoons struck.
After the arrival of the islanders, some of whom were suffering from malnutrition and in need of medical attention (which they received), Hagenbuckle discussed with them a program for restoring the islands, roads, structures, and other infrastructure to a livable condition. Naval personnel “marveled” at the “preservation of American traits in these people of American, British, Portuguese, Spanish, Polynesian, and Japanese blood and the ability of the adults to speak English—a facility which had been cherished through the generations of Japanese rule.” One of the first acts was to establish a local government, as the Navy presence at this point was only meant to be temporary. On 19 October, the Bonin Islands Council, comprised of six elected members representing the main families from the prewar period, was created as a local governing body, with each member responsible for a certain aspect of the reconstruction program. In charge of housing and construction was Richard Washington. Grover Gilley was charged with the recondition of vessels. Frank Gonzales, whose father had been a teacher and preacher, was placed in charge of education and public welfare (and also conducted marriages). Wilson Savory was responsible for livestock and food production. Jerry Savory and Roderick Webb were appointed initially to serve as local police, or “inspectors,” as they were called. A formal schedule—four days a week for community activities, two days for fishing, farming, and gathering firewood and fruit, with Sunday for rest—was also established. Frank’s son, Clark Gonzales, served as the first president of the council. Younger members were also added to the body as “assistant councilmen.”

With the aforementioned issues decided, initial rehabilitation projects completed, and an American flag from the LCI handed over to the islanders, the Navy representatives departed Futami Bay on 22 October. As the late anthropologist Shepardson, who made important contributions to the study of the postwar history of the islands, wrote, “like their ancestors in 1830, the settlers were alone [again] on the small volcanic island.”

As can be expected, life initially was hard for them. They were isolated and without the means to conduct commerce or communication with the outside world, with the exception the U.S. Navy vessels that made regular visits to the islands in the first year following resettlement to bring supplies as well as to provide basic medical and dental services. Years later, as travel between Chichi Jima and Guam became more routine, three Navy Grumman HU-16D Albatross amphibious aircraft, nicknamed the “Chichi Birds,” would fly on an irregular schedule, in addition to visits by LSTs and other naval vessels. The flights were described as “five hours of boredom and ten seconds of sheer terror.” In 1967, one crashed in the bay.

The initial situation of the islands was made worse when a tidal wave following a large earthquake off Shikoku, in western Japan, struck on 21 December 1946, destroying some houses and gardens. To help, several tons of supplies from a prisoner-of-war stockade on Saipan were delivered to the island in January 1947 and a subsequent trip made in March.

At this point, housing was still limited with two or three families sharing the Marine Quonset huts, which lacked electricity, running water, and indoor toilets. When Charlie Washington returned, he found his house still standing but none of his possessions. Even the things he had buried on his property before the evacuation were gone. Nathaniel Savory, the great-grandson and namesake of one of the original settlers, described life as very
difficult for them. “When my [Japanese] wife and I came to Chichi after the war, there was nothing here. There was no well water. Three families had to share a Quonset hut. There was no school, nothing. The U.S. forces did nothing for us [except send] a boat once a month that brought us some food and some clothes but it was used clothing with P.O.W. stamped on every article. They really didn’t do much for us.”

The Japanese wives had an especially difficult time. Most of them were new to the island, and in some cases new to marriage, and thus quite homesick. “She was a little lonesome at first, I guess. She cried a lot,” one man said of his wife.

There were others, however, who said “life was easy for the returnees” and spoke of living on supplies left by the Japanese in the caves that were rationed out, ships bringing supplies from Saipan and later, Guam, and emergency illnesses being treated by medevacs to Guam by seaplane. Nevertheless, this same man said he and his family had to share a Quonset hut with another family for 10 years.

Commander Hagenbuckle was dissatisfied, however, with the lack of support for the islands. Writing to his superior, the deputy military governor, on 27 January 1947, he noted that

sufficient material goods and equipment to start their new life have not yet been supplied though such material and goods have been persistently requested since 28 October 1946. . . . Can the assistance [to] the Bonins to date be truthfully considered “out of proportion to the area as a whole?” . . . The Bonin Islanders have accepted the consequences of war and are making every effort to alleviate their condition. They were held increasingly suspect by the Japanese since several years before the war. They suffered untold hardships and brutal treatment all during the war. They proved of great value to our occupation forces both in Japan and in the Bonins. They seek no special favors and are deeply grateful for the help they have thus far received. They are a worthy people and any assistance that can be supplied them will most certainly prove a sound investment. . . . Once given a start in basic needs and chance to market fish and farm products, it is firmly believed that the resettlement project in the Bonins will prove a highly successful undertaking.

At this point, there was not a permanent U.S. military presence on the islands. Indeed, the so-called military government was a very indirect one at that.

In the spring of 1947, Hagenbuckle was able to visit the islands again and spent several weeks on Chichi Jima to assist the residents with their problems. Despite their lack of experience in self-government and the tsunami natural disaster, the local government had begun to work well during the difficult first six months, and a school was in operation with 16 pupils between the ages of 4 and 14. Five men and two women were sent to Saipan for training in education, farming, cattle raising, and nursing. Exports of dry fish were being sent there as well for sale or barter. Life was peaceful, but it was clearly at subsistence level.

Yet, a year later, the situation had little improved with no new housing built, few people trained, a limited ability to trade, and none of the wreckage around the islands and in the bay cleared away. A letter from R. S. Wilhelm of the Civil Administration Unit on Saipan to Hagenbuckle directed a fundamental overhaul of the administration:
The island needs a refrigerated ship for fruits and vegetables. The school for children is conducted by an untrained aged resident. There are no recreational facilities or cultural influences of any kind. No chaplain or missionary has visited the island. The people are Japan oriented. There is no reason to tie them to the Marianas. The evacuees (Japanese) could return. SCAP or COMNAVFE [Commander Naval Forces, Far East] after the war prohibited the Japanese former residents from coming back. These policies should be revised. Only 120 people are allowed there. The Bonins should not be considered part of U.S. trusteeship. Imports exceed exports by 50%. The market for export should be Japan.55

This letter identified or implied many of the problems with the way the occupation was run and the administration would be conducted.

The lack of high-level attention to the islands was most seen when a 20,000-ton Navy transport, the USS General George M. Randall (AP 115), carrying Rear Admiral Charles A. Pownall, visited Chichi Jima on an unscheduled stop in the late summer of 1948. “We were amazed upon awakening to see a large ship approaching us,” Jerry Savory told young but experienced war correspondent Martin Sheridan, who had once read a book about the Bonins and had arranged to travel with Pownall on his trip when he learned that the admiral might stop at Chichi Jima.56 “We thought somebody important was coming ashore as the Randall is the largest ship we’ve ever seen.” The visitor was somebody important, at least for the islands. As the U.S. Commander for the Marianas and Governor of Guam, Pownall was also the deputy military governor for the islands, serving under Admiral DeWitt C. Ramsey, who was Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) and military governor for the Bonins.

Pownall was, in other words, the highest-ranking naval officer to visit the island since Commodore Matthew C. Perry 95 years before. Symbolic of the lack of communications, quite literally “the tiny island was caught unprepared for the visit [as] they had not received a message dropped from a plane dispatched from Iwo a few days before. But most of them gathered on the beach to meet . . . the party.” According to Sheridan, who also traveled with the admiral on shore, Pownall was “deeply interested in the story of Savory’s descendents . . . [and] arranged the visit to Chichi Jima to meet the self-designated Yankees, learn their problems, and aspirations first-hand and to see if there is a practical way of assisting them.”

One of the problems became apparent immediately—the ship’s captain decided against entering the harbor because of uncharted sunken ships and planes and chose instead to drop anchor about a mile offshore. Without Futami Bay being cleared, development and commerce could hardly begin. Pownall met with the local council and visited each of the facilities on the island, with his staff delivering necessary medical and other supplies. He expressed his hope to be able to arrange for Army and Navy transports to visit regularly to deliver supplies, newspapers, and mail, as well as to pick up produce, fish, and other items for shipment to markets in Guam and elsewhere. He also hoped to develop stronger ties between the islands and the people of Massachusetts, where Nathaniel Savory had been born 150 years earlier. It was the admiral’s first and only visit to the islands as well as the first and only visit by a reporter until the mid-1950s.
Sheridan’s two-part article goes into some detail and color about the background of the islanders’ return and life there since repatriation.

During the past year and a half, the hand-picked colony has made considerable progress toward economic security. The Bonin Islands Trading Co. has been formed by the Military Government Staff at Saipan, with each able-bodied man owning a share on a co-operative basis. They have netted a profit of $10,000—kept in the Bank of Guam—from the sale of dried tuna fish and vegetables. Among the 42 charter members are 15 Savories, 11 Washingtons, 5 Webbs, 3 Gilleys and 2 Gonzalez. They have voluntarily banned the importation of alcoholic beverages. The Chichi Jimans certainly behave better than any stateside community for they do not have a police force. In addition, they have organized and elected the Bonin Island Council to administer the small community as the U.S. Navy does not keep a representative there. Most of these followers of the simple life are Protestants who would like to have missionary couples join them for a year or two at a time to direct a religious program. They still call their community Yankeetown, and like thousands of rural Americans, order clothing and equipment from the Sears Roebuck catalog.57

Nevertheless, throughout the article, Sheridan stressed the islanders’ loneliness and their desire for closer ties with the people—their relatives—in the United States, including citizenship. “One question dims the otherwise peaceful future—their status and the status of the Bonin Islands. They want the United States to hold on to the chain, not to return the islands to Japan. Most of all they’d like to become American citizens. As yet, Uncle Sam has not given any indication of what he will decide.”

This was a theme regularly heard in the nineteenth century, and over the next 20 years of the U.S. Navy administration of the islands. “Forgotten Americans” was what one Navy commander called the returnees.58

The Confusing Start of the Military Government

The original basis for the military government in the Bonin Islands was established by a 12 January 1945, directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, known as “Directive for Military Government in Japanese Outlying Islands.”59 Otherwise known as JCS 1231, it instructed the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas (at the time, Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz), to “establish military government in such of the Japanese outlying islands as may be occupied by the forces under your command.” These islands included the “Nanpo Shoto, consisting of the Izu, Bonin, and Volcano Islands (including Marcus Island).” The guidelines for CINCPACFLT were found in paragraphs three and four of the directive:

3. You will be the supreme authority, and you will possess all rights, powers and responsibilities vested in the commander of an occupying force in time of war by international law.

   a. This authority will be broadly construed and will include the authority to take all measures deemed by you to be necessary or desirable in the execution of your military mission.
b. You may in your discretion delegate to subordinate members of your command, in whole or in part, the authority herein granted you, and authorize such subordinate members to subdelegate such authority to their subordinates.

4. The objective of your military government will be to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the accomplishment of your military mission.

According to an internal organizational history of the administration of the Bonin Islands, the operational control of the geographical area of the islands was originally vested in the Commander in Chief Far East (CINCFE), General MacArthur, although this did not include military government. In a unified command plan presented to President Harry S. Truman on 12 December 1946, concerning command of U.S. forces outside the continental United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that although CINCFE would be responsible for the security of the islands and that the forces there would be assigned to his operational control to “facilitate the discharging of [CINCFE’s] present mission. . . . eventually operational control should revert to the Pacific Command.” When Truman subsequently released the plan to the public on 17 December, he explained that the Marianas, including the Bonin Islands in this case, “will eventually revert to the Pacific Command, the present arrangements being designated to give support to General MacArthur in the military occupation of Japan and South Korea.” So, while the operational control of the islands was under MacArthur’s CINCFE, the actual military government responsibilities fell to CINCPACFLT and its subordinate commands.

Shortly after this, in early February 1947, the geographic limits of the Marianas Area of the Pacific Command and the four sub-areas into which it was divided were established. The Bonin Islands were included in the Bonins–Marianas Sub-Area, which also constituted the Marianas–Bonins Command Area (MARBO) of the Far East Command. Through this arrangement, according to the same organizational history, CINCFE exercised operational control for unified command of the naval forces and facilities in the MARBO area, with the Commander in Chief, Pacific and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, who was directly below CINCPAC, exercising unified command for the remainder of the Marianas area. Nevertheless, as described above, CINCFE’s operational control did not include naval administration, logistics, or civil and military government. These responsibilities remained a function of CINCPACFLT’s command. Military government of the Marianas area was exercised through the Commander Marianas as Chief Military Government Officer Marianas, with the Senior Naval Officer Saipan in charge of the direct administration of the Bonins as Chief Military Government Officer Bonins–Marianas Island Group. Under him, as seen in the command chart below, was the Officer in Charge Bonin Islands, with counterparts in the respective offices. Hagenbuckle was the first officer in charge of the Bonin Islands.

In April 1947, a revised JCS 1231 was approved as 1231/12, and it directed the continuation of military government over the Bonin-Volcano Islands “until such time as their ultimate international status is determined.” Paragraph two stated,
2. The authority to establish military government in the areas considered by this directive is vested in the president. The executive administration of the military governmental authority of the president, in this instance, has been delegated as an interim authority to the Secretary of the Navy who has further delegated such authority to the Chief of Naval Operations, and with the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurrence, to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet as Military Governor.

Because the Bonin Islands were recognized to be historic territory of Japan, this administrative structure toward them did not change when the United States assumed responsibility for the trusteeship of the former Japanese Mandates on 18 July 1947, following the establishment of the United Nations trusteeship system and the appointment of CINCPACFLT as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. CINCPACFLT, in other words, retained his title of Military Governor of the Bonin and Volcano Islands. The Deputy Military Governor, as the renamed Commander, Naval Forces Marianas (formerly Commander Marianas Area), however, would administer the area through the Office of the High Commissioner. This procedure was apparently adopted to “simplify the administrative organization and to enable CINCPACFLT, as High Commissioner, to discharge both the responsibilities assumed by the United States under the Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations and the obligation of CINCPACFLT as Military Governor.”

Despite the Bonins being a part of Japan, in the words of Dorothy Richard Pesce, who authored a massive study of the Trust Territory, they “continued to be administered as an appendage of the Trust Territory” since the “problems of the [Bonin Islands] were similar
to those of the islands in the Trust Territory and since the population approximated a mere 130 people existing on a subsistence basis supplemented by supplies provided by the Navy, a separate government organization and [set of] regulations were not justified.” However, despite a number of administrative, military, and economic connections, the islands were not legally a part of the Trust Territory as they were historically Japanese territory. It was, in a nutshell, a confusing and in many ways unnatural situation, much like the separation of the Amami Islands from Kagoshima Prefecture created numerous problems.

In any case, the budget for the Bonins came through the so-called EIGLOAN (Expenses Island Governments and Liberated and Occupied Areas Navy) appropriation for the administration of the Trust Territory. Likewise, all provisions of the Navy Department policy for the government of the territory (incorporating the different changes over the past year), promulgated on 15 January 1948, by Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, were considered “applicable to the Naval Government of the Bonin-Volcano Islands.” This five-page directive introduced in some detail the “principles . . . to be considered as a guide for all officers and persons connected with the several governments under the cognizance of the Navy Department.” However, it did not provide any guidance as to what the final disposition of the Bonin Islands was to be, and as a result, “the optimistic hopes held by the early Navy administrators for the progressive rehabilitation of the Bonin Islanders did not materialize.”

With the confusing command structure, and the administration not succeeding in providing basic services to the islanders, Navy personnel “became convinced that administrative as well as operational control of the Bonin-Volcano area should be held by the Far East Command.” As a result, the Deputy Chief Military Government Officer Bonins recommended in March 1948 to the Chief of Naval Operations that the administration of the islands be transferred to SCAP. He gave the following reasons: (1) the Bonins were geographically, economically, and culturally closely related to Japan and there appeared no reason to force them to be a part of Micronesia; (2) geographically, they were distant and remote from most of the Trust Territory islands; (3) their nearest neighbor, the Marianas, needed no products that the Bonins could produce; (4) the Bonins had no lingual or cultural ties with Micronesia; (5) logistically and administratively, it was difficult for the Navy to support them from Guam and Saipan; (6) by contrast, they could find a ready market in Japan; and (7) the Bonins were attached to the Japanese people through marriage and cultural affiliation. Unfortunately, this was not done. According to Pesce, there was no record of the CNO having ever received this recommendation.

Not all of the Navy’s leadership in theater saw the issue the same way. R. W. Kenney, a Navy commander who conducted a field inspection trip in the spring of 1948 to Chichi Jima, argued that it was important “not to give these islands back to the Japanese. They cost too many American lives during World War II and besides, we owe a debt to those Forgotten Americans now living there.” Kenney, who wrote these thoughts in a “Letter from Yankeetown,” was highly moved by the history of the original settlers and challenged the U.S. government to recognize the islanders as American citizens:

Old Nat Savory was a fighter with the American pioneer spirit, living to the ripe old age of eighty. Neither Hamilton Fish nor anybody else would have dared to tell
old Nat to his face that he was not an American. Young Nathaniel Savory, a great-grandson, is living on Chichi today and has that same spirit of Americanism—but we say that he is a Japanese subject. A Japanese subject with a down east twang who could pass anywhere for a Gloucester fisherman! A Japanese subject whose ancestors met secretly on each 4th of July to celebrate that eventful day, and to hold to their faith that they were Americans at heart. But for what?

He goes on to ask, “What is the future of these Forgotten Americans and what as fellow Americans have we to offer them in the way of freedom and security?” and suggest that “perhaps the United Nations would grant a request to add the Bonins to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. It is the least we can do for them!” Interestingly, Kenney also suggests that a few thousand refugees from Europe find new opportunities in the Bonins and help the islands become self-sufficient so they did not have to be returned to Japan.

In any case, the islands had already been separated from Japanese government control on 29 January 1946, through SCAPIN 677. By separating the islands not only from Japanese government control, but also keeping the islands separate from CINCFE’s administrative control, and essentially placing them under the trusteeship architecture for administrative purposes, the United States had created a very complicated occupation and administration structure.

**Clarifying the Administration of the Islands**

The situation did not mean that all things had gone poorly for the islanders following their return. Services and products, which included leftover wartime goods, were initially provided free of charge by the Navy. Several islanders, including Ikeda Minoru and Jerry Savory, were respectively sent to Tinian for training in radio communications and Guam for medical training at the Naval Medical Center, along with several women (including Martha Savory, Jerry’s sister) who received nursing training. With their immediate needs covered, the lives of the islanders began to improve. A school was opened for 16 children, and taught in English by an elder islander, Frank Gonzales, who had worked for 40 years in a British exporting firm in mainland Japan. The economy began to grow by exporting frozen and dried fish, turtle, pork, beef, and vegetables to Guam and Saipan, although these items could only be shipped out every three months. To support this, the Bonin Islands Trading Company was formed by the military government staff at Saipan, with each “able-bodied man” owning a share of the co-op. By 1948, the 42-charter-member trading company had earned a profit of $10,000 from the sale of vegetables and fish. In the same year, Navy Seabees laid new water lines, and, subsequently, the Navy provided an additional 25 tons of construction material for housing.

When housing was finally constructed, the residences were built—without regard to actual land ownership claims of the Japanese residents—in a line to make it easier and cheaper with electric, water, and sewer lines. This would cause great problems in the future when the Japanese islanders returned or tried to exercise their property rights. When a Western islander demurred about choosing a site along that line, he was told by naval authorities: “Do what you want. This is your island.” The islanders were led to believe the islands would never be returned to Japan.
Despite these construction projects and eventual development of Chichi Jima, living conditions in the very early years, according to Pesce, “vacillated from better to worse,” depending on the ability of the Navy to supply the islands.\textsuperscript{86} Items that were brought in often could not be paid for as the people did not always have means to get their products to markets. Fishing, which was the natural occupation of many of the islanders, was not as successful as hoped due to the lack of boats and ability to transport the catch to Guam or Saipan in a timely manner. School supplies were lacking, as were proper medical care and sanitary facilities. Petty crime and pirating by Japanese fishing boats that illegally visited the islands caused fear among the defenseless islanders. Self-government was still slow in developing. Overall, a “lackadaisical attitude” was found to exist among the islanders.\textsuperscript{87}

In light of the situation, and the fact that the administration for the Trust Territory would be shifting to the Department of the Interior, the Chief of Naval Operations in August 1950 told CINCPACFLT that a need existed to make “other plans” for the islands, “which will continue indefinitely to be an administrative responsibility” of the Navy.\textsuperscript{88} In particular, because the logistical support group of the Trust Territory, Service Division 51, would probably be inactivated at the time of the transfer, it was important to develop plans for supplying the Bonins after 1 July 1951, the date the Department of the Interior was scheduled to take over.\textsuperscript{89}

One month later on 15 September, CINCPACFLT made its recommendations for future policy options in a long memorandum.\textsuperscript{90} Essentially, it argued that it had been difficult for the Navy military government to fulfill its economic mission and recommended that responsibility for the administration should be transferred to CINCFE, because “such a transfer would stimulate resumption of pre-war trade with Japan and would be culturally desirable from the standpoint of the people, who have been virtually isolated from Japan since the end of the war.” It added that another reason for transfer of control was because the islands were Japanese territory and their final disposition would be taken up at the time of an Allied peace treaty with Japan, it would be logical to have the islands under the control of SCAP. The Chief of Naval Operations apparently favored the proposal, but noted that any transfer would have to be coordinated with the other commands of the Marianas Area, which remained under the operational control of CINCFE, currently facing North Korean forces that had overrun South Korea that June.\textsuperscript{91}

According to Pesce, the “course of the Korean War during the winter of 1950–1951,” namely the large-scale intervention of Chinese forces, “caused the Navy to change its thinking” on the transfer of responsibility to CINCFE.\textsuperscript{92} Instead of shifting responsibility west to Tokyo (CINCFE), the Chief of Naval Operations, in a 12 February 1951, memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that control be shifted east to Honolulu. “Because of the present world situation,” Admiral Forrest P. Sherman wrote, “I consider it imperative that responsibility for the security of the Marianas and Bonin-Volcano Islands and operational control of the facilities and local forces in these islands now revert to the Pacific Command” with CINCPAC “exercis[ing] unified command over all forces allocated to him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or other authority including forces assigned to the Marianas Islands and the Bonin-Volcano Islands.”\textsuperscript{93} When the joint chiefs, then chaired by General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, did not act on the recommendation, Sherman brought the matter again
to their attention, arguing that the original purpose for which CINCFE had been given operational control over the Bonin Islands was to support the occupation of Japan and Korea, which had essentially been fulfilled with the draft peace treaty with Japan almost complete. The following month, on 9 April, the JCS decided to follow Sherman’s recommendation and transfer the responsibility for the security and operational control of the facilities on the Marianas and Bonin-Volcano Islands to CINCPAC, with CINCPACFLT continuing to be responsible for the military government and civil administration of the Bonins. The actual transfer of command was decided through conferences between the units and commands involved over the following several months.

As a result of the JCS decision, it became possible for CINCPACFLT to plan more long term for the administration of the islands. In April, shortly after the decision, a chief petty officer, Frederick A. Pobst, was assigned to Chichi Jima on 23 April as resident Military Government Representative, a position, as seen in the chart below, that would continue until June 1968. The Navy was finally established in the Bonins, in a way more visible than ever.

This fact would be made clearer with the visit of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in May 1951. Radford was as impressed as most people were with their first visit to Chichi Jima: “I shall never forget the beauty of that two-mile ride into the harbor. The shores of the almost landlocked bay rose gradually and gracefully to the rather steep mountains that hem the harbor. The splendor of the island was magnified in the early morning sunlight. I could imagine the feelings of early explorers and the original Savory group as they entered the bay for the first time.” Radford would become the strongest advocate of not only preventing the return of the islands to Japan, but in actually promoting U.S. citizenship for the islanders.

Figure 8. Military government representatives/officers in charge, Chichi Jima, 1951–68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Approximate dates served</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CPO Frederick A. Pobst</td>
<td>April 1951–June 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr John W. Kelsey Jr.</td>
<td>June 1952–July 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr Clayton E. Frost</td>
<td>July 1953–October 1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr Earl D. Bronson</td>
<td>October 1955–March 1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr T. G. Rice</td>
<td>May 1958–June 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr V. W. Weatherby</td>
<td>July 1960–June 1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr J. R. Thorndyke</td>
<td>July 1963–January 1964 (relieved of command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr R. L. Farrar</td>
<td>February 1964–July 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr J. H. Reynolds</td>
<td>July 1964–December 1965 (died)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCdr Dale W. Johnson</td>
<td>December 1965–June 1968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like Pownall, Radford was enthusiastic about assisting the islanders, and would take it upon himself to act as their benefactor as CINCPAC/CINCPACFLT and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (upon replacing Bradley). Although his visit was short, Radford “want[ed] to see all I could of the administrative and residential sections of Chichi Jima, particularly of Yankeetown. I wanted to meet with the men of the community to talk about plans for their future.”

After an inspection around the island by jeep, Radford spoke with community leaders at the schoolhouse. “It was evident that they were descendents,” Radford observed, “of a hardy group and were now living as they wished to live, as free men, for the first time in many years.”

Recalling his trip, Radford continued,

I have never addressed a more attentive group than I did that bright morning on Chichi Jima. I told them of my intense interest in their history and well being, of my knowledge of their hardships and my desire to help them. I had not visited the islands before but had been able to keep in close touch with the Islanders and thought I had a pretty good idea of their problems. I would not only be glad to receive but would appreciate any suggestions which they cared to make pertaining to the administrative, economic, and social matters of their community.

In addition to announcing that the request of the male islanders to be permitted to marry Japanese citizens had been granted, Radford addressed the appeals for U.S. citizenship that the residents had made earlier that year, which had said “we are willing to offer our best to America and ask as little as possible in return. Our greatest desire is to become a part of the United States of America.” He read them a letter he had written on their behalf as military governor and to tell them that he had been directed to inform them that their request would receive careful consideration. “I was anxious to help them,” Radford recalled in his memoirs, “not only because of historical ties but because I felt that there were many good reasons for the United States to retain possession of this island group.” He went on to explain what he thought these political, administrative, and strategic reasons to be:

In the Bonin Islands, there was no local Japanese population to return to Japanese sovereignty and there were no natural resources that made the islands particularly valuable. There was local fishing, which furnished a good livelihood and which would suffice for many years to come. In the fine harbor of Chichi Jima and the airfields of Iwo Jima, the United States could have an excellent advanced naval base to complement our bases in Guam and the Philippines. There could come a day when we might have to project our strength into the western Pacific again, without bases in Japan or in the mainland.

Specifically, Radford believed that the naval facilities at Yokosuka on mainland Japan and in Okinawa were vulnerable to an “all-out” attack by the Soviet Union and thus Iwo Jima as an air base and Chichi Jima as a submarine base were “vitally necessary as auxiliary bases should U.S. forces be driven from” Okinawa and mainland Japan. At the minimum, Radford sought the status quo maintained with regard to the islands; if possible he wanted their permanent separation from Japan (as MacArthur hoped for Okinawa). In the end, at the time of the September 1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan, the Allies recognized Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over the Nansei and Nanpo Islands, frustrating what appeared to be Radford’s long-term desires. The United States, however, was granted administrative rights
over the islands, as per Article 3 of the treaty. In light of this decision, it became imperative to the Navy that it be able to protect the rights it gained, and not see them lost to Japan or any other power.

THE POST-PEACE TREATY YEARS NAVAL ADMINISTRATION: PROTECTING NATIONAL AND LOCAL INTERESTS

Following the decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to transfer administrative control from CINCFE to CINCPAC, a military government representative was assigned to the islands. Subsequently, a chief storekeeper and several personnel were sent to maintain what was then known as the Military Government Unit. The following year, the unit was expanded when Radford wrote to the new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William M. Fechteler, recommending its enlargement to three officers and 11 men. As a result, the U.S. Naval Facility, Chichi Jima, was established on 8 March 1952, being upgraded from the smaller unit status.

Shortly after that, a bottom drag, followed by a magnetic sweep of Futami Bay, was performed by the minesweeper USS Shoveler (AM 382) to ensure that the approach channel and bay were safe for surface navigation and to minimize the danger from mine ordnance to ships anchoring in the harbor. It was estimated at the time that Futami could accommodate 20 submarines and two ship's tenders.

In addition, in early 1953, Susaki airfield, on the other side of Futami Bay across from the village of Omura, was rehabilitated as an emergency landing airfield. While subject to “tricky cross-winds,” the original airfield was developed by the Japanese to a length of 3,600 feet, but had experienced difficulties with the surf and reduced the runway to 2,400 feet with arresting gear at both ends for larger bombers. The runway had been damaged from bombings and hastily repaired by the Japanese Imperial Navy with “any material at hand, such as rocks, earth, parts of wrecked planes . . . for fill.” On 9 March, the first U.S. Navy plane, a Douglas R4D-8, later designated C-117D Super Gooney, tested the airfield when it arrived from Guam.

Moreover, Chichi Jima boasted two seaplane ramps, one an operational civilian ramp located east of Omura pier, and the other, nonoperational, at the former Imperial Navy's seaplane base. Furthermore, there were fuel storage tanks, tunnels, and caves and vaults developed or left by the Japanese that would be utilized.

Like most Navy posts in the Pacific region, its address was out of San Francisco: “U.S. Naval Facility, Navy No. 905, C/O Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.” Initially, approximately 15 enlisted personnel and two civilians were assigned to the facility, in addition to a detachment of Navy Seabees sent to construct housing. After the 103d Division of the Seabees began full construction in July 1953, the facility eventually grew to a 30-man base, not including dependents. A number of new buildings, 13 housing units, and facility improvements were undertaken.

The administration was improved by the arrival in July 1953 of the conscientious Lieutenant Commander Clayton E. Frost, a mustang, or someone who rose to officer rank from
Respected by his staff and appreciated by the islanders, his was a productive three-year assignment.

Shortly after the establishment of the naval facility, Radford visited the islands again in October 1952 with Ambassador to Japan Robert D. Murphy and their respective staffs. Ambassador Murphy had been receiving numerous requests from the Japanese government and private individuals seeking to return to the islands. Murphy was inclined to permit this. Radford felt it necessary to convince Murphy and the State Department that for strategic reasons this not be permitted. "I urged him," the admiral wrote, "to meet me in Chichi Jima so that I could acquaint him personally with the Islanders, their problems, and the reasons I felt we should not give [the islands] up. Bob was convinced that I was right after our visit, and he cooperated with me thereafter in my efforts to hold on to [them]." Murphy had gone there, however, to at least suggest to Radford a compromise proposal—permitting Japanese to return to Haha Jima, south of Chichi Jima, where many Japanese from the mainland had traditionally lived (with the islanders of Western descent preferring Chichi). "Smaller Haha Jima," the ambassador wrote, "had little or no naval interest and the several tiny islands represent no practical importance." According to Murphy’s report of the trip, Radford was “unwilling to increase responsibilities of security and supply inherent in the presence of a larger foreign civilian population on these islands.” Radford’s opposition, however, would open the United States to charges of discrimination in its policy toward the islands, allowing islanders of Western descent but preventing the resettlement of ethnic Japanese islanders from the mainland, something that Murphy and Radford faced in the meetings with Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo upon their return to Tokyo.

Okazaki was particularly upset about this point. Foreign Ministry officials and a representative of the League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation, Yokota Tatsuo, were scheduled to go with Murphy and Radford on their visit to the islands but at the last minute had been denied passage. As one former leader of that organization noted, “in addition to the peace treaty, this was the second time we lost the chance [to get the Bonins back].” The opportunity would not come again for a number of years. Radford, who would not change his views on the importance of the islands, was subsequently appointed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in June 1953 and in that position continued to reject Japan’s claims. He retired from the Navy in August 1957, after being reappointed chairman in August 1955.

Less than one year after that fateful visit, Admiral Felix B. Stump, who had recently replaced Radford as Commander in Chief, Pacific, visited Chichi Jima with members of his staff in July 1953. Stump served as CINCPAC in Hawaii for another four-and-a-half years, until January 1958. Unfortunately, having not left a set of memoirs or other personal papers, it is hard to know to what extent he shared the views of his predecessor regarding the Bonin Islands. In any case, with Radford as chairman of the JCS, it was he who in the end had, for all practical purposes, the final say on this matter. The fact that the status of the Bonin Islands did not change at all during Stump’s tenure suggests that he was not willing to push the issue, particularly in light of the development of the islands as an important submarine base during this time.

At the same time, Radford and the Navy saw as its role in Chichi Jima both the protection of U.S. national security interests and local interests, and as a result, strongly resisted
official and unofficial requests for the former Japanese residents of the islands to be allowed to return. These concerns were made clear in a letter by Chairman Radford to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in the mid-1950s. Radford argued that

the day we permit any group of Japanese to enter [the] Bonins to colonize [the] area is the day [the] U.S. will lose administrative and security control of these islands and ex-mandates. Japs will not stop in their efforts until [that] ultimate goal is accomplished. Future in the Pacific for the long term indicates we should strengthen our position—not weaken it. Problems of Japan are not going to be alleviated in any noticeable extent by a concession in the Bonins.\(^\text{126}\)

In the discussions between the State Department and the military, the Okinawa analogy (that the administration of the islands was becoming increasingly difficult and that a backup base area was necessary) was often applied by the services: “On Okinawa, where we enjoy administrative authority, we are bound to run into difficulty as the population pressures increase and new weapons come into use. As a backup proposition, the Bonin-Volcano Islands are becoming more and more important.”\(^\text{127}\) As discussed earlier, the Bonins would be strategically important if the Soviets knocked out Okinawa and Yokosuka. Politically, as well, with the growing instability of the local situation in Okinawa, the Bonins were important if the U.S. position in Okinawa eroded further. It was primarily because of these fears that Radford strongly opposed attempts by U.S. officials to give the Bonins back and by Japanese officials and former residents to reacquire the islands, although he and others in the Navy were also paternally motivated by sympathy for the descendants of the original American settlers.

In what appears to have been an attempt to prevent efforts by Japan to have the islands returned, the Navy facilitated a trip to Hawaii and Washington, DC, in November for members of the Bonin Island Council. Wilson, Jerry, Nathaniel Savory and Richard Washington could explain their desire not to see the Japanese return. This followed a visit to the United States by representatives of the former residents association in October 1955, in which they appealed to Navy and governmental authorities to have the islands returned or at least be allowed to return to the islands. The Bonin Island Council also made its own appeal to the State Department in an effort to “point out the following true facts and to beseech” the U.S. government to deny the petition of the Japanese, with what can be assumed to have been the full blessing of the U.S. Navy.\(^\text{128}\)

According to the official story, the Bonin islanders first read of the petition made by the League of Bonin Evacuees in the \emph{Guam News}, and, in order to contest the league’s statements, appealed to Navy authorities to let four of the councilmen go to Washington to plead their case.\(^\text{129}\) Richard Washington, who was then president of the Bonin Island Council, remembers that it was the Navy that initiated the proposal. The Navy representative on the island encouraged the representatives of the islanders to go. “Commander [Earl D.] Bronson sent me a message to see him at once. ‘If you want this island you should request the right to hold it. The Japanese want it back. You must get ready to go to Washington right way.’”\(^\text{130}\) Richard Washington’s version of events is essentially confirmed in a letter by Jeff Graham Parsons, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, who was forwarding a report by a member of the embassy staff, Richard M. Lamb, who
had visited Chichi Jima as a guest of Admiral Fitzhugh Lee III a few months after the conversation. Noting that it was probably good to “keep in the [State Department] family” and not include it in the report itself, Parsons stated,

There is reason to believe that the petition of November 2, 1955, signed by all adult residents of the islands, was drafted by Cdr Bronson himself on the Navy’s instructions, and was not in any sense a “spontaneous” expression of the islanders’ view. Bronson announced with considerable pride that the petition had been drafted immediately upon receipt of “referenced message,” and that signatures of all the islanders had been obtained in the course of a single afternoon. Cdr Bronson added that he had kept the petition short and to the point since long petitions usually go unread.131

Parsons went on to mention that Lamb “observed no particular hostility toward the former Japanese residents on the part of the natives nor fear of possible reprisals.” The fact that the petition was written on what appears to be government letterhead (bonded paper with an American government symbol) and in perfect English further adds credence to the theory of Lamb and Parsons that Bronson had written it.

In either case, the group departed in early November arriving in Washington on the 17th before proceeding to New Bedford, Massachusetts, the home of Nathaniel Savory, three of whose descendents made up the delegation.132 They were joined by Commander Julius W. Jockusch, the island government officer from CINCPACFLT.

Beginning on the 18th, the group first met with Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, who had become Chief of Naval Operations in August, followed by calls on Admiral Radford, Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe (Deputy CNO), and Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Brigadier General J. K. Wilson Jr., who was serving in place of Gordon Gray due to the latter’s absence on a trip. In their meeting with Radford, they told him that compared to when they lived under the Japanese, they were “happier than they had ever been in their lives” and in light of the restoration of fishing industry and farming, “we now have an island paradise and we hope it remains so.”133 They expressed their concern about the return of the Japanese, “fear[ing] the Japanese will not forget the position they took and the facts they gave during [the war crimes trials].”134 Wilson Savory, who was the oldest of the group, added how the “speaking of English was forbidden during the war years and a penalty was imposed upon those who spoke English, even in their homes. During these years, they (the real Bonin islanders) were closely watched by the Japanese and their movements on the islands were restricted.”135

After touring Washington and Virginia over the weekend and meeting with the press, the group next met with State Department representatives on 22 and 23 November. Wilson Savory explained to Robert J. G. McClurkin, Richard B. Finn, and Richard M. Herndon, all of the Office for Northeast Asian Affairs, that over the past decade, “life on Chichi Jima is now improving, but an influx of Japanese would result in a return to the unfortunate prewar status” for the islanders, repeating a concern he had expressed to Radford.136 This was a reference to the treatment by the Japanese military on the islands in the late 1930s. Jerry Savory, who with his brother Fred had returned to Chichi Jima in late 1945 to survey
the island in the hope to repatriate some of the islanders and ended up providing testimony while there, stated he favored “continued U.S. protection and control” and would like to be American citizens. He mentioned the islanders had already applied for citizenship in 1951 and had “expected some decision on their request at the time of the treaty effectuation and are still waiting.”137

In response to these comments, McClurkin reviewed the international status of the islands, explaining the concept of “residual sovereignty” and Article 3 of the Peace Treaty:

Official statements made since the effectuation of the Japanese peace treaty have emphasized that the United States would continue to exercise its present degree of control of these islands while threat and tension in the Far East remained . . . The concept of bringing the Article III islands under a United Nations trusteeship administered by the United States has not been followed, although no official statement denying such an intention has ever been made. It seems logical to assume, therefore, that eventually the islands will go back to Japanese control, although this has never been officially stated either. Along with the concept of residual sovereignty, there would appear to follow the concept of residual nationality which would apply to the residents of the Bonin Islands today . . . This was roughly the same explanation given the Japanese Bonin Islander delegation last month.138

In other words, the islanders were Japanese citizens in the eyes of the U.S. government. This was probably not what they wanted to hear, but the delegation did not seem to challenge McClurkin who suggested that the delegation present their new petition directly to Assistant Secretary Walter S. Robertson the next day.

The group met with Robertson at 1630 on 23 November and submitted their petition.139 While it did not specifically request citizenship, it did call on the government of the United States to “establish the Bonin Islands as a United States affiliate in any capacity which may be considered suitable for the protection of these islands, and in consideration of the true American principles of self government, free enterprise, and the rights of the individual.”140 It also called on the U.S. government “to deny the petition” of the Japanese islanders, and cited a number of contentions both to support their case and discredit that of the Japanese islanders. The relevant part of the petition read,

It is the contention of this Council for the people that:

1. These islands are incapable of supporting a population of the proposed magnitude. (7,700 as reported by the Guam newspapers.)

2. The Japanese petitioners are not true Bonin Islanders but were mostly immigrants of the early 1930s and that only a nominal percentage of that population were able to subsist off the natural resources of the islands and the surrounding waters. And, that the remainder of this population were in fact employed by the military in constructing fortification[s] on the Bonin Islands in preparation for an attack on the United States and the possibility of ultimate defense of the Japanese Home Islands.
3. The present residents of these Islands are the true Bonin Islanders. The majority having descended from the original settlers who were of American descent and displaced no previous inhabitants.

4. The standard of living under the previous Japanese occupation was far below that presently enjoyed by the people.

5. Various members of the Council and of the present population were instrumental in bringing Japanese War Criminals to trial and ultimate conviction, thereby demonstrating preference for the democratic way of life and loyalty to the principles of the United States.

6. The people are grateful for the opportunity to gradually progress into self-government and for the assistance in this direction by the Naval Administration.

7. The Council and the entire population pledge themselves to continue along the lines of progress established and to cooperate with the United States in any affiliated capacity granted.

It is further contended that the Japanese delegation has erred in their statements to the press in regards to natural resources and the industrial potential of these islands. In this regard, the following are the true facts:

1. Mineral resources are limited to small sulphur deposits on Iwo Jima. No deposits of any value are known to exist on the islands under consideration.

2. Timber stands of commercial magnitude is nonexistent. Cutting the few trees of logging size that do remain would without doubt, cause unacceptable erosion and destruction of the water sheds.

3. Agriculture on a commercial scale of any magnitude is prohibited by the extremely mountainous terrain. The present population will, by normal increase, require all suitable land that is available in a few years.

4. The above indicates that the majority of any large migrating groups would have to exist by fishing, the only truly commercial potential. The expert fishermen of the indigenous population estimate that the establishment of a fishing fleet of the size necessary to support the proposed population would deplete the fishing in a few years so that even this method of support would be destroyed.\textsuperscript{141}

The petition was signed first by Richard Washington, president of the Bonin Island Council; Roderick Webb, secretary-treasurer; and members Jerry Savory, Minoru Ikeda, and Jesse Webb. It included the signatures of all 82 residents over the age of 18, and was certified by Commander Bronson, who had the authority to administer oaths as per Article 0117, Naval Supplement to Manual for Courts-Martial, 1951.
A copy of this petition was also given to Murphy—who had become deputy under secretary of state for political affairs in 1955, the highest position to which a career diplomat could usually aspire at the time—when the group called on him after their meeting with Robertson. After discussing the state of the fishing industry in response to a question by Murphy, Jerry Savory asked that the United States keep the islands under their present status and prevent the influx of large numbers of Japanese “which would ruin the fishing industry for those now engaged in it . . . [In fishing and housing matters, t]hings were getting better after the difficult war-time and post-war years, and naturally enough the islanders do not wish to go through such difficulties again.” After noting that the league members, during their trip to Washington, had made claims that were different from what he was hearing, Murphy explained “there was nothing new on the subject of repatriation of Japanese Bonin Islanders . . . [and] that there appeared to be no immediate prospect of a change in United States policy in regard to the Bonin Islands.” In other words, the Japanese were not going to be permitted for the time being to be repatriated.

When the league heard about the trip, they were extremely shocked and disappointed and felt betrayed, which further helps support the argument that it was in fact the Navy that promoted the petition and trip from the beginning. Writing to Roderick Webb “and other fellow islanders,” league president Yokota stated that they placed the Japanese islanders “in a tight corner” if they opposed the return. He noted that if the islanders of Western descent feared their return for the effect it would have on their living, it was based on a “gross misunderstanding,” and explained the reasons why their return would not negatively impact the islanders already there. He ended with a plea:

Believe us that your fears about our pressure upon you and discrimination against you are utterly groundless. What we worry about as a matter of feeling between you and ourselves in the future is simply your attitude towards us, that is, whether or not you will receive us with warm hands. Pray receive us with a smile. And let us strive hand-in-hand for the rehabilitation of our war-devastated native islands. You and ourselves are fellow countrymen, and there is absolutely nothing which would drive both of us into antagonism with each other.

Yokota asked for a reply to clear up the possible misunderstanding, and also sent a copy of the letter to Vice Admiral Briscoe as well, but it does not appear that he received a reply from either man.

After concluding their work in Washington, the delegation traveled to New Bedford to visit the hometown of their ancestor. The group then visited New York City, where they spent one week. “We flew on Admiral Radford’s plane just for pleasure,” Washington said in an interview, and dined with a sister of Miriam Savory who was living in the United States. On their return trip, the group stopped in San Francisco to meet with Fleet Admiral Nimitz “and his old lady who served us homemade cookies” for a couple of hours. Subsequently, the delegation arrived in Hawaii in early December and met with Admiral Stump and Lieutenant General William O. Brice, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and others on the staff. Few of these men needed convincing, however, of the importance of the Bonins to U.S. strategy in the area.
The Islands in the Cold War

The introduction in February 1956, shortly after the delegation's visit, of nuclear warheads for storage in Chichi Jima in the caves of Kiyose hamlet and on Iwo Jima made the U.S. position even more difficult to retract. It would not be for another 10 years, after the weapons were removed, before the Pentagon could or would seriously consider returning the islands.

One writer speculates that the real reason for Admiral Radford's October 1952 trip to the islands was to examine their utility for storing nuclear weapons. Photos of his group in a report from the trip include retired Vice Admiral H. E. Overich of the Central Intelligence Agency in the copper-lined Kiyose vaults. With the status quo officially maintained for the Bonin Islands at the May 1953 Hawaii conference and affirmed in National Security Council meetings and by Secretary of State Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower in late 1953 and early 1954, it became easier to plan for the deployment of those weapons to Chichi and Iwo. The near isolation of the islands and lack of "Japanese" residents as potential agitators or spies made them all the more attractive. Marines were brought to the islands to guard the entrance of the Kiyose vaults and "Mary's Little Lamb," which islanders used to describe the mystery contents inside. The islanders, however, knew something was up, but they also knew not to ask questions or approach the entrances.

In light of this, it is not surprising, therefore, that several of the officers in charge of the islands during these years were submarine specialists, such as Lieutenant Commanders Frost and Bronson. Indeed, when recommending the establishment of a naval facility, Radford had specifically suggested "a submariner as commanding officer." The role of Chichi Jima in supporting naval submarine strategy for the region therefore was significant, and the need for men who understood the role of submarines in America's postwar strategy to be assigned to the islands as the officer in charge, high.

Bronson, in an in-depth report on the islands that he wrote upon the end of his command, described his time as military government representative as "by far the most demanding of my naval career . . . The administration of this remote naval facility may well be compared to operating a ship continually at sea. That is, the length of supply lines never lessen, the necessity to think ahead at least two months is always present. Every job or project is bound to contain an element of 'Make Do.'" Writing a decade later, the last military government representative, Lieutenant Commander Dale W. Johnson, stated almost the same thing—he had to do a little bit of everything and perform a lot of roles in a lot of settings: "I have been a civil engineer, cashier, accountant, foreman, and government adviser."

Symbolic of their importance during the subsequent decade and a half following Radford's and Murphy's visits, numerous officials from Hawaii and stateside would continue to travel to the islands. State Department officer Lamb arrived in early 1956, later followed by Admiral Herbert G. Hopwood, who had just become CINCPAC and, thus, officially Military Governor of the Bonin Islands and would continue until relieved in August 1960. In March 1958, Daniel K. Inouye, then a young representative from Hawaii, which recently had been admitted to the United States as the 50th state in the union, visited followed by
others in November 1959, and in the summer of 1966 by Admiral Roy L. Johnson, CINC-PAC, and Deputy Governor Rear Admiral C. B. Jones. 

By the time of the visit by Johnson and Jones, the last of the nuclear weapons deployed to Chichi Jima had been removed. These were warheads for the Bendix RIM-8 Talos surface-to-air missiles initially brought there in the fall of 1964. In December 1965, they were removed. The Talos deployments were preceded by the Chance Vought SSM-N-8 Regulus, which had arrived between March and May 1956 and were deployed there until October–December 1964. The Regulus cruise missile provided the first nuclear strategic deterrence force for the U.S. Navy. Prior to the Regulus warhead’s deployment to Chichi Jima, at least one nuclear bomb was positioned there beginning in February 1956. 

Chichi Jima was not the only island in the Bonins group to which nuclear weapons were deployed; Iwo Jima hosted at least one weapon between September 1956 and September–December 1959, and related components from February 1956 to June 1966. According to notes of a Stars and Stripes reporter who visited the island, it appears the nuclear weapons were stored near the foot of Mt. Suribachi in the ammunition bunker area, just below the 9,800-foot runway.

After the Battle of Iwo Jima, the island was the site of an Army Air Forces base for the 20th Air Force and part of the Far East Air Logistics Force. Eventually the base came to be called the Central Air Base, and the Far East Air Materiel Command set up shop there. The Coast Guard also operated a Loran (LOng-RAnge Navigation) station at the northern end of the island with a 1,350-foot tower.

In the early 1950s, when the Korean War was in full force, Iwo played an important role in the Far East Air Logistics Force’s “10,000 mile lifeline . . . 24 hours a day, seven days a week” for scheduled and transient aircraft flying the north-south routes between Japan and the islands to the south, east-west routes between Wake and Okinawa, and to and from the United States. The island’s role was “like that of a blood bank, but instead of dispensing blood, Iwo dispenses fuel and oil, and instead of injecting it into a human artery, it is injected into a giant lifeline of supply, which stretches from the United States to the Korean battlefield.” As a “welcome haven” in the middle of the Pacific for the aircraft and crews in this lifeline, Iwo in the 1950s played a role similar to that after the island was seized in 1945.

The lifeline was sometimes interrupted by the strong typhoons that sweep through the Bonin Islands, one of which, Rosalind, on 9 October 1947, was particularly destructive, as was Louise on 25 September 1955. A volcanic eruption in March 1957 also caused concern. When there were some deaths after a particularly bad storm that caused the LORAN tower to collapse in early 1964, one Japanese Buddhist priest, Wachi Tsunezo, implied to U.S. authorities that it was due to the fact that the souls of fallen Japanese soldiers and sailors on the island had not been laid to rest nor their remains collected, and warned “if the present deplorable conditions are left as they are, second and third such disasters will occur successfully, I am sure.”

Beginning in 1954, Iwo Jima was used for large amphibious exercises by the U.S. Navy and Marines, and even the Royal Navy. The first such event, Operation Flag Hoist, conducted by the 3d Marines in March 1954, was the largest amphibious training exercise
since the end of the Korean War. The task force feinted at Haha Jima, and then staged an invasion rehearsal there prior to landing at Iwo.

At least one exercise—in mid-February 1956—considered the use of tactical nuclear weapons by both sides in the scenario. An aggressor force would attempt to take the island using the weapons while being repulsed by defenders using similar weapons. This was the same time that a real nuclear warhead was placed at Chichi Jima. As part of this exercise, U.S. Navy jets also “atom-bombed” Muko Jima to the north of Chichi as a prelude. The bombs included dummies similar in size, shape, and weight to some of the weapons then in American stockpiles and included devices to detonate at up to 1,000 feet high. The bombing session was designed to provide training for carrier-based pilots in the fast breakaways necessary to get both the plane and pilot out of danger of the blast after dropping the bomb. The exercise, dubbed Operation NAVMARLEX I-56, was described as a “massive atomic age amphibious maneuver,” and saw the participation of some 40,000 personnel, including 11,000 Marines from Okinawa and mainland Japan. One of the purposes was to help the Navy develop a new method of deploying and positioning ships during a landing to avoid assembling them in so small an area that one atomic bomb could destroy the entire force. Nevertheless, a simulated atomic bomb ended up exploding over the task force early in the exercise and “sunk” four transports carrying 2,000 men. The main purpose, however, seems to have been to accustom America’s military to the nuclear age. Said Rear Admiral Irving T. Duke, who led the 72-ship task force, “(it is necessary) to penetrate the psychological barrier which confronts all of us when we think of what we would do in an atomic war.”

The Air Force had been considering that question as well. The year before, in May 1955, it conducted an atomic defense exercise with 300 men stationed on Iwo scrambling to caves and huddling there until the danger from an imaginary nuclear air attack passed. “The test was considered successful,” a newspaper report stated, “and the ready-built shelters may well increase the strategic importance of Iwo Jima.” The article added that 5,000 Marines, “were killed digging stubborn Japanese defenders from an underground city carved out of the sulphur-ridden innards of the islands. Now the Air Force has begun a program to turn the caves into life-saving shelters, and form what will perhaps be the most perfect network of any atomic protection found anywhere.”

Much of this work and planning was made all the easier because of the lack of a civilian community on Iwo Jima. Although in the late 1940s, a mere two years after the battle, families of the personnel assigned to the island were initially able to live with them, the Japanese islanders were unable to return. As a result, the Air Force command had no responsibility for civil affairs, although the base there did assist in transport of people and goods to and from Chichi Jima when necessary by ship and seaplane.

**Local Government and Life on Chichi**

The Bonin Island Council was originally established as the Island Governing Council on 19 October 1946. In the interim, it continued to function despite the increased presence of the Navy administration. Reduced from six to five members (due to the passing of one of
the male members of the families represented who had no male offspring to succeed him), the council was elected every June by those residents over the age of 18. The person receiving the most votes became the president, with the second highest vote count becoming the treasurer. The next three highest vote-getters became council members. Moreover, at the New England–style open general meetings, all the islanders could express their opinions about issues and participate in government affairs. The military government representative served as council advisor.

The council, specifically the president, acted as the islanders’ representative not only in local government affairs, but also when meeting visitors to the islands as well as officials when on trips off the island. For example, council members represented the islanders’ interests in the United States in November 1955 during discussions of the return of the former islanders and in Tokyo in February 1968 while meeting with national and metropolitan officials involved in the reversion arrangements.

A Bonin Islands Court was established after the arrival of the military government representative in 1951. The council selected a judge, who would serve for one year, and council members served as additional members of the court. The military government representative served as advisor.

In practice, military government representatives appeared to have grown disheartened by the lack of leadership and character among the islanders, which one officer in charge described as “their biggest fault.” “There is no man amongst them,” a report observes, “willing to lead. Any group effort is extremely hard to organize. No one wants to take the job of leader because it entails the possibility of making him disliked. If only one strong character were available, it would solve many problems in Island leadership.” The report goes on to complain that so far it has been impossible to turn any project over to the Council without the necessity of frequent check-ups and nagging to gain completion. This attitude is without doubt due to generations of Japanese influence. During these times, the Japanese made all of the decisions and it was much simpler just to do as ordered. The Bonin Islander will carry out specific instructions on an individual basis. He will not organize or follow through without assistance.

Nevertheless, during this time, the situation continued to improve locally. In March 1952, the military governor set up the Bonin-Volcano Trust Fund for the islanders’ benefit. Its main source—$100,000—came from the salvage of scrap metal on the islands, discussed during Admiral Radford’s visit in mid-1951. The economy, completely dependent on the ever-growing naval presence, was improving; there was no unemployment.

The Navy, meanwhile, had permitted in 1952 the local school to relocate to the former administration building. With the impending retirement of 70-year-old Frank Gonzales as teacher and the departure of the son of the military government representative, who was teaching the upper grades, military government representative C. E. Frost pleaded to the deputy governor to hire two Japanese-English speaking teachers for the school staff by September 1955. “Replacement for either of these teachers is not available locally under
existing conditions,” Frost explained, as “a survey of local talent has revealed a definite lack of potential school teachers. . . . Those few who have some potential qualifications have repeatedly refused to accept a teaching position because of personal disinclination or because of more attractive positions elsewhere on the island.” On another note, Frost explained that the addition of two unmarried male teachers to the islands would also “improve existing social conditions for the indigenous women who are of marriageable age.” The hiring of two new teachers was eventually done by the next year, and, in March 1956, two graduates of the University of Hawaii, George Yokota, who later became principal, and Robert Hashimoto, arrived. Later there were a total of four teachers, including Dave Wolcotts and Jack Stetenbenz. During this time in 1958, the Navy built a five-room school named the Admiral Radford Elementary School. Education in English and following an American curriculum was compulsory until the end of seventh—and later ninth—grade. In 1968, enrollment was 69 students—60 islanders and 9 Navy dependents. Students had to move to Guam or mainland Japan for high school. All but three, Principal Yokota acknowledged in an interview later, chose to go to Guam.

Missionary work, likewise, got an early, albeit modest, start after the return of the islanders. In September 1948, the first missionaries—the Reverend and Mrs. Edward Stevens—traveling on Admiral Pownall’s ship, arrived in Chichi Jima staying for a few days. Subsequently that October, the General Association of General Baptists met in Owensville, Indiana, and decided to expand its operations beyond Guam and Saipan and open a mission in Chichi Jima by sending Reverend J. W. Greenway and his wife and daughter. They arrived in mid-July 1949. When the Greenways went to Saipan the following spring for the minister to train in a hospital, Reverend Edward Couch and his family arrived in their place. The Greenways returned to Chichi Jima in the fall of 1950. However in the fall of 1951, Mrs. Greenway became ill and had to return to the United States. They, in turn, were replaced by Stevens, who arrived in January 1952. In the summer of that year, however, a pneumonia epidemic hit the island, and Stevens became ill. He was taken to Guam for a physical in mid-September but died on board ship. His family was flown to Guam by seaplane and later on to the United States. After hearing the news, the Couch family volunteered their services and arrived in Chichi Jima on 31 March. Couch was succeeded by Reverend Cecil Green in 1955, who, in turn, was replaced by Reverend John E. Kell. He apparently attempted to prohibit alcohol and left—or was asked to leave—in 1959. Following his departure, the islanders requested a return to the Anglican church and suggested to the Navy that the grandson of a popular pre-war minister take over the duties. As a result, in 1962, a young minister and graduate of Rikkyo University in Tokyo, Isaac Gonzales, arrived on the island to assume responsibilities as minister at St. George’s Church. Realizing the need for the children of the island to be taught Japanese, the minister began to offer after-school classes for eighth and ninth graders in 1966, but even that was seen as too little, too late, when it became clear in 1967 that the islands would soon revert to Japan.

A dispensary to provide medical care for the islanders was established early on in a concrete building adjacent to that occupied by the military government representative. On 13 December 1952, a Navy medical officer arrived on Chichi Jima, having been assigned late the previous month. He also became responsible for housing inspections, as well as observing livestock slaughtering, and the cleaning of fish to ensure proper hygiene and sanitation.
The Bonin Island Trading Company’s Superette, a community-owned store importing clothing and food from Guam and Japan, was incorporated on 1 October 1955, with an initial capital of $4,500. To assist in the establishment of the store, the military governor advanced two-thirds of the funds from the Bonin-Volcano Trust Fund to supplement the $1,500 provided by the islanders. Most of the items were procured in Japan, using the facilities of the Naval Supply Depot at Yokosuka, and naval vessels for transportation. Guam and Saipan also provided supplies.

At the social level, relations with the naval personnel—through fishing, singing, parties, movies, marriage, etc.—seem to have been excellent. “These people are good, real good. The natives and the Navy here are just like a big family.” Nightlife, particularly for single men, was quite limited, however. “Most single men who have been stationed here,” advises the **General Information Brochure** (circa 1963), “have found their tour of duty on Chichi Jima most interesting and rewarding, plus presenting an outstanding opportunity to save money.” A song that the 17 single sailors on Chichi were said to have sung captured the dilemma in a different way: “We get news from FEN/and some diving in the skin/there’s softball, bikes, and tennis/and beer and bingo at the club/with lots of sunshine and good fishing/we really shouldn’t yell/but what ain’t we got—you know darn well.”

A general information brochure for those arriving on the island gave this description of the local people:

It is easy to imagine the Bonin Islanders as an isolated, forgotten bit of the human race. It is the opinion of those of us who have had the good fortune to live with them that they are neither. They are a people who have known oppression, but have retained the love for their native island and confidence in the future. Their ways often seem strange to us who have become accustomed to a softer way of life, but their ways have enabled them to survive for more than a hundred years. The worries of the atomic age are lost on these people. Their only apparent concern at times is whether or not the fish are biting, and whether or not there will be a ready market for their fish when they are caught. But this is a false impression. They hope for a better way of life for their children, just as we do for our own. They live not only for today, but also for the future. They want their children to have better education and better opportunities than they have enjoyed, just as we have the same hopes for our own children.

At the administrative level, as discussed earlier, there was at least one military government representative who had less than high praise for the islanders, at least when communicating with superiors. Bronson questioned just how “pro-U.S.” in fact the local community was. In the report cited above about the lack of leadership, the officer in charge wrote—admittedly in a not entirely flattering manner—of the islanders:

Politically, all people profess to be strong pro-American. Considering the influence of the American dollar, the logistic situation (entirely dependent on naval vessel), the standard of living (far better now than most of them ever dreamed of enjoying), and the fact that we are in the administrative driver’s seat at present, it would seem that they would be foolish indeed to profess anything else. My personal feel-
ing, based on the tendency of the people to hang onto the Japanese language and customs, the eagerness with which they visit friends and relatives in Japan, and a notable preference for Japanese goods, is that the majority of the Bonin Islanders are “fence straddlers.” I believe that they would much prefer to have the advantages of both ways of life and the responsibilities of neither.199

Still, Bronson urged Admiral Hopwood that much more needed to be done for the islands. He included the following six recommendations, mostly for the military, but with the last one for the direct benefit of the residents:

1. That every effort be continued to provide resident administration with high caliber military officers and personnel. Any apparent weakness in this area will be reflected in immediate activity by the so-called displaced Bonin Islanders and probably in communist propaganda.

2. That present policies be actively maintained until final disposition of the area is attained. Then introduce a system of rigidly controlled homesteading in order to improve the community and above all to strengthen the political position of the Islands. I am virtually certain that they will sometime be needed for military purposes and just as certain that a strong position from a humanitarian standpoint is the best defense against political aggression and community stagnation. American pioneering is needed here.

3. That some occupation, either military or indigenous, be established on Haha Jima as soon as practicable. This island is now a major target for the repatriation group and our defense is weak, i.e., you have nothing there, why can’t we have it?

4. That the military establishment on Chichi Jima be strengthened and expanded on a continuing basis. Every chore finished now is one less that will have to be done on an emergency basis in case of mobilization.

5. That military security be maintained at its present level, with as little fanfare as possible. I believe that the lax attitude here toward Japanese vessel entry during 1954–55 was at least partially responsible for the pressure imposed at the end of that period by the Japanese repatriation group.

6. That an agriculturalist, possibly a Japanese-American, be made available for a period of at least one year to actively supervise and educate the indigenous people of these islands in methods of animal husbandry and farming suitable to this climate and terrain. This recommendation is I believe the most important single item that can be undertaken now to improve community conditions here. The community could afford to pay a small salary and I’m sure that this would ensure full utilization of such an employee. A [U.S.] government subsidized man would only serve to strengthen the “something for nothing” philosophy that I have tried so hard to subjugate.

In his concluding remarks, Bronson argued that the “small price paid and being paid to keep the Bonin Islands and their inhabitants in the American fold is a bargain. Here is one of the few places that has not been subjected to foreign policy to the extent of ‘go home
American.’ It could still go that way if communism or improper local administration or policies are allowed to encroach. Let’s continue to be careful here.”

Bronson’s warnings came in light of the movements during most of the 1950s seeking a return to the islands, or their actual reversion, as well as the problems being faced in Okinawa. The U.S. government was basically able to hold the line over the next decade by not permitting repatriation and instead agreeing to compensate the former Japanese islanders. But it was only buying time. The Western islanders may or may have not known that was the case, but it was only a matter of time before the islands would revert to Japanese control.

**The Islander’s Anxieties about Reversion**

After another 10 years of attempts by the Navy to preserve its special rights on the islands and counter tries by the former islanders and Japanese government officials to see them returned, the U.S. and Japanese governments agreed in November 1967 at the summit between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku to return the islands to Japan. Eventually, after approximately four months of negotiations, the reversion agreement for the Bonin Islands was signed in April 1968, with the islands finally reverting on 26 June.

The decision to return the islands was, in the words of the wife of the final military government representative, Lieutenant Commander Dale W. Johnson, “a rude awakening both for the U.S. Navy and the Bonin Islanders.”\(^{200}\) “It never occurred to anyone,” one woman said, “that the islands would be given to Japan. We thought they would always be American.”\(^{201}\) Indeed, as one postmortem report notes, “Little did the inhabitants of the island realize how the pressure for reversion was increasing, especially since they were repeatedly assured that the U.S. Navy had no intentions of relinquishing the islands. They too, thought that 1970 might be a year of reckoning, but none anticipated this accelerated schedule. Therefore, they were stunned by the reversion announcement.”\(^{202}\) Obviously, it was not the Navy’s fault. The decision to return territory historically Japanese was made at the highest level for the sake of U.S.-Japan bilateral relations and U.S. prestige in the world. At the same time, however, the Navy was clearly at fault in its administration of the islands for pursuing an agenda that suggested to the islanders that they would become a part of the United States, or at the minimum, seeking to limit the influence of Japan on their daily lives, despite the strong possibility that the islands might in fact one day be returned to Japan. The Navy maintained its stance, in part, because it strongly desired to hold on to the islands for security reasons; it was deeply distrustful of Japanese attempts to return to the islands (not to mention attempts to see the administration of the islands reverted); and it was paternalistic in nature, intentionally or inadvertently, creating a local environment dependent upon the Navy and desirous of U.S. citizenship. At the least, the Navy did not discourage this.

Having been under the administration of the Navy for more than 20 years, the islanders now had to completely change their lifestyles once again, a fact that understandably left them quite anxious.\(^{203}\) “The first challenge was the administration of the islands and related laws, which would shift from the U.S. to the Japanese system. Second, education was a
concern. Younger people were for the most part illiterate in Japanese, having been educated in English. Third, medical and dental needs had been provided for free by the Navy, as was transportation and other logistics support to and from the island. The sudden rise in prices for goods and services was of great concern. Fourth, was the question of land ownership. No private ownership existed under U.S. administration and land that originally was Japanese-owned had been put to specific uses. Clarifying land ownership would be a problem, especially with the influx of the former Japanese residents who had owned the land. Fifth, economic and employment opportunities would be lost, as most people had been dependent on the Navy for jobs. The economy, therefore, was based on either those working for the Navy or fishing, which was also dependent on the use of Navy ships to move their products to markets in Guam. With the Navy leaving, those working for the service would lose their livelihoods. Fishermen also feared the arrival of large Japanese cooperatives that would fish them out of business, as noted earlier in the delegation’s meetings in Washington.

“To tell you the truth,” one of the older residents told an interviewer, “I wish they never would come back. We’re content. The Navy has always treated us good. What more could we want?” Another islander echoed his appreciation for the Navy: “I’ll tell you one thing. We’re thankful for what the United States has done. I can’t express it—the way they treated us, the kindness. They gave everybody a show to earn a livin’.”

In light of the islanders’ concerns about reversion, both the Japanese and U.S. governments sought, in some cases haphazardly, to develop immediate and more long-term policies to ease the anxieties. They sent numerous study missions to the islands to investigate the local situation. Similar trips were taken by Tokyo metropolitan government officials, to which the islands would revert. Likewise, members of the Bonin Island Council undertook a mission to Japan from 18–24 February 1968, to explain their concerns. Finally, the U.S. and Japanese governments passed special legislation to facilitate the return of the islands. In the case of the United States, legislation permitted islanders to immigrate to the United States or to go on for further schooling.

Despite these efforts, some islanders could not help but feel abandoned by the Navy. “Most of the islanders were heartbroken and felt betrayed,” wrote Shepardson, who conducted her research on Chichi Jima shortly after the reversion. “It was a sorry day when the Yankees left us, left us on the beach,” one said. In the end, however, despite the existence of some bitterness and a sense of abandonment, a number of close relationships between former Navy personnel and the local population have continued through the present day. Also, several of the younger generation elected to go on to the United States, although most did end up staying on Chichi Jima or moving to the mainland.

A final word is needed regarding the apparently contradictory—and potentially divisive—relationship between the islanders of Western descent and their views of the “Japanese.” It was probably Bonins Island specialist Daniel Long of Tokyo Metropolitan University who best explained the dynamics when he wrote,

When they initially petitioned the U.S. authorities for their return to the island, the Bonin Islanders stated that they, not being ethnic Japanese, had been the victims of horrendous racial discrimination during the period of their evacuation to the
Japanese mainland. There is no reason to doubt whatsoever their claim. It is important to realize here that their complaints were against the mainland Japanese, the Japanese military, and their pre-war Imperial government. Even the most critical reports do not complain about the ethnic Japanese the Bonin Islanders grew up alongside, and indeed with whom they intermarried. The most disparaging comments I have encountered by Bonin Islanders about their ethnic Japanese fellow islanders focus on who could whip whom in a fistfight—claims more typical of friendly rivalry than deep-rooted hatred. The vital distinction is too seldom drawn between the Bonin Islanders’ fear, distrust, and dislike of the mainland Japanese on the one hand, and their comparatively warmer feelings about their ethnic Japanese neighbors on the other.

Long’s analysis is essentially confirmed by Uncle Charlie Washington on the eve of reversion, who said simply and matter-of-factly, “I can’t say anything against the Japs. They treated us O.K. Of course, I was born under the round ball, the rising sun.” Having seen so much in his very long life, Uncle Charlie was probably ready for anything, including yet another change—reversion back to Japanese control.

NOTES

1 An earlier version of part of this chapter was presented at the Asia Studies Conference Japan held at Sophia University, Tokyo, on 21 June 2003, which formed the basis of the article entitled “The U.S. Naval Administration of the Ogasawara Islands, 1945–1968,” Ogasawara Kenkyu [Ogasawara Research], no. 29 (March 2004), 95–124.


3 The author was unable to locate a specific directive establishing English as the official language of education. The closest thing to an official directive appears to be the Navy’s revised basic policy toward the Pacific Islands (of January 1948), the provisions of which were “applicable to the Naval Military Government of the Bonin–Volcano Island.” (“Memorandum from Office of Chief of Naval Operations to Commander in Chief, Pacific and U.S. Pacific Fleet on Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, January 15, 1948,” Operational Archives.) The provisions were “principles . . . to be considered as a guide for all officers and persons connected with the several governments under the cognizance of the Navy Department.” (Ibid.) On the one hand, it suggested that “educational programs shall foster and encourage instruction in the native language and history and in native arts and crafts,” yet this recommendation was immediately followed by one that described English language education as a “prime necessity for inhabitants of all ages.” (Ibid.) It then pointed out that “this is not to be construed as discouraging instruction in native languages and culture.” (Ibid.) It seems instead that English language education came about therefore by default, out of necessity (the isolation of the islands and lack of Japanese teachers, and supply of native English
“teachers” and “aides” among the Naval community), out of a desire on part of the local residents, as opposed to an actual official U.S. policy. One officer in charge of the naval facility, however, admitted in the mid-1950s that “the mission of the present school has been to convert a predominately Japanese-speaking people to the English language, to acquaint them with the American way of life, and to provide an adequate foundation in the basic arts and sciences.” (“Memorandum from Officer in Charge, U.S. Naval Facility, to Commander Naval Forces Marianas on Bonin Island School and Education Facilities; information concerning, April 25, 1955,” Folder: Bonin-Volcanos, Education of Natives, 1955–1966, Box 98, Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands.) This confusing approach contrasted greatly with that of education in Okinawa, also under U.S. administration, and would be responsible for much unease and confusion 20 years later when the islands were returned.


5Ibid., 178.

6Ibid., 180.

7Ibid., 179.

8Ibid.

9Ibid., 178.

10Mary Shepardson, The Bonin Islands: Pawns of Power (unpublished manuscript 1988, unedited version), chapter 30, 1 (actual page number appears as 30-1).


12See Cant, “Home to Chichijima,” 19, and Sheridan, “Sunday Telegram Writer,” 17 October 1948, 8. In the prewar years, St. Joseph’s, which was run by the Brotherhood of St. Mary, had a faculty that was almost 90 percent American.


14“CINCPAC restricted message 180116 (December 1945),” cited in Pesce, Book I, 27.

15“CNO confidential message 281705 (December 1945),” cited in ibid.

16Cant, “Home to Chichijima,” 19.

17Shepardson, The Bonin Islands, 30–35. Also see Cant, “Home to Chichijima,” 19.

18“Minutes of State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (March 19, 1946),” in Iokibe, ed., Microfiche 2-C-66. Initially it seems that SWNCC had suggested that the islanders resettle in Tinian, in the Northern Marianas, as part of a ranching project. That proposal, however, was rejected by the then-Commander of the Northern Marianas. Savory was reported to have also suggested Tinian or Saipan for the time being, aware that the lack of facilities on Chichi Jima might delay their return. See Pesce, Book I, 28.

20Cant, “Home to Chichijima,” 17–19.

21Shepardson, The Bonin Islands (unedited version), 30-5.

22Ibid., 30-6.

23Cant, “Home to Chichijima,” 19.


25“CINCAFPAC Tokyo message 041139 (September 1946),” cited in Pesce, Book I, 28. CINCPAC agreed with SCAP that families should not be separated and concurred with SCAP’s recommendation to permit the return of the spouses. See “CINCPAC message 152201 (September 1946),” cited in ibid.

26Shepardson, The Bonin Islands (unedited version), 30-6.

27Ibid., 31–32. Also see Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 58. There is some discrepancy in the research on the actual date of arrival, with some materials suggesting the 16th and others the 17th. It seems that the ship arrived late in the evening on the 16th, and the passengers disembarked on the 17th.

28Pesce, Book I, 30.

29Shepardson, The Bonin Islands, 190.

30Ibid., 191.

31Shepardson, The Bonin Islands (unedited version), 31-2. Also see Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 58; and “U.S. Naval Facility Chichijima, Bonin Islands Press Kit (undated),” Folder: Bonin Volcanos, Description of Islands and Navy Presence, 1946–1965, Box 98, Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands. LCI(L) refers to Landing Craft Infantry (Large) and PC to Patrol Craft.


33Fendrich, “Bonin Island Historic Events.”

34Pesce, Book I, 29.

35Ibid. Also see Fendrich, “Bonin Island Historic Events.”

36Shepardson, The Bonin Islands, 191.


38Fendrich, “Bonin Island Historic Events.”

39Pesce, Book I, 30. According to Fendrich, the crews were expecting only about 94 to show up, which corresponds with the original list presented by Savory.

40Pesce, Book I, 30.

41Shepardson, The Bonin Islands (unedited version), 31-2, and Pesce, Book I, 32.

42Fearing the abuse of the title “police,” which was common during the prewar and wartime period, the name “inspector” was given. Position “bosses” were similarly made “supervisors.” See Pesce, Book
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I, 31. Jerry was subsequently sent to Guam to receive a few months of intensive study in basic medical care at Guam Memorial Hospital.


44Shepardson, The Bonin Islands, 191. Shepardson’s student Arima writes that a petty officer was left on the island for liaison purposes. See Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 59.


46Ibid.

47For that account, see Mary-Lou Johnson, A Honeymoon Island, unpublished and undated manuscript, 5–6.

48Pesce, Book I, 31–32.


50Shepardson, The Bonin Islands, 191.

51Ibid., 194.

52Ibid., 195.

53Ibid., 194.

54Ibid., 196–97.

55Ibid., 197. The Japanese evacuees were not allowed to return due to the SWNCC policy, as discussed in chapter 4, not that of SCAP or Commander, Naval Forces Far East. As mentioned earlier, there were 126 islanders of Western descent and their spouses who actually returned, not 120.


57Ibid., 8.


59JCS 1231.


61Pesce, Book I, 34.

62“PacFlt ltr 54L-46, revised (February 2, 1947),” cited in ibid., 34.

63Ibid., 35.
Naval Administration and Chichi Jima Life, 1945–68

64Ibid.

65JCS 1231/12 cited in Findley, Book II, 62.

66Ibid.


69For the financial and humanitarian problems caused in the case of the Amami Islands, see Elbridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, 6–11.


72Pesce, Book I, 38.

73Ibid.

74Ibid.

75“DCMGO Bonins ltr ser 125 (March 5, 1948),” cited in ibid.

76Ibid., 38n1.

77Ibid.

78Kenney, “Letter from Yankeetown.” For the reference to Fish, who served as U.S. secretary of state in the 1870s and is seen as having abandoned the islanders of American descent, see chapter 1.

79Kenney, “Letter from Yankeetown.”


81Ibid. Also see Sheridan, “Sunday Telegram Writer,” 10 October 1948, 12.

82Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 59. Later, each fisherman was limited to 800 pounds a month as space was limited on the Navy ships. See Sampson, “The Bonins and Iwo Jima Go Back,” 136.


85Shepardson, The Bonin Islands (unedited manuscript), 32–8.

86Pesce, Book I, 42.

87Ibid., 45.

88Ibid., 46.

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90“CINCPACFLT ltr serial 3487 (September 15, 1950),” cited in ibid.

91“DCNO (Admin) personal letter to DEPHICOMTERPACIS (September 29, 1950),” cited in ibid., 49.

92Ibid.

93“CNO confidential memo, serial 02P30, JCS 1259/198 (February 12, 1951),” cited in ibid.

94“CNO confidential memo (March 15, 1951),” cited in ibid., 50. Incidentally, Bradley thought highly of Sherman in his memoirs, describing him as “one of the most impressive military officers I have met in any service . . . He was the perfect man to restore discipline in the Navy [following the so-called Admirals' Revolt and Denfeld's 'professional death'] and a welcomed face in the JCS.” See Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 513. Sherman died shortly after this exchange from a heart attack during a trip to Europe in late July.


96In the meantime, MacArthur had been relieved of command by President Truman over the handling of the Korean War and his insubordination.

97Pesce, *Book I*, 51–52. Pobst's wife and daughter traveled with him there, and a son was also born while he was there.


100Ibid., 259–60.

101Ibid., 260.

102Ibid., 261.

103“Petition from Undersigned Bonin Islanders to Chief Military Officer, Bonin Island on Request for United States Citizenship (January 24, 1951),” Records of the Military Government/Civil Affairs Branch of the Office of the CNO, Series VII Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center. According to the internal organizational history, CINCPACFLT forwarded the petition to the Chief of Naval Operations, who in turn referred it to the Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews (see “CINCPACFLT 2nd Endorsement serial 1633 [March 23, 1951],” cited in Pesce, *Book I*, 51). Although Matthews believed the islanders' request to be premature since the status of the islands would not be decided until the peace treaty with Japan, he did point out to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson in a 13 April letter the validity, from a humanitarian perspective, of the U.S. plan for a trusteeship for the islands (see “Letter from SecNav to SecState [April 13, 1951],” cited in ibid.). The State Department's reply to the Navy Department suggested that the islanders be thanked for presenting their desires and informed them that their petition had been studied with care (see “Letter from SecState to SecNav [April 23, 1951],” cited in ibid.).


105Ibid., 260.
106Ibid.


110Ibid.

111Findley, *Book II*, 66–69. This became effective retroactively on 1 March.

112Ibid., 102–3.

113Ibid., 103.

114Ibid., 105–6.

115Ibid.

116Ibid., 107.

117Ibid.

118Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 60.

119Author’s e-mail correspondence with Jeanie Frost, 14 May 2003.

120Radford, *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam*, 261.

121Ibid.

122“The Ambassador in Japan (Murphy) to the Department of State (October 13, 1952).”


124Ibid., 253.


126“Memorandum from Admiral Radford to Secretary of State Dulles (March 15, 1956),” Naval Records. A similar argument was introduced in an internal Navy study: “It is clearly evident that the Japanese will never slacken their efforts to return to the Bonins and will continue to press for other toe holds in the central Pacific . . . The day we permit any group of Japanese to enter the Bonin-Volcano Islands—for any reason—will be the day the United States begins to lose administrative and security control of these islands, including the Marianas and Carolines to the south” [emphasis added]. See Findley, *Book II*, 284.

127“Memorandum from Admiral Radford to Secretary of State Dulles (March 15, 1956).”


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131“Letter from J. Graham Parsons to Noel Hemmendinger, January 25, 1956,” Central Decimal Files, 794C.00/1-2556, RG 59.


133Findley, Book II, 235–36.

134Ibid.

135Ibid., 237.

136“Memorandum of Conversation on Views of Present Day Inhabitants of the Bonin Islands, November 22, 1955,” CDF 794C.00/11-2255, RG 59.

137Ibid.

138Ibid.

139“Memorandum of Conversation, Repatriation of Japanese to the Bonin Islands, November 23, 1955,” CDF 794C.00/11-2355, RG 59.

140Petition of the Indigenous Population of Chichi Jima, Bonin Islands to the State Department of the United States of America, November 2, 1955,” CDF 794C.00/11-2355, RG 59.

141Ibid.

142“Memorandum of Conversation (with Robert Murphy), Repatriation of Japanese to the Bonin Islands, November 23, 1955,” CDF 794C.00/11-2355, RG 59.

143Ibid.


145Shepardson, The Bonin Islands (unedited version), 32-16.

146Ibid.

147Findley, Book II, 237. For more, see Folder 12 (Bonin-Volcanos Bonin Island Delegation's Visit to New Bedford, RI, 1955), Box 98, Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands.


149Findley, Book II, 284-A.

150Author’s interview with local islander who was a teenager then, Chichi Jima, 22 August 2007.

151Findley, Book II, 67.

152For more on submarine strategy, see Chuck Lawliss, The Submarine Book: An Illustrated History of the Attack Submarine (Short Hills, NJ: Burford Books, 2000).

153“Memorandum from Military Government Representative to Military Governor, Bonin-Volcano Islands on Information Concerning the Bonin Islands (March 20, 1958),” Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands.

154Sampson, “The Bonins and Iwo Jima Go Back to Japan,” 137.


“Chronology Deployments by Country,” B-3.

Information on the units serving on Iwo Jima was taken from press clippings from the Pacific Stars and Stripes from the 1940s and 1950s. The author is grateful to Murota Norio of the Pacific Stars and Stripes for providing access to these clippings.

Porkchop: Iwo is Important Link in FEALF Lifeline, Pacific Stars and Stripes, 3 September 1952.

Ibid.

Ibid.


3rd Marines Leave Iwo, Pacific Stars and Stripes, 30 March 1954. According to the article, the British ships participating were the destroyer HMS Cockade and the cruisers HMS Birmingham and Constance. For more on the importance of amphibious doctrine and training for the Marine Corps during this time, see Joseph H. Alexander and Merrill L. Bartlett, Sea Soldiers in the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995).

Iwo Marines ‘Attack’ Nidan Hill; General Hull Returns to Tokyo, ibid., 24 March 1954; “3rd Marines Stage Iwo Assault in Decade’s 2nd Invasion of Island,” ibid., 21 March 1954.

‘Assault’ on Iwo,” ibid., 10 February 1956.


1st Wave of Marines Steams Toward Iwo,” ibid., 11 February 1956.


11 Years Later, Marines Land Again on Iwo Jima,” ibid., 6 March 1956.

Once Hid Japanese Troops, Iwo Caves to be AF A-Shelters,” ibid., 29 May 1955.

Ibid.


Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 60. The other main family, Robinson, had daughters who married into other families and thus was not represented.
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176 Ibid.
177 Ibid., 61.
178 Memorandum from Military Government Representative to Military Governor (March 20, 1958).
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
181 Briefing Paper on Bonin-Volcano Islands for Secretary of Navy.
182 Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 260.
184 Ibid.
188 Ibid. For more on the educational situation in the islands, see Kikuchi Takehisa, “Amerika Shisekenka no Kokoseitachi o Tazunete: Ogasawara Koto Gakko no Zenshi no Kochiku ni” [Visiting the Former High School Students from the American Administration Days in an Effort to Understand the Early History of Ogasawara High School], Tokyo Toritsu Ogasawara Koto Gakko Kenkyu Kiyo, no. 8 (1994), 75–82.
190 Ibid., 65.
191 Arima, “An Ethnographic and Historical Study,” 204. Interview with Reverend and Mrs. Isaac Gonzales (Ogasawara Aisaku), August 2000. The original church was built in 1909, but was destroyed during the war. At the time, it was set up in a Quonset hut. In 1967, the Navy built a new church on the same site as the original.
194 Ibid., 114–16. Also see “Bonin Isles May Become Japan’s Hawaii.”

*Brochure of General Information.*

“Memorandum from Military Government Representative to Military Governor.”


“Bonin Islanders Face Problems in Japan Reversion.” Also see “Chichijimans Uneasy About Return to Japan,” *Japan Times*, date unknown.


Ibid., 128.


Ibid.

Daniel Long, “Conclusion,” in Shepardson, *The Bonin Islands*, 209–10. As Shepardson had passed away before her manuscript was finished, Long helped complete it by writing the final chapter.

We have many difficult issues with Japan. With respect to some of them, such as Okinawa, there is nothing we can do at this juncture to meet the Japanese view. However, with respect to the Bonin Islanders, I do feel strongly that we can, without jeopardizing our basic and fundamental interest or security, be forthcoming enough to find reasonable solutions. This is very important, because the Bonin Island problem is a very contentious issue which has deep psychological overtones which cannot but affect our long-term relations with Japan.

—Telegram from Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 20 September 1957

Although the Peace Treaty allowed Japan to retain “residual sovereignty” over the islands, and thus a near fatal wound to the postwar U.S.-Japan relationship was avoided, the 7,000 islanders who could not return to their homes in Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, Iwo Jima, and Kita Iwo Jima, as well as the nation as a whole, were unhappy with the fact that Japan was not permitted to administer the islands that had been historically theirs for at least 70 years, and some would say 360 years. This dissatisfaction, or irredentism, would gnaw at U.S.-Japan relations over the next 15 years until the decision to return administrative control over the islands was made in November 1967 and the return completed in June 1968.

Before examining the bilateral discussions on reversion and repatriation, it is necessary to briefly look at the situation of the islanders of Japanese descent who wished to be repatriated and their efforts to realize that desire, as it is their hopes for return and the U.S. Navy’s unwillingness to allow them to return that were the subject of the bilateral talks.

THE LEAGUE OF BONIN EVACUEES AND THEIR DESIRE TO RETURN HOME

Islanders of Japanese descent had petitioned General MacArthur’s headquarters in early 1946 to be allowed to return, but they never officially received a reply regarding their plea. In the meantime, 130 islanders of Western descent, who had made similar pleas shortly before theirs, were able to return in late 1946.

The economic situation in Japan in the meantime had worsened, with inflation and unemployment high. The islanders of Japanese descent, lacking social and other connections and permanent livelihoods on the mainland, fared poorly in this situation. In particular, funds for their community were getting low as the national subsidies they had been receiv-
ing as part of their evacuation from the islands were ended for fiscal year 1946 and the sala-
ries of public workers for the Ogasawara Village Office—which was temporarily housed in
the Shitayatake-cho Elementary School in Tokyo—after April were unlikely to be paid.¹

As a result, community leaders gathered and decided to form a group to continue their
appeals to the central government and Tokyo Metropolitan Government for continued
economic assistance. The Ogasawarato Iwo Jima Hikiagesha Renmei (League for Ogasawara
and Iwo Jima Evacuees) was subsequently formed in July 1946, with Kikuchi Torahiko
(from Chichi Jima, who drafted the earlier petition) as its chairperson and Yokota Tatsuo
(from Haha Jima, who presented the petition to MacArthur’s headquarters) as vice chair.
The league was successful in getting financial support from the metropolitan government
in October and in getting special tax treatment for having lost their assets on the islands
that same month.

Around the same time, the islanders of Western descent were allowed to return to Chi-
chi Jima, and their return, while causing some jealousy, also acted to embolden the islanders
of Japanese descent. In July, about 800 gathered for a rally at the Shitayatake-cho Ele-
mentary School to demonstrate their desire to return to the islands. At this time, they disband-
ed the league, and created a new one—the Ogasawarato Iwojima Kikyo Sokushin Renmei
(League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation).² Kikuchi was named chair again,
and Yokota as vice chair. The rally also approved a petition that was subsequently forwarded
to General MacArthur; Matsuoka Komakichi, the speaker of the lower house; and Yasui
Seiichiro, the governor of Tokyo.

Hoping for a favorable response from occupation authorities, the league waited and
exercised restraint, but with nothing forthcoming after a year and a half, it regrouped in an
attempt to strengthen its position. They submitted new petitions, this time to the Mari-
anas commander and the speaker of the upper house, Matsudaira Tsuneo, in addition to
MacArthur, Governor Yasui, and lower house Speaker Shidehara Kijuro, the former prime
minister (1945–46), who had replaced Matsuoka on 11 February 1949.³ With this, and the
fact that the league was garnering the support of some Japanese politicians and bureau-
crats, it gained the attention of occupation authorities, who were now more willing to crack
down on political agitators. It was investigated in June 1949 by the Special Investigation
Bureau of General Headquarters to determine if it was involved in political activities and
if it should be considered a political organization. It was, and its chair, Kikuchi, having
been purged for heading the Omura Sonendan (Omura Village Young Men’s League) in
Chichi Jima, was rendered ineligible to head the league any longer. He stepped down, and
was replaced by Yokota in June 1950, who in turn was succeeded by Asanuma Keisaburo as
vice chair through a vote of the organization members.⁴ This did not stop the league from
continuing its appeals, however.

One of the first things the new leadership did was conduct a house-to-house survey in
October that year of the islanders to clarify their desires with regard to repatriation to the
islands.⁵ Some 500 households, or 3,000 people, were asked about their living standards—
now six years after their forced removal—and their desire to return. Based on this survey,
the league prepared a detailed plan to develop local industry and business to support the
islanders upon their return. This was to be used as a briefing document for the Japanese
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and U.S. governments and other interested parties. According to Kikuchi, as the movement spread, the league learned that not many in Japan and its leadership knew of the plight of the islanders. They thus shared the findings of the survey with as many as they could. The group followed the 1950 survey with another in May 1953.

The league also began submitting petitions—nearly 100 over the years—addressing their return to the islands, the retention of sovereignty over the islands by Japan, or the return of the islands to Japan (see appendix 4 for a full list). While residual sovereignty would in fact be retained, administrative rights were not. Nor were the islanders granted their desire to return home.

**SEEKING AN EARLY SOLUTION TO THE BONINS’ PROBLEM**

Shortly after the peace treaty went into effect on 28 April 1952, the Japanese government renewed its efforts to see the islands returned, and if that were impossible, to have the islanders returned to their homes. On 26 June, Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo, who had drafted one of the first position papers on the territorial issue in the summer of 1947, met with the new U.S. ambassador to Japan, Robert D. Murphy, to discuss the fate of the islanders and to request their repatriation. Mentioning the “constant flood of oral and written petitions” from the evacuees, Okazaki explained “their situation is deplorable” and that “all they ask . . . is the right to return to their homes where they can make a living.” Okazaki stated that it was hard for the Japanese government to understand U.S. reluctance to per-
mit their return, especially when the 135 former Bonin residents who were descendents of American and European settlers were already permitted to do so. “Security considerations can be no greater than those concerning Okinawa and Japan proper,” Okazaki asked rhetorically, “so what is the reason for preventing their return?”

Murphy, a career diplomat with extensive experience with refugees and other political-military issues in occupied Europe as General Dwight D. Eisenhower's political advisor, had already received a petition from the league at the end of May, a month after he began his duties in Japan, so he was probably familiar to some extent with the situation of the islanders. This was not the last petition he was to receive; after he returned to Washington as undersecretary of state, he would receive numerous petitions and visitors concerning the Bonin Islands.

Murphy seems to have had difficulty answering Okazaki's question, and wrote to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson for instructions, sending copies to Commander in Chief, Far East General Mark W. Clark based at Ichigaya in Tokyo; Commander, Naval Forces, Far East Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe based at Yokosuka; and Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, at Pearl Harbor. After explaining the embassy's difficulty in answering “this seemingly reasonable request” as a result of not having heard the Navy's reasons against permitting the return of the evacuees, Murphy warned,

Unless there are important contrary considerations of which the Embassy is not aware, we cannot but feel that responsible naval authorities are performing a grave disservice, not only to the evacuees themselves but also to over-all U.S.-Japan relations, in refusing to permit repatriation. In this connection, it should be pointed out to the Navy that this refusal is giving rise to charges in Japan due to racial discrimination, territorial aggrandizement and general unhumanitarian action on part of U.S., and constitutes a growing source of potential friction between U.S. and Japanese Governments.

Likely on the instructions of Foreign Minister Okazaki, Ambassador Araki Eikichi in Washington, raised the same issue in a meeting on 8 July 1952, with Assistant Secretary John M. Allison. It is not clear what answer Allison gave, but according to a letter he sent a week later to Frank C. Nash, his counterpart as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, the State Department supported the views of Araki and Okazaki and believed that the former residents should be allowed to return to the islands. Allison, referring specifically to Murphy's telegram of 2 July, outlined the situation with regard to the islands and requested that, because they were under the Department of the Navy, representatives of the Defense Department inform the State Department's Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (NAA) as to what “appropriate reply” could be given to the Japanese government. About six weeks passed before Allison received an answer from Nash, but Murphy's telegram and Allison's subsequent inquiry raised warning bells in the Navy and indirectly within the Defense Department.

Admiral Radford was “very surprised,” almost hurt it seems, to receive Murphy's telegram recommending the islands’ return to Japan. “Our first post-war ambassador to Japan . . . had been . . . a good friend of mine. I believed we [had] talked over the future of the
Bonin and Volcano Islands several times but am not certain,” Radford wrote. Radford immediately voiced his concerns in a message to Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William M. Fechteler, who was not initially informed of the State Department’s telegram. Radford described Murphy’s views as “very disturbing” because it “indicates a lack of continuity between the ambassador and former political sections of SCAP . . . [and] complete unawareness of current existing directives, which so far as CINCPACFLT is aware, are the current United States policy directives on this subject.” Radford pointed out that the case for retention of the status quo, as outlined in JCS 1380/135, “is not a unilateral Navy position, nor was the 1946 repatriation decision,” and as such, the State Department should “support the conclusions reached by the JCS in these papers” and the ambassador be “so instructed.” In the meantime, Radford “took immediate steps to delay any [attempts to return the islands] and urged [the ambassador] to meet me in Chichi Jima so that I could acquaint him personally with the islanders, their problems, and the reasons why I felt we should not give them up.”

Radford’s four-page communication spells out in great detail his command’s opposition to the return of the islands and the repatriation of the evacuees. The arguments were heard in the past and would be heard again. But this is a good place to introduce them in detail, particularly as they were written on the eve of a trip to the Bonins by Radford and would serve as the basis for the Navy’s opposition over the years to any changes in the status quo.

As part of his efforts to “acquaint himself with the people and problems of the western Pacific,” which was the area of responsibility that Radford inherited when he became Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command/Pacific Fleet on 30 April 1949, and High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of Pacific Islands, Radford visited the Bonin Islands in May 1951 after the situation had stabilized on the Korean Peninsula. His trip was more than for sightseeing, however, and he met with the islanders and inspected the administrative and residential sections. The admiral’s views on the geo-strategic importance of the islands were probably confirmed at the time of this first visit and reinforced on his second visit in October 1952. His thoughts were made quite clear in the July communication.

After explaining the respective policy directives, Radford began his memo by noting that most of the present residents of the islands were “never particularly happy under Japanese rule” and had not been “fully trusted” by the Japanese government or the Japanese citizenry, even though they had been “forced to accept Japanese citizenship and Japanese names.” The present islanders, as a result, were against the repatriation of the Japanese ex-residents and had “argue[d] that many of the latter had flimsy and short-time ties with these islands.” Others “fear the return of Japanese because of testimony present residents gave in connection with the war crimes trials,” Radford added, mentioning specifically the case of cannibalism. “All in all, the present residents of Chichi Jima are entitled to consideration. They are, to all intents and purposes, the only real natives of these islands.”

Radford next explained that, even when the islands were under Japanese rule, “civilian travel throughout the Bonins was severely limited” and that they were heavily fortified. The farmers and fishermen, Radford noted, “primarily supplied the needs of the Japanese military,” and that the “great majority” of those who were not farmers or fishermen, were “engaged in construction of fortifications and other military facilities which was in progress.
for 20 years prior to World War Two.” Moreover, based on records gathered in Tokyo, the
land titles for the Bonins, according to Radford, showed that the Japanese government
owned “78% of all Bonin land at the start of World War Two and undoubtedly took over all
of it during the war.” As a result, the admiral stated, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima can be said
to have been primarily military bases prior to the war, and that the majority of the civilians
were there “solely because of this fact.” As if to drive home the point, he added, quoting
from Murphy’s telegram (who was quoting Foreign Minister Okazaki), “the idea that they
led simple bucolic lives and wish to return to their ‘native hearth’ just does not jibe with
cold hard facts.” Mentioning the evacuation of the civilians in 1944, Radford believed that
the Japanese government could “readily understand” the situation regarding the exclusion
of civilians from the area “for the same reasons which prompted the Japanese government
evacuation decision.”

In addition, Radford pointed out that “All vestiges of former villages and homes have
disappeared. Some were destroyed by bombing and fire and some by Japanese military. At
any rate, there are no homes to which former residents can return and it would be a very
expensive project to resettle them.” In looking at possible alternatives and compromises,
Radford mentioned the idea of resettlement on some of the smaller islands, but said it was
not “realistic even if feasible from [the] security viewpoint.” Nevertheless, he stated from
that point of view, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima are “interdependent and must be considered
as one U.S. base. The dual control of this base, which would inevitably ensue were [the]
proposed influx of non-U.S. nationals permitted, would be most undesirable.” Citing an
example from the discussions over the use of Yokosuka Naval Base for friendly third-power
vessels in which, because of the “split-control situation,” there were “interpretative differ-
ences” between Japan and the United States “within days of the security treaty’s acceptance”
by the two countries. “[I]t is crystal clear that maintenance of single authority in a territory
eliminates the possibility of stalemating differences ever arising.”

One compromise Radford did suggest was that consideration be given to “compensating
Japanese landholders for 22 percent of [the] Bonins which they once held.” In addition to
its humanitarian appeal (“sympathetic move”), Radford argued that it would be a “decisive
action to close the door to further futile requests for repatriation.” Finally, Radford argued
that a “physical sighting of the islands in question is a tremendous aid to clear evaluation of
Japanese government proposal,” and he later encouraged Murphy to go to the islands and
see for himself.

Fechteler apparently was impressed with Radford’s memo and seems to have shared his
concerns. During a tour of the Far East later in July, he visited with Ambassador Murphy
specifically to discuss this issue. Murphy reiterated the points in his telegram, emphasizing
the humanitarian nature of the situation. He noted that it is “one item in a list of eco-
nomic and population problems” that would “sooner or later . . . have to be faced.” Murphy
also stressed the political importance of the issue for the Japanese government (a pattern
that would be seen repeated regularly afterward): “A small gesture in the present case, if
that is possible, could have an important effect needed by a friendly Japanese government
which is facing general elections in the near future and which is under increasing attack by
the opposition on the score that it is subservient to American interests.” Murphy argued
for an approach in which “some measure of satisfaction could be given,” and ended by saying that he was “not convinced of the validity” of treating the Ryukyus (where the islanders were allowed to continue to reside) and the Bonins differently, particularly as the Bonins involved a situation of only 7,000 people, which was the equivalent of roughly 1 percent of the number of those in the Nansei Islands. Fechteler replied that he now understood the “political problem caused by this exiled group” but still supported Radford’s position (which, it seems, was forwarded to Murphy at some point). “With the type of Naval installations in the Bonins,” he did not see how it would be possible for the former residents to resettle there. Fechteler invited Murphy to visit the islands for himself, probably forwarding Radford’s invitation. Murphy accepted, admitting that he did “not understand all the factors involved in the Navy’s point of view.” The Navy had won its first battle in the war against repatriation, one front in the larger war against changing the status quo with regard to the islands.

The Navy’s initial victory in Tokyo was followed by a delaying action in Washington. Nash, who headed international security affairs in the Defense Department (known as the “Little State Department”), finally responded to Allison’s 15 July letter with one of his own in which he carefully laid out the Department of Defense position.\(^\text{20}\) He concluded that the Defense Department supported the JCS conclusions of 22 January 1952 that “no change in U.S. policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East,” and observing that the “return of so many Japanese citizens to an area not under the control of Japan would create administrative difficulties, including questions of criminal jurisdiction, and by their very numbers would tend to prejudge a later decision on the eventual disposition of the islands—a decision which it is not desirable to make at this time.” Nash concluded by stating that it was “not in the best interest” of the U.S. government to revise the present repatriation policy and recommended that no further action be taken until Allison had the opportunity to speak with Radford, Clark, and Murphy during his trip to the Far East.\(^\text{21}\)

A week later on 5 September, Allison met with Admiral Radford, who was visiting Washington on a trip necessitated in part because of the Bonins issue.\(^\text{22}\) It was at this time that Allison suggested that some representatives of the Japanese government and “one or two leaders” of the former residents of the islands accompany Radford and Murphy on their trip to the islands to “show them local conditions and not only difficulty but perhaps undesirability of return of large number of these former residents.” Radford promised to consider it.

When Radford arrived in Hawaii, a letter from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru awaited him requesting that the islanders be permitted to return and that economic activities by Japanese nationals, including mining, fishing, and farming, be permitted in the former mandated islands.\(^\text{23}\) Yoshida explained that the islanders “have no foothold, social or economic, in Japan proper; they are helpless and almost destitute. Their only hope is to be allowed to go back to their islands . . . Disappointment and growing poverty are rendering their lives more miserable than ever,” and “being convinced that the resettlement of the Bonin Islanders will contribute substantially to the strengthening of friendly ties between Japan and America.” Yoshida was “appeal[ing] personally to you for help toward its realiza-
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It is not clear if Radford, who had hosted Yoshida the year before when the latter came through Honolulu on his way to and from San Francisco for the peace treaty conference, immediately responded, but he was no doubt unhappy about this request from the prime minister of a former enemy state.

The Yoshida government was under political pressure, or at least perceived itself to be so, and explicitly linked a resolution to the issue with future elections, hence the reference in Yoshida’s letter to Radford that “concrete action . . . taken by your Government immediately . . . would not only gladden the hearts of the islanders in distress and bring joy to all Japanese, but also to serve to strengthen the Government’s position in the coming general elections scheduled for the 1st of October next” [emphasis original]. This was not the first reference by the Japanese side to domestic politics—Okazaki’s 23 June letter to Murphy had alluded to the “strong dissatisfaction . . . revealed by members of the Japanese Diet now in session in connection with the tardiness of the Japanese Government action” on the issue of repatriation—and it would not be the last, but it seems to have been the first written expression of concern about the electoral effects if the Japanese government’s desires were not realized.

Murphy alerted the State Department about the Japanese government’s concerns, after meeting with Okazaki on 30 August, at which time he was shown a copy of Yoshida’s letter to Radford and informed Okazaki that Allison and Radford might visit Tokyo that fall. Murphy mentioned that Okazaki said he was happy about their visit, but that pressure on the Foreign Ministry was continuing and Okazaki was disappointed that a resolution had not been found earlier, “especially in view . . . of elections on October 1, [Okazaki] hoped for some results (rpt [repeat] not) too distant future.”

Murphy clearly wanted to help and tried to keep the ministry informed on the one hand, and reminded U.S. military officials on the other of the Japanese political situation. In his July meeting with Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Fechteler, for example, Murphy had stated rhetorically, “The present Japanese government would need support of this nature if it is to remain in power and I assumed that we would like it to remain in power.” It would not be the first or last time for Murphy to do so.

By early September, Ambassador Murphy had decided to accept Admiral Radford’s invitation to visit the islands and was encouraged to do so by Allison. The date for the inspection was set for early October. On 9 September, Murphy called on Foreign Minister Okazaki to tell him about the trip with Clark and Briscoe and mentioned that Radford would be meeting them there. Murphy invited the Foreign Ministry to send a government representative and have one of the former residents come along as well. Acting on a request from the State Department, he also asked Okazaki to confirm whether the Japanese government had the financial ability to pay for the transportation of the islanders and their living costs on the island, where the Japanese government planned on having the settlers relocate (as most of the land was Japanese government-owned and being used by the U.S. Navy, which had no immediate plans of returning). He also asked about the large discrepancy in the figure of more than 7,000 people who supposedly wished to return to the islands when some 80 percent had been there to build fortifications from 1940 or so on, and did not represent the 20 percent who were traditional resident farmers and fishermen. Okazaki promised to get back to Murphy with the answers.
Okazaki did so on 22 September, with a two-page memo entitled, “Memorandum on the Repatriation Plan of the Japanese to the Bonin Islands.” In it, he answered each of the questions and offered an overview of a plan being considered to repatriate the islanders. He explained that 5,000 of 7,711 residents as of 1944 desired to return, the remainder having already established themselves in Honshu with no desire to return. Of the 5,000 residents, according to Okazaki’s plan, 2,000 would return to the islands as soon as permitted and the remaining 3,000 would go once the first group had “settled down and [was] ready to accept them.”

In the memo, Okazaki reemphasized at the end of the memo that the Japanese government was prepared to extend assistance, financial or otherwise, to the resettlement of the islanders, Okazaki requested that “in view of the fact that the economic life of the resident Japanese in the Bonin Islands will depend much upon that of Honshu as it was in the past . . . traffic and economic intercourse between Honshu and the Bonin Islands be permitted as much as possible and so long as the military and security reasons permit.”

This was not the only plan Okazaki submitted. In late June 1952, he wrote to Ambassador Murphy explaining that the Foreign Ministry had forwarded a petition on 5 March from the League of Bonin Evacuees to SCAP requesting favorable consideration of their petition, but “no reply has . . . been given us.” In this note, which prompted the meeting between him and Murphy, Okazaki suggests that if “mass repatriation” was difficult because of housing and other subsistence issues, then “their ardent desire” could be achieved on a gradual basis, conditioned on U.S. security interests and so as not to be “burdensome” to the United States.

Sometime around the time of the receipt of this memorandum and the trip to the Bonins, Murphy was forced to relay an unpleasant message—the decision, probably by Radford in his desire to maintain the status quo, to not permit the two Japanese representatives to go to the Bonins. It is unclear when exactly Murphy relayed this, and how and when the decision was made, but it no doubt came as a shock to the Japanese side. During the summer, the Japanese government, through the efforts of Okazaki and Ambassador Araki, had been raising the Bonin question, along with those of Amami and Okinawa, and had been led to believe that things were moving forward with the Bonins and that a resolution to the problem of repatriation was near. It was a particularly big disappointment for the league. “As a result of this abrupt cancellation,” league member Kikuchi wrote, “a second chance to go home was lost,” the first being at the time the peace treaty went into effect. The Navy had won its second battle.

Prior to departing for his inspection tour, Murphy said he had felt that Radford and the Navy were starting to accept the State Department’s views on the issue of returning the islands to Japan. “Instead,” Murphy told his State Department colleague in an “eyes only” message, “I found Radford sympathetic but adamant in his determination to maintain the status quo.” Interestingly, writing of the visit, Radford said, “Bob was convinced that I was right after our visit, and he cooperated with me thereafter in my efforts to hold on to the islands.” Murphy confirmed this in his memoirs written a decade later: “My investigation convinced me that Radford’s views were right.” The Navy won its third battle.

Murphy departed for Iwo Jima by plane on 2 October with John J. Conroy, first secretary at the embassy, naval attaché Captain Ethelbert Watts, and Colonel Walter R. Hensley Jr., the assistant G-5 (civil affairs) chief of staff from the Far Eastern Command. The next
day, they were joined by Admiral Radford and members of his staff and Commander, Naval Forces, Marianas Rear Admiral Ernest W. Litch.\textsuperscript{42} One day later, the group departed Iwo Jima on board the USS Toledo (CA 133) for the 150-nautical-mile trip northeastward to Chichi Jima, anchoring in Futami Port that afternoon.\textsuperscript{43} Already in Futami Harbor were the submarine tender USS Sperry (AS 12),\textsuperscript{44} submarines Cabezon (SS 334)\textsuperscript{45} and Sea Devil (SS 400),\textsuperscript{46} and LST 611, which had participated in the September 1950 Inchon landings, as well as those in Leyte and Mindoro in October and December 1944, respectively. On the morning of the 4th, Radford, now on his second visit, escorted his guests ashore.

The visitors were met by Roderick Webb, president of the Bonin Islands Council, and its other members, Jerry Savory, Grover Gilley, Frank Gonzales, Wilson Savory, and Richard Washington.\textsuperscript{47} They then departed in jeeps, visiting the former Japanese naval station, the new housing project for Navy dependents, the military government headquarters area, the gun emplacements, the copper-lined vaults located in the village of Kiyose (used later to store nuclear weapons), the old Japanese seaplane hangar, the underground POL (petroleum, oil, and lubricant) storage tanks, and a few other sites, such as the Westerners’ cemetery. In the afternoon, they traveled by helicopter to see Susaki airstrip and Haha Jima.\textsuperscript{48}

A photograph of the inspection tour—Murphy surrounded by seven naval officers that shows inside of one of the copper-lined vaults—seems to capture Navy efforts to convince Murphy, and thus the State Department about the need to retain the islands.\textsuperscript{49} Murphy came to better appreciate that Navy planning and development of Chichi Jima had progressed quite a bit and recognized that “as far as I am able to ascertain, Chichi Jima provides [an] ideal submarine and naval base with super natural harbor,” in addition to the gun emplacements and other facilities Japan had built during the war.\textsuperscript{50} Murphy was less impressed with Haha Jima, mentioning that there was “little or no naval interest and the several tiny islands represent no practical importance.”\textsuperscript{51} Nevertheless, he felt that the Navy’s views of the “strategic situation and present danger together with its idea of its own responsibilities and needs are difficult to dispute” and thus came around to endorsing the Navy position. He suggested that the State Department pursue a compromise with Japan along the lines of a leasehold arrangement and compensation to the former residents.\textsuperscript{52}

Murphy traveled with Radford on board the Toledo to Tokyo, which allowed the two to discuss in greater detail the disposition of the islands. Murphy, in reporting to the State Department, mentioned that they explored a number of possible alternatives in the event that the JCS did not budge on the issue. One was a bilateral arrangement for a “form of leasehold along the lines of wartime agreement[s] covering bases at places like Bermuda, Trinidad, or Argentia.”\textsuperscript{53}

The leasehold arrangement was explored more when Murphy and Radford met with Okazaki upon their return to Tokyo. Prefacing his remarks by saying the idea was “a personal and unofficial thought,” Murphy suggested to Okazaki that negotiations over continued use of the islands could be undertaken in exchange for leasing 18 frigates and 50 LSSLs (landing ship support, large) to the Japanese government, part of the military build-up that Japan was expected to do.\textsuperscript{54} Murphy emphasized that the State Department had not authorized him to make the suggestion. Okazaki seemed to understand, Murphy noted, and said it was worth careful study.
Okazaki was still probably trying to recover from the exchange he and Radford had just had. Okazaki explained the Japanese position, including the feeling that the Navy’s policy of allowing islanders of American and European descent to return but not the former Japanese islanders was one of “racial discrimination.” Radford “vehemently” denied this, but his reply that 25 percent of the residents were being allowed to marry Japanese nationals and bring them back to the island greatly missed the mark. He stated that the policy is in place as a “strategic necessity, which [your] government should understand as it had removed [the] civilian population for the same reason in 1944.” Murphy observed that Okazaki was “most disappointed” over the Navy’s attitude. Murphy prophetically warned that while there was “only mild public interest” shown with regard to the Bonins or even the Ryukyus “at the moment,” it could easily grow if the Japanese government “saw fit to stimulate it.” While the government saw no “large scale agitation . . . on the horizon,” he admitted that it is “always hard to assess [the] size to which a political issue of this type might be blown” up.

While it would not blow up per se, it did have the potential to become a very tense issue in the relationship, and it did over the next decade before a settlement along the lines of compensation of the former residents would be finalized. But even then, no one was satisfied. In any case, the repeated petitions by the league and pressure by the Japanese government on this question clearly suggested that the U.S. government needed to devise a clearer policy with regard to the Article 3 islands under American administrative control. If it did not, distrust in the United States in this critical post-treaty period would likely grow.

**Clarifying U.S. Post-Treaty Policy on Retaining Control of the Islands**

That fall, Washington was preoccupied with the presidential election of 1952, but by early the next year, both State and Defense Departments were ready to take up the issue of the Article 3 islands again. In particular, the State Department raised the issue and proposed a compromise to the internal debate on returning the islands. The compromise was part of an intricate formula by which the Amami Islands would be returned, but the status quo would be maintained for the Bonins and Ryukyus, while a more flexible civilian administration would be explored for Okinawa.

Although both departments had been examining the question of the islands’ disposition in the spring and summer of 1952, it was not until September that representatives of the State-Defense working group met to discuss the issue again. In the meantime, both had been considering the issue as the document NSC 125, “Interim Policy with Respect to Japan,” which included a section on the islands, was being circulated within the government. The State Department was concerned with the Defense Department’s efforts to seek the deletion of references to an agreement with the Japanese government regarding the disposition of Okinawa and the Bonins, and limiting any statement to simply state the intention of the United States to retain bases on a long-term basis. Eventually, a compromise was reached in the wording to the related paragraph appearing in NSC 125/1. Completed on 17 July, it stated in part in section 2 (d): “The United States security interests will require long-term retention of bases in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in view of the eventual possibility that
future Japanese governments may severely restrict or exclude United States use of military facilities in Japan proper.” As part of the courses of action, paragraph 7 (b) 1 stated that the long-term military requirements relating to the Article 3 islands would be sought based on recommendations to the president from State and Defense. After some unrelated amendments, NSC 125/1 was approved by President Harry S. Truman on 7 August as NSC 125/2, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan.”

The following week, Chairman Omar N. Bradley of the JCS informed Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett that there “should be no change in the status quo of the islands in question until such time as the politico-military situation in the Far East becomes stabilized in a way favorable to United States security interests.” The JCS, Bradley noted, believed that a “firm, early decision . . . is necessary.” Further, he recommended that their position be conveyed to Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and that he be told the Department of Defense would be willing to provide representatives to a State-Defense working group on the issue.

Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster forwarded the JCS memo to Acheson and explained he “fully concur[red] in the view of the JCS that there should be no change in the status quo” and mentioned his willingness to appoint people to a joint working group. Acheson responded two weeks later, naming the State representatives and suggesting that a meeting be arranged as soon as Defense representatives were decided. In fact, it was Defense that had been ready and wanting to meet since at least the week before, but there apparently was a mix-up within State about who was representing the department.

In fact, State was confused about more than just who was to represent it. There was uncertainty about how to approach the talks—what the department “wants to do about the Defense position,” as Kenneth B. Young, who had become director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs in March 1952, wrote in a memo to his predecessor, John M. Allison. Young and Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff, who would both represent State, felt that the courses of action proposed by the JCS in its staff study (submitted on 15 August to Foster) was “inadequate and unresponsive,” in that it provided only a cursory analysis of base requirements, misquoted State Department views on possible courses of actions, and eliminated them “all too briefly and even flippantly.”

In the end, the working group did meet on 12 September, and on and off through the fall. In the September 22 joint meeting Defense representatives spoke in some detail about the Bonins in response to questions the State Department had asked in written form.

Defense representatives, which included Captain Joseph F. Enright, a Navy submari-
the element of deception in certain military and naval operations.” For the Defense Department representatives, security problems would increase if Japan was once again in control of the islands. In addition, they argued that if they were under Japanese administrative control, it would likely become more difficult and time-consuming to get agreement when building new facilities there.

Over the course of the talks, however, State Department representatives increasingly found over the course of the talks the Defense Department’s position “an inflexible presentation of the JCS viewpoint,” and stated that they believed the “question carries sufficient political importance to warrant its being presented to the president.” With regard to the Bonin Islands, Young informed Allison that, while there is a question about them because of the presence of a submarine base, the State Department’s position should be to recommend to the president their return. “In any event,” Young emphasized, “we should insist upon permission for the Bonin Islanders to return.” This became one piece of the compromise puzzle within the U.S. government that would be worked out later that year for the Article 3 islands.

Allison did precisely this in a memorandum dated 18 March 1953 for the new secretary of state, his former boss during the Japanese peace treaty negotiations, John Foster Dulles. Allison informed Dulles that the NSC policy paper on Japan, approved by President Truman on 7 August 1952, had left the disposition of the islands unresolved and that “extensive staff discussions” saw no change in the Defense position that “retention of all of these islands in their present status is essential to United States strategic interests.” Allison, as part of his explanation to Dulles, argued that, with regard to the Bonin Islands, the “case for the strategic necessity for their retention is weaker than for Okinawa” and recommended that the islands should be returned to Japan or that arrangements be made to allow the repatriation of those inhabitants who wanted to return. Allison requested Dulles’ authorization to develop a paper for presentation to the Department of Defense or to the National Security Council, making specific recommendations for the disposition of the islands. Dulles immediately granted it.

Two weeks later on 3 April, Allison and Dulles met with Nash to discuss a number of issues in the U.S.-Japan relationship that concerned both the State and Defense Departments. On the question of the Bonins and Ryukyus, the secretary “went down the line for us,” Young informed Murphy in a “top secret” letter to him dated 8 April. Young meant that Dulles had argued for the “necessity of doing something other than maintaining the status quo,” which is the position Young and Allison had been urging for some time. Interestingly, Nash volunteered the information in a personal view, which Young requested Murphy not mention to anyone: the Bonin Islanders could be repatriated (and the Amami group returned to Japan) if the State Department agreed to retaining jurisdiction over Okinawa and the islands south of the Amami group. An understanding was reached, however, that the question would not be decided by the NSC until after Allison and Nash had the opportunity to speak with Admiral Radford in Honolulu in May.

Allison and the State Department would continue to study the issue and prepare the paper on it to be taken up by the NSC in June. In the meantime, however, Admiral Radford essentially closed the door to any changes in the status quo with regard to the Bonins at the
Honolulu conference held between 11 and 14 May. At that time, an unofficial agreement was reached to maintain the Bonins current status “during the present unstable security situation in the Pacific,” as well as to retain the policy of closing the islands to “further colonization, as established by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in 1945,” i.e., not permitting the return of the evacuees.81

The agreement did not have the official support of the State Department, but was one of five “agreement papers” worked out by the attendees, who included participants from State, Defense, Interior, and the Navy Departments. Navy officials represented the CNO, CINC-PACFLT, COMNAVFE, and COMNAVMARIANAS (Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Marianas).82 Allison, who had been appointed ambassador to Japan that spring but had yet to actually arrive in Japan, represented State.83 He was outgunned in Hawaii, it seems, and the Navy won yet another engagement. One hundred years to the day of Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s visit to Peel Island (Chichi Jima), the United States finally decided that it was going to stay for some time.

It is unclear why Allison cooperated at this point with the Navy’s position. He may have had his eyes on his next assignment and was not ready to make a decision that would have to be implemented by his successor as assistant secretary, Walter S. Robertson. A mere 10 days after the Hawaii conference, Allison arrived in Tokyo on 23 May to assume the ambassadorship.84 His agreement to not permit the return of the evacuees was obviously not “consistent” with the position Secretary of State Dulles had approved on 18 March, a fact Dulles was reminded of in a memo prepared after the Honolulu conference at the end of May.85 Nevertheless, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson reported to Dulles that his office “concur[red]” with Allison’s approach taken in Hawaii.86 The immediate reasons for this were provided in Robertson’s memorandum forwarded to Dulles on 2 June:

In view of the strategic factors and the fact that the political status of these islands generates somewhat less political heat in Japan than the Ryukyus, it is desirable for the United States to retain political control. Since the return of the Bonin Islanders while the islands are under United States control would create administrative and security difficulties, it is preferable to refuse to permit repatriation of the islanders for the present.87

The arguments used to justify the decision are debatable, particularly in light of the fact that Nash had admitted the return of the islanders was possible. (Radford, of course, continued to oppose it.) What is clear, however, is that the issue had become much larger than that of simply the disposition of the Bonin Islands, or of the repatriation of the islanders. It had to do with the future of U.S. policy with regard to all three groups of Japanese islands under U.S. administration—the Bonins, Amami, and the Ryukyus. The State Department, looking at the issue from a politico-diplomatic perspective, was asking itself: what would be best for the United States, U.S.-Japan relations, and the islanders under U.S. administration or denied entry? What was the balance?

It appears that the department’s rather abrupt policy shift with regard to the Bonin Islands was based on these larger considerations and was twofold in nature. First, it saw a resolution to the Amami issue, with its 219,000 inhabitants unnecessarily separated from
mainland Japan, as the more pressing issue, and one that Japan was pushing more. By agreeing to the status quo of the Bonin Islands and the strategically vital Ryukyu Islands south of the Amami group, the State Department could resolve a larger humanitarian and politically troublesome issue. Second, it hoped to see the administration of the Ryukyus improved, particularly with regard to local autonomy and land acquisition, as well as allowing the Japanese government an increasing role in the governance of the islands, and called upon the Defense Department to do so. Agreeing to military demands with regard to the Bonin Islands would help its case for the Ryukyus. In short, the State Department had shifted emphasis from the Bonins to the more problematic Amami and the Ryukyu Islands. This can be described as a tactical move; the department was not giving up on finding a solution for the Bonins altogether.

The decision on the Bonins was officially made in the National Security Council meeting held on 25 June, based on a report prepared by the NSC Planning Board, which recommended that the council agree to “maintain the degree of control and authority now exercised, pursuant to Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan, over all islands mentioned in Article 3, until conditions of peace and stability prevail in the Far East.” This approach was adopted at the 25 June meeting with Admiral Fechteler and the new Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles, in addition to Secretary of State Dulles and Secretary of Defense Wilson, among a dozen others present. President Eisenhower, who had stopped in Iwo Jima because of serious engine trouble with his plane on the way to his promised inspection of the Korean battlefront several weeks after his election in November 1952, had personally experienced one of the reasons for Iwo’s strategic importance—its airfield. Although he would favor returning the Amami Islands, as he witnessed during other occupations how residents would come to “hate our soldiers,” felt “with regard to our ‘fortress positions,’ or main bases, such as Wake, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima, that was a different story.”

The return of the Amami Islands to Japan would be at an appropriate time in the future. This decision was announced on 8 August, when Dulles visited Tokyo after meetings in South Korea. The Amami Islands were returned to Japan on 25 December 1953, making it a “Christmas present” of sorts, after military, financial, and other arrangements were concluded. At the time of Amami’s reversion, the United States also made a public statement announcing it would continue to “exercise its present powers and rights” in the other islands specified in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty “so long as conditions of threat and tension exist” in the region, for it “would be an abdication of responsibility to the common effort of these free nations, including Japan, for the United States to adopt any other course set out, since the remaining Ryukyuan and other islands specified in Article [3] of the Peace Treaty constitute an essential link in the strategic defense of the whole Pacific area.”

While the decision to return the Amami Islands was appreciated by the Japanese government, there was still great disappointment that Okinawa and the Bonins were not being returned. When Allison informed Dulles of Okazaki’s comment that he “guess[ed] it could not be helped” that the other islands were not returned, and stated that it “was better to live in poverty and be independent than be prosperous and be under foreign rule,” Dulles exploded. The Japanese are constantly asking more and more from the U.S.,” Dulles wrote,
“without feeling any obligation themselves to do what is necessary to promote security in Asia.” In writing this, Dulles set the conditions for Japan by which Okinawa and the Bonin Islands were to be returned.

It would be a long time, however, before those conditions were met by Japan. In the interim, the issue of the reversion of both groups of islands, as well the repatriation of the islanders to the Bonins, would continue to plague the relationship.

**Japanese Efforts**

Okazaki was not the only one disappointed in the failure to see the islands returned at this point. There were Many of the evacuees and their supporters, as well as those in the Diet, were unhappy, too. At the same time, the decision to return Amami gave them hope that their islands could be returned, or at least their repatriation to the islands would be permitted. Amid the disappointment, the Japanese government, the islanders, and their supporters would have to find a way to see their demands met.

One such person was Fukuda Tokuyasu, who had begun to take up the cause of the evacuees and had sought the participation of Japanese representatives on the trip. Many evacuees, including league Chairman Yokota, lived in his electoral district of Tachikawa City and approached him sometime after the Peace Treaty. This would begin a long and deep association, giving Fukuda the name “Father of Ogasawara’s Reversion (Ogasawara Henkan no Chichi)” in later years and seeing a statue raised in his honor after reversion.

Fukuda had been in the Foreign Ministry prior to running for the Diet in the 24th lower house elections held in October 1949 that saw many former bureaucrats enter politics under Yoshida’s tutelage. Fukuda enjoyed the confidence of Yoshida and had been his secretary (shusho shuseki bishokan) in May 1946 when he was seconded there from the ministry. He used his influence in the political world and bureaucracy, as well as his diplomatic background, to pursue their cause, arguing that the “Bonins’ problem is a problem for the islanders, but it is also a problem for the people of Japan, too.” Symbolic of this, Fukuda and the league sent a petition to Secretary of State Dulles on 8 August urging him to permit the return of the islands. This was the second petition to Dulles in his capacity as secretary, the first was on 20 February 1953. There had been an even earlier one on 5 December 1952, after the November presidential elections, but before Dulles became secretary of state. The August petition, timed with Dulles’ visit to Japan, came a few days after the Diet’s House of Representatives had unanimously passed a resolution proposed by Utsunomiya Tokuma of the ruling Liberal Party and some 89 other members of the lower house calling for the government to take measures for the repatriation of the islanders, as “we can no longer sit idle looking on their difficulties.” The league called on Dulles to “take steps to rescue the Bonin evacuees from the present difficult situation” as the “national polity of the United States, laying stress on fairness, freedom, and humanity, is known to the world.” Unfortunately, by this point, the U.S. decision to retain the islands had been already made.

The resolution introduced by Utsunomiya was not the first one on the territorial issue. Prior to the Peace Treaty being finalized in June 1951, Uehara Etsujirō, a veteran lawmaker and former academic who had studied at Washington State University and in London, and
18 others sponsored a resolution calling on the Allies to respect the desires of Japan when deciding on the territorial clauses in the peace settlement.\textsuperscript{104}

A second resolution was passed about nine months later when the treaty went into effect. This one, sponsored by the president of the lower house, Hayashi Joji, stated that, among other things, the Japanese government would pursue a fair resolution of the territorial issues.\textsuperscript{105}

The third resolution was passed on 31 July 1952, in the lower house, and was named the “Resolution on Territory.” Promoted by Tokonami Tokuji from Kagoshima Prefecture, where the Amami Islands are located, the resolution had 20 other cosponsors and, among numerous issues, called “first for the return of the former inhabitants [to the Bonin Islands] and then for the early and expansive involvement of the Japanese government in the fields of education, industry, family registrations, and other areas.”\textsuperscript{106}

The next resolution dealing directly with Bonins was put forth a year later on 7 July 1953, and although they had not been immediately successful, this did not stop the league and its supporters from further pursuing the issue, which they did on four fronts—by continuing to send petitions, by having the Diet raise the issue, by pushing the Japanese government to deal with the issue, and when all the above failed, by meeting directly with U.S. officials.

On 24 September 1953, for example, the league sent a petition, its 39th to date (according to its own records), to Radford’s successor as Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Felix B. Stump, in light of the new resolution, which was enclosed, and the new announcement by Dulles.\textsuperscript{107} The tone of this petition was somewhat stronger than those in the past:

\begin{quote}
We feel it most deplorable that the United States continues to disregard the natural desire of the Bonin evacuees for returning home and to shackle their efforts for securing the freedom of movements, despite the fact that the question of repatriation of Bonin evacuees, it is considered, can be solved adequately without giving any inconvenience to the United States strategically and that the unfortunate evacuees have waiting [sic] nine years after their evacuation from the native place for the adoption of generous steps by the United States in respect to their question.\textsuperscript{108}
\end{quote}

The 21 July letter to Stump, interestingly, had included the latest data on the situation of the islanders, updating the previous study done in 1950. Whereas the 1950 results showed a dramatic worsening of their situation, as compared to 1944 when they were first evacuated, the May 1953 survey (see figure 9) confirmed that it had become drastic: the number of those well-off had declined to a few households, and those struggling numbered more than 1,000 families. The petition also referenced a story in the Yomiuri Shimbun on 17 May 1953, which reported that 147 of the evacuees had died due to the stress and other problems related to being separated from their homes and another 18 died from family suicides.\textsuperscript{109}

Turning their attention next to the Diet, the league worked with parliamentary members to have a resolution submitted at the time of the deliberations on the bills concerning the return of the Amami Islands. Entitled “Okinawa Oyobi Ogasawara Shoto ni Kansuru
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"Ketsugian (Resolution concerning Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands)," the resolution, which passed on 7 November 1953, had been officially introduced by Sato Eisaku, who later was prime minister when the Bonins and Okinawa were returned.

It is not clear to what extent the earlier petitions and the Diet resolution had a role, but on 12 November, Counselor of Embassy Samuel D. Berger responded on behalf of Dulles to a 10 September letter from Fukuda in which he told Fukuda that the issue was under “careful study and consideration” within the U.S. government and that it was the “earnest hope” of the secretary that a “practical solution” might be found in the near future. Dulles’ letter was subsequently introduced in the Diet in February 1954, when the Bonins problem was taken up in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the lower house in great detail.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Yoshida made a statement in the Diet on 27 January 1954 that his government would do its best to persuade the United States to return Okinawa and the other islands to Japan. U.S. officials in Washington immediately told the press they saw no possibility that they would be returned soon, but emphasized that it did not mean that the U.S. intended to hold them forever.

The next month on 10 February, beginning at 1030, recessing for 90 minutes at noon, and continuing on until a couple of minutes before 1700, the Foreign Affairs Committee met for five hours to discuss the Bonins problem. Attending the meeting as witnesses were Yokota and Fujita from the league, and Deputy Mayor Haru Hikoichi from the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. Following the questioning of Haru as to the lack of support that the Tokyo government had given to the islanders over the past decade, Fukuda had Yokota and Fujita provide an introduction of the situation that the islanders had found themselves in and an explanation of their desires to return to the Bonins and of their willingness to work with the government and the United States for a practical solution.

The Bonins were discussed again, this time briefly, two weeks later in the Foreign Affairs Committee on 24 February. In a published news story the day before, Secretary of the Navy Robert B. Anderson mentioned the ultimate intention of the United States to return the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands to Japan in a letter to Nakayoshi Ryoko of the Association for Reunion of the Okinawan Islands with Japan (Okinawa Shoto Nihon Fukki Kiseikai). In testimony by a government witness, the Parliamentary Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kodaki Akira expressed his happiness with the story, introduced by Fukuda, and mentioned that Foreign Minister Okazaki would be raising it in his next meeting with Ambassador Allison scheduled for the following week. Kodaki, who later served briefly as the director general of the defense agency in the Ishibashi Tanzan and Kishi Nobusuke cabinets in early 1957, added that the embassy in Washington would also be taking up the issue.

The two-pronged strategy of the league and its supporters in government developed over the next couple of weeks. While it is uncertain if the issue was taken up at the subsequent Okazaki-Allison meeting, it is clear that the issue was raised both in Tokyo and Washington, and that the U.S. embassy in Tokyo and the State Department were watching the debate in Japan, as well. The embassy, for example, followed the deliberations and expressed doubts to the State Department about the policy’s status. Jeff Graham Parsons, who was in the process of succeeding Berger as embassy counselor, wrote to Robert J. G.
McClurkin, the deputy director of Northeast Asian Affairs, asking where the policy of allowing the islanders to return stood.\(^{117}\) The State Department, after observing the discussions in the Diet and the comments by Parliamentary Vice Foreign Minister Kodaki, noted that “the exploitation of Mr. Anderson’s letter is but the latest in an organized attempt to maintain pressure on the Japanese and U.S. governments for the return of the islands.”\(^{118}\) If this view is true, then the next attempts were made in early March.

On the evening of 5 March, Japan time, Fukuda and Omori Hachiro of the Foreign Ministry’s planning division (Keikakuka) invited Counselor of Embassy Berger\(^{119}\) to dinner where Yokota Tatsuo and Fujita Hozen of the league were waiting. Exactly two years had passed since the ministry wrote to the diplomatic section of GHQ, requesting sympathetic consideration and forwarding a translation of a petition to Prime Minister Yoshida from the league. According to Berger’s later account of the meeting, “it was clear that the purpose of the dinner was to talk about the Bonin Islands.”\(^{120}\) Fukuda mentioned that both the Communists and rightists were “stirring up anti-Americanism feeling” on the issue of the islands, and suggested he was aware of the differences between the views of the State Department, which “favored repatriation,” and the Navy, which opposed.\(^{121}\) Berger explained that prospects for the return of the islands were much later in the future and that the issue of the return of the islanders was continually being reviewed by the department. A review had just been completed, he said, and there were no changes anticipated in the current policy.

That same day in Washington, Shima Shigenobu, minister of the Japanese embassy, paid a visit in the late afternoon to Young and Frank Hawley of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs. Shima submitted a memo entitled “Points for Consideration”\(^{122}\) concerning the return, “on an experimental basis” of an “initial group of 1,000 [islanders] who, if successfully reestablished, would be followed by the remainder of those evacuated from the Islands.”\(^{123}\) Shima stated he understood the problem was difficult but he hoped that for “humanitarian reasons” the Navy would permit the return of the islanders on an experimental basis. According to the memo, the Japanese government would pay all costs of transportation and repatriation and would be prepared to assist through loans and grants those repatriated in reestablishing their homes and businesses. The memo also stated that the government would “exercise every precaution to ensure all those chosen would be able-bodied men and women, prepared to support themselves by farming and fishing within a short time following their resettlement.”\(^{124}\)

Shima also seemed aware of the difference of opinion that existed between the State Department and the Navy on this issue, but also the delicate situation that the department was in: “[Shima] did not wish to press the request so hard,” the memorandum of conversation noted, “as to get a flat denial and expressed the hope that the Department of State would give support to the Japanese aspirations at such time as the matter was taken up with the authorities responsible for the administration of the Islands.”\(^{125}\) Young responded that they would study the points raised by Shima and asked, if the experimental repatriation failed, would the Japanese government undertake the return of the islanders to their present homes, and to what islands, other than Haha Jima, did they intend to relocate. Shima responded that the government had not considered the return of the islanders back to their
current residences if the experiment failed, but “assumed [it] to be logical for his Government to make such a commitment.”\textsuperscript{126} With regard to the other islands, Shima, who thought Haha Jima alone would be able to support all 3,000 resettled islanders, stated that the designation of other islands would depend on the economic capacities of the islands and U.S. security considerations.\textsuperscript{127} Later that evening, however, after examining the proposal, Hawley recommended that a review of policy should not be made at this time: “the return of former residents of the Bonin Islands . . . is not in accord with current policies.”\textsuperscript{128}

Allison discussed the issue with Secretary of Defense Wilson, who was visiting Japan in June, and gave him a memorandum dated 11 June, that took up the issue of repatriation.\textsuperscript{129} However, little was done with regard to the islands over the coming months and instead, several issues came front and center, including the problems relating to the handling of the \textit{Dai Go Fukuryu Maru} (Lucky Dragon No. 5) incident in which the crew of a Japanese tuna fishing boat was exposed to radiation from a thermonuclear device test in the Bikini Atoll. The U.S.-Japan relationship faced its first serious crisis in the post-peace treaty period. In the background of this crisis lay the increasing political instability in Japan as conservatives tried to challenge Yoshida’s rule. At the end of May, Murphy, who was the Acting Secretary of State, informed President Eisenhower that the State Department “doub[ed] that Yoshida will remain much longer as Prime Minister.”\textsuperscript{130} Another issue that year was the minister’s planned trip to the United States in June, which was postponed until November primarily due to the domestic political situation. Eventually, he visited the United States in the first and second week of November, but within a month of his visit was forced to resign office. He never returned to the premiership, but remained a force behind the scenes and through his “students,” especially Ikeda Hayato and Sato, both prime ministers.

In preparation for Yoshida’s visit, Foreign Minister Okazaki visited Washington in October and had working level talks with Assistant Secretary Robertson on a variety of issues. Most prominently compensation as a result of the \textit{Fukuryu Maru} incident, but the Bonins problem also came up.\textsuperscript{131} Although Yoshida wrote in his memoirs that his trip was “not so much to talk with [the Eisenhower administration] with reference to any specific question or issues as to explain to them the actual political and economic state of affairs in Japan, and so, I hoped, promote better understanding between our two countries,”\textsuperscript{132} there were at least six things that Yoshida wanted to discuss, according to previously submitted discussion papers, and hence the need for the working-level talks.

One such preparatory meeting on 23 October saw Foreign Minister Okazaki take up with Assistant Secretary Robertson the issue of a limited return of islanders to the Bonin Islands.\textsuperscript{133} Okazaki had consulted with Radford the day before, saying it would be difficult to repatriate the islanders and suggested that compensation for them be explored.\textsuperscript{134} Another meeting on the 28th, with neither Radford nor Okazaki in attendance, saw Ambassador Iguchi Sadao (March 1954–February 1956) raise the issue again and mention that the Japanese government would finance the repatriation so as not to place an economic burden on local authorities.\textsuperscript{135} Robertson promised to “look into the matter and see what might be done.” Takeuchi Ryuji, director of the European and American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry and a future ambassador to the United States, asked if the islanders could be compensated for their loss of private property, and Iguchi added that the Foreign
Ministry was looking into the issue to see if a formal claim might be filed, particularly since Radford suggested it.¹³⁶

Between the two meetings, the embassy prepared a two-page memorandum on the issue of compensation and repatriation and submitted it to the State Department on 25 October. Handed by Tanaka Hiroto, first secretary of the Japanese embassy, to Richard B. Finn, the acting officer in charge of Japanese affairs who had recently returned from Tokyo after almost seven years there, it stated that the Japanese government “wishes to reiterate that its primary interest is still and will continue to be the repatriation of [the former residents],” but requested the U.S. government give “serious consideration” to the demands of the islanders for compensation “founded on an established principle of international law, i.e., the inviolability of private property.”¹³⁷ The memo pointed out that “the private property situated on the Bonin Islands is subject to discriminatory treatment when compared with the treatment accorded to the private property situated on the Ryukyu Islands, although the legal status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands is exactly the same, as borne out by the provisions in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan,” and explained that the losses suffered by the islanders were estimated to total approximately 820 million yen since the treaty went into effect.¹³⁸

The second page of the memorandum, recreated here, displayed a concise chart (figure 10) computing the losses suffered by the islanders in the areas of agriculture and fishing.

After spending time in New York, where Yoshida spoke before the Council on Foreign Relations and was wined and dined by Governor Thomas E. Dewey—the former Republican candidate for president in the 1948 presidential election who had visited Japan in 1952—and the business community, led by John D. Rockefeller III, the Japanese delegation arrived in the capital on 7 November.¹³⁹ While there, Yoshida met with Dulles, Secretary Wilson, and, of course, President Eisenhower, in addition to his close friend, former Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, whose help he no doubt tried to enlist in the cause.¹⁴⁰ Yoshida, in his talks with Secretary of State Dulles on 9 November, also raised the issue of compensation for the islanders,¹⁴¹ but no conclusion was reached. The joint statement between Yoshida and Eisenhower released on 10 November mentioned that the issue had been “reviewed” but it did not say if any agreement had been made.¹⁴²

By chance, the same day that Yoshida was visiting Washington—the Marine Corps’ Birthday—the bronze U.S. Marine Corps War Memorial, sculpted by Felix de Weldon of the Iwo Jima flag raising, was unveiled in Arlington. Both Eisenhower and Vice President Richard M. Nixon were in attendance. Nixon stated that the statue symbolizes the hopes and dreams of America, and the real purpose of our foreign policy. We realize that to retain freedom for ourselves, we must be concerned when people in other parts of the world may lose theirs. There is no greater challenge to statesmanship than to find a way that such sacrifices as this statue represents are not necessary in the future, and to build the kind of world in which people can be free, in which nations can be independent, and in which people can live together in peace and friendship.

Yoshida’s presence in Washington at that time symbolized how far the relationship had come, while the monument using the iconic image of the flag raising would show how psy-
Bilateral Problem: Reversion and Repatriation, 1952–57

For some Japanese, especially Wachi Tsunezo of the newly created Iwo Jima Kyokai (Association of Iwo Jima), the monument represented an insensitive celebration of the U.S. victory on Iwo Jima. Wachi protested it in a letter to the head of the Marine Corps War Memorial Foundation, Major General Merritt A. Edson. In Japan, members of the league were also disappointed, having been convinced that a resolution was near. “It was the fourth time we lost the chance to return home,” Kikuchi wrote later.

This did not mean that Eisenhower and Dulles were unimpressed by the appeals. Both had received petitions from the league dated 24 September 1954, on the eve of Yoshida’s trip, urging the U.S. government to make his visit “fruitful” by granting the request and explaining that the league was “convinced that the United States will be benefited instead of being placed at a disadvantage if our desire [to return to the Islands] is granted.” In the end, it seems that Dulles wanted to feel the Japanese side out before committing to anything, particularly with Yoshida’s uncertain political life.

The fact that the State Department was moved by the Japanese appeals can be best seen in a memo from Robertson to Dulles in early December 1954. He urged Dulles, who

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viewed the Defense Department as “rabid” on the Bonin Islands question, to make clear to the Department of Defense once again the importance of returning the former residents to the Bonins in America’s relations with Japan. To Robertson, it went beyond a partisan issue limited to Yoshida’s government: “I do not consider that Yoshida’s resignation will affect Japan’s interest in the matter.” The Bonin issue would continue, in other words, until it was resolved.

Dulles’ letter to Secretary Wilson suggested that the State Department still hoped the islanders could be repatriated, but if that were not possible then it wanted to explore the possibility of compensating them. Dulles told Wilson that, while the compensation issue was a “complicated legal one,” he believed it would be one that would continue to “plague us” for the legal position in the Bonin Islands was similar to that in the Ryukyus where the United States was already compensating owners of private property when their land was being used for military purposes. Dulles asked for Wilson’s views on the subject and for any information the Defense Department had on property holdings in the Bonins. Closing his letter, Dulles stressed that the issue would “continue to be [an] area of friction with Japan. . . . I hope that some gesture can be made to alleviate their inability to return, either in the form of a token repatriation of a small number of Bonin Islanders or through an informal agreement to consider the compensation issue. These issues are vexatious but in the interest of our relations with Japan I believe that they should be explored.”

In retrospect, it was clear that the department would reject even a “token repatriation” as it was against any repatriation at all. Compensation, initially raised by Radford in 1952, was a solution of interest and would become a temporary compromise that everyone could live with—the league, the Japanese government, the State and Defense Departments. That agreement, however, would be several years off.

The embassy did not waste any time considering the issue, particularly in light of the start of the new government of Hatoyama Ichiro in December 1954 and the general elections expected to be held the next February—as part of the deal with the opposition parties to name Hatoyama premier. On 7 January 1955, Ambassador Allison wrote to Dulles telling him that, while the elections would not be the “last chance” for the conservatives, he did believe that “some compensation” for the dispossessed islanders was a question that deserved “serious consideration” at this juncture. In response, Dulles wrote that “any initiative” on the Bonin Islands should come from the Japanese side and provided a couple of responses for the embassy to give. If the question of the return of the islanders came up, Dulles suggested, then the U.S. position was to state that “U.S. security considerations preclude [their return].” If the question of compensation arose, the Japanese side, Dulles noted, should submit a “formal note giving a detailed legal basis” for the compensation claim and explaining how land ownership could be established, after which the United States would then examine the question. Dulles added that he agreed with Allison’s view that the compensation issue deserved serious consideration but it had to be based on a “clear exposition” of Japan’s claim.

Dulles ended the telegram by referring to a conversation between Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru and Admiral Radford, who was touring the Asia-Pacific region in
December 1954 and January 1955 and had paid a courtesy call on the foreign minister. Shigemitsu raised the issue of the return of the islanders to the Bonins, but did not go into detail. The State Department, nevertheless, saw the conversation as significant; it was the first time the new Hatoyama government had mentioned it. A memo by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs for Deputy Secretary of State Herbert C. Hoover Jr. later that month determined that the issue of compensation was so complex that it could not be “readily settled” nor would it be possible to reach a settlement by the 27 February general elections. In any case, it would be up to the Japanese to raise the issue.

Shortly after this exchange within the State Department, the Japanese side did raise it again when First Secretary Tanaka of the Japanese embassy took up the issue of the return of the islanders with Finn on the Japan desk, and asked if the U.S. government would be willing to pay compensation to the islanders if they were not permitted to return to the islands. Finn responded that repatriation was impossible for security reasons, but if the Japanese government prepared a detailed report on the reasons for the request for compensation, the U.S. government would consider it. Finn’s suggestion was acted upon—later that year, the Japanese embassy presented a detailed claim for compensation on behalf of the islanders. The “to be raised at Japanese initiative” idea would become the mantra for the remainder of the year.

On the Japanese side, there was some movement to ease the islanders’ situation when, following the testimony of representatives of the evacuees’ league in the Diet in February 1954, the government decided to provide financial assistance of 17.65 million yen to the islanders for the period prior to the peace treaty going into effect, and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government agreed to pay another 35 million yen. In 1955, the government paid out an extra 100 million yen, but this was to be returned to government coffers if and when the U.S. government paid compensation to the islanders.

As the Japanese side dealt with this issue, and with the effects of movements toward political party mergers in Japan, there were no bilateral discussions on the Bonin issue until late summer when Foreign Minister Shigemitsu visited Washington. The U.S. side saw his visit as a combination of both an “internal political move,” by which he wanted to bolster his personal prestige, and a move that would “serve Japanese foreign policy purposes.” Although the embassy had been told the trip was to be “general in character [with] no formal agenda [being] necessary,” an agenda was already being prepared. As a result, and as with all visits, the State Department prepared a series of position papers on the issues that were expected to come up during the talks. The question of the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands ranked fairly high in the list of a dozen topics.

The Bonins issue was introduced in a general statement in the first meeting conducted on 29 August and taken up more fully in the third meeting two days later. At the latter session, Shigemitsu presented and read from a paper, “The Ryukyu and Bonin Islands,” that called for both island groups to be returned. He described the issue as a “problem of major importance” and said it was the “ardent hope of the entire Japanese people” that the islands be restored to Japan, and reemphasized that “national feeling is very strong” on the issue. Specifically, Shigemitsu, who also served as deputy prime minister, stated,
3. With regard to the Bonin Islands where military installations are few, the return of administrative rights is very strongly hoped for and will prove an effective gesture of good will on the part of the United States. If as an immediate initial step, measures could be taken to allow the former inhabitants of these islands to return to their original homes, a great stride forward would nevertheless be made in improving Japanese-American relations. These islanders are undergoing extreme hardship, being obliged to make their livelihood away from their home islands. For their relief the Japanese Government, together with the Municipal-ity of Tokyo, paid some 37 million yen in Japanese fiscal year 1954. In Japanese fiscal year 1955, the Japanese Government will, in order to comply with a Diet Resolution, by itself make disbursements to the extent of 100 million yen for the relief of these people. In this connection, we hope that the United States Gov-ernment will give their sympathetic consideration to the claims which have been presented with regard to the losses sustained by the islanders through not having been permitted to return to the islands.\footnote{168}

Dulles pointed out that the United States was not willing to give any consideration to the status of the Bonins and Ryukyus, but recognized that Japan still retained residual sovereignty over them. He added that as the United States was making “large defense expenditures” in those areas, it did not seem to be “in the common interest for their status to be agitated.”\footnote{169} On the issue of the status of the inhabitants of the Bonins, Dulles feigned ignorance of their situation and said he preferred not to comment, but he recalled that the Department of Defense was opposed to the return of the inhabitants, and that it had “valid security concerns.”\footnote{170} Shigemitsu interjected, incorrectly, “Iwo Jima is the only one that is fortified.” Although only one person on the U.S. side, Murphy, had actually been to the islands, every one of the 11 American participants in the meeting knew there was more there but probably decided it was better not to inform the Japanese side. The meeting concluded with Dulles and Shigemitsu reviewing the joint statement to be released at the end of the visit. Unlike the original draft joint statement, which included a reference to the islands, the final version did not mention it, probably reflecting Dulles’ desire not to highlight the issue any more than necessary.\footnote{171}

\section*{Fukuda and the League in America}

About five weeks after the foreign minister’s visit, Ambassador Iguchi, having been asked by Shigemitsu to follow up on his conversation with Dulles, paid a call on Robertson and Finn on 7 October to discuss several issues, including the repatriation of the islanders.\footnote{172} Iguchi told Robertson that a “Diet representative familiar with this problem” would be arriving shortly in Washington to discuss the issue.\footnote{173} Iguchi recognized that security concerns existed and that the issue was complex. Robertson agreed, but informed him that the matter was under “active consideration” with the Department of Defense and that they hoped to give the foreign minister an early answer.\footnote{174}

The reference to a Diet member concerned the trip to Washington by Fukuda Tokuyasu, who in addition to being a member of the lower house was the deputy secretary general of
the Liberal Party and an advisor to the league of evacuees. Robertson was already aware of
the visit, as he had just sent a response to Fukuda, who requested a meeting with Dulles
to seek “favorable consideration” for the evacuees. A former Foreign Ministry official,
Fukuda was a believer in bipartisan diplomacy. One of his strongest concerns was the
Bonins problem. In fact, he was so involved in the problem, that he wrote in his memoirs, that
people asked him if he was from the islands. Fukuda’s trip focused exclusively on the
Bonins issue, and he brought with him Yokota and Fujita from the league and Ishii Michi-
nori, director of the Southern Islands Liaison Bureau of the prime minister’s office.

Fukuda’s delegation departed Haneda Airport in Tokyo on 15 October, and stopped
first in Hawaii, where they met with Japanese Consul General Kaneyama Masahide to ar-
range an appointment with Admiral Felix B. Stump, the commander in chief of the Pacific
Command, for the return trip. The next day, they flew on to the mainland and arrived
in Washington, DC, on the 17th. On the morning of 19th, the group, along with Tanaka
and Attaché Masuda Hiroshi of the embassy, presented a petition at the State Department,
with attendance by members of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and Commander L.
G. Findley of the Chief of Naval Operations office, among others, and explained the pur-
pose of their visit. The petition stated the background to their situation and proposed a
limited repatriation of 2,000 people to Haha Jima. Yokota read the document; Fukuda,
using his status as a politician, spoke for the group.

The next day, 20 October, the group met with Assistant Secretary Robertson and Rich-
ard M. Herndon of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs. In addition to the four members
of Fukuda’s group, Minister Shima and several embassy officials attended. Fukuda spoke
not at all of compensation, instead focusing entirely on the issue of repatriation. The 7,000
evacuees had been waiting patiently in their “enforced exile” while sensing there was “out-
right racial discrimination” involved in not letting them return to the islands while granting
permission to the 135 former residents of Caucasian descent. The Communists, Fukuda
warned, were trying to take advantage of the situation and infiltrate the group if the league
was “unable to show some results after 10 years of efforts.” While aware of the security
concerns, the league failed to understand why they could not return, while in Okinawa
100 times the population coexisted with the military bases. It was not only a local issue,
however, but a national one as well. Fukuda cited a Mainichi Shimbun editorial that urged
something be done for their situation.

Robertson noted that the State Department had asked the Defense Department to
review the situation and mentioned that it was the U.S. opinion that the islands had consti-
tuted a “prewar Japanese military base, [and] there must have been a considerable number
of Japanese on the islands in employment connected with the military installations.” This
essentially echoed the mistaken view of the U.S. military that almost all of the islanders
were former military contractors. Robertson then went on to describe the Cold War situ-
ation in East Asia and made a completely unrelated comment: “A pull-out of our forces
would result in a Communist take-over.” It is unclear in the memorandum of conversa-
tion if the Japanese responded at this point, but they should have—they were not asking
for U.S. forces to pull out of anywhere; they were asking to be allowed to return to their
homes.
Minister Shima did raise a few points, however, explaining that the Japanese did not understand how the United States could interpret Article 3 of the Peace Treaty as applying to the issue of repatriation, how the issue of security was a question if 135 islanders had already been allowed to return, and why security would be difficult to enforce on a small island. As an option, the Japanese official suggested a trial return of islanders to Haha Jima, “where it is believed that no military installations exist.” Robertson asked again whether the 7,000 were there “solely in connection with the Japanese military bases,” and Shima explained that this was not the case. “Both the 135 repatriated islanders and the 7,000 in Japan were prewar residents apart from those who were temporarily employed in the islands in war-connected work. . . . The evacuees in Japan represented the fourth generation of the earliest Japanese settlers.” Robertson thanked the delegation for the presentation and promised that the repatriation question would be carefully reviewed.

The following day, the delegation held a press conference to raise American public awareness of the plight of the evacuees. Through the Foreign Ministry, a public announcement was sent through the consulates in the United States at the beginning of the month, the media was likely aware of the general nature of the trip, but the press conference provided a chance for the delegation to explain their pleas in greater detail. The appeal was released to the press by the league president, Yokota. Writing about the reaction of the press, Fukuda noted that Stewart Hensley of United Press International described their requests as completely justified.

Over the next few days, Fukuda and the group met with other officials, including former Ambassador Robert Murphy, Assistant Secretary of Defense Gordon Gray, Admiral Radford, and Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, the deputy chief of Naval Operations. In particular, Fukuda followed up with Admiral Briscoe on the issue of repatriation by letters and petitions, “appeal[ing] to the wisdom and generosity of the American nation for the consideration of this question from a larger point of view, wishing that a new hope will be brought to the Bonin Islanders.”

Fukuda met with State Department officials again on 25 October to discuss the issue and other matters. Fukuda, Shima, and other embassy officials stressed the importance of the islanders being allowed to return to their homes and questioned whether security considerations were really such an obstacle to repatriation. They surmised (incorrectly, as we now know) that the opposition to the return “only reflected excessive precautions favored by the lower echelons in the Navy,” and that if raised at higher levels, such as that of Admiral Radford, would be overruled. Representing the State Department, McClurkin said that this was not the case and that security issues had a “valid basis.” The embassy officials then asked if repatriation were impossible, compensation could be made to the displaced islanders. The State Department side said that it would be considered if “formal representations were made” to the United States.

The next day, 26 October, Ishii accompanied by Second Secretary Nemoto Hiroshi, visited Herndon at the department to discuss the issue of compensation, presenting an “informal paper” on a possible claim against the United States on behalf of the islanders and three other issues. The first concerned granting permission to the Japanese government to visit the islands to update its records on the inhabitants and inspect the graves of island-
ers who had died since 1944. Ishii requested that some evacuees be allowed to participate in such a mission. The second concerned permitting the evacuees to share in the proceeds of the sale of scrap located on the islands and in territorial waters. The final issue was the reestablishment of a land-based whaling station on the islands, which had been profitable in the prewar years and which only required people on the island between April and July each year.197

After their rounds of meetings in Washington, the group left for San Francisco and Hawaii on their return to Japan. While in San Francisco, the delegation met with former Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas, retired Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who reportedly stated he could not understand why the islanders were being prevented from returning.198 Nimitz promised to speak with Secretary of the Navy Charles S. Thomas, who was scheduled to visit San Francisco the following week. “It was an unforgettable experience,” Fukuda later wrote, “speaking about the future of U.S.-Japan relations [with Nimitz] in San Francisco, famous for its fog.”199

Arriving in Hawaii on Saturday, 4 November, the delegation met with Admiral Stump the following morning. He promised to give “favorable consideration” to the requests of the delegation and arranged for the group to meet with his staff the following day for follow-up discussions.200 Fukuda felt “quite happy with this answer, considering the bitter taste of negative responses they had usually received to date.”201

Overall, the Diet legislator was satisfied with the trip. He was not expecting a miracle when they started out, he wrote, considering their trip was only about one month after Shigemitsu’s visit and that the issue of the islands had been removed from the joint statement between the foreign minister and Dulles. He sensed, however, that the U.S. side was supportive and wanted to find a solution.202 He also was happy to have corrected some of the Americans’ misunderstandings—that most of the evacuees had been military contractors and that the islands were too small to support a population of 7,000 or so.203 The biggest result, however, according to Fukuda, was the willingness of the U.S. side to consider a plan to relocate the islanders.204 Shortly after their return to Tokyo, the league began drafting a revised plan that accommodated for the return of 2,639 evacuees who desired to return to the islands.205

Their efforts were probably given greater impetus when they learned that a few of the islanders of Western descent, having heard of the league’s trip, decided to take one of their own and, with the assistance (or active planning) of the Navy, lobbied the State Department and others not to allow the evacuees to return.

A New Airing

In Japan, Shigemitsu was scheduled to meet with Ambassador Allison on 15 December to review the history of the problem and the desires of the evacuees and to share the league’s study.206 The day before, Allison wrote to Robertson to express his support for the latter’s 21 October letter to Gordon Gray encouraging the Department of Defense to review the matter in order to respond to the foreign minister.207 Indeed, he went beyond this simple support by arguing that the whole issue needs “an airing” before an “impartialtribune,” such
as the Operations Coordinating Board, designed to monitor the implementation of NSC presidential decisions. The board was “unusually well adapted for short-circuiting obstructions in the Pentagon” and could deal with the interests of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA), allusions to which was “one of the cleverest of the Navy’s stratagems.”

The ambassador went on to explain his view of the issue:

The basic difficulty is and always has been the rooted determination of the Navy to keep foreigners, particularly Japanese, out of the islands they administer. Radford has personally been committed to this for years. The Navy simply dug in right after the war and has fought tooth and nail ever since to hold the line. This makes me suspect that alleged “security” considerations are really rationalizations in defense of Navy policy, rather than reasons on which national policy should logically be decided. One line of thought which I imagine is present though seldom if ever put on paper is: returning residents to former Japanese islands promotes reversionism and is therefore an entering wedge for eventual loss of control whereas the islands might some day be valuable to us. If so, the argument should be frankly laid on the table by the Navy, specifying what they want the islands for and when. Then these purposes could be weighed against our other national objectives.

Allison included an additional letter of the same date that went beyond a simple endorsement of Robertson’s approach and, hoping to avoid yet another “perfunctory exercise undertaken in order to tell the Japanese that we have not changed our minds,” challenged the way the government approached the issue:

I hope this interchange will give rise to a careful scrutiny of underlying problems conducted by a group which is qualified to weight the relative merits of security and other considerations. We have tended too often in the past, I think, to adopt a compartmentalized approach which inevitably makes the “security” reasons for excluding the Japanese from the Islands seem absolute, whereas if these reasons could be balanced specifically against other pertinent points something in the way of a compromise might turn out to be preferable in light of overall national objectives.

Allison went on to dissect the arguments used for preventing repatriation and returning the islands, arguing that the situation had changed. He was thus very much prepared and involved when he met with the foreign minister the following day.

Shigemitsu asked that the United States consider the repatriation of a small number of islanders to a limited area on an experimental basis and submitted a note explaining the government’s position. In addition to the three-page note addressed to the ambassador that called for the islanders to be allowed to return “as soon as possible,” Shigemitsu submitted a copy of a document titled “Program of Return of Former Inhabitants to the Nanpo Shoto” and a “List of Inhabitants of Nanpo Shoto Whose Return to Their Home Islands is Desired,” both of which were prepared by the league. The submission of these materials was noted in the press.

Shigemitsu also met with Secretary of the Navy Thomas, who was visiting Japan, on 20 December, and requested favorable consideration.
description of the meeting, stated he was familiar with the issue and was working on it. A couple of weeks later, when Radford visited Japan as part of his inspection of the region, his Japanese hosts repeated the request.\textsuperscript{214}

Fukuda followed up these requests with a letter of his own to Robertson in the new year. He repeated the arguments in favor of repatriation, or limited repatriation, either in number or location (suggesting Haha Jima, where no one was living, on an experimental basis). He also linked the resolution of the issue to broader U.S.-Japan relations.

Now that I have expressed my personal view on the question of the desired return of former inhabitants to the Bonin Islands, I wish to appeal to the wisdom and generosity of the American nation for the consideration of this question from a larger point of view, wishing that a new hope will be brought to the Bonin Islanders. Serving as Chairman of the United States-Japan Cooperation Committee of the Democratic Liberal Party, I participate in the establishment of diplomatic policies towards the United States and am making every effort for a settlement of the question of the Sunakwa military base which has come to fore recently. The question of the Bonin Islanders is also one of the important questions requiring an early settlement, and I sincerely hope from the viewpoint of cooperation between our two countries that it will be settled as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{215}

Of note, the letter was signed in Fukuda’s capacity as chairman of the committee and not in his capacity as advisor to the league. He also sent a letter to former Ambassador Murphy, now deputy under secretary of state, and U.S. Navy officials as well.\textsuperscript{216}

Robertson did not need Fukuda’s letter, for he was already clearly moved on the subject and in favor of reconsidering the repatriation issue. In a 9 January response to Allison’s earlier letters, he wrote,

On the basis of my separate talks in recent months with both the Japanese Bonin evacuees and the four-man delegation from Chichi Jima, it was apparent that the Japanese found our emphasis on “security” hard to understand, while the present-day residents unabashedly based their opposition to the return of the Japanese on understandable arguments of economic self-interest plus the fears of reprisals growing out of testimony they gave in war crimes trials. It was clear that the Japanese could not understand why the return of prewar residents who were not of Western descent should constitute a security threat when the return of those of Western descent did not constitute such a threat. They were frank in stating that the difference in treatment seemed to them to be racial discrimination. It was of interest talking with Chichi Jima representatives to note from their account of daily life in the Bonins that “security” does not seem to inhibit them at all as far as their personal lives are concerned.\textsuperscript{217}

In the meantime, as mentioned above, Robertson had written to the Defense Department after his meeting with Fukuda, and the earlier ones with Shigemitsu, on 21 October and requested that the Pacific Island Coordinating Group, which had been established in May 1953, be convened.\textsuperscript{218} Although Assistant Secretary Gray wrote in his response of 4 November that the Defense Department did not recommend any “present change in the
situation,” he did agree that any decision or policy could be reviewed at any time and would not object to convening such a meeting.\textsuperscript{219} The participants eventually met on 2 February 1956, at the State Department, which officially called the meeting, to discuss the repatriation issue, among other matters.\textsuperscript{220}

William J. Sebald, the deputy assistant secretary of state and former political advisor in Tokyo under General MacArthur, and Radford, the senior-most Defense Department official attended. The fact that the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff attended this meeting suggests the importance the military—and Radford personally—placed on the Bonins question. Sebald described the decision to allow 129 islanders of Western descent to return, but not those of Japanese descent, as a “mistake [because] it discriminated against certain Japanese in favor of others. . . . Security is as compelling in Okinawa as in the Bonins, but the Japanese can go to Okinawa.”\textsuperscript{221} Sebald explained that the Japanese memo of 15 December “present[ed] a good case” for the return of the islanders and that the State Department desired to “get rid of some of these problems” that are continually arising, “Our arguments do not convince the Japanese as to why they can’t return to the Bonins.”\textsuperscript{222}

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administration) Vice Admiral G. L. Russell interjected that, “Japanese logic is what they want it to be. Their position is weak in regard to the Bonins. They were the ones who evacuated the people, not the U.S. The Japanese Peace Treaty gives the U.S. every right in the Bonins. The residual sovereignty takes over when we leave, not before.”\textsuperscript{223} Admiral Radford continued by asking if the State Department had given any thought to how the islanders who desired to return would be taken care of. “I have seen no suggested plan,” the chairman of the JCS stated.\textsuperscript{224} Radford then pointed out that Haha Jima had “no means of supporting that number” and noted that everything to restart and support the return of the islanders would have to be brought in and done so through Chichi Jima “as Haha Jima has no harbor.”\textsuperscript{225} Furthermore, the admiral stated that, while the peace treaty gave the United States full administrative authority, the Japanese government expected to administer Haha. “Under any arrangement,” he notes, “there would be continual problems requiring resolution.”\textsuperscript{226}

Citing the comments made by the group of islanders of Western descent who visited the United States in November, Radford explained,

Today we have the nucleus of a group loyal to U.S. interests in the Bonins. I cannot see how the group that wants to come in could or would have loyalties other than to Japan. Security in the area cannot help but suffer with the addition of an alien element in the Bonins. The Bonins have a strategic importance in preserving the national security. They will become more important as we withdraw our forces now in Japan, under pressure from the Japanese Government, to areas farther back from the defense perimeter currently maintained in the Pacific. Under such conditions the value of the Bonins would not be enhanced by the presence of a larger number of Japanese. Our problems on Okinawa today are much greater because of the Japanese than they would be without them. If the Japanese press this problem of returning the former residents, they will make a bad situation worse. It is bound to cost them more to support these people in the Bonins than in Japan. The Japanese should move this group to Hokkaido where there is plenty of room. The problem
is a social one rather than a political one. . . . The future in the Pacific for the long
term indicates we should be strengthening our positions—not weakening it. The
problems of Japan are not going to be alleviated in any noticeable extent by a con-
cession in the Bonins.\textsuperscript{227}

In response, Sebald asked about compensation for the islanders who wished to return
but were being denied the right. Radford, who had originally called for compensation in
1952, strongly agreed that it was a solution to the problem.

The Japanese government was aware that this meeting was scheduled to be held, and
prior to it, Ambassador Iguchi paid a call on Dulles on 13 January to encourage the United
States to quickly address Japanese requests\textsuperscript{228} and to invite Dulles to Japan on his return
home from the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) conference in Karachi.\textsuperscript{229}
On 4 February, Robertson met with Iguchi and told him of the Defense Department’s
continued concern with security and its lack of enthusiasm for any changes in the policy.\textsuperscript{230}
On 10 February, Iguchi, in what was a “last appeal” on the issue prior to his return to To-
kyo at the end of his term of ambassador, called on Dulles and left a “short paper” on the
Bonin Islands.\textsuperscript{231} Iguchi asked that the issue be taken up at the highest level and that, if it
was not, it would be difficult to resolve the issue. Iguchi did not seem to get a satisfactory
answer, however.\textsuperscript{232} Dulles was “non-committal” during the ambassador’s visit, but wrote to
Robertson about the meeting to say that he “ha[s] the impression that the political advan-
tages of this return [of islanders] override[s] the possible security risk, and I feel we might
be justified in asking the President to make a decision to this affect.”\textsuperscript{233} Robertson had the
staff begin working on a memorandum to the secretary on the issue.\textsuperscript{234}

After Iguchi left Washington, Acting Ambassador Shima called on Sebald on 21 Feb-
ruary to explain that the Japanese government intended to take up the matter again when
Dulles visited Japan (on 18 and 19 March), and that the Japanese side desired a real dis-
cussion, not the lip service it always received about security concerns.\textsuperscript{235} Other officials at
the embassy in Washington kept the pressure on the State Department by “constantly and
not too subtly telling us that there are rumors in Japan that the secretary [will] make an
announcement” when he went to Tokyo, much like he did at the time of the August 1953
announcement to return the Amami Islands.\textsuperscript{236}

By the 24th, Noel H. Hemmendinger, Charles H. Pletcher, and Herndon of the Divi-
sion of Northeast Asian Affairs had finished the memorandum under Sebald’s guidance
and submitted it to Dulles.\textsuperscript{237} The paper argued that the “vague and speculative security
advantage to the U.S. does not outweigh the grave political disadvantages from refusing
without plausible reason to accept the Japanese request [of repatriation] . . . Refusal runs
seriously counter to the major U.S. objective of securing Japan as an ally.”\textsuperscript{238} Sebald rec-
ommended that Dulles, after consulting with Defense Secretary Wilson, seek a decision
on the “repatriation on a trial basis of a limited number” of islanders, such as 150 families,
with consideration to be given later for the additional repatriation of more individuals. If
necessary, Sebald urged, Dulles should seek the president’s decision, too. If such a decision
is made, the announcement should be made while Dulles was in Tokyo. In doing so, Dulles
should make clear that there was no change in the status of U.S. control over the islands.
The next day, 25 February, the newly arrived ambassador, Tani Masayuki, a veteran diplomat who once served as foreign minister in the Tojo Hideki cabinet, called on the leadership at the State Department, explaining the history of the problem and requesting a solution. He was told that the situation did not look promising in the near future due to the position of the Defense Department. Tani subsequently informed the Foreign Ministry that, if the Japanese government raised the compensation issue alongside the repatriation problem, it would only weaken their negotiating position. In early March, the Japanese embassy went so far as to urge the ministry to refrain from making an official presentation on the compensation claim until after Dulles' visit in the hope that the U.S. secretary of state would make an announcement while in Tokyo, approving “token repatriation.”

The ministry had not taken a definitive stand on what it wished to do by this point, which likely prompted the above recommendations, but it appeared to lean toward emphasizing repatriation over compensation. In answering questions on the Bonins in the Diet on 25 February, for example, Asian Bureau Chief Nakagawa distinguished between claims for compensation and plans to return the former residents, and he denied that the proposed submission of claims meant that repatriation plans were being abandoned. To U.S. embassy officials, he stated that he realized the issue was “delicate” and that it could not be settled during Dulles’ visit, but emphasized the government took the problem “very seriously” and would probably raise it with the secretary. Moreover, while he denied press reports that he had indicated the Japanese government hoped to settle the issue of islanders’ return when Secretary Dulles visited Tokyo, he noted that he had said the government, of course, would “miss no opportunity” to do so.

Based on Tani’s 7 March recommendation and earlier suggestions, the Asia Affairs Division, which was assigned the issue of the Article 3 islands among other duties, recommended that the ministry only introduce the compensation issue when it was clear that there was no hope for a solution on repatriation. As a result, Shigemitsu, who had succeeded Tani as foreign minister in 1943, handed Allison a long memorandum for Secretary Dulles, with a section dedicated to the Bonin Islands. Shigemitsu warned that the problem is “now assuming a character of a national issue . . . I appeal again most fervently for your kind consideration.” As a compromise, Shigemitsu proposed limiting the number of returnees and places of resettlement in a way that would be compatible with U.S. strategic requirements.

By this point, Dulles had left Washington for the SEATO meeting in Karachi, which was held from 6 to 8 March. He was also to visit Vietnam, the Republic of China, and South Korea before going to Japan. Prior to departing from Washington, Dulles spent much time examining the issue and decided not to raise it with the president at this point, but instead intended to look into it personally while in Tokyo. He instructed his staff to prepare a position paper laying out the pros and cons of repatriation to be sent to him in Tokyo. Based on interactions with the Japanese and U.S. embassies, the State Department expected the issue to be “very high on the list” of subjects to be raised by the Japanese side. The position paper reached Dulles without a problem prior to his arrival in Japan.

Dulles seemed to enjoy his trip to Tokyo. In reporting on it to the cabinet on 23 March, he described his meetings in Japan as “the best talks I’ve ever had”—[they] included some
of the party people who are the real power behind the officials.” Dulles’ first meeting in Japan was on the 18th and, on the following day, in his meeting with Prime Minister Hatoyama, the minister raised the repatriation issue and requested that Dulles help find a solution to the problem. Dulles told Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, and other influential cabinet and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members gathered—including future prime minister Kishi—that he had in fact studied the problem and while he had been “inclined to believe the islanders should be allowed to return... the more he studied the problem the less confident he became.” Dulles said he doubted whether the islands could sustain such a population and feared creating a Cyprus-like situation, where an island saw divided rule and loyalties. “[I]t was quite possible that after the islanders had been returned they would want more and more... Letting the Bonin islanders return might do more harm to Japanese-American relations than good.” He noted the strategic importance of the islands for the United States and its allies, and that it was necessary to view the problem from “a long range basis.”

It is likely that Dulles’ true reason for opposing the return of the islanders was due to the fact that nuclear warheads had been stored in Chichi Jima the month before. Dulles, in an 18 November 1955 letter, noted that he was not opposed to storing nuclear weapons in the Bonins and the Volcano Islands, but explained that he did not want to see that fact used as a way to deny the return of the islanders. He does not seem to have informed the Japanese side that the weapons were on the island.

While Hatoyama and the Japanese side did not appear to object to Dulles’ explanation, and despite Dulles’ favorable report of the trip, they were no doubt unhappy about the situation. Miki Bukichi, one of the meeting attendees and an important member of the LDP and ally of Hatoyama, pointed out that while Japanese leaders were aware of the reasoning behind U.S. policy, the people did not understand it and saw the United States as “heartless” for refusing to allow repatriation. “Mountains could be undermined by ant hills,” the 72-year old veteran politician warned.

Back in Washington, the State Department staff, which had supported approving repatriation, was also concerned about the effect the Bonins’ issue could have on the relationship. Acting director of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Noel H. Hemmendinger, a lawyer who shortly thereafter entered private practice, told Robertson, “We cannot afford to ignore these appeals from Japanese leaders.” U.S. policy, he continued,

Recognizes that we cannot count upon Japan’s friendship as Japan grows stronger, but we tend to assume that Japan’s allegiance will be a matter of cold calculation. Cold calculation alone does not explain the degree to which Japan has cooperated with the United States. Japan’s cooperation is based in part, in the Japanese way of thinking, on what Japan owes us, as the stronger partner; the counterpart of this, in the Japanese way of thinking, is that we owe Japan receptiveness to Japanese interests and aspirations... In deciding the repatriation question, we have to weigh our security interests in unimpeded control of the Bonins against our security interest in keeping Japan as an ally. The Bonins alone, of course, will not determine Japan’s future course. But the Japanese think the issue is important, and, unlike some of the other problems on which our help is sought, it is one which we have
the power to resolve. To underestimate the role of intangibles in making the decision could prove to be an historic mistake. \textsuperscript{261}

The “intangibles” that Hemmendinger alluded to were the same ones that existed elsewhere in the U.S.-Japan relationship yet were “not fully appreciated” by the Americans. \textsuperscript{262} The repatriation question, he noted, “cuts across a large number of more or less clearly defined aspirations of the Japanese,” with migration being one, but also included “national pride, which suffered ignominiously from defeat and loss of territory, and resentment of racial discrimination, which has often in the past characterized the United States attitude toward Japan.” \textsuperscript{263}

By chance, this latter point had become particularly prominent around that time due to the situation in which Arthur Ackerman, an islander of Eurasian descent, was granted permission by the U.S. Navy to return to the islands with his six family members. \textsuperscript{264} The Japanese press and the league made much of the Ackermans, who had left the islands to live in Japan much earlier, while others, who had lived on the islands much longer and still had property and possessions there, were not permitted to return. The Foreign Ministry also raised the issue with the embassy. Allison, who had only been informed of the CNO’s decision when Captain William C. Norvell, his naval attaché, told him, was indignant. “I can see absolutely no justification for this kind of discriminatory treatment, apparently based on Eurasian background of Ackerman and wishes of present island inhabitants. Such action obviously arouses resentment here, and makes our delicate position on Bonin repatriation issue even more difficult.” \textsuperscript{265} Allison encouraged the department to take steps to defer the Ackermans’ repatriation to consult with the Navy and investigate the case further. The following day, a decision to cancel the permission was made. Still bothered by the Navy’s handling of the issue, Allison told the department that the incident was an “entirely avoidable embarrassment” and that he would not take responsibility for it because he had not been consulted in advance. \textsuperscript{266}

The embassy and the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs had been in regular communication over the Bonins’ issue, and they saw “eye-to-eye.” Deputy Chief of Mission Parsons and NAA’s Acting Director Hemmendinger, in particular, often wrote to one another, and even Ambassador Allison personally wrote to Dulles in early April. \textsuperscript{267}

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, former Japanese Ambassador to the United States Iguchi, who had recently returned to Japan, spoke before the Japan-America Society on 30 March. Spending some time at the end of his speech on the Bonins problem, he stated,

One item of unfinished business relates to the pleas of the former inhabitants of the Bonin Islands to be allowed to return to their native islands to live in a manner to which they have long been accustomed and to earn a living in a way they best know how. Now, they are a sort of displaced people, suffering hardships and forced in many cases to fall back on government aid. If the door is opened, they will be moved back to the Bonins at Japanese expense. They will observe any security or other regulations as are necessary. But they want to live in the home islands of their ancestry, just as the people of Okinawa are living on their own native soil. \textsuperscript{268}

It was not only Iguchi, but his successor Tani, who took up the issue quickly and earnestly. On 11 April, Tani paid Robertson a “courtesy call,” but the conversation immediately
turned substantive. Tani wanted to get his reactions to the talks in Tokyo between Dulles and Shigemitsu, which Robertson had also attended. After that discussion, the ambassador mentioned that Japan needed “tangible encouragement” as a way to “consolidate and strengthen the conservative merger.” This, of course, was not the first time the Japanese government—regardless of who headed it—asked for a diplomatic favor to resolve a domestic problem. Tani, noting that “Hatoyama would not last much longer,” called for “a gesture of friendship” from the United States and suggested a “token repatriation” of Bonin Islanders of about 2,500 of the 7,000 total. Robertson explained the comments made by Dulles at the Tokyo meetings and why it was difficult to meet the demands, but Tani pointed to Okinawa, which had many more bases with numerous Japanese citizens living there. He also reminded Robertson that “The . . . conservatives [in Japan] would be encouraged by a friendly gesture by the United States—even a small gesture.” When Robertson thanked him for his “views,” the ambassador brusquely replied that they were not just his views but his “conviction.”

The following week, First Secretary Tanaka called on the new officer in charge of Japanese affairs, James V. Martin Jr., who was born in Japan and had recently returned to the department after serving as the consul general in Fukuoka, to discuss the question of compensation. Specifically, Tanaka wanted to know the likelihood of the U.S. government paying those islanders who had not been repatriated should an official request be made. Martin said he would not make any promises but it certainly was possible. Although he was surely aware of the answer, Martin asked Tanaka why the Japanese government “desired to make such a big issue” of the islanders’ situation. Describing their claim as of “relative unimportance,” Martin accused the Japanese government of having “some other motive in urging for repatriation.” If offended, Tanaka did not show it. He explained that the government simply wished for repatriation at the present time, and also desired the United States to announce that the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands would be returned to Japan in the future. Martin then launched into a Dullesian lecture to the effect that if Japan desired the return of the islands it had to create the “conditions favorable” for their return by building up its defense effort and “making itself a truly valuable ally.” It was, Martin continued with an added note of finality, “the fear of the possibility that Japan might swing toward neutralism which made the United States unwilling to think of returning the Ryukyus or the Bonins for the foreseeable future.” The message was clear: Japan needed to confirm that it was politically stable, pro-United States, and militarily capable.

This did not mean that higher levels in the State Department were unconcerned about the Bonins problem, however. Earlier, on 5 April, Allison wrote a letter to Secretary Dulles that urged repatriation, and Dulles agreed to consider the matter further. Allison told him that the Dulles visit to Japan had been generally well received, but the matter of repatriation was one with which he remained “deeply concerned.” Allison’s letter was very much like the description Jeff Graham Parsons gave of Allison’s dealings with Dulles in Parson’s unpublished memoirs—not afraid to argue with him. Allison, who unlike his predecessor Murphy and like his two immediate successors never visited the Bonins himself, told Dulles that it was “difficult even for me, let alone the Japanese,” to see how the policy of nonrepatriation could be justified. The Navy had “no military facilities worthy of the name” and the “security considerations . . . cannot possibly outweigh the potentially
grave effect which our continued refusal to permit repatriation or make some mutually satisfactory deal on the Bonins is likely to have on our relations with our Japanese ally.”

As an example of this warning, Allison mentioned the reactions in Japan to Dulles’ conversations in Tokyo about the Bonins problem. While the actual discussions were not reported in the press, it was “common knowledge in Tokyo . . . that [Dulles] was ‘cool’ to the idea of repatriation. On practically all levels, the Japanese reaction to this ‘rejection’ . . . has been bitter.” Allison noted that, within the Foreign Ministry, there were those who felt the prime minister and party leadership had not presented the repatriation issue effectively in the talks but, “in general . . . the resentment has been directed solely at the United States, and there has been not the slightest understanding or sympathy displayed for our position on the issue, which is regarded as being a ‘heartless’ one, without any kind of moral or other justification.”

Allison also informed Dulles that, in light of Soviet intransigence on the Southern Kuriles, U.S. policy on the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands has been linked in the minds of Japanese officials and citizenry, and Hatoyama has been unwilling or unable to reply to opposition attacks on the apparent “conspiring” of the Navy with the islanders of Western descent to prevent the repatriation of the evacuees.

Allison stated that he agreed with Dulles regarding the “Cyprus parallel,” namely, that repatriation would tend to increase pressure for reversion, but urged Dulles to be forthright on the issue:

Personally I think it would benefit and help to establish our partnership with Japan to let her have the Bonins back as soon as she gets an adequate navy. But if—for some reason not yet made clear to me—we must insist on retaining them for a long period, I think we ought to tell the Japanese so and arrange a deal on that basis—for example, repatriation in return for a long-term lease, or some other quid pro quo that would definitively close the reversion issue for decades.

Dulles agreed to consider the matter further and, later in the month, some recommendations were written for him by Hemmendinger on 24 April 24. Among other ideas, Hemmendinger, a lawyer by training, recommended placing the issue before the National Security Council. Sebald, however, did not approve of raising it before the NSC at this point, and the matter continued unresolved. The issue, however, did not go away.

On 24 May, Tani visited Robertson again and repeated much of the same message he relayed at his 11 April session. He described the denial of the right of the former inhabitants to return to the islands as “social injustice” and argued that there was a way in which their needs and the security needs of the United States could be met. Robertson noted Dulles’ conversation in Tokyo, where he had referred to the Cyprus situation, and suggested that repatriation of 2,500 would only exacerbate the Bonins problem. Tani also raised the issue of compensation, which he described as separate from the repatriation problem, and mentioned that the government wanted to pursue it more in the near future.

Robertson’s staff seemed concerned about the memorandum that Tani had left with him, which alluded to the “treacherous winds that blow from the Red continent” that were weakening the present government, and explained to the Americans that the Japanese government believed an “urgent solution [to the Bonins problem] is indispensable in bolstering
the efforts of Japan’s present leadership to consolidate their position and to strengthen the partnership” between the two countries.\textsuperscript{290} Once again, this time under Robertson’s signature, recommendations were prepared for Dulles in late July urging him to discuss the issue with Secretary of Defense Wilson and, if no new reasons are advanced, “to seek a decision at the highest level” to permit repatriation as “a trial step” of 2,639 former inhabitants.\textsuperscript{291}

Again, no decision seems to have been forthcoming, and it is unclear if a meeting or any exchanges took place between the two secretaries. In the meantime, on 5 July, the Foreign Ministry submitted to the U.S. embassy a note requesting 960 million yen as compensation for the islanders.\textsuperscript{292} The Japanese, as noted earlier, had been hesitant for a long time to make such a request, as it felt that in doing so, its case for repatriation would be weakened. The State Department, it turns out, had also been hesitant to pursue such an approach in that it felt “it would be an admission of the rights of the former inhabitants and in the absence of plausible reasons for refusing return would leave us hopelessly in the wrong in Japanese eyes. The bill would probably not be modest, and Japanese residual sovereignty would not be extinguished.”\textsuperscript{293} Nevertheless, the department recognized that compensation had to be considered as one possible solution in case repatriation or reversion was not realized. It informed the U.S. embassy in Tokyo that, when the text of the Japanese note arrived, it would “start the legal wheels in the Department moving to obtain a determination of the extent of our liability,” anticipating that it would “take some time.”\textsuperscript{294} Time it would take—it was not until 1961 before payment was finally made after Congress authorized the funds.

In the meantime, State Department officials, not to mention the Foreign Ministry, had not given up hope that the repatriation issue might be resolved. The department, of course, had to continue to show a united front with the Department of Defense vis-à-vis Japan, even though it clearly disagreed with DOD’s Bonins policy. On 10 August, Tanaka from the Japanese embassy called on his State Department counterparts to ask about the status of their thinking with regard to the Bonin Islands.\textsuperscript{295} Martin told him that the claim for compensation was being reviewed and that repatriation was under consideration as well. Tanaka suggested a concession on the Bonins be made before Japan and the Soviet Union concluded their normalization of relations talks (eventually completed in October 1956), as it would “have a better effect coming as a more voluntary concession on the part of the United States rather than coming as a reaction to some Russian concession.”\textsuperscript{296} Martin said he could not promise anything, and warned the Japanese embassy “not to push the department too hard on the matter because if pressed for an immediate answer, that answer would probably be negative.”\textsuperscript{297}

In the end, the Soviet Union failed to return the Northern Islands to Japan at the time of the normalization talks, and the issue remains unresolved to this day. The Soviet Union’s missed opportunity did not get the United States off the hook, however, with Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, and the problem would continue to haunt the relationship. So much so that the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, as part of its 34-page dispatch entitled “A Fresh Start with Japan,” raised the issue, warning, that

our entire policy in the Bonins in fact is interpreted by most Japanese as an attempt to detach the islands from Japan and annex them to the U.S. As long as the former residents are excluded, the Bonin issue will continue to be a source of nationwide
resentment against the United States, a major irritant in U.S.-Japan relations. There is no possibility that the issue will fade gradually away.\textsuperscript{298}

Allison explained that the embassy continued to believe that “despite the disadvantages which might accrue, it would be in the overall interests of the United States to permit at least some of the islanders to return, with generous compensation to be paid to those who (like the former inhabitants of Iwo Jima) cannot be absorbed due to change of circumstances.”\textsuperscript{299} Robertson, who visited Japan later that year in December, was strongly in favor of many of the recommendations Allison made and with the ambassador’s general thinking. In early September, just before he was sent the embassy’s report, he received another letter from Fukuda regarding a story that had appeared in the news about how the United States intended to refuse to pay compensation to the islanders. Fukuda felt this was too much, especially as their real desire was repatriation, which was denied to them and which caused much of their financial, mental, and other hardships. Fukuda reported that Ambassador Tani assured him that the story was false and thanked Robertson for his continued interest. Fukuda also alluded to some of the domestic and bilateral risks of U.S. intransigence on this issue.

I am very happy I can tell you that there has so far been not a single Bonin Islander who turned anti-American because of their privations. In fact, at the time when The People’s Mass Meeting was about to be held in Tokyo (on July 4 last) as a gesture of protest against the Price Recommendation on the Okinawa Land Problem, the Bonin residents of Tokyo were repeatedly and tenaciously called upon by the sponsoring agencies, including the So-hyo (General Council of Japanese Trade unions—Japanese counterpart of C[ongress of ] I[ndustrial] O[rganizations]), to join them in their demonstrations, but which they declined determinedly. In light of the delicate circumstances in which Japan’s issues with the Soviet Union are being weighed in terms of her relations with the United States I trust that you can very easily appreciate just how Japanese intelligent public are [sic] looking forward for the American decision and just how much the matter is worthy of careful consideration.\textsuperscript{300}

Robertson responded shortly after receiving Fukuda’s letter, emphasizing that no official U.S. government reply has been made to the Japanese government’s request for compensation for the islanders, and added that the State Department “understand[s] and have sympathy for the problems of the Islanders.”\textsuperscript{301} Robertson, in addition, saw the letter as a “good presentation of Japanese viewpoint” and proposed that it be forwarded to Gray at the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{302} Gray responded in mid-October, promising to give “careful consideration” to the request for compensation of the former islanders.\textsuperscript{303} Gray’s letter, however, implied that the group had changed its position from repatriation to compensation, but that was not the case—it simply shifted to compensation if repatriation was not possible at the time. The islanders still desired repatriation, as well as the return of the islands.

Around this time, Robertson met with Harry F. Kern, the director of the New York-based magazine \textit{Foreign Reports} and a former foreign news editor for \textit{Newsweek}. It is unclear who initiated the action, but Kern—a prominent Republican and staunch supporter of Japan through the lobbying group, the American Council on Japan—reported to Robertson
that he had gone to the Navy to discuss the issue and suggested that the Navy make an “informal explanation of the their attitude to the Japanese” in order to reach a settlement. In his discussion with Rear Admiral Hebert D. Riley, Kern suggested that former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State William J. Castle, who had served with Joseph C. Grew as the co-chairman of the ACJ and who was “greatly trusted and [whose] views are heeded” in Japan, be utilized to bring the two sides together. Kern warned of the consequences, particularly in the media and public opinion, if the United States did not adequately deal with the issue. “The Japanese assure me,” Kern wrote in a follow-up letter to Riley after their meeting in late October, which followed the signing of the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration that normalized relations, “that a settlement would be of the greatest importance to the conservative regime in the near future.” It is unclear, however, what Riley or the Navy did with this offer by Kern. It is also unclear if Robertson actually approved this effort, as there is no evidence he tried to stop it.

In light of the changes in the Japanese-Soviet relationship and pending issues in the U.S.-Japan relationship, Robertson wrote a memorandum to Dulles in early January 1957 entitled “Our Japan Policy: Need for a Reappraisal and Certain Immediate Actions.” One of those actions he urged was repatriating 2,639 of the Bonin Islanders. Solving this, in addition to the war criminals issue, “promptly and generously,” Robertson felt would “buy us time to develop solutions on our own initiative” to several larger problems, including the status of the Ryukyus, reviewing security relations with Japan, and examining the question of to what extent the United States should lend support to Japan in the United Nations, which it had recently joined in December 1956, and in leading the Afro-Asian bloc. Robertson suggested that Dulles hold a meeting the following week with his senior staff, including Douglas MacArthur II, counselor of the Department of State and who had recently been designated to succeed Allison as ambassador to Japan; Robert R. Bowie, assistant secretary of state for policy planning; and Robertson and Howard L. Parsons. Dulles agreed, and the meeting was held on 16 January. Unfortunately, no record of it was found in State Department files. In any case, Dulles does not seem to have raised the issue in the cabinet meeting held on the 18th, so it can be assumed that a decision was not reached at the department meeting.

Again, as Allison noted, the issue would not go away. In Diet testimony in February, Acting Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who was serving in place of the hospitalized Prime Minister Ishibashi Tanzan (December 1956–February 1957), stated that the government was “making various efforts to secure the return of administrative control of the islands, but from the standpoint of international strategic conditions, the U.S. would not agree.” While most reports of Kishi’s comments focused on Okinawa and noted that “pledges seeking the restoration to Japanese administration of Okinawa and the Bonins . . . were long considered political necessity here and has been made by every Japanese government since the Peace Treaty,” the embassy nevertheless planned to point out to the Foreign Ministry the “difficulties” such statements created. Although the telegram also said that the statements were “apparently so commonplace that the vernacular press paid little attention to it,” in fact, Kishi, when he became prime minister just 10 days later on 23 February, would once again seriously begin to raise the issue, among others, including revising the security treaty.
Kishi’s concern over the Bonins and Ryukyus, as well as on security treaty revision, was based on recognition of the need to strengthen the U.S.-Japan bonds. He saw those issues eating away at the relationship, as did many in the State Department, including the new ambassador, MacArthur, who presented his credentials on 25 February. Kishi and MacArthur immediately began meeting privately to discuss overhauling the relationship and, in April, Kishi discussed some papers with the ambassador, explaining the “national sentiments of the Japanese people regarding U.S.-Japan relations” and analyzing the causes “impeding cooperation” between the two countries. One of the papers given to MacArthur concerned territorial problems.

Regarding the Bonin Islands, Kishi’s paper pointed out that the U.S. government had never explained what military interests would be jeopardized if the former inhabitants were allowed to return. Kishi then proposed that a 10-year time limit be set on the Article 3 islands, during which time, in the case of the Bonins, the “former inhabitants will be permitted to return progressively, and islands of lesser military importance will be fully restored to Japan, as expeditiously as possible.” While MacArthur did not think Kishi “reasonably expects us to buy his proposals out of hand,” he did believe that the issues were “so basic and require urgent attention.” The ambassador, who served closely with Dulles for several years, traveled with him extensively, and probably spent more time together than they did with their own wives, continued,

I urge that Kishi’s approach be taken with utmost seriousness and that the U.S. government make a basic and fundamental review of our policy regarding Japan . . . If we are unable to lay solid groundwork with Kishi when he visits Washington with constructive suggestions for achieving readjustment in our relationships, I am not optimistic about the future in terms of our long-term interest in Japan.

With tensions still high over the Girard case, in which a Japanese woman was shot by a U.S. soldier on a firing range on 30 January, and Okinawa and other related problems, MacArthur’s concerns could not be ignored. After speaking with Kishi, who raised the issue of the repatriation again on 1 May, MacArthur once again encouraged the department to seek a solution. While it agreed, the department had to instruct MacArthur that in his talks with Kishi in Tokyo to repeat the mantra—“for general strategic reasons the United States does not favor repatriation of the 7,000 Bonin Islanders at the present time”—and tell Kishi not to get his hopes up.

CINCPAC was very much worried about MacArthur’s willingness to accommodate Kishi. “An inherent danger” exists in such willingness, Stump warned the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, in that “it may provide too fast a tempo and could mislead the Japanese into misinterpreting U.S. intentions.” The Navy’s continued distrust of Japan was particularly clear in this message, but so were its concerns over regional stability.

It would be well to remind Mr. Kishi that his predecessor Mr. Shigeru Yoshida in discussing territorial issues . . . stated “I cannot but hope that the administration of [the Ryukyu and Bonin] islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not too distant future with the reestablishment of world security—especially the security
of Asia." This condition of desired security seems prerequisite to any change in the status of these island groups.  

Nevertheless, the State Department supported MacArthur's views, including his call in early May to permit the repatriation of "few hundred former residents to those islands on which we do not maintain important security installations." Writing to the deputy chief of mission, Outerbridge Horsey, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Director Howard Parsons admitted, however, that the Bonins issue, along with that of the Ryukyus and war criminals, "offer ground for endless debate. . . . We have tried and failed so often that our hope is not too bright, but we are making the strongest possible effort." One effort involved restarting talks with the Defense Department on the Bonins problem. Robertson, who argued that "we must somehow accommodate the reviving Japanese nationalism with respect to which the Bonin Islands have become an important symbol," urged Dulles to give him permission to seek the agreement of the Department of Defense to permit the return. Receiving Dulles' permission on 5 June, Robertson met with Radford to discuss the matter, but found him unwilling to change his view that "such repatriation would jeopardize our security position in the Bonins Islands."  

A State–Defense meeting was finally had on 17 June, after MacArthur had returned to Washington on the eve of Kishi's visit. Also in attendance were Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II; Navy Captain Berton A. Robbins Jr., the regional director, Far East, representing defense; and Dulles, Ambassador MacArthur, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, Assistant Secretary Robertson, Assistant Secretary Bowie, and Parsons, Martin, and Harry F. Pfeiffer Jr., of the Northeast Asian Affairs Office representing the State Department. Both sides were well prepared for the meeting, although the DOD, outmanned, ended up once again battling the State Department to a stalemate, and thus technically won, by preserving the status quo.

Taking a hard-line position going into interagency talks, the Navy recommended that the U.S. position on the Bonins problem should: be nonnegotiable; not relinquish any island of the Bonins until "strategic considerations" permit the reversion of all of them, including the Volcano islands; make no commitment as to the date for the islands' reversion; and not permit any repatriation of the former islanders until the islands are reverted. The Navy explained that its recommendations were based on the following considerations, some of which were reiterations of earlier views and some which reflected new realities. As they are insightful into the thinking of the Navy, they are cited below in full.

1. Our base system in the Pacific Ocean is a single strategic entity comprised of numerous island positions. Most of these positions represent potential capabilities only. Although economy of forces and the dictates of strategy will not permit maintenance of garrisons or continuous use of all these positions, the maximum U.S. control must be maintained everywhere in time of peace to assure the maximum availability in time of war.

2. The physical value of the Bonins to Japan is negligible. They have almost no economic potential, and the Japanese are not in a position to make use of any military potential.
(3) Since return of the islands to Japan is primarily a symbolic issue, it is susceptible of a symbolic solution, such as a commitment to restudy disposition at such time as a changed security situation may permit release.

(4) In areas under exclusive U.S. control, in which all or nearly all foreign nationals are excluded, it is possible to conduct classified activities not feasible in sovereign foreign territory. Reduction or loss of U.S. control, or admission of additional aliens, would reduce or destroy this capability.

(5) In the atomic era, dispersal of forces is a recognized necessity. This makes necessary many small mobile bases with the widest possible choice of locations.

(6) Repatriation of a few hundred former islanders, instead of relieving political pressures, would redouble the pressure from the remaining few thousand, making the issue more of an irritant than at present.

(7) The present islanders’ family residence in the Bonins pre-dates the arrival of the first Japanese. They feel they were oppressed under Japanese rule, and the arrival of Japanese latter-day colonists would introduce a serious local irritant that does not now exist.

(8) In the face of the security restrictions, which it would be necessary to apply to some repatriates, the Japanese Government would find it necessary to champion their cause and demand a voice in the administration of the Bonins.

(9) The few present residents are content under a simple government administered as additional duty by the three officers and 12 men of the U.S. Naval Facility, Chichi Jima. Enlargement of the indigenous population would make necessary a larger and more costly government.

(10) The policy of keeping the Bonin-Volcano Islands closed to further colonization was established by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in 1945. It was reviewed and reaffirmed by the Pacific Islands Coordinating Group (State-Defense-Interior) in 1953 and again in 1956.

(11) The United States has not deported or removed any residents since it gained control of the islands in 1945, and hence does not bear responsibility for the dislocations which are the basis for the claims of former residents.

(12) Additional Japanese in the Bonins would present daily problems and difficulties, and in many matters would be at odds with the U.S. administration. Whenever they raised an outcry there would be an immediate reaction in Japan with serious domestic political implications. It is only natural under these circumstances that the Bonins would preoccupy the Japanese public.392

After exchanges regarding security treaty revision and U.S. force levels in Japan, the discussion the morning of 17 June turned to the Bonins problem. Dulles explained that his department was planning to tell the Japanese side that repatriation of some individuals
would be permitted with costs to be borne by Japan. Dulles mentioned that he had “taken a strong line against this in the past and had hoped agitation would drop but it has not done so,” and stated his doubts that the U.S. position could be continued much longer in light of the existence of a much larger population in Okinawa amid U.S. bases. Radford, in what would be one of his last interagency meetings on the issue as he was soon to retire as JCS chairman, seized this opportunity to launch a detailed review of the situation and picked apart traditional arguments used by the Japanese to justify repatriation based on the internal study. According to the memorandum of conversation prepared by Navy Captain Robbins, “State representatives at the meeting had little to offer in rebuttal other than a general statement by Assistant Secretary Robertson” who argued that it would be difficult to keep out the Bonin Islanders who had lived in the islands for several generations. Dulles, according to the memo, even went so far as to say he “had some serious questions as to the validity of the Japanese proposals,” curiously suggesting that the issue was simply being used for “political agitation” and that the Japanese side “did not really want to settle the matter.” As a result of the State Department failing to convince the Defense Department, the meeting ended “with a clear understanding that there had been no final decision” on the State Department’s proposal to allow the return of a few hundred islanders and that it “would make no unilateral decision on this matter. End of meeting.”

Although the author was unable to locate a State Department version of the memorandum of conversation, it seems that some in the department took away a completely different impression as to what been decided. According to a memorandum prepared for Ambassador MacArthur, the suggestion arose that the Bonin Island Council “should screen and approve” the former islanders who wished to return. Marshall Green, a long time Japan-hand who was serving as a regional advisor in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, disagreed, describing the council as “a creature of the U.S. Navy [which] largely engages in endorsing USN actions.” He went on to caution, “Since all five members of the Council . . . are of Caucasian origin, any decisions made by the Council . . . would be denounced by the Japanese as discriminatory. The race issue would be revived on a grand scale.” Instead, Green proposed that a different screening and selection process should be developed, and that it be proposed to Kishi:

(a) The U.S. determines the number who could be repatriated and transmits this figure to the Japanese government, (b) The Japanese Government determines which families should be repatriated using length of family residence on the islands, desire and need to return, and security factors as principal criteria, (c) Visa applications are then submitted to the U.S. Embassy Tokyo for those selected, (d) The U.S. will issue visas in accordance with usual screening and other procedures, (e) The Japanese Government will defray all costs of transportation and proper resettlement of islanders, [and] (f) The Japanese Government agrees to deal with all complaints that might arise out of this process.

Green’s memo became the basis for a formula shared with the president, at the latter’s request.

The following day, as per prior arrangement, Dulles met with President Eisenhower—along with Robertson, MacArthur, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald A. Quarles, As-
sistant Secretary Mansfield D. Sprague, Admiral Radford, and some others—to prepare him for Kishi’s visit. With regard to the Bonins problem, Dulles explained that his department was ready to agree to some islanders being repatriated, and Robertson indicated that the number it had in mind was about 2,500. DOD, however, it was pointed out, was opposed. Radford explained that if the islanders were to return, they “would adopt an attitude of hostility toward our military organizations there, and will steadily demand more from us.” Dulles, as in the 17 June meeting, again failed to support his staff on the issue, stating “he was inclined to feel that if we let the Bonin Islanders in, the result would be trouble for us,” and adding that “while the action might give Kishi some immediate prestige,” he thought “the matter could be left in abeyance until later in the conference.” Eisenhower, turning to Radford, asked for a memorandum concerning military requirements in the Bonins.

The president, however, continued to give thought to the issue during the meeting while other concerns were being discussed. At the end of the meeting, he asked the State Department to prepare for his consideration a formula to permit the repatriation of certain islanders. While a decision on whether or not they would be permitted to return was deferred, Eisenhower wanted to know what the options were. Later that day, Dulles forwarded to the president a memorandum on the repatriation formula devised by Green.

The next day, Radford submitted the memorandum the president requested on military requirements to Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the White House staff secretary. Radford’s memo was fairly brief, and he noted that it introduced only the “more important factors from a military point of view to be considered with retention” of the Bonin Islands. He explained that the JCS thinking on this matter was “related to the eventuality of [U.S.] forces withdrawing from Japan,” and thus the United States needed to preserve its strategic flexibility: “Our base system in the Pacific Ocean is a single strategic entity which comprises numerous island positions. While economy of forces will not permit maintenance of garrisons in all these positions, the maximum of U.S. control must be maintained in order to assure maximum of availability in time of war.” Related to this, Radford pointed out that the JCS “believe that repatriation of Japanese-oriented group[s] to any of these islands, regardless of whether or not there are at present any military installations, would largely negate their potential usefulness. Furthermore, the difficulties which would ensue as a consequence of such partial repatriation are clearly indicated by our experience in the Ryukyu Islands.” President Eisenhower read it, as his initials can be found at the top of the document, but it is unclear if he fully agreed with it.

It was relevant to note that the U.S. side placed much emphasis on discussing the issue as Ambassador Asakai Koichiro, who had succeeded Tani in May 1957, had informed Robertson on 8 June that Kishi planned to concentrate on territorial issues in addition to the security and defense relationship. As mentioned earlier, MacArthur also believed repatriation of the Bonin Islanders was an issue “which is important as a part of our over-all readjustment in our relations with Japan.” Both Dulles and Eisenhower, for whom MacArthur also had worked in Europe during World War II, respected the ambassador’s opinions.

Leaving Tokyo on 16 June, and arriving in Washington by way of Honolulu and San Francisco on the 19th, Kishi’s first meeting was held at 0900 on 20 June at the State De-
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partment. After Dulles made some opening remarks and Kishi responded with some opening remarks, Radford was asked to address the group on the regional security situation. In his comments, he stressed the importance of “not altering the strategic status of the Bonins and Ryukyus.” Kishi then was given the chance to make some comments, during which he spent a lot of time discussing territorial issues and Japanese sentiments regarding them. Regarding the Bonins, in addition to the land being used by the U.S. military, the problem, he stated, was being compounded by the failure to allow the former residents to return. “This represented discrimination in Japanese eyes,” he said. After Kishi finished, Dulles spoke at length, first on the need for Japan to assume a larger security role and to devote more to its defense. He then spoke of Okinawa and the Bonins. With regard to the latter, which he saw as being of “considerable strategic value,” Dulles asked Kishi rhetorically whether the bilateral relationship would really benefit by having the former residents return—“people who would have a hard time earning a livelihood and whose presence would involve the same type of problems we now have in Okinawa.” Kishi did not have a chance to respond, as the scheduled time for the end of the meeting had arrived.

Several of the participants then moved to Secretary Dulles’ office for a smaller meeting. Although Dulles had said he was hesitant to support repatriation in meetings on 18 June with the president, a view which he seemed to show in the morning meeting, Dulles informed Kishi that he was willing to study further whether a “very limited number,” such as 200 to 300, of the former residents could be permitted to return to the islands. He qualified it by saying that “as the islands were being used for military purposes more than is generally realized,” the actual number to be returned would depend on security requirements. Dulles cautioned Kishi that, even if some were to return, the problem might actually become worse—“if the objective of the prime minister was to get relations on a better long-term basis, in the secretary’s opinion the return of a few hundred persons to the Bonin Islands might give the prime minister the impression of an immediate accomplishment but the problems which might grow out of this in the future would be even more difficult.” Dulles also wanted Kishi to understand that, as the U.S. ability to use military areas in Japan decreased, the importance of the Bonin Islands would only increase. (Although he did not say it, this was true of Okinawa as well.) Finally, Dulles mentioned that he was unsure whether the president would approve the idea, even in principle.

Later that day at a follow-up meeting, Kishi said he “fully appreciated” the concerns raised by Dulles, but that he nevertheless felt that the repatriation of “those persons whose families had resided in the islands for generations” would be “beneficial” for the relations of both countries. Kishi mentioned that, if repatriation was found to be difficult, it would be necessary to compensate the islanders who were unable to return and were experiencing financial difficulties in Japan. Dulles, in reply, mistakenly stated that the records the United States had on land holdings in the Bonin Islands showed that “virtually all of the land” in the islands had been owned by the Japanese government and that former residents had “no property rights of their own.” Kishi immediately corrected Dulles, explaining that the inhabitants had in fact owned parcels of land on their own, and that they also possessed fishing rights, which were considered property. Dulles promised to study it more.

The following morning, 21 June, Kishi and Dulles met for two-and-one-half hours prior to Kishi’s call on the president at the White House to discuss the contents of the joint
communiqué. Both men got into a long discussion about the Japanese desire to use the word “ultimate” when discussing the return of Okinawa and the Bonins. Kishi referred to Dulles’ use of the word at an 23 April press conference, but Dulles said he did not think the word necessary, nor did he feel it right to change the formula used at the peace conference. The matter was further discussed in the presence of the president, when Kishi called on him later that morning. The issue of repatriating a small number of islanders—this time the number used was “100 or 150”—also came up, and Dulles stated that it might be better to indemnify the former inhabitants instead. Eisenhower promised to study the matter “sympathetically.”

When Kishi and Dulles met again to further consider the joint communiqué, the two got into another negotiating session on the Bonin Islands. Kishi agreed to delete “ultimate” from the phrase on the status of the Ryukyus and Bonins, but requested that the sentence, “The President expressed his readiness to give further sympathetic study to the possibility of the return to the Bonin Islands of a limited number of those islanders who are now residing in the home islands of Japan,” be included in the communiqué. When Dulles demurred, Kishi asked if the U.S. side was in fact going to carry out the study promised the day before. Dulles reminded him that repatriation could not be done for “more than a very few people” and, as if he had already made up his mind, that it “would cause more trouble than would be worthwhile.” Dulles promised to explore compensation, as requested by the prime minister, and to communicate with him further on the possibilities.

Kishi then raised another matter, which had not come up before and would take almost a decade to resolve. He asked that the former inhabitants be allowed to travel to the islands to visit their family graves. Dulles agreed to include that question in the study. It was not, however, mentioned in the final communiqué, the paragraph of which read,

The Prime Minister emphasized the strong desire of the Japanese people for the return of administrative control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to Japan. The President reaffirmed the United States position that Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands. He pointed out, however, that so long as the conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East the United States will find it necessary to continue the present status. He stated the United States will continue its policy of improving the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the islands and of promoting their economic and cultural advancement.

Following Kishi’s departure, the State Department requested assistance from the Defense Department to conduct studies on the feasibility of repatriating some of the islanders, ancestral grave visits, and compensation for those unable to return. In a 13 July letter from Robertson to his counterpart, Assistant Secretary Sprague, he pointed out that the repatriation issue had been “the subject of protracted discussion between our two Departments extending over a period of several years,” and noted that despite this, the U.S. government had never surveyed the islands to determine how many people could in fact be supported in areas not required for military facilities. In addition, he explained the view of the State Department that “it is most desirable to accede to the request” of the islanders to be allowed to visit the graves: “the attachment which Japanese feel to their family graves is emotional, sincere and deeply felt.” Robertson warned of the consequences of refusing to allow
“some sort of organized visits . . . of properly cleared former residents,” as it “may produce an emotional upset in Japan out of all proportion to the number of people involved.”

With regard to the issue of indemnification, Robertson informed Sprague that the State Department believed the United States had an obligation to “make just compensation to property owners for such expropriation or use,” and thus it was essential to determine if in fact the United States used private property since 28 April 1952, when the peace treaty went into effect. Naval authorities, Robertson observed, have continually said that because of World War II bombardments and the subsequent occupation by U.S. forces, there are no markers or other means to identify property lines. However, the Japanese government may have such records, he said, and if that is the case the United States could inform the Japanese side that it was prepared to compensate those former residents whose property had been used or appropriated, but that it was necessary for the Japanese to present evidence of private property holdings. With this, the United States could then determine how much of the private property had been used.

Sprague responded on 8 August with essentially a regurgitation of the JCS position on the issue, in which he argued against repatriation: “To appreciate fully the need for extensive control of the area, it must be realized that it is envisaged that the Bonin-Volcano positions will be utilized as missile bases, as advanced submarine bases, and as a supporting base for NSA and CIA operations. These sensitive uses demand a degree of security which would be largely negated by any repatriation.” Sprague warned that allowing some of the islanders to return would be opening a “Pandora’s box” in relations with Japan as the restrictions placed on the group for security reasons “would result in protests to the Japanese government, which in turn would find itself bound to champion the cause of the repatriates; eventually the Japanese Government would demand a voice in the Bonins administration . . . Instead of being relieved of the repatriation issue, the U.S. would be plagued with a ‘Cyprus’ type of problem of its own making.” Summarizing, Sprague argued that “continued and exclusive U.S. control” of the islands was “essential,” and that “until the door to the Bonins is firmly closed to the Japanese this issue w[ould] continue to threaten our strategic posture as well as our friendly relations with Japan.”

For those reasons, Sprague wrote that compensation, while “difficult and complex,” seemed to offer “the most practical means” by which the United States could deal with Japanese sensitivities. Sprague qualified his support for it, however, urging the State Department to inform the Japanese government that it should also pay for half of the compensation, as it had evacuated the islanders initially. The U.S. payment should be made as a lump sum, which would be given to the Japanese government to distribute. Sprague also stated that the U.S. government should try to obtain the Japanese government’s agreement that the payment would represent “a final settlement of the compensation and repatriation issue.”

On 9 August, Robertson met with Radford (then one week away from retirement) and Sprague. Sprague, as his letter implied, agreed with the general approach to the compensation and suggested that representatives of the two departments meet to seek an agreement on a course of action. Robertson wrote back on 16 August, concurring in this suggestion. The three representatives also agreed that the Defense Department would inform the State Department as to the results of the survey of the islands to see whether islanders could be repatriated and if any could visit ancestral graves.
Green, who was well known throughout the State Department for his humor, was quite serious here. He was very skeptical of the military’s ability to produce an objective survey. “I foresee an almost impossible task,” Green began.  

“The military will first of all,” he continued,  

[v]aguely claim that they have all sorts of future requirements in the islands, some of the requirements arising out of planned or possible withdrawals from Japan. They will accordingly block off large chunks of territory (like all of Chichi Jima from those areas available for resettlement). They are then likely to claim that the resulting limited resettlement areas can support only one or two hundred persons, and that to resettle so few persons is to generate more ill will and difficulties with the Japanese than to maintain the present status (I am inclined to agree with this argument). They will also continue to argue that to resettle any number, however small, will create all sorts of administrative headaches for the U.S. Such an expected military reaction to our request for a survey of the islands is likely to postpone indefinitely or kill any chance of our government’s adopting a Bonin resettlement plan.

Even Green would have been surprised at what eventually happened. With two days remaining to Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro’s arrival in Washington, and three days before the first meeting between Dulles and the Japanese foreign minister, Sprague wrote to Robertson in response to the latter’s letter of 16 August. He informed him that he could not “determine” that the Defense Department actually agreed at the State-JCS meeting to conduct a survey to determine the number of repatriates that the Bonin Islands could support. Sprague admitted that the two departments had been obligated to “study whether a very limited number of former inhabitants of the Bonin Islands could be permitted to return there,” but he disagreed that the study “should take the form of a survey of only one of the several considerations which would affect the questions of repatriation.” Although not saying it in so many words, he appears to have been arguing that a study predicated on repatriating islanders could not be done when the Navy was against repatriation in the first place. The assistant secretary was willing to produce “a pro forma ‘study’ . . . using unclassified arguments directed toward convincing the Japanese of the futility of further agitation on the subject.”  

Sprague added, “in view of the language of the Eisenhower-Kishi communiqué in saying that ‘The United States will find it necessary to continue the present status’ of the Bonins, the Japanese must surely be expecting the results of our study to be negative.”

Three months after the Eisenhower-Kishi meetings, two months after Robertson’s letter, and more than one month after the State-JCS meeting, the Defense Department began its study the same day that Chief of Naval Operations Burke ordered Stump to provide one. The “survey” was eventually submitted on 23 September but, as expected, was more editorial than data-based, arguing that “further repatriation would be an unacceptable security burden to the United States . . . As long as the requirement remains for any of these functions, the presence of any alien group owing allegiance to a foreign nation is not compatible with implementation of the [military] activities [described in the survey]. There is no middle ground allowing a few repatriates to enter. The current U.S. policy restricting repatriation to the Bonins should be continued unchanged.”

In the meantime, the new foreign minister, Fujiyama, a businessman and close friend of Kishi who had assumed his position on 23 July, approached MacArthur on 6 September
and shared with him a talking paper on the Bonins. His paper expressed Kishi’s appreciation for Dulles’ “thoughtfulness” and called for the early realization of the “long-cherished desire” of the Japanese people for the repatriation of the islanders. Fujiyama asked about the status of the study to be prepared by the U.S. government on repatriation and promised that, “judging from the statements and actions [of the league],” the islanders selected would “cause no trouble of any kind.” Fujiyama went further, explaining that the islanders would have no difficulty making a living either, citing prewar figures to support his claim. Related to this, Fujiyama said he did not think there would be any problems between the islanders to be repatriated and those already there, as the islands were rich in natural resources and employment opportunities and the Japanese government would be willing to help sustain them. In his conversation with MacArthur, Fujiyama stressed that the return of even a limited number of islanders would “remove a very sensitive and controversial issue” from the relationship. “A deep feeling,” Fujiyama pointed out, exists in Japan “that racial discrimination has been practiced thus far by permitting return of only former inhabitants of Western descent.” The new foreign minister went on to explain that he and the prime minister “earnestly hope” that “something constructive” would be announced before the Diet convened again in November “since it would greatly strengthen the government’s position and help them deal with the Socialists and leftists on other domestic matters of great common interest, including Japan’s defense effort and reduction of communist influence in trade union movement.” Like Yoshida and Hatoyama before him, Kishi shamelessly linked domestic politics and bilateral relations.

No sooner had this message been delivered than Otabe Kenichi, counselor of the embassy of Japan, called on Howard Parsons and William C. Ockey to coordinate the foreign minister’s visit. Otabe stressed in his afternoon meeting on 9 September that Kishi “attaches great importance” in the bilateral relationship to the repatriation of the islanders. Otabe also informed the two men that Ambassador Asakai would join with the foreign minister in San Francisco and fly back to New York for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. They would then go on to Washington to prepare the foreign minister for his meetings. Otabe reinforced his message with Parsons again in New York on 19 September of the importance Fujiyama and Kishi placed on the repatriation issue.

Around the same time in Japan, Deputy Secretary of State Christian A. Herter was to meet with Kishi during his one-month trip throughout the region, primarily to attend the Malaysian independence celebrations. In their meeting on the morning of 18 September, Kishi emphasized his view that the repatriation issue was “a real impediment to long-term development of stronger Japanese-U.S. relations.” Herter told Kishi that Ambassador MacArthur was “doing everything possible to assist in solving the problem.”

One day earlier, for example, just before the final position papers were to be completed, Ambassador MacArthur made a last-minute plea after reading in the newspaper that the United States had turned down Japan’s request for a limited number of islanders to return to the Bonins. MacArthur could not hide his disappointment, and wrote to Dulles to urge him to seek the return of at least 200–300 islanders. “I fully understand [the] difficult considerations involved in this problem,” he wrote, “[but] this issue is one of extreme sensitivity in Japan because its racial discrimination aspects stemming from [the] fact we
have only permitted return of islanders of Caucasian origin. Over [the] long term, our present position can only play into hands of anti-American elements and also alienate friendly Japanese who liken our stand to the Asiatic Exclusion Laws." If that was not clear enough, the ambassador ended the telegram to his long-time traveling companion and boss, Dulles, "[I]t is my considered judgment that we should do everything possible to find a solution which will eliminate [the] racial discrimination issue from our long-term relations with Japan."

MacArthur, in fact, placed the Bonins issue "at the top of the list of problems on which I think we are in a position to, and should, act on at once," as he told Herter in a letter a couple of days later. MacArthur went on to explain,

We have many difficult issues with Japan. With respect to some of them, such as Okinawa, there is nothing we can do at this juncture to meet the Japanese view. However, with respect to the Bonin Islanders, I do feel strongly that we can, without jeopardizing our basic and fundamental interest or security, be forthcoming enough to find reasonable solutions. This is very important, because the Bonin Island problem is a very contentious issue which has deep psychological overtones which cannot but affect our long-term relations with Japan.

Despite MacArthur's efforts, Fujiyama and Kishi were to be disappointed. Because of the strong resistance (and stalling tactics) of the Defense Department, not only was repatriation not in the offing, but even permission for the islanders to visit ancestral graves was not forthcoming. Regarding the latter, permission was denied because there were no facilities to provide accommodations for the visitors, the islands were overgrown and the destruction from World War II bombings made locating grave sites difficult, and that there were "probably" no more grave markers. It is clear, however, that the decision had been already made, and that the reasons were simply excuses devised to justify the policy.

Interestingly, according to Ockey, acting director of the Office of the Northeast Asian Affairs, the U.S. position "was not firm until a few hours before the discussion with [Foreign Minister Fujiyama]." Ockey continued in a secret letter to foreign service officer John M. Steeves, who was political advisor to CINCPAC, Admiral Felix Stump, "Up until the last minute . . . we had been discussing the possibility of agreeing to repatriation of a small number of Bonin Islanders as well as the questions of visits to family graves and compensation. We received on 23 September a letter from Defense which put the Defense position so forcefully that the Secretary and Mr. Robertson agreed that we should not press further for repatriation of any Bonin Islanders at this time."

As expected, Fujiyama raised the Bonins problem at his meeting with Dulles and others from the State Department on the afternoon of 23 September. Fujiyama was "deeply disappointed" that there had been no progress on the Bonins problem and stressed that "from the point of view of overall relations, a solution should be found." He asked if there was no formula to satisfy Japan, such as restricting the area of admittance, minimizing the number of returnees, limiting the types of occupations of those to be returned, anything to give the islanders "some satisfaction." They were "not Communists" but "hard-working men of integrity," Fujiyama added. "It would be heartbreaking . . . to bring them disappoint-
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Dulles, who had received the Defense Department’s study only that morning but was familiar with its conclusions, told Fujiyama that there were security factors involved about which he was not at liberty to elaborate, but that these became even more important as U.S. forces were withdrawing from mainland Japan. “These factors require an exclusive military reserve,” Dulles emphasized. He had hoped to have met the “wishes of the Japanese government, but had been persuaded otherwise” by the military. When Fujiyama offered that he was not aware of the U.S. security requirements, but mentioned that the “fact that some islanders of part Caucasian blood had been allowed to return was embarrassing,” Dulles countered by saying that those islanders had been allowed to return because they had been discriminated against in Japan. “The discrimination did not start with us, but with the Japanese. If we had it to do over, we would not take them. They have only a meager existence and are an embarrassment to the security of the islands.” Fujiyama challenged Dulles’ explanation by questioning whether there in fact had been discrimination against the islanders of Western descent. Dulles weakly replied that neither he nor the foreign minister “had firsthand knowledge on that point.” In any case, the United States has “exhausted the means for consideration of this problem . . . We are dealing with bigger elements.” Fujiyama also asked about grave visits, which he described as a “general oriental trait not solely Japanese and was a religious impetus,” but Dulles said that they would not be permitted either as “military reports [said] graves [were] obliterated and covered by jungle.” Fujiyama mentioned that he did not want to “dash the hopes” of the islanders, to which Dulles said it was unfair to keep their hopes alive. He cautioned Fujiyama not to let “the question of a small number [of former inhabitants who wish to return] become a major point of difference between the two countries,” and not to “encourage them in the vain hope which would not be realized.” Dulles asked Fujiyama to consider indemnification, which he described as Kishi’s proposal, viewing this as the only alternative available.

The next day, Robertson and Martin met with Ambassador Asakai to elaborate on the repatriation issue. Robertson gave Asakai an overview of the security situation in the region and emphasized that the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces had made it necessary for the United States to maintain its strategic posture. “The position of the Bonins had changed,” he continued. “The U.S. has strategic uses for those islands which made them a defense for Japan as well as for the United States, adding that the Defense Department had plans for using all of Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, which necessitated ‘complete exclusion.’” The assistant secretary told Asakai he had “spent hours” talking with officials in the Defense Department, as had Dulles himself, on the question and that “no one this side of the President would be able to get the Defense Department to change its mind . . . We were sorry to have to say ‘no’ to Mr. Fujiyama.” Robertson asked Asakai to tell the foreign minister that the Bonin problem was the “toughest problem he could have possibly posed at this juncture.”

Asakai listened carefully. He was more doubtful, however, about the denial of grave visits and said so after Robertson explained that the visits could not happen. “The statement that there were no tombs,” Asakai interrupted, “was ridiculous.” Interestingly, Robertson,
shedding the State-Defense Departments united front approach momentarily, agreed. “If he had been born and raised in the Bonins, he would be able to find his own home and the graves of his ancestors even though he had not been there for over 10 years. This was only an excuse,” he continued. “The real reason was the desire for complete exclusion. If pilgrims came it would cause problems.” While Robertson’s honesty was appreciated, Asakai, who described the issue as a “hot ball,” was not satisfied, arguing that when Kishi had come, Japan “had received some wonderful news—a ray of hope when the secretary had agreed that possibly 200 or 300 Bonin Islanders might be repatriated.” Now it was time for Robertson to interrupt. Raising his hand as if to say “time out,” he stated that he knew of no such promise. He took out the minutes of the meeting from the Kishi visit and read them, emphasizing that “quite the contrary” Dulles had not created an expectation that repatriation was possible. In fact, he had been “very careful” not to raise hopes—indeed, the secretary had purposely deleted the sentence in the joint communiqué that dealt with the possibility that there might be limited repatriation.

The press statement released at the end of Fujiyama’s stay was also anticlimatic. Perhaps the participants realized it, but with this meeting, all options and compromises regarding the repatriation of the islanders to the Bonins was essentially closed for the next decade, and bilateral discussions between the United States and Japan would focus on indemnification and later grave visits, before the final push for reversion of the islands themselves. Ironically, compensation would prove an equally difficult process within the U.S. government, Japanese government, and the League of Evacuees.

NOTES

1Fukuda, ed., Ogasawarashoto Gaishi, Sono I, 38.
2Ibid., 38–39, and Kikuchi, “Nanpo no Mon,” 111. This is not the literal name of the association, but the official one. The literal name would be “League to Promote the Return to Our Hometowns, Ogasawara and Iwo Jima.” For more on the league, see its 15-page brochure, League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation, ed., History of the Problem of the Bonin Islands (Tokyo: Assistance Association for Okinawa and Ogasawara, August 1958).
5Kikuchi, “Nanpo no Mon,” 112.
6“Telegram 33 from Embassy Japan to State Department, July 2, 1952,” Central Decimal Files 794C.0221/7-252 (hereafter decimal number only), RG 59, and “Despatch 298 from Embassy Japan to State Department, June 26, 1952,” 794.022/6-2652. Many of the telegrams use abbreviated sentences and words. To make it easier to read, I have included the full wording in the quoted sections.
7“Telegram No. 33.”
8See appendix 4 for the petitions and a reference to them in Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday and Co, 1964), 345.
9“Telegram No. 33.”
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10“Letter from Assistant Secretary Allison to Assistant Secretary Nash, July 15, 1952,” 794C.0221/7-252. The letter is dated 15 July, but was given a 2 July marking for archival purposes, apparently because the discussion related to the issue raised on 2 July. This may explain why the editors of *FRUS*, 1952–1954 were unable to locate the letter, as mentioned in 1316n1.

11Allison also met with Charles Sullivan of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, sometime around the time he sent his letter to Nash where the issue of repatriation came up. As no memorandum of conversation was located, the date and actual contents of the meeting are unknown. For a reference to the meeting, see “Letter from Assistant Secretary Nash to Assistant Secretary Allison, August 26, 1952,” 794c.0221/8-2752. Assistant Secretary Allison wrote to Frank C. Nash, his counterpart as assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs, an office that has been called the Defense Department’s “State Department,” outlining the situation and explaining that DOD was forwarded copies of Murphy’s telegram. Murphy did not receive an immediate response, probably because the State and Defense Departments were in the middle of clarifying their respective views. Indeed, the State Department, summarizing the two departments’ stances and requesting detailed comment from the embassy, wrote to Murphy to get his staff’s comments at the end of August. See the document at 794C.0221/8-2952, and “Mail Instruction No. 25, September 11, 1952,” *FRUS*, 1952–1954, 1340.


13Fechteler succeeded Adm Forrest P. Sherman, who died in office in August 1951.

14“Communication No. 4274 from CINCPACFLT to CNO, July 12, 1952,” Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands.


16Ibid., 258–59.

17“Communication No. 4274.”

18True combined basing with U.S. forces in Japan has for the most part yet to be realized in Japan, due less to the lack of U.S. willingness and more to a lack of interest on Japan’s part.

19“Memorandum for Files (Memorandum of Conversation with Admiral Fechteler), July 16, 1952,” sent as an attachment to “Letter from Ambassador Murphy to Assistant Secretary Allison, July 29, 1952,” 794C.0221/7-2952.

20“Letter from Assistant Secretary Nash to Assistant Secretary Allison, August 26, 1952.” As will be discussed later, there was a difference of opinion between Nash’s office and the Navy on the question of the islands’ return.

21Ibid. Allison had been making plans to visit the Far East in his capacity as assistant secretary since May (which would be the first time that any assistant secretary had done so). Allison eventually was not able to make it to the Bonin Islands himself, although he had originally “hoped to be with you and Radford to discuss this problem and go” with Murphy there. See “Telegram 643, from Department of State to Ambassador Murphy, September 6, 1952,” 794C.022/9-652. Allison was in Japan the second week of November. Radford, by chance, was in Washington, DC, on 5 September probably because of the Bonins issue, among others, and met with Allison. The author was unable to find a memorandum of their conversation, but Allison discusses it in his 6 September telegram to Murphy (“Telegram 643”).
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22“Telegram 643.”

23“Letter from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Admiral Radford, September 3, 1952.” This document was obtained by the author through the Japanese equivalent of the Freedom of Information Act in 2006 (hereafter, Eldridge, JFOIA, 2006). According to 1343n1 of FRUS, 1952–1954, the editors were unable to locate the letter (dated according to Murphy’s memo in the FRUS volume of 2 September) but that is because it was probably sent directly to Radford and not through State Department channels. 1343n3 states that the department was “unaware [of the] existence” of the Yoshida letter to Radford, but Murphy had made clear in a 30 August telegram that it was in preparation, as Foreign Minister Okazaki had showed him a draft of the letter on 30 August. See “Telegram 771 from Embassy to State Department, August 30, 1952,” 794c.0221/8-3052. It seems, in any case, the State Department had not received a copy, and it questioned the “desirability” of the Japanese government communicating directly with CINCPACFLT, and requested the embassy to raise the issue in an “appropriately discreet manner that normal diplomatic channels should be followed [in] matters [of] this type.” As noted above, this author was able to have the letter declassified, and so now it is available to researchers.

24“Letter from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Admiral Radford.”

25For Radford’s hosting of Yoshida, see Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 262–64. For the meeting with Yoshida on 14 October 1952, in Tokyo, see “Telegram 1226 from Ambassador Murphy to Secretary of State, October 14, 1952,” 790.022/10-1452.

26“Letter from Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to Admiral Radford.”

27“Telegram 771.”

28“Memorandum for Files (Memorandum of Conversation with Admiral Fechteler), July 16, 1952.”


30The request by the State Department was made to confirm statements made by the Defense Department in a 26 August letter to the State Department. See above, “Letter from Assistant Secretary Nash to Assistant Secretary Allison, August 26, 1952,” and “Telegram 644, from Secretary Acheson to Ambassador Murphy, September 3, 1952,” 794c.0221/8-3052.


32Ibid.

33Ibid. Prime Minister Yoshida seems to have made a direct appeal shortly before this on 3 September in a letter sent to Adm Radford. He asked for special consideration for the residents.

34“Letter from Foreign Minister Okazaki to Ambassador Murphy, June 23, 1952,” Eldridge, JFOIA, 2006. The author was able to have the 5 March letter, drafted by Wajima Eiji, chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau, MOFA, to the Diplomatic Section of GHQ on the Question of Repatriation of Evacuees from the Bonin Islands, declassified.

35“Letter from Foreign Minister Okazaki to Ambassador Murphy.”

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38“Telegram 1204 from Ambassador Murphy to U. Alexis Johnson, October 13, 1952,” 794C.022/10-1352; and “Telegram No. 643.” Also see “Letter from William C. Foster to Secretary of State Acheson, October 1, 1952,” 794C.022/10-152, and “Telegram No. 1135 from Embassy to State Department, October 6, 1952,” 794C.022/10-652.

39“Telegram 1204.”

40Radford, From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam, 261.

41Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, 345.

42“Telegram 1204,” and Findley, Book II, 213.

43Findley, Book II, 213. A history of the Toledo, which spent much of this period involved in supporting the Korean War, notes that it narrowly missed being damaged only a few days before. It took up station on the bomb line a few days later after returning Radford and Murphy and its other passengers to Japan. For more, see the on-line history at http://www.usstolledoca133.com/.

44The Sperry, a submarine tender that serviced submarines activated in response to the Korean War, arrived in Futami on 2 October and stayed there for a full week before returning to the West Coast of the United States. The three-month cruise was the only time for it to go into the Western Pacific. While at Chichi Jima, the Sperry's crew provided dental and other medical services to the islanders, and made repairs to naval facility equipment including its 50-foot patrol boat and the two diesel generators at the radio station on top of Yoake Yama. See Findley, Book II, 215–16.

45The Cabezon, which was based at Pearl Harbor, was approaching the end of the second of two cruises to the Far East when it stopped in Futami Harbor. Part of its mission during this cruise was to conduct reconnaissance between Hokkaido and Sakhalin Island.

46The Sea Devil had been decommissioned in September 1948 but was reactivated in March 1951 after hostilities broke out on the Korean Peninsula, and operated primarily in Hawaiian waters. In 1952, it underwent an overhaul at Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and then in September was sent to Yokosuka to conduct antisubmarine warfare training exercises. The Sea Devil was on its way to Yokosuka when it stopped in Futami, its first deployment to the Western Pacific since it was recommissioned.

47Findley, Book II, 213.

48Ibid., 213–14, and “Telegram 1204.”

49See photograph “Admiral Radford’s inspection of the Bonins on 3–4 October 1952,” in Findley, Book II, 284-a. Findley, incidentally, was a Navy commander and the island government officer at the time of the inspection, and became one of the Navy’s strongest advocates for retaining the islands. One of those in the photograph, retired VAdm H. E. Overich, was apparently working for the CIA at this time, as his identification says “CIA.” This may explain why his name does not appear in Murphy’s account of the trip in his telegram. It adds further credence to the Defense Department’s assertion that “covert operations” were based out of the Bonin Islands, as mentioned in the 22 September State-Defense working group meeting.

50“Telegram 1204,” 1341.

51Ibid.
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52 Ibid., 1342.
53 Ibid., 1341.
54 Ibid., 1342.
55 Ibid., 1341–42.
56 Ibid., 1342.
57 Ibid., 1341.
58 Ibid., 1342.


60 See editorial note, FRUS, 1952–1954, 1286.

61 For NSC 125/2, see FRUS, 1952–1954, 1300–308.


63 “Letter from Foster to Acheson, August 29, 1952.”

64 “Letter from Acheson to Foster, September 16, 1952,” Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, NEA Files, RG 59. The actual date the letter was sent is unclear, although it is dated 16 September. By that point, the meetings had already started.

65 Memorandum on State-Defense Divergence on Disposition of the Ryukyus from Kenneth B. Young to Assistant Secretary Allison, September 11, 1952,” 794c.0221/9-1152.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 See Joseph F. Enright, Shinano! The Sinking of Japan’s Secret Supership (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987). After the war, Enright was stationed in Japan and later served as the Navy adviser at the time of signing of the peace treaty. He was also involved in helping the postwar Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (then known as the Maritime Safety Force) acquire 16 landing craft as patrol vessels. (Ibid., 193).

69 The author was unable to discover just exactly what “covert operations” were centered on the islands, although there were many rumors about activities and tangential evidence about different actions, including references to the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency. While it does not specifically mention the islands, a new book about the CIA discusses some of its activities in Japan and Northeast Asia in the early 1950s. See Tim Werner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007), 60.

70 Memorandum on State-Defense of Conversation by Deputy Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs McClurkin, September 22, 1952,” FRUS 1952–1954, 1334. There was no mention of the specific covert activities, but a 5 January 1953, memorandum from JCS chairman Gen Bradley to the Director, Central Intelligence Walter Bedell Smith, with the subject, Haha Jima, refers to an unattached memo. Smith, an Army general, wrote to Bradley that same day. Bradley, who apparently
did not get along with Smith, told the director that the memorandum would be given “full consider-
ation whenever this matter is again brought up before the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” (See “Memorandum
on Haha Jima from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley to Director, Central Intelligence, 5
January 1953,” Folder: CJCS 091 Japan 1953, Box 5, Chairman’s Files, General Bradley, 1949–1953,
RG 218.) The author was unable to locate the memo from Smith to Bradley.

71 It is unclear if the Defense Department representatives had in mind the issue of locating nuclear
weapons and warheads when they made this statement, but the potential for Japan to limit their
transit on mainland Japan likely was a reason.

72 “Memorandum on the Status of Our Work on the Problem of the Ryukyus by Director Young to

73 Ibid., 1378.

74 Dulles became secretary of State in January 1953 and served during most of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration. He died from cancer in May 1959, having resigned the month before.

75 “Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Allison to Secretary of State
Dulles on Future Disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, March 18, 1953,” 794C.0221/3-
1853.

76 Allison’s memo also took up the question of the Amami Islands and Okinawa. In the case of the
former, Allison urged that the Amami group be returned to Japan “at an early date.” Based on this
approach, the islands were in fact returned later that year. For more, see Eldridge, The Return of the
Amami Islands, particularly chapter 4.

77 “Letter from Director Young to Ambassador Murphy, April 8, 1953,” field correspondence from
Japan, RG 59.

78 Ibid.

79 According to Findley, the conference had its origins from correspondence on 19 February initi-
ated by Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, who feared “increased Japanese efforts to [have us]
return the islands.” Findley, Book II, 219.

80 One example of their study included a meeting with Dr. Justin Williams, who had served on the
J-5 staff at CINCFE and was responsible for helping to write the report of Gen Matthew B. Ridg-
way, which said that Okinawa could probably be returned. Williams still felt that Okinawa should
be returned but, surprisingly, stated, in a question by Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast
Asian Affairs Robert J. G. McClurkin, that he did not see any reason to return the Bonins to Japan
at this point, although he did believe arrangements could be made by which the islanders could be
allowed to return. See “Memorandum of Conversation on the Ryukyu and Bonin Islanders, April
23, 1953,” 794c.0221/4-253. For more on the report by Williams, see Eldridge, The Origins of the
Bilateral Okinawa Problem, 365–70.

return of the Bonins, had no problem seeing the Amami group of islands returned, as they were not
under his command.

82 Findley, Book II, 220. In addition, representatives from the Trust Territory, Guam, and the Civil
Aeronautics Administration were there.

83 In addition to the above paper, which was Agreement Paper No. 5, the conferees agreed (in Agree-
ment Paper No. 1) to establish the Pacific Islands Coordinating Group, or PICG. For a summary

84 Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 223.

85 Memorandum on Discussion by NSC Planning Board of Ryukyu and Bonin Islands by Assistant Secretary Robertson to Secretary Dulles, June 2, 1953,” 794c.0221/5-2953, also cited in fn. 4, FRUS, 1952–1954, 1435.

86 Ibid.

87 Memorandum on Discussion by NSC Planning Board.”

88 Fechteler was representing Bradley, chairman of the JCS. Both strongly opposed to changing the status quo on the Bonins.

89 For more on the Amami decision, see Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, chapter 4.

90 Ross, Iwo Jima, 355.


92 Memorandum on the Japanese Treaty Islands by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council, June 15, 1953,” FRUS, 1952–1954, 1433.

93 Chapter 5 of Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, explores the arrangements and negotiations in more detail.


95 Telegram 1586 from Ambassador Allison to Secretary of State, December 26, 1953,” (794c.0221/12-2653), cited in FRUS, 1952–1954, 1571.


97 Author’s Interview with Kikuchi Tadahiko, August 3, 2000, Chichi Jima.” Also see Fukuda Tokuyasu, “ ‘Ogasawara’ Hakkan ni Yosete [On the Occasion of Publishing ‘Ogasawara’],” Ogasawara, no. 1 (November 1965), 1, published by the Ogasawara Kyokai. This was reprinted in Special Issue [Tokushu], no. 44 (December 1998) of Ogasawara, 1. Letter to author from Mrs. Fukuda Tokuyasu (Aya), 3 October 2007.


99 Fukuda, “ ‘Ogasawara’ Hakkan.”

100 Petition for Permission to Return to the Bonin Islands, August 8, 1953,” in Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 128–29.

101 Tsuji, Ogasawara Shoto Gaishi, 282. For the latter petition, see Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 114–19.

102 Ogasawara Shoto yori Hikiagesaserareta Motojumin no Kikyo ni Kansuru Ketsugi [Resolution for Repatriation of Former Inhabitants Who Have been Evacuated from the Bonin Islands] August 4, 1953,” in Ishii Michinori, Ogasawara Shoto Gaishi (Sono 2), 23–27. An English version of the
resolution can be found in Fukuda, ed., *Sono 1*, 129–30. Utsunomiya’s connection to the resolution is unclear, but he was elected from Tokyo, where many inhabitants of the islands lived, in 1952 as a member of the Liberal Party, having been a member of the Communist Party as well as a businessman at one point. He was considered the furthest to the left among the conservatives.

103**Petition for Permission to Return to the Bonin Islands, August 8, 1953.**”


107**Letter from League of Bonin Evacuees to Admiral Felix B. Stump with Petition for Quick Return to the Bonin Islands, September 24, 1953,” in Fukuda, ed., *Sono 1*, 125–28. It was the second one to Stump, the first being sent on 21 July, 11 days after he assumed command. The first one can be found in ibid., 122–25. A couple weeks after receipt of the first one, Stump visited Chichi Jima on 11 August where he met with local representatives. For more on his visit, see chapter 5 of this book. Also see Findley, *Book II*, 223–25, and 284.

108**Letter from League of Bonin Evacuees to Admiral Felix B. Stump with Petition for Quick Return to the Bonin Islands, September 24, 1953,” ibid., 126–27.

109**Ibid., 123. Also see “Bokyo no Maru 9 Nen” [9 Full Years of Missing our Hometown], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 17 May 1953.

110**Telegram 1425 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, December 8, 1953,” CDF, 1950–1954 (794.0221/12–853), RG 59. Apparently the Associated Press had introduced a story on 7 December by *The Nippon Times* (formerly and later to be known as *The Japan Times*), which had misrepresented the letter from Berger, and caused a series of exchanges between the department and embassy. That same day (12 November), the league had submitted a petition entitled “Petition for Return of the Okinawan and Bonin Islands out of Respect for Decision by Japanese House of Representatives,” but the letter of 12 November does not appear to be in response to the petition. For the petition, see Fukuda, ed., *Sono 1*, 83–84. Reference to Dulles’ message was made in testimony by Fujita Hozen in Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lower House, on 10 February 1954, in Ishii, ed., *Sono 2*, 154, and by Fukuda Tokuyasu, in ibid., 162.

111The transcript of the meeting can be found in Ishii, ed., *Sono 2*, 129–211.


113The Tokyo Metropolitan Government, which had jurisdiction over the islands prior to the beginning of the U.S. Naval administration, conducted a subsequent survey in April 1954, and found that only 9 percent were living “above the average standard,” and 266 households within the Tokyo area, required support under the Livelihood Protection Law.

114Ishii, ed., *Sono 2*, 112. “U.S. Said Intending Ryukyu, Bonin Return,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 23 February 1954. Also see “Despatch no. 1217, Bi-Weekly Political Notes February 12, 1954–February 26, 1954,” 794.00/2–2654. The group was also known as the Committee for Acceleration of Return of Okinawa to Japan, and the leader also went by the name of Nakayoshi Yoshimitsu, an alternative reading of his personal name.

115For Kodaki’s statement in the Foreign Affairs Committee, see Ishii, ed., *Sono 2*, 212.
“Anderson Note Brings on Query,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, 25 February 1964. Allison was back in Washington, DC, at the time (FRUS, 1609). Okazaki wanted to sign the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement on 2 March (see FRUS, 1611), but it was not signed until 8 March (FRUS, 1616). It is unclear when he returned. The Bikini Incident happened on 1 March 1954.

Letter from Acting Director McClurkin to Counselor of Embassy Parsons, March 16, 1954,” Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, NEA Files, RG 59.

“Despatch no. 1217.”


Memorandum of Conversation by Samuel D. Berger (March 5, 1954),” Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, NEA Files, RG 59.

Ibid.

The full title of the memo, attached to the memorandum of conversation, was “Four Points for Consideration Concerning the Repatriation from Japan of Former Residents of the Bonin Islands Which are Now Under the Control of U.S. Military Forces.” See “Memorandum of Conversation on Return of Bonin Islanders to Bonin Islands (March 5, 1954),” Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, NEA Files, RG 59.

Ibid.

Four Points for Consideration,” in ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

As mentioned in chapter 1, at the time of evacuation, Haha Jima had a population of approximately 1,900.

Memorandum from Frank Hawley to Kenneth Young on Return of Bonin Islanders to Bonin Islands, March 5, 1954,” Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, NEA Files, RG 59.

Memorandum by Robertson to Secretary Dulles on Bonin Islands and Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, December 2, 1954,” Roll 5, ibid.

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State Murphy to the President, May 29, 1954,” in FRUS, 1952–1954, 1648.

Yoshida had been petitioned at least twice in 1954 prior to his trip to the United States by the league to make sure he took up their issue, as was Okazaki. See Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 51.

Yoshida, The Yoshida Memoirs, 122. The papers related to Yoshida's visit can be found in Briefing Books, Yoshida Visit, Roll 13, Microfilm C0044, Office of NEA Affairs, RG 59.


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135Ibid.

136Ibid.

137“Untitled memo, received from Mr. Tanaka, October 25, 1954,” attachment to “Memorandum from Mr. Finn to Mr. Snow on Bonin Islanders Claim.”

138Ibid.


141“Memorandum from Mr. Finn to Mr. Snow on Bonin Islanders Claims.”


143For more on this exchange, see Kamisaka, *Iwo Jima Imada*, 149–52. Eerily, Edson, a veteran of some of the hardest fighting in the Pacific, was found dead of carbon monoxide poisoning less than a year later on 14 August 1955, in his car in his garage; coroners ruled his death a suicide. Edson resigned from the Marines in 1947 fearing the excessive involvement of the military in policy matters: “I am a military man and proud of it. But when we reach the point where the military are directing, instead of supporting, our country’s policies, we were far along the road to losing what this country has always stood for.” See Jack Raymond, *Power at the Pentagon* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 81.

144Kikuchi, “Nanpo no Mon,” 114.

145wPetition to President Eisenhower, Request for Permission to Return to Bonin Islands, September 24, 1954,” in Fukuda, ed., *Sono 1*, 133–35. The one to Dulles is essentially identical, and can be found in ibid., 135–37.

146wMemorandum of Telephone Conversation Prepared in Department of State.”

147wMemorandum by Robertson to Secretary Dulles, December 2, 1954.”

148Ibid.

149Ibid.

150wTelegram 1624 from Embassy to Department of State, January 7, 1955,” 794.5/1-755.

151wTelegram 1401 from Dulles to Allison on Bonin Islanders, January 12, 1955,” 794.5/1-755.

152Ibid.

153Ibid.

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155“Telegram 1605.”

156Memorandum from McClurkin to Sebald on Bonin Islanders, January 12, 1955,” 794.5/1-755.

157“Memorandum from Sebald to Scott on Compensation for Bonin Islanders, January 20, 1955,” 794.5/1-755

158Memorandum of Conversation on Bonins and Ryukyus (March 15, 1955),” Roll 5, Microfilm fC0044, NEA Files, RG 59.

159Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 178.

160Ibid.

161“Telegram 409 from Allison to Dulles, August 12, 1955,” 033.9411/8-1155.

162“Telegram 394 from Allison to Dulles, August 11, 1955,” 033.9411/8-1155.


164Memorandum of Conversation, First Meeting with Shigemitsu (August 29, 1955),” FRUS, 1955–1957, 90–96. The general statement, as it concerned the Bonins, reads, “With respect to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, it is, as is well known, the fervent desire of us all that the administrative rights over them will be restored to Japan at an early date. Setting aside Iwo Jima, where an American air base is said to exist, the return of administrative rights over the Bonins, where there are practically no military establishments, will prove an effective gesture on the part of the United States in demonstrating its good will toward Japan. At least as an immediate initial step, we hope that the United States Government will permit the former inhabitants of the Bonins to return to their home islands in accordance with our long standing request.” The general statement is not included in the FRUS volume, but is attached to the memorandum of conversation in the Central Decimal Files (033.9411/8-2955). The author was unable to locate a similar version, English or Japanese, in the materials he had declassified as part of his FOIA request to the foreign ministry.


166The paper, in English and dated 29 August 1955, is not included in the FRUS volume, but is attached to the memorandum of conversation in the Central Decimal Files (033.9411/8-3155). Like the general statement above, the author was unable to locate a similar version, English or Japanese, in the materials he had declassified as part of his FOIA request to the foreign ministry.

167The Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.”

168Ibid.

169Memorandum of Conversation, Third Meeting with Shigemitsu.”

170Ibid. Dulles had been briefed earlier that day in a memo by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Sebald, which included the following: “Ryukyus and Bonins (Tab K). Regret
that none of proposed actions feasible at this time (statement of intention restore Japanese administration, return of Bonins except Iwo Jima, repatriation to Bonins). We believe these problems should remain in present status, and any of proposed actions might increase rather than lessen the agitation within Japan for further steps which cannot be taken in the present international situation.” See “Memorandum from Sebald to Dulles on Meeting with Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Wednesday August 31, Room 5100, August 31, 1955,” 033.9411/8-3155.

171 Regarding the Bonins, the draft statement had read, “The Foreign Minister asked that . . . the United States favorably considered Japan’s hopes for eventual return to Japanese administration of the Ryukyuans and Bonin Islands. United States officials described the complexity of these problems.”


173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.

175 “Letter from Tokuyasu Fukuda to the Honorable John Foster Dulles, September 27, 1953,” 033.9411/9-2755. In his response, Robertson told Fukuda he would be happy to meet with him, but that Secretary Dulles could not do so as the secretary would be preparing to leave for Geneva to attend the foreign ministers meeting.

176 Fukuda, Chiseiten, 1–3.

177 Ibid., 113.

178 “Letter from Tokuyasu Fukuda to the Honorable John Foster Dulles, September 27, 1953,” 033.9411/9-2755. In his response, Robertson told Fukuda he would be happy to meet with him, but that Secretary Dulles could not do so as the secretary would be preparing to leave for Geneva to attend the foreign ministers meeting.

179 Ibid.

180 Entitled “Petition to the Government of the United States of America for Permission to Return to the Bonin Islands,” it can be found as appendix XI, in ibid, 330–32.


182 Ibid.

183 “Shasetsu Ogasawara Tomin no Kito o Yobo Suru” [Editorial Demanding the Return of the Ogasawara Islanders], Mainichi Shimbun, 4 October 1955.

184 Ibid.

185 Ibid.

186 Ibid.


188 Statement to Press by Mr. Tatsuo Yokota, President of the League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation,” in Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 166–71.
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190 Ibid., 25.
191 “Letter from Fukuda Tokuyasu to Vice Admiral Robert P. Briscoe, January 5, 1956,” Chairman’s Files, Admiral Radford, 1953–1957, RG 218. At the end of the letter, Fukuda, not-so-subtly mentioned that he served as chairman of the United States–Japan Cooperation Committee within the LDP, and was “making every effort for a settlement of the question of the Sumakawa [sic] military base which has come to the fore recently,” seemingly linking to a resolution of the base issue with that of the repatriation one. (Fukuda was referring to the Sunakawa, which was part of the expansion of the U.S. base at Tachikawa, outside of Tokyo.) Fukuda also included a letter he had sent to Roderick Webb and the other islanders of Western descent, introduced more fully in chapter 5, who had petitioned naval authorities not to let the evacuees return, arguing that they had not been discriminated against and had been aided by the league in the past. See “Letter from Yokota Tatsuo to Webb Roderick and other fellow islanders, the Bonin Islands, December 10, 1955,” attachment to ibid.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid.
195 Ibid.
197 The issue of reestablishing a whaling station was taken up later that fall by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and was denied. The direct reason for the study seems to have been because of a letter from a Mr. Suzuki of Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd., who had written to the secretary of state about establishing said station. See “Memorandum from Chief of Naval Operations to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on Request from the Japanese for Establishing a Whaling Land Station in the Bonin Islands; denial of, December 19, 1955,” Box 14, Chairman’s Files, Admiral Radford, 1953–1957, RG 218.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid., 27.
201 Ibid.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid., 26.
204 Ibid., 27.
205 Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 199. Fukuda’s account says the study was submitted to the Japanese government on 27 December, but a foreign ministry memo (below) suggests it was received before then.
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207Ibid.

208Ibid.

209Ibid.

210Ibid.

211“Foreign Office Note on Repatriation of Bonin Islanders, December 20, 1955,” 794c.00/12-2055.

212Ibid.

213“Ogasawara Jumin no Kito.”

214Ibid.

215Ibid.

216Ibid.

217Ibid.

218Ibid.

219Ibid.

220Documents in Adm Radford’s files include a position paper which says “Pacific Islands Coordinating Group Meeting 10 January 1956” but is not a memorandum of conversation. It is instead a position paper, probably prepared for a meeting scheduled for 10 January. It does not appear, however, that the meeting took place then, but instead on 2 February. Many of the points raised in the position paper for Radford were raised by him in the February meeting. See “Position Paper No. 1, Japanese Repatriation to the Bonin Islands, Pacific Islands Coordinating Group Meeting (January 10, 1956),” Chairman’s Files, Admiral Radford, 1953–1957, Box 14, RG 218.

221Findley, Book II, 247.

222Ibid.

223Ibid.

224Ibid., 248.

225Ibid. Technically, this is not true, as Haha Jima has at least two places of entry by sea, and its main harbor being Oki.
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226Ibid., 248.

227Ibid., 249.

228“Ogasawara Jumin no Kito.”


230“Ogasawara Jumin no Kito.”

231Ibid. Also see “Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending 2-25-56,” Weekly Notes, Box 52, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84, and “Memorandum from Dulles to Robertson, February 10, 1956,” John Foster Dulles Chronological File, February 1956 (3), Box 13, JFD Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951–1959, Eisenhower Library.

232“Ogasawara Jumin no Kito,” and “Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending 2-25-56.”

233Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending 2-25-56,” and “Memorandum from Dulles to Robertson, February 10, 1956.” Dulles also noted that “perhaps prompt action [was] appropriate in view of the agitation in the National Diet.”

234“Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending 2-25-56.”

235“Ogasawara Jumin no Kito.”

236Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending 2-25-56.” For more on the Amami announcement, see Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, 104–10.

237Memorandum from Sebald to Dulles on Repatriation of Bonin Islanders (February 24, 1956),” Box 1, Japan Jan–July 1956, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Subject Files, 1956, RG 59.

238Ibid.

239Ibid. Tani, according to Fn 3 of FRUS, 1955–1957, 171, officially presented his credentials on 2 March. In a letter to Noel Hemmendinger, the acting director of Northeast Asian Affairs, DCM Parsons noted that a couple of representatives of the league attended Tani’s send-off party, which overall was a “rather sad affair” due to the lack of attendance. See “Letter from Parsons to Hemmendinger, February 24, 1956,” 601.9411/2-2456, and author’s interview with Noel Hemmendinger on 7 June 2001, Washington, DC.

240Letter from Noel Hemmendinger to John Allison Regarding the Secretary’s Briefing Papers, March 5, 1956,” Folder 322.3 Jan–April 1956, Box 47, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, RG 84.

241Ibid.

242Telegram No. 1999 from Embassy to State, February 27, 1956,” ibid.

243Ibid.

244Ibid.

245“Biko Ogasawara Jumin no Sonshitsu Hosho Mondai [Note the Problem of Compensation for the Ogasawara Islanders on their Losses], undated,” attached to ibid.

246“Memorandum on Current Problems, March 18, 1956,” enclosure to “Memo from Roger Kirk to Mr. Wadell, 22 March 1956,” 611.94/3-2256.
The week before Dulles arrived in Tokyo, a story appeared in *The New York Times* by Robert Trumbull about long-range plans by the U.S. Navy for an important submarine base and thus desires to have no Japanese repatriated to the island. It is unclear if the story was leaked by the Navy to set the tone of the visit, but it portrayed the State Department as unsympathetic to the Navy’s position. See “Telegram 1974 from Hoover to U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, March 12, 1956,” 794c.022/3-1256.

The LDP was established in November 1955 through a merger of the conservative parties.

Author’s interview with Hemmendinger.

When embassy official Richard M. Lamb visited the islands on 18 January 1956, he apparently was told of Ackerman’s desire to return and noted that the islanders spoke highly of him.

*Draft letter from Parsons to Hemmendinger, April 9, 1956,” Folder 322.3 Jan–April 1956, Box 47, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, RG 84.*
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269*Telegram No. 2333, Telegram from Allison to Department of State, April 3, 1956,” FRUS, 1955–1957, 171. See Iguchi Sadao, “For Enduring Japanese-American Friendship,” Bulletin: The America-Japan Society, Tokyo, vol. 4, no. 6 (March–April 1956), 74. Iguchi would continue to remain engaged in this issue. For example, in early August, when Chairman of the JCS Adm Radford visited Japan, Ambassador Iguchi called on the Radford at the embassy to discuss the Bonins issue. See “Memorandum of Conversation of Ambassador Iguchi’s Call on Admiral Radford, August 4, 1956,” Folder 322.3 Ryukyus July–August 1956, Box 47, Japan, Tokyo Embassy, RG 84.

270*Memorandum of Conversation of Ambassador Tani’s Call on Mr. Robertson, April 11, 1956,” 611.94/4-1156.

271Ibid.

272Ibid.

273Ibid.

274Ibid.

275*Memorandum of Conversation on the Ryukyus and Bonins, April 17, 1956,” 794.5/4-1756. Author’s interview with Martin on 30 January 1999 in Washington, DC. While in Fukuoka, Martin represented the United States at the Amami Reversion Ceremony in Naze City on 25 December 1953. See Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, 140–42.

276*Memorandum of Conversation on the Ryukyus and Bonins, April 17, 1956.”

277Ibid.

278Ibid.

279*Memorandum from Hemmendinger to Sebald on Repatriation of Bonin Islanders, April 24, 1956,” 794.5/4-2456, RG 59; “Letter from Allison to Dulles, April 5, 1956,” Folder: 322.3 Ryukyus Jan–April 1956, Box 47, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

280*Letter from Allison to Dulles, April 5, 1956.”

281*Memoirs (unpublished manuscript),” Folders 16–17, Box 13, Jeff Graham Parsons Papers, Special Collections Division, Georgetown University Library, Washington, DC.

282*Letter from Allison to Dulles, April 5, 1956.”

283Ibid.

284Ibid.

285Ibid.

286Ibid.

287Ibid.

288*Memorandum from Hemmendinger to Sebald on Repatriation of Bonin Islanders, April 24, 1956.”


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“Memo from Robertson to Dulles on Repatriation of former Inhabitants of Bonin Islands, July 26, 1956,” Folder: Japan 1956, July–September, Box 1, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Subject Files, 1956, RG 59.

Ibid.

Also see “Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending July 14, 1956,” Folder: Weekly Notes from Department, July–December 1956, Box 52, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

Memorandum from Sebald to Dulles on Repatriation of Bonin Islanders (February 24, 1956).

Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending July 14, 1956.” Robertson, for example, wrote to Assistant Secretary Gray on 14 September about the property claimed by the former residents, but did not receive a response until 8 January 1957. See “Letter from Gray to Robertson, January 8, 1957,” Folder: Kishi, Nobusuke (Prime Minister of Japan) Visit June 1957, Box 3, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Subject Files, 1956, RG 59.

Weekly Notes to Tokyo for Week Ending August 10, 1956,” Folder: Weekly Notes from Department, July–December 1956, Box 52, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

Ibid.

Dispatch 276, A Fresh Start with Japan, September 21, 1956,” 611.94/9-2156.

Ibid.

Letter from Tokuyasu Fukuda to Robertson, September 4, 1956,” 794c.00/9-456.

Letter from Robertson to Fukuda, September 20, 1956,” 794c.00/9-456. In a note attached to the letter for internal purposes, Fukuda was described as someone who “has long championed the cause of the Bonin Islanders in the Diet” and someone whom Ambassador Allison “considers a good friend of the United States.”

Ibid.

Letter from Gray to Robertson, October 19, 1956,” 794c.00/10-1956.

Letter from Kern to Riley, October 26, 1956,” as attachment to “Letter from Kern to Robertson, October 27, 1956,” 794c.022/10-2756. Riley was then serving as the head of the International Affairs Division of OpNav, and would subsequently serve as chief of staff at the Pacific Command under Adm Felix B. Stump and Harry D. Felt, both of whom were convinced of the need to retain exclusive use of the Bonin Islands.

Letter from Kern to Riley.


Ibid., 243n6. The editors of FRUS note that they were unable to locate the attachment, which had an explanation of the repatriation issue and the recommendation for the return of the 2,639 islanders, but this author found a similar paper completed just before the 7 January memo. See “Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Repatriation of Bonin Islanders, January 4, 1957,” in Folder: Japan 1957, Box 1, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs Subject Files, 1956, RG 59.

Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Our Japan Policy,” 243.
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309 See *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 244n8.


311 Symbolic of this, Roger N. Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union, wrote to Noel Hemmendinger on the Japan Desk of the State Department to inquire about the status of the petition the league had submitted. (See “Letter from Baldwin to Hemmendinger, February 21, 1957,” 794c.022/2-2157.) Hemmendinger’s successor, Howard L. Parsons, wrote back a couple of weeks later, apologizing for not having followed up on Baldwin’s request and stating that the situation was still the same—a decision had been reached that it would not be possible to allow them return at the present time. (See “Letter from Parsons to Baldwin, March 8, 1957,” 794c.022/2-2157.)

312d Telegram 1758 from Horsey to Dulles, February 13, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Ryukyus, January–May 1957, Box 47, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

313 Ibid.

314 Ibid.

315c Telegram 2255 from MacArthur to Dulles, April 10, 1957,” 611.94/4-1057, and “Telegram 2258 from MacArthur to Dulles, April 10, 1957,” 611.94/4-1057.

316c Telegram 2306 from MacArthur to Dulles, April 13, 1957,” 611.94/4-1357.

317 Ibid.

318c Telegram 2336 from MacArthur to Dulles, April 17, 1957,” 611.94/4-1757.

319 Author’s interview with Mimi MacArthur, January 2003, Brussels, Belgium.

320d “Telegram 2336.” The United States had originally planned to invite Kishi’s predecessor, Ishibashi, to Washington, but he had to resign due to health reasons prior to the invitation being given. Instead, Kishi was invited, originally for May, but he eventually was able to go from 19 June to 21 June. For more, see *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 259n3, “Telegram 1848 from MacArthur to Dulles, February 25, 1957,” ibid., 270–71, and “Telegram 2010 from MacArthur to Dulles, March 14, 1957,” ibid., 272–74.

321c Telegram 2455 from MacArthur to Secretary of State, May 1, 1957,” 033.9411/5-157.

322c Telegram from Dulles to MacArthur, May 8, 1957,” 611.94/5-857.

323c Telegram 2493 from CINCPAC to CNO, May 20, 1957,” CCS 092 Japan (12-20-50) Sec 23d, Box 11, Geographic File 1957, RG 218.

324c Ibid.


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328“Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Official Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan, June 12, 1957,” 033.9411/6-1257.

329“Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with Secretary Dulles Monday, 17 June 1957 in Connection with Kishi Visit,” Geographic File 1957, Box 11, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50), RG 218.

330Findley, Book II, 256. For the discussion, see “Memorandum of Conversation of Defense–State Meeting in Connection with the Visit of Prime Minister Kishi on 17 June 1958 [sic],” in ibid.

331Ibid., 253.

332Ibid., 253–56.

333Ibid.

334Ibid.

335Ibid. Dulles’ less-than-strong stance that day may have been due to the opinion of the president’s special consultant, Frank Nash, who had recently visited Iwo Jima and flown over the Bonins. Nash felt the issue of the return of the islanders could “be worked out, given a little time, but it would not be desirable (as I saw it) to push this issue in terms of the Kishi visit.” See “Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting between the Secretary of State and the President’s Special Consultant (Nash), June 5, 1957,” in FRUS, 1955–1957, 342. The result of Nash’s study was United States Overseas Military Bases: Report to the President by Frank C. Nash, December 1957. Page 31 of the study discusses the Bonin Islands: “Japanese fear of a second atomic devastation, and the consequent ban on our introduction of these weapons into Japan, severely limits the retaliatory potential of our bases there. Furthermore, Japan’s profound fear of nuclear war raises the question of what her attitude would be in the event the United States desired to use bases in Japan to prosecute a war in which Japan desired to remain neutral. Since it seems highly likely that Japan would refuse her cooperation and would render use of our Japanese bases impossible, it is obvious we must adjust our base program and force deployments so as to have alternatives at hand should the Japanese bases be unavailable. A possible alternative lies in the Bonin Islands, and we should make clear to the Japanese that as we withdraw forces from Japan the Bonins become more important and necessary to us from the point of view of military facilities. For this reason we cannot permit repatriation of the islanders as long as the islands are under our control. Temporizing measures along this line, such as permitting visits to the graveyards of relatives, can only build up cumulatively into a situation such as the one now confronting us in Okinawa.”

336“Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting with Secretary Dulles Monday, 17 June 1957.”


338Ibid.

339Ibid.

340Ibid.


342Ibid., 359.
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343 Ibid.

344 Ibid.


347 “Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Goodpaster on the Bonin Islands, June 19, 1957,” FRUS, 1955–1957, 376, which includes an abbreviated version of it, much of which was still classified at the time of its publication in 1991. The entire memo has since been declassified.

348 “Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Goodpaster.” Also see “Author’s interview with Goodpaster, January 30, 2000, Washington, DC.”

349 The United States was planning to reduce its force levels by at least 50 percent, including all ground combat forces.

350 “Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Goodpaster.”

351 Ibid.

352 “Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Official Visit of the Prime Minister of Japan, June 12, 1957.”

353 Ibid.

354 “Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Kishi, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957, 9 a.m.,” FRUS, 1955–1957, 380. A Defense Department version of the meeting was also made. See “Memorandum of Conversation of Meeting at State, Thursday, 20 June 1957 on Discussion of Over-all U.S.-Japanese Political, Military, and Economic Relations, June 21, 1957,” Geographic File 1957, Box 11, CCS 092 Japan (12-12-50) Sec. 24, RG 218. Radford’s presentation was based on “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Talking Paper for Kishi’s Visit,” Chairman’s Files, Admiral Radford, 1953–1957, Box 12, CJCS-091 Japan (21 June 1957), RG 218.

355 “Memorandum of a Conversation between Secretary of State Dulles and Prime Minister Kishi, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957, 9 a.m.,” FRUS, 1955–1957, 384.

356 Ibid., 386.

357 “Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Bonin Islands, September 23, 1957,” Folder: Japan 1957, Box 1, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs 1957, RG 59.

358 Ibid.

359 Ibid.

360 “Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Office, Department of State, Washington, June 20, 1957, 3 p.m.,” FRUS, 1955–1957, 394.

361 Ibid., 395.

Dulles stated that this figure was “as big a permanent population as the islands had ever had . . . since the former inhabitants had been brought to the islands before the war for military purposes.” This was clearly incorrect. See “Memorandum of a Conversation, White House, Washington, June 21, 1957, 11:35 a.m.,” *FRUS, 1955–1957*, 412.

Ibid.


Ibid., 414.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid., 264–65.

Ibid., 266.

Ibid., 265.

Ibid.


Letter from Robertson to Sprague, August 16, 1957,” 794c.0221/8-1657.


Memorandum from Green to Ockey, August 26, 1957,”


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

See “Naval Message 21984 from CNO to CINCPACFLT, September 20, 1957,” Geographic Files 1957, Box 11, 092 Japan (12-12-50) Section 24, RG 218.
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations


Telegram No. 705 from MacArthur to Dulles, September 7, 1957,” 033.9411/9-757. Also see Findley, *Book II*, 266.

Memorandum from MacArthur to Dulles, September 7, 1957.”

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Telegram 819 from MacArthur to Dulles, September 17, 1957,” 033.9411/9-1757.

Outgoing Telegram from Embassy Tokyo to State, September 17, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

Telegram from Embassy to State Department, September 17, 1957.”


Ibid.

Letter from Sprague to Robertson, September 20, 1957.” Also see “Fujiyama Visit, September 1957, Bonin Islands,” I-5.1, Box 14, Subject Files Relating to the Ryukyus, 1952–1958, RG 59.


Letter from Ockey to Steeves.”

Memorandum of Conversation on General Discussion of American-Japanese Relations by the Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister, September 23, 1957, 3:00 to 5:30 p.m., Secretary’s Office,” Folder: I-5.1, Box 14, Subject File Relating to the Ryukyus, 1952–1958, RG 59. There are several versions of the memorandum of conversations. All three will be used to recreate the meeting.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Bonin Islands, September 23, 1957,” Folder: I-5.1, Box 14, Subject Files Relating to the Ryukyus, 1952–1958, RG 59. Also see “Letter from Robertson
Bilateral Problem: Reversion and Repatriation, 1952–57


411“Memorandum of Conversation on General Discussion of American-Japanese Relations by the Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister, September 23, 1957.”

412Ibid.

413Ibid.

414Ibid.

415Ibid.

416Ibid.

417Ibid.

418Ibid.


420Ibid.

421Ibid.

422Ibid.

423Ibid.

424Ibid.

425Ibid.

426Ibid.
The Ogasawara Problem is a problem for the people of the Ogasawara Islands, but it also a problem for every person in our country.

—Fukuda Tokuyasu, Liberal Democratic Party Diet Member and then–chairman of the Ogasawara Association, in the inaugural issue of the newsletter Ogasawara

On 25 September 1957, Suganuma Kiyoshi, Northeast Asian Section chief of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, met with Richard L. Sneider, first secretary of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, to express his “disappointment” in the talks between Foreign Minister Fujiiyama Aiichiro and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, which seemed to end hopes for repatriation. The day before, Suganuma said he had received “hourly” phone calls from a “very excited” League for the Repatriation of the Bonin Islanders inquiring about the status of the talks.¹ The league had been “to a certain extent optimistic of achieving at least a mildly favorable solution” about repatriation and Suganuma admitted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was in “a difficult position” as it had given the league “some encouragement that a favorable solution might be possible” after the talks between Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke and President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Suganuma was uncertain now how to break the news to the league.

The Foreign Ministry would often be caught in this position, giving hope—sometimes too much—to the league that a solution to their problems, whether it be repatriation, compensation, or grave visits, was at hand. The American embassy was usually understanding and often sympathetic, but the U.S. government’s position on this matter—that there be no repatriation at this time—was clear. This position was explained in an October 1957 letter from an official in the Department of State to his counterpart at the headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC):

Withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan has caused a reassessment of our security needs in the Pacific and as a result of this reappraisal we find that no repatriation is possible for the foreseeable future. However, we will study the question of compensation and discuss this further with the Japanese. We do not consider that visits to the ancestral graves are feasible due to the destruction of graves and markers during the war as well as to the fact there are no facilities for visitors on the islands. We agreed, however, to explore the feasibility of sending a Japanese government representative to the Islands to verify the situation.²

This approach was echoed early the following month in the report, United States Overseas Military Bases: Report to the President, written by Frank C. Nash, who had served as assistant
secretary of defense for international security affairs from August 1951 to February 1954, and had subsequently traveled to several countries, including Japan, to draft the report:

The recent decision to withdraw large numbers of United States troops and facilities from Japan makes our position on nonrepatriation a good deal more tenable. The Marianas–Bonins offer the most logical area for redeploying certain facilities to be withdrawn from Japan, and the Japanese should be so informed. Obviously almost all the limited space on these small islands is likely to be needed in the future for military facilities, and even if there were limited space left over for, say, one or two hundred Bonin Islanders to return, it is doubtful if such a limited repatriation would serve the interests of either Japan or the United States. It would be more likely to increase Japanese demands and involve us in a situation similar to the “reversion” conditions on Okinawa. It seems only fair to make it clear to the Japanese and Bonin Islanders that repatriation is out of the question, at least at this time. In taking this position, it is important that we move ahead in indemnifying the Bonin Islanders for use of their land, perhaps making compensation on the same basis that we are paying for the use of private lands in the Ryukyus.3

Following the talks, a dissatisfied Japan continued to press the issue of repatriation from many angles. On 2 October 1957, for example, a Socialist Party delegation led by Kawakami Jotaro of the House of Representatives and including Sone Eki, a member of the upper house (House of Councillors), and Morishima Morito, of the lower house (House of Representatives), called on Dulles, followed by a visit with Robertson, where they requested among other things, the return of Okinawa and the Bonins.4 Viewing it as an “excellent chance to correct some of the misconceptions that the Socialists in Japan seem to have about our policies and an opportunity to encourage moderatism,”5 Robertson explained that the United States was not in the islands “because it wished to be there, but because of military necessity. As soon as the military threat was gone, our Congress would be glad to be rid of the costly burden, but the threat continued to remain and we could not make ourselves helpless before it. We had no designs upon one square inch of Japanese land or that of any other country.”6 When Sone asked if there was a possibility of “sharing part of the powers of administration,” Robertson responded that it was a subject of discussion between the two governments and that the delegation members should ask their own government.7

Moreover, on 21 October, Kono Ichiro, state minister of the Economic Planning Agency, who was visiting Washington, raised the Bonins problem with Dulles during a discussion on U.S.-Japan relations. When Kono described the negotiations on repatriation as “deadlocked,” Dulles snapped back that the discussions “were not deadlocked, but finished.”8 The secretary went on to say that he “had studied every square mile on maps of the islands, searching for possible areas of repatriation. United States security requirements are such that we cannot bring anyone back. We would be better off now if those that were allowed to return had not been repatriated.”9

It was some time before the Japanese government raised the problem again. On the morning of 10 December, Fujiyama asked to meet Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II privately. Prefacing his remarks by mentioning that Kishi was probably going to dissolve the Diet sometime in 1958 and that, “in order to win as many votes as possible,” the Kishi
government was hoping to “settle as many outstanding problems as possible,” Fujiyama urged that several specific problems, including that of compensation for the islanders, be settled “as quickly as possible.” Fujiyama told MacArthur that although he and Kishi realized that the United States could not accept all of Japan’s requests with regard to the Bonin Islands, the Japanese government did hope for the “eventual return” of the islanders. Fujiyama said he explained the situation to the league, and the islanders now desire for the Japanese government to take up the matter of compensation with the United States and submit a proposal “hop[ing] it will be accepted.” Fujiyama informed MacArthur that the proposal would be based on the previously introduced letter then-Foreign Minister Shigemitsu gave to Ambassador Allison in 1955, but with new compensation figures.

MacArthur, after promising to relay the Japanese government’s proposal to Washington when it was ready, decided to state his “personal observations” before the Japanese position had become final and “expectations … which subsequently could not be realized” built up. Namely, MacArthur said “his strong impression” was that the U.S. government was leaning toward one lump sum payment, rather than annual rentals, and if this were the case, he hoped that the Japanese government and league would not be “disappointed.” Fujiyama responded that he would do his best to avoid building up expectations, and that he would take MacArthur’s comments into consideration when developing the proposal, but that he nevertheless “strongly hope[ed] that a satisfactory solution could be reached.” Fujiyama mentioned that the league’s members “are very moderate in political beliefs and place great confidence in the Foreign Office. The former residents are mostly farmers who are very much attached to their land . . . It would be very difficult for them to accept a lump sum settlement since it might foster the impression they are giving up land permanently.” Fujiyama instead suggested that the Foreign Ministry was thinking of a two-part formula—a lump sum payment for use of the land up to the present time, with the understanding that additional payments would be made at appropriate intervals for future use of land. MacArthur did not indicate any reaction to this idea, but he had been aware for several days that the ministry was probably going to make an “early approach” on the issue, and that it was important for the embassy to be in a position to respond quickly.

By chance, the U.S. government was finalizing its position in Washington, and the day after MacArthur’s meeting with Fujiyama, the Department of Defense (DOD) wrote to the State Department saying that it would follow in principle the State Department’s lead on the compensation issue. The decision took more than two months to reach. Following the Dulles–Fujiyama meeting, the record of conversation was shared with the Defense Department, and a working group was established between the two departments to consider the question of indemnification of the displaced islanders in September. While it agreed that an “equitable method of compensation should be developed,” the Defense Department argued that the Japanese government should “share the cost of compensation” as the islanders were originally evicted by the Japanese government. The State Department disagreed with that position, pointing out that such an approach would “nullify the major political objective we are seeking to obtain through compensation, which is to eliminate or at least to greatly diminish the pressure for repatriation.” Moreover, the State Department felt that the Kishi government would be unable to derive any political capital from such a method.
With no progress having been made by early November, Robertson wrote to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II to ask him to concur in the development of a compensation method that did not involve a cost-sharing feature. Irwin's superior, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mansfield D. Sprague, responded the following month on 11 December, reiterating his department's concerns and pointing out three advantages that had not been raised in Robertson's letter. By chance, this was the day after MacArthur had met with Fujiyama to discuss the compensation issue. One advantage mentioned by Sprague was that by sharing the cost, both Japan and the United States would “maintain an interest in keeping the amount of compensation to a minimum,” which the DOD felt was an “important factor to be considered in justifying any appropriation request before Congress.” The second advantage is that sharing would avoid the connotation that the United States is solely responsible for the situation facing the islanders, and the third, is that charges by the opposition in Japan that the United States was buying the islands would be averted. Nevertheless, Sprague informed Robertson that the Defense Department would “defer to the judgment” of the State Department in “developing the best means of attaining a desirable political arrangement in this matter.” Deftly, Sprague also noted that “since political considerations”—a phrase he borrowed from Robertson's own letter—“have overriding priority, it is assumed the Department of State will take the lead in sponsoring and justifying the necessary Congressional appropriation.” Irwin proposed that if the value of the land could not be determined by a search of the records of land transfers on the islands, then the value of comparable land in the Ryukyus, as suggested in the Nash Report, or in mainland Japan, could be used for computation purposes. If the land value in Okinawa were used ($1,060 per acre) as a reference point, Irwin notes, then the Bonins’ settlement would amount to $3,837,200.

As a result of this letter, the State Department was successful in securing DOD’s commitment to U.S. compensation of the displaced islanders, but many details needed to be worked out. Over the following month, discussions continued between the two department’s representatives and, on 22 January 1958, Dulles wrote to MacArthur to update him on the meetings in Washington. Dulles said he “anticipates” agreement with the Defense Department on the “principle” of compensation for property “used or taken,” but that it had not yet agreed to the details of what was to be compensated. According to Dulles, “in exchange for compensation, the United States would obtain unlimited use of property for [an] indefinite period.” Dulles said that the payments would not be considered ex gratia, and instead “would be within the framework of our legal liabilities.” He added that “we hope to arrive at a sum large enough and sufficiently widely distributed to quiet ex-Bonin Islanders.” Dulles urged MacArthur not to inform the Japanese side at this point, as it was still being discussed with the Defense Department.

The following week, on 28 January, a State-Defense Department working-level meeting reached agreement on the principle of compensation of Bonin Islanders for all private land holdings, based on the reasoning that their exclusion after the peace treaty was “tantamount to taking of all private property in the islands.” The DOD representatives were initially worried that a precedent would be set for unsettled Japanese claims in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Ely Maurer, the legal advisor in the State Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, explained that the Bonins situation was different, noting that they were
covered in a different section of the peace treaty and that in the Trust Territories, Japanese property had been confiscated while in the Bonins the former islanders were being deprived of their property rights.

Both State and Defense Department representatives agreed that a “hand-out” or *ex gratia* approach needed to be avoided and that compensation should be “carefully tied to a legal cause” or else a “precedent” might be established in Japanese eyes. However, Captain Berton Robbins of the Office of International Security Affairs argued that it would be difficult for Congress to understand why the United States should have a legal liability to compensate the islanders when it did not remove the islanders from their homes and “only took over military base property in the islands from the Japanese military forces.”

Captain E. F. Baldridge of the Office of Naval Operations suggested that it might be useful when requesting Congress for the compensation appropriation to point out that Japan would share the burden. The State Department representatives balked at this suggestion, noting that such an arrangement would “nullify the very political gain which we are trying to achieve,” but Baldridge pointed out that the Japanese have already paid a considerable amount to the islanders “in the nature of relief” and thus this could be considered “the Japanese share in compensation.”

Baldridge went on to explain that the Navy felt the islanders should be compensated for private land holdings at approximately the same rate as compensation in the Ryukyu Islands. As the total area of privately held lands was 3,260 acres in the Bonins, this would amount to $4 million. Baldridge added the Navy would add that 5 percent per annum interest to it from the time of the peace treaty, raising the total compensation to approximately $5 million. As it would be difficult to raise this any higher and still be within the legal liability framework, this lump sum would be turned over to the Japanese government, which would be responsible for distributing it to the islanders and deciding if part of the money would be used to compensate for fishing rights, as suggested by Kishi during his visit to Washington in June 1957.

The State Department realized that the formula would only reach 503 landholding families and not the entire 7,000 former residents, unless the Japanese government “on [its] own responsibility spreads it wider.” The families to be compensated were, in the State Department’s opinion, the “most influential ex-Islanders and the backbone of the League.” Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter pointed out that it would be impossible to compensate the remaining former islanders in a way other than by *ex gratia* payments, but that such a method should be “avoided” in that it “only opens the door for future claims of same nature.”

The representatives agreed to draw up a draft telegram and request the views of the embassy and the military authorities involved in Bonin matters. After studying the joint State-Defense Departments’ understanding, CINCPAC immediately concurred but doubted that it would “lay all Bonin problems to permanent rest.” The Hawaii-based command did hope, however, that the U.S. payment of compensation and the Japanese acceptance of the lump sum payment “will quiet the repatriation clamor which has long been a disproportionate irritant to both governments.” While agreeing to the compensation, CINCPAC noted that “no exact evaluation of Bonin land can be made . . . [as] there just
is no comparable area.” Namely, the value of the islands in the prewar era was the fishing industry, not agriculture. Moreover, while the land in the Bonin Islands was more valuable than the sugar tracts on Saipan, which had been appraised at $40 per acre, it was not as valuable as the average Ryukyu land, which was calculated at $1,060 per acre. Nevertheless, CINCPAC agreed that it was better to use the Ryukyuan figure than to select an arbitrary value: “the comparison is admittedly imperfect, but it is perhaps the best under the circumstances. Certainly it is generous.” As a result, CINCPAC felt it was unnecessary to send a survey team to conduct a land appraisal. Doing so would “serve only to delay solution of a problem which already has plagued us too long,” the telegram argued, and noted that “further prompt decision on basis suggested above might be used to our political advantage in support of conservative party in Japan in light of the forthcoming elections there.”

The embassy added its views to the discussion by stating that there was a “fair chance” that the islanders would accept the lump sum payment, but pointed out that there would be problems “since some circles will interpret compensation on this basis as a ‘perpetual lease’” of the islands. However, in the same telegram, the embassy drew a distinction between the Bonins and the “bitter, grassroots dispute” in Okinawa: “the Bonin Islanders are far separated, in space and time, hence psychology, from their islands. The Bonins are virtually unpopulated with no prospect of population or other pressures raising land values. Also the Bonins problem is uncomplicated by vexations of Okinawan political situation.” However, the embassy anticipated objections over the scope and amount of the compensation. It recommended that the government pay compensation for not only land rights, but for other proprietary rights, such as fishing, that have equal legal force in Japan. Doing so “would have the advantage of spreading the benefits wider and providing a larger total sum that would have a better chance of quieting the issue permanently.”

The State Department’s Office of Northeast Asian Affairs gathered these comments and, in early March, began studying ways to seek funding, including from the Mutual Security Act funds, the president’s emergency fund, and P. L. 480 counterpart funds. However, attempts to secure this funding were unsuccessful. Moreover, during the next several months, the State Department believed the need for compensation arose from the fact that the Bonin Islands had become a military reservation, and argued it was better for the Defense Department to seek an appropriation request, believing that Congress would respond more favorably to a DOD request. In late June, Robertson wrote to his Defense Department counterpart, Assistant Secretary Sprague, to review the interdepartmental consultations and to point out that while the framework for compensation and general amount had been agreed upon, the source of the funds remained unresolved. Robertson noted that the failure to find funds within the executive branch meant that it was necessary to seek congressional appropriation. Robertson pointed out that since the need for compensation arises from the fact of having made the Bonin Islands a military reservation Congress will undoubtedly respond more favorably to a presentation including the necessary appropriation in the Defense budget than it would to any other type of presentation. In our view the United States has an obligation to the displaced Bonin Islanders because it is preventing them from using
their property. This obligation arises from the fact that the Bonin Islands in their entirety have, for reasons of strategy, been reserved for military purposes. Finally, since the Department of Defense is primarily responsible for this reservation the appropriation to pay compensation should properly in our judgment be included in its appropriation bill.\textsuperscript{45}

It was several weeks before Sprague responded. The Defense Department disagreed with Robertson’s characterization of the Bonin Islands as a military reservation, and thus did not believe it had primary responsibility for raising compensation funds. Instead, Sprague suggested that “special legislation” in the form of a “relief bill” be prepared that would “meet the objective but not disturb the appropriation request of our respective Departments.”\textsuperscript{46} Sprague offered to support the State Department in preparing and sponsoring such legislation if Robertson agreed.\textsuperscript{47}

Robertson’s staff did not find Sprague’s response problematic and suggested that he agree. They mentioned that time was of the essence, as a year had passed since Foreign Minister Fujiyama’s visit and he would probably “expect [the United States] to have reached some sort of definite conclusion.”\textsuperscript{48} David M. Bane, acting director of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, who had just finished a year of study at the National War College, pointed out that the “chances for obtaining a favorable settlement on the basis of a moderate ‘one-time’ payment [as expected to be proposed by the Japanese government] are better now than they will be in the future when the pressure may develop for our paying annual rents in the Bonins.”\textsuperscript{49}

During the spring and early summer, the Japanese government refrained from raising the compensation issue, due in part to the Japanese government’s decision to defer action until the land compensation question in the Ryukyus had been resolved, but the issue arose again at a meeting in late July between the embassy and Foreign Ministry officials. The meeting was prompted by stories that appeared the same day (24 1958) in the \textit{Tokyo Shim bun} and other newspapers, which included comments by Matsuno Raizo, director of the general administrative affairs section of the prime minister’s office, to the effect that the Japanese government would ask the United States to expedite the return of the former islanders to the Bonins. At the embassy, First Secretary of the Embassy Harlan B. Clark told his Foreign Ministry counterparts, Miyake Kijiro, counselor of foreign affairs, Asian Affairs Bureau, and Suganuma of the same bureau, that Ambassador MacArthur felt the article’s appearance was “most unhelpful,” and that the issue had been thoroughly discussed between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Kishi and between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aiichiro. The MOFA representatives explained that they had not been consulted about Matsuno’s comments, which had been made “in response to inquiries from the press and continued pressure on the part of the Bonin Islanders who are urging that action be taken on their claims,” but agreed the story was “unfortunate.”\textsuperscript{50} Miyake added that “it did not represent present Japanese government intentions as he knew them.”\textsuperscript{51}

The conversation then turned to the compensation issue, which Clark reported in his dispatch would likely be taken up in Washington by Ambassador Asakai and Foreign Minister Fujiyama. Miyake stated that the Japanese government believed the United States would
make compensation in the Bonin Islands in a lump sum basis, rather than on an annual rental basis, and felt it was logical to divide the payments into two categories: (1) lump sum payment for the period from the peace treaty up until the present, and (2) lump sum payment or payments, once every three to five years for the period from the present until the islanders are returned to the Bonins. Miyake said the Japanese government was interested in knowing if the United States was in a position “politically and legally” to make compensation and if it would do so in the manner he had suggested. Clark responded that he “believed something might be worked out for the islanders on the basis of compensation” but he did not know yet, “as many factors would have to be considered” by the State Department and other agencies in the U.S. government. Clark found it “of interest” that working-level officials in MOFA were thinking of different types of payments, and noted their position appeared “flexible.” He asked the department to provide the embassy with any available information that could be shared with the Foreign Ministry on U.S. thinking with regard to the compensation issue and followed up with a telegram at the end of the week.

It was late August before the State Department responded in a telegram that essentially summarized the agreement reached with the Defense Department in late February and early March, and explained that the question before the two departments was how and where to obtain the $5 million. The Defense Department did not wish to include it in its regular budget framework, and the State Department was unsuccessful in exploring funds available to the executive branch. It agreed to the suggestion by the Defense Department to seek congressional appropriation through legislation outside the normal budget framework, however, it was unsure of the chances of success. Dulles told the embassy that it was difficult to commit to any specific payment because of the uncertainty of the source of the funds, but recommended that it at least explore with the Japanese the type and size of payment without guaranteeing that such a payment be made, and indicate the United States would prefer a plan that did not require it to make an indefinite number of future payments. He also wanted to assure the Japanese government that the United States had no intention of taking permanent title to any land in the Bonins or preventing the islanders from returning at such an undetermined time as the United States may relinquish the islands, and continues to recognize Japan’s residual sovereignty over the islands.

MacArthur met with Fujiyama on the afternoon of 29 August for their final meeting before the latter departed for Washington. Fujiyama presented an aide memoire, the gist of which stated,

While the GOJ [government of Japan] as well as [the 7,434] islanders continue hope for their early return, [the absence] of any prospects for such an early return and pressing economic necessity have combined to make islanders ask for compensation. The GOJ accordingly requests the USG [United States government] meet this desire by a lump sum payment to relieve their difficulties and help them stabilize their future living and would like to propose the amount of 4,500 million yen ($12.5 million) which is deemed reasonable after due consultation with League for Repatriation of Bonin Islanders. Payment should not prejudice their exercise of property rights at such time as they may be able to return to the islands.
Although MacArthur had met several times with the league’s representatives, including once earlier that day, he was “surprised at the magnitude of the figure.”Fujiyama explained that it was “not arbitrary” but based on “careful calculation of property rights,” the details of which could be provided the next day. He stated that the islanders are “living in great poverty in Japan but had withstood efforts of radicals to enlist them, and deserved compensation for material losses and long period of hardship they have suffered for so many years. They fully realize the return to the islands is not possible in the foreseeable future [so] compensation would enable them to establish themselves more or less permanently in Japan until they can return.”

MacArthur said he would “be less than candid” if he did not tell Fujiyama that he thought the figure cited “seemed . . . unrealistic,” but he would nevertheless forward the proposal to the State Department. He agreed that the islanders are “good people and long-suffering and deserved compensation” but it was not fair for them to expect a settlement that was unobtainable. As a result, MacArthur told Fujiyama he had cautioned the islanders against expecting too much from Washington, as Congress might not appropriate funds for fishing and tenancy rights, which did not constitute property rights in the United States. He suggested that speculation about amounts should be kept out of the press until it was known if an agreement was possible on a figure. He then mentioned that informal soundings in Washington indicated that $3.5 million might be obtainable, and that it could be as much as $5 million. It was impossible, however, to promise funds when they had not even been appropriated by Congress. Fujiyama agreed that it was not desirable to talk publicly about specific amounts or discuss individual components, but wanted the Americans to understand that the Japanese proposal is “based on a legal calculation of losses to islanders in accordance with Japanese property law.” The ambassador particularly emphasized the points in Dulles’ instructions. He also mention that the United States preferred the Japanese government to distribute any agreed sum as it saw fit, to which Fujiyama concurred. In summarizing the exchange, MacArthur told Dulles in a later telegram that Fujiyama obviously has in mind something like ex gratia formula relieving us of any further obligation to islanders until time when Bonin Islands may be restored to Japanese control. While Fujiyama’s figure seems substantially too high, I think if we can increase the amount of compensation which we are prepared to offer from $5 million to about $8 million we have basis for lasting solution to this problem which will otherwise continue to cause difficulties in our relations with Japan. In my opinion $8 million would do the trick.

A few days later, MacArthur followed this telegram with the details of the Japanese proposal. The embassy found the calculations in the proposal “accurate, fair, and not inflated for bargaining purposes. They concern loss of income only for persons engaged in agriculture and fisheries and for owners of building lots and miscellaneous land and exclude shopkeepers, artisans and others.”MacArthur went on to explain that the calculations were based on the standards used by the Japanese government when compensating persons in Japan whose land and property, including fishing rights, had been taken over by U.S. forces. This method, according to the Japanese proposal, was incorporated in Japanese legislation approved by the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers during the occupation, and as
a result, the Japanese government felt the United States should accept these standards in paying compensation for the islanders. (It was later learned that Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers [SCAP] had not approved the legislation because it was created after the end of the occupation.68)

Regarding the distribution of the funds, the Foreign Ministry desired to distribute the money in accordance with the guidelines set by the Japanese government to ensure that compensation is “spread” to all former islanders.69 MOFA officials stated they understood that the final figure would reflect both “political realities as well as legal justifications.” They hoped, however, that if the figure was smaller than their request that the detailed compensation breakdown not be made public since the government would “experience serious difficulties in the Diet” if it had to admit that it had agreed to the elimination of claims recognized in Japanese law, such as those for fishing rights.70

The same day, the Foreign Ministry suggested the agenda topics for the talks between Fujiyama and Dulles.71 Of course, the Bonins problem was high on the list. The following day, Martin F. Herz, a first secretary of the embassy, held a working-level meeting with Miyake and Suganuma of the ministry to discuss the methods of reaching a bilateral agreement—talks between the foreign minister and the secretary of state on the amount only, in the interest of a quick understanding, or the establishment of committees to examine the Japanese evidence and consider each point in detail. Fujiyama, according to Miyake, preferred the former. However, the ministry wished to know if the United States would be in a position to make payment within a reasonable time following an agreement or would the appropriations have to go through Congress, with payment being delayed as much as a year.

Miyake had “serious misgivings” on the problem, and asked about the possibility of shifting funds already appropriated or “resorting to some subterfuge whereby earlier payment might be affected.”72 Herz offered “sympathy, but no encouragement.”73 Miyake then explained if the figure reached between Fujiyama and Dulles “is not too far” from that proposed by Japan, then Fujiyama would have the “authority to sign on the dotted line.” If the figure was quite different, then the matter would have to be referred back to the cabinet and further discussions would have to take place through diplomatic channels.74 In what was probably an attempt to add a little pressure on raising the figure, Suganuma joined in and said if the figure is arrived at quickly, then it might be a little lower than what the Japanese side expected and, in that case, Japanese negotiators would have to “hold out” and wait for follow-up negotiations.75 After some “sparring” about the figures, Miyake

Recreated by author based on State Despatch no. 266

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<th>Period</th>
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<th>Fisheries</th>
<th>Building lots</th>
<th>Forests fields</th>
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Figure 11. Japanese compensation request by category67

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stated his “personal opinion” that Fujiyama might be willing to conclude an agreement on the basis of an $8 million settlement. After stating this, both men watched carefully for Herz’s reaction while “preserving impassive Oriental countenances.” Herz humorously concludes his memorandum of conversation that he, too, “preserved an impassive Occidental countenance.”

Herz followed this summary with another memo to the ambassador providing additional arguments to be used internally within the State Department and eventually within the U.S. government for accepting the larger $8 million figure. Herz argued that it would be “politically impossible” for the Japanese government to accept a solution based on the “discredited Ryukyuan formula,” which had been strongly opposed by the local population in Okinawa leading to island-wide protests with nearly 100,000 participants. He warned that, while the Japanese side still did not know that the calculations were based on such a formula, “as soon as they do some calculating they are bound to find out.” Moreover, Herz also noted that the Japanese government would not be able to accept a situation in which they “clearly have surrendered their entire claim to property rights other than land.” If a higher figure is not proposed, Herz suggested the Japanese side will then marshal numerous documents and justifications in support of their proposal, which would commit the U.S. government to an even higher figure. The United States, Herz wrote, has “every interest to try and prevent a long drawn-out negotiating exercise which could involve us in interminable arguments about individual items,” and as such, if the United States wants an early settlement, it was important to “move fast.” Herz proposed that the secretary, on a “highly confidential and tentative basis,” mention his intention to Fujiyama to seek agreement on the basis of $8 million.

It is unclear what MacArthur thought of Herz’s arguments, but that same day he sent the department a suggestion that his economic staff had considered—the use of P.L. 480 (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas [GARIOA] Funds) repayments in place of compensation. The first payment of $1.2 million is due in December 1958, he noted, followed by $3.2 million in 1959, and another $4.1 million in 1960. While MacArthur said he was not sure what sort of congressional action would be required to use those funds nor of Japanese reaction to such an idea, he noted that Congress “might find it easier to sanction adequate compensation if related to P.L. 480 repayments.”

As the talks remained general, the suggestions did not make their way into the position paper on the Bonin Islands the State Department had prepared, assuming Japan raised the issue in the upcoming talks between Fujiyama and Dulles. After explaining what it anticipated the Japanese requests to be, the paper then laid out the U.S. position:

The United States position on resettlement remains unchanged: the security requirements of the United States make further resettlement inadvisable. The United States has given careful thought and consideration to the problem of compensation. The United States has tentatively decided that the former Bonin Islanders residing in Japan should be compensated in respect to their private land holdings on the islands, but that no compensation should be paid for loss of livelihood or for preventing the islanders from returning to the islands. The United States has no intention of taking permanent title to any land in the Bonins or preventing the
Islanders from returning at such undetermined time as the United States may relinquish the Islands. The United States continues to recognize Japan’s residual sovereignty over the Bonins. As the land has been out of civilian use since the end of World War II and much of it is overgrown, it has been decided that the practicable method of obtaining a value figure for the land is to take an average value figure for land on other islands in the area and multiply that by the amount of land in the Bonins that was privately owned. The United States would add to this five percent of the amount per annum since the effective date of the Japanese Peace Treaty (April 18, 1952) as interest. The Japanese Government might wish to contribute by compensating the Islanders for the period 1946–1952. The United States believes that it would be desirable to pay compensation in one sum equivalent to the value of the land and in full settlement of all claims against the United States by the Bonin Islanders. This sum would be turned over to the Japanese Government for disbursement to the claimants. The United States would appreciate having the Japanese views on this approach to compensation and will give careful study to any compensation plan which the Japanese have to offer. However, in view of the fact that we anticipate having to go to the Congress for funds, the United States cannot commit itself that any payment will be made.84

One department official was not satisfied with an early draft of the position paper that had been circulated for comment. Richard H. Lamb, who was one of the few Foreign Service Officers to have actually visited the islands (in early 1956), blasted the paper. He wrote that not only did it oversimplify the problem, leaving out a number of key issues that would have to be settled, and did not give a clear picture of the Japanese government’s view of the issue, but was also “overoptimistic” by “assum[ing] that the compensation plan we have worked out—unilaterally, without discussing it with the Japanese—will settle the problem once and for all.”85 Lamb added, “money is never going to settle this problem . . . any more than giving $3,000–$5,000 per family would settle the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine.”86

Lamb’s comments highlighted an important concern that was shared by others in the department. In late March, the State Department assessed U.S. policies toward Japan and, as part of this reevaluation, suggested that the Bonins policy be reexamined to determine what steps could be taken to limit repatriation, in addition to compensation.87 Specifically, Robertson recommended that, “As with Okinawa,” the department reexamine Bonin policy,

At the highest levels, with a view to determining: (1) whether our present or projected military installations there are essential to the security of the United States; (2) whether our ability to carry out our military mission in the Bonins would be critically impaired if a limited number of former Japanese residents were permitted to return; (3) whether (if the answer to the above questions is affirmative), the military advantages outweigh the grave political (and even military) liabilities which our present position involves. As a minimum step, the former Bonin residents should be promptly and fully compensated for the use of their property from 1952 to the present. Though paid in a lump sum, the recipients preferably should
not be required to consider this as compensation for “permanent use” of their land in the future.\textsuperscript{88}

In making this recommendation, Robertson argued that the Bonins issue would continue “for an indefinite future to be a source of nationwide resentment” in Japan and “a major irritant” in bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{89} “In the Japanese view,” he noted,

United States actions in the Bonins run contrary to international standards of morality, and cannot be justified on security or any other grounds. The Japanese point out that we have not only seized territory which we have long recognized to be legitimately acquired Japanese territory, but, while repatriating a handful of “pro-American” Caucasians, have refused—apparently forever—to permit bona fide Japanese residents to return to their native land. If Japan ever chose to take the Bonins issues to the United Nations (as Japanese leftists have urged), she could make a strong case, and would almost certainly be able to rally support from most of Afro-Asia.\textsuperscript{90}

Robertson’s concerns were confirmed a few weeks later when a report of a conversation with Minister Shimoda Takezo was shared with him. The conversation took place at a luncheon on 9 April, when Howard L. Parsons asked Shimoda what he considered to be the most important problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship. Shimoda’s “immediate response” was the continued U.S. administration of Okinawa and the Bonins.\textsuperscript{91} He said that the government might request the immediate return of administrative rights over the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands shortly after the general election to be held in May, and explained that there were two schools of thought on the question of reversion. One would call for the immediate reversion of rights in the Ryukyus and Bonins to Japan. The second called for gradual reversion so that eventually administrative rights would have been turned over to Japan on a de facto basis. Parsons, it seems, felt it necessary to comment, explaining that calls for immediate reversion would have the “distinct disadvantage” of inviting the Japanese to “whittle away at the freedom of use” by the United States of bases, and that would be “detrimental” not only for the United States but also for the “defense posture which is so important to Japan.”\textsuperscript{92} Expressing a view he would continue to hold over the next decade or more, Shimoda responded that the “Japanese people would understand that to obtain the return of the territory they would have to pay a price for it, and the price they would have to pay would be completely unfettered utilization by the Americans of the bases in the islands.”\textsuperscript{93} Shimoda added that the “Japanese people would understand [the need to station atomic weapons on these bases and in and around the islands] and the Japanese Government would be under obligation to guarantee that this understanding continued.”\textsuperscript{94}

Ironically, Shimoda’s view would be the formula adopted almost exactly 10 years later, but it was premature to adopt this idea in 1958 particularly as the security treaty revision discussions and the question of including the Ryukyus and Bonins in the treaty area were still undeveloped.\textsuperscript{95} In the meantime, the Bonins problem continued to grow. The seriousness of the issue was reinforced during a meeting at the State Department with Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Diet member Fukuda Tokuyasu, a strong supporter of the league, on the eve of Fujiyama’s arrival in Washington. Sharing with his State Department interlocutors a copy of the English-language pamphlet, \textit{History of the Problem of the Bonin Islands in U.S.-Japan Relations},
Islands, Fukuda told them that the “problem of the Bonin Islands was similar to the land problem in Okinawa. The main difference was that the land problem in Okinawa had been exploited by the Reds.”

Fukuda, who was serving as vice chairman of the LDP’s Foreign Policy Committee, added that he was not negotiating, “just explaining,” but that he wanted to emphasize the fact that “haste was urgent because the Bonin Islanders were becoming impatient and the problem could become political.” Fukuda stated that it “was time to settle the problem” and with repatriation being laid aside for the time being, it was necessary to settle the problem through compensation.

The Foreign Ministry had explained that Fukuda was representing only himself, but it is clear that the timing of his visit and LDP affiliation was meant as an additional voice of pressure. Indeed, as Fukuda mentioned, he met with both Kishi and the secretary general of the LDP, Kawashima Shojiro, just before he departed Japan.

The next day, Fujiyama arrived on schedule in Washington from Canada, and met with Dulles and Robertson on 11 September. The foreign minister said that the U.S. position that the islanders could not be repatriated had been explained to the League of Bonin Islanders and that they “accept the fact that circumstances at present prevent their return.” Instead, they would like to be compensated, the minister said, and he would like to have Ambassador Asakai undertake discussions with the State Department on this question. Dulles responded that the United States appreciated the Japanese government’s efforts to help the islanders to understand the American decision, which it took “reluctantly but for compelling reasons.”

While noting that some of the figures mentioned were “somewhat beyond the value of anything he thought had existed in the Bonins,” Dulles was prepared to begin discussions with the Japanese government on this matter.

Fujiyama was aware of the different figures for compensation, but the question was “one of the mental anguish of the Bonin Islanders, who hope that some settlement can be made.” He hoped Dulles understood that the league was well meaning and “constantly making anti-Communist efforts.” Any compensation granted “would be appreciated by them and by the people of Japan in a manner which would increase good will toward the United States.”

Dulles and Fujiyama agreed to continue the discussion of the issue in Washington and Tokyo “on a parallel basis.”

A month after these talks, the Foreign Ministry approached the embassy to ask when the United States would be prepared to discuss the compensation issue and expressed the “strong hope” they could begin in October. The embassy, in its telegram, wrote that it believed the Japanese side would meet the United States halfway on the figure.

The following week, on 17 October, Counsellor of Embassy Yasukawa Takeshi, who would later become Japanese ambassador to the United States, called on the State Department to ask if the U.S. government wished to have the talks on compensation in Washington, as indicated by the U.S. embassy in Tokyo, so that the Defense Department could participate. James V. Martin Jr., the officer in charge of Japanese affairs, replied that the government had not yet decided and wished to consult further with the Japanese side. The two then discussed the different views of compensation held by both nations. The Japanese side was calling for compensation that included the loss of income or livelihood and fishing rights, while the Americans viewed compensation as “merely the value of the property
lost by the individual,” or more specifically, the land. Nevertheless, according to Martin, the land values had been calculated “on a very liberal basis with the knowledge that the Japanese Government would wish to have the Bonin Islanders compensated for the loss of what they regarded as their fishing rights or property.” Martin went on to add, “Although it would not relieve them of the necessity to gain a livelihood for themselves, they would be no worse off in this respect, and probably better off than many of their Japanese countrymen who had suffered more seriously in the war and who had without complaint reestablished themselves and rebuilt their lives.”

About three weeks later, on 12 November, Asakai called on Robertson to tell him that the Japanese government would like the United States to consider a figure of $9 million, rather than the earlier $12.5 million, for compensation. He explained that the Japanese government was hoping to pay each of the 1,370 households about $6,500. Robertson responded that he thought the figure was much too high and noted that, while the government had not arrived at a final figure, it was thinking in terms of $5 million. Robertson explained that this was based on the value of private land taken for military use. Asakai reiterated that it was the Japanese position that fishing rights would also have to be compensated. Robertson replied that there was no American precedent for that, and this approach might hurt the chances for getting a congressional appropriation. Asakai rebutted that if such was the case, then a higher land valuation than the one used in the Ryukyus should be considered, particularly as the “Bonin Islanders had no hope of returning to their homeland within the foreseeable future . . . unlike the Ryukyuans [who] still had access to other land in the Islands.” Asakai went on to stress that the Bonin Islanders “had been most patient and had refrained from political agitation,” and requested the United States give consideration to this aspect. He ended his plea by saying that he did not think the $9 million was an unreasonable figure. Robertson explained that his bureau had “long advocated payment of compensation to the Bonin Islanders” and that “they would like to see these people receive some compensation,” but it would be “embarrassing as well as counterproductive” if the State Department’s request to Congress failed because it did not appear to be “reasonable or justifiable.” Noting that the United States was facing a $12 billion budget deficit, Robertson said he wanted “to go to Congress with as strong a case as possible.” It was necessary, therefore, he observed, to reconcile the American and Japanese figures to arrive at a “fair and justifiable basis of compensation” if the State Department were to obtain congressional authorization.

Around the same time in Tokyo, Minister Outerbridge Horsey met with Itagaki Osamu, director, Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and Counsellor Miyake, about the compensation issue. Itagaki, who understood the principles of compensation as laid out by Horsey, disagreed with the amount. He stated that, while the ministry had not spoken directly with the islanders about it, he felt the minimum acceptable was about $9 million, as Asakai had mentioned. Itagaki emphasized that the islanders “had so far shown great restraint and had resisted attempts of the Communists to exploit their situation, but if offered such a low settlement he ‘feared what the results might be.’” After Itagaki explained that the government had paid compensation for the loss of fishing income to fishermen affected by U.S. forces off the Japanese coast in the past, Horsey replied that the United States could not compensate for the loss of income and fishing rights, but had no objection
to the Japanese government distributing the funds as it wished. Horsey explained the rough calculations involved, which Itagaki described as a “political” figure. Horsey noted that it would be very difficult to establish a value for the land: “detailed negotiations over the value of every piece of land would last forever and would not solve the political problems between our two governments. On the contrary, such a procedure would inevitably lead to compounding our present difficulties.” Continuing, Horsey told Itagaki that it was “useless” to return with an appeal for a larger amount of money. Itagaki responded that the figure was “inadequate.” Horsey’s next comment reflected his and other Americans’ frustration with the overall bilateral relationship:

In response to repeated indications that our proposed figure was inadequate, I said I would like to give him another aspect of the case on a purely personal basis. I said that there are some people in Washington who felt that no compensation whatsoever should be made by the U.S. and that the Japanese Government should do whatever needed to be done, as a contribution to mutual defense. I said that we were spending $40 billion a year for the defense of ourselves and the free world and that Japan was a direct beneficiary. I said it was a mistake to think that, because we seemed to have so much money, we could pay any given amount of claims. We had the same difficulties as any other government and we were, as I noted, spending an enormous amount of money for what is in effect the common defense.

In a letter to Howard Parsons in the State Department about 10 days later, Horsey said informal soundings of the Japanese on the U.S. figure were “not encouraging.” However, he mentioned that Itagaki’s “ranking subordinate” (likely Miyake) had expressed his “personal opinion” that a figure of $8 million might be acceptable. Horsey informed Parsons that the embassy had discovered a “disturbing misconception” in the Foreign Ministry about the “firmness of our $5 million figure.” Apparently, the ministry had been told by Yasukawa that the Americans were willing to compensate the islanders in amounts between $3,000 and $5,000 each, and taking the higher figure and multiplying it by 1,357 (the number of families), had arrived at the conclusion that the State Department was willing to settle for somewhere between $6.5 million and $7 million. “We have spared no effort to disabuse them of this misconception,” Horsey added. Summarizing the two countries’ positions, he explained that the Japanese side,

has always felt that a settlement, in order to be lastingly acceptable to the Bonin islanders, would have to be “generous.” Our position has been that it is not so much a question of generosity or tightfistedness as one of what we can honestly justify to the Congress. The Japanese, consequently, seem to be considering a solution patterned after the land settlement in Okinawa. It seems to us that this would have many disadvantages both for us and the Japanese, one of them being that it would rule out compensation for a sizeable portion of the Bonin islanders.

According to Horsey, Ambassador MacArthur still did not think $5 million was going to be enough to end the problem and that, if the United States could offer $6.5 to $7 million, “we might have a very reasonable prospect of reaching an acceptable agreement on a problem which can still cause serious difficulties in Japanese-American relations if it once really gets off the rails. For a difference of from $1.5 to $2 million, which is what would
seem to be involved, it just doesn't seem worthwhile to have the whole territorial question opened up again with the Japanese."¹²⁴

MacArthur followed up with a telegram in early December, urging that the United States agree to a $6 million figure, one that Fujiyama had proposed the day before when the two met.¹²⁵ Justifying this, MacArthur explained that it seemed to him to be,

not only a reasonable price to pay to ensure our indefinite occupation and use of these very important islands without further pressures for return of islanders, but particularly because by paying six million we will engage responsibility of leaders of Bonin islanders and GOJ to defend solution not only to former islanders but also to Japanese public at large. Since our purpose is not only to satisfy Bonin islanders but also, and principally, to remove an important long-festering issue between Japan and U.S., public posture of GOJ and Bonin Islanders League is vital element in any solution. It would seem to me well worth expenditure of additional one million to arrive at settlement that accomplishes political purpose of settling this issue once and for all.¹²⁶

In the meeting between MacArthur and Fujiyama, the foreign minister had emphasized that, while it wished to “remove this troublesome issue once and for all, [it] could not endorse settlement,” it is not acceptable to the league, and called for an increase of compensation as much as possible.¹²⁷

Dulles accepted MacArthur’s arguments, and decided to raise the request to Congress by $1 million to $6 million, doing so in a letter to Maurice H. Stans, director of the Bureau of the Budget.¹²⁸ Stans had written to Dulles the week before and explained that it would be “inappropriate” to request an appropriation in the amount of $5 million to compensate the displaced islanders when the United States had a large claim of $640 million—which represented only two-thirds of the original U.S. claim—against Japan.¹²⁹ Stans, who took over as director in March 1958 as a recession started to hit and felt he “had [been] handed a real hot potato” with the budget,¹³⁰ recommended to Dulles that “unless it is your personal judgment . . . that the political difficulties are insurmountable, it would be appear to me that an attempt should be made to resolve the problem of compensation of the Bonin Islanders by means of a deduction from the United States GARIOA claim.”¹³¹ Dulles responded that it would be “inadvisable” to attempt deducting the claim from the GARIOA funds.¹³² He did not deny that it was important to seek a resolution of the GARIOA claim, but thought it would take too much time to resolve. “I do not believe that a settlement of the claim of the Bonin Islanders should be deferred until this uncertain future date,” Dulles wrote, and “from the political point of view, a settlement of the Bonin Islands compensation question should be obtained as soon as possible.”¹³³ Eventually, the State Department was permitted to seek this appropriation.

In the meantime, Director Parsons wrote to Horsey, responding to the latter’s 25 November letter, about the exchange between Dulles and Stans, as well as that between the State and Defense Departments, particularly the Navy. The Navy had informed the State Department that a figure approximating $6 million could be justified on the basis of Ryukyuuan land values at the time of the effective date of the peace treaty (as adjusted in
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1956), plus 6 percent per annum since that date, and that there was a good precedent for using the 6 percent as this was accepted by the Price Committee for Okinawa. Parsons mentioned that the department was, however, having difficulty getting the Navy to accept a straight $6 million figure. Instead, the service preferred to pay $5.75 million and ask the Japanese government to make up the remaining $250,000. Parsons told MacArthur that “we do not think that such haggling is a good idea and are holding out for $6 million.” As neither the Defense Department nor the Bureau of the Budget had approved the $6 million figure, however, Parsons instructed that the embassy should not inform the Foreign Ministry that the State Department was seeking this amount.

In mid-January, MacArthur received word that the compensation question was still being considered in Washington, but funds that could be used to cover the $6 million were included as a State Department item in the overall government contingency fund. As the budget contained no specific reference to compensation or anything identifiable by the press as related to the Bonins, the department did not think it advisable to discuss it with the Japanese government at this time, even though it had inquired about the compensation on numerous occasions.

In early February, embassy officials met with their Foreign Ministry counterparts who pointed out that Fujiyama was certain to be questioned about the status of the compensation negotiations in the Diet and that it would be necessary for the foreign minister to explain whether the delay in reaching a settlement was due to a deadlock. They decided that if he was questioned, Fujiyama would take the following line: negotiations with the United States are proceeding and the Japanese government is hopeful of achieving a satisfactory compromise; nothing further can be said since negotiations are not yet concluded; and in any event, the U.S. government could not conclude an agreement until it is known that Congress is willing to appropriate the necessary funds. Following up on this, Ambassador Asakai asked Robertson in Washington if there was any progress, but Robertson simply responded that he would have to let him know later.

In late February, the department once again informed MacArthur that $6 million had been included in the overall government contingency fund in the 1960 fiscal year (FY) budget for possible Bonin compensation if it is decided to seek authorizing and appropriating legislation from Congress for that purpose. Reviving an old discussion, however, the communiqué pointed out that Acting Secretary Herter, Under Secretary Robert D. Murphy, and the Bureau of the Budget questioned the appropriation of new money for the Bonins compensation while Japan had a large outstanding GARIOA debt. As an alternative, it suggested that the settlement of the compensation claim could be achieved by asking the Japanese government to pay the Bonin Islanders and to subtract payment from the amount the Japanese government was expected to pay to settle GARIOA.

The embassy immediately reviewed the compensation issue and wrote back challenging the suggestion (even though, as we saw earlier, it had at one point proposed precisely this solution):

We strongly believe that GOJ should make acceptable GARIOA settlement but for us now to renege on unqualified Bonin compensation formula advanced to Ki-
shi and reiterated to Fujiyama and try to link compensation with GARIOA claims would, we believe, be considered by Japanese as grave breach of faith. . . . Linking [it] will only delay Bonin compensation and permit that problem to fester again. If this issue again becomes inflamed we are in for serious trouble.\textsuperscript{140}

Noting that we “now have an acceptable solution to which both [the Japanese government] and League of Bonin Islanders are committed,” the embassy urged that the department seek congressional appropriation in the 1960 FY budget as it would “eliminate this aspect of the territorial problem as a major irritant in U.S.-Japan relations.”\textsuperscript{141} This argument seems to have worked as nothing further was heard about it.

Shortly after this, Counselor of Embassy Clark wrote to Parsons to tell him of a conversation with Suganuma regarding the Japanese government’s concerns if “anything got into the press about the actual justification for the money sought,” i.e., the calculations and rationale.\textsuperscript{142} According to Suganuma, “If, for instance, it were to become known that the settlement was calculated only on the basis of land values in the Bonins, this would gravely weaken the position of the leaders of the Bonin Islanders who have succeeded in getting the land holders among them to accept the proposition that the settlement will be used to satisfy all of the Bonin Islanders, including the owners of fishing rights.”\textsuperscript{143} Clark pointed out that the Japanese government would also be in a “very difficult position” with the islanders if anything about the rationale of U.S. calculations became known “since, in effect, we have rejected their rationale and substituted our own.”\textsuperscript{144} Clark admitted, however, that all the Japanese government (and islanders) “have to do is accept the settlement—they don’t have to (and can’t) accept the calculations by which we arrived at an agreed figure.”\textsuperscript{145} Clark warned that the fact that “the lump sum idea has been discredited and abandoned” in the Ryukyus represented an additional danger of the calculations’ rationale becoming public knowledge.\textsuperscript{146} “The Japanese government,” he wrote, “would come in for criticism in the Diet that it had accepted for the Bonins a formula that had been found to be inequitable in the Ryukyus.”\textsuperscript{147} Clark closed by adding that “in a nutshell, while we hope that we will soon have good news from Washington permitting us to conclude a settlement of the Bonin claims in the amount of $6 million, we hope the news will be brief and that it will not be publicly explained how we arrived at the final figure.”\textsuperscript{148}

Parsons wrote back immediately to say that the concerns of the embassy were “understood and appreciated” in the department, and that it had been exploring ways to “soft-pedal the publicity as much as possible.”\textsuperscript{149} However, he explained, as the department would have to justify the request before Congress, there was the risk of publicity. To justify the compensation, it was likely that reference would be made to the similar obligation to pay in the Ryukyus, as well as the fact that the land valuations there served as a justification for that of land values in the Bonins plus the 6 percent interest being added to the value sum. Parsons promised that the department would “try, wherever possible, to refer to the compensation as being for the taking and use of private property in the Bonins, rather than for private land holdings. However, of course, we cannot guarantee that, some place along the line, public attention will not be drawn to the fact that we are only compensating for private land holdings.”\textsuperscript{150}
Responding to Parsons, Clark encouraged the department to try to limit any explanations to an “executive session” of Congress, and that if the calculations rationale became public knowledge, that the embassy be given as much advance notice as possible in order to discuss it with the Japanese side and draw up on an informal basis the necessary agreement. Clark told Parsons that the ability of the Japanese government to conclude any agreement is dependent on the acceptance of the Bonin Islanders. “This assurance exists at present,” Clark wrote, “but it can disappear if the landholders among the claimants get the impression that our Congress was legislating for their exclusive benefit.” Clark asked that if any speculative stories came out of Washington about the basis of U.S. calculations, the United States should try to allow the Japanese government to get its side of the story into the press.

Clark followed up on this letter with another in May to pass on the “strong hope” of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that, if Congress took favorable action on the appropriation bill, it could be informed as soon as possible in order to work out an agreement, “which could be announced in time to benefit the Japanese government in the forthcoming Upper House elections [on 2 June].”

A week later, the embassy reported that the Foreign Ministry had requested information on an Associated Press story datelined “Washington, June 1” that the U.S. government would ask Congress for the $6 million authorization for compensation. In reply to inquiries from the league and media, the ministry had been stating it had no official information, but that the report might be correct. The embassy requested guidance from the department on what it and the Foreign Office can say to further questions.

The AP story was essentially accurate, as acknowledged by the department spokesman on 3 June. A few days prior, on 29 May, Acting Secretary of State Herter had submitted the request to the Senate, and on 2 June, to the House. Subsequently, on 8 June, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. William Fulbright (D-AR), submitted “A Bill to Authorize a Payment to the Government of Japan,” to the Senate, and it was immediately referred to the Foreign Relations Committee for study.

In mid-July, the Foreign Ministry informed the embassy that the league was “increasingly anxious” about the fate of the legislation and asked for any information and about the likelihood that it would pass during the current session of Congress. The department responded that, although Senator Fulbright had introduced the bill on 8 June, hearings had not yet been scheduled. Nevertheless, it felt congressional action during the session was still considered possible. Subsequently, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the bill on 27 July, at which the new assistant secretary of state, Jeff Graham Parsons, testified. In reporting on the vote by telegram that day, the department told the embassy that the House committee had not yet scheduled its hearings.

The State Department had no further word on the issue when Asakai called on Assistant Secretary Parsons to inquire about it. Parsons explained that the authorization bill was expected to pass the Senate soon, and there was “no difficulty anticipated in the House if there is sufficient time.” However, the crowded legislative calendar presented a problem and the appropriation bill would likely move to January. Asakai was “disappointed but understanding.”
After receiving this report from Asakai, the Foreign Ministry immediately called on the embassy to say that it was “very deeply disturbed” that, if the appropriation bill was introduced in next session of Congress, the settlement might be delayed almost an entire year, and in the meantime, the islanders, “who up to now have been quiet and sensible, may become restive.”163 The Foreign Ministry representatives added, “Many of [the islanders] have taken out short-term bank loans in the hope of early compensation settlement and if delay becomes known those destitute people may become ready prey of leftist agitators.”164 Embassy officials correctly explained that the U.S. government could not hurry Congress, which alone determined the precedence of its business, and that the House could not take up the appropriation bill until the authorization bill had been passed. The ministry representatives understood the difficulty of attempting to push this legislation through Congress, but nevertheless expressed the “urgent hope” that some way might be found to explain the urgency of settlement “privately” to congressional leadership so that “if at all possible both bills might yet pass [the] present session,” and warned of a “growing anxiety that if settlement is not reached till next year, leftists and pro-Communist elements may work on islanders with view to persuading them to reject agreement which has been so painstakingly achieved.”165

By chance, the Senate passed the authorization legislation that same day, 24 August, and the department told the embassy it would “seek [to] expedite House action” on it.166 Unfortunately, the first half of the 86th session ended on 15 September (1959), and the second half would not start again until 6 January 1960.

**Passage of the Compensation Bills: The Second Chance**

Yokota Tatsuo of the league and two others called on MacArthur to express their gratitude for the embassy’s efforts to seek appropriations to compensate the islanders. MacArthur said it was unfortunate that time had run out, but that the embassy would renew its efforts in the future, including briefing congressional members who would be visiting Tokyo in the coming months. Yokota explained to MacArthur and First Secretary Herz that the islanders “are staking their entire fortune” on the early passage of the legislation and that many had gone into debt.167 After mentioning his concern about the potential of “Red” infiltration and exploitation of the movement, Yokota added melancholically that “many of the Bonin Islanders were getting on in years and felt, as he did personally, that they would not live to see the Bonin Islands again. Their hopes . . . were now focused entirely on the compensation settlement.”168

As promised, in order to push the legislation along, Ambassador MacArthur would regularly brief visiting U.S. legislators, such as Senator John C. Stennis (D-MS) and Representatives Phil Weaver (R-NE) and Daniel John Flood (D-PA) of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees.169 MacArthur also followed up his briefings with letters that, while not for publication, were meant to be shared with committee colleagues.

While there was no movement on the bill during the fall, Assistant Secretary Parsons was able to inform Prime Minister Kishi, who was visiting Washington in mid-January 1960 for the signing of the revised security treaty, that the chairman of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, Thomas Ellsworth Morgan (D-PA), had told him during the White House luncheon on 19 January that the committee would take up the matter the following day. Parsons told Kishi and the Japanese delegation that it was most “unusual” that the committee would act “at such an early stage in the Congressional session,” but that it “reflects the interest of the Committee in the Bonin’s compensation as a result of the State Department’s initiative” and wanted Kishi to know that the United States “had not forgotten the Bonin Islands compensation problem and was attempting to move ahead on this problem.” Kishi responded that he was most appreciative of the information because there was continued interest in this problem in Japan.

The legislation safely passed the Foreign Affairs Committee that week and went to the Appropriations Committee after that. This was followed “with close attention” in Japan, especially the testimony of Assistant Vice Chief of Naval Operations/Director of Naval Administration Rear Admiral Glynn R. Donaho. MacArthur’s letter to Representative Flood was also referred to in the session. Nevertheless, due to the consideration of more pressing legislation in the House, the Bonins bill did not move as quickly as the department and embassy hoped. Secretary of State Christian Herter told MacArthur the department would continue to seek the “earliest possible House action.”

In mid-May, the Bonins compensation bill (along with one for the Ryukyus) was cleared by the House Rules Committee. All that remained was for the House to act on it and the president to sign the bill. The Foreign Ministry immediately expressed its appreciation for this “constructive development,” the news of which had been “warmly endorsed” in the Japanese press. The ministry hoped that the authorization and appropriation bills would be passed by Congress before adjournment, and it pointed out that “as the Embassy was well aware, the Bonin Islanders have for the past two years been bitterly disappointed at the lack of action regarding compensation despite [the] position of [the] U.S. government favoring such legislation.”

The authorization bill was successfully voted on in the House on 23 May, and one week later on 1 June, President Eisenhower signed the compensation bill into law (Public Law 86-486). MacArthur was immediately visited again by league Chairman Yokota who expressed his “deep appreciation” to the ambassador for the enactment of the compensation. MacArthur explained that while the first stage, the passage of an authorization bill, was completed, the second stage, that of an appropriation bill, remained. As such, he “could not promise of course that the latter and very important stage would be completed this year, but that it was his hope that Congress would pass an appropriation bill adjournment.” The ambassador reminisced about having first met the representatives of the league at his residence in May 1957, a few months after he arrived in Japan, mentioning that “he had said to them then that he would report their problems to his government, and he had sought an equitable solution ever since. Authorization now had been provided for the compensation that they well deserved, pending the establishment of conditions of real peace in the Far East that would permit their eventual return to the islands.”

In this process and in years afterward, the efforts of Japanese-American lobbyist Mike Masaoka were crucial. Masaoka wrote that the league had “raised some money and hired a Washington law firm to plead their case,” but “the attorneys had used up the money with
little to show for it when Fukuda came to me.” Masaoka said he “became interested in the matter . . . because of the vague resemblance to the plight of Japanese Americans who had to bow to military necessity.” Masaoka stuck with the group until the islands were finally reverted: “The Bonin Islanders were delighted and grateful, but they also were almost destitute. My reward for helping them to regain their homes was a handsome silver model of a boat, a beautifully carved piece of rare coral, and a very nice letter.”

After the bill was signed, it was sent on 13 June 1960, to both houses of Congress for consideration in the respective appropriations committees, which would discuss the bill along with the regular department appropriations bill. However, the department’s supplementary budget bill, of which the Bonins appropriations was part, failed to reach the conference stage before Congress’s summer adjournment and was deferred until the August session. The department reported to the embassy that, fortunately, the Bonin item was not a subject of controversy between the House and Senate. Eventually, both houses of Congress approved the Bonin Compensation Bill on 24 August and the bill was signed by the president into law (Public Law 86–678) on 31 August.

**Negotiating the Exchange of Notes on Bonin Islands Compensation**

The passage of the bill was carried prominently in the Japanese press. Representatives of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bonin Islanders called the U.S. embassy to express their appreciation. It was unclear, however, when the funds would be transferred. Indeed, the two governments had to complete drafting the exchange of notes before the funds could be exchanged. It would take some 10 months before the $6 million was transferred to Japan (in June 1961).

An *Asahi Shimbun* (*Morning Sun*) story of 10 October 1960, hinted at some of the problems expected with negotiating the exchange of notes, specifically on the Japanese side. First was the fear among the islanders that they would be forfeiting repatriation possibilities by accepting compensation, and thus the ministry was expected to conduct negotiations in a way that guaranteed property rights while assuring the chance for repatriation. Second was the disagreement among the islanders as to whether the money should be divided among all the islanders or just the landowners, which had prevented the ministry from starting negotiations with the United States.

Counselor of the Asian Affairs Bureau Uyama Atsushi informed the embassy that the article had not been inspired by the ministry, but that it did reflect access to inside information, which he added was not entirely accurate. The embassy, however, viewed the article as painting a “quite accurate picture of the problems faced by [the Japanese government] in working out best means of effecting the transfer of funds.” In any case, Uyama said the Foreign Ministry expected to have a draft note ready for presentation to the embassy in a few days.

Regardless of whether all the details in the *Asahi* story were correct or not, it did correctly point out that the distribution of compensation payments had become a point of disagreement within the league, symbolized by the fact that several special interest groups
emerged starting in August 1960, just after Eisenhower had signed the bill into law. In addition to the league, now chaired by Yokota Tatsuo, the first breakaway group formed was the **Ogasawara Tochi Shoyusha Inkai** (Committee of Ogasawara Landowners), headed by Morizumi Hirasuke. The second was the **Ogasawara Tochi Nogyo Doshikai** (Association of Agricultural Landowners), chaired by Koiwai Koichi. The last was the **Ogasawara Tomin Taikai Kyogikai** (Council for Ogasawara Islanders), led by Tsuboi Ben, which was formed immediately before the compensation was about to be turned over to the other three organizations. Quite often, historically speaking, movements would break up over ideological reasons or leadership problems, but this time the splintering appears to be related to financial reasons—who should get compensation priority and how much. This division cost the movement much lost time in pressing the other outstanding issues of ancestral grave visits and repatriation, not to mention reversion.

In the meantime, the embassy gave the Foreign Ministry a copy of the U.S. draft exchange of notes on 13 October 1960, and the ministry took it up with the prime minister’s office, Ministry of Finance, and Cabinet Legislative Bureau. Over the next six months, the Japanese government prepared its own draft, and eventually submitted it to the U.S. embassy in March 1961. During that time, the Foreign Ministry coordinated with the various Bonin organizations that had sprung up as well as with the embassy. Although there was no time limit on transferring funds to the Japanese side, the State Department asked the embassy in late October the status of the talks and if it should schedule payment for the current fiscal quarter ending on 31 December. Responding in early December, embassy First Secretary James S. Sutterlin told Richard L. Sneider, who had succeeded Martin as officer in charge, Japanese Affairs, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, that the embassy, despite numerous inquiries, had received no word from the Foreign Ministry on this matter since submitting the department’s draft on 13 October. Sutterlin explained that the primary cause for the delay was related to the problem the Japanese government was experiencing in devising a satisfactory method of distributing the funds, something widely reported in the press and confirmed by a representative of the ministry. Namely, the disagreement was between the landowners, who believed that the payments should go to them, and the others, who felt they should also receive payment because of the losses of fishing and farming rights and other means of livelihood due to their inability to return to the islands. Sutterlin told the department that the same Foreign Ministry official had told him the prime minister’s office planned to form a committee in the next few days comprising representatives of the factions to negotiate an equitable means of settlement. An advisory committee of experts in claims settlement would also be formed to assist in resolving the dispute. Once it was resolved, the Japanese government would be in a position to start negotiations. Sutterlin also informed the State Department that the embassy had learned the Foreign Ministry would likely propose extensive revisions in the draft exchange of letters prepared by the department.

A month later, on 5 January, Counselor Uyama informed the U.S. embassy that the Japanese side was still not ready to negotiate, but that it had some questions regarding wording of the U.S. draft, including if “interests” included both tangible and intangible, and whether “all claims of Japanese nationals, etc.” should be construed as restricting compensation to landowners or any bona fide claimant as determined by the Japanese government.
The embassy responded that the U.S. government was “bound by the legislative language and record,” but would ask the department about legal interpretations. In asking about the interpretation, the embassy strongly recommended to the department that the embassy be authorized to tell the Japanese government that “interests” included both tangible and intangible elements as determined by the Japanese government, and that “all claims of Japanese nationals etc.” is not restricted to compensation to landowners and includes any bona fide claimants as determined by the Japanese government. MacArthur wrote that, by taking this position, the United States would “place responsibility on [the Japanese government], where it properly belongs, to satisfy all bona fide claimants in terms of Japanese custom and law.” Importantly, the Foreign Ministry supported this view “believing such an interpretation by us will enable it to work out acceptable agreement with all claimants whereas [a] more narrow interpretation limiting claimants to landowners, etc., would leave unsatisfied [the] group of Bonin Islanders who under Japanese custom and law would have claims which would be considered valid by Japanese opinion.”

The department immediately responded, authorizing the embassy to inform the Foreign Ministry of the recommendations it had made, and the embassy did so on 7 January. While this information helped, the Foreign Ministry and the prime minister’s office were still having difficulty getting the claimants to agree to the method of distribution, despite meeting with them on a regular basis. The large landowners, those who were financially able to hire legal counsel and hold out for a more satisfactory settlement, comprised the group that “caused the most difficulty,” Uyama told embassy Counselor Coburn Kidd in February. While there were still some holdouts, Kidd sensed that the ministry had just about gotten the matter under control.

Around this time, Deputy Chief of Mission William C. Leonhart met with Deputy Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Shima Shigenobu on 6 February and informed him that the compensation appropriation would lapse on 30 June that year, and after that date, a new appropriation would have to be sought. Shima was informed that the prospects for a second appropriation would be slim because Washington would inevitably interpret the failure to reach a settlement for distribution as a lack of interest in Japan. Leonhart urged the Japanese government to expedite its consideration of the problem. Shima contacted him the following day to say that the Foreign Ministry understood the deadline of the appropriation bill and the need to hurry. Shima said he was “quite certain” that a settlement would be worked out well before then, and that the American side would probably be given a proposal by March. Shima’s estimate was correct. On 1 March, Uyama asked Sutterlin of the embassy to come to the Foreign Ministry, where he gave him an advance copy of the Japanese counter draft and a pro memoria explaining the differences in the text. The draft had been approved the day before by Vice Minister Takeuchi Ryuji but, before getting the minister’s approval it was necessary to sound out MacArthur.

At a meeting on 3 March held at the Foreign Ministry, ministry and embassy officials discussed the draft and decided to get it closer in line to the U.S. draft from mid-October before sending it on to Washington in an attempt “to bring the whole matter to a successful close as quickly as possible.” Kidd raised several points, primarily in terminology, regarding the draft that he felt was problematic, particularly as they went against the understand-
ing of the congressional report. A long discussion was held on the “hold harmless” clause, and Kidd pointed out that there would be little chance of agreement in Washington if it was not satisfactorily handled. The two sides agreed to meet again soon to reconcile the drafts, with Kidd mentioning that Ambassador MacArthur had a “deep personal interest in this question since he has worked on it for years now and had hoped to see it finished prior to his departure [later in March].” Uyama, somewhat realistically, responded that despite everyone’s efforts, it might not be possible to reach a final agreement on the matter by that time. MacArthur, upon learning of the ministry draft, was concerned enough to call Vice Minister Takeuchi directly and tell him that it would “present serious problems since it departed from the principle of complete compensation, on which we had had thought we were in agreement, and from the wording of the congressional report and the act itself.”

Uyama’s earlier caution was based on his realization that the Foreign Ministry “expect[ed to] have a difficult time [clearing it with other ministries concerned], particularly since we have told them some of revisions they had been considering (on basis of strong views of other ministries) were completely out of question.” On 8 March, he had submitted the ministry’s new draft exchange of notes requesting comments “urgently . . . to assist them in clearing it with other ministries.” The Foreign Ministry felt that if it could indicate to others in the government that the draft had Ambassador MacArthur’s approval and is “generally acceptable to Washington,” it could get the other ministries to accept the exchange. Uyama told the embassy they had attempted to meet its concerns and retain the U.S. wording to the greatest extent, but hoped the United States would understand the political problems that had motivated the changes they made in the text. “They have a host of claimants to deal with,” the embassy pointed out, “representing all variety of claims, and wish at all costs to avoid the necessity of submitting exchange to [the] Diet, where disappointed claimants might instigate Socialist members to undertake wearisome debate on legal points and U.S. policies in retention of islands.” After going through the major points of the Japanese draft, the embassy recommended that Washington generally accept it, noting that even on the “hold harmless” clause, the Japanese draft’s inclusion of the phrase “full settlement” effectively relieves the United States of “any possible future liability,” and that the “hold harmless” phrase only “bolt[s the] door twice.”

Earlier that day, MacArthur made his final call on Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. It is unclear if the Bonins issue came up, but considering the ambassador’s personal interest in the issue, that he had been briefed in great detail on the status of the talks the week before, and that in his record of accomplishments in Japan he referred to the obtainment of congressional authorization for compensating the dispossessed Bonin Islanders as one of his biggest achievements, it can be assumed that the issue did in fact arise. It also may have prompted the submission sometime that day of the revised Japanese draft.

Kidd and Sutterlin met again with Uyama and the others from the Foreign Ministry on 10 March to discuss the wording and other points. These “small changes and minor editorial revisions” were forwarded to the department that same day. Over the next two weeks, the department worked on a revised draft, which it completed on 25 March. On the 27th, Kidd and Sutterlin met for the fifth time with their Foreign Ministry counterparts to discuss the latest U.S. version. They met again the following week, on 4 April, and once
more on 10 April to finalize the draft. By this point, the two sides had essentially agreed to the text.

Unfortunately, the Japanese government was still having difficulties with the islanders who continued to fight among themselves over the payments. In early May, Uyama, meeting with Kidd on another matter, told the latter that the prime minister’s office had informed him that the islanders remained “badly divided” on how the money should be distributed and that the government thought the exchange of notes should be delayed “in order to maintain pressure on the opposing groups to reach agreement among themselves.” Kidd mentioned that the new ambassador, Edwin O. Reischauer, would be going to Washington in early June to prepare for the prime minister’s visit to the United States (from 20 to 23 June) and it was probably best to have the signing done before then. Moreover, Kidd reminded Uyama the compensation authorization would expire on 30 June, and it would be necessary to conduct the transaction before then or reapply.

Eventually, the sides exchanged notes on 8 June 1961, without the islanders having come to an agreement among themselves. With the exchange of notes, the compensation issue was essentially resolved at the bilateral level. The U.S. government would remain interested in the issue to see if the funds were properly distributed, but the work was essentially done. As a result, the Bonins issue did not receive much attention in the talks between Prime Minister Ikeda and President John F. Kennedy later that month. Instead, discussions focused primarily on the Ryukyus, as the joint communiqué released after their talks, suggests:

The President and the Prime Minister exchanged views on matters relating to the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, which are under United States administration but in which Japan retains residual sovereignty. The President affirmed that the United States would make further efforts to enhance the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and welcomed Japanese cooperation in these efforts; the Prime Minister affirmed that Japan would continue to cooperate with the United States to this end.

One of the reasons why there was little else addressed with regard to the Bonins had to do with the fact that the National Security Council, in deliberations the year before, had essentially reaffirmed that there would be no substantial changes in U.S. policy on the question of the islands under Article 3 of the Peace Treaty. The NSC’s 446th meeting on 31 May 1960, for example, discussed updates to its policy toward Japan. And President Eisenhower approved the NSC Report known as 6008/1, “United States Policy toward Japan,” on 11 June, which stated “Taking into account the Communist threat in the Far East and the new security arrangements with Japan signed on January 19, 1960, [the United States should] maintain the degree of control over the islands enumerated in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty deemed by the President to be essential to our vital security interests.” Moreover, as mentioned above, the payment of compensation further meant the closure of the Bonin problem for the time being.

But this did not mean, however, that there were not issues remaining such as ancestral grave visits.
Distributing the Funds and the Creation of the Ogasawara Association

Immediately after the notes were signed and the funds transferred, the vice ministers of the respective ministries gathered at a June 15 meeting called by director general of the prime minister’s office, Fujieda Sensuke, to develop a plan for the distribution of the funds, as the islanders had yet to devise a unified plan on their own. Over the next year and a half, the committee would meet more than a dozen times before the plan (Ogasawara Guntoto no Kyutominto no Tame no Juryokin no Haibun ni Tsuite) was finalized and approved by the cabinet on 9 November 1962. During this time, the $6 million remained in commercial banks in the name of the four organizations representing islanders, but under the continuing control of the Special Areas Liaison Bureau of the prime minister’s office.

Even that process had not been easy. By May 1962, the committee had developed a draft plan in coordination with three Diet members who acted as representatives of three of the groups: Fukuda represented the league, Narahashi Wataru, also of the LDP, represented the landholders, and Kato Kanju, a Socialist Party member and husband of the famous women's rights activist and Diet member Kato Shizue, represented the Council for Ogasawara Islanders. (It is unclear if the other group, the agricultural land owners association, had a sponsor.) But that spring, problems emerged. Mochimaru Matsuo, a member of the standing committee of the landowners group, was arrested in April for allegations of embezzlement of some 3.6 million yen (about $10,000) from funds on deposit in Tokyo. The embassy worried if the embezzled funds had come from the money transferred by the United States, but that was not the case. In any case, the embassy expressed its concern that “because the organization in which the accused served was one of the three to which U.S.-supplied funds had been turned over . . . unless the U.S. funds were promptly distributed they might be subject to misuse to the serious detriment of the objective for which they were intended.” Nevertheless, the embassy learned of a new problem—the arrest in early June of the vice chairman of the Council for Ogasawara Islanders, Ueno Haruo, for alleged blackmail.

The council had been formed immediately prior to the transfer of the $6 million to Japan, and Ueno told Mochimaru that he would reveal irregularities in the accounts of the league unless “adequately compensated” as well as oppose the transfer of the funds to commercial banks unless given some of the funds.

Because of this “new development,” the embassy approached the American Bureau Director Ando Yoshimitsu on this issue and also spoke with Furuya Toru, a senior official in the bureau of the prime minister’s office that deals with the Bonins question, to reemphasize its “serious concern over the long delay in distributing the funds and the possibility that they might be subject to misuse and scandal before they reach their intended recipients.” Ambassador Reischauer’s staff also told the Japanese representatives that the United States had “expected the funds would bring prompt assistance to former Bonin residents in establishing themselves in Japan and pointed out that there could be an adverse reaction in Congress if Congressmen became aware that the money, which had been urgently requested by the Department, had not yet reached the claimants. The result could be a reluctance to accept recommendations for comparable payments elsewhere.” Furuya told the embassy that the prime minister’s office had developed a new formula and outlined it to the representa-
tives of the islanders and to members of the LDP and opposition Socialist Party. While the islanders had not indicated their reaction, the Socialists said the Japanese government should also contribute to the compensation of the islanders. Furuya felt the chances were good for an early settlement, which he recognized was urgently needed. Agreement was eventually reached and the cabinet gave its approval in November. Payments began to be made at the end of the Japanese fiscal year (March 1963) and continued into the middle of the 1963 fiscal year.

Because of the fractious infighting and bad blood that had developed, the league’s general meeting in March 1964 passed a resolution to dissolve itself and create a new organization called the Ogasawara Kyokai (Ogasawara Association), which would include outside experts. The Nanpo Doho Engokai, or the Assistance Association for Okinawa and Ogasawara and Northern Islands, was instrumental in helping to create the new association; its experience in dealing with the Okinawa problem would be particularly helpful to the association. On 24 December 1964, leaders of the islanders met to officially name the new organization and begin the application process for incorporation with the government. Six weeks later, on 3 February 1965, the application was submitted to the prime minister's office, and after three months, the Ogasawara Association's incorporation was officially approved on 8 May. It had a start-up fiscal base of seven million yen, using some of the compensation funds received for its activities. Fukuda became chairman. Later in the year, the Ogasawara Association set up local chapters in Tokyo, Shizuoka, Hachijo Jima, and Izu Oshima, where many of the resettled islanders were living. The association began regularly cosponsoring meetings with the Nanpo Doho Engokai.

A renewed interest had been developing regarding the Bonins problem during this time. The new prime minister, Sato Eisaku, would raise the issue of ancestral grave site visits in his first meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington in early January 1965. Moreover, the Diet was increasingly taking an interest in the problem. For example, on 6 April 1965, the lower house passed a resolution on the return of administrative rights over Okinawa and the Bonins, stating that “it is regretful that administrative rights of the two island groups have not been returned to Japan yet” and calling for “the government to take appropriate measures for the return of administrative rights over Okinawa and the Bonins.” It was the seventh resolution to date on Bonin Islands–related territorial issues. After the vote, Sato, who attended the session, made a statement stressing that the “government intends to make positive efforts also in the future, along the purport of this resolution, for early realization of reversion of the administration.”

**Ancestral Grave Visits**

Although the question of compensation was resolved, the larger question of the islands’ reversion remained. Only time and changed international and bilateral circumstances would allow a fundamental reexamination of this question. In the meantime, a smaller, but psychologically and symbolically important issue—that of ancestral grave visits—increasingly needed to be addressed. It would be somewhat difficult organizationally to address the issue with the league divided on the question of compensation, but the question of grave visits allowed the league and its successor, the Ogasawara Association, to rally around a common issue.
The desire to visit ancestral graves on the islands had been a long-standing one, but rather than raising only this desire, the islanders had focused their efforts on returning to the islands.\(^{244}\) As noted above, the league requested that Foreign Minister Fujiyama raise the issue of ancestral grave visits during his September 1957 visit to the United States, which he did.\(^{245}\) Dulles, however, was not forthcoming on the matter. Over the next couple of years, the compensation issue took priority and the grave visits issue was moved to the back burner. Nevertheless, with the 17th anniversary since their evacuation coming up the following year, the league began to press the Japanese government to negotiate with the United States to allow the temporary return of the islanders.

On 24 July 1959, the league presented the Japanese government with a petition to allow ancestral grave visitation and bury the cremated remains of those who had died in the meantime.\(^{246}\) The petition included a specific plan of the numbers of those who were to participate, how they would accomplish it, and what they needed. Unfortunately, they were unsuccessful at this point.

The league presented the same petition and plan the following year on 26 July 1960 but again, it was not successful. According to Foreign Ministry sources, the reason it was not discussed at the bilateral level had to do with “timing”—the ministry probably thought it was inappropriate to raise it while the compensation issue was still being worked out.\(^{247}\) The league accepted this view and did not appeal directly to the U.S. government, but once the compensation issue was resolved in 1961, it raised the issue with the U.S. embassy on 30 August 1961 by submitting a petition and copy of the plan to Ambassador Reischauer.\(^{248}\) After expressing gratitude to the U.S. government for the $6 million compensation payment, the petition requested permission to send 50 people to Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, Kita Iwo Jima, and Iwo Jima to observe memorial services for the ancestors of the islanders. It emphasized that their plan “does not involve any political intentions.”\(^{249}\) Yokota, chairman of the league, told Reischauer that he and his colleagues had already raised it with the Foreign Ministry and expected them to formally request the plan with the embassy. Yokota mentioned that the islanders had asked the Japanese government to pay the $5,861,000 expected cost for the 32-day trip. Yokota said that, while he was aware the issue would have to be dealt with between the ministry and the embassy, he was giving the ambassador a copy of the petition so that the U.S. government could be aware of the islanders’ desires and be prepared for an approach by the ministry. Counselor Kidd told the department that he accepted the petition, but did not give Yokota any encouragement. He surmised that the Foreign Ministry had not yet approached the embassy because it was probably “deterred by the islanders’ request that all expenses of the projected trip be borne by the Japanese government.”\(^{250}\)

Kidd also mentioned that, when Yokota raised the issue with the Foreign Ministry, he referred to the permission given in August 1961 by the Soviet Union for a group of Japanese nationals to visit the graves of relatives who died while prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and were buried in eastern Siberia. The visit took place that month, when 30 relatives, 10 members of the press, and 3 Japanese government officials visited cemeteries in Chita and Khabarovsk.\(^{251}\) In late January 1962, the Soviet government notified the Japanese embassy in Moscow that bereaved family members would be allowed to visit again
that coming summer. While the situations were far from similar, as Assistant Secretary of State W. Averell Harriman would point out later in conversations with Ambassador Asakai, the implications were clear—the Soviets were allowing grave visits, so why not the United States?

A couple weeks after the embassy informed the department of the league’s petition, Asian Bureau Counselor Uyama made an official request on 2 October that a delegation of 50 islanders be allowed to visit the graves, along the lines of the petition. He said that, while the government had not yet allocated the funds, he was sure financing could be arranged if the United States authorized the visit.\footnote{252} Uyama explained the timing of the request, pointing out that “this is the 17th year since the departure of the islanders from the Bonins and that under Buddhist ritual, the 3rd, 7th, 13th, 17th, 33rd, 55th, and 100th years are of particular significance and usually marked by special observances.”\footnote{253} He went on to note “The islanders are deeply concerned by their inability to care for ancestral graves and are most anxious that [the] representative delegation have [the] opportunity during this 17th year to perform appropriate rites at [the] sites of [their family] graves. Some have kept remains of relatives who have died in Japan in hope that they may be buried with ancestors in Bonin Island cemeteries.”\footnote{254} Despite this request, at the end of the meeting, Uyama said that the Foreign Ministry did “not wish to exert pressure” on the United States, but that the issue would probably come up in Diet interpellations and thus desired the American government give the matter “sympathetic consideration” and reply in the “near future.”\footnote{255}

Reischauer forwarded the request to the State Department noting that while permission would “tend to heighten the interest and hopes of the islanders in an eventual return to the Bonins and could lead to an increase in pressure for repatriation, at least of a small group,” while any “refusal to permit the islanders to tend their ancestral graves would contrast unfavorably” with the recent trip by 30 Japanese to visit the graves in Siberia and “could give rise to criticism of the United States.”\footnote{256} In light of this, the embassy passed along the following judgment: “on balance, permission to visit the graves would be [a] desirable thing from the point of view of U.S. relations with Japan,” but noted that it realized “there are other considerations which must be kept in mind.”\footnote{257}

Reischauer’s request was taken up by officials in Washington and Hawaii, and in early November, the State Department was informed by the Defense Department’s Office of International Security Affairs that CINCPAC Admiral Harry D. Felt did not agree to the visit, and that Secretary of Navy John B. Connally Jr. was certain to support Felt’s position.\footnote{258} The opposition by Felt, who was said to be extremely difficult to work for as well as “definitely hostile to Japan because of lingering feelings”\footnote{259} about World War II, was based on the following arguments:

On the basis of past experience and military consideration, I cannot support the proposed visit. A similar visit to honor the dead in the Pacific Islands and return token remains to Japan was authorized in 1953 with the understanding that this was to be the only such visit. This trip was successful from both the Japanese and U.S. standpoint and is considered comparable to [the] more recent visit to the USSR. On the other hand, two other Japanese visits to Iwo Jima, in 1952 and 1954, resulted in publicity detrimental to the U.S. based on emotional articles and faked
pictures. Physical conditions on the islands, the lack of accommodations, the isolation and undoubtedly deteriorated condition of the cemeteries, all militate against developments favorable to the U.S. from such a visit. The limited area actively used by the U.S. would give incentive for more agitation for return of former residents, a development definitely not desirable from a military point of view.

As a result of these views, the State Department told Reischauer, who had received a briefing at the Pentagon on the uses of the Bonin Islands prior to departing Washington in March 1961, that unless the embassy believed political considerations to be so important that the issue should be pursued further, he should inform the Foreign Ministry that “military considerations and the U.S. understanding that the 1953 visit was to be the only such a visit.” It also suggested that the embassy could “contain . . . any unfavorable publicity” about the U.S. refusal to permit entry by pointing out the visit to Pacific Islands.

The embassy did as instructed and subsequently informed the Foreign Ministry that the United States would be unable to authorize the visit for the above reasons. The ministry officials did not seem willing to take “no” for an answer, as they responded with questions and comments, as well as further requests. They asked that the United States be more forthcoming in clarifying the nature of the 1953 understanding and of the military considerations. The Foreign Ministry also pointed out that the visit would be related to ancestral grave visits, and thus quite different from the 1953 visit, which related to war dead. In relaying the results of the meeting, Reischauer noted that CINCPAC’s statement on the visits had noted the cemeteries were in a “deteriorated condition,” and he believed it would be “helpful in replying to future requests from islanders and in countering eventual public pressure” if the United States could give assurances to the Foreign Ministry and to islanders that the graves were being maintained by U.S. authorities. “The Embassy is not able judge extent of task involved,” Reischauer continued, “but it feels [the] emotional appeal in Japan of question[s] pertaining to ancestral graves should not be underestimated” and believes “we should do as much as possible to prevent this matter of cemetery neglect from becoming a public issue.”

Reischauer felt it would be useful to provide a high level, confidential briefing to Foreign Ministry officials on the strategic utilization of the Bonin Islands, including the military considerations that preclude visiting the islands for grave visits. He also reminded the State Department that the Japanese government had made a similar request prior to Ikeda’s Washington visit. Reischauer also requested information on the 1953 understanding about no more further visits, as the embassy files from that time had been returned to Washington, and the Foreign Ministry representative had said he was unaware of such an understanding.

A few weeks later, the State Department responded to Reischauer’s airgram with one of its own. Regarding the condition of the graves, the Navy and Defense Department “assured” the State Department that the civilian cemetery on Chichi Jima and military cemetery on Iwo Jima “are being maintained in good condition.” However, it noted, “individual graves in many parts of widely scattered islands have unavoidably fallen into disrepair as a result of World War II bombing and shelling, unrestrained jungle growth in some areas, and lack of interested inhabitants to perform maintenance tasks. U.S. administering authorities regret that it simply is not practicable to restore and maintain in good
condition these widely dispersed and in some cases unlocatable individual graves.” Regarding the military considerations, the State Department told Reischauer that “security considerations preclude disclosure of these uses to GOJ even on highly confidential basis,” and thus said it would be unable to authorize the embassy sharing any detailed information to the Japanese government. Finally, on the question of the understanding regarding the 1953 visit, the department quoted a 7 July 1952 (see previous chapter) airgram that the U.S. government was “prepared to permit the Japanese mission to conduct appropriate religious services on the site of the graves and to erect suitable markers with the understanding that there would be no further requests by the Japanese for permission to visit the graves in the Nanpo Shoto,” and said it assumes the U.S. understanding was conveyed to the Foreign Ministry in 1952, as well as referenced in 1957, when the ministry made a similar request. In addition to relaying the U.S. government’s regrets, the department suggested that the embassy, at its discretion, might point out that the Bonins “can be expected to remain [a] closed military area for some time to come, and the U.S. had thought this had been made clear during discussions and negotiations which culminated in [the] $6 million settlement in June . . . [the] U.S. government would hope [the] Foreign [Ministry] will be prepared to remind representatives of former residents of this understanding.”

It is unclear whether the embassy relayed the message and how the Foreign Ministry took it, but the exchange caused some concern within the Defense Department. Rear Admiral L. C. Heinz, the regional director, Far East, within the Office of International Security Affairs, noted that “our position is weak in the Bonins but could be strengthened if the three principal islands in the Bonin-Volcano group . . . were all occupied by U.S. forces or an agency of the U.S. government.” Eventually, CINCPAC chimed in to write that the “attempt to ‘justify’ U.S. policy in regard to administration of territory under U.S. authority as a matter of right is bound to fail,” and that “an attempt at ‘rejustification’ would be tacit acceptance of Japanese right to interfere in U.S. military matters.” Instead, it argued that the “best position” for the United States to take at this point was “a positive one, reaffirming that the islands were essential to the U.S. and free world.” Unless that were done, “limited access, even for visits, would only emphasize the fact that the islands are not being fully utilized and increase the demands for resettlement or ‘justification of refusal.’”

Nevertheless, the islanders still desired to visit the ancestral graves according to Ambassador Asakai. In a call on Assistant Secretary Harriman on 23 February 1962, Asakai raised this request. He pointed out their demands continued, despite previous opposition by U.S. authorities, and noted that the recent Soviet permission for Japanese to visit graves in Siberia in 1961 had “further stimulated their desires.” The assistant secretary pointed out that a Japanese mission had visited the Bonins (actually, Iwo Jima) in 1953 to conduct religious ceremonies at grave sites and erect markers with the explicit understanding that only one such visit would take place. Harriman, at one point one of America’s leading experts on the Soviet Union, strongly dismissed the reference to the Soviet’s permission “as not at all comparable” as Japanese were allowed to visit the United States under normal visa procedures after the Peace Treaty. Moreover, he noted that the federal government had allowed the visit more than eight years previously while the Japanese had not yet been permitted to visit graves on any of the Northern Territories occupied by the Soviets. (These visits began in September 1964 when 51 people visited the islands of Suisho Jima in the Habomai group and Shikotan Island.)
While this exchange was the last for a couple of years on this issue, the reality was that the United States government was very much concerned about the parallels drawn to the Soviet Union. The league, however, never received a concrete response from the embassy and, in the meantime, infighting among the islanders’ representatives over the distribution of the funds made it impossible to focus the efforts of the movement on the grave visits. This internal conflict and lack of positive responses from the U.S. and Japanese governments did not prevent the league from continuing its petitions to the Japanese government. On 30 July 1962 and 15 July 1963, it called on Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi and others in the government to help realize the grave visits. Nevertheless, it was not until the league dissolved itself and was on the way to creating the Ogasawara Association that it could realistically focus its efforts on realizing the grave visits.

The first of these new efforts was seen when its advisor, Fukuda, visited the United States. On 30 June 1964, Fukuda, who had become director general of the Japan Defense Agency in July 1963 and reappointed in December, met with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to discuss relations with Southeast Asia and China, the defense budget, and other matters, including the Ogasawara Islands, which Fukuda said he had been asked to raise by the prime minister. He mentioned the permission of the Soviets to visit gravesites in the Kuriles, and similar actions by the People’s Republic of China, and asked if the United States would consider grave visits to the Bonins. While McNamara did not specifically agree to it, he did say that it could be considered through the U.S. embassy in Tokyo.

A second effort was made by Fukuda later that year, when he stopped in Hawaii in early December to meet with Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, commander, Pacific Fleet, while on his way back from Mexico where he attended the presidential inauguration of Gustavo Diaz Ordaz on behalf of the Japanese government. Moorer, who had previously served as the commander of the Seventh Fleet based in Japan and would go on to become the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked several questions. He inquired about the timing of the visit, the places to be visited, the number of people in the party, and the method of travel. Overall, however, the impression Fukuda got was that Moorer was favorably inclined. Upon returning to Tokyo, he immediately met with officials from the Foreign Ministry and prime minister’s office.

Shortly thereafter, on 5 December, Foreign Minister Shiina Etsusaburo, who was visiting New York for the UN General Assembly, met with Secretary of State David Dean Rusk. During the late afternoon meeting, Shiina requested the United States allow former residents of the Bonins be allowed to visit gravesites, noting that the Soviets were granting visits to Habomai and Shikotan. Rusk, who expected the issue might be raised in light of an earlier meeting on 25 November with Ambassador Takeuchi, promised to explore the matter with Secretary McNamara. Later that month, Rusk wrote to McNamara and recommended that the question be reviewed as Prime Minister Sato would probably raise it with the president in their upcoming meeting. Rusk also stated that he believed “a reasonable number of visits might be possible” as long as U.S. security interests were protected. The impetus for Rusk’s letter, drafted on 18 December, may have been the cable that Ambassador Reischauer sent to the State Department that same day. In it, Reischauer explained that the issue had been regularly raised over the years and reemphasized that Sato was likely to
raise it during his visit. Explaining the cultural and diplomatic aspects involved, he argued that the grave visits should be agreed to by the United States as a “gesture of understanding and friendship,” and observed that it was on “weak ground [if the United States] continued to refuse permission for grave visits to [the] Bonin Islands unless there are specific sensitive security considerations which are not known to us.”

The ambassador recommended that the matter receive urgent study in order to give an affirmative response to Sato. Based on this cable, and information his staff received from the Defense Department that the Navy might be willing to consider such visits, Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy suggested to Rusk in a memo that the secretary or president give Prime Minister Sato a favorable response during the latter’s visit to Washington.

Rusk’s letter to McNamara went out that weekend, and a week later on 28 December, the Navy provided State Department officials with a briefing on the Bonin Islands, which Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green found to be “extremely valuable.”

Green also expressed interest in the suggestion by Admiral Woldemar F. A. Wendt, who was serving as the director of the Strategic Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, that representatives from the State Department visit the islands to gain a clearer understanding of the local factors relating to temporary visits to the islands by outsiders. Prior to his Washington assignment, Wendt had served as deputy military governor of the Bonin-Volcano Islands based out of Guam and was thus quite familiar with them. His suggestion was eventually implemented with the visit of J. Owen Zurhellen Jr. in early February 1965, making him only the third State Department officer to have officially visited the islands, after Ambassador Robert Murphy in 1952 and Richard Lamb in 1956.

In Japan, officials of the Foreign Ministry, prime minister’s office, and Tokyo Metropolitan Government met with representatives of the Nanpo Doho Engokai (acting on behalf of the as of yet official Ogasawara Association) on 23 December to discuss the grave visits issue. They agreed that the Foreign Ministry would take the lead in raising the issue with the U.S. government. Subsequently, on 28 December, the Foreign Ministry made the formal request for permission to undertake grave visits. This request was among a set of talking papers given to the Tokyo embassy that day, but somehow were not included in a similar batch shared with the State Department in Washington, DC, by the Japanese embassy there. The details of the Bonins paper included a request for a visit to Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, and Iwo Jima for 10 days beginning on 21 March 1965 by approximately 30 people, including bereaved families, government officials, and Buddhist priests.

With these in hand, Ambassador Reischauer met twice with Sato the next day at the prime minister’s office in formal and private sessions to review the issues to be raised and Sato’s views on bilateral and international affairs not reflected in the memos. He also spoke with Sato in detail on the talking papers on both the Ryukyus and Bonins. Reischauer seemed to praise the detail of the papers and proposals, but tried to discourage the prime minister from getting his hopes up: “I doubt conclusions or even meaningful discussions could be obtained during [this] short Washington visit.” Sato’s reaction is unclear but, according to Reischauer’s telegram, the prime minister referred specifically to the grave visits and said he “hoped we could at least agree to that.”
In Washington, Secretary Rusk met with Ambassador Takeuchi Ryuji on 30 December, a week after a previous meeting on the evening of the 23d, to discuss a U.S. aide mémoire on topics to be raised and asked about a similar Japanese memorandum. Takeuchi said he hoped to give it to him on 7 or 8 January, after he returned to Washington following a trip to Japan to consult with Sato. (Sato met with Takeuchi on 3 January and again on 7 January.) Thus in this manner, the Bonins issue became one of the topics raised by Sato during his visit to Washington in January 1965.

The United States, of course, had been aware that the issue was going to arise, too, as seen from the above exchanges, but also for some time before. For example, after a visit to Japan by Assistant Secretary Bundy at the end of September during which the Bonins issue had been raised by Takeuchi, who was then still director of the American Affairs Bureau, Bundy met with Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze and Navy leaders to discuss the issue and probably to suggest that changes in the status quo were necessary. More dramatically, in response to a department request in October, as 1964 drew to a close, Reischauer and the embassy prepared an assessment of Japan, which noted in regard to Okinawa and the Bonin Islands: “we must recognize that over the long run, and possibly sooner than is generally realized, Japan will press for reversion of administrative rights over the Ryukyus and the Bonins.”

In early 1965, while the reversion of administrative rights was not seriously being considered, Secretary Rusk informed President Johnson in an undated memorandum ahead of Sato’s visit that the State Department “accept[s] in principle a Bonins graves visit” and Ambassador Reischauer would work out the details in Tokyo if the president approved. On the eve of the visit, James C. Thomson Jr., who was the de facto director for East Asian Affairs on the National Security Council, wrote to the president that Sato “will consider his visit a success . . . if he comes away from Washington with a firm sense that we accept the Japanese as full partners (on equal footing with our European allies) and that we will take them into our confidence on long-term planning,” and it “will be an added plus for us both” if some progress is made on bilateral frictions. One of these issues was the Bonin Islands visits, and Thomson informed Johnson, based on Rusk’s memorandum, that the administration accepted, in principle, grave visits for the former inhabitants who live in Japan.

The graves visit issue was taken up, and quickly agreed to, at a private meeting in the late morning of 12 January between President Johnson and Sato, who had arrived early the previous evening. After coordinating the next day’s agenda at the Japanese embassy at 2520 Massachusetts Avenue, Sato retired to Blair House with which he was apparently very satisfied, noting in his diary: “the accommodations at Blair House were quite good (soto no mono).” Sato was also satisfied with the content of his talks the next day with Johnson. According to the Japanese memorandum of conversation, the president spoke of his desire to improve the welfare of the Okinawans and make further efforts at developing the economy, and followed this by stating his willingness to consider the Bonins grave visits question. According to his diary, Sato was “surprised at how quickly his request with regard to ancestral grave visits” was received and agreed to by the president.

Later that day, Sato met with Rusk, Under Secretary George Ball, Reischauer, and the rest of the State Department staff to discuss the grave visits, which was included in the draft communiqué. Ambassador Takeuchi inquired about the timing of the visit, because the
release of the communiqué to the press would inevitably invite questions about the dates. The ambassador suggested from a Japanese point of view, either March or April (around the time of the vernal equinox) or in August, for Obon (the Buddhist custom to honor the spirits of one’s ancestors) would probably be best. Rusk responded by saying that the timing would have to be decided later, following talks between Reischauer and a representative of the prime minister, but he wished to “discuss frankly” with the Japanese government the “various practical problems” involved in such a visit and ask the Japanese government the best way to handle them.\(^3\) Reischauer mentioned that John K. Emmerson, minister of the embassy, who was attending the meeting, would be returning to Japan the following day and could launch preliminary discussions with the Foreign Ministry immediately. Interestingly, Rusk also suggested that the prime minister might wish to have a personal representative make a “confidential and unpublicized visit” to the islands to explore how best to handle problems that might arise, stating that such an “exploratory visit” would be helpful to both sides by facilitating the consultations.\(^3\) Sato agreed to consider it, but said such an unpublicized and confidential visit might be difficult. (It appears that no such person was ever designated by Sato, although Owen Zurhellen from the embassy went in early February to make a survey.)

The joint statement was released the following day, with the section dealing with the Bonins noting,

> The President and the Prime Minister recognized the importance of United States military installations on the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands for the security of the Far East. The Prime Minister expressed the desire that, as soon as feasible, the administrative control over these islands will be restored to Japan and also a deep interest in the expansion of the autonomy of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus and in further promoting their welfare. Appreciating the desire of the Government and people of Japan for the restoration of administration to Japan, the President stated that he looks forward to the day when the security interests of the free world in the Far East will permit the realization of this desire . . . The President agreed to give favorable consideration to an ancestral graves visit by a representative group of former residents of the Bonin Islands.\(^3\)

Reischauer, who stayed on in Washington for some weeks later, described the Sato visit on the morning of 25 January as a “smashing” success before an audience of State Department and military personnel interested in Japan and Far East problems.\(^3\) Reflecting, however, his concerns about the importance of Okinawa and the Bonins, the former Harvard University professor and leading Japan scholar explained that “we must expect the Japanese desire to regain administrative control over these islands to grow. The Bonins question is directly tied to the Ryukyu Islands. Whatever happens with respect to them will carry the Bonins along because there is no difference in their legal position. Residual sovereignty has been acknowledged in both.”\(^3\) Reischauer then went on to point out that he “has never been able to understand the Navy’s position with regard to the Bonins,” a statement that got the attention of the Navy’s notetaker, Commander A. K. Rentschler, who quoted it in full. “The graves visit,” Reischauer continued, “is related and something we could give, especially, since those Russians allowed visits so why not ‘our good friends the Americans?’” Finally,
after reiterating that “the Bonins are directly related to whatever happens with Okinawa,” Reischauer argued “we must be ‘flexible and daring’ in dealing with Japan” and suggested, prophetically, that “possibly a deal could be made to allow entry of nuclear weapons at bases in Okinawa in exchange for Japanese administration.” This later became the basis of the formula used not only for the reversion of Okinawa but for that of the Bonins as well.

Following the Johnson-Sato talks, the U.S. government began to investigate the state of the graves on the islands and the issues surrounding the visits by dispatching Zurhellen on 5 February. Zurhellen, a highly respected Japan specialist within the department who served in both the Navy and the Marines in World War II, completed his trip on the 9th and, to the relief of many, discovered that while the conditions of the sites on Chichi Jima and Haha Jima were mixed, “In no case is there anything resembling improper treatment or desecration of grave site[s].” While U.S. authorities felt that the destruction caused during the war and in the years after due to exposure to the weather was beyond the “reasonable capability of the U.S. to prevent” and that the current islanders “should [not] be thought responsible for the present condition,” it would not stop the residents from helping to clean up the graves sites. Indeed, one resident, Anglican priest Father Gonzales (Ogasawara Aisaku) said he was “troubled by the impression that would be made on old friends among the former islanders who find that family graves of present islanders are well kept while those of former islanders have received no care,” and as a result some of the current islanders “had in mind attempting a cleanup of grave sites, at least on Chichi Jima, to the extent their free time permit.”

Based on Zurhellen’s report, a talking paper dated 4 March 1965, was prepared and submitted to the Japanese side. It described the logistics of the trip, the conditions of the graves sites, and the possible challenges to be faced and asked for Japan’s comments and suggestions.

After receiving a copy of the study, the Tokyo Metropolitan Government began drafting its plan for the grave visits, and set up the Ogasawara Grave Visit Measures Headquarters (Ogasawara Bosan Taisaku Honbu) within its General Affairs Division on 22 March. On 30 March, the government began accepting names of those who wished to make the visit. The Ogasawara Association, which would officially come into being on 8 May, was put in charge.

Two teams were formed to handle each of the visits—an Iwo Jima Team, led by Iizuka Fujitaro, and a Chichi Jima–Haha Jima Team, led by Yoshida Shimaichi. Several U.S. and Japanese officials and members of the press also went along, as did Dietman Fukuda, as a board member of Nanpo Doho Engokai. The Iwo Jima delegation, which totaled 26 people, including 10 family members and 5 Japanese government officials—among them Fukuda, a doctor, and a Buddhist priest—5 members of the Japanese press, a State Department official (embassy First Secretary William H. Bruns), and 5 American press representatives, departed Haneda Airport early on the morning of 18 May for the one-day trip. After flying over Chichi Jima and then Haha Jima, the chartered Japan Airlines flight landed on Iwo Jima at 1140. The island had changed dramatically in the 21 years since the former residents were last there because of
its destruction in the battle. In the short time the delegation had on the island, they were unable to locate the Nishi cemetery. As a result, they performed the ceremonies by the roadside near a hill that was close to the site.\textsuperscript{315}

The Chichi Jima and Haha Jima delegation of 37 members, including Yoshida Shien of the \textit{Nanpo Doho Engokai}, departed two days later in the evening of 20 May on board the Japanese Coast Guard (\textit{Kaijo Hoancho}) patrol vessel \textit{Soya}, a ship that had made six trips to Antarctica in the past for research purposes. The group included Bruns, from the embassy, and a reporter from \textit{U.S. News & World Report}.\textsuperscript{316} They arrived in Futami Bay in the early morning of 23 May. About 40 U.S. officials and local representatives turned out in welcome when the visitors arrived at Omura village. After a party that lasted until 1100, the delegation helped local islanders clean the Komagari cemetery, where a ceremony was held the next day. The following day, the group cleared and cleaned Oneyama cemetery, and conducted a similar ceremony on the 26th. On the 27th, the delegation left for Haha Jima where it repeated its burial ground activities. The delegation departed Haha Jima's Oki port in the mid-afternoon of 30 May and arrived back in Tokyo in the early morning of 2 June.\textsuperscript{317}

The first Bonin Islands grave visits were thus conducted without incident, and the following year, after consultations between the two governments, a second visit took place at the same time of year\textsuperscript{318} followed by a third one in 1967. At the time of Zurhellen's inspection trip, he noted the likelihood of follow-up requests and urged that the United States cooperate with them, and thus the embassy and military officials were already prepared.

The possibility of follow-up visits had been raised in early 1966 by Nakajima Toshijiro, the chief of the North American section of the Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{319} Like Asakai and others before, Nakajima said the government was receiving pressure from the islanders and noted that the Soviet Union had permitted “consecutive grave visits” to Habomai and Shikotan islands in 1964 and 1965.\textsuperscript{320} He also suggested that an additional argument in favor of permitting the visits was that space limitations had precluded the participation the year before by many former residents who had wished to be included. The embassy recommended to the department that it approve the request, arguing that the visit had a “favorable effect” on the bilateral relationship and had not resulted in an increase in pressure for reversion. After consultations with the DOD, the State Department replied in March to inform the embassy that the visit had been approved. Rodney E. Armstrong, the embassy second secretary, would represent it on the second and third trips.\textsuperscript{321}

Importantly, through these visits, two decades of suspicion and mistrust began to gradually disappear. An after-action report in 1967 stated that “the general attitude of the islanders to the visits appears increasingly receptive each year. It was especially noted that the islanders appeared far less reluctant to converse with the visitors, both in homes and during the various receptions,” and added that “there was a marked increase in the fraternization between visitors and islanders. It is believed that this resulted from lessening of island fears that the graves visits signaled the imminent reversion of the islands to Japan.”\textsuperscript{322}

Ironically, from the mainland perspective, however, it was apparent that the next issue to be addressed was reversion, and thus the grave visits, if anything, was one more definite
step in that process. Indeed the reversion issue was taken up in the Diet literally as the 1967 grave visit was being conducted.

RELIGIOUS RITES AND THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTING WAR REMAINS ON IWO JIMA

As of 1967, three annual visits to the family grave sites on Chichi Jima, Haha Jima, and Iwo Jima had all been handled successfully, but one outstanding problem remained—conducting religious rites and collecting remains of Japanese soldiers killed on Iwo Jima during the battle. This problem saw little resolution since it was first taken up in the early 1950s and, as alluded to in other parts of this book, the collection of the remains of Japanese personnel is still not completely settled. U.S. military officials have described this as “probably the most drawn-out and difficult operation” that they faced.\textsuperscript{323}

Former Imperial Navy Captain Wachi Tsunezo, garrison commander on Iwo Jima prior to Lieutenant General Kuribayashi Tadamichi’s arrival in mid-1944, had become a Buddhist priest of the Kuya Sect of the Tendai School in the immediate aftermath of the war. He assumed the name Jushoan Koami and devoted the remaining half-century preparing for the souls of his fallen men as well as for all U.S. and Japanese forces. His work began immediately after the end of hostilities when he explained to Marine Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Hayward, who had arrived at the end of August to discuss the arrangements to take over Wachi’s 32d Assault Unit’s base in Kagoshima, that he “sincerely wished to go back to [Iwo] to pray and mourn for the departed souls of all the colleagues, officers, and men who had bereaved me.”\textsuperscript{324} According to Wachi, Hayward “kindly took my appeal to heart just like a comrade of many years and suggested that I should write an application to General Headquarters of the Allied Occupation Forces which he would forward.”\textsuperscript{325} Around the same time, a British officer, Colonel Thomas, arrived in Kagoshima on other business and later offered to correct Wachi’s English draft. “It was very significant and humanitarian that two officers of enemy forces until a few months ago generously offered me their helping hand to make my appeal come to light. I was deeply impressed. It actually marked the very first step of my devotion to the problems of Iwo Jima and to this day I appreciate the thoughtfulness and friendship rendered me by them right after the dreadful war.”\textsuperscript{326} Wachi applied to GHQ through Hayward on 10 November 1945, but did not receive a response.\textsuperscript{327}

In the end, he applied another three times (on 6 June 1947, on 13 May 1949, and again on 5 February 1951), but his requests were always denied. The headquarters was reluctant to approve the requests, it seems, for fear of creating a precedent, as well as problems over who would pay for the costs involved.

However, Wachi applied one more time on 27 May 1951. Three weeks before, one of his subordinates, Yamakage Kofuku of the Imperial Navy, who had been permitted to go back to Iwo to recover his diary and other personal effects that he supposedly left in a cave that he and another man had lived in for almost four years after the battle of Iwo Jima ended, had unexpectedly killed himself by jumping off the side of Mount Suribachi some 30 minutes before he was to fly back to Tokyo.\textsuperscript{328} According to Wachi, “From a viewpoint of a Buddhist,
it is construed that he was invited by the souls of his war-dead comrades-in-arms. It is be-
lieved that the souls of the Japanese warriors killed on the island are roaming over the island
as unconsolled souls without any religious service being held for their repose. It is be-
lieved that the souls of the Japanese warriors killed on the island are roaming over the island
as unconsolled souls without any religious service being held for their repose."

This incident made headquarters even more cautious. By this point, however, General
Douglas A. MacArthur had already been relieved and succeeded in April by the more flex-
ible General Matthew B. Ridgway. Perhaps because of this, Wachi received his first positive
response on Independence Day, 4 July, from Marine Lieutenant Colonel D. R. Nugent,
who was the chief of the Civil Information and Education Section. After explaining that
the proper procedures for applying for “travel abroad” were through the Foreign Ministry
and that Wachi should consult with its officials, Nugent added, “you may rest assured that
the religious motivations of your interest in this matter are fully recognized and that this
headquarters is prepared to give consideration to any suitably sponsored and coordinated
program for the care of remains of Japanese war dead in overseas areas.” After consulting
more with Nugent and others, Wachi decided to resubmit a detailed plan to the Japanese
government, and sent his application to the director of the Repatriation Relief Agency
(Hikiage Enchojo), Ministry of Welfare, the minister of education, and the minister of for-
eign affairs.

After studying the application, on 20 August the Foreign Ministry and the Repatriation
Relief Agency held a meeting with regard to handling war remains in the southern areas,
and agreed to support Wachi’s application as well as to send some officials along to conduct
an investigation on Iwo Jima. On 8 September, the Repatriation Relief Agency informed
the Foreign Ministry that it was prepared to send two of its officials, Shirai Masatoki (chief
of 2d Branch, Demobilization Section, Demobilization Business Division, Demobilization
Bureau) and Nakajima Chikatake (chief of Business Branch of the same section, who was
once one of Wachi’s subordinates) along with Wachi to Iwo Jima. The Foreign Ministry,
in turn, forwarded the application to the GHQ, explaining that the Japanese government
has “long been making inquiries into the problems of maintaining the graves of the Japanese
who were killed in the war not only in Iwo Jima but also on other islands scattered in the
Southern Pacific, and of collecting their remains and relics for burial or delivery to the be-
reaved families. In view of the established Japanese custom, no small importance is attached
to those problems.” The ministry’s request emphasized that “if anybody is to be sent to the
island for the stated purposes, Rev. Jushoan is regarded as the best qualified person.”

The headquarters forwarded Wachi’s request on to Hawaii for the attention of Admiral
Radford at CINCPAC. He and his staff viewed the request suspiciously and requested
guidance from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral William M. Fechteler, warning what
it felt would be “far reaching consequences.” Nevertheless, Fechteler agreed to the visit,
explaining that requests for such visits, following approval by the Supreme Commander
of the Allied Powers, should be considered based on several criteria, including that (1) no
expense would accrue to the United States; (2) CINCPAC concurs from a security stand-
point; and (3) group size is limited to those necessary for ceremonial purposes.

The chief’s concurrence was forwarded by CINCPAC to SCAP, which informed the
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 3 December 1951 that it approved the visit in
principle subject to the submission of a detailed plan. Subsequently, a plan for a visit by
five people—Wachi, the two Repatriation Agency representatives, a correspondent, and a photographer—was submitted to GHQ.

Wachi’s group eventually departed on board the Chinese chartered vessel, the SS Chiho, from Yokohama’s Tsurumi Port for Iwo Jima near the end of January 1952. They arrived at the island four days later on 30 January. It was the first time in more than seven years that Wachi had been to Iwo and much had changed during that time, including the landscape. U.S. Air Force Major Maurice F. Youngs, more than 10 years Wachi’s junior, was there to meet him on the shore.\(^\text{338}\)

Wachi, carrying two \textit{kannon} statues, explained that he hoped to place one that was covered in gold on top of Mount Suribachi, and the other stone one, at the northern point of the island, where so many of his comrades had died. Youngs called his higher headquarters in Tachikawa, which said the statue could be placed on Suribachi but not on the top of the mountain. With the assistance of workers from one of the salvage companies that was on Iwo collecting discarded weapons and other metals, a “South Kannon (\textit{Minami Kannon})” and “North Kannon (\textit{Kita Kannon})” were named and installed. On the afternoon of 10 February, a dedication ceremony was held. Most of the participants were U.S. military personnel. Both Youngs and Wachi gave speeches calling for world peace.\(^\text{339}\)

Wachi spent a full month on the island trying to determine the location and number of remains. Several days after the dedication ceremony, Navy Captain J. L. Collis, who was on the staff of Commander, Naval Forces Marianas, rushed out to Iwo to speak with Wachi and investigate “macabre statements and photos concerning skeletal remains being scattered about the Iwo landscape,” as was being reported by members of the Japanese press that had preceded Wachi to the island and repeated in stories in the United States.\(^\text{340}\) Apparently, the newsmen and photographers, under pressure from their editors for stories, had removed items from the caves to use as props for the article. The resulting stories “did a maximum amount of damage to U.S. prestige in Japan” a Navy study later observed.\(^\text{341}\) When asked by Collis about the stories, Wachi, who knew nothing, lamented them and said that “the tendency of journalists to write sensational stories is found in every country.”\(^\text{342}\)

However, while on Iwo, Wachi noticed to his “sorrow” that a number of skulls had been removed from the skeletons of soldiers he had seen in the caves and told Collis. The captain reportedly responded, “I know,” and asked that Wachi not talk about it when he went back to Japan and to leave it up to the authorities on the island.\(^\text{343}\) This Wachi promised to do.

Afterward, Collis continued to investigate and immediately reported his findings to CINCPACFLT. He found that:

a. The caves are now strictly out of bounds for military personnel, but are not so for the salvage contractor. Caves have been combed in the past by souvenir hunters.

b. There are still skeletal remains in many, if not most of the caves.

c. In the Suribachi caves, most of the skulls are missing.

d. In caves elsewhere, most of the skeletons are intact.

e. It is possible by diligent search in the heavy undergrowth to uncover a bone or
two . . . Nevertheless, the painstaking observer, much less the casual one, would never gain an impression that the island is littered with “uncared for” remains.

f. There are many small pieces of bleached white coral scattered over the island which bear resemblance to a bone fragment.

g. In no spot were bones in full view of the public except as previously reported by dispatch to Commander in Chief Pacific, at the mouth of the caves, on the main road, directly opposite the Coast Guard station. A litter of new flash bulbs were scattered amongst the bones [and] the battle litter, which had been moved from the caves. The Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard station was quite familiar with the spot and declared the bones and gear were not there a few days before. His testimony was merely corroborative because the condition of the bones and gear negated the possibility of their having been exposed to weather for more than a few days. The caves, warmed by the inner fires of Iwo, preserve things rather well.344

Collis also added that “Wachi impressed me as a man of high character and motives and I am convinced that the handling of the story, had it been left to his group alone, would have been factual and dignified. I told him that his group could do much to set the record straight with subsequent publicity and was assured they would do so.”345

Wachi kept his promise upon returning to mainland Japan. He did not inform the Japanese government that the skulls were missing, nor did he tell the bereaved families when he met them around the country. Despite Collis’ report, however, it does not look like Wachi or the Japanese government was told anything further.

In the interim, the U.S. government examined the possibility of permitting religious services on Iwo and the remains of Japanese soldiers to be gathered. The impetus for the review appears to have been a request from Japan, which Ridgway forwarded to the Army Department in Washington. In it, Ridgway pointed out the importance of public sentiment in Japan, particularly in light of Japan being a Buddhist nation that requires the proper interment of their dead.346 This request was in turn sent on to the Chief of Naval Operations and subsequently the State Department called a meeting with representatives from the Army and Navy and Department of the Interior. The result of this conference was that approval should be granted and “that [such entry] should be for a single visit only to each location, in order that the operation would have a positive terminal date.”347 In other words, “any practical request by the Japanese government for a limited number of Japanese government and religious officials to undertake, at their expense, a token disinterment of Japanese World War II dead in the Pacific Islands under U.S. control would be favorably considered.”348 Japan subsequently submitted a detailed plan to disinter remains and conduct ceremonies at six islands, including Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. The U.S. government conditionally accepted the plan, permitting the Japanese government’s mission to make only one trip at its own expense to disinter “token” remains at each site, conduct appropriate religious services, and erect small markers.349

Later on 22 December, Japanese and U.S. officials met at the American embassy to coordinate the mission’s trip to the Pacific islands. A month later on 30 January, the mis-
sion departed from Shibaura Port on the *Nippon Maru*, a 2,400-ton sailing ship, and after stops at Guam, Saipan, and other islands, arrived at Iwo Jima on 13 March, the last of the sites visited before returning to Japan on the 17th.\textsuperscript{350} Afterward, Tsurumi Kiyohiko, chief of the 5th Section of the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, relayed to the U.S. government that “the memorial services conducted on Iwo Jima on 13 March 1953, were sufficient for all religious purposes.”\textsuperscript{351}

Wachi did not participate in the government’s mission, but he maintained his interest in Iwo Jima. Following his departure from Iwo in February 1952, he began work to create an organization dedicated to consoling the souls of the fallen Japanese and U.S. forces and giving comfort and assistance to their families. The *Iwo Jima Kyokai* (Iwo Jima Association) was established in the summer of 1953. Despite his hope for a truly bilateral association, and his efforts at informing influential figures in the Marine Corps and Navy—such as meeting with Major General E. A. Pollock when the latter was traveling through Japan on his way to Quantico after having been in Korea, Admiral Stump, and former Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, then U.S. ambassador to the Philippines—he had only little success in getting Americans to join. As a result, the Iwo Jima Association became predominantly Japanese.

Another disappointment for Wachi was the sad news that reached him in early 1954 that the gold-covered *kannon* statue on the island had been stolen shortly after some amphibious exercises there. Wachi read about it in a story published in the *Mainichi Shimbun* whose reporter had been able to visit Iwo Jima on an Air Force plane (because the public affairs office of the Far East Air Force was unaware of the need to refer such requests to CINCPACFLT).\textsuperscript{352} The Navy found the article “very similar” to the ones written by the “horde” of reporters that went to the island in January 1952.\textsuperscript{353} The embassy did not expect the report to negatively influence public opinion “to any appreciable degree,” but did see it as “indicative of the continuing interest of the Japanese press and public in the disposition of war dead remains,” and likely to encourage the Foreign Ministry to continue its request for further assistance from the United States in returning the remains to Japan.\textsuperscript{354} After seeing the article, Wachi immediately met with the reporter, Kato, to confirm the story, and then shortly after wrote to the commander of the Far Eastern Command, who was also the commanding general of the Air Force in Japan.\textsuperscript{355} In the letter, Wachi referred to his January–February 1952 visit and wrote, “I had found that a considerable number of the skulls of the Japanese war-dead had been taken away from the caves which many Americans had got into,” and mentioned that he had informed Youngs and Collis about it. He then stated that “if such a fact should be revealed to the bereaved families as well as the Japanese people, a very grave consequence would be brought about, so that I have kept the fact to myself . . . As it is believed that the above mentioned matters are so delicate in nature that they should not be notified to you through the Japanese government as a formal channel, I write this letter directly . . . to request to take appropriate measures.”

Unfortunately, Wachi received no response. In 1955, 10 years after the Battle of Iwo Jima, Wachi learned of a similar incident and once again wrote to U.S. military officials in Japan.\textsuperscript{356} Because he failed to receive a response again, he wrote on 3 June to the secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury.\textsuperscript{357} This included an overview of a plan to repatriate the
former islanders to Iwo Jima as a way to “prevent [the] occurrence of stealing the statue.” Nevertheless, he received no reply.

In November the following year, Wachi wrote to Admiral Stump and this time, Civil Affairs/Island Government Officer Commander L. G. Findley responded. Findley was, along with Admiral Radford, among the two strongest proponents in the Navy of keeping the Bonin Islands an exclusive American Navy preserve. According to Findley’s response, he had met Wachi in December 1951 when Wachi was planning his 1952 visit to Iwo Jima. Findley then went on to note he well remembered the negative publicity after Wachi’s trip, and that he was also involved in planning the Japanese government’s mission to the islands in 1953. He explained that “following the completion of the ceremonies on Iwo Jima, on 13 March 1953, the Japanese Government informed the Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Far East, that it was pleased with the arrangements that had been made and with the results of the mission.” Findley further stated that “Since that time all caves known to contain Japanese war-dead on Iwo Jima have been sealed by setting off demolition charges at the mouth of each cave, thus blowing in the cave and providing a six-foot cover of rock and soil at the entrances . . . In view of the above, it is not considered necessary for you to visit this headquarters to discuss this matter further.” Although Wachi sent other letters and pamphlets to the U.S. government in the early part of 1957, no replies were sent, the Navy’s history records, as the “war dead mission in the Bonin-Volcano Islands and other islands in the central Pacific was considered to be a closed issue.”

It is not clear if Findley’s arguments were deliberate or not, but they were certainly incorrect in places. Wachi had already gathered counter testimony from salvage workers on Iwo Jima and reporters who traveled there. Wachi published “An Appeal,” a one-page letter, in Richard F. Newcomb’s 1965 book, Iwo Jima, in exchange for providing the author with documents and other information necessary to complete his work. The letter was not published in the Japanese translation of the book out of concern for the bereaved families. Wachi said the possible desecrations were “barriers to Japanese-American friendship.” In response to his appeal, an air-mailed package that did not have a return address or even the sender’s name on it arrived at Wachi’s Iwo Jima Association in June 1973. Inside was a skull and a letter that read in part: “This skull was taken from Iwo Jima in 1955.” This letter proved to Wachi that desecration or other such behavior was sadly possible until at least the mid-1950s, and thus Findley’s assertions were not entirely correct. He explained that he did not think this type of behavior was done by Marines, but instead was done by members of the military who stopped through Iwo Jima.

Findley’s response continued,

Your letter claims that the Peace Kannon near Mt. Suribachi was stolen and that the remains of Japanese soldiers were desecrated, but I wish to make clear to you that since 1952, the caves and areas around them have been placed off-limits. American military members can not even go near them. You even admit that you have no actual evidence that members of U.S. forces have taken these remains home. In addition to U.S. military members, there are Japanese and people from other countries there working in salvage operations. We are bothered that “some unidentifiable person” has stolen the Peace Kannon.
Wachi was no doubt surprised and disappointed by the tone and contents of the letter. “I was informed by a staff officer . . . of the fact that the caves had been sealed with the bodies lying as they were. That might have helped prevent further removal of the skulls but it brought about another grave obstacle. It made it almost impossible for us to collect other remains which had been sealed in with the bodies unless we used heavy machinery.” He was also angry at the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Health and Welfare officials, as well as those from the prime minister’s office, to whom he showed a copy of Findley’s letter. He blasted them for “giving the impression that the Japanese government was satisfied with the ceremony performed on Iwo, in just one day, and grateful to the U.S., thereby letting the U.S. government side off the hook.”

Wachi saw no progress over the remainder of the 1950s but, with the start of the Kennedy administration in 1961, took it upon himself to raise the issue again. However, Assistant Secretary of State Bundy simply quoted Findley’s letter when he responded. Wachi also wrote to Bundy in April 1964, but he does not appear to have received an answer. Many of the bereaved families, who hoped to see the remains returned “as soon as possible,” would have to wait until a fuller retrieval effort after the reversion of Iwo Jima to Japan. Indeed, many are still waiting.

NOTES

1“Despatch 478 from Embassy Tokyo to State on Memorandum of Conversation on Bonins, Nuclear Test Compensation, etc. (September 25, 1957), October 25, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Island 1957, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.


4“Telegram 01232 from State to Embassy Tokyo, October 2, 1957,” 033.9411/10-257, RG 59.


6“Memorandum of Conversation with Japanese Socialist Delegation’s Call on Mr. Robertson, October 2, 1957,” 611.94/10-257.

7“Telegram from Embassy Tokyo to State, September 17, 1957.”

8“Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese-American Relations, October 21, 1957,” 611.94/10-21-57.

9Ibid. Shortly after this visit, United Press reported that “American officials are expected to reject any demand Japan may make for compensation of Japanese nationals prohibited by U.S. from returning to their homes in Bonin Islands . . . U.S. attitude appears to be, so far as could be learned at State Dept, that islanders are Japanese responsibility. Officials implied that Japan is getting enough U.S. aid from various sources to be able to take care of islanders itself.” (See “Telegram 1182 from Em-
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bassy Tokyo to State, October 23, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Island 1957, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84). However, the State Department informed the embassy, which was concerned about the story as it was reported in the Japanese press, that there was no basis for it and the embassy was unable to determine the source. See “Telegram from State to Embassy Tokyo, October 26, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Island 1957, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

10“Telegram 1551 from Embassy Tokyo to State, December 10, 1957,” 611.94/12-1057.

11“Telegram 1552 from Embassy Tokyo to State, December 10, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Island 1957, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

12Ibid.

13Ibid.

14Ibid.

15Ibid.

16“Telegram 1522 from Embassy Tokyo to State, December 6, 1957,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Island 1957, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.


18“Letter from Robertson to Irwin, November 4, 1957.”

19Ibid.


21“Letter from Sprague to Robertson, December 11, 1957.”

22Ibid.

23“Telegram from State to Embassy Tokyo, January 22, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

24Ibid.

25Ibid.

26Ibid.

27“Telegram from State to Embassy Tokyo, February 13, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.


29Ibid.

30Ibid.
31“Telegram from State to Embassy Tokyo, February 13, 1958.”
32Ibid.
33Ibid.
34“Telegram from CINCPAC to Embassy Tokyo, February 28, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.
35Ibid.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
38Ibid.
40Ibid. The State Department was primarily interested in linking it to the Ryukyus for evaluation since Congress had already expressed approval for payments in those islands and, therefore, the department assumed it would be easier to get the appropriation from Congress on that basis. See “Memorandum from Martin to Parsons on Bonin Compensation, March 5, 1958,” Folder: R 6.4, Box 14, subject file relating to the Ryukyus, 1952–1958, lot files, RG 59.
41“Telegram from Embassy Tokyo to State, March 3, 1958.”
42“Memo from Parsons to Murphy on Status of Bonin Islanders’ Compensation, June 5, 1958.”
43Ibid. The Defense Department agreed in the summer of 1958 to “support legislation to obtain funds for compensation,” but disagreed with the State Department’s assertion that the problem “is primarily a military one revolving around the designation of the Bonins as a military reservation.” See “Memo from Bane to Robertson on Compensation for the Bonin Islanders Residing in Japan, August 15, 1958,” Folder: R 6.4, Box 14, Subject File Relating to the Ryukyus, 1952–1958, lot files, RG 59.
45Ibid.
47Sprague wrote later that “as the negotiation of the settlement of these claims will be a matter within the cognizance of the Department of State, I believe it appropriate that State should present the legislation to Congress. As stated in my letter . . . the Department of Defense will support the Department of State in this matter.” In other words, Defense was not going to jointly sponsor the legislation, but would support the State Department in doing so. See “Letter from Sprague to Robertson, September 23, 1958,” ibid.
48“Memorandum from Bane and Robertson on Compensation for the Bonin Islanders Residing in Japan, August 15, 1958.”
49Ibid.
50“Despatch 114 from Embassy Tokyo to State on Compensation for the Former Inhabitants of the
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51Ibid.

52Ibid.

53Ibid.

54Ibid.


56“Telegram from State to Embassy Tokyo, August 23, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

57Ibid.

58“Telegram from Embassy Tokyo to State, August 29, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

59Ibid.

60Ibid.

61Ibid.

62Ibid.

63Ibid.

64Ibid.

65“Telegram from Embassy Tokyo to State, September 2, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

66According to the telegram, the time period used in the calculations included the period from the effective date of the peace treaty to the end of 1957 and 10 times the lost revenue for 1957. The total of 152/3 years is less than the period envisaged under the old formula in the Ryukyus.


68The State Department later asked MacArthur to confirm the dates and citations of the laws said to be approved by SCAP. See “Airgram G-112 from State to Embassy Tokyo, September 12, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84; “Outgoing Telegram 778 from Embassy Tokyo to State, October 10, 1958,” ibid.; and “Despatch 409 from Embassy Tokyo to State, October 8, 1958,” ibid.

69“Telegram from Embassy Tokyo to State, September 2, 1958.”

70Ibid.


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73Ibid.
74Ibid.
75Ibid.
76Ibid.
77Ibid.
79Ibid.
80Ibid.
81Ibid.
82Ibid.
83“Telegram 536 from Embassy Tokyo to State, September 4, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84. Perhaps unbeknownst to the embassy, the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs had also examined the possibility of obtaining money from P.L. 480 Funds, but this appears to have been “future” funds, those related to the future sale of surplus agricultural commodities to Japan. For several reasons, this solution was not viewed as acceptable. See “Memorandum from Bane and Robertson on Compensation for the Bonin Islanders Residing in Japan, August 15, 1958.”
86Ibid.
87“Memorandum from Robertson to Dulles on Reappraisal of United States Policies toward Japan, March 28, 1958,” 611.94/3-2858.
88Ibid.
89Ibid.
90Ibid.
91“Memorandum from Howard L. Parsons to Robertson on Reversion of Administrative Rights in Ryukyus to Japan, April 12, 1958,” 611.94/4-1258.
92Ibid.
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
95For more on the question of including the Article 3 islands in the revised security treaty, see Robert D. Eldridge, “The Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and Okinawa: Factional and Domestic
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96“Memorandum of Conversation of Dietman Fukuda’s Representation on Behalf of Bonin Islanders, September 9, 1958,” 794C.022/9-958. The pamphlet he delivered to them was prepared by the league.

97Ibid.

98Ibid.


100Ibid.

101Ibid.

102Ibid., 82–83.

103“Telegram 778 from Embassy Tokyo to State, October 10, 1958.”


105Ibid.

106Ibid.

107Ibid.

108“Memorandum of Conversation with Asakai on Bonin Island Compensation, etc., November 12, 1958,” ibid.

109Ibid.

110Ibid.

111Ibid.

112Ibid. The United States experienced a recession in 1958. For more on the budget deficit that year, see Maurice H. Stans, One of the Presidents’ Men: Twenty Years with Eisenhower and Nixon (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1995), 63–64.

113“Memorandum of Conversation with Asakai on Bonin Island Compensation, etc., November 12, 1958.”

114“Memorandum of Conversation with Itagaki, November 13, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.

115Ibid.

116Ibid.

117Ibid.

360
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118 Ibid.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125a Telegram 1162 from Embassy Tokyo to State, December 4, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
129 “Letter from Director Stans to Secretary Dulles, November 26, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.
130 Stans, One of the Presidents’ Men, 63.
131a “Letter from Director Stans to Secretary Dulles, November 26, 1958.”
132a “Letter from Dulles to Maurice H. Stans, Director, Bureau of the Budget, December 4, 1958.”
133 Ibid.
134 “Letter from Parsons to Horsey, December 19, 1958,” Folder: 322.3 Bonin Islands 1958, Box 46, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84. The Price Committee was formed in response to a request by Okinawan leaders and residents to investigate the Okinawa base problem. Headed by Charles M. Price, the committee traveled to Okinawa in the summer of 1955 and released its report in June 1956. Okinawans opposed the contents of the report, leading to the “island-wide protests” of 1956.
135 Ibid.
136a Telegram 998 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, January 20, 1959,” Folder 322.3 Bonin Islands, 1959–1961, Box 66, Tokyo Post Records, RG 84.
137a Airgram G-456 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department on Bonins Island Compensation, February 3, 1959,” ibid.
138a Memorandum of Conversation on Compensation for Former Inhabitants of the Bonin Islands, February 6, 1959,” ibid.
139a Telegram from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, February 22, 1959,” ibid.
140a Telegram 1707 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, February 24, 1959,” ibid.
141 Ibid.
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142“Letter from Clark to Parsons, March 2, 1959,” ibid.
143Ibid.
144Ibid.
145Ibid.
146Ibid.
147Ibid.
148Ibid.
149“Letter from Parsons to Clark, March 9, 1959,” ibid.
150Ibid.
151“Letter from Clark to Parsons, March 20, 1959,” ibid.
152Ibid.
154Telegram 2558 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, June 2, 1959,” ibid.
155Telegram 1864 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, June 2, 1959,” ibid.
156The letter is reprinted in full in Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 225–28.
158Telegram 133 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, July 15, 1959,” ibid.
159Telegram 135.”
160Telegram 222 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, July 28, 1959,” ibid. Also see “Letter from Leonard Lee Bacon, Acting Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to William Leonhart, July 31, 1959,” ibid.
161Telegram 421 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, August 22, 1959,” ibid.
162Ibid.
163Telegram 512 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, August 24, 1959,” ibid.
164Ibid.
165Ibid.
166Telegram 430 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, August 25, 1959,” ibid.
167Despatch 412 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, on Visit by Leaders of the Bonin Island Repatriation League, September 29, 1959,” ibid.
168Ibid.
169Ibid., and “Despatch 519 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department on Congressional Correspondence, October 27, 1959,” ibid.
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171 Ibid.


173 “Telegram 2901 from Embassy Tokyo to State, March 9, 1959,” ibid.

174 “Telegram 2117 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, March 11, 1959,” ibid.

175 “Telegram 3770 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, May 20, 1959,” ibid.

176 “Telegram 2744 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, May 20, 1959,” ibid.

177 “Telegram 3770.”

178 Ibid.

179 Ibid.

180 “Telegram from State Department to Embassy, June 3, 1960,” ibid.

181 “Despatch 1457 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, on Call by Leaders of the Bonin Island Repatriation League, June 8, 1960,” ibid.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid.

184 Ibid.


186 Ibid.

187 Ibid., 296.


189 “Telegram 18 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, July 5 1960,” ibid.


191 “Telegram 619 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, August 24, 1960,” ibid.

192 Ibid.

193 “Airgram G–428 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, October 14, 1960,” ibid.

194 Ibid.

195 It does not appear that the Foreign Ministry submitted its own draft note, as no such note was found in U.S. files or in the documents declassified as a result of the author’s FOIA request to the Foreign Ministry around this time.

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197 Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 230.


199 “Telegram 1921 from Embassy Tokyo to State, January 5, 1961,” ibid.

200 Ibid.

201 “Telegram 1922 from Embassy Tokyo to State, January 6, 1961,” ibid.

202 Ibid.

203 Ibid.

204 “Telegram 1190 from State to Embassy Tokyo, January 7, 1961,” ibid.


206 “Memorandum for the Record on Expiration of Bonin Appropriation, February 8, 1961,” ibid.

207 “Ogasawara Hosho Mondai Kokan Kobun ni Kansuru Ken” [First U.S.-Japan Meeting Regarding Exchange of Notes on Ogasawara Compensation Problem], March 1, 1961, Eldridge JFOIA.

208 Ibid.


210 “Memorandum of Conversation on Compensation for Bonin Islanders, March 3, 1961.”

211 Ibid.

212 “Letter from Kidd to Sneider, March 8, 1961.”

213 “Telegram 2547 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, March 8, 1961,” ibid. A Japanese version of the memorandum of conversation can be found at “Ogasawara Hosho Mondai Kokan Kobun ni Kansuru Ken (Dai Sankai Nichibei Kaidan Yoshi) [Third U.S.-Japan Meeting Regarding Exchange of Notes on Ogasawara Compensation Problem], March 8, 1961,” Eldridge JFOIA.

214 Ibid.

215 Ibid.

216 Ibid.

217 Ibid. The Japanese draft was sent the same day as “Telegram 2546,” ibid.

218 This reference appeared in “Summary of US-Japan Post-War Relations and Problems—Past, Present, and Future,” enclosure to “Letter from Kidd to David M. Bane, December 20, 1960,” 611.94/12-2060. In the summary, it was noted that, when MacArthur arrived in Japan, the United States was faced with the “insistence we transfer administration of Bonin Islands to Japan and if
that not possible we at least permit return dispossessed inhabitants of Bonin Islands (whom, with exception of those having some Western blood, we had refused to repatriate) or alternatively offer them monetary compensation.”

219Ogasawara Hosho Mondai Kokan Kobun ni Kansuru Ken (Dai Yonkai Nichibei Kaidan Yoshi) [Fourth U.S.-Japan Meeting Regarding Exchange of Notes on Ogasawara Compensation Problem], March 10, 1961,” Eldridge JFOIA.


221Ogasawara Hosho Mondai Kokan Kobun ni Kansuru Ken (Dai Gokai Nichibei Kaidan Yoshi) [Fifth U.S.-Japan Meeting Regarding Exchange of Notes on Ogasawara Compensation Problem], March 27, 1961,” Eldridge JFOIA.

222Ogasawara Hosho Mondai Kokan Kobun ni Kansuru Ken (Dai Rokukai Nichibei Kaidan Yoshi) [Sixth U.S.-Japan Meeting Regarding Exchange of Notes on Ogasawara Compensation Problem], April 4, 1961,” Eldridge JFOIA, and “Ogasawara Hosho Mondai Kokan Kobun ni Kansuru Ken (Dai Nanakai Nichibei Kaidan Yoshi) [Seventh U.S.-Japan Meeting Regarding Exchange of Notes on Ogasawara Compensation Problem], April 10, 1961,” ibid.


224Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 230–42.

225Airgram 1063.”


229Kato had questioned Foreign Minister Kosaka Zentaro in the lower house Foreign Affairs Committee on 11 April 1962 on what progress the Japanese government was making in achieving return of administrative rights over the Bonin Islands. (“Airgram 210 from Embassy to State on Socialist Interpellations Concerning Bonins, April 17, 1962,” Box 2177, CDF, 1960–1963, RG 59.) Kosaka said that he believed the United States had been withholding permission for the return of former inhabitants to the Bonins because of military reasons. Kato then asked about the status of the U.S. $6 million compensation, to which the prime minister’s office Director General Kodaira Hisao explained that the government would distribute the money according to the wishes of the islanders but had so far not been able to reach agreement with them on a formula for dividing these funds.

230Airgram 1063.”

231Ibid.

232Ibid.

233Ibid.

234Nanpo, Ogasawara Mondai no Gaiyo, 17.

235Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 266.
The Nanpo Doho Engokai, or NDEK, was established on 15 November 1956, as a judicial foundation (shadan hojin) in “order to conduct research, investigation, education and propaganda concerning the various problems of the Northern Islands, and to cooperate with the Japanese government in expediting the settlement of the problems of Okinawa and Ogasawara.” See “A Brief of Assistance Association for Okinawa, Ogasawara, and Northern Islands,” in “Despatch 26 from Naha to State on Visit to Ryukyus of Shien Yoshida, May 17, 1960,” 794c.022/5-1760. The literal name of the association was Southern Areas Benevolent Association.


Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 273.

Kito ni Tomonau Kakushibu o Keisei [Formation of Chapters to Pursue Return to Islands], Ogasawara, no. 44 (December 1995), 28.

Ibid.

Airgram 1354 from Embassy Tokyo to State on Diet Resolutions on Okinawa and the Northern Territories,” Folder: POL 19 Government of Dependencies Ryukyu Islands 1/1/65, Box 2626, CFP 1964–1966 Political and Defense, RG 59.

Nanpo, Ogasawara Mondai no Gaiyo, 12.

Airgram 1354.”

Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 255.

Ibid.

Ibid., 256–59.

Ibid., 259.

Ibid., 259–62.


Despatch 265.”

Airgram A-665 from Embassy Tokyo to State, February 6, 1962,” 661.94/2-662.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Airgram 351 from Embassy Tokyo to State, October 6, 1961,” ibid.

Ibid.

Telegram 1230 from Embassy Tokyo to State, November 3, 1961,” ibid.

Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, 248.
“Telegram 1230.”

Ibid.

Ibid.

Airgram 471 from Embassy Tokyo to State, November 16, 1961,” ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Airgram CA-620 from Embassy Tokyo to State, November 16, 1961,” ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Memorandum from OP-09B to OP-03 and OP-06 on Bonin-Volcano Islands and Marcus Island; Use of by the United States, December 1, 1961,” records regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands, operational archives, Naval Historical Center.

Memorandum from CINCPAC to JCS on Adequate Utilization of Bonin/Volcano Islands, March 11, 1962,” ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Telegram 11040.”

Ibid.


Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 266.

Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, 247.

Telegram from Secretary Rusk to State Department, December 5, 1964,” Folder: Pol 7 Japan-U.S., Box. 1925, CDF, 1964–1966, RG 59.
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287“Action Memorandum from William P. Bundy to Secretary Rusk on Japanese Request for Temporary Visits to the Bonin Islands, December 18, 1964,” Folder: Political Affairs and Relations, Bonin Islands, 1/1/64, Box 1925, CDF 1964–1966, RG 59.


289Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 267.

290Ibid.


294Ibid.


298“Memorandum for the President by Dean Rusk on Your Meetings with Prime Minister Sato for Visit of Prime Minister Sato, January 11–14, 1965,” ibid.

299Author’s interview with Dr. James C. Thomson, 3 October 2000, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Reischauer wrote, “There was no moral or legal justification for the removal from Japan of the Bonin, Ryukyu, and Kurile Islands, either, and these the Japanese most certainly have not renounced in their hearts. They promised in the peace treaty to support American proposals for the assignment of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to the United States as trusteeship territories, but they still have hopes of getting them back some day. The Bonin Islands, located in the Pacific between Japan and her former Mandates, have been indisputably Japanese since 1875.” Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 238.

Bilateral Problem: Compensation, Visits, and Rites, 1957–67

301Ibid.
302Sato, Sato Eisaku Nikki, 223.
303“Daiikkai Jonson Daitoryo Oyobi Sato Sori Kaidan Yoshi, 1 Gatsu 12 Nichi Howaito Hausu ni Oite [Summary of First Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato, January 12, White House],” Eldridge JFOIA.
304Sato, Sato Eisaku Nikki, 223.
306Ibid.
308Memorandum for the Record on Ambassador Reischauer Briefing at 1000, January 25, 1965,” records regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands, operational archives, Naval Historical Center.
309Ibid. For a recent biography on Reischauer, see George R. Packard and Edwin O. Reischauer in the American Discovery of Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), especially chapters 8 and 9.
310For more on Zurhellen, see Roger Dingman, Deciphering the Rising Sun: Navy and Marine Corps Codebreakers, Translators, and Interpreters in the Pacific War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009).
311Naval Message 160943Z from Embassy Tokyo to CINCPACFLT, February 17, 1965,” records regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands, operational archives, Naval Historical Center.
313Ibid., 273.
314Ibid.
316For the story by the unidentified member of the international staff of the magazine, see “A Look Inside a Secret U.S. Base,” U.S. News & World Report, 23 August 1965, 66.
318Fukuda, ed., Sono 1, 274.
319Naval Message from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, February 3, 1966,” Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.
320Ibid.

Findley, Book II, 172.

Wachi Tsunezo, Miizu: Beiju Kinen (Yokosuka: Iwo Jima Kyokai, 1989), 20. This pamphlet, published in commemoration of Wachi’s 88th birthday, was translated by his daughter (Rosa Chikako Ogawa) as “The August Virtue of His Imperial Majesty,” and shared with the author by her. See the author’s interview with Ogawa Chikako Rosa, 5 June 2008, Tokyo.

Wachi, Miizu, 20.


Petition to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from Jushoan Koami, Service Priest, Main Temple at Nikko, Byakurensha (Religious Corporation), Nikko Sannnai, Nikko-machi, Tochigi Prefecture, Regarding Request for Permission to Visit Iwo-Jima for Religious Service for the War-Dead, May 27, 1951,” Ikotsu Shushu, Iwo Jima.


Hamai Kazufumi, “Kita no Hate Kara Minami no Shima e: Kita Reihi Junpaidan no Okinawa Toko to Sono Inpakuto” [From the Northern Extreme to the Southern Islands: The Trip to Okinawa of the Northern Delegation to Pay Respects and Impact of That Visit], 20 Seiki Kenkyu, no. 7 (December 2006), 58–59.

Letter from Chief of Demobilization Bureau, Repatriation Relief Agency, to Chief of Control Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Dispatch of Agency’s staff members to Iwo Jima for investigation of plight of remains of those killed on the island in action, September 8, 1951,” Ikotsu Shushu, Iwo Jima.

Ibid.

Findley, Book II, 173.


Around the same time, Ishii Shuji, who was a hygienic specialist on Iwo Jima during the battle and was later captured, traveled to Iwo Jima with a reporter from the Mainichi Shim bun. See Ishii Shuji, Iwo Jima ni Ikiru [Surviving on Iwo Jima] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1981), 175–216.


Findley, Book II, 179–81. It is unclear if the captain’s name is “Collis” as is written in Findley’s version or “Collins” as Wachi writes. The author used “Collis” along the lines of the official Navy study.

 Ibid., 176.

Kamisaka, Iwo Jima Imada, 125.

Ibid., 125–28.


Ibid., 180.


Findley, Book II, 183.

Ibid., 184.

Ibid., 187.

Ibid., 191–93.

Ibid., 201.

Ibid., 199. Also see “Iwo Jima ni Ikotsu o Saguru: Honsha Kato Kisha Zento Shisatsuki” [Looking for Remains on Iwo Jima: A Record of Reporter Kato from Our Newspaper on His Investigative Trip around the Whole Island], Mainichi Shim bun, 8 April 1954.

Findley, Book II, 199. A Japanese man who was working on Iwo Jima in 1951 for a total of three months between February and October that year published a book in early 1952 with a dozen pho-
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tos about what he reportedly saw there. See Hagiwara Toshio, *Hakkotsu no Shima: Iwoto no Higeki* [Island of Skeletons: The Tragedy of Iwo Jima] (Tokyo: Aokisha, 1952). It is unclear if the embassy or the U.S. military was aware that the book was published, as they seemed more concerned about the news reports.


355 “Letter Concerning to Missing of the Statues of Kannon and Skulls of Japanese War-Dead of Iwo Jima, April 19, 1954,” Folder 7, Japanese War Dead, Box 100, records regarding the Bonin- Volcano Islands, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center.


357 “Repeated Misdoings by American Military Personnel on Iwo-jima and Drastic Measures Thereafter,” ibid.


359 Ibid.


361 Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, 293.


363 Newcomb, *Iwo Jima*, 293.


369 Ibid.


371 Despite Iwo having been reverted in the summer of 1968, the former islanders of Iwo and Kita Iwo, who once numbered 216 households and 1,164 people, were unable to return. Following reversion, studies were made on the volcanic activity of the island, which took several years. During that time, the islanders were allowed to go to Iwo for grave visits, but they could not live there. In May 1977, the *Ogasawara Mondai Kenkyukai* (Ogasawara Problem Study Group) submitted an interim report on Ogasawara’s future development that recommended the establishment of a separate study group for Iwo Jima as a private advisory body under Tokyo Metropolitan Governor Minobe Ryokichi. On 28 September that year, the *Iwo Jima Mondai Kenkyukai* (Iwo Jima Problem Study Group)
came into being. It was headed by Ota Kazuo, president of the Ogasawara Association. One of its first acts was to request Tokyo Institute of Technology (Tokyo Kogyo Daigaku) to undertake a multiyear study on the possibility of redeveloping the islands for people to live on. The study took longer than initially expected, because of the islands' location and other problems encountered. This fact hinted at the conclusions of the report: due to volcanic activities, unexploded ordnance, search for human remains, the changed landscape from the battle, and base development and related inability to confirm landholdings, the report noted that there were many problems that had to be overcome if people were to live there. There were numerous other problems working against resettlement—the large area occupied by the Self-Defense Forces base, the limited arable and other land for development, the limited number of former islanders who actually were willing to return, and the relative isolation of the island. In late May 1984, the Council for the Development of the Ogasawara Islands (Ogasawara Shoto Shinko Shingikai) of the Land Agency (Kokudocho) submitted its opinion that the return of the islanders was impossible due to the above reasons, and recommended that the government take all possible measures to compensate and otherwise alleviate the concerns of the former islanders. See Ogasawara Kyokai, ed., “Ogasawara Shoto no Gaiyo Oyobi Shinkoto no Seika: Henkan 35 Shunenme o Mukaete” [An Overview of the Ogasawara Islands and the Results of the Development of the Islands on the Eve of the 35th Anniversary of their Reversion], Ogasawara, no. 48 (2003), 7.
CHAPTER 8
THE REVERSION, 1967–68

It was disheartening to learn that President Lyndon Johnson decided to return Iwo Jima to Japan. The island contains the blood of thousands of our men who valiantly fought and died for our nation. Although the remains of our heroes have been moved to American soil, Iwo Jima is an American shrine to be revered, not abandoned.

—Second Lieutenant Patrick F. Caruso, rifle company officer, K Company, 9th Regiment, 3d Marine Division

The road to reversion of the Bonin Islands was a long one on the one hand, but short on the other, if we consider that it took 20 years to permit just grave visits, while reversion itself was agreed to only two-and-a-half years after that. In reality, however, the reversion story was a long one—23 years in total—and slightly longer if the time involved for the islanders to actually be repatriated following reversion is considered.

“Spadework”

There still had not been a resolution to the issue of the reversion of the islands when U. Alexis Johnson, one of America’s leading diplomats, succeeded Edwin O. Reischauer as U.S. ambassador to Japan in late October 1966. Johnson saw that with Japan “emerging as a major world power . . . many aspects of the relations between our two countries needed bringing up to date.” The Bonins issue was one of them.

Yet, in order to resolve some of these issues, including the Bonins and Okinawa, Johnson believed Japan would have to put forth its basic positions and answer a “fundamental question,” namely “if administrative rights over the Ryukyus reverted to [Japan], should the United States retain its present rights to mount operations from the bases there without consulting the Japanese government?” Japan was reluctant to show its hand, Johnson recalls in his memoirs, and instead “tried the familiar gambit” of asking the U.S. side for its minimum needs without indicating its own position.

This did not mean that the Japanese government was not thinking about the question. In late May, Edamura Sumio, chief of the North American Affairs Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ North American Bureau, informed the U.S. embassy that Foreign Minister Miki Takeo gave the “most serious attention” to the problems of the Ryukyus and Bonins and saw those problems as major ones in the bilateral relationship. As a result, politicians and journalists, who knew of Miki’s feelings, were constantly attempting to probe his thinking on the issue to see if he was going to take some initiative.
Miki provided a suggestion during the upper house’s budget subcommittee interpella-
tion on 23 May, in which he stated in response to questions by Seya Hideyuki of the Social-
list Party that the Bonins were less militarily important than Okinawa, and thus, hinted that
their early return might be possible.8 He also said that he would push for the return of the
former islanders, and discuss with the United States the return of the Bonins.

The next day, he took questions from the press after a meeting with Ohama Nobumoto
of the Council of Advisers on the Okinawa Problem (Okinawa Mondai Kondankai), who had
recently returned from a trip to the United States.9 Miki stated that, while the U.S. Navy
felt the “Bonins have great military value,” the Japanese side “think[s] that the military value
is different from that of Okinawa.”10 He explained that he believed the issue of repatriation
needed to be dealt with first—“only then,” he added, “can we turn to our attention to the
question of reversion.” On the question of separating the Bonins issue from that of Okinawa,
he hedged, stating that he was not arguing for that, but at the same time saying that it might
not be “entirely bad to separate the two problems.” In any case, he added that Japan wanted
to study the Bonins question “in the context of the overall Okinawa problem.”

Back in Washington, the Bonins problem was raised at a daily press briefing at the State
Department on 24 May. When asked what the U.S. position was on their return, spokesman
Robert J. McCombs responded that the department had studied the issue, but concluded
that the return was not feasible because of the role they continue to play in the defense
posture of the region “while conditions of threat and tension persist in the Far East.”11

Later that week, newspapers reported that a “high Foreign Office official” had set 1970
as the date by which the return of the Bonin Islands and Okinawa had to be settled.12
Miki was asked about this the following week by Socialist Party member Mori Motojiro,
a former reporter and secretary to Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu (May 1947–March
1948), in the upper house Foreign Affairs Committee.13 He responded to the effect that it
was an issue in which a date could not be set unilaterally. It was necessary, Miki stated, “to
continue talks with the United States to harmonize the strong national wish for return of
the Okinawa and Bonin Islands with the military role that the islands are playing for the
security and stability of the Far East . . . In the current Far Eastern situation, immediate and
complete return of the Okinawa and Bonin Islands is impossible.” He added, however, that
the government would study “every possibility if not all possibilities” to “realize the national
wish” of the return of the islands.

Because of these statements and newspaper reporting, the American embassy asked Eda-
mura to explain if the Japanese government intended to take some initiative on these questions.
He denied that was the case, and said that Miki’s comments were meant to end speculation
that something was in the offing. The embassy informed the State Department that it agreed
that the “current escalation of public attention” was not the result of deliberate actions on the
part of the Japanese government, and was “possibly premature in terms of the GOJ’s [Government
of Japan’s] own timetable” in determining its position on the issues of the Bonins and
Okinawa.14 Nevertheless, the embassy felt that the publicity would stir up public interest in
the issue, and noted that it seemed to be doing so in the United States as well, citing The Wash-
ington Post editorial of 26 May 1967.15 It encouraged U.S. officials to make no statements on
the issue, as the American position had been made clear in the past.
This attention to the issue probably bothered Johnson more than the embassy’s telegram let on. He was a believer in “quiet diplomacy,” avoiding “television appearances, press conferences, and other splashy events” in favor of “more normal and mature relations.” He probably would have liked Japan to conduct the discussions on the Bonins issue out of the public spotlight. In an oral history, he noted that one of the “greatest difficulties” he had in working in Japan was the “impossibility of conversations,” or, as he said, “the great difficulty of having any private conversations.” It was not possible, he continued,

without very elaborate arrangements for me to meet with the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister without having the press aware of this, and many of our meetings and discussions, have been carried on through intermediaries. When we’ve had private meetings, we’ve had to do this in hotel rooms and out at villas and other places. The press here in Japan follows these people very closely, they follow me closely, and I find it very difficult to have private conversations with the government here. Even when I think it’s private, things leak to the press in one way or the other . . . I have found that almost everything I say, everything I do, eventually appears in newspaper headlines here, even though I’d hoped at times that it would not.

As alluded to by Johnson, Miki sought to accommodate the ambassador’s style by arranging for the two to meet secretly at the New Otani Hotel on the morning of 15 July. Johnson brought with him Lewis M. Purnell, counselor of the Political Section, and interpreter James J. Wickel. Miki had Ushiba Nobuhiko, vice minister of foreign affairs, Togo Fumihiko, director of the Bureau of North American Affairs, Edamura, and interpreter Watanabe Makoto by his side. Miki had wanted to discuss an aide-mémoire submitted to the embassy the day before and to request that Johnson forward it to the State Department. Although it described the issue of the bases in Okinawa and their status as the main question between the two countries, as Johnson expected, the Japanese simply asked what the American minimum requirements were.

Johnson was no doubt frustrated, as he had been trying since his arrival in Japan the year before to get the Japanese government to begin thinking not about the “minimum the United States can get along with, but rather what is the maximum which is desirable to both of us.” In his memoirs, Johnson stated that the Japanese

fully expected us to take the lead in figuring out how best to protect Japan [but] they seemed to take for granted that the best thing for Japan was to bargain us down on our base rights as far as we could be made to go. Japan’s attitude, I thought, was immature, contrary to its own long-term interest and certainly contrary to continued healthy relations with the United States . . . The Japanese were trying to have their cake and eat it too, taking the benefits of American military protection without acknowledging they really wanted it or assuming any concomitant responsibilities. I believed it was time for Japan to come to its own conclusions about the role it wanted to play, and wanted us to play, in the security of East Asia, and take responsibility for them.

In addition to the Okinawa question, Miki asked about the Bonin Islands, to which his aide-mémoire also referred. The unsigned nine-page document, which called for the two governments “to explore means of solution to the problems of Okinawa and the Bonins on
the basis of their common interest in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East region, and for the purpose of maintaining and further developing friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries,” noted about the Bonins:24

(2) As regards Ogasawara:

To reach an understanding that the administration over Ogasawara be returned to Japan, and to make necessary arrangements for this end:

In view of the seemingly limited military significance of Ogasawara, it is difficult for the Japanese side to understand the reason why the United States should retain the administrative right on Ogasawara. Moreover, as there is a fact that a part of the former residents who have the Caucasian origin were allowed to return to the islands soon after the war, it is extremely difficult to persuade the Japanese people to accept the continuation of the present situation concerning the problems of the return of the former residents to the islands or the restoration of the administration to Japan.

If it is possible to have the former residents return to the islands, it would of course be welcome. However, as it might give rise to troublesome problems in relation to the administration over these residents, it is more pertinent to take another step forward so as to agree to an early restoration of the administration to Japan, and make necessary arrangements for it, including the examination of the United States military facilities to be continued on Ogasawara.

The return of the administrative right over Ogasawara would be a concrete proof of good faith of the United States and would strengthen the belief on the part of the Japanese that it will be possible to solve the problem of Okinawa also within the context of the relationship of mutual trust between Japan and the United States.

Miki stated it was only “common sense to recognize a difference” between the Bonins and Okinawa.25 Johnson privately agreed with him on this question, but felt it was premature to tell him so as he needed to gain the acceptance of CINCPAC and others in the U.S. government. According to a telegram he sent after the meeting, Johnson limited his comments at this point to agreeing with Miki that the question of repatriation of the islanders should not be considered until the question of the islands administration was determined.26

Johnson’s thinking on the issue was more complex than his comment suggested. According to his memoirs, the ambassador was convinced that whatever arrangements were made, they would set a “very firm precedent” for Okinawa and thus it was necessary to “take care over the fine print.”27 In the same passage, Johnson—who had served as the American consul in Yokohama at the time the islanders of Western descent made their request through the consulate to return to the Bonin Islands in late 1945—referred to the need for reimbursement of U.S. facilities Japan took over and protection of the islanders’ economic
rights” whose welfare the United States was representing. Although he did not specifically mention it here, the United States also had to ensure base rights as well, including the positioning or reintroduction of nuclear weapons. “By maintaining a tough façade on the Bonins,” Johnson wrote, “we might induce some concessions from Japan that would be invaluable on Okinawa.” Another key concern of his and the State Department was the timing of the return. If it was hastened, pressure from the Japanese public and government might increase for the return of Okinawa, rather than decrease, thus “diminishing our room to maneuver.” U.S. officials, as noted earlier, had been greatly concerned that the return of the Amami Islands might result in increasing expectations, rather than diminishing them. Indeed, initially, that was precisely what did happen.

Johnson had probed Japanese officials on this question before. At a private lunch with Vice Foreign Minister Ushiba on 21 June, Johnson was told that there was “no question whatever in [Ushiba’s] mind that if [reversion] could be done, it would help somewhat to relieve rather than to increase the pressure on Okinawa, because it would demonstrate that the GOJ was ‘doing something’ about these problems.” Still not certain, Johnson asked about Miki’s intentions, to which Ushiba replied that he did not think Miki would raise it with Secretary David Dean Rusk “in any definitive form” during their talks in September, but would probably wish to have an informal discussion on the issue prior to the prime minister’s visit in November. Miki viewed the talks he wanted to have with Johnson in the same light, according to Ushiba, who explained at the outset of the lunch that the Foreign Ministry was working on a paper on Okinawa (and the Bonins), and which Miki would want to discuss with the ambassador.

Johnson seemed uncertain how to respond on the issue of the Bonins’ connection with Okinawan reversion sentiments. On the one hand, he probably wished to believe Ushiba and Miki. In a telegram a week later, he noted that the talks Miki desired would “of course be of very preliminary nature and he will not necessarily be expecting any definitive answers on my part.” At the same time, he did express his hope that the department would provide some guidelines on Johnson’s “preliminary and ‘personal’ replies,” suggesting that he realized the issue would likely continue to grow. Indeed, Miki’s raising the issue in the way he did in July suggests his government was going to push for reversion of the Bonin Islands.

Johnson was also watching public sentiment in Japan, as the earlier concerns about the Diet interpellation and newspaper reporting of it had suggested, and mentioned to Ushiba his meeting with Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi, who had recently been elected. Minobe raised the issue of repatriation of the islanders, many of whom continued to live in Tokyo, with the ambassador. Minobe, a Marxist economics professor from Hosei University in Tokyo, who ran with the backing of the Socialists and Communists, served for three terms (until 1979), before entering the upper house.

As time went on, Diet and public interest did in fact grow. On 21 July, two resolutions were passed in the Special Committee on the Okinawa Problem, Et Cetera (Okinawa Mondaito ni Kansuru Tokubestu Iinkai) in both houses of the Diet. While generally similar, including calls for the “prompt” and “early” reversion of the Bonin Islands and Okinawa, the latter resolution went into more detail on the Bonins question, calling for the repatriation of the islanders and assistance in their resettlement.
In Washington, DC, meanwhile, similar interest was being raised. Ambassador Shimoda Takezo, who had arrived on 20 June, paid a call on Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy on 10 July, where he raised the issue of Okinawa and the Bonins “at length.” Shimoda wanted to sound out Bundy and his colleagues on their views, and let them know about Japanese thinking on the reversion of Okinawa. He mentioned there were two schools of thought—one called the “enclave theory” by which the United States would retain administrative rights over the base areas with the rest of the islands being returned to Japan, and the second, a special arrangement by which the islands would be returned without a prior consultation clause applied to them. Shimoda had publicly spoken out on the latter idea, called the “Shimoda concept,” in Diet testimony, and told Bundy that he believed the prime minister, Sato Eisaku, also supported it. In either case, both formulas would “provide the U.S. 100 percent freedom in use of bases.” Shimoda added that he felt the return of the islands could occur before the end of the Vietnam War and an agreement on returning the islands should occur before 1970.

Regarding the Bonin Islands, Shimoda explained the “seriousness of the potential pressures” of the problem, and said that the government considered it separate from Okinawa. The ambassador also said the Foreign Ministry thought that repatriation of the islanders would invite more problems than it would solve, and for that reason also favored pursuing reversion directly. In response to questions about the impact an early return of the Bonins would have on Okinawa, Shimoda acknowledged that it might make Okinawans feel they had been “sacrificed” in a deal between the two governments. In any case, he asked if the United States would be able to respond to a “concrete” Japanese proposal when Miki visited in September. Bundy replied that it would require “serious study” and that he would respond in the future.

Several in the U.S. government had already been thinking along the lines of the need to return the islands, particularly as they saw the Bonins issue, and that of Okinawa, “coming to a head” prior to the visit of Sato, scheduled in the fall. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), for example, Policy Planning Staff Director Morton Halperin recommended in late May 1967 to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs John T. McNaughton that the U.S. government should move ahead “with plans for reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins” prior to 1970. Halperin admitted to his boss, who had been in the Battle of Okinawa, that this would necessitate not only “overruling” the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), but “require convincing” the State Department that it was important to remove this “major irritant” to the bilateral relationship as well as to secure a “Japanese commitment to participate with us in responsibility for the region.” Halperin was optimistic that the timetable he spelled out in the memorandum could be met and, that in preparing for the Miki and Sato visits in September and November respectively, it was necessary to lay the ground work.

Halperin’s Policy Planning Staff was undergoing reorganization at the time. A Plans Division, one of three established under the staff, was charged with studying the question of the reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins. As director of the planning staff, Halperin was to represent OSD at an interagency committee that was to consider the question. In the meantime, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, at Halperin’s and MacNaugh-
ton’s urging, had asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now headed by U.S. Army General Earle G. Wheeler, to examine the utility of the Bonin Islands.46 The JCS report was completed on 29 June.47

Despite some further interagency work, Bundy eventually informed Ambassador Johnson on 14 August that the government would not have an answer for him prior to his departure for the United States on 28 August on the eve of Miki’s visit. Bundy suggested that the ambassador tell the foreign minister that Secretary of State Rusk would be prepared to discuss the Japanese government’s proposals when Miki arrived.48 The issue, Bundy told Johnson, was not just U.S. military requirements but those of Japan and the region, something that Johnson had been trying to impress upon the foreign minister.

The same day the telegram went out, Bundy met with Secretary Rusk about the Okinawa and Bonins issue, and it was agreed that a National Security Council meeting would be held prior to Miki’s visit.49 It was two weeks later, at noon on 31 August, when the NSC took up the question of the reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins.50 Ambassador Johnson attended, in addition to the president, his cabinet, and National Security Adviser Walt R. Rostow.51 After identifying the topics to be discussed, the president noted that the upcoming visits of the foreign minister in September and the prime minister in November made consideration of matters particularly urgent. The meeting focused on Okinawa for the most part, but the Bonins question came up as well. Secretary Rusk argued that action on the Bonins would “take much heat out of” the Ryukyus question.52 Ambassador Johnson pointed out that the issue was not the removal of the bases; indeed, the Japanese government desired that the United States retain its bases (under the Mutual Security Treaty). Instead, according to the ambassador, Sato sought the return of the Bonins, and “something on the Ryukyus that would look like movement,” perhaps with the issue being settled by 1970. When the president asked what the United States would get out of it, the ambassador said that, without any forward motion, it might end up with a hostile government. This was not the answer Johnson was looking for, and he repeated his question. “We always seem to think of what is necessary or good for others,” he questioned aloud, but, “what was in it for the United States?” The president’s question generated a long debate. Ambassador Johnson began by saying that the United States could get Japan to assume larger security responsibilities in the region. While direct military assistance was “not realistic,” he did see Japan playing a “greater political role.” “We need,” he continued, “to involve them more with us in Asia.” When the president asked if Japan could assist economically with the balance of payments problem, the ambassador said he was unsure of that, but was certain Japan would do more in Asia. President Johnson then requested a “list of things we hoped to get from Japan.” This list (discussed below) was eventually provided to Rostow in early November.

Within Japan, Ushiba had prepared the Japanese government’s negotiating position and presented it to the prime and foreign ministers on 8 August, according to an Asahi Shimbun story published shortly thereafter.53 The story stated that the government would grant the United States free use of bases upon the return of the islands, but would not permit the storage of nuclear weapons in Okinawa. It also reported that the government would seek a commitment to begin talks on the return of the Bonins. When asked about the story by the
embassy, Togo denied that any one official gave the reporter a verbatim account, but instead that the “bright young man” had pieced together what he thought to be the story.

On 16 August, Sato met with the Okinawa Mondaito Kondankai (Council of Advisors on Okinawa and Other Problems) for their first meeting since its reconstitution as an advisory body directly under the prime minister. (Previously, it had been under the director general of the prime minister’s office.) Symbolic of the importance of the Bonins, the council’s name, which had been limited to “Okinawa Problem” prior to its reconstitution now included “and other problems,” to represent Ogasawara and the Northern Islands. Sato told the council that “control by a foreign power 22 years after the end of WWII was ‘unnatural’” and that “the continued administration of the islands might impair future U.S.-Japan cooperation in defense of East Asia.” During the course of their one-hour meeting and lunch, Sato also said he intended to take up the issue during his official visit in November and asked the council to produce an interim report before he left for Washington. His comments were reported in the 17 August New York Times and by Reuters. Okikon, as the advisory council was known, subsequently released its “Interim Report on the Problem of the Return of Administrative Rights over Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands (Okinawa oyobi Ogasawara Shoto no Shiseiken Henkan Mondai ni tsuite no Chukan Hokoku),” on 1 November.

Sato and Miki met a number of times prior to the latter’s departure in mid-September, including a final meeting on the issue of the islands at Sato’s home on Saturday, 9 September. A week later, on 14 September, Miki, along with Ambassador Shimoda and other Foreign Ministry officials, were meeting with their American counterparts at the State Department for a two-and-a-half hour discussion in the afternoon. Their talks covered five subjects, including the territories of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands. Miki described the issue as “the most important problem” in the bilateral relationship. He explained that while the reversion of Okinawa “need not be immediate,” it was necessary to prepare for it so that the reversion could be accomplished by 1970. On the complicated question of the Bonins Islands, Miki added, the “majority of opinion” in Japan felt that the United States could return the islands “as soon as it wishes,” and that the bases could “easily” be maintained under the SOFA and Security Treaty. When asked by Rusk, who did not seem to disagree with the above assessment, if the return of the Bonin Islands would “make the Okinawa situation more difficult,” Miki responded he did “not believe there would be a bad effect by first resolving the problem of the Bonins.” Miki and Rusk would take up this issue again a couple of days later, but in the meantime, a comment by a prominent U.S. senator visiting Japan highlighted the Bonins situation.

Senator Michael J. Mansfield (D-MT), the influential majority leader and someone with a long-time interest in the region, spoke out on the question of the Bonins and Okinawa during the first Shimoda Conference on 15 September 1967. Also known as the Japan-American Assembly, the conference was an early example of Track II diplomacy—a forum for high-level but unofficial discussions—in the bilateral relationship on issues of importance to U.S.-Japan relations. Despite the conference’s unofficial nature, President Johnson asked the State Department to prepare a memorandum for Mansfield’s use. The paper discussed the military importance of the Bonins, and in presenting it, the State
Department had asked Mansfield not to raise the Bonins-Okinawa issue unless the Japanese did.\textsuperscript{61} Because the senator took the separation of powers of the three branches of U.S. government very seriously, this request by the State Department to a member of Congress probably had the opposite effect. In any case, Mansfield made the following comment at the conference: “There are no major U.S. military installations [in the Bonins] and strategic considerations do not appear to be involved in any significant way. In sum, there would appear to be no major blocks—at least I know of none—to the restoration of the Bonins.”\textsuperscript{62}

This was not Mansfield’s first expression of interest in the subject. In January, he had asked the former ambassador to Japan, Reischauer, questions on the status of the islands, and stated at the end that he hoped “at some feasible time that we could put into operation the term ‘residual sovereignty’ so that this situation, which now exists could be corrected and the islands returned to Japan where they should be, and will be in time.”\textsuperscript{63} He followed this with a proposal that a “two-stage formula—to return the Bonin Islands first and then to settle the Okinawan problem—should preferably be followed” in light of the difficulties with returning both groups of islands simultaneously.\textsuperscript{64} Knowing his position on the issue and as a critic of the Johnson administration, the Japanese media widely reported these views and his Shimoda Conference comments.

As expected, Secretary Rusk was asked by the press about Mansfield’s comments following the conclusion of the sixth meeting of the Joint Economic Committee. Rusk emphasized that Mansfield was “speaking individually and not for the government.”\textsuperscript{65} Rusk was asked a second time about the matter. He then explained that, while it was not a subject of the cabinet meeting on trade and economic affairs, he and Miki had discussed it in some of their earlier meetings and would continue to do so over the weekend and perhaps when both were attending the UN General Assembly. “This is a matter,” Rusk recognized, “on which our two governments will continue to be in close contact.”

Later that day, Miki and his staff met with Secretary of Defense McNamara in his Pentagon office. Ambassador Johnson, Halperin, and interpreter Wickel joined them. Miki stated that the military importance of Okinawa was well understood, but most Japanese felt that the Bonins were different and therefore could be resolved earlier.\textsuperscript{66} McNamara agreed the Bonins issue was probably easier to resolve, but he did not know exactly how to do so, but expressed his willingness to continue talks on the problem.

Miki also met with Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey Jr. that day. Both liberals and party men, the two had struck up a friendship and relationship of trust over the past decade. They both promised to work together should the other win in their respective elections: “If we both win, Japanese-American relations should go very well indeed.”\textsuperscript{67} Miki later acknowledged his indebtedness to Humphrey. He had felt that his talks with the U.S. side had not been going well and had grown increasingly concerned about how to proceed. Humphrey encouraged him with the exhortation to “try making one more push,”\textsuperscript{68} and said that he believed something could be worked out in a “short time span.”\textsuperscript{69}

The next day, Rusk and Ambassador Johnson met with Miki and Shimoda. Much of the discussion focused on domestic public opinion and political calendars of both countries, including the 1968 U.S. presidential election and the start of the new administration in
January 1969, as well as the situation with the Vietnam War and the attitude of Congress. As a result, Rusk stated, the United States would be “unable to give an answer on Okinawa before 1969 at the earliest . . . There is no possibility of reversion in the immediate future.” Miki responded that he hoped the joint communiqué by Sato and Johnson would show that both governments were committed to eventual return of the islands, and stressed that it was “essential to demonstrate some progress” on the questions before them. Miki suggested the return of the Bonin Islands at this point.

Rusk said he would be willing to consider “a formulation” that made clear the United States “anticipate[d] reversion” of Okinawa to Japan, premised on the security role of Okinawa not being negatively impacted. With regard to the Bonin Islands, Rusk raised the same question Johnson had asked a few months before—would the return of the Bonins make the Okinawa situation more difficult, with Okinawans asking, “Why not us, too?” Rusk asked a second question as well. Explaining that Iwo Jima was a “special case” with “special aspects” that placed it in a “special category,” especially “while there was a war in progress,” Rusk asked if Iwo Jima could be separated from the other islands were they to be returned. “It is important,” the secretary stressed, “not to give those in Peking any impression that the United States is withdrawing from its position and its commitments during this period. Otherwise they may miscalculate and this would present a danger to Japan and the United States.” Miki did not directly respond to Rusk’s suggestion, but explained that he believed the return of the Bonin Islands would not “adversely affect” U.S. security capabilities, and would be “an expression of goodwill and would demonstrate progress in this area.” He also reemphasized the political necessity in Japan for a solution to the reversion issue: “The prime minister’s political future as well as that of the Government of Japan depends on making some progress toward this problem.”

It was not only Miki who emphasized the importance of resolving the Bonins problem. Kuraishi Tadao, agriculture and forestry minister and a member of the Fukuda Takeo faction (formerly Kishi Nobusuke faction), raised the issue with Bundy at the cabinet meetings during a coffee break at the very outset of the bilateral talks on the morning of 13 September. Kuraishi—who Bundy believed was asking about U.S. views on the situation on the direct instructions from Sato and the top leadership of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—stressed that if it were possible to make “even a little” progress on the Bonin Islands, it would have a favorable effect on the “atmosphere in Japan.”

According to Johnson, although Miki “was unaware of it at the time,” it was the Bonins issue on which “the most substantial progress was made” during the foreign minister’s visit. As the above meetings were going on, Ambassador Johnson was meeting privately with Secretary Rusk, members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary McNamara, as well as attending a full National Security Council meeting. He noted that, while the Navy continued to argue that the Bonin Islands remained important in case the United States “were driven from the rest of the Far East,” the remainder of the joint chiefs, Secretary McNamara, and civilian officials at DOD agreed with “State’s position.” Johnson left Washington “fairly certain” that the return of the islands could be announced during Sato’s visit in November. On the return to Japan, Ambassador Johnson stopped off in Honolulu to brief Admiral Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, then CINCPAC, about the talks with Miki and
the evolution of thinking on Okinawa and the Bonins in Washington. While Johnson does not mention it in his memoirs, Robert A. Fearey, who was then serving as the State Department political advisor to CINCPAC, was keeping Sharp up-to-date about the department’s thinking on the issue.

Several weeks after the Miki visit, Ambassador Shimoda sounded out the U.S. side once again. Shimoda was preparing to return to Japan for consultations on Sato’s upcoming trip to the United States. After summarizing the U.S. position as he understood it, Shimoda laid out the basic thinking on the Japanese side and explained that his government “urgently hopes for at least more advanced steps” on the Bonins. Bundy stated the United States “appreciated the GOJ[‘s] hopes on Bonins” and confirmed the U.S. “readiness . . . to take a hard look at Bonins as action separate from Ryukyus.” He stressed, however, that no final decision had been made and mentioned that the government remained concerned any action on the issue would, instead of being considered a step forward, actually “increase pressures in Japan for Ryukyu reversion.”

A few days later, Washington was visited by retired Admiral Hoshina Zenshiro, who had been elected to the Diet in 1955 and subsequently served as the chairman of the LDP’s Security Research Council (Jiminto Anzen Bosho Chosakai). Hoshina—a hawk on defense issues particularly as they related to Okinawa and the need for the United States to maintain nuclear weapons as part of its nuclear umbrella for Japan there—was designated by Sato to help push the U.S. side, particularly the Navy, to accept reversion of the Bonin Islands. It was hoped that this former Imperial Navy man, who was instrumental in working with the United States in building up the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, would be able to convince his Navy counterparts to go along. Over the course of more than a decade and a half, Hoshina had maintained a good relationship with many U.S. Navy figures, including retired Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, head of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which he helped found in 1962 as the Center for Strategic Studies, then located at Georgetown University. Burke had served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961, and over the years had been a conduit for bilateral relations, introducing, for example, Hoshina to Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, who had just assumed the position of CNO in August. Moorer was at Pearl Harbor and had a bad relationship with McNamara, particularly for what he saw as political leaders’ interference in military decisions as well as McNamara starving the Navy budget and not replacing aging ships. He was the third CNO—after Leahy and Radford—to become chairman of the JCS. He also served in Japan as Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, from October 1962 to June 1964, and then in Hawaii, as Commander, Pacific Fleet, from June 1964 to March 1965. Getting the U.S. Navy on board was crucial for the Japanese government—the service controlled the administration of the islands and its submarines and ships used Chichi Jima to support its Pacific strategy.

Hoshina first called on Halperin at the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 2 October to discuss the security treaty in addition to the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands. He cautioned the United States to handle the problem of Okinawa and the Bonins “astutely,” warning “it would become an emotional problem which would damage relations between the two countries” if it did not. While Hoshina was cautious on Okinawa, he felt that admin-
istrative rights over the Bonin Islands could be returned immediately. He alluded to the racially motivated policy with regard to the islanders, stating the “Japanese people had doubts about U.S. intentions.”82 Calling the Bonins problem a “political matter rather than a military problem,” he pointed out that “failure to resolve the issue would irritate Japanese sentiments” and urged President Johnson to tell Prime Minister Sato when he arrived in November that the United States would agree to return the islands.83

Later in the week, on 5 October, Hoshina met with State Department officials Richard L. Sneider and Richard R. Hart, both in the office of Japan affairs. Hoshina again stressed national sentiment in Japan. He stated that the return of the Bonin Islands would be of “mutual benefit,” including leading to, among other things, the “relax[ation of] Japanese pressures for the reversion of Okinawa.”84 He added that Japan would be able to undertake greater security responsibilities in the Bonins area, including antisubmarine warfare activities in the Western Pacific. While Sneider did not comment, this was one of the critical points the U.S. side wanted to hear. No doubt, Hoshina had gotten some cues from his interaction during the week with Burke and Moorer.

Around the same time in Tokyo, Miki, who had returned to Japan on 25 September, spoke at an America-Japan Society luncheon on 5 October. He pointed out that, while the United States appeared reluctant to discuss the reversion of Okinawa until the Vietnam War had ended, Japanese feelings “demand early return” regardless of the Vietnam problem. He further expressed his view that it was “important for each side to place itself in the position of the other.”85

Next, I would like to turn to the problem of Okinawa and Ogasawara. To what extent does the United States understand Japan’s position in this matter? I believe that Secretary of State Rusk understands the national sentiment of the Japanese people in seeking an early return of these islands. However, as far as the general public and the Congress of the United States is concerned, the problem of utmost concern is the war in Vietnam. We must recognize that they do not have such great interest in the problem of Okinawa. Not only that, the United States considers the military importance of Okinawa as vital in the security of the entire Far East area. It believes that any weakening of the military effectiveness of Okinawa, resulting from its return to Japan, should be avoided. Of course, for Japan also, the handling of the Okinawa problem is a vital security issue. The keystone of Japan’s security lies in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Needless to say, this coincides with the interests of our two countries. However, we must recognize that the respective views and positions of Japan and the United States are not identical. I am convinced that this problem can be adjusted if both our countries approach it from the basis of our mutual goal of strengthening United States-Japanese relations. It was with this thought in mind that I said recently in Washington that I was neither optimistic nor pessimistic. This question will be fully discussed at the highest level of government when Prime Minister Sato meets President Johnson in November. Until then, we in the Foreign Ministry will undertake all the necessary spadework in preparation for this meeting. So long as both sides exercise care and consideration in the conduct of U.S.-Japan relations, I believe that a just solution to the prob-
problem will inevitably be found. Toward this end, the leaders and the peoples of both countries must approach the problem with wisdom and reason. We all realize that matters of great importance cannot be settled in a day. But I have high hopes that the coming talks between our Prime Minister and President Johnson will mean a major step forward toward an overall solution of this problem.  

Ambassador Johnson also attended the meeting, undertaking some diplomacy on the sidelines of this unofficial gathering. Miki informed him that he had been meeting with Sato on the Okinawa problem and the wording of the joint communiqué to be released in November, expressing his hope to meet with Johnson the following week to begin work on the document. In his telegram to Rusk, Johnson expressed praise for Miki’s comments on Vietnam, in which Miki said it would be a “dangerous gamble” for the United States to stop bombing North Vietnam without a guarantee that the latter would come to the peace table, and called on North Vietnam’s friends to act as guarantors that it would “come to the table for productive talks.” Johnson said the comments should be read as a response to statements made to Miki in Washington that Japan needed to assume a “larger degree of political responsibility in this part of the world.” He also noted that Miki’s comments, which were similar to those that Sato had recently made in Bangkok, were a “reflection of the very healthy effect” Sato’s trip had had on the prime minister, too.

**Toward a Joint Communiqué**

As Miki had alluded, the first round of talks on the joint communiqué began on 11 October. At their two-hour meeting, he handed Ambassador Johnson a copy of the version of the draft communiqué that the Japanese had prepared for discussion purposes, which Johnson subsequently forwarded to Washington.

Symbolic of the importance that the prime minister placed on the problem of the Bonin Islands and Okinawa, much of the draft was devoted to those subjects:

The President and the Prime Minister frankly discussed the matter of reversion of the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands. The Prime Minister emphasized that it is unnatural and abnormal that the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands, which are Japanese territories and their residents who are Japanese nationals, are still, 22 years after the end of the war, placed under the administrative right of the United States, and that the national sentiment of the Japanese people will not be able to leave such a situation indefinitely. He then expressed his conviction, from the standpoint of further strengthening friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries, that the time has come to seek an adequate solution to the problem of reversion of the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands on the basis of mutual understanding and trust between the governments and peoples of the two countries . . . On the question of the Ogasawara Islands, the President stated that, recognizing that it is possible to return the administrative right over the Nampo Shoto (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island without hampering the security interests of the free world in the Far East, the United States government is prepared to return the administrative right over these
islands to the Japanese government as testimony to the good faith of the United States government. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to this decision of the President, and stated that the return of the administration right over these islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but also help reinforcing the conviction of the Japanese people that the problem of the return of the administrative right over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries. The President and Prime Minister agreed that the two governments enter immediately into consultations to make necessary arrangements for the implementation of the return of the Ogasawara Islands.\textsuperscript{92}

In his accompanying telegram, Ambassador Johnson informed the State Department that he emphasized to Miki that one of the U.S. government’s main concerns was the relationship between the Bonins reversion and the Okinawa question. Miki, Johnson wrote, stated that both the foreign minister and the prime minister felt the return of the Bonins would enable the Sato government to better deal with the “public opinion problem” on the Ryukyus by demonstrating that the United States was not interested in keeping administrative rights over the Article 3 islands but did so only for security factors.\textsuperscript{98} Johnson explained that he had asked if the Japanese government “could and would” use the return of the Bonins “to buy time on the Ryukyus.”\textsuperscript{94} Miki replied that the “government would and could use it to buy time because this would enable the government to show ‘the goodwill’ of the U.S. . . . Since Okinawa and Ogasawara will be the focus of attention for [the] prime minister’s visit and since they will be unable to say when Okinawa will be returned, it would be most helpful in dealing with [the] overall problem to have a commitment on Ogasawara in November.”\textsuperscript{95}

Johnson also asked about separating Iwo Jima from the islands to be returned. The foreign minister responded that “it would be very difficult to exempt” Iwo Jima as it would “blunt the effect of the return of the remainder of the islands.” Miki stated (according to the U.S. telegram) that the “airbase on Iwo could be ‘left’ under the security treaty.”\textsuperscript{96} He also said that he was aware of U.S. public opinion problems on the question, however, and thought “some special arrangement” might be possible.\textsuperscript{97} Miki did not provide specifics and limited his comment to saying the GOJ “could consider ‘some measures’ to meet U.S. national sentiment.”\textsuperscript{98} Next, Johnson asked about Japan’s assuming a greater defense role, referring to a statement at the Security Subcommittee in May.\textsuperscript{99} Miki said it was “only natural” that the Japanese government would take on additional defense responsibilities, and thus the prime minister needed to be prepared to assure President Johnson on this question, but it would take some time for the government to firm up its position.\textsuperscript{100}

The following week, Johnson wrote to ask the State Department for its guidance on the Bonins question, as he was scheduled to meet Miki again shortly. He stated that he believed the United States “would not seek a decision on the Bonins” until immediately before Sato’s arrival in Washington, and it was seen how far Japan had come in “matters of interest to us.”\textsuperscript{101} Johnson was uncertain whether if by discussing other matters, he was “leading them down the garden path to think there is some real hope of getting the Bonin Islands if they came through on these matters,” or if he “shut the door firmly on the Bonins,” the United
States would get less cooperation on these other matters. If the door was going to be shut, Johnson urged that Sato be told “sooner rather than later” and be prepared for the “considerable” consequences.

By chance, Johnson received a telegram from the State Department about the communiqué the same day, but it did not reference his telegram, and his did not reference the department’s, and so it seems they just missed each other. The State Department, after examining the draft communiqué sent by Johnson on 11 October, replied that while it was “disappointing in some respects,” the department nevertheless realized it was simply an “opening gambit” by the Japanese government. Regarding the Bonins, the department told Johnson it supported his preliminary comments to Miki and mentioned that it assumed the Japanese government understood that the U.S. had made no commitment on the return of the Bonin Islands.

The next day, on 18 October, Ambassador Shimoda, who had recently returned from Tokyo, called on Bundy. The assistant secretary told him that the department had just sent off its comments to Ambassador Johnson the evening before and stated many of the same reservations regarding the communiqué that Johnson had told the foreign minister. These included the fact that the United States had made no final decision on return of the islands, the concern it had over the failure of the Japanese government in making special provisions for Iwo Jima, and the desire to see Japan assuming additional defense responsibilities connected with the return of the Bonin Islands.

Later that week, on Saturday, 21 October, Togo handed Purnell a copy of an aide-mémoire on the Bonins that had been promised by Miki earlier. The seven-page document builds on the earlier one of 15 July, and tries to answer the question of whether the reversion of the Bonins will stimulate the calls for the reversion of Okinawa by stating,

It should be borne in mind that the movements for the return of the administrative right over Okinawa still continue to gather momentum regardless of actions which might be taken in respect of Ogasawara . . . It is believed, in these circumstances, that the consideration for the temporary impact which the return of Ogasawara might give to the urge for the return of Okinawa should not let us lose sight of the far more basic question . . . namely, the question of how the Government of Japan should best be able to persuade the people with confidence and in good conscience, in order to handle the problem of Okinawa wisely, that they should seek a solution of the problem within the context of the friendly relationship between the two countries . . . Since the announcement on the return of the administration of Ogasawara is expected this time to be combined with that on the basic understanding on the intension of the United States to return the administrative right over Okinawa, the Government of Japan will be in an even better position than at the time of the reversion of the Amami Oshima Group to tell the public that the return of Ogasawara is a concrete proof of the good faith of the United States.

The Japanese government’s aide-mémoire also covered other issues that Johnson had raised, including the status of Iwo Jima and Japanese defense responsibilities.
Regarding the former, the Japanese government stated that, while it understood that “a special sentiment may exist” among Americans concerning Iwo Jima, both countries had developed relations with one another “rising above the hard experiences of the past war.” Further, it would be “out of tune with our present relationship” to separate Iwo Jima due to those sentiments and the memories of the war. It cautioned that such an action would only result in “reducing the overall political gains to be obtained” from reversion. Nevertheless, the aide-mémoire suggested ways of meeting U.S. sentiment on the question of Iwo Jima, such as erecting a memorial or building a memorial park commemorating the “courage and dedication” of the United States Marine Corps, and perhaps doing so as a “joint project of some form” by the two countries. “Such [a] memorial,” the paper went on, “should in our view be meant to commemorate the bravery of not only American but also Japanese soldiers, as well as to symbolize the present and future peace and friendship between our two countries.”

With regard to military use of the islands, the document explained that the Japanese government was prepared to have the United States retain the necessary military facilities in the Bonins area “under the terms” of the mutual security treaty and to enter into consultations on “detailed arrangements.” With regard to the question of Japan’s assumption of a greater defense role, the communication noted the government’s intention to use the islands as air and sea bases for the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) to maintain the security of the sea transportation route to and from Japan. Doing so, it explained, “will help strengthen the defense posture of the free world in this part of the world.” The paper said the United States would be informed of the detailed plan “in due course.”

Purnell asked if all of Iwo Jima could be retained as an air base. Togo, admitting that the government had not considered it and thus he did not dismiss the idea, responded that such a situation would have to be justified on security needs and doubted that a convincing case could be made to the public. Togo privately felt that continued administration of the islands itself was “strange” and would only lead to the problem growing. Johnson, in commenting on Togo’s explanation and on the aide-mémoire in his telegram to the State Department, said he was inclined to agree that retaining Iwo Jima would “significantly detract here from value of the Bonins reversion.” Togo also elaborated on the idea of a joint memorial park for Iwo Jima, explaining that the government was willing to include all of Mt. Suribachi and indicating that an arrangement similar to the John F. Kennedy Memorial, dedicated in 1965 in the United Kingdom at Runnymede, could be worked out by which land was deeded to binational trustees. Togo also mentioned the possibility of turning over a portion of the park, if necessary, to the American Battle Monuments Commission, a federal agency established in 1923 after World War I to help maintain U.S. military cemeteries in foreign countries, among other duties. Johnson liked the idea of a joint memorial park as well, and thought it would be “most welcome” in Japan. Perhaps, for the same reason, he wrote that he did not like the alternative plan for the granting of land exclusively for the battle monuments commission, desiring to keep the project joint. He was also encouraged to see the “clear statement” of Japanese intentions to use the MSDF to help protect the sea lanes. This was exactly the type of more proactive role he had been encouraging Japan to take over the past year.

Another type of memorial or, better put, tribute was being discussed this same day. Sadly, former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had passed away the day before, on 20 Oc-
Johnson had hoped for an answer early but Bundy wrote on the 24th that they were unable to provide guidance at this point on the Ryukyus and Bonins, and would have to do so later in the week.\textsuperscript{119} In the meantime, Miki asked the ambassador to meet on Saturday morning, 28 October, for approximately one hour to discuss Washington’s reaction to their meeting on 11 October, and to share with Johnson a new aide-mémoire on Japan’s defense plans for the Bonin Islands. Johnson felt the document would be “very useful” and promised to forward it to Washington.\textsuperscript{120} Prefacing his comments that he was without instructions,\textsuperscript{121} Johnson then took up the question of Iwo Jima in an attempt to explain that it was a “matter of real concern” in Washington, as Rusk had indicated to Miki.\textsuperscript{122} The foreign minister, in turn, stated that he felt the joint memorial park would be a “good symbol of the new cooperative U.S.-Japan relationship,” and urged Johnson to inform the department of the importance of including Iwo Jima in the reversion of the Bonins as the Japanese government needed such “evidence of U.S. good will to demonstrate to the Japanese people U.S. good intentions in order to bring them along for solution of the Okinawa problem.”\textsuperscript{123} After Johnson explained in more detail American concerns about Iwo Jima, Miki repeated his government’s views and then asked that the United States “try to see the Japanese point of view and he would try to understand ours.”\textsuperscript{124} Regarding the question of the airfield on Iwo Jima, Togo, who was also in attendance, interjected that the United States would retain control of it under the security treaty, with the Japanese being given joint use. Eventually the airstrip would be turned over to the Japanese government, with U.S. forces being given joint use.

Johnson also asked if the Japanese government would be willing to be more forthcoming in the joint communiqué on economic assistance to Southeast Asia. Miki said it would be able to “improve and clarify” this portion, but would be unable to give an exact figure.\textsuperscript{125} In commenting on their talk and on the aide-mémoire sent that same day,\textsuperscript{126} Johnson said the document went “a long way” in advancing efforts to take greater responsibilities for their own defense and that of the area.\textsuperscript{127} The ambassador reaffirmed his view that insistence on retaining Iwo Jima “obviously detracts from [the] value of [the] package,” and because he doubted the “package would have any meaning for Japanese without Iwo Jima,” he urged that “this aspect be given full weight in our consideration of the Iwo Jima problem.”\textsuperscript{128} In concluding his telegram, he observed that Sato was “floundering” over how to handle the press, public opinion, and the opposition on the Okinawa question, which was
due in part to his uncertainty as to how far the United States was willing to address his desires, including for the Bonins reversion. The ambassador emphasized that the problem was important not only for Sato’s own political future, but in his ability to be “responsive” to matters of “immediate and future interest” to the United States.

By this point, it was still unclear if Miki would join the premier on his trip to the United States, but on 31 October, Sato informally decided on his participation, along with that of Chief Cabinet Secretary Kimura Toshio. According to Sato’s secretary, the prime minister had probably already decided on the people he planned to include in the reshuffled cabinet he was to form (on 25 November) after his trip, and chose some who would continue in the cabinet to accompany him. Miki’s political rivalry with Sato was already well known, and so the press and pundits speculated that his inclusion meant Sato wished for him to accept “collective responsibility” for the bilateral negotiations if they did not produce results. The official decision was made at the cabinet meeting on 2 November.

The ambassador’s telegrams and other reporting were of strong interest not only to Rusk and McNamara, but also to senior officials in the Johnson White House, such as the president’s national security advisor, Rostow. Importantly, Rostow also had his own sources of information to supplement those from the State and Defense Departments. He was in contact with Wakaizumi Kei, a young professor of international relations at Kyoto Sangyo University whom Sato employed as a personal emissary to the White House because of his lack of confidence and trust in the Foreign Ministry. Wakaizumi, then just 37 years old, had an extensive network in the United States among academics and policy makers that Sato wanted to tap into to help push the Okinawa and Bonins negotiations. One of those contacts was Rostow, formerly a professor of economics and history at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an individual with a rich history in policy matters. Wakaizumi was not originally connected to the Okinawa question; he was a specialist on arms control and security policy. In 1966, he had the opportunity to brief Sato on the type of response Japan should take to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Sato, who regularly consulted with scholars and experts, appeared to take a liking to Wakaizumi. In July, Fukuda Takeo, the secretary general of the LDP and a close confidante of Sato, asked Wakaizumi to sound out Washington on the Okinawa and Bonins question.

Rostow, who had served as deputy special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs and chairman of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department, had succeeded McGeorge Bundy as national security advisor in early 1966. He had known Wakaizumi “well” since April 1965. Indeed, Rostow was the godfather of Wakaizumi’s son. With this special relationship, Wakaizumi called on Rostow on the morning of Friday, 27 October, to tell him that he was “one of a small group of advisors” to Sato, and he wanted to speak about Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, “which are absolutely critical to the future of Japanese political life and the U.S.-Japan alliance.” While he agreed that the case for retention of administrative rights was “strong,” and explained why he felt so, he also argued that “there was a good case for early reversion,” and proceeded to explain his rationale.

“The Japanese-U.S. alliance,” Wakaizumi stated, according to Rostow’s memorandum of conversation, “was more important to the security structure of the Pacific than the base
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S.-Japan Relations

He stated that Sato hoped agreement could be reached concerning the return of the islands, and mentioned that the prime minister was faced with several questions, including whether to “separate the issue of the Bonins from Okinawa, or treat the problem as a whole.” Rostow did not directly answer this question, but told Wakaizumi of the U.S. awareness of Sato’s desire for progress in the reversion questions, and explained that staff work was proceeding on the issue, but that the president had not yet made a decision. In response to a question about what Sato could bring as a “gift,” assuming he were not returning home “empty-handed,” Rostow replied that the United States would like to see stronger political support for the Vietnam War, greater economic assistance to the region and the Asian Development Bank, and any ideas the prime minister had about a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. Wakaizumi promised to tell only Sato of the conversation and flew back to Japan.

According to Sato’s diary entry, the two met on 6 November for more than one hour. That evening, he added in his diary that he was considering sending Wakaizumi again to Washington to help with the negotiations, particularly on the communiqué. Eventually, he did ask him to go.

In the meantime, Sato’s visit and the related outstanding issues were the subject of the weekly Tuesday lunch that President Johnson held with Rusk, McNamara, and other cabinet members, a format similar to that of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, which he had once chaired. The lunches, which began in February 1964, were a “deceptively informal” affair, explains the author of a book on Johnson and his approach to foreign policy. Despite meeting more than 150 times over the next five years, or twice as often as the National Security Council during that same period, “The Tuesday lunch, gave the impression of no agenda and no procedure for follow-up. In fact, it operated with a frugal support system: There was an agenda, approved by Johnson, and the National Security advisor . . . took notes. The notes were held closely, and most of the follow-up was oral.”

As the national security advisor, Rostow had to keep Johnson informed of the status of the delicate negotiations for the issues to be raised during the Sato visit. In a memorandum prepared by Alfred L. Jenkins, a State Department officer then working for the National Security Council, Jenkins shared with Rostow copies of the telegram from Ambassador Johnson’s latest meeting with Miki, as well as the defense-related aide-mémoire, and noted that Japan intended to increase its defense responsibilities as well as its economic aid to Southeast Asia. The memorandum emphasized the concerns that the ambassador had raised, namely that Sato needed guidance on U.S. intentions with regard to the islands so that he would be able to shape the debate in Japan, and that the prime minister needed a promise that the Bonins would be returned in order to “buy time against pressure for immediate return of the Ryukyus.” Paraphrasing Miki, the memo stated that the foreign minister had said that an expression of U.S. intent to return the islands, even without specifying when and how they would be returned, would meet Sato’s needs, assuming the Bonin Islands were returned soon. Finally, Jenkins informed Rostow that despite the ambassador’s “strong pitch” for retaining Iwo Jima, Ambassador Johnson had met “prompt resistance” from the foreign minister. Jenkins viewed the Iwo Jima issue as more political than military in nature, “It seems our position on Iwo Jima is based more on concerns about
[U.S.] domestic public opinion than on strategic grounds. It is hard for me to believe that [American] public opinion would not accept the return of Iwo Jima at this stage, provided something like a national monuments arrangement were worked out.” Importantly, both Secretaries Rusk and McNamara believed that it was unnecessary to separate Iwo Jima from the rest of the islands to be returned, and supported its inclusion in the reversion of the Bonin Islands. Jenkins noted the State Department’s view that, while there should be no change in this approach, it needed to be left open to reconsideration pending further consultations with the Japanese and Congress.

As planned, the Ryukyus and Bonins were one of the subjects discussed at the luncheon. After his meeting with the president and internal discussions, Rusk informed Ambassador Johnson by telegram on 1 November that pending consultations with Congress, the department wanted to leave open the question of any special arrangements especially for Iwo Jima. Rusk also told Johnson that from the military perspective, the facilities on Chichi Jima were more important to the United States than those at Iwo Jima.

That same day, Sneider of the State Department’s Japan office began drafting the language of a joint communiqué, which Rusk later shared with the president.

The President and Prime Minister also reviewed the status of the Bonin Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within the arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to the GOJ.

They, therefore, agreed that the two Governments will enter immediately into consultation regarding specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Japanese Government, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for the defense of the area. The President and Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries.

The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries, but would also help to reinforce the conviction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryuku Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries.

On 3 November, Rusk forwarded to Rostow for the president the above text of the draft summit communiqué with Sato, informing Johnson that he (Rusk), Secretary McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff “are fully agreed on the general principle” to begin immediate consultations on the return of the Bonin Islands. Rusk noted that the language in the text had been “strengthened” since he last discussed the matter with the president at their Tuesday luncheon, and said that it “fully protects whatever military needs we wish to retain.” Rusk explained that it is not necessary “for any foreseeable military purpose” to exempt Iwo Jima or Chichi Jima from the return of the islands. He concluded the memo
by saying the decision to return the islands, as reflected in the attached communiqué,\textsuperscript{158} was “a wise and essential move at this time in the overall framework of our relations with Japan, including our desire to obtain more firm Japanese support on Vietnam and favorable action by Japan particularly with respect to our balance of payments problems.”\textsuperscript{159}

Despite the agreement of Rusk and McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to oppose the actual reversion of the Bonin Islands. According to a “supplementary note” prepared by Rostow for the president, the chairman of the JCS, General Wheeler, was “personally willing to go along,” but the JCS did not agree.\textsuperscript{160} Rostow found their argument to be a “marginal position . . . an old view deep in the Pentagon; namely that to make any concession to the Japanese with respect to the Ryukyus and Bonins is to put us on a slippery slope. The fact is that the old, immediately pre-war relationship is changing and must change.”\textsuperscript{161} Rostow, like Rusk and McNamara, looked to the future of the relationship, not its past. “Our objective can only now be,” he continued, “a gradual and judicious transition into a new relationship in which the Japanese take increased responsibility as a partner as we alter the essentially occupation status on the islands. At the moment they are assuming more partnership responsibility in aide and monetary affairs; and they should do more. The transition to military partnership will take longer.”\textsuperscript{162} Rostow suggested that the president meet with Rusk, McNamara, and Wheeler, with the JCS chairman laying out the arguments of his colleagues, and if Johnson agreed with Rusk and McNamara for reversion, then to have Wheeler report to the JCS that their argument had been heard prior to making a final decision. It was an elaborate ploy, but perhaps something necessary to get their acquiescence.\textsuperscript{163}

The meeting was held the following afternoon, Saturday, 4 November. Several issues, especially Vietnam, were discussed, but toward the end of the meeting the subject turned to the Bonin Islands. Wheeler said that the JCS agreed with the need to consult with Japan on the return of the islands but felt that the proposal by Rusk and McNamara went “too far, too fast, especially with regard to Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima.”\textsuperscript{164} Wheeler added that, before the president returned administrative control of the islands to Japan, it was important to determine what Japan intended to do about their defense. The president then interjected, “in other words, you’re saying ‘put your money where your mouth is.’”\textsuperscript{165} McNamara said it would be impossible to get “something signed” between then and 18 November, when Sato was scheduled to return to Japan, and he believed the president did not wish for Sato to return home without “some resolution.”\textsuperscript{166}

Johnson asked why he should not say to Sato, “here is our attitude and we are willing to turn over control of the islands when you are ready to sign up,” and then inquired, what “are [we] getting from Sato on Vietnam?”\textsuperscript{167} McNamara, who had earlier noted that Sato had done a “good deed for us” by going to Vietnam and “the mere fact that he went there is an endorsement for our policies there,” replied, “that guy put his political future in his hands when he went to Vietnam.”\textsuperscript{168} Johnson shut him up by saying, “but what I’m interested in is bodies.”\textsuperscript{169} McNamara repeated that Sato could be helpful by speaking out for our policies.

Johnson asked his advisors once again why he could not say that “we’re ready to move when you’re ready to assume your part of the defense?” McNamara gave three reasons: the administration did not know what it wanted Sato to do; politically, Sato could not do
much at the present time; and the United States wishes to have nuclear bases there later. On the question of nuclear weapons, Wheeler suggested that the United States tell the Japanese that it reserved the right to negotiate the inclusion of nuclear weapons on the Bonin Islands, and explained that as the islands lie on the “great circle route for submarine traffic” between the Chinese mainland and the continental United States, the government might “in time want to put nuclear weapons on the Bonins.” When Rusk pointed out that the Bonins would not be needed unless “Guam is knocked out,” Wheeler observed that it would impact the negotiations on Okinawa, as Japan would insist on “the same formula in Okinawa on nuclear weapons and this will be a precedent.” Rusk did not argue but, sounding tired, noted that the “appetite on Okinawa will feed itself. All we are doing is gaining time.”

Johnson, like U.S. leaders before him, especially former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, showed his frustration at this point: “We should not give away land just to put a man in good humor for 48 hours. The Japanese have been treated darn well. Why can't we say that we don’t want to hold on to the islands, but we cannot secure the world alone? Maybe we can't work out an arrangement in two weeks, but let us know when you’re ready. I'm somewhat disappointed with the Japanese and Pakistan and some of these others anyway.” McNamara agreed that Japan needed to be pushed, but he said “this is not the issue. This will only weaken Sato.” Rusk shared the same view as the defense secretary: “[Sato’s] been the most pro-American Prime Minister Japan has had since World War II. Besides, we are only a squatter on the Bonins.” When Johnson asked if the communiqué was saying “when you move, we move,” Rostow said it actually was committing the United States to enter into consultations on the early return of the islands. McNamara countered that it was saying more than that—if Japan lets the United States have bases on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima, then administrative rights would be returned to Japan. Confused, Johnson asked McNamara and Rostow to “concisely and clearly put down on paper” what the United States was offering in this communiqué and present it to him later.

In the interim, the president seems to have approved of Rusk’s recommendations for the new draft language for the communiqué introduced above, and the secretary of state informed Ambassador Johnson of the new draft. Rusk noted the “encouraging recognition of the GOJ” of its responsibilities for the region, and its understanding of the relationship “between a Ryukyus settlement and its own broader regional security.” Rusk praised Sato’s trip through the region, and the prime minister’s and foreign minister’s “helpful statements” on Vietnam, and the government’s “public efforts to place the Ryukyu issue on a realistic security basis.” Rusk hoped Sato would be able to discuss in more concrete terms Japan’s increased assistance for Southeast Asia and in addressing the balance of payments problem, including matching U.S. contributions to the Asian Development Bank. Based on these “encouraging signs” of Japan’s recognition on the need to share more in the responsibilities of the region, Rusk told the ambassador that Washington was prepared to “take a meaningful step forward toward resolution of the territorial issues.” Specifically, Rusk told Johnson that, with regard to the Bonin Islands, the United States was willing to enter into negotiations for the return of administrative rights if Japan agreed to U.S. retention of all current military facilities and other areas deemed necessary; provided assurances (as Miki had stated) that the GOJ would use return of the Bonins to “stem pressures” for
the immediate reversion of the Ryukyus; and agreed to gradually assume responsibilities for maintaining current facilities and for expanding antisubmarine warfare and other defense operations in area.

At this point, Rusk also told the ambassador that, although the United States saw “no immediate need to station nuclear weapons in the Bonins,” he would have to inform Sato and Miki that the United States “reserves the right to discuss the question of nuclear weapons facilities in our consultations on the Bonins.” Moreover, Johnson was asked to make clear that “any resolution of this matter would not be a precedent for the Ryukyus.” This instruction, Rusk said, was based on the JCS position that the issue had to be raised in some form “against contingency of need for storage of ASW [antisubmarine warfare] weapons in the event of prospective enemy submarine threat and unavailability of nuclear storage in Ryukyus and Marianas.” In other words, to get the JCS to go along, the State Department had to agree to raise it with its Japanese counterparts, with the understanding that the handling of the issue would be discussed with the government as consultations got under way. Rusk mentioned a couple of formulas that might be possible with the Japanese side, including “some form of GOJ assurance that it would give sympathetic consideration of any such request if need arose” and “a request for waiver of prior consultation provisions of [the] Treaty.” Rusk added, however, that they believed the Japanese would “react negatively” on the latter point and thus “no assurances had been given [to the JCS] as to what outcome can be achieved.” In any case, Rusk felt it important that Sato and Miki “be on notice” that nuclear facilities were not being excluded. Rusk wrote that he was leaving it up to the ambassador’s judgment as to whether Sato and Miki should be urged to keep the matter entirely to themselves or not, but thought it important in light of any Japanese government assurance “in the end be[ing] itself a very closely held and high-level matter.”

Johnson met with Miki the following morning, sharing with him a copy of the U.S. draft of the communiqué and telling him of the nuclear weapons issue. According to Johnson’s telegram to Rusk informing him of their meeting, Miki was “obviously rocked” by the mention of nuclear weapons storage on the Bonin Islands. He explained to Miki that the United States was not “asking for their agreement in the Bonins prior to, and as a condition precedent to, the issuance of communiqué language on the Bonins,” but simply notifying the Japanese government that the United States “reserv[es] the right to raise, discuss, and hopefully reach agreement” with Japan on this issue “within [the] framework of [the] present security treaty” when detailed negotiations on the Bonin Islands were undertaken. Softening the blow, Johnson told Miki that the United States was making no exception for Iwo Jima, and the use of the term “Bonins” included all the islands other than the Ryukyus. There would be a need, he pointed out, to discuss facilities on Iwo Jima, including the Japanese proposal for a memorial park. Miki avoided comment on these issues and said he was going to meet with Sato later that day, 6 November. Sato’s diary entry makes mention of the receipt of the communiqué and meeting with Foreign Ministry officials. Sato also met with Miki the following day.

Johnson met again with Miki on 7 November, for what he called a “most rigorous session” lasting more than three hours. Most of the discussion dealt with the Japanese government’s revised draft for the section on Okinawa, which the foreign minister said
was necessary in order to get the public to accept the “delayed reversion” of Okinawa and to prevent their interpretation of the Bonins as a “scapegoat for the lack of progress on Okinawa.”

Ambassador Johnson explained that the draft in its present form would be hard for Washington to accept, and urged the Japanese to bring it more in line with the U.S. position so that it could be seriously considered. At the end of their meeting, the two men became philosophical. Miki stated that he

felt there was a gap between Washington and Tokyo concerning Japanese security, but . . . in fact there was no basic difference. The GOJ had difficulties concerning the Bonins and Okinawa and was trying to find a solution compatible with her territorial problems and security requirements. On the occasion of the prime minister’s visit to Washington, he must be given the tools to guide public opinion and the U.S. must trust [the] GOJ not to misuse these tools.

To this, Johnson agreed. There was the “impression in Washington that the GOJ was less interested in the security of Japan than was the USG [U.S. government]. Japan seemed ‘ashamed’ of what it was in fact doing to cooperate in our use of bases in Japan to support our effort in Vietnam and elsewhere in East Asia. I hoped that they could shift to talking pride in this and the prime minister’s visit offered good opportunity to correct public impression in U.S.” As described earlier, these were the same opinions Johnson introduced in his memoirs.

The ambassador departed Japan on 8 November to consult with officials in Washington before the prime minister’s party arrived. Johnson had two surprises waiting for him when he arrived in the nation’s capital. First, he was “startled to discover” that no one had raised the issue of the reversion of Iwo Jima with key members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and thus he was requested to do so the next day. “I thought this should have been the responsibility of our people in Washington,” Johnson records in his memoirs, “but I had no choice but to agree.” The second was his discovery that the legislators were in fact “quite sympathetic” to returning Iwo Jima to Japan.

Johnson and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul C. Warnke visited key legislators to explain the plan to return the Bonin Islands while promising that whatever final agreement was reached, the Japanese would let the United States “keep our flag flying over our Iwo Jima memorial.”

Ironically, as Johnson admits, he had no idea what he was promising as he had never been to Iwo Jima before. “At the time I assumed that the memorial was identical to the large impressive bronze statue that sits in the Arlington National Cemetery, commemorating the famous picture of the Marines raising the flag atop Mount Suribachi.” While he does not mention it, the presence of Mansfield, the Senate majority leader and former Marine who called for the reversion of the Bonin Islands and whose views were well known on Capitol Hill, had a calming presence on the debate and reactions of his colleagues.

Nevertheless, in reading the memos circulating in the executive branch the weekend before Sato’s arrival, the tension must have been palpable. His visit was scheduled for early the following week, and there were still several things to be worked out with regard to Okinawa and the Bonins, including the timeline in the case of the former and the issue of nuclear weapons storage in the case of the latter. Officials worked through the weekend, despite it being the Veterans’ Day holiday.
Another issue that the administration had to consider was reading how far Japan was willing to meet U.S. requests. On 8 November, Rostow was handed a list of Japanese actions in recent years for which the United States was appreciative and a list of those that the United States sought help from Japan. Among the appreciated actions, which numbered 25 in total, the subcategories included Vietnam, military activities, Asian assistance, regional cooperation, balance of payments assistance, and the UN. There were 11 actions that the United States sought from Japan on assistance, military matters, balance of payments, and other issues.

In addition to coordinating the papers, Rostow had a meeting lined up with Wakaizumi on 11 November. This time, Wakaizumi came as a “confidential personal representative,” a title he was given by Sato on 8 November. It became clear to Ambassador Johnson at this point that Sato’s use of Wakaizumi probably had to do with the prime minister’s distrust of his foreign minister. “Sato did not entirely trust Miki, and wanted to make sure that he, not Miki, controlled the terms Japan offered in the negotiations.” The prime minister, according to Wakaizumi, may have also felt that Miki was handling the talks irresponsibly, publicly pushing for a denuclearized reversion not necessarily because Sato may have wanted it, but “for what appeared to be self-interested political reasons.” In any case, the prime minister wanted to keep as many lines of communication as possible open.

Sato’s wide use of his networks was also apparent in the fact that he made a former reporter from the Sankei Shimbun, Kusuda Minoru, his personal secretary in March 1967. Kusuda had long covered Sato as a political reporter and was widely respected in the field. In addition, before becoming his secretary, he regularly provided Sato with advice on Japan’s politics and foreign relations. One example of Sato’s use of Kusuda’s network related to the Bonins. During a visit to Washington in late 1965, for example, as part of the U.S. Information Agency/State Department’s International Visitors Program, Kusuda, then still with Sankei, had the chance to speak with veteran Sankei reporter Sakai Yoneo, who was based in Washington. Sakai told him that he thought Sato was mistaken to call for the early reversion of Okinawa as the international situation would not realistically permit that. “Instead,” he continued, “the U.S. would probably go along with the reversion of Ogasawara. When you meet with Deputy Undersecretary [U. Alexis] Johnson [on this trip], why don’t you ask him? He might provide some hints.” When Kusuda met with Johnson a few days later, he did ask him through Wickel, the State Department’s leading Japanese language interpreter. “The deputy undersecretary did not endorse what I said,” Kusuda wrote later, “but he did not deny it either.” Because it was an off-the-record interview, Kusuda could not write a story about Johnson’s comments or the interview, but he did tell Sato as soon as he could after returning to Japan. It is unclear what Sato thought about this, but in the end, the “Ogasawara first” approach was the one adopted, although political pressures made it such that Okinawa would also be high on the agenda, as the meeting between another of Sato’s contacts, Wakaizumi, and Rostow suggests.

Rostow expected the Ryukyus and the Bonins to be on the top of Wakaizumi’s list, because of some outstanding issues. A memo prepared for Rostow warned that Wakaizumi would probably “fish around for reasons why we may want nuclear storage in the Bonins.” Rostow should, the memo suggested, simply reiterate what Ambassador Johnson told Miki,
i.e., that the United States reserved the right to discuss the issue during the negotiations on the islands’ return. As it happened, the focus of Wakaizumi’s meeting with Rostow was primarily on the perception that there was forward movement with Okinawa. As a result, Wakaizumi proposed a formula “within a few years” for inclusion in the joint communiqué about when agreement would be had on a satisfactory date for the reversion of Okinawa.

Later that day, Wakaizumi visited Rostow’s home for dinner. Asking for 10 minutes of privacy, Wakaizumi explained that when they met earlier, he had just gotten off the plane and was suffering jet lag, and not sure if his comments had been clearly understood. He read his comments to Rostow from a typed list. He said that “Mr. Sato is very grateful to the Johnson Administration for the favourable consideration to the early reversion of the Bonins. He is well aware of the difficult problems involved on your side.” He then added that he did not think Sato “has any objections to your reservations with regards to the Bonins’ reversion.” At the same time, Wakaizumi explained that the political pressure in Japan had grown so large over the issue of Okinawa’s return that “few Japanese evaluate the return of the Bonins as a great achievement. On the contrary,” he continued, “the great many people now fear that the return of the Bonins might be used as relief in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa.” Rather than being discouraged that Japan was simply going to ask for more, Rostow was encouraged by the comments, telling Rusk, “it is clear that Sato is prepared for a high price in aid and balance-of-payments help if we can meet him on this.”

Wakaizumi’s evening appeals were too late to find their way in to the memo Rostow prepared for President Johnson on 10 November, but the young professor’s points certainly underscored the themes already in the memo. Rostow began by telling the president that the talks with Sato would be “very important in influencing how quickly” Japan was prepared to “come of age as a major league power and our full partner in Asia.”

Preparations for the meeting continued during the week in Washington. In Japan, planning also continued, where Sato was under great pressure for a successful trip and response to his petitions. One petitioner was Tokyo Governor Minobe Ryokichi, who called on the prime minister on 6 November to seek the return of the islands. Sato finally departed Tokyo’s Haneda Airport in the afternoon of 12 November, and, after spending the night in Seattle, arrived in the afternoon of the 13th in Washington for the party’s stay at Blair House. Ambassador Johnson arrived with the group, having flown out in the president’s plane to Seattle to meet up with Sato’s delegation. On the plane ride to Washington, Johnson spoke privately with Sato about the arrangements and compromise formulas being discussed, but made it clear that only the president could make the final decision.

Back in Washington, Rusk wrote to President Johnson on the 13th to inform him of his instructions to Ambassador Johnson to have Sato change the Japanese reference to the “earliest possible date” for reversion to alternative phrasing. Rusk also told the president about the status of consultations with congressional leaders, explaining that he personally spoke with Senator Mansfield and Congressman (and future President) Gerald R. Ford (R-MI). He added that Ambassador Johnson and Assistant Secretary Warnke had also met with Senators Everett M. Dirksen (R-IL), Richard B. Russell Jr. (D-GA), and Margaret Chase Smith (R-ME), as well as with Representatives L. Mendel Rivers (D-SC), Charles
M. Price (D-IL), George H. Mahon (D-TX), and Glenard P. Lipscomb (R-CA). Similarly, Bundy had spoken with House Speaker John W. McCormack (D-MA), Majority Leader Carl B. Albert (D-OK), Senators J. William Fulbright (D-AR) and Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-IA), and Representatives Thomas E. Morgan (D-PA), Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI), E. Ross Adair (R-IN), and Frances P. Bolton (R-OH).

Overall, the consultations had gone “very smoothly” Rusk reported, and the reactions had generally been those of “clear approval [for] the proposed course,” which Rusk identified as “involving no change for the present in the Ryukyus but a decision to proceed with consultations for the reversion of the Bonins, subject to our reserving appropriate military and naval facilities including some special arrangements to deal with our national feeling about Iwo Jima.”

No dissent, Rusk noted, had been expressed by any of those consulted, although Hickenlooper, a World War I Army veteran, said he would respond to Rusk if he had a problem with it after the chance to give it further thought. Rusk told the president that Hickenlooper had not contacted him. He also informed the president that they would consult with a few more congressional leaders and that the Department of Defense would inform the leadership of major veterans’ organizations later in the week. Reiterating, Rusk said that it seemed “clear” that the plan to return Iwo Jima and the remainder of the Bonin Islands conditionally had “entirely satisfactory congressional understanding and support.”

The first meetings took place on 14 November, followed by final sessions the next day. The biggest difficulty was agreeing on the compromise wording of “within a few years” for setting the date for reversion of Okinawa. This caused part of the delay in the meetings on the 15th.

The next morning, Sato met with Secretary Rusk to hammer out some details. The focus of the discussions, like most bilateral negotiations, was “find[ing] communiqué language tolerable both to U.S. political problems and to Sato’s political problems.”

At 1100, Sato went to Arlington National Cemetery to lay wreaths at the graves of John F. Kennedy and John Foster Dulles. The prime minister became emotional thinking what Yoshida, his mentor who had died just a few weeks before, and Dulles were saying to each other now up in heaven about the agreement between him and President Johnson concerning the return of the remainder of the Article 3 territories. He was aware that there would be criticism back in Japan about the inability at this point to get the immediate and unconditional return of Okinawa, and acknowledged in his diary that it would be up to future historians to judge the merits of the agreement.

The meeting on the afternoon of 15 November between the president and Sato was attended only by their interpreters, but fortunately a detailed record of conversation exists on the U.S. side. Going into the meeting, Sato thought it would be a brief one, as the joint communiqué had already been readied, but Johnson did not let up on the economic issues. The 90-minute exchange between the two men showed Johnson at his “arm-twisting” finest and proved that he would not hesitate to employ his famous “treatment” even with foreign leaders. When Sato promised to study an issue the president raised with regard to balance-of-payments, Johnson said “don’t study it, do it.” Flattery and persuasion were other tactics Johnson used. Telling Sato that he should be “congratulated for the
great victory” represented by the joint communiqué they were reviewing, he called it a “step forward” and something that should help the prime minister deal with public opinion in Japan. The president then added that the “Bonin Islands involved strong American sentiments and a deep emotional issue,” and praised Sato by explaining that it was “only Japan's willingness to assume additional responsibilities that would enable him [the president] to defend the decision to return the islands [to Congress and the American people].” The fact that the U.S. deficit would reach almost $30 billion that year made Japan's contributions all the more important, he said.

The day had been a long one for Sato, but the communiqué was finalized and released, and he had gotten a couple of important concessions from the United States. Not only were the Bonin Islands to be returned, but the Americans had agreed to make a decision about when it would return administrative rights over Okinawa within the next few years. Okinawa was no longer a question of “if” but “when.” In a sense, it had always been so, but now the United States was publicly committed to returning the islands by a soon-to-be-set date. The Rubicon had been crossed.

The President and the Prime Minister also reviewed the status of the Bonin Islands and agreed that the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan. They therefore agreed that the two governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Government of Japan, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the United States would retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan such military facilities and areas in the Bonin Islands as required in the mutual security of both countries. The Prime Minister stated that the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands would not only contribute to solidifying the ties of friendship between the two countries but would also help to reinforce the conviction of the Japanese people that the return of the administrative rights over the Ryukyu Islands will also be solved within the framework of mutual trust between the two countries.

PREPARING FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS

On the way back from Washington, Ambassador Johnson stopped off in Honolulu again to brief the CINCPAC and requested his staff to prepare the materials the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) would need to assume defense responsibilities for the islands. The JDA would not be officially tasked by Sato until February the following year, too late for the following fiscal year's budget. The JDA would have to make do with the planned budget.

To prepare for the start of negotiations, Togo requested in late November the United States provide “as much preliminary information as possible” concerning U.S. military installations on the islands, laws and regulations now applied to local inhabitants, facilities
to the ambassador, the State Department reiterated the Johnson-Sato communiqué, which expressed the hope that the negotiations could be concluded quickly, and instructed him to remind Miki that the United States was committed to doing so.\textsuperscript{242} It explained that the department would work to gather and forward to the embassy as much factual material as available by mid-December, to be followed by formal negotiating instructions. Despite the desire for a quick conclusion, Rusk suggested that the ambassador tell Miki that the Japanese government’s wish to submit the agreement to the Diet by the end of January was “excessively optimistic,” as the “timing appears much too tight in view of the many details to be worked out.”\textsuperscript{243} Rusk also asked Johnson to request from the Japanese government information and maps showing the land usage and military base areas in the Bonins, particularly Chichi Jima, for the pre-1944 period.\textsuperscript{244}

In the meantime, Johnson wrote to CINCPAC and COMNAVMARIANAS to request specific information, both for the embassy and the Japanese government, explaining that the “bits and pieces” it had received in the past were now “dated and of uncertain validity.”\textsuperscript{245} He emphasized in the interest of time, quickness over “completeness,” with more up-to-date information to be forwarded later.\textsuperscript{246} It was important to “let the GOJ get started on its homework,” Johnson explained, in order to allow them to plan for the integration of the Bonin Islanders back into the Japanese legal system.\textsuperscript{247} Among the materials that the embassy thought would be helpful were the code of military government regulations and proclamations in effect in the Bonin Islands, the Bonin Island Council legislation in effect, and semi-annual reports of the military government.\textsuperscript{248}

Miki subsequently asked Johnson to come to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the Bonins agreement and the continuing review of the status of Okinawa, among other things. Because it was their first meeting following the summit, Miki began by expressing his “deep appreciation” for the efforts of the president and Secretary Rusk in making Sato’s visit to Washington such a success.\textsuperscript{249} After discussing other matters, Johnson told Miki that he was gathering the informational materials and expected to have his negotiating instructions “by the end of the year,” but thought it would be difficult to meet the Japanese government’s timetable.\textsuperscript{250} Miki and Togo told Johnson that the timetable had since been revised, and they were now hoping to complete the agreement by the end of February, with submission to the Diet in March. The foreign minister reiterated his desire to see the agreement kept as simple as possible, with the details being worked out in the bilateral joint committee or other staff-level meetings. He added that the government desired to send a survey mission on an MSDF ship sometime in mid-January 1968.
Johnson agreed in principle, mentioning the only concern being timing, and then raised the issue of the Mount Suribachi memorial. He told Miki of his commitment to congressional leaders during his meetings with them to the effect that the United States would retain the “statue and American flag.” Johnson said he would welcome the GOJ views as to how this could be accomplished, and according to documents declassified on the Japanese side at the author’s request, the ambassador said “there was no need to decide right now but it would be ideal if the U.S. could retain as is the memorial on the top of Iwo Jima (i.e., on Mt. Suribachi) following the return of the islands.”

Miki was stunned, it seems, and had to ask Johnson, “Mr. Ambassador, you promised to leave the memorial as is?” Johnson replied in the affirmative, to which the foreign minister said he would like to think about it more, keeping in mind the ambassador’s promise. Miki then went on to give his personal opinion, stating that he thought it would be good to build a kinen koen (memorial park). Johnson explained that he doubted whether the top of Suribachi was big enough to accommodate a memorial park “as the U.S. memorial is already up there.” Miki said he “had thought the top of the mountain was big enough, in light of having a sort of basin or valley where the U.S. memorial was located,” and added, “in any case, I would like to study it, but it will be problematic if the memorial is really big.” Johnson’s account of the conversation, however, depicts less of an exchange, noting that Miki had said he felt “a joint memorial park was desirable” and that the two agreed to discuss the issue again when they had maps and photographs to work with.

Despite this brief account of their talks, the reality is, however, that there were clear differences in approaches with regard to the memorial that would lead to misunderstandings until the very end of the negotiations and even on the day of the signing of the agreement. Johnson alludes to that tension in his memoirs when he wrote, “At our November 29 meeting, I told Miki that I had committed myself with the Armed Services Committees [of both the Senate and House] to retaining our memorial atop Mount Suribachi, including its twenty-four-hour flag and statue. This clearly did not please him, since he had not previously known about the statue. He said somewhat sarcastically that he hoped it was not a large one, ‘like those of Stalin in Eastern Europe.’”

Johnson raised another issue with Miki, the situation of the islanders and the desire of the U.S. government to protect their interests. The foreign minister responded that he “appreciated” the concern and agreed to consult “carefully” on the problem. He then stated that the government planned on submitting a draft agreement (see below) on the Bonin Islands for the U.S. reaction. Johnson replied that the U.S. government planned on doing the same. He added, “I saw no reason why both governments could not submit drafts for comparison.”

In the meantime, the State Department began working on a fact sheet for transmittal to the Foreign Ministry, and completed it on 12 December. Much of it was initially classified “secret.” Ambassador Johnson complained that doing so would make it “practically useless” as the Japanese government desired to disseminate it to other agencies within the government. The State Department wrote back immediately and decided to lower the classification levels to “unclassified” for personnel numbers and “confidential” for descriptions of facilities.
Fact Sheet on Military and Non-Military Aspects of Bonins

1. U.S. Military Facilities and Personnel:
   A. Chichi:
      (1) Navy—Harbor facilities for limited logistic support and safehaven; munitions storage facilities; fourteen permanent quarters, community center, dispensary, commissary; shore lights and buoys.
      (2) Personnel—31 Navy, 3 U.S. civilians, 57 foreign national civilians; total 91.
   B. Iwo:
      (1) Air Force—Emergency recovery airfield, 9,800 ft. long capable of accommodating C-130s and 727s. Field in fair condition and requires constant maintenance due to volcanic conditions. Limited refueling capacity for AVGAS.
      (2) Coast Guard—Loran A and C stations.
      (3) Personnel—39 Air Force, 35 Coast Guard, total 74.
   C. Marcus:
      (1) Coast Guard—Airfield 4,000 ft. long capable of accommodating C-130s; Loran C station; aviation radio beacon.
      (2) Weather Bureau—Weather reporting station.
      (3) Personnel: 34 Coast Guard, 5 U.S. civilians (weather), total 39.
   D. Personnel Totals:
      Military 139, U.S. civilians 8, foreign nationals 57, grand total 204.

2. Chichi Non-Military:
   A. Population (indigenous)—Total 205 (34 households)
      Males 60 years and over—9;
      Males 18–60 years old—54;
      Males under 18—44;
      Females 60 years and over—14;
      Females 18–60 years old—44;
      Females under 18—40.
   B. Administration:
      CINCPACFLT, Military Governor;
      COMNAVMARIANAS, Deputy Military Governor; resident Military Governor Representative in Chichi. Under supervision of Military Governor limited self-government is exercised by Bonin Island Council whose members are duly elected by permanent residents.
   C. Law:
      Bonin Islands Judicial and Criminal Code is promulgated by Military Governor. In addition there are local ordinances enacted by Bonin Island Council and approved by Military Government representative in Chichi. Presently no convicted criminals and no outstanding civil cases.
D. Economy:

Major income derived from Navy which employs 57 with $75 thousand annual payroll. Fishing most important local industry, with exports to Guam through Bonin Island Trading Co. totaling $7.8 thousand for January–June 1967. Export of fish has declined due in part to uncertainty of transportation now provided gratis by Navy LST.

E. Currency:

U.S. dollar; amount in circulation is not known exactly but is not large. Total dollar assets which would have to be converted to yen would probably be $100–200 thousand. (F[or] Y[our] I[nformation]: CINCPAC is in process of obtaining closest possible estimate of dollar holdings. End FYI.)

F. Housing:

Three local housing areas, two clustered near U.S. base areas, one of about 8–10 homes near bay. Homes were constructed with building materials provided at no cost by Navy. Exact status of land titles unclear. (FYI: CINCPAC is developing more detailed information on land title problem. End FYI.)

G. Education:

Sixty-seven in Primary-Junior High (English language) school in Chichi which also serves nine dependents. Costs minimal. Nineteen in Guam High School at no cost.

H. Medical care:

Provided by Navy at no cost.

I. Facilities:

Electric power, water, and sewage facilities provided by Navy at minimal cost.

J. Postal Service:

Provided by Navy.

K. Special Entities:

(1) Bonin Islands Trust Fund: Managed by CINCPACFLT for benefit of islanders; assets of $36 thousand of which $22 thousand cash and $14 thousand loaned to Bonin Island Trading Co. at no cost.

(2) Bonin Island Trading Co: Chartered by CINCPAC, owned by individual islanders. (Ownership is not universal.) Operates general store and handles fish exports to Guam. Net worth June 30, 1967 $26.6 thousand.

3. Iwo Jima Memorial:

Memorial occupies an area of 40,000 sq. feet. Included is a 5–6 ft. statue with flag flown on 24-hour basis and an aircraft warning light. Access road and flag require periodic maintenance.
Shortly after receiving (and then forwarding) the information, the State Department sent Ambassador Johnson a list of the guiding principles and a set of negotiating instructions. The negotiating instructions, introduced below, dealt with the memorial, civilian aspects of the reversion, military facilities and nuclear weapons storage issue (this document unfortunately remains classified at the time of this writing), and financial aspects of reversion.

Overall, the State Department desired that the discussions over the return of the Bonin Islands should be based on several principles, and argued that early agreement to them by the Japanese government would “facilitate and expedite agreement” on the details in the negotiations. The first principle was that the Bonins agreement should follow the general approach of the Amami Reversion Agreement, with a basic agreement supplemented by side arrangements if necessary. The State Department realized, however, that there would not be “complete parallelism” between the two agreements because of the military and civilian differences with the islands. The second principle, that of the Bonins agreement not “constitute[ing] a precedent for [eventual] Ryukyuan settlement,” was believed to be necessary to “maintain completely a free hand in eventual” negotiations for the return of Okinawa on such issues as dollar conversion. The department argued this “no precedent” formula was justifiable due to the “obvious differences” between the two island groups with regard to military facilities and civil government, and desired a “clear understanding” with the Japanese government on this point. The third principle was that the return of the Bonin Islands would not give the Japanese government a “balance of payments windfall.” While the department acknowledged the amounts would be small in the case of the Bonins, it was still “important,” particularly if it was seen as a precedent for the case of the eventual return of Okinawa. The fourth was that the Japanese government would be expected to accord the present residents of Chichi Jima “equitable treatment, comparable to that afforded other Japanese nationals returning to the islands.” The fifth was that Japan issue a “comprehensive waiver of claims” and “recognize the validity of all acts and omissions done during period of U.S. administration” along the lines of a similar provision in the Amami agreement. The final principle was that Japan would assume responsibility for the provision of all public services for the islands upon the return of administrative rights or as soon as possible thereafter.

Regarding the Iwo Jima memorial, Johnson was told that the U.S. government desired “appropriate measures” for maintenance of and access to the existing memorial, including the flying of the U.S. flag. In practice, it continued, this would mean Japan’s facilitating of upkeep to be undertaken by U.S. forces (U.S. Marines). The State Department instruction next explained that it would have “no objection to the present U.S. memorial being included in a larger binational Peace Park with appropriate binational symbolism at gate, etc.” nor would the U.S. government object to a separate Japanese memorial to their dead within the binational Peace Park, proposed by Miki at the 29 November meeting with Johnson. However, the State Department instruction stated it would be “unacceptable in light of Congressional and public opinion” to make the Suribachi memorial itself binational.

Regarding the civilian aspects of reversion, the State Department was particularly concerned about the status of the current residents, which it felt “could pose some of the
most difficult problems.” Specifically, it was concerned about the “reintegration” of the residents into Japanese society. The problems, it felt, stemmed primarily from the high level of subsidization and support by the Navy for the living standards of the islanders, the residents no longer being “culturally and socially Japanese-oriented” despite their possessing Japanese nationality, and the lack of preparation of the islanders and its local institutions for reversion. As a result of these issues, the department felt that even under the “best of circumstances,” reversion would “impose a clear loss of economic benefits and other difficulties” for the islanders. While the United States had “no legal obligation” to the residents, it wanted to “soften the impact of this transition for obvious humanitarian reasons” and thus desired to work out with the Japanese government “certain joint and unilateral arrangements to give current residents reasonable prospects for transition period and equitable treatment in [the] future.”

The framework the State Department had in mind included the United States would not assert any claims to assets transferred to individuals or to community bodies, the United States would distribute to individuals or to community bodies the remaining assets in the Bonin Islands Trust Fund, the United States would examine the possibility of employment and/or immigration into U.S. territories for “selected eligible islanders [so] desiring,” Japan would issue a general statement of assurance of equitable treatment welcoming back residents to Japanese administration, and the Japanese government would make provisions to “regularize land status” of the current residents “either by providing at no cost clear title to land presently occupied by them, or by relocating dwelling or providing equivalent housing on former land holdings or elsewhere in vicinity.”

Finally, regarding the financial aspects, the State Department pointed out that reversion would “adversely affect the U.S. balance of payments on official settlements” when currency or bank balances were converted to yen. To prevent a balance of payments windfall, as well as to dispose of movable equipment currently in the islands but not needed to meet American requirements elsewhere, the U.S. government intended to offer for sale at “present fair market value” such items as consumables, shop and office equipment, public quarters furnishings, automotive and construction equipment, and other assets that provide public services to the civilian community as well as to maintain military installations. The State Department wrote that it expected the proceeds to be as much as $800,000 computed at 40 percent of acquisition cost, although it was waiting for a full report from CINCPAC. Prior to specific sales, CINCPAC and the related military departments would have to give their approval, it stated, and once agreement in principle by the Japanese government was given, then CINCPAC would be requested to ascertain through the joint committee what categories of removables the Japanese government would be interested in purchasing.

Ambassador Johnson was given his instructions a few days later.

**GOJ Actions for the Islands**

Despite the harsh criticism in the media following the summit, interest in the return of the islands grew, symbolized by participation of a large group of Japanese media representatives on a trip to Chichi Jima beginning on 5 December. With the exception of a few stories at the time of the earlier ancestral grave visits, it was the first opportunity for the Japanese
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations

press to cover the situation on the islands in any detail. Stephen P. Dawkins, a State Department official and former Marine who traveled with the group on board the USS San Joaquin County (LST 1122), noticed that while the islanders had “used the interval between 15 November and the visit to get their thoughts in order about what they would want from the Japanese government,” they were nevertheless “cautious in talking with the Japanese newsman.”289 Dawkins felt the press coverage “by and large, was a rather faithful reproduction of their apprehensions and desires.”290 For this trip, the Japanese government had asked to send representatives from the Foreign Ministry, prime minister’s office, and Japan Defense Agency. The three joined the media’s trip.291

A couple of weeks later, on 20 December, Prime Minister Sato met with Tokyo Governor Minobe. A Leftist, Minobe was opposed to the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) assuming defense functions over the islands. He also demanded as much autonomy for the metropolitan government when deciding policies over the islands. While no immediate solution was reached on the problems involved in returning the islands, a newspaper story of the meeting said that the government had promised to take the appropriate steps to protect the land and homes of the islanders in the event that the former inhabitants decided to return.292 The Japan desk at the State Department noted that such statements were “very much along lines of what we had in mind re[garding] unilateral GOJ actions with respect to present Chichi population.”293 Sato’s diary acknowledged, however, there was still much work to do, and would have to wait until further investigation locally.294

That local investigation was done a month later when the Japanese government sent a larger group of almost 30 people representing 20 agencies, Tokyo metropolitan government, and the local residents. The groups represented were the prime minister’s office; the home, justice, foreign, finance, education, health and welfare, agriculture and forestry, international trade and industry, transportation, post and telecommunications, labor, construction, and local autonomy ministries; the police; Defense Facilities Administration; and fisheries, forestry, and weather agencies.295 (Curiously, the Defense Agency was not represented nor were any of the SDF services in this group with the exception of facilities administration members Tsushima Yoshitaka and Yagi Hide. Two MSDF Lockheed P2V-7 Neptune patrol planes flew over Iwo Jima, Chichi Jima, and Haha Jima on 5 January 1968 for about four hours to take photos.)296 In any case, the group traveled on board the Japanese Coast Guard large patrol vessel Izu and MSDF destroyer Takatsuki to Chichi Jima on 18 January, arriving on the 20th. During their three days on Chichi, they spent much time interviewing the islanders and meeting with military personnel.297 On the 23d, they left for Haha Jima, and on the 25th went to Iwo Jima, where they toured the island. While there, they met an investigative team from the Japan Defense Agency, which included agency Director General Masuda Kaneshichi.298 After the 10-day trip, the group completed its 143-page report on 20 February.

At least one opposition party—the Komeito, or Clean Government Party—expressed interest in visiting the islands. The party had been formed officially some four years earlier, and had a Diet strength of 25 seats, which it had gained in its first general election effort, the January 1967 elections.299 Strong in the Tokyo area, it had asked the embassy on several occasions to permit a small party delegation to the Bonins, via seaplane from Guam.300 The embassy, aware that debate on the reversion of administrative rights over the islands
would soon “become an important topic for the political process in Japan,” consulted with the Foreign Ministry, which replied that while the Japanese government would not favor an opposition party visiting the islands prior to the official mission (mentioned above), the government would find it “hard to argue that a responsible opposition [party] should not visit the islands” prior to their reversion. The following week, the GOJ announced that it would make available a MSDF vessel for a visit to the islands by an all-party Diet delegation, although the planning was far from advanced according to the embassy. The embassy told the State Department it would find it “impossible to authorize entry of any JCP [Japanese Communist] member that might be nominated for any such visit,” and estimated that the GOJ’s idea probably would not “cool” Komeito’s requests to visit the islands on its own using U.S. military transportation. Indeed, later that month, Komeito’s lower house member Ito Sosukemaru, representing Tokyo’s 5th District, laid out his party’s views on the issue, calling for the welfare of the islanders to be protected and the islands made into places of peace, and listing specific issues to be addressed and proposals for those problems.

Just before the delegation returned from its trip, the government dispatched Vice Minister Ushiba and director-general Togo to Chichi Jima and Iwo on 26 January. Ambassador Johnson, who had wanted to go to the islands to get “a better feel for what I was negotiating about,” joined them, having postponed an earlier opportunity to go with Assistant Secretary Warnke. “First-hand observation,” Johnson wrote of his visit to Iwo, “put quite a different complexion on the problem.” On Chichi, the two nations’ diplomats met with the Bonin Island Council, which made a “very able presentation of the problems that reversion will present” for the islanders, and Ushiba and Togo were “obviously impressed with the presentation and constructive attitude of the council.” The GOJ decided the following month to invite the chairman of the council and one or two additional representatives for a week of discussions on alleviating the islanders’ concerns, including employment and education. It offered to pay for their round-trip airfare from Guam and per diem for the two, but if the United States could provide air travel to and from Tokyo, then it offered to invite a third representative, perhaps someone not on the council but selected by it for special reasons. The embassy deemed such a trip as “highly desirable” and asked that CINCPAC undertake the coordination. Eventually, the Japanese government paid for all three representatives to fly from Guam and they arrived in the middle of February.

While the islanders were still in Tokyo, the cabinet, on 23 February, approved a compromise that “appears to have settled the conflict” between the Tokyo Metropolitan Government and the central government regarding the future administration of the Bonin Islands. Under the compromise, formal legal responsibility for administration was to return to the metropolitan government, while the central government would have overall control of redevelopment. With this cabinet approval, the embassy felt the central government should now be “able to move forward expeditiously” on coordination of the important interim measures for the islands.

**Negotiating the Return of the Bonins**

On 26 December, Rusk authorized the ambassador to open formal negotiations with Japan on the return of the Bonin Islands. Johnson was given discretion to introduce the general
package, but Rusk promised to try to get him in early January the draft texts of the specific issues to be addressed.

Negotiations subsequently began on 28 December, when Johnson presented Miki with an unofficial memorandum that covered several issues. Miki stressed his government’s desire to keep the agreement, which had to have Diet approval, as “simple and uncontroversial as possible.” In fact, it would become quite complicated, with most of it Miki’s doing. Johnson’s memo covered in general terms the instructions he had received from Rusk in the latter part of December. On the question of balance of payments, Miki “tended to play down its importance” but “gave the impression” that the Japanese government would “find enough ‘bargain sale’ items of movables” to purchase, thus offset the dollar losses. The ambassador told Miki that the issue could be “worked out to satisfaction of both” without having to incorporate it in the exchange of notes. The foreign minister then told Johnson that he preferred the agreement to have no specific date for the transfer of administrative rights, but instead, it would come into effect one or two months after the Diet approved it.

After some discussion, in which Johnson seems to have explained that the United States would prefer to have the transfer of authority done by 1 July, which was the start of the new U.S. fiscal year, Miki stated he did not think the Japanese government would have a problem with the turnover of facilities by that date. Although Johnson did not say so to Miki, he “considerably doubt[s]” the ability of the Japan Defense Agency to be prepared to take over the facilities. Further, he told the State Department it needed to be prepared that the Foreign Ministry might come back and inform the embassy that the timetable is too tight after speaking with their Japan Defense Agency counterparts. Regarding the “no precedent” clause, Miki had trouble accepting it, apparently fearing that the eventual return of Okinawa “might not be within the framework of Article 3.” Johnson explained that was not the case—the United States had in mind only military and financial aspects of reversion in mind. This seemed to “calm his concern.”

The next issue discussed was the Iwo Jima memorial. Miki stated that he did not want it mentioned in the agreement, but thought “there would be no difficulty in satisfying” U.S. requirements, such as a unilateral statement by the Japanese government giving the United States the assurances it sought. In any case, he wanted his survey mission to see the monument itself, which was done in mid-January. The foreign minister next raised the issue of the waiver of claims article, saying that it might be omitted since it was covered in Article 19 of the Peace Treaty. Johnson explained, however, that that article covered the period up until the peace treaty went into effect (April 1952) and that the United States would need a waiver for the period up to the date of reversion. The two representatives discussed the problems of the islanders at length, with Johnson recommending that the Japanese survey mission, scheduled for mid-January, be prepared to meet with the islanders. Johnson stated that the United States hoped to have the problems of the islanders “satisfactorily resolved” before the other negotiations were completed. Miki promised to study the U.S. proposals on the issue and to get back to the ambassador.

Overall, Johnson felt the session went “rather well” but told the State Department he expected “some difficulties in translating principles to pieces of paper.” Johnson also mentioned that he hoped to keep the “Bonins package” as small as possible. Rather than the
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four documents suggested in one of State’s follow-up telegrams. Johnson hoped to do it in three: the basic agreement, the official minutes, and the draft minutes for joint commit-

tee. He promised to send the embassy’s drafts for those documents the following week, and also recommended that in order to examine the question of military facilities and areas, a “Subcommittee on the Bonins” be established within the joint committee.

After the two-and-a-half-hour meeting, Johnson and Miki met privately, with only their interpreters present, to discuss the possible future use of the Bonins for nuclear stor-

age. Johnson reminded Miki of their conversation on 6 November and suggested a remedy. American concerns could be accommodated at this time by the ambassador presenting a top-secret note advising the Japanese government that, in a contingency requiring nuclear storage, the United States “would wish to raise the matter and would hope the request would be regarded in a different light than for in Japan proper and would anticipate favor-

able reaction since the request would not be made unless essential for vital security interests of [the] area including those of Japan.” The ambassador mentioned an antisubmarine warfare contingency as an example of the type of emergency in mind, and added that the United States “would not expect any GOJ reply to my note.”

Miki was not enthusiastic about a note. Even though “no reply was necessary or expected,” he hoped that no transmittal would be necessary. Miki explained that, in a contingency whereby the United States would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons in the Far East, Japan’s interests would also be deeply involved and that a request for nuclear storage would be considered in a “vastly different atmosphere” than that now prevailing. “At such a crisis,” he continued, “the question of nuclear storage would have to be considered with respect to all of Japanese territory and not just a particular part such as the Bonins. It would be very difficult to draw a distinction of principle between various parts of the country.” Miki then noted that the issue was political. He and the prime minister had said in the Diet that the nuclear issue is not now involved in [the] return of the Bonins but had been careful to keep their freedom of action with respect to Okinawa. The greatest diplomatic political problem the GOJ faces over next few years is that of the Okinawa nuclear issue. Miki would greatly regret anything that could possibly leak out and muddy waters on [the] fundamental Okinawa issue which GOJ had to face.

When Johnson said the issue was one of “formal official record to which reference could be made in the future” and thus a note was probably the “best method,” Miki responded that, nevertheless, he saw a problem with a note and wanted to think about it and discuss it with Johnson again. In his telegram to the department, Johnson acknowledged that Miki “of course has a point. If knowledge of such a note and lack of any reaction from GOJ came into wrong hands, it could be used by [the] opposition to belabor and embarrass Sato and Miki.” Johnson added that he doubted, therefore, the value of such a note, and suggested instead a “record embodied in my accounts of our official conversations on the subject.”

The following week, early in the new year, Rusk wrote back to Johnson to explain that the U.S. government was “not necessarily tied to [the formula] of a written note” to the Japanese government. “If there is serious danger of a leak of such note,” Rusk continued, “then other procedures for recording notification to GOJ would be acceptable.” Rusk
said the State Department would welcome any suggestions the embassy had on that score. He clarified, however, that the “basic intent is to assure that successive Japanese governments can be advised of the U.S. position.” Rusk agreed that it could probably be done, as Johnson suggested in his telegram, “by recording [the ambassador’s] account of official conversations on subject,” with a copy of such a record being held in the Foreign Ministry “perhaps under the same ground rules as [the] special arrangement made in 1960 which has never leaked.” Rusk also told Johnson that the department would have no objection if the only copy of record was held in the embassy, as long as it was certified in some form by a senior Foreign Ministry official, such as Togo, that it represented the true record of the U.S. statement. “Then,” he continued, “there would be far less risk of future GOJ governments questioning whether we had in past advised the Foreign [Ministry] of our views on contingency of nuclear weapons storage in the Bonins.”

The final document sent to the State Department by the embassy at this point was a copy of the Foreign Ministry’s working-level draft. According to Johnson, however, there were two “defects” with it: the Japanese side’s assumption that the United States would be retaining most of the facilities and areas in the islands, and the fact that it omitted any of the “hold harmless” language that the embassy felt necessary.

Draft for Agreement between Japan and the United States of America concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands (Foreign Ministry working-level draft)

Japan and the United States of America, desiring to accomplish the restoration of the Bonin and Other Islands to Japan, have decided to conclude this agreement, and have accordingly appointed their respective representatives for this purpose, who have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. With respect to Nanpo Shoto and other islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective from the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term “Nanpo Shoto and other islands” means Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island, including their territorial waters.

Article II

1. The installations and sites presently utilized by the United States of America in Nanpo Shoto and other islands, except for those mentioned in paragraph 2 below, will be used by the United States armed forces in accordance with the procedures set forth in the agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation.
and Security between Japan and the United States of America, regarding facilities and areas and the status of United States armed forces in Japan, signed at Washington, January 19, 1960. However, in the event that due to unavoidable delays, it is impossible to comply with the above procedures by the date of entry into force of this agreement, Japan grants to the United States of America the continued use of these installations and sites, pending the completion of the said procedures.

2. The Government of Japan will take over the operation of the weather stations in Chichi Jima and Marcus Island and the —— in ——. In the event that, due to unavoidable delays, it is impossible for the Government of Japan to take over the operation on the date of entry into force of this agreement, it is agreed that the present operation will be continued until such time as the Government of Japan is prepared to assume this responsibility.

Article III

Property, including papers and archives, of the government of the United States of America, except for those in use at the installations and sites mentioned in Article II, Paragraph 1 of this Agreement, existing in Nanpo Shoto and other islands on the date of entry into force of this agreement, shall be transferred to the Government of Japan on that date without compensation.

Article IV

This Agreement shall enter into force —— days after the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the Agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at ——, this —— day of ——, 1968, in duplicate in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic.

For Japan:

For the United States of America:

In its place, the American embassy had prepared its working draft:

WHEREAS the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States of America reviewed together on November 14 and 15, 1967, the status of Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (and other islands in Article 1 below), presently under the administration of the United States of America, and agreed that the mutual security interests of these two countries could be accommodated within arrangements for the return of administration of these islands to Japan;

WHEREAS the governments of the United States of America and Japan have consulted together within the context of expressions by the Government of Japan
of its intention to assume the responsibility for defense of this area and within
the context of agreement between the two governments that the United States
of America will retain under the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security between the United States and Japan only such military installations and
sites in the islands as are required by the security interests of the two countries;

WHEREAS the Government of Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and
authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdic-
tion over the territory and inhabitants of the islands listed in Article 1 below;

THEREFORE, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United
States of America have determined to conclude this Agreement, and have accord-
ingly appointed their respective representatives for this purpose, who have agreed
as follows:

Article I

The United States of America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and inter-
ests under Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San
Francisco on September 8, 1951, with respect to Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan
(including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece
Vela and Marcus Island as of the date of the entry into force of this agreement.
Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of
all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory
and inhabitants of the islands named above.

Article II

1. Except as may otherwise be mutually agreed, the United States will release, and
Japan will assume responsibility for, those installations and sites now being utilized
by the armed forces of the United States in the islands named in Article 1. Until
such time as the necessary steps can be completed in order to comply with the
procedural arrangements which implement the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security, Japan grants to the United States the continued use of present installa-
tions and sites.

2. Those facilities and areas which are to be retained by the United States will be
utilized in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security between the United States of America and Japan, the agreement un-
der Article VI of that treaty, the agreed minutes of these two agreements and all
other arrangements made by the two governments under the terms of the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security.

Article III

1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the United States and
its nationals arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities
of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations
or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America which shall have
occurred in or had any effect upon these islands listed in Article 1 prior to the
entry into force of this agreement. Japan agrees to hold harmless the United States against any claims arising as a result of the coming into force of this agreement.

2. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period in which the subject islands were under the occupation and administration of the United States of America as a consequence of directives of the occupying authorities or of the military government as authorized by existing law at that time, and will take no action subjecting United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

**Article IV**

This Agreement shall enter into force —— days after the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the Agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Tokyo, this —— day of ——, 1968, in duplicate in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic.

For Japan:

For the United States of America:

The above draft had been coordinated “in close cooperation” with representatives of U.S. Forces Japan, which replaced the Far East Command in 1957 and was then located at Fuchu Air Station. Johnson told the State Department that the preamble had “borrow[ed]” language from the joint communiqué to “set context” for the return of the islands in which Japan would assume responsibility for defense of the Bonins area. He also admitted that the embassy doubted whether the Japanese government would accept the wording, as Miki had made “clear he is anxious to present a low silhouette in the Diet” and would probably argue that it was not necessary to reiterate the language in the communiqué. (The embassy’s guess was correct, as the final agreement would show.) At the same time, Johnson stated that including the language in the draft would be a “useful negotiating tactic.”

Article I was described as a “straight crib from the Amami Agreement.” Article II was written, Johnson explained, to “emphasize our generosity in releasing facilities and our intent to utilize retained installations in accordance with the security treaty.” It would also improve the negotiating stance of the U.S. representative in the Facilities and Areas Subcommittee of the U.S.–Japan Joint Committee. He would have to ensure that in turning over facilities, the Japanese government would make provision for access roads and other arrangements that would “give substance” to rights of use and continued maintenance by Japan (as outlined in the draft joint committee minutes). Article III, Johnson’s telegram explains, removes “in line with Miki’s comments” any unnecessary duplication of peace treaty language regarding war claims as found in the fourth article of the Amami agreement while retaining the minimum level of protection the embassy believed necessary. Ar-
article IV was identical to the Japanese draft. Johnson added that the embassy examined the Amami agreement to see if there was any other language that needed to be extracted, but found it unnecessary.

After referring to the facilities and labor issues, Johnson mentioned that he found the State Department’s suggestion of “the reservation of the right to install new facilities or equipment on areas returned to GOJ,” which had been done at the time of the Amami reversion in 1953, to be “unproductive” as the United States does not have that right under the 1960 revised security treaty. Johnson also doubted that a “joint use” formula for the facilities on the Bonins would be good as the “political benefits of turnover would be lost.” As the United States is entitled to ask the Japanese government “for anything we may need any place in Japan” under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of 1960, Johnson felt it was better to depend on the “usual SOFA procedures for acquisition of facilities which might be required in the future.”

On 8 January, Togo, who according to Johnson, as director-general of the North American Affairs Bureau, was “the man in charge of the Foreign Office’s day-to-day work on the Bonins,” asked the embassy political counselor, Purnell, to come to the ministry to review the respective positions on the return of the islands. Togo explained that the Japanese government desired to have a “brief and simple basic agreement with no side exchanges,” as they might cause problems in the Diet. According to Purnell, Togo “appeared sympathetic,” however, to the idea of dealing with military problems in terms of the draft joint committee minutes. Regarding the minutes, Togo stated that the GOJ’s “basic principle” regarding facilities and areas would be the “strict compliance” with the terms of the security treaty and SOFA. He argued that it could not legally accept any commitment that it would continue to operate facilities or that the United States could automatically have the right to establish new facilities without complying with the normal SOFA procedures. Togo suggested that the United States carefully review its present and projected needs and either continue to operate the facilities about which it was particularly concerned, or enter into joint use arrangements for facilities it felt future requirements necessitated.

Purnell countered by saying that the United States believed that “special conditions relating to mutual effort” on the Bonins required a “reaffirmation and sharpening of general language” found in SOFA. Togo indicated he would be open to discussions of ways in which the joint committee could be helpful in managing said problems, but that he would have to see the specifics of any text on special arrangements. Chiba Kazuo, who attended the meeting and explained the provisions of SOFA again for the participants, noted that the government’s lawyers were “very nervous” about the rewording of existing commitments and would be “watching carefully” for divergence from the language of the security treaty arrangements. Moreover, he said, the Diet would be expected to examine the package more closely than at the time of the Amami reversion. In forwarding the meeting comments to the State Department, Johnson asked for a draft as soon as possible of the specific language the United States hoped to use to cover practical problems in order to demonstrate that it was not attempting to write a new SOFA.

On the question of the Bonins agreement not being a precedent for Okinawa, the Foreign Ministry representatives showed their “distaste for putting into black and white” such
a commitment because it was “too obvious a toned statement.” However, they said if the United States insisted upon such language, it could be done in the preamble portion of the basic agreement. Purnell requested suggestions on what type of wording the GOJ considered appropriate.

Richard Sneider from the State Department and Philip E. Barringer, director of Foreign Military Rights Affairs, who would serve almost 50 years in government as an expert on overseas basing arrangements, met with officials from the North America Bureau in separate sessions on 22 January during a visit to Japan. The Foreign Ministry representatives stated that they believed the government would be able to meet the 1 July target date for the turnover of facilities as desired by the U.S. side, but due to budgetary and other reasons might not be able to get all of its personnel to Chichi in time. As a result, they said the government would give “first priority” to defense-related functions to ensure there is no gap in the maintenance of the airfields and other functions. On the question of the bases, they repeated that the government would like to see the commitments more in line with SOFA and said that the lawyers did not like the idea of “taking responsibility” for facilities under terms in which the language implied “perpetual and permanent obligations.” Several other issues were also discussed in the respective meetings.

Over the following month, negotiations continued on a host of issues, but with regard to the “special needs” of the United States in the Bonins, the Foreign Ministry presented a revised draft that the embassy described as a “real effort” by the ministry to give the United States the “handle we need to ensure the maintenance of airfields and Chichi Harbor and a Japanese presence in the islands.” He also explained that the embassy doubted the GOJ would be able to go much further in committing itself to future actions regarding the facilities the United States returned. The Foreign Ministry said the U.S. concern of the availability on short notice of portions of GOJ installations, such as the munitions storage caves, including those for nuclear weapons in a contingency, on Chichi “could be met by agreements under provision of existing SOFA (Paragraph 4B, Article II), which had been “for the most part dormant” since the SOFA signature. The State Department later responded it had no objection to relating United States use of GOJ facilities to the SOFA paragraph as long as it was clear it was not to be a “precedent for the Ryukyus.”

A few days later, the Japanese resubmitted their draft paragraph on facilities to be maintained with the word “substantial” added to read “the U.S. will be kept informed, in advance, of possible future Japanese plans for substantial modifications of those installations and sites referred to in paragraph 3 above.” The GOJ felt it would be “impossible legally to accept” the broad commitment that its earlier counter draft had suggested that lacked the word “substantial.” Toward the end of the meeting, Chiba Kazuo, chief of the North American Section who attended the meeting with Deputy Director of the Northern American Bureau Okawara Yoshio, stressed that there was a “full meeting of minds” on the Japanese side that the Japanese government would assume responsibility for all facilities to be turned over to it in the Bonins. He added that the government had the following timetable in mind: signing of the agreement in mid-March, Diet ratification in mid- or late April, takeover of civil administration 30 days thereafter, with a one-month phase-out of the U.S. naval facility by 30 June. The session ended with a discussion by the U.S. military planners on their...
concerns about uninterrupted availability of services to LORAN sites on Iwo and Marcus, which were valuable for navigation and vessel/aircraft identification purposes.\textsuperscript{363}

In early March, a Maritime Self-Defense Force official, Captain Kunishima Kiyosashi, provided a briefing to U.S. Navy Captain Lawrence A. Kurtz, the embassy defense attaché, and other officials about the Japan Defense Agency’s plans for the Bonins. According to the briefing, the major planned installations for the MSDF, which one former joint staff official described as the most active in preparing for the assumption of responsibilities,\textsuperscript{364} would include a heliport and seaplane base, a destroyer pier, and a guard point for the harbor entrance.\textsuperscript{365} The MSDF also plans to “modernize and macadamize” the old airfield and use it in cooperation with other agencies as a landing field for light planes, such as the seven-passenger turboprop Mitsubishi MU-2 or smaller aircraft.\textsuperscript{366} The embassy was quite happy with the briefing. “While modest and gradual,” it wrote, “the JDA’s plans for the introduction of a Japanese defense capability into the Bonins-Volcano area promise to exceed the present US in-place capability within the near future and thus appear well in line with the commitment to that effect given in the course of the U.S.-GOJ negotiations of last fall which led to an agreement that the islands would be returned to Japanese administration.”\textsuperscript{367}

The following day, Johnson wrote to thank the State Department for helping to expedite the negotiations by providing feedback and guidance and to inform it that the basic agreement was “coming along in good shape.”\textsuperscript{368} On the question of islanders’ concerns, Johnson said he “thought we have done all possible and that the islanders themselves feel this is the case,”\textsuperscript{369} although some islanders would probably have disagreed with this assessment. He mentioned that the Japanese government was drafting the domestic legislation to accommodate the needs of the islanders, and he was “now entirely satisfied with the GOJ’s good faith and, in fact, GOJ is probably going to go further than I expected.”\textsuperscript{370} On the question of the agreement not being a precedent for Okinawa, it was agreed that Miki would make an oral statement, the text of which the Japanese government was to draft and show to Johnson. On the nuclear storage issue, both sides agreed that Johnson would make a statement, which the Japanese government would “accept and file a written copy.”\textsuperscript{371} Regarding the Suribachi memorial, Johnson wrote that he had yet to see the specific proposal. The latter two issues would prove to be difficult ones, with the script tampered with at the last minute. As described later, Johnson had trouble hiding his frustrations in his memoirs.

Later that week, the Japanese government requested permission to send advance parties to the islands for survey and other purposes. They proposed the following schedule: in early to late April, a 15-man survey team travelling by ship to Iwo Jima would assess removable property; in mid-April, a 6-man team would go to Chichi to prepare for takeover; in late April, a similar 6-man team would do the same at Iwo Jima; and within two weeks of takeover, 16-man teams would go to both Chichi and Iwo.\textsuperscript{372}

Negotiators continued into the following week narrowing the differences in both wording and substance on the basic agreement. On the evening of 17 March, Johnson and Togo met alone in a “long session” to work out a formula satisfactory to both sides regarding the “other aspects of the package,” including the texts on the Suribachi memorial and the nuclear weapons storage statements.\textsuperscript{373} The next day, negotiators met again to agree on the
texts while Togo shared the formulas worked out with Johnson with Foreign Minister Miki to confirm his satisfaction with them. That same day, Johnson forwarded to the State Department the bulk of the texts. Plans were subsequently made to conduct the signing on 28 March, but the State Department found that date not practical to allow for a full review of the documents. Instead, it proposed 2 April.

In the meantime, Ambassador Johnson and the foreign minister had to finalize the additional bilateral understandings. On 21 March, Miki and Johnson reached agreement on the text of the oral statements they were to make at the Joint Committee/signing ceremony, which read:

A. Prior to the signing of the agreement today on the return of the Bonin and other islands, the following conversation took place between the Foreign Minister and the American Ambassador.

B. The American Ambassador stated: In the event of a contingency requiring the use of the Bonin and/or the Volcano Islands for nuclear weapon storage, the United States would wish to raise this matter with the Government of Japan and would anticipate a favorable reaction from the Government of Japan since such a request would not be made unless it were essential for the mutual security interests of the area, including Japan.

C. The Foreign Minister stated: Major changes in the equipment of United States forces in Japan, including those in the event of emergency are the subject of prior consultation with the Government of Japan in accordance with the exchange of notes of January 19, 1960, concerning the implementation of Article Five of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The case you have indicated is precisely one which is subject to the said prior consultation, and at this time I can only say that under the circumstances you cite the government of Japan will enter into such consultation.

Because the above agreement had been in place, Ambassador Johnson was taken aback when Miki proposed on 2 April, the day the agreement was to be signed, that he would make a statement that contradicted the above agreement. The embassy had been notified on 1 April that “for reasons not entirely clear” the Foreign Ministry would not be able to obtain cabinet approval for the agreement, and thus the signing would have to take place at the end of the week on the 5th. The problem over the nuclear weapons issue may have been the major delaying factor, but President Johnson’s sudden announcement on 31 March (1 April Japan time) of his decision not to stand for re-election certainly added to the confusion at the time. After further discussion, an understanding was reached in which Miki would orally state Japan’s intention to allow no nuclear weapons on its territory and Ambassador Johnson would reply with a statement confirming the terms of the agreement. Both statements were made on the condition that they would not become part of the official written record of the signing ceremony. A later memorandum stated that the Japanese acknowledged the U.S. position, which saved them from having to specifically say they agreed.
This and Miki’s “last minute efforts” to alter the wording of the letter regarding the Iwo Jima memorial greatly angered Johnson and the State Department and left a “sour taste.” While writing that the department would have “preferred no such exchange,” it nevertheless said it “appears to protect [the] integrity of our arrangement on nucs” and praised Johnson when it wrote that “we think that exchange of oral statements you have worked out is certainly most that we could hope for given Miki’s insistence on reference to Sato’s January 27 speech.” (This was a reference to Sato’s speech before the Diet in which he explained that Japan would not possess nor permit the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.) Assistant Secretary Bundy continued, “you can be assured that if Miki does try to tamper with this formulation at [the] last minute, you will have our full support in not going through with the signing.” Bundy told Johnson that Sneider spoke to Ambassador Shimoda—who himself was “astonished by Miki’s ploy”—the evening before to register the department’s unhappiness with Miki’s “last-minute operations, particularly on nucs,” and that Shimoda in turn passed the message to Vice Minister Ushiba. In addition to registering the complaint, the State Department hoped it would “bolster top level Foreign [Ministry] efforts to block any further tampering by Miki.”

The Iwo Jima monument was another issue that Miki had personally tampered with at the last minute when Togo, on 29 March (the same day that Johnson had received authorization to sign the agreement after the Defense and Treasury Departments and Congress had all approved the terms of the agreement), handed Purnell a redraft of the letter on the Suribachi memorial “which [Togo] said had been done personally by Miki.” Purnell (as would Ambassador Johnson to Vice Minister Ushiba) expressed the U.S. side’s “astonishment and unhappiness at now seeking to change, even non-substantive aspects of documents.” Fortunately, the redraft “in no way changes the assurances of the GOJ with respect to the Marine memorial” and “in some respects [was] an improvement over the original draft.” However, from the U.S. side’s point of view, which had already received approval for the contents of the agreement and related additional documents as is, this last minute change was yet another friction point over the way the Iwo Jima memorial was being handled.

The discussions in late 1967 between Johnson and Miki, their different views for the memorial, and their agreement to hold off further discussion until the related maps and pictures had been studied and a trip made to the island have been presented earlier. In January, Johnson traveled to Iwo Jima to survey the memorial (being only the second U.S. ambassador to visit the island) “to get a better feel for what I was negotiating about.” He was joined by Ushiba and Togo. There, Johnson belatedly discovered Atop Mount Suribachi, with its twenty-four hour-Stars and Stripes, there was no grand statue a la Arlington, but only a small bronze bas-relief, erected not by the Marine Corps itself but by the First Marine Division. The Official Marine Corps memorial was down on the flats, on the site of the now-vacant and overgrown Marine cemetery. First-hand observation put quite a different complexion on this problem, but I still had to deliver the promised twenty-four-hour flag to the Congress.
According to Johnson, following the visit to the island by the Foreign Ministry officials, Miki “mounted a determined campaign against our retaining the twenty-four-hour flag” and the necessary Marine access to maintain it.\textsuperscript{392} On 10 February, Togo called on Johnson to tell him that Miki believed that continuing to fly the flag would be highly controversial, likely requiring a government-to-government agreement and Diet ratification, as the Japanese government “could not appear to be relinquishing control of its territory to the United States.”\textsuperscript{393} Togo asked if the United States could replace the flag with a bronze one “or do something else that might mitigate the problem.”\textsuperscript{394} Johnson, according to his memoirs, said the United States would do anything it could to make the solution “politically palatable,” but it “could not relent on the flag” and explained that his commitment to Congress “precluded any dilution of our right to fly the flag as we saw fit.”\textsuperscript{395} Johnson notes in his memoirs that he did not think the flag issue was a problem impossible to resolve: “If Japan went through with its announced intention of creating a memorial park of its own on Iwo, it could invite us to maintain our memorial there, too, and fly its flag alongside ours.”\textsuperscript{396} Nevertheless, Ushiba reported to Johnson at the end of the next week that Japan could not permit the Stars and Stripes to fly on Iwo Jima once it was returned. “It was the flag that shocked their sensibilities,” one former U.S. Air Force official wrote.\textsuperscript{397} “If it remained, the whole nation would lose face.”

Ushiba and Togo were not the only ones who had complained about the flag. According to Burket E. Tyler—who worked in the office of the deputy commander for services at Tachikawa Air Base at the time and regularly visited Iwo Jima as part of his responsibilities and has authored the manuscript \textit{Iwo Jima}—the “first hint of Japanese sensitivity about the flag” came from the president of the Iwo Jima Association, Wachi Tsunezo, who asked the embassy how the United States intended to maintain the monument.\textsuperscript{398} He volunteered the services of his association, but wondered who would be responsible for changing the flag every several weeks (due to the destruction of the cloth material as a result of the high winds and rough weather). Tyler explained, “For the Japanese, a people acutely aware [and] attuned to symbolism, the monument represented one of her greatest defeats and the supreme sacrifice of 22,000 of her young men. It was bad enough they were not permitted to remove the remains of their fallen soldiers, but to force those soldiers to lie forever beneath the flag of the enemy was asking too much.”\textsuperscript{399}

According to Johnson, Ushiba complained that the ambassador had never mentioned the flag specifically in earlier discussions, to which Johnson reportedly replied that “the flag was such an integral part of the memorial that there was never any question of excluding it,” and warned that he had “gained congressional assent to returning the Bonins as part of a package that included the Iwo Jima memorial, and to back out on it now would open doors that might best be left shut.”\textsuperscript{400} This exchange took place amid the backdrop of quite a few tensions in the bilateral relationship and in regional affairs, including the capture of the USS \textit{Pueblo} (AGER 2) and its crew by North Korean forces and the basing of Boeing B–52 Stratofortresses in Okinawa, in which Japan was seen as not being publicly supportive or helpful.\textsuperscript{401} On 16 February, for example, the usually mild Rusk personally drafted and fired off a “literally eyes only” telegram for Johnson that would have made even Dulles blush:

Surely the time has come for us to begin to resist attempts by the Japanese to erode our base in Okinawa on the grounds of “sensibilities.” We have some sensibilities
too. We have some six hundred thousand men in uniform in the Far Pacific engaged in security tasks which are of vital concern to the future security of Japan. We have taken over a quarter of a million casualties since 1945—most of them in the Far East with Japan as a major beneficiary. So far as I know Japan has not lost a single man in confronting those who are the major threat to Japan itself . . . It is almost more than flesh and spirit can bear to have Japan whining about Okinawa while we are losing several hundred killed each month in behalf of our common security in the Pacific . . . I feel strongly that we must turn around this intolerable Japanese attitude.  

Ushiba apparently persisted, however, so Johnson “reluctantly agreed” to look into replacing the flag with a brass one, as suggested by Togo since “the Japanese were making such a big issue of this flag.” Fortunately, Johnson had felt there was “obvious merit in the long run” to replacing a cloth flag with a bronze one for maintenance and other reasons, and the following week called Lieutenant General Victor H. “Brute” Krulak, the commander of Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, the predecessor to Marine Corps Forces Pacific, based at Camp Smith in Hawaii, whom Johnson had known from the Counterinsurgency Special Group and “who was ultimately responsible for the memorial.” The ambassador “described the flak we had been getting from the Japanese government” and Krulak “immediately saw the problem.” The general agreed that a bronze flag would be much preferable to cloth from the point of view of maintenance. He told Johnson he would order a bronze replacement be cast. Although Johnson wrote in his memoirs, “That was enough to satisfy the Japanese government,” he did not immediately inform the Japanese side of the bronze flag.

Unfortunately, several problems emerged that Johnson did not include in his memoirs. First, in early March, the Japanese press reported that bilateral negotiations on the return of the islands were “stalled over U.S. insistence that [the] American flag fly day and night over [the] memorial on Suribachi,” but that Togo was quoted as saying a solution was being worked out that would accommodate the sensitivities of both countries. While Johnson, who found the story “not sympathetic” to the U.S. point of view, was not “too concerned about the reaction” in Japan. His worry was if the story played in the United States to “make it appear [Krulak] or we have reacted to Japanese pressures.” A few days before this, Krulak had written to Johnson to inform him that the bronze flag was being fabricated and would be installed in about a month. The general also informed Johnson that he did not intend to make any announcement or comment, but simply would “report to Washington that we have completed long-term care of the memorial.”

A second problem, also temporary, emerged as a result of the replacement flag. On 25 March, a group of Marine engineers arrived on Iwo to erect the replacement. The result was an actual “monstrous” replica of a flag and flagpole atop the existing monument, replacing the cloth flag and flag pole. “When the Japanese first saw the news photos of the replica,” Tyler, who was on Iwo at the time, writes, “they were shocked. Technically their demands had been satisfied, but the nation’s sensibilities were still strained. If anything, this new flag, cast in the full flying position, was more distasteful than the original cloth flag. But what could they do? The Americans had removed the flag as requested.” It was at this point that fate struck, or better put, the kamikaze winds that have mythically saved Japan from earlier threats.
Four days after the new flag was built and installed, strong winds atop Mount Suribachi “had ripped the offensive flag from its moorings and sent it crashing into the sea.” Eventually, the Marines had to return and install a 5-by-8 foot bas-relief atop the monument, which remains in place to this day.

A third issue was securing the support of veteran’s groups in the United States. Johnson wrote, “with Krulak on my side, I knew there would be no grumbling from the Marines to Congress that we had sold out.” As a matter of fact, whether Johnson knew it or not, Krulak would have some explaining to do. After 34 years of active duty service, the highly respected Krulak would retire on 1 June 1968, a few weeks before the islands were actually reverted to Japan. But before his retirement, he spoke before the 3d Marine Division Association reunion. At the start of his address, he announced “I have some good news. The Japanese have agreed to allow the American flag to fly over Iwo Jima in perpetuity. In order to win this concession, we have agreed to allow the Japanese to fly their nation’s flag over Pearl Harbor.” The applause that had greeted his first sentence suddenly died down. Now the Marines understood—no sovereign nation, not even a once defeated one, could allow their former enemy to fly its flag.

In the meantime, the Suribachi memorial issue, which was not included in the actual text of the agreement but was instead covered in a letter that would accompany it, was resolved on 21 March when Miki’s staff presented the negotiated text of the letter from the foreign minister to the ambassador that gave assurances the memorial would remain and that the United States would have continued access to it. Miki did not propose the creation of a memorial park, joint or otherwise, after all, but did mention that he hoped a Japanese memorial, “one in memory of the Japanese soldiers who fought for their country in the Battle of Iwo Jima,” would be erected and that the two memorials “will long remain as a symbol of friendship between our two countries achieved after many hard experiences.” This note, along with the other texts, was sent off to Washington for its review. It had already been approved when Johnson was approached with Miki’s changes.

Miki’s actions greatly annoyed and confused Johnson. “Throughout [the negotiations on the Bonins],” Johnson said in his oral history, “I found Foreign Minister Miki very difficult. I had liked him very much and still like him very much as a person.” Johnson’s memoirs get more to the point.

Though the substantive issues were settled by March, stitching up the final agreement took quite a bit longer. For this delay Foreign Minister Miki was responsible. He was very quick and personally agreeable, but he had trouble making up his mind, or perhaps he estimated that the return of the Bonins would redound more to the political benefit of Sato than to his own. Whatever the reason, he just would not commit his government reliably. I sent what I thought was a finished package to Washington in March for the NSC and President to approve, which they did. But then Miki insisted on changing some clauses, and after some fairly lengthy negotiations I had to resubmit everything to Washington.

Eventually, on 5 April, the Bonins reversion agreement was signed, and on 10 April—not 5 April as originally scheduled—the “secret annex” with regard to nuclear weapons was
sent to Secretary Rusk. The actual contents remain classified at the time of this writing out of respect for the Japanese government, but a later memorandum discusses them. Another memorandum, dated 26 August 1968, discusses the return of Okinawa and the question of nuclear weapons storage rights:

If the JCS study reveals that storage rights only in time of crisis would not tolerably degrade our capability, I foresee a proposal which would permit reversion with such an arrangement rather than one which insists on storage rights at all times. This is similar to what was worked out for the Bonins. We said in a classified exchange that we expected that the Japanese would understand if we had to use the Bonins for nuclear operations in a crisis. The Japanese acknowledged that position—which saved them from having to “agree.”

Furthermore, the existence of the secret agreement or understanding is not doubted, as an airgram prepared later in the year specifically references it. That message was prepared because Sato had formed a new cabinet, with a new foreign minister, Aichi Kiichi, the month before and it was necessary to ensure that Aichi knew of the understanding. On 30 December 1968, Ambassador Johnson reported, “I today confirmed with Togo that Foreign Minister Aichi has been briefed on the understanding contained in refgram, Tokyo’s A 1331, April 10, 1968, on Bonin Agreement Nuclear Storage.”

THE SIGNING CEREMONY

In the meantime, Ushiba called Johnson on 2 April to tell him that the cabinet was expected to approve the Bonins agreement on the morning of 5 April. He and Johnson agreed to hold the signing ceremony at 1600 that day. Unfortunately, even at this late stage, there were other problems emerging.

The press release, negotiated bilaterally, was ready on 2 April, but the embassy was “not pleased” with the text that had “little press appeal.” Feeling it “too bland to be useful,” the embassy described it as the “result of tedious negotiations with [the Foreign Ministry] which could not prevent Treaties Bureau intrusion and lawyer’s language.” The embassy cautioned that it would be “useless” to try to negotiate any changes and recommended that the department “make [its] own release.” The department declined to do so, but explained that it would have a desk officer provide background information at the 5 April press conference to make up for the “extreme blandness” of the joint release. The text read,

Foreign Minister Miki and Ambassador Johnson signed today in Tokyo an agreement for the return to Japanese administration of the Bonin and Volcano Island groups (together with Rosario Island, Parece Vela, and Marcus Island), which had been administered by the United States under the provisions of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty with Japan. Upon completion by Japan of its legal procedures necessary for the entry into force of the agreement, the actual turnover of administration will take place after a thirty-day transitional period. President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato agreed in November of 1967 in Washington that the two governments should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrange-
ments for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without
detriment to the security of the area. Today’s agreement is the result of negotiations
conducted within the framework of the President’s and Prime Minister’s under-
standing. After the entry into force of today’s agreement, the United States will
continue the use of LORAN navigational stations on Iwo Jima and Marcus under
the terms of the Status of Forces Agreement between the two countries, but all
other installations and sites will be transferred to Japan. The Government of Japan
has under consideration measures to facilitate the reintegration of the slightly over
two hundred Japanese nationals who are now living on Chichi Jima into Japanese
life, as well as the return of the former residents of the islands evacuated during
the war.

In early April, the Foreign Ministry also shared with Ambassador Johnson a copy of
the draft personal statement of Miki to be made at the time of the signing ceremony. Both
the embassy and the staff of the ministry felt it to be “negatively worded” and not “strik-[ing
a] tone which is desirable.” Subsequently, the embassy was able to suggest improve-
ments and the ministry staff eliminated some of the more “negative language,” but noted
that Miki “stuck by his rather somber overall approach.” It explained that the state-
ment sounded better in Japanese than in English, and informed Washington that it would
be “counterproductive” for the United States to try to alter the language. Miki, on his
own, however, did make further revisions on the morning he was scheduled to make the
statement. The embassy deplored the “eleventh-hour changes” but felt they improved the
tone. Miki stated:

The fact that we are signing the agreement for the reversion of the Ogasawaras
here today is truly a deep pleasure. Dealing with the aftermath of war is no less
difficult than war itself. Given the mood of our people at the end of the war, there
were circumstances which could be accepted. However, with the passage of more
than twenty years there are those which ultimately became unacceptable. When
it comes to changing a situation which has existed for twenty years, it is easy to
imagine that it is difficult for those who must make the change. The reconciliation
of these two aspects and the search for a resolution which deepen Japanese-United
States cooperation is the difficult task of our diplomats. I am deeply pleased that
this reversion of the Ogasawaras could be settled through the understanding and
cooperation of the American side, and especially Ambassador Johnson. I earnestly
hope that other questions which remain can also be resolved in the same spirit.

At the signing ceremony, Johnson, somewhat anticlimactically, stated,

Thank you, Mr. Minister, for your welcome and for your thoughtful words on the
significance of this historic occasion. President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato
agreed in Washington last November that it would be possible to accommodate
the mutual security interests of Japan and the United States within the context of
a return of the Bonin and related islands to Japanese administration. I was pleased,
Mr. Minister, that you and I were able so quickly to reach an understanding on the
principles to be embodied in this agreement. Since then, our representatives have
worked out together all of the multitudinous and detailed questions which arise
when the administration of territory changes hands. In this task we have enjoyed the splendid cooperation of your very able staff. We have also been gratified to see the considerate way in which your government is approaching the complicated problem of reintegrating into Japanese society the two hundred Japanese nationals who have been living on Chichi Jima. I was also very pleased to learn from you the plans of the Japanese government with respect to the preservation of the Marine Corps memorial on Iwo Jima. I believe that the results of our labors are good, and meet the criteria which were outlined for us by the leaders of our two nations. What we are doing today demonstrates, as did the return of Amami Oshima, the good faith of the United States, in relinquishing stewardship of Japanese territory when both our governments agree that circumstances permit. Mr. Minister, the ease and speed with which this agreement was worked out is to me further evidence of that confidence and understanding which forms such a firm basis for the relations between our two countries and peoples.\textsuperscript{434}

In fact, Ambassador Johnson had been clearly bothered by Miki’s speech and told Sato as much a couple of days later when the two met at Sato’s retreat in Kamakura. Johnson said he was “disappointed with the implication of the foreign minister’s statement made at the time of the signing,” and added that “he had hoped that the foreign minister would take that opportunity to speak about American good will and good faith to ease the pressures on Okinawa.”\textsuperscript{435}

As part of the reversion process, a meeting of the joint committee took place at which the following statements were made based on minutes drawn up and negotiated earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{436} These minutes, too, remain classified, but this is the draft:

1. The United States representative stated:

Under the terms of the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning Nanpo Shoto South of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands), and Parece Vela and Marcus Island, the United States wishes to retain for its use and operation the following facilities and areas in these islands:

A. Iwo Jima. The Loran A and C stations, including antenna fields.

B. Marcus Island. The Loran C station, the radio station, which is an integral part of this facility, and the appurtenant antenna fields covering substantially all of the island except the Air Base.

2. The Japanese representative stated:

The Government of Japan agrees with the requests just made by the representative of the United States for the retention of certain facilities on Iwo and Marcus Islands and suggests that the Subcommittee on Facilities and Areas proceed to delineate the boundaries of and the arrangements for the facilities in question.

3. The United States representative stated:

In accordance with the expressed intention of the Government of Japan to assume responsibility for the defense of the Bonins area as set forth in the Joint Com-
muniqué issued following Prime Minister Sato’s meeting with President Johnson November 15, 1967, the United States is prepared to release to the Government of Japan the following facilities when the agreement concerning these islands comes into force or as soon thereafter as the Government of Japan is prepared to assume responsibility for their maintenance and operation.

A. Chichi Jima.

1. The United States naval facility.
2. The United States Navy weather station.
3. The munition storage sites.

B. Iwo Jima.

1. The airfield and other fixed facilities within the Air Base.
2. The aviation fuel farm.
3. The aircraft warning light facility on Mount Suribachi.
4. The low frequency navigational beacon facility.
5. The TACAN facility.

C. Marcus Island.

1. The airfield and other fixed facilities within the Air Base.
2. The aviation fuel farm.
3. The radio beacon facility.

4. The Japanese representative replied:

The Government of Japan is prepared to accept responsibility for the maintenance and operation of the facilities just enumerated by the United States representative.

5. The U.S. representative replied:

The appropriate authorities of the two Governments should now consult as to the moveable equipment located within the enumerated facilities which the Government of Japan may consider it convenient to purchase from the United States Armed Forces.

6. The Japanese representative replied:

This is agreeable to the Government of Japan. The Government of Japan also understands that, as provided in Article IV of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Security Cooperation and Security, it is not obligated to compensate the United States for any improvements within these facilities which are not removable.

7. The United States representative stated:
The United States proposes the following understandings with reference to the islands referred to above:

A. Except as otherwise agreed, the Government of Japan will continue to operate and maintain the installations, airfields and sites turned over to it by the United States in the concerned islands. In view of the limited areas of the islands concerned, both Governments will give special attention and consideration to the possibilities for exchange of reimbursable services. The United States forces will have the right to access to and use of the facilities maintained by the Government of Japan in these islands as required by the United States, subject only to payment for fuel and services rendered. The two Governments will consult about the development of new facilities, or the modification of those facilities, referred to in Paragraph 3 above, including changes in the function or purpose of such facilities.

The important relations of Nanpo Shoto, South of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island to the defense and security of both Japan and the United States of America may require that additional facilities and areas in the Islands be granted to the United States of America on an urgent basis. The Government of the United States understands that the Government of Japan will give as prompt and favorable consideration as possible if and when such requests are made specifically and case by case through the Subcommittee for Facilities and Areas.

B. The United States understands that the United States forces will have freedom of air space in all areas over the land and territorial water, ports and harbors, of these islands in accordance with Article V of the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan.

C. The United States understands that the existing rights, privileges and exemptions enjoyed by all contractors and their personnel presently performing existing contracts with the United States forces will continue in effect until the termination of the contract.

D. The United States understands that the Government of Japan will prohibit or, upon detection or upon the request of the United States forces, will take immediate and adequate measures in the area of the concerned islands for removing, destroying, neutralizing or screening any devices or equipment incompatible with the effective security and protection of, or causing electronic or mechanical interference with, the communication and navigational equipment employed by United States forces in the area.

8. The Japanese representative replied:

These understandings are acceptable to my Government.
Despite the tight schedule created for the return—a mere 11 weeks—the final arrangements proceeded without any major issues, unlike the many minor and major problems introduced in this chapter. Indeed, it was during the year covered in this chapter where the perceived national interests of both countries truly clashed—this time diplomatically rather than militarily—over Iwo Jima and its neighboring islands. Fortunately, their interests were able to mesh and merge for the common good of bilateral and regional stability.

While there many who were and are upset in the United States with the idea of returning Iwo Jima, many others gracefully accepted it. Similarly, the Japanese, rather than boasting about the return, sought to make it an opportunity to bring the two countries closer together. On 9 November 1968, for example, the *Iwo Jima Kensho Kinenbi Kenritsu Kiseikai* (Association for the Construction of a Memorial on Iwo Jima) was formed at a meeting in the Foreign Ministry’s auditorium with the help of the ministry and other government agencies, as well as the *Nanpo Doho Engokai* (Assistance Association for Okinawa and Ogasawara and Northern Islands Nanpo), *Ogasawara Kyokai* (Ogasawara Association), *Iwo Jima Kyokai* (Iwo Jima Association), *Nichibei Kyokai* (Japan-America Society), *Nihon Kyoyu Renmei* (Japan Veterans Association), and the *Ogasawara Yushi no Kai* (Ogasawara Brave Warriors Association). Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, who was Sato’s older brother, the association had a memorial to the Japanese who served on Iwo Jima built of stone from each of Japan’s 47 prefectures. It was completed on 25 June 1969, and a dedication ceremony took place on the 27th.

Embassy political officer Anthony Arnold attended on behalf of the new ambassador, Armin H. Meyer. On an early summer day, Arnold read the ambassador’s statement and then told the audience that he had lost his brother on Iwo Jima during the battle. He was certain, however, that his brother shared with him the same feeling of reverence for the bravery shown by both sides in the battle and the hopes that the bonds between the peoples of both countries would continue to grow in the future. This, after all, was what the reversion of Iwo Jima and its neighboring islands was all about.
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NOTES

1 Caruso, Nightmare on Iwo, 160.

2 Miki used this term to describe the preparatory work for reversion. Johnson uses a very similar phrase: “preparing the soil.” This latter quote comes from Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 470. Johnson was the U.S. ambassador to Japan at the time of the reversion of the Bonin Islands.

3 Johnson, who was serving as deputy ambassador in Saigon, Republic of South Vietnam, was appointed ambassador to Japan on 25 July 1966, and following Senate confirmations in August and a vacation in Hawaii, arrived in Japan on 29 October. See ibid., 441–42.

4 Ibid., 441.

5 Ibid., 467.

6 Ibid., 468.

7 “Telegram 8698 from Johnson to Department of State, June 1, 1967,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, Central Files (hereafter CF) 1967–1969, RG 59, also see author’s interview with Edamura Sumio, 17 July 2007, Tokyo.


13 The transcripts of the meeting can be found at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/055/0082/main.html. An English version that offers the gist of Miki’s comments can be found in “Telegram 8659.”

14 “Telegram 8659.”

15 The editorial (“Bonin Islands,” The Washington Post, 26 May 1967) stated,

For the first time Japan has asked the United States to discuss the return of the Bonin Islands. The United States should promptly agree. The point of the discussions should be how quickest to return the islands to Japanese administration and, then, to undiluted Japanese control. The Bonins sit south of Japan and far east of the strategic Ryukyus. The United States took them in World War II and now maintains a weather station and small naval facility manned by a couple hundred men; their strategic value is, at best, questionable. Politically, the risks of staying and the rewards of leaving are minor, compared to the
Ryukyus. Barely 150 islanders live there, descendents of the American and European colonists who arrived in the 1830s. In Tokyo live a large number of temporary prere war residents of Japanese descent; they supply what modest political pressure there is on the Japanese government to recover the islands. But it is myopic to look at foreign bases only in such narrow terms of current convenience and cost. Sooner or later, American control of foreign territory is bound to become a political liability. However appreciated for its military reassurance, the American presence is quite sure to become a target of local nationalism. Particularly with Japan, as firm and significant a friend as the United States has in Asia, the test should not be whether there is a legal basis for the American position but whether this country could and would establish such a position now. The political realities of today must be the guide, not the legal technicalities of the past. This test is all the more important in view of the United States’ continuing world role. As long as military commitments are made and kept in points so distant as to require foreign installations be sustained in terms responsive to the pride and policy of American allies. A “peace treaty,” which is the basis of the American position in the Bonins (and the Ryukyus), can hardly be relied on as a solid and worthy foundation, when the old relationship of victor and vanquished changes into the more mature and becoming relationship of equal and sovereign states.

The Washington Post followed with a second editorial on 23 July that argued, As an earnest of its good faith, the United States should offer on the spot to relinquish the other Japanese island chain it holds as a result of World War II, the Bonins. Unlike the Ryukyus, which include the great base of Okinawa and arch strategically toward China, the Bonins sit far to the east and have a strategic value so slight the Pentagon is unwilling to make a public case for it. Indeed, the diplomatic case for retaining the Bonins is only that a change in their status would necessarily lead to a change in the Ryukyu’s status. That is why, in our view, we should start with the Bonins.

A subsequent editorial on 20 September argued along the same lines: “In our view, [the United States] should offer immediately to return the Bonins. Their strategic value appears to be close to nil. Their return might invite more pressure on the Ryukyus but it would demonstrate American good faith. The obvious occasion for a Bonins offer is the forthcoming visit of Premier Sato of Japan.”

A fourth editorial on the subject, appearing on 21 October, and entitled “Island Time Bombs,” argued that the “longer the United States holds [the islands] without specifically preparing to turn them back to Japan, the greater the danger of an explosion that will jeopardize this country’s relations with its most important Asian ally . . . In this situation, the United States must start by giving Japan tangible evidence of its intent to return the islands. We have thought for some time that one good way would be for President Johnson to offer to hand back the Bonins at once; their military value appears negligible. The moment will be at hand when Premier Sato arrives in Washington next month.” The author asked Richard Halloran, The Washington Post’s correspondent in Tokyo as to why that newspaper took such a strong interest in the Bonins problem. Halloran guessed it had to do with the importance the editor placed on relations with Japan. Interview with Richard Halloran, 1 November 2007, Honolulu, Hawaii.


17In a September meeting with Miki called at the foreign minister’s request, Johnson told Miki how problematic it was for U.S. leaders that conversations with their Japanese counterparts were regularly leaked to the press. As a result, it was difficult to have “private” talks. Undated, untitled memo in Japanese Foreign Ministry Files (Eldridge JFOIA). Johnson elaborated on this theme in a self-recorded oral history located in the papers of U. Alexis Johnson at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library in Austin, TX.
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18U. Alexis Johnson, Tape 16a, 1, papers of U. Alexis Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.


20Ibid.

21Ibid.

22Ibid., 469–70.


24“Aide-Memoire, Tokyo, July 15, 1967, English translation of 7 Gatsu 15 Nichi, Okinawa, Ogasawara Mondai ni Kansuru Gaimu Dajin, Bei Taishi Kaidan ni Saishi Senpo ni Tewataseru Obogaki, 7/15/1967,” Eldridge JFOIA. The author was unable to locate the aide-mémoire in the files of the State Department, but was able to locate it through an FOIA request to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The previous section on Okinawa is completely censored.


28Ibid.

29Ibid.

30Ibid.


32“Telegram 9182 from Johnson to State Department, June 27, 1967,” ibid.

33“Airgram A-1747.”

34Minobe Ryokichi, Tochiji 12 Nen [12 Years as Tokyo Metropolitan Governor] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1979), 194.


36“Memorandum from William B. Bundy to Mr. Kohler on Your Meeting with Ambassador Shimoda, July 17, 1967,” ibid. Also see “Telegram 5236 from State Department to Tokyo Embassy, July 13, 1967,” ibid.

37“Telegram 5236.”

38Ibid. Also see “Memorandum from William B. Bundy to Mr. Kohler on Your Meeting with Ambassador Shimoda, July 17, 1967.” In interpellations before the lower house Special Okinawa Committee on 28 June, Miki said it was natural to consider the Shimoda concept when preparing for negotiations for reversion, but said the type under the Shimoda concept was “incomplete reversion.” See “Telegram 25551 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, June 29 1967,” Folder: POL 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.
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39“Telegram 5236.”

40Shimoda also raised the Bonins issue a week later on 18 July when he called on Bundy again.


43Morton Halperin, “American Decision Making on Reversion of Okinawa: A Memoir,” in Committee for the Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa, ed., Okinawa Reversion: Its Long-Term Significance in U.S.–Japan Relations, Past and Future (Tokyo: Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, 1994), 54. Sadly, McNaughton, whom Secretary of Defense McNamara had viewed as his likely successor, was killed in a plane crash on 19 July. He had already been appointed secretary of the Navy at this time and was to assume his position on 1 August.

44“Memorandum for Mr. McNaughton.”

45“Memorandum on the Policy Planning Staff.”

46Ibid. Also see “Letter from Robert S. McNamara to author, September 28, 2000.”


49“Telegram 21877, from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, August 16, 1967,” ibid.

50“Memorandum for the Record, NSC Meeting August 30, 1967, Subject: Reversion to Japan of the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Other Western Pacific Islands, August 31, 1967,” Folder: NSC Meetings, 8/30/67, Relations with Japan, Box 2, National Security Files, NSC Meeting File, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

51List of Attendees, NSC Meeting, August 30, 1967,” ibid.

52“Memorandum for the Record, NSC Meeting August 30, 1967.”


54Suetsugu Ichiro, Sengo’ e no Chosen [Challenging the “Postwar”] (Tokyo: Ooru Shuppan, 1981), 226. Also see author’s interview with Suetsugu Ichiro, 18 April 2000, Tokyo.

55“Telegram 22865 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, August 17, 1967,” ibid. According to a recently published diary, it appears that his personal secretary, Kusuda Minoru, a former reporter with the Sankei Shimbun, had a hand in writing the text of Sato’s speech. See Kusuda Minoru, Kusuda Minoru Nikki: Sato Eisaku Seri Shuseki Hisshokan no 2000 Nichi [The Diary of Kusuda Minoru: 2000 Days as the Personal Secretary of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2001), 71–72.
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57 Ibid., 166. Also see Kusuda, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki*, 71–72.


60 “Memorandum from Bundy to Secretary Rusk, August 31, 1967,” ibid.


62 “Address by Michael J. Mansfield,” Japan-American Assembly, 14–17 September 1967, Shimoda, Japan. Also see author’s interview with Michael J. Mansfield, 27 March 2000, Washington, DC. The author would like to thank Weston Konishi of the Mansfield Foundation for helping to arrange the interview.


66 “Miki Daijin, Makunamara Kokubo Chokan Kaidanroku” [Memorandum of Conversation between Minister Miki and Secretary of Defense McNamara], Eldridge FOIA.


68 Ibid., 238.

69 Handwritten Notes of Conversation between Vice President and Foreign Minister Miki (September 15, 1967),” Vice President’s Meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, Box 935, Vice President Files, Foreign Affairs, Hubert H. Humphrey Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, MN.


71 “Memorandum of Conversation on Ryukyu Islands (Part I of II), September 16, 1967.”


74 Ibid., 477. Johnson wrote that he briefed Harry D. Felt, which may be true, but Felt had finished his time as CINCPAC in June 1964. The author, thus, chose to insert the name of the commander at the time, Sharp, for Felt’s.

Author’s interview with Robert A. Fearey, 10 June 2001, Washington, DC.


Ibid., 353, 354, 359.

Ibid., 363.


Ibid.

Ibid.


“Intelligence Note on Japanese Foreign Minister Discusses Vietnam and Okinawa, October 6, 1967.”

Telegram 2298.”

Ibid.

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92“Telegram 2422, Johnson to Secretary of State (October 11, 1967),” Box 2249, Political Affairs and Relations, Japan-U.S. 1/168, CF 1967–1969, RG 59; also see “Telegram 2414, Johnson to Secretary of State (October 11, 1967),” ibid.

93“Telegram 2422.”

94Ibid. Also see “Telegram 2415, Johnson to Secretary of State (October 11, 1967),” ibid.

95“Telegram 2422.”

96Ibid.

97Ibid.

98Ibid.

99The U.S.-Japan Security Subcommittee is one of the bilateral fora to discuss alliance issues and was created as part of the new arrangements under the security treaty revised in 1960.

100“Telegram 2422.”


102Ibid.

103Ibid.


105“Telegram 55551, Secretary of State to American Embassy, Tokyo (October 18, 1967),” ibid. The Japanese memorandum of conversation was sent as telegram no. 2908 to the foreign minister and was made available by the author’s FOIA request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

106“Telegram 2698, Johnson to Secretary of State (October 21, 1967),” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59. Johnson’s 11 October telegram makes no mention of Miki promising a paper on the Bonins, but his 21 October telegram said Miki had made such a promise.

107The aide-mémoire was sent as “Telegram 2697, Johnson to Secretary of State (October 21, 1967),” ibid. The English and Japanese versions were made available as part of the author’s declassification request to the Foreign Ministry. The paragraph quoted here is from page 4 of the aide-mémoire from the Japanese files.

108Aide-Mémoire, October 21, 1967.”

109Ibid.

110Ibid.

111Ibid.

112Ibid.

113Ibid.

The Reversion, 1967–68

115 “Telegram 2698.”

116 Ibid.


118 Ibid.

119 “Telegram 56953 from Bundy to Ambassador, October 24, 1967,” ibid.

120 “Telegram 2913 from Johnson to State Department, October 28, 1967,” Folder: Political and Defense, Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59. The Japanese version of the memo appeared as telegram 1910 from Foreign Ministry to Washington Embassy, 28 October 1967, and was declassified as part of the Eldridge FOIA request.

121 Newspaper reports of the meeting suggested that Miki was unhappy Johnson had not been given instructions for his talks with the foreign minister.

122 “Telegram 2913.”

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Ibid.

126 The aide-mémoire was prepared on 26 October, and the English and Japanese versions were declassified through the author’s request in the Japanese Foreign Ministry files. The English version, not quoted here, is six pages long. It was sent as “Telegram 2907 from Embassy to State Department, October 28, 1967,” Folder: Political and Defense, Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.

127 “Telegram 2913.”

128 Ibid.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.


132 Ibid.


135 Author’s interview with Walt R. Rostow, 12 July 2000, Rostow Office, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations

137Ibid.


139Ibid.

140Ibid.

141Ibid.

142Ibid.

143Ibid.


145Ibid.


147Ibid., 10.


149Memorandum for Mr. Rostow on Tuesday Luncheon Item.”

150Ibid.

151Ibid.

152“Lunch Meeting with the President, Tuesday, October 31, 1967, 1:00 p.m.,” Folder: Meetings with President, July–Dec 1967, Box 1, National Security Files of Walt R. Rostow, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.


156Ibid.

157Ibid.

158Draft Language for Sato Communiqué on the Bonin Islands, undated,” attachment to ibid.
Of course, the argument can be made that the JCS was too acquiescent toward the White House at this time on military strategy. See H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Johnson, McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1997). On Wheeler, see Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1964), 22.

Memorandum to the President on Luncheon Meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, CIA Director Richard Helms, George Christian, and Jim Jones, Saturday, November 4, 1967,” Folder: Meeting with Foreign Policy Advisors, 4 November 1967, 2:20 p.m., Meeting Notes File, Box 2, LBJ Papers, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

"Telegram 65118.”

Telegram 65117 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, November 5, 1967,” Folder: Political Affairs and Relations, Japan-U.S. 1/1/68, Box 2249, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.

Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations

184“Telegram 65117.”
185“Telegram 65120.”
186Ibid.
187Ibid.
188Ibid.
189Ibid.
190“Telegram 3060, Johnson to Secretary of State (November 6, 1967),” Folder: Political Affairs and Relations, Japan-U.S. 1/1/68, Box 2249, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.
191Ibid.
192Sato, Sato Eisaku Nikki, 168.
194“Telegram 3142.”
195“Telegram 3147 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, November 7, 1967,” ibid.
196Ibid.
198Ibid. According to Johnson, the consultation had not been done, but a plan had been worked out between Rusk and McNamara. The two had waited until Ambassador Johnson had informed the Japanese of the “total position [of the United States] in the draft communiqué,” which was done when Johnson told Sato and Miki that the United States reserved the right to discuss nuclear weapons storage in the Bonins. Rusk and McNamara agreed to arrange consultation with the leadership of both houses, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Armed Services Committee, and individually for Senator Carl T. Hayden (D-AZ) and Representative George H. Mahon (D-TX). See “Memorandum for the President on Consultation with Congressional Leaders on our Handling of the Ryukyus and Bonins during Sato Visit, November 5, 1967,” Folder: Political and Defense, Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.
199Ibid. Johnson expressed his surprise at this, but he may have had some hints that Congress would not be too opposed through his talks with two influential senators while still in Japan. The ambassador had met on or about 1 November with Senators John J. Sparkman (D-AL) and John G. Tower (R-TX), along with Gen Matthew C. Ridgway, who were in Japan for the state funeral of Yoshida. Johnson told them of the general direction of the discussions regarding Okinawa and the Bonins, and of Japan's views with regard to Iwo Jima. All three said that the movement on the return of the islands was “entirely appropriate” and none saw any “significant political problems.” Johnson paid extra attention to the views of Tower—who had served in the Pacific on an amphibious gunboat and was a member of the Armed Services Committee—about Iwo Jima. Tower, according to Johnson, did not believe there would be any “significant political opposition” to inclusion of Iwo Jima in the return of the Bonins. Johnson explained that he was only asking on an “informal and personal basis”
and was not “seeking to tie them to their off-the-cuff answers.” See “Telegram 2972 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, November 1, 1967,” Folder: Political and Defense, Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.


201Ibid.

202Author’s interview with Mansfield.


206Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available, 38. Wakaizumi cites the memoirs of a close ally of Sato, Hori Shigeru, who was considered one of the Sato faction’s five lieutenants (Satoha Gobugyo). See Hori Shigeru, Senso Seiji no Oboegaki [A Memorandum on Postwar Politics] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1975), 122–23.

207Author’s interview with Kusuda Minoru, 31 July 2000, Tokyo. Also see Kusuda, Shuseki Hishokan.

208Ibid., 151.

209Ibid. For more on Sakai’s career, see Sakai Yoneo, Watashi no Isho [My Last Will] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1967). Johnson had served as deputy undersecretary from April 1961 to June 1964, when he was suddenly asked to serve as the deputy ambassador in Saigon. He returned to Washington in November 1965 and served once again as the deputy undersecretary until he went to Japan in October 1965 as ambassador to Japan. See Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, chapters 10, 11, and 12.

210Kusuda, Shuseki Hishokan, 152.

211Ibid.


214“Memorandum for the Record, Sunday, November 13 [sic], 1967.”

215Ibid.

216Ibid.

Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S.-Japan Relations

218 “Memorandum for the President, November 10, 1967.”


220 Kusuda, Shuseki Hishokan, 162.

221 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 479. Also see Johnson’s oral history, Tape 15 a, 16, papers of U. Alexis Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

222 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 479.


224 Ibid.

225 Hickenlooper had been nominated as a candidate to attend the Yoshida state funeral, but declined to go. See “Memorandum for the President on U.S. Delegation for Yoshida State Funeral, October 23, 1967,” Folder: Pol 6 Japan, Box 2244, CF 1967–1969, RG 59, and “Status of Yoshida Funeral Delegation as of 1400, October 24.”

226 “Memorandum for the President on Congressional Consultations and Negotiating Status Concerning the Ryukyus and the Bonins, November 13, 1967.”


228 Sato, Sato Eisaku Nikki, vol. 3, 175.


231 Ibid., 175–76.

232 Ibid., 176.


236 Ibid.


238 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 483. Inexplicably, Johnson’s memoirs again mistake the name of the CINCPAC at this point, writing it was Adm John S. McCain Jr. However, McCain did not assume his responsibilities until July 1968. Adm Sharp was still in charge at this time.
Author’s correspondence by e-mail with Miki Hideo, 5 January 2008.


Ibid.

Telegram 75936 from State Department to Tokyo Embassy, November 28, 1967,” ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Johnson asked Miki for this information at their 29 November 1967 meeting. Miki told him that the Tokyo Metropolitan Government probably had such records, and that he would try to obtain them for Ambassador Johnson. See “Telegram 3665 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, November 29, 1967,” Folder: Pol 7 Japan, Box 2244, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

“Miki Daijin, Johnson Bei Taishi Kaidan Kiroku” [Memorandum of Conversation between Minister Miki and U.S. Ambassador Johnson], November 30, 1967,” Eldridge JFOIA.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Telegram 3665.”

Ibid.

Ibid.


Telegram 3967 from Embassy Tokyo from State Department, December 13, 1967,” ibid.

Telegram 84738 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December 14, 1967,” ibid.
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264"Telegram 83547 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December 13, 1967,” ibid.
265"Telegram 85704 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December 16, 1967,” ibid.
266"Telegram 85697 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December 16, 1967,” ibid.
267Ibid.
268"Telegram 85715 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December (exact date unknown), 1967,” ibid. At the time of this writing, the telegram remains classified.
269"Telegram 88836 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December 22, 1967,” ibid.
270"Telegram 85704.”
271Ibid.
272Ibid.
273Ibid.
274Ibid.
275Ibid.
276The provision in the Amami agreement was Article IV. See Eldridge, The Return of the Amami Islands, 159–60.
277"Telegram 85697.”
278Ibid.
279Ibid.
280"Telegram 85704.”
281Ibid.
282Ibid.
283Ibid.
284Ibid.
285On this question, Ambassador Johnson later wrote that he hoped that the government would move fast on the option and that it would be open only as long as the United States retained administrative rights over the islands. “Special provision for emigration,” Johnson continued, “after GOJ takeover could make integration of islanders into Japanese environment more difficult and might be misinterpreted by Japanese public. However, it [was] clear from Miki’s comments [that] immigration into U.S. and/or work in Guam would help ease problem of integration for GOJ which cannot continue high wage jobs for these people.” See “Telegram 4310, Johnson to Secretary of State, December 29, 1967,” Folder: Political and Defense, Pol 19 Bonin Islands, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.
286"Telegram 85704.”
287"Telegram 88836.”
288Ibid.
444

Ibid.


Ibid.


Telegram 4428 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 4, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, 1-1-68, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59. Also see “Telegram 4421 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 4, 1968,” ibid., on background to the request and “Telegram 4902 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 22, 1968,” ibid.

For the text of the address by Tanaka Tatsuo of the prime minister’s office, relayed by Moriya Michio, who headed the delegation, see “Telegram 4819 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 18, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, 1-1-68, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.


Ibid.


Ibid.


Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 484.


Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 484.
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309“Telegram 5507.”
310“Telegram 5506 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, February 9, 1968,” ibid.
311Ibid.
312“Telegram 5596 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, February 13, 1968,” ibid.
313“Telegram 5853 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, February 24, 1968,” ibid.
314Ibid.
315“Telegram 89864 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December 26, 1967,” ibid.
316“Telegram 4310.”
317Ibid.
318Ibid.
319Ibid.
320Ibid.
321Ibid.
322Ibid.
323“Telegram 90207 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December (exact date unknown), 1967,” ibid. At the time of this writing, the telegram remains classified.
324“Telegram 85715 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, December (exact date unknown), 1967,” ibid. At the time of this writing, the telegram remains classified.
325“Telegram 4333, Johnson to Secretary of State, December 29, 1967,” ibid.
326Ibid.
327Ibid.
328Ibid.
329Ibid.
330Ibid.
331Ibid.
333Ibid.
334Ibid.
335Ibid.
336Ibid.
337“Telegram 4391 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 3, 1968,” ibid.
338“Telegram 4394 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 3, 1968,” ibid.
339“Telegram 4392 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 3, 1968,” ibid.

340“Telegram 4391.”

341Ibid.

342Ibid.

343“Telegram 4391.”

344The draft joint committee minutes were sent as “Telegram 4393” on 3 January 1968, but at the time of this writing the telegram remains classified. “Telegram 4391.”

345Ibid.

346Ibid.

347Ibid.


350Ibid.

351Ibid.

352Ibid.

353Ibid.

354Ibid.

355Ibid.

356“Telegram 4954 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, January 23, 1968,” ibid.

357Ibid.

358“Telegram 5797 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, February 21, 1968,” ibid.

359Ibid. The relevant paragraph reads, “4. (b) With respect to facilities and areas which are to be used by United States armed forces for limited periods of time, the Joint Committee shall specify in the agreements covering such facilities and areas the extent to which the provisions of this agreement shall apply.”


362Ibid. See author’s interview with Ambassador Chiba Kazuo, 1 December 2000, Tokyo, and author’s interview with Ambassador Okawara Yoshio, 13 August 2007, Tokyo.

363The first LORAN Station A was located on Kangoku Iwo, a small islet located about 2,000 meters west of Iwo Jima, and was built shortly after the battle of Iwo Jima began. The station was relocated to Kitano Point in 1949. The Quonset hut station was heavily damaged in the September 1955 typhoon,
Louise, discussed in chapter 5. The station was rebuilt and, in 1963, LORAN C functions were added to the station mission. In March 1964, the 1,350-foot LORAN C tower collapsed, killing several people. Construction of the new tower and buildings was completed at the end of the year.

364 Telephone interview with Miki Hideo, January 7, 2008.


366 Ibid.

367 Ibid.

368 Telegram 6197 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, March 5, 1968,” ibid.

369 Ibid.

370 Ibid.

371 Ibid.

372 Telegram 6330 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, March 10, 1968,” ibid. MOFA official Murata Itaru was one of those who traveled to the islands during this time. He provided the author with extensive notes and anecdotes about his trip in interviews and correspondence between March and July 2002.

373 Telegram 6570 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, March 18, 1968,” ibid.

374 Airgram A-1230, from Embassy Tokyo to State Department on Bonin Negotiations: Negotiators Agree on Texts, March 18, 1968,” ibid.

375 Telegram 135534 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, March 23, 1968,” ibid.

376 Telegram 6698 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, March 21, 1968,” ibid.

377 Telegram 7006 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, April 1, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, 4-1-68, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.


379 Telegram 7087 from Embassy Tokyo to the State Department, April 2, 1968,” remains classified. See 270n5, *FRUS, 1964–1968*.

380 Memorandum for Mr. Resor from James V. Siena on Nuclear Weapons on Okinawa, August 26, 1968,” Box 1, History of Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Record of Army Staff, RG 319, document courtesy of Ota Masakatsu.


382 Ibid.

383 Ibid.

384 Ibid.

385 Ibid.

448


388 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 484.

389 Johnson appears to be incorrect here. The original memorial was built by the 31st Navy Construction Battalion, or Seabees, in late summer 1945 and dedicated in October that year.

390 The remains of fallen U.S. personnel in the cemetery were removed between 1948 and 1951. A marker, built in the summer of 1945 by the 31st Navy Seabees, remains today at the former site of the cemetery.

391 Johnson, The Right Hand of Power, 484.

392 Ibid.

393 Ibid., 484–85.

394 Ibid., 485.

395 Ibid.

396 Ibid.

397 Tyler, Iwo Jima, 31.

398 Ibid.

399 Ibid., 30–31.


404 Ibid.

405 Ibid.

406 Ibid.


408 “Telegram 6316 from Tokyo Embassy to State Department, March 8, 1968,” ibid.

409 Ibid.

410 Ibid.
Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S. - Japan Relations


412 Ibid., 32–33.

413 Ibid., 33.


417 Johnson, Tape 17, 2, papers of U. Alexis Johnson, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.


419 “Telegram 1331 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, April 10, 1968,” remains classified.

420 “Memorandum for Mr. Resor.”


422 Ibid.


424 Ibid.


426 Ibid.

427 Ibid.

428 “Telegram 140599 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, April 3, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, 4-1-68, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59. The State Department did have Country Director for Japan Sneider attend the press briefing and provide background information. See “Telegram 142875 from State Department to Embassy Tokyo, April 5, 1968,” ibid.

429 “Telegram 7094 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, April 2, 1968,” ibid.

430 “Telegram 7143 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, April 4, 1968,” ibid.

431 Ibid.

432 “Telegram 7180 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, April 5, 1968,” ibid.

433 “Telegram 7143.”

434 “Telegram 7094.”


450
It was to be located immediately next to the U.S. monument with the plot of land on which both memorials sat, and rented by the Japan-America Society on behalf of the Japanese government.

The memorial was given to the Japan-America Society, which rented the government property on top of Suribachi (at the request of the government) and was charged with the care and maintenance of both the U.S. and Japanese memorials (in practice, MSDF base personnel did it for the Japanese memorial while the U.S. Coast Guard maintained the U.S. one until its departure in 1993).

CONCLUSION

END OF AN ERA

I hope that you...will accept the return of the Bonins as a further earnest of the fact that...we do not “covet a foot of any territory.” The return of the Amamis and now of the Bonin and Volcano Islands gives me confidence that the question of the remaining Japanese territory for which we still have stewardship can be resolved in the same spirit and in the same framework.

—Speech by Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, 26 June 1968, at celebrations marking the return of Ogasawara Islands

THE OFFICIAL REVERSION CEREMONIES ON CHICHI AND IWO

On 26 June 1968, shortly before 1400 (noon in Tokyo), U.S. and Japanese government and military officials, local residents, representatives of the former islanders, and dozens of media representatives crowded the assembly area outside the headquarters of the Chichi Jima U.S. naval facility, the same white concrete building that somehow survived the air raids during the last years of World War II, to participate in an historic event. The gathering was the main event of three official ceremonies marking the return of the administrative rights over the Bonin Islands; the other two being held on Iwo and Marcus (Minami Torishima) Islands. A private celebration, sponsored by the Ogasawara Kyokai (Ogasawara Association) with support from the central government, Tokyo Metropolitan government, and the Nanpo Doho Engokai (Assistance Association for Okinawa and Ogasawara and Northern Islands) was also held in Tokyo.

It had been a busy couple of months for Lieutenant Commander Dale W. Johnson, the commander of the Chichi Jima naval facility and military government representative, since the agreement was signed in Tokyo in early April. During those two-and-a-half months, Johnson, and his new bride, hosted almost 300 official visitors who came to survey the islands in preparation for the return, including Defense Agency Director General Masuda Kaneshichi. Johnson and his small staff had to close the base in time for the transfer of responsibilities and relocate personnel and their dependents, equipment and furniture, records, and other items off the island based on a schedule worked out in late April. Moreover, a few months after the return was initially announced, he escorted members of the Bonin Islands Council to Tokyo in February for discussions on post-reversion measures for the islands.

The commander’s wife, Mary-Lou, described this period: “The following months [after the agreement between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku] of January thru June brought a multitude of visitors to our idyllic island. There were [weeks] that averaged more than one group a week. Gone were our sun-filled days with nothing to do but go swimming, hiking, or bicycle riding. My entertainment schedule increased by 100%.”
While Commander Johnson found that one of the biggest problems was “maintaining a state of normalcy insofar as possible for the Islanders, including maintenance of the existing system” while working on additional projects, including the logistics for supporting visits, he was generally satisfied with the way things went. “It is believed that the transition was achieved with great success and that friendly relations existing between Japan and the United States were strengthened by the cordial receptions given to all visitors during this period under oftentimes trying conditions.” By the time one U.S. official arrived from Tokyo, his “initial impression was that Japanese administration already prevailed in the islands; Japanese police were directing traffic, dollars were already being exchanged for yen, the telegraph center was in full operation, workmen were busy with the construction of a new police station, and a general hum of activity prevailed.”

The ceremony on Chichi, attended by some 470 people, was “simple, yet dignified, and was effected without incident.” At 1400, the opening declaration of the ceremonies began and Rodney E. Armstrong, the embassy political counselor, stepped up to the speaker’s platform to read a message on behalf of President Johnson. “This is an historic moment for the United States and Japan,” the president’s message began, “and in particular for you, the people of the Bonin Islands . . . I take pleasure in the fact that [the] consultations [for the return of the islands] have now been successfully concluded . . . As you begin your new lives today once again under Japanese administration I extend to you my best wishes for the future.” Director general of the prime minister’s office Tanaka Tatsuo, who had arrived earlier that morning on the Takatsuki—a MSDF antisubmarine warfare ship built in 1966 and commissioned in March 1967—with many of the other dignitaries, then read a message on behalf of Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, which described the reversion as “an achievement to be long commemorated in the postwar history of Japan.” Next, Commander Johnson gave the order to lower the American flag flying above the headquarters building. The action was accompanied by the playing of the U.S. national anthem by the JMSDF band. “The Stars and Stripes were lowered to the always inspiring strains of the Star Spangled Banner,” his wife explained and, “I was thankful to have my sunglasses on as they not only shielded my eyes but also hid my tears.” Next, the Japanese Hinomaru was raised, accompanied by the playing of the Kimigayo, at 1425. This time it was Tanaka’s assistant Yamano Kokichi’s turn to cry. “I did not even try to wipe the tears,” he recalled in his memoirs.

Rear Admiral W. R. McKinney of the CINCPACFLT staff, who represented the U.S. government, exchanged ceremonial handshakes with Tanaka, who represented the Japanese government. McKinney then spoke, reviewing the history of the Navy’s administration of the islands and, after thanking the men of the military government, in an “unscheduled and unexpected part of the program,” awarded the Navy Achievement Medal to Commander Johnson for his outstanding service while officer in charge of the naval facility and military government representative. A series of speeches followed, first by Ben Savory and Takewari Masao, representing the present and former islanders, addresses by Tokyo assembly speaker Ohinata Tsutaji and Governor Minobe Ryoichi, who was making his second visit to the island. Minobe expressed his gratitude to the U.S. government and naval authorities for their concern for the islanders. The Japanese speeches were “uniformly high complimentary to U.S. Naval administration,” Armstrong noted, and Savory’s speech was “note-
worthy” for its “touching tribute to U.S. stewardship [over] these islands.” According to Armstrong, Savory added a plea to the Japanese government to “accept full responsibility for bringing the islands into full step with the modern world.” At the end, several letters of appreciation were then given to Johnson; the Navy doctor, Wayne Crossman; and the island government officer based in Guam. To Armstrong, the ceremony was “simple but impressive.”

Following the ceremony, a reception was held on board the Takatsuki, and at 1630, Rear Admiral McKinney departed aboard the “Chichi Bird,” followed by the departure of a few more seaplanes with some of the dignitaries and dependents.

Finally, after a farewell party at Banner Pier beginning at 1800, and the round of tearful goodbyes, the San Joaquin County got underway at 1915 with ribbons and tape fluttering through the air and many of the islanders left behind still crying. The departure of Commander Johnson, Armstrong observed, “together with the last vestiges of USN association with the islands . . . was a touching scene, with many of the islanders apparently realizing for the first time that their long association with the United States was indeed drawing to a close.” Their American friends had departed 138 years to the day when one of their own, Nathaniel Savory, first arrived on the uninhabited Peel Island in 1830 and began building the little colony in the Pacific.

There were mixed feelings that day among both the islanders and U.S. personnel. Some islanders understandably felt betrayed. Even U.S. personnel were uncertain about the future. Despite the successful reversion, Commander Johnson had some reservations about the Japanese government’s relationship with the islanders. Several weeks after the ceremony, he recommended in his final report that “an impartial U.S. observer be sent to the Bonin Islands during the readjustment period to evaluate the extent of follow through by the Government of Japan on promises made to the Islander population prior to reversion.” He further suggested that an “accredited newsman” serve this function since the Japanese government would not likely “tolerate” an official observer. As he wrote this recommendation, the bill to allow up to 205 islanders to immigrate to the United States was awaiting action by a House judiciary subcommittee on immigration, having already passed the Senate.

On Iwo Jima, a similar ceremony had simultaneously taken place, this time attended by only a few, but likely observed by the many ghosts who are said to inhabit the island. The attendees, which included newsmen from CBS, NBC, ABC, Reuters, Fuji TV, The New York Times and the Press Trust of India, among others, were brought in from Tachikawa Air Base outside Tokyo on two U.S. Air Force transport planes. Among them were two who had been in the battle, Robert Trumbull, a correspondent for the The New York Times who had closely followed the Bonins issue for years, and NBC correspondent John Rich, who was a Marine first lieutenant during the island combat.

The flight took four hours, and 23 years. After circling Iwo Jima three times to allow for pictures to be taken of the island, the planes landed at 1300. At precisely 1400, military units of Japan and the United States marched onto the macadam aircraft parking ramp in front of the air base headquarters and the ceremony began. Old Glory was carefully lowered, folded, and presented to Air Force Brigadier General Richard L. Ault, who was the
senior American officer present. The U.S. honor guard stepped back and then the Maritime Self-Defense Force enlisted men marched forward to hoist the Hinomaru once again over the island. “The ceremony was respectful,” a participant in the ceremony stated later, “and both sides exhibited a deep measure of understanding exactly what we were witnessing.”

That was, Iwo Jima—the location of the most fiercely fought battle in the Pacific—“had been peacefully returned to Japan.”

Burket E. Tyler observed a potentially embarrassing incident that was capably avoided by the new local Japanese commander. “After the formalities, tours up Suribachi were provided. Three of the American press corps approached the [MSDF] commander. They asked him to have some Japanese sailor[s] raise a flag à la the famous photo. The commander gave a sharp ‘NO!’ There was no mistaking his feeling about such a disrespectful act. I went over to him later and shook his hand.” He added, “I was proud of my country that day.”

Predictably, others were angry about the decision to return the islands and complained bitterly to the State Department and Congress after the stories in the press:

We are . . . distressed and outraged at the action of the Executive Branch in returning Iwo Jima to the Japs. Always the politicians give away the military advantages won at such dreadful cost to the cream of the crop of our young manhood. How can the Department of State boys negotiate away—and probably for nothing in return—this and other advantages we have won? How do they get away with it?

Another letter, this one from a former Navy veteran who participated in the assault on Iwo, was less emotional but got to the point by protesting to his congressman and asking that the issue be taken up in Congress. Yet others, while disappointed, were more philosophical about the island’s return. One veteran told the author, “We were angry and bitter about it. We lost a lot of guys here. What can you do?”

Celebrations in Tokyo

A few minutes after the official ceremonies were completed on Chichi and Iwo, celebrations began in Tokyo. The Ogasawara Association, with the support of the Nanpo Doho Engokai (Relief Association for Okinawa and Ogasawara and Northern Islands) and the Japanese government, sponsored a commemoration in Tokyo’s Hibiya Hall that was attended by the Crown Prince and Princess, Prime Minister Šato Eisaku, Foreign Minister Miki Takeo, Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, and numerous other dignitaries. According to the organizers, some 2,500 people attended the celebrations, which began at 1300. Ambassador Johnson described the hall as “packed.”

Although the Japanese government “had hoped to make it entirely an LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] show,” it was necessary “to invite some of the opposition parties in order to obtain the presence of the Crown Prince and Princess.” The Japan Communist Party, which had voted against ratification of the reversion agreement, was not invited, but the Japan Socialist Party, Democratic Socialist Party, and Komeito were. In the end, Johnson felt the ruling LDP did “not lose anything” by the presence of the opposition as, overall, the ceremony itself was “competently organized.”
After the start of the ceremony, the crown prince spoke expressing his “pleasure that the return had come about through Japan-U.S. cooperation and understanding.” He was followed by Prime Minister Sato, who had done much to realize the return of the islands, reviewing the history of the problem and the promises of the Japanese government to work to rehabilitate the islands in the future. The ambassador then gave one of the best speeches of the day—and perhaps in the history of U.S.-Japan relations. One portion declared, “I am happy to join with you in your celebration today of the return of the Bonin and Volcano Islands to Japanese administration. In this troubled modern world, peaceful changes in the administration of territory are indeed a rare and unusual occurrence. In the case of the change we celebrate today no armies marched, no shots were fired, no threats were issued and no demonstrations were involved.”

Johnson’s speech was well received. Kusuda Minoru, the prime minister’s secretary who also attended the celebrations, felt he struck the right chord, “and knew what Japanese feelings were.” In contrast, both Johnson and Kusuda were disappointed by the speech of Japan Socialist Party Chairman Yamamoto Koichi. Johnson described it as “boorish” and full of “political bias.” (Johnson was happy to note that “Yamamoto’s mawkish pouting over the remaining ‘bases’ in the Bonins and Okinawa got no press play.”) Kusuda, a former Sankei Shimbun reporter, described Yamamoto’s comments as “just like an election stump speech with its usual ‘anti-Japan–U.S. Security Treaty, Return Okinawa’ rhetoric. It was out of place. He simply does not realize that it would be so much better to make a more appropriate speech here.” Kusuda then went on to compare it with the simple congratulatory speech of the Democratic Socialist Party’s Nishimura Eiichi, which was “so much smarter and made everyone feel good.” Other speeches included that by Komeito, which was represented by lower house member Matsumoto Chusuke (elected from Tokyo the year before and serving on the special committee for Okinawa, Ogasawara, and Northern Island affairs). Deputy Governor Kondo Ryuichi, in place of Governor Minobe who was attending the ceremonies on Chichi, spoke on behalf of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. After the speeches, Sato and Johnson were both presented with bouquets of flowers by girls representing the Bonin Islanders. After further remarks from representatives of the Ogasawara Association and three “banzai” cheers from Foreign Minister Miki Takeo, the ceremony was concluded.

Johnson, who had been so “irritated” with Miki’s “ungraciousness” at the early April signing ceremony that he had mentioned his “displeasure” to Sato, later believed his “complaint may have been responsible for the large public celebration held in Tokyo.” This is unlikely, as the Ogasawara Association had probably been planning the event for some time. In any case, Johnson felt the commemorations that day at Hibiya Hall and subsequent activities were a “most pleasant and refreshing occasion that should do much to improve the ‘atmosphere’ . . . after the recent series of unpleasant incidents involving U.S.-Japan relations,” a reference to recent port visits gone amiss.

The ceremony was followed at 1400 by a parade with some 3,000 participants from the hall to the Yaesu entrance of Tokyo Station, led by the Ground Self-Defense Force Marching Band, the former islanders, school children, and other citizens of the Tokyo metropolitan area. “Both the prime minister and I were liberally applauded,” Johnson informed the
secretary of state, “and throughout there were high good spirits with no untoward incidents of any kind.” In a subsequent telegram, Johnson added that “from start to finish, reversion was celebrated with joy and enthusiasm . . . press coverage was lavish and positive. . . . Japan greeted reversion of the Bonin and Volcano Islands . . . as an auspicious event that corrected an aberration in the nation’s territorial integrity and consigned one of the remaining episodes from the great and bitter war to history in a dignified way.”

Later that evening, the proud Ogasawara Association sponsored a reception at the Akasaka Hilton Hotel to welcome the islands’ return with representatives and supporters from all walks of life. Their hard-fought battle had finally been won after many years of appeals and perseverance. Tomorrow, the long and difficult work to reintegrate the islands back into Japanese administration would have to begin.

In one of his last acts that day, Sato wrote to President Johnson:

Dear Mr. President,

On this day of the return of the Ogasawara Islands to Japan, it is my greatest pleasure to convey to you the feelings of satisfaction that the statesmanship of our two countries has succeeded in bringing about the peaceful settlement of this long-standing issue. May the relations between our two countries be ever guided by such wisdom and foresight.

Sincerely,
Eisaku Sato
Prime Minister of Japan

The Return of Japanese Administration

Japanese administration, cut off for almost 23 years, restarted this day. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government established the Ogasawara Shicho (Ogasawara Branch Office), and for the next 11 years (until the Ministry of Home Affairs, or Jichisho, approved the creation of a mayor’s position and assembly in April 1979), the director of the branch office also performed the functions of a mayor. A Village Administration Deliberative Council (Sonsei Shingikai) operated as the village assembly. The central government also established the Ogasawara General Office (Ogasawara Sogo Jimusho) on reversion day.

The work of the officials began by trying to address the needs of the islanders based on input from the Ogasawara Association and Nanpo Doho Engokai as well as six months of study by both the central government and the Tokyo Prefectural Government, and the Special Provision Law (Zantei Sochiho) that had been passed on 1 June. The LDP, moreover, created an Ogasawara Shinko Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai (Special Committee on Countermeasures for Ogasawara Development) headed by Fukuda to develop a law, initially named the Ogasawara Fukkoho (Ogasawara Reconstruction Plan), for Ogasawara’s development.

One of the key components of the islands’ development, as historically had been the case, was the resettlement of the former inhabitants. According to a poll conducted by the prime minister’s office, more than 4,000 of the former islanders desired to return, but in
the end fewer than one-third that number returned. The repatriation had to be limited, and initially was structured to prevent chaos from breaking out over the islands’ resources and property rights. Fishermen took the lead in making the return.

In August the following year, a scholarly committee headed by Tokyo University’s Professor Ouchi Tsutomu submitted a report Ogasawara Kaihatsu no Kihon Koso (Basic Concept on Ogasawara’s Development) to Governor Minobe suggesting ways to plan for Ogasawara’s development in the years ahead. Later that year, on 8 December, the Ogasawara Shoto Fukko Tokubetsu Sochiho (Special Law for Ogasawara’s Redevelopment) was passed in order to efficiently promote planned island development. On 31 July 1970—more than two years after the islands’ reversion to Japan—the cabinet approved the plans.

The former islanders began to return in larger numbers at this point but, with more than a quarter of century having passed since their initial evacuation, most decided not to return and the numbers never reached their prewar high. Today, the population (as of 1 January 2012) of the two civilian inhabited islands, Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, total 2,239 and 516, respectively, although it rises during the tourist season when temporary workers, tourists, and others invade the islands. The former islanders of Iwo Jima have yet to be permitted to return by the Japanese government because of the inability to support them, the existence of unexploded ordinance, the need to recover the remains of war dead, the lack of a port, and the conduct (over the last 20 years) of field carrier landing practice by the U.S. military. None of these reasons are convincing enough to exclude the islanders from their former land. In an attempt to be at least a little closer to their lost homes on Iwo, several households have instead chosen to reside on Haha Jima. However, they and the other islanders continue to press their case with the Japanese government.

**Final Thoughts**

The return of the Bonin Islands did not resolve all the problems that faced the bilateral relationship at the time. Indeed, the same day that the reversion ceremonies and celebrations took place, the governor of Fukuoka Prefecture, Kamei Hikaru, was meeting with Prime Minister Sato to protest the recent crash of a U.S. military jet into Kyushu University and to call for the closure of Itazuke Air Base. And, of course, the problem of Okinawa’s return remained. But, as the return of the Bonins, and the Amami Islands before that, both showed, it was not a question of “if” but “when.”

That “when” was closer than most observers probably realized. About a year-and-a-half later, Sato and the newly elected American president, Richard M. Nixon, met at the White House and announced their agreement to return administrative rights over Okinawa in 1972. In this sense, the reversion of the Bonins, like that of the Amami Islands, was a prelude to Okinawa’s return. As participants at the time knew, the arrangements they were discussing would form precedents for the reversion of the larger island. Getting the return of the Bonins right—in tone, spirit, and details—was extremely important. This author believes for the most part, they got it right, despite the unusual circumstances of the naval administration and Japan’s long hesitance to play a larger role in the alliance—a hesitance that is still with us today.
More important, the historical significance of one country peacefully returning territory seized in war—and an extremely bloody and vicious war at that—cannot be overlooked. America’s decisions, both at the time of the peace treaty when Japan was allowed to have “residual sovereignty” and in the agreement to return the islands, should be appreciated for what it really was—a generous act.

NOTES

1“Ogasawara under Japan’s Rule after 23-Year U.S. Reign,” Japan Times, 27 June 1968. Because of its small size, the author does not cover the ceremony on Marcus Island in this concluding chapter. The only report of the Marcus Island ceremony in the State Department files stated, “Reversion on the distant dot of Marcus Island was, of course, unobserved by the outer world and took place in a simple ceremony held between the USCG and JMSDF representatives.” See “Airgram A-1786 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department on the Reversion of the Bonin Islands, July 19, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands 4-1-68, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59.

2The two were married only four months prior to arriving at Chichi Jima on 15 December 1965. See Mary-Lou Johnson, A Honeymoon Island, unpublished and undated manuscript, 1.

3“Chronological Summary of Official Visitors from December 1967 to 26 June 1968,” Operational Archives. If the number of visitors from December (1967), after the decision to return the islands was announced, until April (1968) was included, the number of visitors would increase to more than 350. Reflecting just how busy the days prior to reversion were, the “Summary” notes that the “listings for period 20–26 June are incomplete.” Moreover, more than 120 members of the press visited between 20 November 1967 and 26 June 1968. See “Chronological Summary of News Media Representatives from November 1967 to 26 June 1968,” ibid.


5Johnson, A Honeymoon Island, 8.


10“Plan of the Day, June 26, 1968,” Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands. According to Armstrong, the Foreign Ministry had wanted a State Department employee (i.e., civilian) to read
the president’s message and not someone in uniform, reflecting perhaps an aversion to things military or the image it represented. See “Telegram 9667 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, June 27, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands 4-1-68, Box 1898, CF 1967–1969, RG 59. This message was sent to Tokyo from the USS San Joaquin County (LST 1122), which was bringing the personnel to Guam. Armstrong wrote a short article about his involvement in the negotiations for the return of the islands. See Rodney E. Armstrong, “The Bonins and Iwo Jima,” *Foreign Service Journal*, vol. 29, no. 5 (May 1992): 26–27.


12Bob Yamada and Jim Falk, “U.S. Returns Bonin Islands to Japan Rule,” *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 28 June 1967. Tanaka, who was the oldest son of the infamous general and prewar prime minister, Tanaka Giichi, was a Diet member hailing from Prime Minister Sato’s home prefecture of Yamaguchi. He also was elected governor of Yamaguchi in 1947 at the age of 36, the youngest ever.


17Takewari, who hailed from Haha Jima, was one of three official representatives of the *Ogasawara Kyokai*, or Ogasawara Association, an organization created in 1964 (see chapter 7) to represent the interests of the islanders. The other two representatives were Shibata Eiichi of Chichi Jima and Koi- zumi Genzaburo of Iwo Jima. See Ogasawara Kyokai, ed., “Ogasawara Shoto no Nihon Fukki o Iwau Shukuten,” 26.

18“Ogasawara under Japan’s Rule after 23-Year U.S. Reign.”

19“Telegram 9667.”

20Ibid.

21Ibid.

22“Airgram A-1786.”

23“Memorandum from Dale W. Johnson to Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, on Reversion to the Government of Japan of the Administration of the Bonin-Volcano Islands, Lessons Learned during July 12, 1968,” Records Regarding the Bonin-Volcano Islands.

24“Bill Aims at Bonin Islanders,” *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 13 July 1968. The House bill was named “H. R. 4574, A Bill to Provide for the Admission to the United States of Certain Inhabitants of the Bonin Islands.” It was introduced on 27 January 1969, by Representative Emanuel Celler (D-NY), who had been serving since 1923 and who, because of his Jewish roots, strongly supported flexible immigration laws based on humanitarian reasons. The bill was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and then referred to the House calendar and ordered to be printed on 20 November 1969. Eventually, the Act of 10 July 1970 (Private Law 91-114, 2d Sess.) would make special provision for the accumulation of naturalization residence by certain inhabitants of the Bonin Islands who entered the United States under the act before 11 July 1972.

Trumbull, for example, was one of the first reporters to visit the islands and report on them. See Robert Trumbull, “Bonin Islanders Seek U.S. Tie But Remain International Pawns,” *The New York Times*, 11 March 1956.


“Iwo Comments,” attachment to e-mail correspondence with Burket E. Tyler, 18 January 2008, and numerous times afterward.

Tyler, *Iwo Jima*, 35.

“Iwo Comments.”

Tyler, *Iwo Jima*, 35.


Interview with Jack Colavito, March 12, 2003, Iwo Jima.

Ogasawara Kyokai, ed., “Ogasawara Shoto no Nihon Fukki o Iwau Shukuten.”

Telegram 9629 from Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, June 26, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands 4-1-68, Box 1898.

Ibid.


Telegram 9629.”

Telegram 9690 from Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, June 26, 1968,” ibid.

Telegram 9638 from Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, June 26, 1968,” ibid.

Telegram 9628 from Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, June 26, 1968,” ibid.


Telegram 9629.”

Telegram 9690.”


Iwo Jima and the Bonin Islands in U.S.-Japan Relations

48“Telegram 9629.”
49Ibid.
50“Telegram 9690.”
51Ogasawara Kyokai, ed., “Ogasawara Shoto no Nihon Fukki o Iwau Shukuten.”
54Ogasawara Kaiun, Ogasawara Kaiun, 6.
APPENDIX A
THE OGASAWARA REVERSION AGREEMENT

Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning Nanpo Shoto and Other Islands (April 5, 1968)

WHEREAS the Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the United States of America reviewed together on November 14 and 15, 1967 the status of Nanpo Shoto and other islands, and agreed that the Governments of Japan and the United States of America should enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area; and

WHEREAS the United States of America desires, with respect to Nanpo Shoto and other islands, to relinquish in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951; and

WHEREAS Japan is willing to assume full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of Nanpo Shoto and other islands;

THEREFORE, the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America have determined to conclude this Agreement, and have accordingly appointed their respective representatives for this purpose, who have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. With respect to Nanpo Shoto and other islands, as defined in paragraph 2 below, the United States of America relinquishes in favor of Japan all rights and interests under Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement. Japan, as of such date, assumes full responsibility and authority for the exercise of all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of the said islands.

2. For the purpose of this Agreement, the term “Nanpo Shoto and other islands” means Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rasairo Island, and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island, including their territorial waters.

ARTICLE II

It is confirmed that treaties, conventions and other agreements concluded between Japan and the United States of America, including, but without limitation, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America signed at Washington on January 19, 1960 and the agreements related thereto and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States of America
signed at Tokyo on April 2, 1953, become applicable to Nanpo Shoto and other islands as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

1. The communications sites (LORAN stations) in Iwo Jima and Marcus Island presently utilized by the United States armed forces will be used by them in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Agreement under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan, signed at Washington on January 19, 1960. However, in the event that, due to unavoidable delays, it is not possible to comply with the above procedures by the date of entry into force of this Agreement, Japan grants to the United States of America the continued use of those particular sites, pending the completion of the said procedures.

2. The installations and sites in Nanpo Shoto and other islands which are presently utilized by the United States armed forces, except for those mentioned in paragraph 1 above, will be transferred to Japan upon entry into force of this Agreement. However, in the event that, due to unavoidable delays, it is not possible to complete the said transfer by the date of entry into force of this Agreement, Japan grants to the United States of America the continued use of these installations and sites, pending the completion of the said transfer.

3. The use of the installations and sites, which may be made by the United States armed forces under paragraphs 1 and 2 above until such time as the necessary procedures or the transfers are completed shall be governed by the arrangements made pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Washington on January 19, 1960.

ARTICLE IV

The weather station in Marcus Island now being operated by the United States Weather Bureau will be transferred to the Government of Japan upon entry into force of this Agreement. In the event of unavoidable delays in the said transfer, it is agreed that the present operation of the weather station will be continued until the completion of the transfer.

ARTICLE V

1. Japan waives all claims of Japan and its nationals against the United States of America and its nationals and against the local authorities of Nanpo Shoto and other islands, arising from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America in these islands, or from the presence, operations or actions of forces or authorities of the United States of America having had any effect upon these islands, prior to the date of entry into force of this Agreement. The foregoing waiver does not, however, include claims of Japanese nationals specifically recognized in the laws of the United States of America or the local laws of these islands applicable during the period of United States administration of these islands.

2. Japan recognizes the validity of all acts and omissions done during the period of
Appendices

United States administration of Nanpo Shoto and other islands under or in consequence of directives of the United States or local authorities, or authorized by existing law during that period, and will take no action subjecting United States nationals or the residents of these islands to civil or criminal liability arising out of such acts or omissions.

3. It is confirmed that during the period of United States administration of Nanpo Shoto and other islands, the United States or local authorities have not taken any official action to transfer title to the property rights and ownership interests in these islands belonging to Japan and its nationals who during that period have been unable to enjoy the use, benefit or exercise of such property rights or interests due to measures taken by the United States of America.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall enter into force thirty days after the date of receipt by the Government of the United States of America of a note from the Government of Japan stating that Japan has approved the Agreement in accordance with its legal procedures.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Tokyo, this fifth day of April, 1968, in duplicate in the Japanese and English languages, both equally authentic.

For Japan:
(Signed) Takeo Miki
For the United States of America:
(Signed) U. Alexis Johnson
APPENDIX B

STATEMENT ON MT. SURIBACHI MEMORIAL

Letter from Japanese Government to U.S. Government regarding Mount Suribachi Memorial
(Translation)

Tokyo, April 5, 1968

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

The return to Japan of the administration over the Bonin and other islands which the United States Government has exercised under the terms of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan has filled me with great satisfaction. Amongst the islands that are being returned, one of the hardest battles was fought on the island of Iwo-jima in the course of the Pacific War.

There is a memorial on top of Suribachi-yama dedicated to the United States Marines who fought with great valor. I understand well the American desire to long preserve this memorial. At the same time this battlefield is one where our Japanese soldiers fought also with great courage. Thus, it is my hope, on the occasion of the return of Iwo-jima, that there will be erected a memorial in memory of the Japanese soldiers, and that these two memorials will long remain on this spot as a prayer for eternal peace between the two nations, and as a reminder of the valor and dedication of the brave men on both sides.

Therefore I wish to inform you that it is the intention of my Government to assure the United States that the memorial dedicated to the United States Marines will be preserved on Suribachi-yama and that United States personnel may have access thereto.

Yours sincerely,

April 5, 1968

(Signed)

Takeo Miki
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan

His Excellency

U. Alexis Johnson

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

of the United States of America to Japan
APPENDIX C

DRAFT TEXT ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE,
21 MARCH 1968

“Telegram 6698 from Embassy Tokyo to State Department, March 21, 1968,” Folder: Pol 19 Bonin Islands, 3-1-68, Box 1898, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967–1969, Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State, National Archives II, College Park, MD.

March 21, 1968

From American Embassy, Tokyo
To Secretary of State Washington, DC
Info CINCPAC Priority
COMUS Japan

Secret Tokyo 6698 EXDIS
CINCPAC Exclusive for Sharp
COMUS Japan Exclusive for Mckee
Ref: Tokyo 6696

Subject: Bonins Negotiations—Nuclear Storage

1. Following negotiated text for recording oral statements to be exchanged between
FonMin Miki and me on contingency requiring nuclear storage in Bonins:

Begin Text:

Prior to the signing of the agreement today on the return of the Bonin and other islands, the following conversation took place between the Foreign Minister and the American Ambassador.

The American Ambassador stated: In the event of a contingency requiring the use of the Bonin and/or the Volcano Islands for nuclear weapon storage, the United States would wish to raise this matter with the Government of Japan and would anticipate a favorable reaction from the Government of Japan since such a request would not be made unless it were essential for the mutual security interests of the area, including Japan.

The Foreign Minister stated: Major changes in the equipment of United States forces in Japan, including those in the event of emergency are the subject of prior consultation with the Government of Japan in accordance with the exchange of notes of January 19, 1960, concerning the implementation of Article Five of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The case you have indicated is precisely one which is subject to the said prior consultation, and at this time I can only say that under the circumstances you cite the government of Japan will enter into such consultation.

Johnson
## Appendix D

### List of Island Appeals and Petitions, 1947–64

**Petitions Submitted to U.S. Authorities for Returning to/ of the Bonin Islands by the League of Bonin Evacuees**

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Addressees</th>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Sender/remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>11 July 1947</td>
<td>General Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td>Petition for Repatriation to the Bonin Islands</td>
<td>League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 October 1949*</td>
<td>U.S. Navy Commander of the Mariana Islands, Vice Admiral C. A. Pownall</td>
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<td>League</td>
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<td>(15 September 1949)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>25 November 1949</td>
<td>General Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td></td>
<td>League</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 January 1950</td>
<td>Mrs. Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td></td>
<td>League Women’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 June 1950</td>
<td>General Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td>Petition for restoration to Japan of administrative rights over Bonin Islands</td>
<td>Governor of Tokyo, Asai Seiichiro</td>
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<td>16 October 1950</td>
<td>General Douglas MacArthur</td>
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<td>14 November 1950</td>
<td>Colonel Pierce, SCAP, GHQ</td>
<td>Petition for Repatriation to the Bonin Islands</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 November 1950</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense (Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas)</td>
<td>Plan for returning to the Bonin Islands</td>
<td>League Women’s Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 November 1950</td>
<td>Mrs. Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td>Petition for restoration to Japan of administrative rights over Bonin Islands</td>
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</tr>
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<td>24 December 1950</td>
<td>General Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td>Plan for Returning to the Bonin Islands</td>
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<td>2 February 1951</td>
<td>General Douglas MacArthur</td>
<td>Petition for restoration to Japan of administrative rights over Bonin Islands</td>
<td>Speaker of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 August 1951</td>
<td>Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson</td>
<td>Petition for restoration to Japan of administrative rights over Bonin Islands</td>
<td>League</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 November 1953</td>
<td>Vice President Richard M. Nixon</td>
<td>Petition for Repatriation to the Bonin Islands</td>
<td>League? (submitted when Nixon visited Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1954</td>
<td>Secretary of State John Foster Dulles</td>
<td></td>
<td>Diet Member Fukuda Tokuyasu</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 September 1955</td>
<td>Ambassador John M. Allison</td>
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<td>League? (Presented during interview)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October 1955</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Felix D. Stump</td>
<td></td>
<td>Governor of Tokyo, Asai</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Sender/remarks</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 October 1955</td>
<td>Director, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Robert J. G. McClurkin</td>
<td>Representatives made appeal personally when visiting United States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 October 1955</td>
<td>Secretary of State Dulles, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of the Navy, Charles S. Thomas, Governor of Tokyo, Asai, President of the Senate2, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Samuel T. Rayburn, Acting Undersecretary of State, Robert D. Murphy, Undersecretary of Defense, Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of State, Walter S. Robertson3, Governor of Tokyo, Asai, Representatives made personal appeal when visiting United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>25 October 1955</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur D. Radford</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>26 October 1955</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations Division</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4 November 1955</td>
<td>Admiral Chester Nimitz (retired, residing in Hawaii)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 November 1955</td>
<td>Admiral Stump</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 December 1955</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>Plan for Returning to the Bonin Islands</td>
<td>League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 December 1955</td>
<td>Secretary Thomas</td>
<td>Petition for Repatriation to the Bonin Islands</td>
<td>Petition submitted when Thomas visited Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 January 1956</td>
<td>Acting Undersecretary Murphy, Undersecretary Gray, Assistant Secretary Robertson, Assistant Director Reid, Japan Desk, Department of State, Richard B. Finn, Director McClurkin</td>
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<td>Diet Member Fukuda</td>
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<td>Admiral Nimitz, Admiral Stump, Speaker of the</td>
<td>Requested by League through MOFA</td>
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<td>House of Representatives, Walter H. Judd [sic]</td>
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<td>Assistant Secretary Robertson</td>
<td>Petition for Repatriation to the Bonin Islands</td>
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<td>League</td>
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<td>5 June 1961</td>
<td>Ambassador Edwin Reischauer</td>
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<td>League and two other organizations</td>
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<td>30 August 1961</td>
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1According to Ogasawara Shoto Gaishi, Sono 1, 94, and a brochure entitled “Selections from Evacuees’ Petitions and Letters Regarding Their Repatriation” (Ogasawara Association, 1962), the date is 15 September 1949.

2The author was unable to locate the actual petition, but an English version of an abbreviated list of petitions found in “History of the Problem of the Bonin Islands,” published by the League of Bonin Evacuees for Hastening Repatriation in August 1958, says it was sent to the “President of the Senate.” As readers will know, there are two presidents, the president ex officio, filled by the vice president of the United States, and the president pro tempore, the highest ranking senator. It is assumed that the petition was handled by the latter individual. In this case, it was Walter F. George, a Democrat from Georgia, who served temporarily as special ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1957 before becoming ill and passing away.

3There was some confusion in the title of Robertson’s position in the above documents prepared by the league. The title was mistranslated as “asstistant undersecretary” and “undersecretary” but the actual title is “assistant secretary.”

4Judd, a Republican from Minnesota, was not the Speaker of the House at this time, nor was he ever.

5See n3.
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