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Introduction

The Crisis of the African State and the Impact of Globalization, Tribalism, and Jihadism

Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov

This book focuses on security problems facing the twenty-first-century African state. Through multiple essays, the authors explore both current and past security issues associated with tribal warfare and jihadist terrorism within a rapidly changing global context where state sovereignty and institutional capability is in decline. Historic and modern situations have coalesced to create unique security challenges for many African states.

A comprehensive analysis of how Islamic radicalism, tribal conflicts, and globalization merge to complicate African security is frequently missing from the literature. These three forces conjoin in some African countries to create vexing security challenges. Amy Chua’s excellent book, World on Fire, explores some of these issues albeit in a very general way. However, given the lack of a systematic exploration of these issues, the authors of this volume hope to make such a contribution. We also aspire to illuminate how tribal animosity, civil war, and reconciliation are being handled in select African countries. We shall accomplish these goals using a state-centric focus.

Despite the novelty of the book’s exploration of recent challenges, we will take a more traditional route and concentrate on the central role of the state and its vital connection to security. The critical role of the state in the provision of security is amply recognized in social science literature. Maintaining order—social, political, and economic—is frequently predicated upon the state achieving a monopoly over the instrument of coercion. Without security, fully developed economic and social structures are problematic at best and their full potential is drastically constrained. States unable to maintain security often suffer lawlessness, civil war, alienation, poverty, famine, pandemics, and societal collapse. Distressingly, this is the case in many

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African countries. Table 1 shows where various African states fall on The Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index, which is a comprehensive measure of a society’s level of instability. The index is based on a range of comprehensive economic, social, legal, and political conditions that provide a general snapshot of a dysfunctional continent full of failing states.

Africa is a continent awash in failed states that are unable to maintain political stability and security. The 2014 Fragile States Index, for example, contains a preponderance of African and especially sub-Saharan states. Government failure is so widespread that it conjures an image of a dysfunctional continent. Indeed, African states include 14 of the top 20 failing regimes. Some of the most extreme examples can be found in sub-Saharan Africa.

Somalia illustrates the worst aspects of state failure in the region and of the combined impact of globalization, Islamic radicalism, and tribal-religious animosities. The overthrow of General Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime more than three decades ago resulted in state collapse and internecine fighting between rival warlords. The breakdown in security disrupted agricultural production, resulting in widespread famine and hundreds of thousands of deaths. The United Nations (UN) intervened in 1992 to assist international agencies in their famine relief operations. International forces accompanying the UN relief effort eventually expanded into security operations against warlords who were interfering with the delivery of food supplies, further exacerbating the security situation as those warlords then turned their guns on UN forces.

Table 1. 2014 Fragile States Index for select African states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  South Sudan</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>102.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Somalia</td>
<td>112.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>101.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Central African Republic</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Sudan</td>
<td>110.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Chad</td>
<td>108.7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Zimbabwe</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://ffp.statesindex.org
The high profile street clashes between U.S. Special Forces and militias loyal to warlord General Mohammed Farah Aidid resulted in the death of 19 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis in a failed snatch-and-grab operation.³ The U.S. casualties convinced the William J. “Bill” Clinton administration to end U.S. participation in the UN effort. This withdrawal intensified warlord fighting and contributed to the emergence of Islamist groups hoping to reverse chronic insecurity.

The Islamic Court Union (ICU), for example, hoped to defeat the warlords and create the basis for Sharia law across Somalia. Given the Islamic ICU’s radical jihadist character and fear that the country could serve as an al-Qaeda terror sanctuary, Western powers backed moderate warlords who were resisting the Islamists. These warlords eventually formed the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that is combating radical Islamist forces, including the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab.⁴

Formed from the ICU and declaring jihad against invading pro-TFG Ethiopian forces, al-Shabaab has mounted a fierce guerrilla campaign. Since its formation more than a decade ago, al-Shabaab has continued its war against the TFG and allied African Union (AU) forces. Declaring its fidelity to Osama bin Laden’s organization in 2012, al-Qaeda’s Somali affiliate controlled two-thirds of Somalia at the height of its power. Recently al-Shabaab has experienced battlefield defeats, including the loss of the strategic port of Kismayo and the displacement of its forces from Mogadishu.⁵ It has also suffered from internal disputes between rival leaders. Somalia continues to be beset by civil war, famine, Islamic radicalism, and chronic lawlessness.

The combined impact of globalization, Islamic radicalism, and tribal-religious animosities also plagues Sudan. Predating the Taliban’s rise in Afghanistan, Hussein al-Turabi’s Islamist regime in the 1990s was a magnet for jihadist groups. Bin Laden’s Sudanese sanctuary (1992–96) played a key role in his terror network’s development and the creation of the group’s African branch.⁶ The ascendance of radical Islamist forces came at the ex-

⁴ The Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (or al-Shabaab) was the militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts that took over most of southern Somalia in the last half of 2006. Defeated by Somali and Ethiopian forces in 2007, al-Shabaab—a clan-based insurgent and terrorist group—continues its violent insurgency in southern and central Somalia.
pense of black Christian and Muslim minorities who have been brutalized by the regime in Khartoum and its proxy forces.\textsuperscript{7}

Sudan has experienced a generation of civil war and religious conflict between a northern Muslim majority and a southern Christian minority. After the death of millions, Christian insurgents were able to secure international mediation that achieved a tenuous peace agreement resulting in the 2011 creation of an independent Christian-dominated state of South Sudan. Recent fighting over disputed territory containing substantial oil reserves threatens to unhinge the treaty.\textsuperscript{8}

**Explaining State Failure**

State failure in Africa has invited many explanations. These tend to be grouped into overarching theories that rely heavily on colonialism, neocolonialist exploitation, dysfunctional postcolonial political elites, and misguided economic strategies.\textsuperscript{9} The uniqueness of the continent’s history and its ethnoreligious and linguistic diversity severely complicates the maintenance of security and the achievement of social cohesion. This is especially true in Africa where colonial-era borders have created heterogeneous national cultures that impair national consciousness. For some, the progression of the African one-party state is a consequence of weakly developed democratic structures that have served as the basis for tribal politics and national unraveling.\textsuperscript{10}

African locally based traditions, moreover, mitigate against the imposition of central authority. It is clear that the colonial-era Westphalian state in Africa has produced systematic upheaval facilitating civil war, tribal animosity, autocratic one-party states, and ethnic cleansing. Many of the following essays offer ample testimony to the dysfunctional impact of arbitrarily drawn borders that are incongruent with national cohesion.

The colonial development of African economic systems also made them heavily dependent upon the extraction of primary materials and the export


\textsuperscript{8} The country’s oil fields are dominated by Chinese companies who increasingly play an important role in regional energy markets. The economic weight of China, with its massive investment in Sudan’s energy and transport infrastructure, has sparked enormous controversy. The Asian giant’s financial underwriting of Khartoum has given the regime the capability to brutalize Darfur’s black Muslim minority. Multitudes have been killed by invading Arab militias backed by Sudan’s Islamist government and most have suffered from famine. Furthermore, the appalling economic exploitation of African labor in Chinese factories has resulted in the opprobrium of the international community.


\textsuperscript{10} Ibid.
of cash crops, exacerbating the continent’s financial weakness and aggravating its terms of trade.\textsuperscript{11} Falling commodity prices and mounting foreign debt coalesced to weaken African economies in the post-independence phase. International Monetary Fund (IMF) policies designed to enhance economic competitiveness, precondition capital infusions upon the implementation of market reforms that shrink the state sector, weakening central authority. The rise of African civic and private charitable organizations has, moreover, been insufficient to cushion the adverse health and literacy effects of cuts in state welfare and education programs.\textsuperscript{12} In many areas, states have withdrawn security forces, encouraging the rise of lawless militias and regional warlords.

The absence of a genuine democratic ethos and the rise of extreme leftist ideology of Africa’s postcolonial political and economic elite have contributed to the continent’s security and economic problems. Jean-François Bayart’s concept of the \textit{patrimonial state} is a standard referent in any discussion of corruption, autocracy, and societal dysfunction in Africa.\textsuperscript{13} The exclusive characteristics of the independence movement and the absence of a deep civic culture among the populace resulted in a weak commitment to democratic values. Nationalist leaders sought to use state patronage to forge a network of political supporters under an umbrella of a dominant hegemonic party.

The prevalence of socialist economic ideas and the simultaneous expansion of the state sector fit nicely with the need to create a stable coterie of followers receptive to the use of state funds for private purposes. The systemic corruption and parasitic exploitation of state finances tragically represented by regimes like Mobutu Sese Seko’s 30-plus year dictatorship became a standard practice of \textit{legitimate} governance. The unwise import substation policies of an inefficient and bloated public sector drained productive areas of the economy. The prevalence of marketing boards for agricultural products that controlled prices squeezed the productive agricultural sector, exacerbating global competitiveness.\textsuperscript{14} These forces culminated in the 1990s with many African states receiving conditional IMF financial assistance that demanded a retrenchment of the state sector. Despite the beneficial consequences of liberating market forces, the reduction

\textsuperscript{14} Thomson, \textit{An Introduction to African Politics}. 
of the state sector further complicated the maintenance of public order. During this period of retrenchment, many African states underwent challenges by regional warlords, irredentist movements, tribal guerrilla insurgencies, and terrorist movements. State authority collapsed in the Democratic Republic of Congo after the fall of Mobutu Sese Seko’s regime. Warlords established territorial enclaves to exploit the country’s immense mineral wealth. Rwanda experienced civil war and genocide in 1994, with a million butchered in fewer than 10 weeks.\(^{15}\) Irredentist movements convulsed in Ethiopia and much of the continent became mired in economic crises, eroding state authority, causing political disorder, and instigating a general failure to respond to the challenge of globalization.\(^{16}\)

**Globalization, Tribal Politics, and Radical Islam**

The decline of the autocratic one-party system and the reduction of the state’s economic role have coincided with democratization and multiparty politics that may lay the basis for future tribal conflict. Faced with declining state resources and patronage opportunities, autocratic elites could no longer keep the single-party state and its entrenched interests intact. International aid donors, moreover, demanded democratization. In the last 25 years, democracy had grown dramatically on the continent.\(^{17}\) This could, if not managed properly, unleash further tribal and ethnic conflict. Many of the essays in this volume address this issue.

Globalization, moreover, could reward tribes and ethnic minorities more able to adapt to marketplace opportunities. Globally entrepreneurial minorities like the Jews, the Chinese, and the Ibos (an ethnic group in Nigeria) have frequently been attacked by enraged mobs envious of their economic success. The financial prominence of minority groups in Africa has in the past exacerbated group and tribal conflict. The Tutsi in Rwanda, the Ibos in Nigeria, the Indians in Kenya and Uganda, the whites in Zimbabwe, and the Lebanese in Sierra Leone have all been brutally targeted by majoritarian states and groups.\(^{18}\) The mixture of globalization, democracy, and tribal conflicts could exacerbate the instances of civil war and ethnic cleansing, not increase intercommunal harmony.


\(^{16}\) For more information on irredentism, see Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan, *International Relations: The Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2002), 168–70.

\(^{17}\) Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

\(^{18}\) Chua, *World on Fire*. 
The security of the African state is also being challenged by the rise of Islamism and jihadism. Islam spread rapidly throughout North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa by the tenth century. In black Africa, Islam’s southward progression meshed with Animist traditions to create unique and tolerant belief systems. Sufism dominates much of black African Islamic culture and has generally mixed well with Christian and Animist groups. This does not mean, however, that the continent has been free of sectarian conflict. Nigeria has seen internecine violence between Christians and Muslims for generations, and nineteenth-century Sudanese religious revivalism led the self-proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmad, to be defeated. The Sudanese Mahdist legacy, however, has inspired other revivalist movements that are rapidly sweeping across the continent replacing Sufism with Wahhabi-inspired fundamentalism.

International events have driven this revivalism. The 1979 Iranian Revolution, the USSR’s defeat of in Afghanistan by the mujahideen, and Saudi Arabia’s petro-financed spread of Wahhabi fundamentalism have played an invaluable role in the religious reconfiguration of African Islam. These broad forces, combined with the weakness and decay of the one-party African state, has inspired both peaceful and violent Islamist movements. Hussein Turabi hoped to use state patronage in the Sudan to promote the cause of radical Islam in the region. His support for groups like Egyptian Islamic jihad spurred terrorism against Mubarak’s regime in Cairo in the 1990s, and his assistance to bin Laden’s network was widely condemned by the international community. It would further set the stage for al-Qaeda’s development of regional cells in East Africa.

Events in Algeria were even more troublesome. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1980s was able to exploit the incipient democratization of the Algerian state. The party swept the parliamentary elections in 1991, but its electoral victory was annulled by the military that feared the implantation of a radical Islamist state. Algeria soon descended into a civil war that killed hundreds of thousands.

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19 For more information about Animism, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/animism.htm.
22 Vidino, “The Arrival of Islamic Fundamentalism in the Sudan.”
Returning home after their successful jihad against Soviet forces, Algerian mujahideen formed the ultraviolent Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The jihadists unleashed a brutal insurgency and terror campaign against Algiers. As believers in Takfiri doctrines that branded all nonfollowers as “apostates,” the GIA brutally massacred entire villages, often beheading their victims. The group’s extreme violence, however, undermined its popular appeal and weakened the Islamist insurgency. Relying on savage counterinsurgency practices and deftly splitting Islamist insurgents through amnesty programs, Algiers was able to defeat the Islamists by the late 1990s, but at a terrible price. The scars of the civil war continue to haunt Algeria.

The rise of jihadist forces in Sudan, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, and East Africa threaten to unleash a contagion of violence in the region. Bin Laden was able to create an ample East African network during his Sudanese sanctuary period that allowed him to plan and execute the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed hundreds.24 Today al-Qaeda has affiliates in Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel. The fall of regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya offer al-Qaeda Central additional opportunities to spread the network’s regional tentacles.25

Local jihadist groups in Mali, Niger, and Nigeria have also spread their message of violent extremism. Boko Haram in Nigeria and the reverberations of Muammar Qaddafi’s fall in Libya continue to shake the region.26 Thousands have died in Nigeria due to Boko Haram’s Islamist insurgency, and jihadist forces in Mali were able to briefly secure a sanctuary assisted by Tuareg rebels and Libyan arms before the recent French intervention drove them from power. They are likely to mount a protracted insurgent-terror campaign. The diffusion of radical Islamist groups across the fragile Sahelian Belt is likely to complicate security for Mali’s neighbors. Recent attacks in neighboring Algeria and Niger punctuate the dangers of the regional jihadist movement.

The Book’s Organization

The African state is under severe pressure, and the combined challenges of globalization, tribal politics, jihadism, and the retrenchment of the state have

created alternative loci of identification. Tribalism, Islamism, communitarianism, and the predations of regional warlords also have exacted a considerable toll. We hope to illuminate some of these challenges here. The organization of the essays proceeds on three levels. First, we will look at the impact of the Arab Spring and its potential for the revitalization of radical political Islam in Africa. Second, we will examine the intersection of globalization, ethnoreligious conflict, civil war, and the capacity for stable governance in a variety of African states. Finally, we will integrate this complex array of factors into a Nigerian case study that encapsulates many of Africa’s enduring problems.

The Arab Spring and the Future of the Maghreb Salafi-Jihadist Movement

The Arab world’s massive street protests and demands for democratization, known collectively as the Arab Spring, surprised many analysts. The region was thought to be impervious to the waves of democratization that had swept across Eastern Europe, Latin America, the Far East, and Africa. Long-repressed Arab civil society began to assert itself against corrupt despotic regimes, laying the basis for democratization in Egypt and Tunisia, the overthrow of Qaddafi’s dictatorship, and the ongoing rebellion in Syria.

This emergence of Arab civil society and mass protests were hailed by many experts as a harbinger of a new democratic age and the perfect antidote to violent radical Islam. The election of Muslim Brotherhood-dominated governments in Tunisia and Egypt was thought to be a first and decisive step in reconciling Islam and democracy, denying al-Qaeda’s narrative that democratic systems are un-Islamic. This initial wave of optimism, however, soon dissipated and gave way to growing fear, anxiety, and uncertainty. Much of this concern hinges on the turmoil and instability that the Arab Spring has wrought. Radical Islamic extremists hope to capitalize on the unstable security environment in the region. Within this context, the first three essays explore the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which may give jihadists an opening to advance their strategic interests.

The first chapter by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross explores how jihadist and

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Salafist forces attempted to exploit the changes brought by the Arab Spring revolutions. Based on field research in Tunisia and extensive primary source research, Gartenstein-Ross examines how radical Islamists saw a strategic opportunity in the country’s democratization. Critical to the initial pursuit of their aims was the opportunity to perform *dawa*, or missionary preaching, that helped them expand their movement in the country. Over time, jihadist activism in the country came to encompass *hisba* violence, which is designed to enforce conservative Islamic norms through vigilante violence, and ultimately war against the state. Though Tunisian jihadist groups have now been banned by the state and are pursued by counterterrorism forces, they have continued waging war against the country, including targeting its vital tourism sector.

In the second chapter, Anthony Celso provides an historical overview of the Maghreb Islamist movement from the Afghan jihad to its recent expansion into Libya and Mali. Concentrating mainly on Algerian jihadist movements, Dr. Celso traces the organizational permutations that culminated in the development of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) created in 2006 by Ayman al-Zawahiri. He argues that recent advances by AQIM in Libya and Mali are due principally to the adverse consequences of Qaddafi’s overthrow. The Islamist threat in the region, however, is limited by the internal dysfunctions of the jihadist movement, whose ideological fanaticism and extreme violence has led to popular rejection and internal fracturing. AQIM’s brief northern Mali sanctuary was punctuated by sectarian extremism and the harsh imposition of Islamic law that alienated much of the local population. France’s recent military intervention in Mali has reversed AQIM’s limited gains, and al-Qaeda’s regeneration is impeded by internal and external enemies.

The volume’s third chapter by Henri Boré examines whether Islamist forces can be checked by the French and African forces in Mali. Relying on the principles of counterinsurgency warfare popularized by T. E. Lawrence, Boré argues that only Chadian forces have the necessary mobility and tactics to offset the inevitable Islamist insurgency campaign. The formation of a Pan-African stabilization force by European and West African states lacks such a capability at present. The success of future counterinsurgency policy in Mali, moreover, is dependent upon resolving the autonomy demands of Tuareg minorities who joined Islamist forces in 2012 to achieve an independent state in the northern part of the country. Despite the initial gains
associated with France’s military incursion, the country’s security status is tenuous and reversible.

Civil War, Ethnic Cleansing, and the Rise of Governing Rebel Movements

The second section of the book concentrates on the impact of tribalism, ethnic cleansing, third-party external intervention, and the emergence of rebel movements that made the transition to government rule. It examines the nexus between ethnotribal conflicts and the pursuit of political power by violent means. Some of these cases involve the use of reconciliation measures to ensure proper governance. Within the section, the Rwandan 1994 genocide and its surprising and hopeful political aftermath will predominate the discussion.

In the fourth chapter, Ian Spears focuses on tribal guerrilla resistance in Rwanda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia where, after a period of protracted insurgency, minority groups were able to seize power. These new regimes were led by guerrilla leaders, whose ruling capability has been enhanced by their years of insurgent resistance requiring leadership and political and organizational skills. Dr. Spears argues that these regimes have wisely scaled back democratic reforms for fear that they will exacerbate tribal antagonisms and damage the country’s fragile national consensus.

Rwanda resurfaces in Robert Gribbin’s analysis in chapter 5 of the 1994 genocide and its aftermath. Driven by a Hutu governing elite that refused to share power with a Tutsi minority, the genocide was driven by political rivalries and not simply by tribal antagonism. The 1994 genocide was deliberately planned and orchestrated by the regime that used its militias to cleanse Tutsi and moderate Hutus. In a 10-week spree of organized killing, Hutu government forces slaughtered almost a million people. Ironically, the genocide produced such chaos that it allowed the rebel Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) the capacity to seize power. The event also dramatically illustrated the ineffectiveness of the UN and the international community, whose failure to intervene contributed immeasurably to the genocide.

Ambassador Gribbin’s essay concentrates on Rwanda’s postgenocide reconstruction that was spearheaded by the victorious RPF and its charismatic leader Paul Kagame’s autocratic but unifying policies that put the country on a solid path toward political and economic recovery. Complicated by civil war, state implosion, and Hutu rebel sanctuaries in neighboring Zaire, Rwan-
da has successfully made strides toward punishing those who organized and implemented the 1994 genocide. Gribbin’s analysis reinforces Dr. Spear’s conclusions about how minority rebel movements have made the successful transition to governance through the use of coercive and conciliatory gestures.

Robert Nalbandov deals with the triangular relationship between Chad, Libya, and France in chapter 6. Dr. Nalbandov’s essay focuses on the nebulously defined borders between states and the underlying ethnotribal and religious antagonism associated with territorial disputes. The continued role of the French, who aspire to retain their status in the region, is an additional complicating factor. Like Sudan, Chad is split between a Muslim north and a Christian south, where groups have historically clashed.

Driven by neocolonial interests rather than a desire to see a peaceful, unified Chad, French forces have intervened successfully to ensure the survival of Chadian elites representing Gallic interests. The same cannot be said of Libya’s efforts in the 1980s to Islamize Chad when its forces were badly routed by pro-French southern Christian forces. Like many African states in the postcolonial era, Chad has been shaken by internal conflict, religious cleavages, and external intervention. It remains one of the poorest states in the region and remains choked by internecine religious and tribal clashes. The benefits of globalization have barely reached Chad.

**Nigeria as a Microcosm of the Twenty-First-Century African State**

In chapter 7, the focus is on Nigeria, which confronts a myriad of economic, political, and security challenges. The Nigerian case exemplifies much of the continent’s enduring conflicts. Among these problems are an imperfect transition to a democratic society, an unstable economy, corruption, Islamic insurgency, tribal conflicts, and political legitimacy issues. Nigeria with its immense population, ethnoreligious tapestry, and huge oil industry demands attention.

Clarence Bouchat fittingly provides a comprehensive snapshot of the country’s manifold challenges in chapter 7. His review of Nigeria’s history, ethnoreligious diversity, and political conflicts features repeated military coups and a tenuous democratic evolution. Bouchat’s analysis principally focuses on the Nigerian oil economy and Abuja’s failed efforts to diversify its export sector and improve its competitive position. He argues that the

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success of the oil industry has been hampered by chronic corruption, poor management, inadequate infrastructure, and insufficient efforts to use its profits to promote the country’s financial prosperity.

Much of the oil wealth generated has been siphoned off by corrupt political and economic elites. Ironically, the Niger Delta—where much of the oil is produced—is one of the poorest regions in Africa, and its regional poverty has inspired a local insurgency fueled by Abuja’s inability to distribute profits equitably. Nigeria is also beset by a northern Islamist insurgency led by the fundamentalist group Boko Haram that is positioned to become an al-Qaeda or Islamic State (IS) affiliate. The rise of the Boko Haram in Nigeria is but one of the emerging signs of a resurgent jihadist movement in Africa. Since its formation in 2009, thousands have died. Oddly, Nigeria’s democratization may have contributed to the ascension of radical Islamist forces.

Celso and Nalbandov return for the final chapter to look at the resurgence of African jihadism and tribalism as being a consequence of Western-led globalization and democratization efforts. Borrowing from the work of Samuel Huntington, Robert Kaplan, Benjamin Barber, and Amy Chua, the chapter explains the reemergence of communal identity as a counteraction to the West’s promotion of capitalism, individualism, secularism, and democracy. Threatened by Western values, jihadism and tribalism seek to reverse the spread of liberal democratic influence. Ironically, the international community’s promotion of democracy and capitalism has resulted in the weakening of central authority and the acceleration of religious and tribal conflict.

The UN’s effort to broker a power-sharing arrangement leading to multiparty democracy in 1994 contributed to the Hutu elite’s determination to ethnically cleanse the Tutsi minority. The resulting civil war led to the death of a million people. IMF brokering structural adjustment policies (SAP) in the 1990s tied to democratization initiatives similarly eroded state power and led to the emergence of tribal and Islamist militias committed to regime change. Finally, the Arab revolts and the emergence of unstable democracies continue to convulse. North and West Africa have catalyzed the jihadi movement, resulting in numerous security challenges.
Chapter One

The Evolution of Post-Ben Ali Tunisian Jihadism

by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross*

Introduction

Today, Tunisian politicians widely regard salafi jihadist militancy as the greatest immediate challenge their country faces. This chapter explores the growth and evolution of the salafi jihadist movement in Tunisia after the revolution that inspired the world by overthrowing longstanding dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali through nonviolent means.¹

The first Tunisian salafi jihadist organization with a national reach to become publicly identifiable following the revolution was Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). In its early life, a phase lasting until December 2012, AST did an effective job fostering a social movement around salafi jihadist beliefs. The group was able to operate legally and in the open, and its activities were primarily focused on dawa (evangelism). However, even during this period in which AST prioritized legal and nonviolent dawa, the group also embraced violence in two different ways. Its primary use of violence was hisba, or “forbidding wrong,” which for AST entailed the enforcement of religious

* Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross is the author or volume editor of 20 books and monographs, and holds a PhD in world politics from The Catholic University of America and a juris doctor degree from the New York University School of Law. Much of the work for this chapter was undertaken for a pair of projects the author completed for the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), The Hague, resulting in the monographs Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia’s Long Game: Dawa, Hisba and Jihad (2013) and Raising the Stakes: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Shift to Jihad (2014). Parts of this chapter are adapted from these two previous studies. The author would like to thank ICCT for allowing the republication of previously published passages. He would also like to thank Nathaniel Barr for his research assistance on Ansar al-Sharia’s activities during the course of 2014, and Bridget Moreng and Kathleen Soucy for their collaborative work with him on Raising the Stakes. Finally, the author would like to thank Edwin Bakker, Sergei Boeke, Eva Entenmann, Gilles de Kerchove, Peter Knoope, Andrew Lebovich, Lauren Morgan, Christophe Paulussen, and Aaron Y. Zelin for their feedback on this chapter.

norms within—and sometimes beyond—the Tunisian Muslim community.

There was another way AST embraced violence during this period. While hisba violence is primarily focused on imposing the group’s norms on other Muslims, AST also endorsed jihad violence, interpreting the theological concept of jihad in the same manner as al-Qaeda. Indeed, AST’s propaganda often featured statements from al-Qaeda icons like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, making clear that AST supported al-Qaeda’s fight and methods. However, despite AST’s rhetorical support for al-Qaeda’s jihad, the group largely refrained from major terrorist attacks or military actions inside Tunisia during this initial stage of its life.² It was a different story abroad, as AST members participated in jihad violence when they took part in the conflicts in Mali and Syria. The idea that AST was gathering strength by operating legally, even while preparing for an eventual military confrontation with its foes, was articulated in a 2012 interview given by Hassan Ben Brik, who led AST’s dawa committee. Ben Brik described jihad as “certainly part of our political project,” but said that AST had “no interest currently in embarking on violent initiatives, or acts of terrorism.”³ Similarly, another young AST leader told an Italian researcher during this period that AST had not “eliminated the idea of jihad from our philosophy,” but that the group was not currently engaged in revolutionary violence because it was focused on dawa.⁴

The second major phase of salafi jihadism in Tunisia saw a period of escalation in the fight against the state. Though it is difficult to pinpoint a definitive beginning to this phase, the most persuasive inflection point is December 2012, when militants shot and killed Anis Jelassi, an adjutant in the Tunisian National Guard, in the Kasserine governorate in western Tunisia.⁵ This incident prompted Tunisian authorities to identify, for the first time,

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² AST’s involvement in the 14 September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis may be an exception in which it engaged in jihad violence inside Tunisia. For discussion of AST’s role, see Habib M. Sayah, “Qui a Attaqué l’Ambassade des Etats-Unis: Retour sur Ansar al-Chari’a, Abou Iyadh et ses Relations avec Ennahdha,” Institut Kheireddine, 14 September 2012. However, it is possible that this attack too can be characterized as hisba rather than jihad, since it was seen as a reaction to the controversial “Innocence of Muslims” video and, in that way, the attack mainly related to the enforcement of Islamic norms.


a militant group known as Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, which would later publicly identify itself as a battalion of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). As this chapter discusses, however, it seems that Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi and AST are not actually distinct, but rather different facets of the same organization. During this period, Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi fought Tunisian security forces in the western part of the state, while AST was able to make dawa openly, including in urban areas.

The February 2013 assassination of secularist politician Chokri Belaïd was another significant point in the escalation. Though he was killed by an AST member, it is unclear who ordered or authorized his assassination and what strategic thinking guided it.

Belaïd’s assassination prompted a great deal of national attention and political pressure on the government, but no crackdown against AST. Thereafter, there were several more progressions in the escalating conflict between salafi jihadists and the Tunisian government. The state stepped up security operations in western Tunisia, and soldiers patrolling there suffered from frequent landmine attacks. The state also retaliated against AST in other ways, including interrupting public lectures and other AST dawa activities and cancelling the group’s annual conference in the city of Kairouan. But the period of escalation hit its apex during one week in late July 2013, when AST members gunned down another prominent secularist politician, Mohamed Brahmi, and took part in a Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi-led ambush in western Tunisia’s Jebel ech Chaambi mountains that killed eight soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit.6

This was an extraordinarily bloody week, especially by Tunisian standards. The eight soldiers killed in Jebel ech Chaambi represented the deadliest day in Tunisian military history to that point, and the slitting of their throats was an especially grotesque reminder of the brutalities inflicted by jihadists in neighboring Algeria during the country’s civil war. The two incidents occurring so close together marked a point of no return and ushered in the third phase of post-Ben Ali Tunisian jihadim’s life—state crackdown. This phase really began in August 2013, when Tunisia designated AST a terrorist organization and thus banned it. Thereafter, AST’s members were pursued, and both its militant activities and its public activities were interrupted.

The crackdown was going well from the state’s perspective in early 2014. Over the course of the year, however, the crackdown phase gradually gave

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way to a fourth phase—Tunisian jihadism’s recovery. AST and the connected organization Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi were able to carry out an increasing number of, and increasingly deadly, attacks as the year progressed. Most of these were concentrated in the western governorates of Kef and Kasserine, which border Algeria.

As Tunisia is now concerned with constraining jihadism’s growth, it has become clear how nearby safe havens can strengthen jihadist organizations. As Libya has become an incredibly hospitable environment for jihadists in the wake of Qaddafí’s fall, Tunisia has come to see Libya’s deterioration as its primary security challenge. Tunisian Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, for example, accurately described the situation in Libya as the greatest threat that Tunisia faces. Not only could Libya’s chaos spill over into Tunisia, but jihadist groups have been able to use Libyan territory to escape from Tunisia’s policing operations. AST emir Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, for example, has established connections with a variety of Libyan political Islamist and jihadist actors, and is believed to have found safe haven in the country once Tunisia moved to capture him. Growing numbers of Tunisian militants have also entered Libya to attend training camps. The terrorists who struck Tunis’s Bardo Museum in March 2015, killing 21 people, had received weapons training in Libya before carrying out that attack.

Thus, Tunisia is in the unfortunate position where it cannot fully be the master of its own fate. This chapter examines the evolution of post-Ben Ali Salafi jihadism. But even as Tunisia continues to refine its approach to dealing with jihadist groups in the country, the future of the country’s security is also wedded to the broader picture of jihadism in North Africa.

AST’s Leadership and Organizational Structure

Leadership and Outlook

AST is led by 47-year-old Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, who was born Seifallah Ben Hassine. Abu Iyad has long-standing ties to international jihadism, which he established during his exile from Tunisia. In the 1990s, Abu Iyad spent time in Britain, where he associated with the UK-based jihadist figure Abu Qatada al-Filistini. Some jihadist forums have described Abu Iyad as Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, who was born Seifallah Ben Hassine. Abu Iyad has long-standing ties to international jihadism, which he established during his exile from Tunisia. In the 1990s, Abu Iyad spent time in Britain, where he associated with the UK-based jihadist figure Abu Qatada al-Filistini. Some jihadist forums have described Abu Iyad as Abu Qatada al-Filistini. Some jihadist forums have described Abu Iyad as Abu

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7 “Tunisia Prime Minister Sees Main Threat from Libya,” Associated Press, 3 January 2015.
Qatada’s “disciple,” and one AST member said that Abu Qatada is “probably the most influential” of the theorists who have the group’s ear.\textit{10} Abu Iyad also spent time in Afghanistan when al-Qaeda found refuge there prior to the 9/11 attacks. In 2000, he became one of the founders of the Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), which facilitated the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud just before al-Qaeda executed the 9/11 attacks. Abu Iyad was arrested in Turkey in 2003, after which Turkish authorities extradited him to Tunisia. There, Ben Ali’s regime sentenced him to 43 years of imprisonment. Abu Iyad was released, however, following the revolution. Abu Iyad was then able to operate openly until AST played a major role in the September 2012 attack on the U.S. embassy in Tunis. The government issued an arrest warrant for Abu Iyad, which forced him into hiding. He is believed to have fled to Libya.

Even before AST was banned, few of the group’s other core leaders were named publicly. Those who were known included 37-year-old Hassan Ben Brik, who headed AST’s dawa committee; Ahmed al-Akrami, coordinator for AST’s medical and humanitarian convoys; and 33-year-old Sayf al-Din Ben Rayes, who produced sermons and statements on AST’s behalf. Several individuals with longstanding militant ties—Tarek Maaroufi, Sami bin Khamis bin Salih Essid, and Mehdi Kammoun—were also believed to have nonpublic roles in AST that related to its violent activities.\textit{11}

According to Ben Brik, the founding members of AST had been active in Tunisia since 2003.\textit{12} Ben Brik mentioned their “experiences abroad” prior to their return to Tunisia, a clear reference to their activities as part of the transnational jihadist movement. The deep connections between AST’s founders and transnational jihadism would prove significant in many ways, including in forging an extremely close working relationship between AST and AQIM. AST’s founders were imprisoned after their return to Tunisia following their involvement in militancy abroad. Ben Brik claimed that, “We got to know each other in prison, and we began our work from there.”\textit{13}

Ben Brik described the group’s political project as bringing sharia to Tunisia and, ultimately, to “the Arab world” beyond it. From the outset, AST fre-

\textit{10} Merone, “An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia.”


\textit{12} The information from Ben Brik can be found in Galasso, “Intervista ad Hassan Ben Brik.”

\textit{13} Ibid.
quently expressed an affinity for al-Qaeda and its affiliates, even when the group was primarily focused on dawa. For example, after AQIM released a statement on 17 March 2013 calling for salafi jihadists in Tunisia to pursue the fight against secularism at home rather than going to Mali or elsewhere, high-level AST activist Mohamed Anis Chaieb praised its “calls to preserve the gains of the Tunisian revolution.” AST also praised al-Qaeda and transnational jihadism through its social media accounts, and distributed its multimedia propaganda onto jihadist Web forums regularly used by al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups. Italian researcher Fabio Merone’s interview with a young AST leader further reinforces AST’s allegiance with al-Qaeda and transnational jihadism, as the young man named those strongly associated with al-Qaeda and its affiliates—Abu Qatada, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdissi, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Hani al-Sibai’i, and Anwar al-Awlaki—as the group’s key influencers.

Though some observers were skeptical that AST could be regarded as a jihadist organization during the early phase when the group was primarily focused on nonviolent evangelism—skepticism that was completely unwarranted, given AST’s associations and explanation of its goals—at this point, there is no room for doubt. AST has simply become more open over time about its place in transnational jihadism.

**AST’s Organizational Structure**

AST’s organizational structure was largely opaque from the time of the group’s inception. This was by design, as the group’s leaders were well aware that they could one day be banned and pursued. As Hassan Ben Brik explained when refusing to speak to an interviewer about the group’s structure, “all the members of Ansar al-Sharia are being targeted by the government and by the international community.” Since Tunisia designated AST a terrorist organization, its structure has become even more obscure, and the group was forced to adapt in ways that are not well understood.

Despite AST leaders’ hesitance to reveal organizational details, researchers were able to tease out some aspects of the group in its early stages. The fact that Abu Iyad is the emir of AST is well established, and it also became clear from social media postings and interviews with the group’s members

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15 Merone, “An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia.”
16 Galasso, “Intervista ad Hassan Ben Brik.”
that the AST had several divisions under its most senior leadership prior to the ban:

- The dawa office, which Ben Brik headed.\textsuperscript{17}
- AST’s humanitarian activities, including its medical convoys.
- AST’s media activities, including the al-Bayariq Media Productions Foundation, AST’s Web site, and other online outlets for propaganda.
- A division that coordinates with local AST groups.\textsuperscript{18}
- A clandestine military wing that included:
  - a “preparatory operations group” with six members;
  - a “support and implementation group” with eight members; and
  - a “mobilization and armament group” with two members.\textsuperscript{19}

Some questions were raised early in AST’s existence about how hierarchical the organization was. For example, Merone’s AST interlocutor told him, “You should not think . . . that it is a top-down organization that emerged. On the contrary, it is a lightweight and decentralized movement, with an extended autonomy for the local groups, which are the real core of the movement.”\textsuperscript{20} While it is clear that local AST groups enjoyed a great deal of autonomy, however, sources loyal to AST had a clear incentive to portray the group as more decentralized than might actually be the case. By emphasizing the decentralized nature of the organization, AST tried—ultimately unsuccessfully—to ratchet up the level of violence it engaged in without triggering a state crackdown. Thus, the portrayal of AST as a “very decentralized” organization in the early days should be read with at least some skepticism. Further, “very decentralized” is a rather indeterminate description, particularly when it could simply mean that local branches take a great deal of initiative, which would not preclude directives being passed down from the group’s senior leadership.

Since AST was banned, its organizational structure has become increasingly opaque to researchers working from open sources. Though AST clearly undertook adaptations, the group’s specific adaptations are not clear. More-

\textsuperscript{17} Torelli, Merone, and Cavatorta, “Salafism in Tunisia,” 149.
\textsuperscript{18} The interview subject told Merone that this coordination is divided geographically by AST into northern, central, and southern regions. See Merone, “An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia.”
\textsuperscript{20} Merone, “An Interview with a Member of Ansar al-Sharia.”
over, a large percentage of the militant activities attributed to AST during its recovery phase were in fact carried out by Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi. Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi’s association with both AST and AQIM is well known, but the specific chain of command and key decision makers behind its attacks are not.

No reliable estimate of AST’s size existed even when it was operating openly, though it seems that official estimates tended to understate the group’s numbers. The most frequently cited figures as of 2013, at the beginning of AST’s escalation of violence, reported approximately 10,000 salafists in Tunisia, with around 3,000 identified as salafi jihadists. However, AST managed to draw between 3,000 and 10,000 attendees to the annual conference it held in Kairouan, while approximately 3,000 Tunisians went abroad to fight for jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war. Further, Tunisian religious affairs minister Noureddine el-Khadmi said in March 2012 that salafists controlled around 400 of the country’s mosques through such mechanisms as demonizing the previous imams and forcing them out.

The three aforementioned data points demonstrate conclusively that the most prevalent estimates of salafists and salafi jihadists in Tunisia were too low during AST’s dawa phase. Further, the Kairouan conference drew almost 3,000 people by the lowest estimates, and the photographs that AST posted to its social media accounts make the numbers appear higher than 3,000. If there were only 3,000 salafi jihadists in Tunisia, all of them would have had to show up at the Kairouan conference.

**AST’s International Connections**

AST has had extensive connections to transnational jihadism since its inception. Indeed, its connections to other jihadist groups would become more apparent over time and, as this section explains, revelations made by the Tunisian government in 2013 paint AST as a covert branch of al-Qaeda.

Given Abu Iyad’s personal history, which included time in Britain’s jihadist scene, it is natural to begin with his contacts in the United Kingdom. Not only was Abu Iyad connected to Abu Qatada al-Filistini, but the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) monitoring service has also noted his connection to prominent Egyptian-born salafi jihadist scholar Hani al-Siba’i,

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who heads the al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies from London.\(^\text{23}\) Al-Siba’i’s involvement in international jihadism runs even longer and deeper than Abu Iyad’s. For example, in February 1999, London’s Al-Hayah reported that al-Siba’i was then serving as the head of the media committee for Ayman al-Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ).\(^\text{24}\) Al-Siba’i maintained his loyalty to Abu Iyad over the years, delivering a March 2012 video address sponsored by AST to a Tunisian salafi audience. When AST held its second annual Kairouan conference in May 2012, al-Siba’i was one of several foreign scholars to address the audience by video.

Some of the other prominent jihadist scholars who attended were, like al-Siba’i, born in Egypt. Ahmad Ashush issued a written statement expressing his “endorsement and support” of AST, hoping that the group would bring rule based on sharia to Tunisia. The Egyptian salafi jihadist cleric Marjan Salim issued a video address warning against discord amongst Muslims and pointing to the disaster that befell the “Islamic state” the Taliban had erected in Afghanistan. At the time al-Siba’i headed EIJ’s media committee, Salim ran its sharia committee, which Al-Hayah noted “involves preparing the group’s views on and reactions to matters pertaining to sharia, differences, and jurisprudence and responding to the criticism leveled against it.”\(^\text{25}\) More recently, Salim has been identified as “directing aspiring jihadis” to training camps in Libya.\(^\text{26}\)

Major salafi jihadist figures from several other countries also expressed their support for AST at the Kairouan conference. Moroccan clerics Umar al-Haddushi and Hasan al-Kattani travelled to Tunisia to attend, only to be turned away when they tried to enter the country because the Tunisian government had placed them on a blacklist due to their involvement in terrorist attacks in Morocco. Jordanian cleric Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi, who has been heavily involved in spurring jihadists to enter the Syrian war, also contributed a video address. In it, he quoted bin Laden and urged a future revolution to incite a salafi takeover in place of the democratic system that is “the fetish of the modern era.”

AST also won the praise and endorsement of Abu Sa’d al-Amili, a prom-


\(^{25}\) Ibid.

inent online jihadist who appears to also be an official in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda’s branch in Yemen.\textsuperscript{27} Abu Sa’d’s AQAP responsibilities included providing strategic advice to affiliates in North Africa and, during AST’s dawa-oriented phase, he referred to the group in several of his articles and messages. One 2012 article presented a roadmap for spreading salafi jihadist ideology in Tunisia. It did not specifically mention AST, but that was the most prominent group engaged in such work. Near the end of 2012, al-Amili issued a statement through AST’s media group, al-Bayariq Media Productions Foundation, that attacked Tunisia’s ruling Islamist political party (Ennahda) for its embrace of democracy. Al-Amili told AST members to be prepared to fight with “sword and pen.”\textsuperscript{28} And in January 2013, al-Amili wrote an editorial in the Global Islamic Media Front’s magazine \textit{Sada al-Jihad} (Echo of Jihad) praising the challenge AST posed to Tunisia’s “false” government.

AST’s most operationally significant connection to another major jihadist group has been its ties to AQIM, which has been extremely clear about its affinity for AST and the fact that they share a common goal, releasing multiple statements about AST. For example, in an April 2013 media release that answered questions directed to the group over Twitter, the director of AQIM’s al-Andalus Media Foundation stated that AST were AQIM’s “brothers, we are from them and they are from us.”\textsuperscript{29} He further stated, “We appreciate the project of our brothers Ansar al-Sharia and bless it, and call the youth of Tunisia to support and cooperate with them.”\textsuperscript{30} But AQIM’s connections to AST clearly run deeper than just public expressions of support.

When the Tunisian government announced that it was banning AST, it made several sets of revelations about the organization’s relationship to al-Qaeda. The most significant connection alleged was a handwritten “Allegiance Act” between AST emir Abu Iyad al-Tunisi and AQIM emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud.\textsuperscript{31} If the claim of the Allegiance Act is accurate, then AST appears to have been functioning, since the signing of the document, as an

\textsuperscript{28} Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, \textit{Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia’s International Connections} (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 21 March 2013).
\textsuperscript{29} AQIM, “Journalistic Encounter with the Director of al-Andalus Media Foundation,” \textit{Jihadology}, 18 April 2013, 17.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 25.
unacknowledged al-Qaeda affiliate: an organization subordinate to AQIM within al-Qaeda’s hierarchy, with AST’s emir having taken bayat (pledge) to AQIM’s emir. Lending further credence to this conclusion, allegations of an Allegiance Act are consistent with claims made by captured members of Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi. Algerian security forces arrested Riadh Toufi, one of the Katibat’s founding members, on 18 November 2013. During his interrogation, Toufi described Abu Iyad as nothing more than a “marionette,” claiming that AQIM held all the power and that Abu Iyad followed AQIM’s dictates. The existence of an Allegiance Act is also consistent with the operational connections between AST and AQIM, a large part of which are focused on Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, the joint military venture of AST and AQIM. Additionally, an Allegiance Act is also consistent with the claims of Mustapha Ben Amor, Tunisia’s director general of national security, who said that government investigations found that AST’s financing comes from “external and internal sources,” with the external sources located in such countries as Yemen, Libya, and Mali, all of which have a significant al-Qaeda presence. AST’s response to these revelations was a rather weak denial claiming that the group was “not tied to any outside group.” However, the statement also acknowledged that “regarding our loyalty to Qaedat al Jihad and the jihadi formations, we have declared it from the first day and we are not ashamed to renew today our declaration with a louder voice.”

Indeed, the strategy that AST pursued in Tunisia was consistent with the course that major al-Qaeda-affiliated strategists and ideologues encouraged other jihadist groups to pursue in the post-Arab Spring environment. These strategists unanimously agreed that the changes gripping the region were good for their cause: in addition to producing the kind of widespread instability necessary for a utopian movement to attain its grandiose goals, the regime changes would likely present unprecedented opportunities to

undertake dawa.\textsuperscript{37} AST accordingly adopted a dawa-focused strategy in the immediate wake of Ben Ali’s fall.

However, the jihadist movement has never been satisfied constraining itself to nonviolent activism. Jihadist writer Hamzah bin Muhammad al-Bassam, while urging a focus on dawa, also articulated the ultimate need for the movement to engage in violence. Without violence, al-Bassam reasoned, salafi jihadism would become just one of a number of different “intellectual trends.”\textsuperscript{38} In other words, even while the movement gathers strength through preaching, it should see violence as its eventual trump over other competing visions. Accordingly, AST not only built up its covert military capabilities, but also engaged in, and over time ramped up, its hisba violence; and the group eventually turned toward a strategy that favored jihad violence over other forms of activism.

**AST’s Dawa-Focused Phase**

When AST primarily focused on dawa, there were two constraints on its use of violence. First, the organization tried to keep its overall levels of violence within what might be termed “acceptable bounds,” that is, a level that would not trigger a state crackdown. In doing so, AST seemingly attempted to increase the amount of violence that might occur without the state getting involved. This approach ultimately failed: AST’s actions eventually did prompt a state crackdown. Second, the organization tried to undertake violence without alienating the population. In other words, independent of the state security apparatus, AST was wary that its hisba or jihad activities might interfere with its dawa, which was more important to the group at this stage. The three prongs of AST’s strategy during this phase are dawa, hisba, and jihad.

**Dawa**

As one Malaysian academic has noted, dawa “refers to calling or inviting people to embrace Islam. Though not an article of the Islamic faith, Muslims are urged to be actively engaged in dawa activities.”\textsuperscript{39} Most frequently, however, salafi jihadists’ dawa efforts are focused not on leading non-Muslims to


\textsuperscript{38} Al-Bassam, “Heeding the Advantages and Lessons of the Two Uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia.”

Islam, but on persuading other Muslims to accept their version of the faith.

In undertaking dawa efforts while it could operate legally, AST made its presence felt in some traditional ways: forcing out old imams at mosques and capturing key leadership positions, holding dawa events at markets or universities, holding public protests, and dominating physical spaces (such as cafés) near places of worship. But AST also had some innovative approaches to dawa, including providing social services (something that other militant Islamic groups like Hezbollah and Hamas have also done) and using social media.

AST’s social services activity included distributing food, clothing, and basic supplies, as well as sponsoring convoys that provided both medical care and medicine. These efforts concentrated on areas of Tunisia typically neglected by the government, such as rural and impoverished areas. AST’s social services were usually accompanied by distribution of literature designed to propagate its ideology. While AST constantly engaged in efforts to provide social services, it did not reach the same areas consistently. This gap is where AST’s savvy use of social media became particularly relevant. Almost immediately after it undertook humanitarian efforts, AST would post information about its most recent venture—including photographs—to its Facebook page and other Web sites. Thus, social media served as a force multiplier, as its social media activity illustrated a rapid pace of humanitarian assistance throughout the country.

Two things are worth noting about AST’s dawa strategy. First is the context in which this work was undertaken. The Tunisian economy was, during this time, poor; and it has only grown worse subsequently. The country’s youth were hit particularly hard. As Monica Marks writes, “Across the ideological spectrum, from leftist communists to jihadi Salafis, young people speak of being neglected and deceived by their political leaders. Significant numbers of Tunisian youth hold college degrees but cannot find employment.”40 Because of this situation, she concluded that “the desperation and discontent that drove many young people to protest in the early weeks of the revolution are still present today.”41

Tunisia has suffered from maldistribution of resources for some time; under Ben Ali, the coastal cities experienced relatively strong economic

40 Marks, “Youth Politics and Tunisian Salafism,” 110.
growth, while cities in the country's interior and south benefited little from this prosperity.42 Thus, even before the revolution, “marginalized areas” within Tunisia were the most “significant sources of recruits to the Islamist movement.”43 This structural problem of wealth distribution continues, and AST was able to win sympathy and recruits in some of these marginalized areas. AST positioned itself as a critic of the status quo writ large, and portrayed itself as a champion of those neglected by the system.

A second aspect of AST’s dawa efforts worth noting is the likelihood of foreign sponsorship of at least some of AST’s activities.44 Although AST collected donations at mosques during Friday prayers, the economy in Tunisia was dim enough that these donations likely did not cover all of the group’s humanitarian expenses, particularly those related to its distribution of medicine. The pictures, videos, and information that AST posted on its Facebook page suggests another source of funding; in at least one case, it received medical supplies from the Kuwaiti charity, Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS), which is known as the Society for Preservation of Islamic Heritage in Tunisia.

The fact that the RIHS may have been involved in supporting a jihadist group in Tunisia will come as no surprise to seasoned observers of militant financing. The U.S. Department of the Treasury designated the RIHS a sponsor of terrorism in 2008 “for providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda affiliates, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Jemaah Islamiyah, and Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya.”45 The Treasury also charged RIHS with providing financial support specifically for terrorist acts. RIHS did not constitute AST’s only established connection to sympathetic foreign organizations. The literature it distributed at dawa events could be traced to at least three publishing houses in Saudi Arabia: Dar al-Qasem, based in Riyadh; Dar al-Tarafen, based in Taif; and the Cooperative Office for the Call and Guidance and Education Communities, based in Dammam.

44 This discussion of AST’s probable foreign sponsorship is adapted from Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Aaron Y. Zelin, “Uncharitable Organizations,” Foreign Policy, 26 February 2013, where the phenomenon of foreign sponsorship of jihadist groups—in Tunisia and beyond—is discussed in detail.
Many questions remain about AST’s foreign sources of support, both then and now. Nonetheless, the available evidence is suggestive, and analysts should continue to explore and attempt to map foreign sources working to strengthen AST and other Tunisian jihadist groups.

Hisba

While the concepts of dawa and jihad are likely familiar to most readers, many are likely unfamiliar with hisba. The obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” is an important Islamic concept discussed in the Qur’an. As Michael Cook explains in his comprehensive study, the well-known Sunni scholar Ghazzali “adopted the word hisba as a general term for ‘forbidding wrong’.”

Hisba amplified AST’s message, as there were numerous incidents of Tunisian salafi jihadists employing violence against their opponents. It is worth noting, of course, that any given act of violence linked to salafi jihadism could have been carried out by individuals unaffiliated with AST. This ambiguity is consistent with AST’s effort to maintain doubt about its use of violence during this period. The fact that it was unclear whether AST or other salafi jihadists were responsible for any given act of hisba violence allowed the group to increase the virulence of its actions without being targeted in a crackdown during this period.

This section details the phenomenon of salafist vigilantism (hisba violence) in Tunisia during AST’s dawa-focused phase. Given the difficulties determining which specific hisba violence AST was responsible for, this section examines salafi vigilantism as a complete phenomenon without distinguishing between AST-linked actions and those not attributable to the organization.

One group that felt particularly targeted in the early days after the revolution was Tunisian women, who believed that the societal pressures directed at them were mounting. These pressures were not entirely attributable to salafi jihadists—there are other conservative religious segments of Tunisian society—but salafi jihadists were an important part of this picture.

Since its independence from France in 1956, Tunisia has had one of the most progressive legal systems in the Arab world with respect to women’s

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47 Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
48 This section is adapted from Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Springtime for Salafists,” Foreign Policy, 26 March 2013.
Until the 2011 revolution, the Tunisian state viewed “the presence or absence of hijab” as “a key component” distinguishing modernity from tradition. In addition to imposing some legal restrictions on women’s ability to wear hijab (or cover), the state actively framed it as a part of the past that civil society was moving beyond. A study examining the symbolism of the hijab under Ben Ali written by Simon Hawkins persuasively demonstrates that the state took great pains to associate the hijab with a tradition that, while deserving of respect, society would inevitably leave behind as it embraced modernity; young women who did not wear hijab were portrayed as central to the country’s more enlightened and liberated future. Since the revolution, however, many Tunisian women perceived increasing societal pressures and harassment directed at their manner of dress. Consequently, some women changed the way they dressed unwillingly, including donning the hijab as a protective measure.

Tunisia’s earliest known postrevolution act of vigilante violence targeted female prostitutes. Though maisons closes (brothels) have been legal in Tunisia since 1942, Der Spiegel reported that, in February 2011, a crowd of “several hundred outraged citizens” gathered near a maison close in Tunis on a Friday, the Muslim day of prayer, to protest the presence of prostitutes. The protesters came armed with “sticks and torches in hand,” but were stopped by both the Tunisian military and “a militia of pimps, porters, and day laborers.” Attacks on prostitutes quickly spread, with maisons closes being set afame in such cities as Kairouan, Médenine, Sfax, and Sousse. During some of these attacks, the prostitutes “were hunted down and beaten.”

Other women were physically attacked for lesser affronts to public morals than prostitution. In the working class Tunis neighborhood of Intilaka, a street vendor scolded journalist Zeineb Rezgui for wearing a sleeveless

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51 Ibid., 45-46.
54 Ibid.
summer dress.\textsuperscript{55} As Rezgui recounted, “I tried to talk to him, but all of a sudden he jumped and slapped me hard on my neck. I fell on the ground, he started kicking me. About five other men, also with long beards, some wearing long tunics, joined him. They were kicking and punching me all over my body. The rest of the people were just watching and nobody dared to approach.”\textsuperscript{56} Similar attacks occurred in the northwestern city of Jendouba.\textsuperscript{57}

Though violence targeting women was the first sign, salafi vigilante violence rapidly spread to other sectors of Tunisian society. One critical battlefield relates to the debate over free expression. The ability to discuss vital issues robustly is critical to any democratic society, and an array of Tunisian salafist groups moved to short-circuit the conversation. They launched attacks and intimidation campaigns against artists and public intellectuals whose work they thought transgressed the moral standards appropriate for an Islamic society.

One of the earliest attacks on artists occurred on 9 April 2011. Director Nouiri Bouzid—a film director with outspoken anti-Islamist views—was stabbed in the head by a bearded student who shouted “Allahu Akbar!” (God is great) before delivering the blow. Bouzid fortunately survived the attack, which he attributed to his “pro-secular stands and rejection of [extremist Islamic] culture.”\textsuperscript{58} In June 2011, an art house cinema in Tunis planned to show a movie about secularism that many salafists viewed as heretical. In response, “a gang of salafists forcibly entered” the theater and “sprayed tear gas and roughed up the management.”\textsuperscript{59} The cinema has been closed ever since.

An even more striking string of incidents occurred in October 2011, when the TV station Nessma showed Persepolis, an animated film that many conservative Muslims found blasphemous because it contains a scene depicting God, which is anathema to stricter interpretations of the faith. After the controversy flared up, the owner of the station, Nebil Karoui, issued an apology for broadcasting the film. Nonetheless, a number of preachers devoted their Friday sermons to denouncing Nessma, after which a mob

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Sana Ajmi, “Clashes Between Salafists and Police in Northwestern City of Tunisia,” Tunisian Live, 22 February 2012.
\textsuperscript{58} Andrew Gilligan, “Tunisia: Birthplace of the Arab Spring Fears Islamist Resurgence,” Telegraph (UK), 28 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{59} Smoltczyk, “Islamist Intimidation.”
of approximately 300 people attacked the Nessma studios in an attempt to set fire to them.  

This violence was followed a week later by an assault on Karoui’s home. As Middle East Online reported, an armed mob of “about a hundred men, some of whom threw Molotov cocktails,” laid siege to his house. Twenty members of the mob were able to get inside. Karoui’s family was home at the time, though he was not, and they barely managed to escape. In a disturbing footnote to these incidents, the government’s response was to call for “respect for sacred things” and, in May 2012, Karoui was fined by a Tunisian court for “disturbing public order and attacking moral values” for showing the film in the first place.

At the same time salafists tried to leave their imprimatur on the art world, they also sought to dominate discourse in the civil and religious spheres. There were numerous instances of salafists showing up in mosques and demonizing the previous imams, accusing them of being collaborators with the old regime. These actions facilitated the salafi—and also salafi jihadist—takeover of an estimated 400 Tunisian mosques in the days before AST’s ban. Salafi vigilantes also attempted to control the religious sphere by targeting Islamic practices regarded as deviant. A sufi shrine in the small town of Akuda, 85 miles south of Tunis, was set ablaze by salafists in January 2013, the 35th such attack in a seven-month period.

Salafi vigilante violence also extended to non-Islamic faiths. In September 2011, a group of salafists occupied the Christian basilica in the northwestern city of El Kef with the intention of turning it into a mosque. In March 2013, salafis attacked two Italians and two Tunisians in the southeastern coastal town of Zarzis, under the erroneous impression that they were promoting Christianity.

Education was another heavily contested area. At Manouba University (in Manouba, Tunisia), outrage boiled over into violence after university ad-

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62 “Outrage over #PersepolisTrialVerdict,” Al Jazeera, 4 May 2012.
64 Agence France-Presse, “Muslims Bid to Turn Christian Site into Mosque,” 16 September 2012.
ministrators decided to reaffirm the presidential decree issued in 1981 that prohibited female students from wearing the niqab (face covering) in class. Salafis denounced the ban and also demanded an end to coeducation. During the course of several contentious months, salafis briefly took Habib Kazdaghihi, the dean of the college of letters, as a hostage. “Salafists are not letting us do our job. Whenever us professors try to apply the university’s law, we get physically attacked,” said English professor Radhia Jaidi. “The Faculté des Lettres is no longer a safe environment for us to teach in.”

During the ongoing dispute, a salafi ripped down the Tunisian flag and replaced it with a black flag bearing the shahadah, Islam’s declaration of faith. Other Tunisian universities saw similar open confrontations between secularists and salafis, but such incidents were not confined to the university level. A group of salafis broke into a secondary school in Menzel Bouzelfa in April 2013 and physically and verbally assaulted the principal, who had barred entry to a female student wearing a niqab. The principal had to be hospitalized.

Another sphere that salafi vigilantes attempted to control was that of private vice by way of numerous attacks on hotel bars and alcohol vendors. In one September incident, an estimated 50 activists burst into a bar in Sidi Bouzid’s Hotel Horchani, where they smashed bottles and chased customers, while yelling “al-saharab haram” (drinking is a sin). “A young man who tried to film the raid was beaten by members of the group and taken to an unknown location,” Agence France-Presse reported.

A final category of attack was directed at civil society activists, those most likely to present Tunisia with an alternative course to salafism. A harrowing letter that Human Rights Watch (HRW) sent to the Tunisian interior minister and justice minister in 2012 documented these assaults. Rajab Magri, who was part of a group that disrupted the aforementioned salafi occupation

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71 Whitson, “Letter to Tunisian Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice.”
of the basilica in El Kef, told HRW that he was targeted by salafis after the fact—first on Facebook and then in person. In May 2012, salafi activists ambushed him on an El Kef street. "They started kicking and punching me all over my body, they grabbed me by the hair and started hitting my head on the pavement," he reported. "I was almost unconscious. They were insulting me, calling me a kafir (infidel) and shouting that they will kill me." 72

Other activists had similar stories. Jaouhar Ben Mbarek, a spokesman for the secular political list Doustourna, recounted how salafis vilified his party’s activists on Facebook after they began planning a series of meetings in southern Tunisia. The war of words led to a Doustourna meeting in a southern village being attacked by 40–50 bearded men. 73 “They started beating people in the room at random, throwing chairs at people, and kicking them,” Ben Mbarek recounted. “When they saw me, they left everybody else and rushed towards me. They surrounded me and started kicking me. Two of them forced me to kneel, someone grabbed me by the hair and shouted, ‘Where is the knife?’ as if he wanted to slaughter me.”

Unfortunately, the police response to acts of salafi violence was often tepid up until the crackdown against AST. HRW reported on police inaction following multiple attacks. In Magri’s case, police took no action after two separate assaults, and one officer told him that they could not arrest one of the attackers because “his emir threatened to set the city on fire if they do.” Zeyneb Rezgui, the female journalist who was attacked in Tunis, reported a similar explanation for police inaction. A police officer said that her attackers “threatened him and vowed to burn his house and kill his family if they did anything against him.” 74

Again, it is impossible to say with certainty which of these salafi hisba attacks could be attributed to AST. Some of the violence is almost certainly unconnected to the organization. Conversely, the attacks related to the Nessma TV station appear particularly likely to have been the work of AST, a conclusion shared by local observers. 75 Further, the intimidation of police had strategic benefits for AST, pushing the boundaries of acceptable violence and highlighting the fact that security forces will suffer for going after salafi groups.

72 Ibid.
74 Whitson, “Letter-to Tunisian Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice.”
75 Sayah, “Qui a Attaqué l’Ambassade des Etats-Unis.”
Jihad

Before the crackdown on AST, Abu Iyad affirmed on multiple occasions that Tunisia was a land of dawa rather than a land of jihad. But AST also made no secret of the fact that it supported jihad abroad and, even in its dawa-focused phase, AST was preparing for eventual confrontation with the state.

Tunisia has had the largest number of foreign fighters travel from its territory to fight with militant groups in Syria, an estimated 3,000, while other Tunisians have fought in Mali. However, in February 2013, Abu Iyad “advised Tunisians not to migrate to Syria or other active jihad fronts but to stay in the country and carry out peaceful jihad there.” In other words, salafi jihadists were needed more on the home front, advancing the movement’s agenda in Tunisia, rather than going abroad. Abu Iyad’s advice in this regard was consistent with a statement AQIM released on 17 March 2013 in which the group said Tunisians should combat secularism at home rather than fighting in Mali. According to Abu Iyad, there was an exception for those who had “special skills.” Yet despite these words discouraging Tunisians from fighting abroad, AST’s media wing continued to issue eulogies for Tunisians killed while fighting as a part of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN or al-Nusra Front), the Syrian jihadist group. Further, when a reporter for Echourouk El-Youmi visited northern Mali while it was under hard-line Islamist control, he interacted with a number of foreigners who reportedly “talked about themselves” and their experiences with several regional jihadist groups, including AST.

In addition to jihad abroad, there is the issue of AST and jihad violence at home. One early act of jihad violence that AST was engaged in at home occurred on 14 September 2012, when hundreds of protesters turned up at the U.S. embassy in Tunis following the controversial privately made film satirizing the Prophet Muhammad called The Innocence of Muslims. The protesters were able to overrun security and ransack not only the embassy, but also a nearby American school. Four people were killed and 46 injured in skirmishes. AST played a major role in organizing the demonstrations, as it used its Facebook page to encourage Tunisians to protest in front of the

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76 “Jihadists See Tunisia Assassination as Conspiracy Against Islamists,” BBC Monitoring [in English], 14 February 2013.
77 See “Al-Bayariq Media Establishment Video Eulogizes Tunisian Member of Al-Nusrah Front,” Ansar al-Mujahedin Network, 14 March 2013.
78 “Salafist Group in Timbuktu Wants Return of Islamic Caliphate,” Echourouk el-Youmi (Algeria), 26 April 2012.
U.S. embassy. AST members, including Abu Iyad, were seen at the demonstration. Though many other Tunisians turned up to demonstrate, including nonsalafists, local eyewitnesses believe that AST initiated the clashes.\footnote{Sayah, “Qui a Attaqué l’Ambassade des Etats-Unis.”} The attack ended up being extremely disruptive to U.S. diplomatic efforts in Tunisia. American officials ordered the evacuation of U.S. personnel from Tunisia, and many who had been working at the embassy had to leave without even packing their belongings. Some of the other second-order consequences, such as new security procedures, have made it more difficult for American diplomats to do their jobs effectively.

During this dawa-focused period, AST was also preparing for future confrontation with the state. Arms were frequently smuggled into Tunisia through the country’s porous borders, sometimes resulting in clashes between security forces and smugglers. Several political figures linked this flow of arms to jihadist groups. For example, Tunisia’s then-prime minister, Hamadi Jebali, commented in December 2012 that, “Due to the Libyan revolution and disturbances in Mali, some terrorist organizations took the opportunity to smuggle arms into Tunisia.”\footnote{Amira Masrour, “Prime Minister Jebali Addresses Arms Trafficking in Tunisia,” 
\textit{Tunisia Live}, 13 December 2012.}

AST would continue to ratchet up its level of violence over time, prompting the Tunisian state’s crackdown and dramatically changing the relationship between the group and the state.

**AST’s Escalation**

An increasing sequence of attacks by AST contributed to an open conflict between the group and the Tunisian state. Though it is hard to pinpoint a definitive beginning to the escalation, the most persuasive inflection point came in December 2012, when militants shot and killed Anis Jelassi, an adjutant in the Tunisian National Guard, in the Kasserine governorate.\footnote{“Décès de l’Adjudant Anis Jelassi dans des Affrontements à Feriana.”} This incident prompted Tunisian authorities to identify, for the first time, the militant group known as Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi. The February 2013 assassination of secularist politician Chokri Belaïd marked another escalation.

Thereafter, several more progressions occurred in the escalating conflict between AST and the government. Tunisia stepped up its security operations in Jebel ech Chaambi after frequent landmine attacks. In May, the government interrupted public lectures and other AST dawa activities, then can-
celled the group’s annual conference in Kairouan. While cancelling the event put the conflict between AST and the government in increasingly uncharted territory, tensions between the two reached their climax in late July. In a one-week period at the end of July, another prominent secularist politician, Mohamed Brahmi, was gunned down by assassins, and a jihadist ambush in Jebel ech Chaambi left “eight soldiers dead—five with slit throats.”

This was finally a point of no return, though it is not clear that AST intended it to be so. The decision to ambush and kill the soldiers may have been made by the Katibat’s field commanders rather than AST’s leadership, nor is it clear that AST’s leadership ordered Brahmi’s killing.

**Violence in Jebel ech Chaambi**

Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi was described as a “shadowy group” by one of the analysts who first took notice of it. This was by design: both of the major organizations associated with Katibat—AQIM and AST—have largely clandestine structures and operate in a surreptitious manner.

Several aspects of Katibat’s structure have been reported in open sources. One regional analyst explains that the “basic unit” of an organization like Katibat is the serrya, an Arabic military term referring to a company. The analyst continues that each serrya includes about 15 men, and several such groups “form a katiba (battalion) which includes 50 to 80 men.” Katibat, according to Tunisian officials, includes at least two serryas. Authorities are not certain of the number of members in each serrya, but their estimates are around 30 men, which is consistent with what is known about the militants’ conception of a serrya. The serryas have been able to maintain a consistent level of activity even though authorities have killed or captured many members, thus suggesting that the Katibat’s structure is designed to make it resilient in the face of losses.

Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi has Algerian and Tunisian members, further underscoring the manner in which it operates in

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83 Schemm, “Jihadis Threaten Tunisia’s Arab Spring Transition.”
87 For a discussion of how the structure of clandestine militant organizations can enable their resiliency, see Derek Jones, *Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks: The First Steps in Effective Counternetwork Operations* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2012).
both countries and connects AST to AQIM. Its serayas were active in both Jebel ech Chaambi and El Kef. The question of who controls the Katibat became less murky in January 2015, when it began to openly describe itself as a battalion of AQIM.

The first set of incidents that caused Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi to become central to relations between the Tunisian government and AST occurred in December 2012. Tunisian authorities decided to step up interdiction efforts at the border with Algeria after a police raid in Jendouba on 8 December resulted in the seizure of guns and explosives and the arrest of two men “suspected of membership in a salafist group.” Two days later, Tunisian National Guardsmen patrolling the border received a call indicating that a group of about four militants had entered Tunisian territory and were in the forest near the village of Derneya, which is located near the Algerian border. A small detachment of guardsmen entered the forest, and the militants shot and killed Anis Jelassi, an adjutant.

Jelassi’s death prompted intensified police operations. Tunisian authorities arrested seven salafists suspected in the killing. At a press conference announcing the arrests, Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi was mentioned publicly by officials for the first time when Interior Minister Ali Laarayedh said that the seven arrestees belonged to a group bearing that name. He also said that the Katibat was part of AQIM emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud’s (a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel) militant network, an allegation that proved correct when the group later began to describe itself that way. Tunisian authorities suspected that the Katibat was engaged in smuggling activity between Tunisia and Algeria, and that it used Jebel ech Chaambi to conduct militant training. The terrain is appropriate for such training activity, as it is a densely wooded national park filled with valleys and caves.

Police operations at the Algerian border continued following these arrests. Sweeps by the Tunisian Army and National Guard discovered caches of weapons and ammunition. In early May 2013, 16 members of the secu-

90 Ibid.
93 “Poursuite d’un Groupe Armé dans une Zone Forestière à la Frontière entre la Tunisie et l’Algérie,” Kapitalis, 12 March 2013.
rity forces were wounded in four separate landmine attacks, and 5 of them had limbs amputated as a result.\textsuperscript{94}

On 7 May 2013, following these incidents, Tunisian authorities held a major press conference to discuss Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi. Interior ministry spokesman Ali Aroui alleged that the Katibat’s two serryas in Jebel ech Chaambi and El Kef were part of the al-Qaeda network.\textsuperscript{95} The government also claimed that AST was connected to the Jebel ech Chaambi violence, though one of AST’s leaders denied this in an interview with a regional Arabic-language publication, describing the government’s claims as lies designed to squash the salafist movement.\textsuperscript{96}

Violence in Jebel ech Chaambi continued throughout the year, and militant attacks were met with increased policing operations and offensives. The surge in violence that had occurred in May 2013 led the government to forbid AST’s annual conference in Kairouan, a move that further increased tensions.

\textbf{Cancelling the Kairouan Conference and Its Aftermath}

For the first couple of years of AST’s existence, one of the most visible spectacles to draw its members, supporters, and fellow travellers was an annual event hosted in Kairouan. The second annual Kairouan conference, which began on 20 May 2012, drew between 3,000 and 10,000 attendees. It also drew a star-studded line-up of jihadist speakers. AST’s 2013 conference was scheduled to begin on 19 May, and some media outlets estimated the number of expected attendees at 40,000.\textsuperscript{97} On 15 May, only days before the conference was to begin, the government banned the meeting. While it seems clear that tensions over the violence at Jebel ech Chaambi prompted the cancellation, the government claimed that its move was prompted by AST’s failure to submit the paperwork necessary to hold the conference.\textsuperscript{98}

The following day, AST spokesman Saif Eddine Erais held a press conference in Tunis, claiming that the group “doesn’t need the government’s authorization to preach the word of God.”\textsuperscript{99} Asserting that the conference would be held despite the government’s cancellation, Erais warned against

\textsuperscript{94} Lebovich, “Confronting Tunisia’s Jihadists.”
\textsuperscript{95} “Des Groupes Liés à Al-Qaida Recherchés en Tunisie.”
police efforts to stop it. He said, “The government will be responsible for
every drop of blood that will be poured.” Brushing aside these warnings,
the government affirmed its decision to ban the conference, and Tunisia’s
interior ministry accused the salafist movement of showing contempt for
the institutions of the state and inciting violence against them. During the
course of this war of words, Ali Laarayedh—who had by then been elevated
from interior minister to prime minister—described AST as an “illegal orga-
nization that defies and provokes the state’s authority.” Though observers
were confused about what Laarayedh’s description of AST as an “illegal or-
ganization” meant—would AST’s dawa activities now be banned?—the gov-
ernment did not prevent AST from operating openly until several months
had passed, and more blood was shed.

On 19 May, the day the Kairouan conference was scheduled to begin,
AST advised its international supporters through a Facebook post to cancel
their trips to Tunisia due to the security situation. Another Facebook post
that went up the same day called on AST’s supporters to gather in the city
of Ettadhamen, near the capital of Tunis. This change in venue was an
attempt to circumvent the ban: AST wanted to flout the state’s authority by
holding the conference, but moving it out of Kairouan—a city that would be
surrounded by a ring of security.

That evening, AST released an audio message from Abu Iyad on its Face-
book page, which the group described as the speech he would have given
at the conference. In the recording, Abu Iyad assured supporters that AST
could not be defeated despite the “persecution” the government was in-
flicting upon them. He congratulated his supporters on “proving to the
entire world that their preaching is invincible before these hordes of ene-
emies, that the ambitions of Ansar al-Sharia will not be hampered.”

The same evening that Abu Iyad’s statement was posted, clashes erupted be-
tween police and salafists in Ettadhamen. Demonstrators threw rocks and Mo-
lotov cocktails at officers, burned an armored vehicle, attacked a national guard
post, and blocked the road between M’nihla and al-Intilaka with burning tires.

100 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
There were also reports of looting and of burning a Tunisian flag. According to official statistics, 1 person was killed and 18 wounded, including 15 police officers, in the first night of clashes. Confrontations also occurred in Kairouan. Though the clashes were intense, the police soon gained the upper hand in both Kairouan and Ettadhamen by arresting nearly 200, many of whom were quickly released.

Tensions between the government and AST continued to simmer. Violent incidents were sparse, and many confrontations during this period were precipitated by the government through house raids, arrests, and sweeps at Jebel ech Chaambi. For example, on 23 May 2013, authorities arrested seven men who were suspects in the 2 May killing of a police officer. The murder weapon had been a sword.

Escalating these raids, on 6 June, Tunisian police raided Abu Iyad’s home, but he was not found. In an incident that occurred the same day, two security officers driving in Jebel ech Chaambi died in a landmine explosion. These events illustrate the interplay between violence in Jebel ech Chaambi and policing operations in the country’s interior during this period; as landmines and other incidents took the lives of security forces at the border, pressure built for the government to show resolve in the face of the jihadist threat. After the landmine claimed the two officers’ lives, about 50 Chaambi residents held a public protest, calling for the government to take a stronger stance. They said that authorities should set the mountain on fire if necessary.

The military continued to sweep the Chaambi region, raiding the homes of suspected militants and arresting those who were thought to have a connection to the serryas operating in the area. Algerian security forces cooperated with the Tunisians, setting up 20 new military checkpoints at their shared border to inhibit militants’ passage.

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108 “200 Salafistes Arrêtés après des Heurts Meurtriers avec la Police.”
sian authorities broadened their sweeps in July to flush out militants.114

At the end of July, two major incidents would substantially reshape the relationship between AST and the government. One particularly grisly incident occurred on 29 July in a jihadist ambush in Jebel ech Chaambi that killed eight soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit. Though eight soldiers dying in a single day might seem routine for some countries in the region, this was the bloodiest day that Tunisian security forces had ever experienced. Relations between AST and the government were already strained following the 25 July assassination of a secularist politician that was linked to AST. The incident at Jebel ech Chaambi pushed the conflict irreparably over the edge.

**AST’s Political Assassinations**

AST was blamed for two political assassinations that occurred in 2013, both of secularist politicians. Chokri Belaïd was assassinated in February 2013, while Mohammed Brahmi was assassinated at the end of July.

On 6 February, Chokri Belaïd was gunned down outside his home in Tunis. For more than a year prior to his death, Belaïd was the subject of an intensive campaign of surveillance and intimidation. He had many enemies, and it was unclear who was watching and stalking him. Indeed, the politician was constantly followed, and received countless threatening phone calls and text messages. As the stalking intensified, Belaïd began removing his phone battery before travelling.

Immediately after Belaïd’s murder, about a million outraged Tunisians took to the streets, protesting in “one of the largest outpourings of grief in Tunisian history.”115 The Ennahda Movement, Tunisia’s ruling Islamist faction, was a particular object of popular rage, as protestors torched the political party’s buildings and ransacked its offices in Gafsa; they believed the party was too lax when it came to combating religious extremism.116 Some protesters called for a “second revolution” against the new Tunisian government, and thereafter members of the Popular Front political coalition, of which Belaïd was a part, organized weekly demonstrations in front of Ennahda’s offices throughout the country.

114 “Operations Against AQIM Tuesday,” 20 Minutes (France), 5 July 2013.
The main suspect in Belaïd’s murder was a Tunisian named Kamel Gadhgadhi. Though Gadhgadhi’s background is not well documented, he has been portrayed as intelligent and well educated. He apparently knew five languages, and studied in the United States.\textsuperscript{117} A 3 February 2014 raid by Tunisian forces on two AST safehouses in the Tunis suburb of Raoued caused a 24-hour standoff. The clashes between AST members and the police ultimately resulted in the death of Gadhgadhi and six other militants, as well as one police officer.\textsuperscript{118}

While the AST members targeted in the raid were heavily armed, Minister of the Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddou said in a 4 February 2014 press conference that authorities “wanted to avoid their death, and asked them to surrender, but each of them had weapons, grenades, and explosive belts.”\textsuperscript{119} The militants also allegedly possessed 600 kilograms of explosives.\textsuperscript{120} Though Ben Jeddou portrayed the incident as bringing closure to Belaïd’s death, describing the killing of the militants as “the best present that we could give Tunisians,” Belaid’s family was unconvinced. Belaïd’s brother told the media, “We want to know the whole truth. Gadhgadhi was not alone. There are other parties implicated and we hope they will be captured so that the truth is revealed.”\textsuperscript{121}

The other major assassination that AST was blamed for in 2013 occurred six months after Belaïd’s murder, on July 25, when secularist politician Mohamed Brahmi was gunned down in Tunis as he sat in a car outside his home. The gunmen, who reportedly fired 11 shots into the vehicle, then fled on a motorbike. The assassination spun Tunisia into new chaos; protests erupted across the country, as angry crowds again called for the Ennahda government’s resignation.

The day following Brahmi’s assassination, interior minister Jeddou held a press conference in which he claimed that forensic ballistics determined that Belaïd and Brahmi were killed by the same gun—which was subsequent-

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\textsuperscript{117} David Ottaway, Violence Unsettles Tunisia’s Democratic Transition (Washington, DC: The Wilson Center, 2013), 2; and “Qui est Kamel Gadhgadhi?,” DirectInfo, 5 February 2013.


\textsuperscript{120} “Anti-Terrorist Operation in Raoued: Ben Jeddou Announces Gadhgadhi’s Death,” Tunis Afrique Presse, 4 February 2014.

ly confiscated in a raid in Tunis’s Wardieh neighborhood.¹²² Prime Minister Laarayedh described the gun as “proof that the Ansar group is responsible” for the two assassinations.¹²³

Ennahda ultimately responded by designating AST a terrorist organisation and banning it on 27 August, stating that the jihadist group was responsible for both assassinations as well as the Jebel ech Chaambi attacks. This designation would trigger the next phase in AST’s evolution, that of the state’s crackdown against the organization.

**The Government Crackdown on AST**

The crackdown phase of AST’s lifecycle began when Ennahda designated it a terrorist organization and banned it. These restrictions largely went well for the government in the early stages, significantly reducing AST’s activities. AST continued to undertake dawa, but youth leader Youssef Mazouz said the group now carried out “less than half the work it used to before August when it could plan events openly and post details on Facebook.”¹²⁴

**AST’s Targeting of Tourists**

As the state’s efforts escalated, so did those of Tunisian salafists, but their efforts were initially unsuccessful. One early salafi jihadist target in the crackdown phase was tourism, an important part of Tunisia’s economy that contributes to 7 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 15 percent of its employment.¹²⁵

On the morning of 30 October 2013, just before 10:00 a.m., a man carrying a bulky suitcase tried to enter Sousse’s four-star Riadh Palms Hotel, a popular resort for European tourists visiting the beachside city. Security guards questioned him as he tried to make his way in, and quickly decided they did not want to let him enter. The man with the suitcase rushed out toward the beach with security giving chase. Suddenly a loud explosion disrupted the morning’s tranquillity. Wrecked umbrellas, lounge chairs, and the suicide bomber’s

remains littered the beach. Explosives experts later discovered that the bomb had been detonated from a distance with a cell phone, a technique that terrorist groups sometimes employ when the attacker is a new member.\textsuperscript{126}

Fifteen miles south, on the edge of the Gulf of Hammamet peninsula, sits the city of Monastir. Almost simultaneous with the Sousse bombing, authorities arrested an 18-year-old named Aymen Sâadi Berchid outside the mausoleum of Habib Bourguiba, the country’s secular-minded first president. Though Bourguiba is respected by most Tunisians for his role in bringing Tunisia its independence, these secular tendencies make him the \textit{bête noire} (literally “black beast”) of religious conservatives. The intentions of Berchid were clear enough from the fact that his backpack was jammed full of explosives. He tossed a firecracker to distract security officers, but the diversion failed and authorities restrained him. Tunisia’s Ministry of the Interior stated that both of the 30 October attackers belonged to AST.\textsuperscript{127}

As with past security incidents, Tunisian police sprang into action immediately following the attacks. The interior ministry announced the arrest of five individuals “with direct links to the assailants” in the cities of Sousse and Monastir.\textsuperscript{128} They also found a large quantity of explosives in one of the houses they searched in Monastir.\textsuperscript{129} The individuals arrested in the sweep allegedly confessed to a plot to bomb the headquarters of the National Union of Tunisian Security Forces Syndicates, police posts, and four supermarkets that sold alcohol.\textsuperscript{130} Those arrested were reportedly in contact with Abu Iyad by Skype two days before the attacks.\textsuperscript{131}

\textbf{December 2013 Arrests}

On 9 December 2013, Tunisian authorities thwarted another planned attack that similarly targeted tourists when they arrested six members of a cell.\textsuperscript{132} Though their intended target was unclear, reports state that the most serious threat was against the island of Djerba off the coast of Tunisia in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{126} “Selon les Premiers Éléments de l’Enquête, la Bombe Aurait été Déclenchée à Distance,” \textit{Directinfo}, 1 November 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Noureddine Baltayeb, “Ansar al-Sharia Inaugurates Era of Suicide Bombers,” \textit{Al Akhbar}, 1 November 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Hamida Ben Salah, “Tunisia Arrests 5 Suspects After Failed Suicide Attacks,” \textit{Agence France-Presse}, 30 October 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{129} “Attentats en Tunisie: Cinq Suspects Arrêtés, les Salafistes Accusés,” \textit{Le Monde}, 30 October 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{130} “Tunisie: Les Terroristes Arrêtés après l’Attentat de Sousse Planifiaient des Attentats dans 4 Supermarchés,” \textit{Kapitalis}, 1 November 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Monia Ghanmi, “Tunisia Thwarts New Suicide Bombing,” \textit{allAfrica}, 10 December 2013.
\end{itemize}
Gulf of Gabes. Interior ministry spokesman Mohamed Ali Aroui suggested that the attack may have been intended for New Year’s Eve celebrations, possibly striking hotels or clubs.

**AST’s Rebound, February 2014–Present**

AST has experienced a rebound since February 2014. Since then, the vast majority of militant attacks and clashes with Tunisian security forces have been concentrated in the western governorates of Kef and Kasserine, both of which border Algeria. As of this writing, there have been 36 kinetic incidents involving Islamist militants since 16 February 2014. Of them, 19 took place in Kasserine, while another 6 occurred in Kef. Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi is active in both governorates, and Tunisian security forces have intensified operations in these areas, resulting in an increased number of clashes with militants.

As Tunisian forces have stepped up security operations in Jebel ech Chaambi, they have continued to suffer from landmine attacks. Since February 2014, three Tunisian soldiers have been killed and eight have been wounded in three landmine attacks in Chaambi. The number of landmine attacks in Chaambi since February 2014 has declined in comparison to landmine attacks and casualties from February 2013 to January 2014, when 5 Tunisian security forces were killed, and between 17 and 30 security forces were wounded in six attacks.

Although landmine attacks have declined, militants operating in the Chaambi region have become increasingly brazen in their confrontations with Tunisian security forces. Militants have engaged in firefights with Tunisian security forces on four separate occasions since April 2014, while just one similar incident had taken place the previous year. On 16 July 2014, the deadliest attack on Tunisian security forces since the fall of the Ben Ali regime occurred as 40–60 militants, armed with rocket-propelled grenades and rifles, killed 14 soldiers and wounded 20 others in simultaneous attacks on two military posts in Jebel ech Chaambi, which came just as the soldiers were holding their *Iftar* (evening) meal to break the day’s Ramadan fast. A

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133 This number does not include the March 2015 attack at Tunis’s Bardo Museum, which occurred following the statistical analysis described in this section.
134 Statistics on casualty counts for one landmine attack vary. As such, the total number of deaths from landmines ranges from two to three, while the total number of casualties ranges from seven to eight.
year earlier, militants had conducted a similar ambush against Tunisian military forces in Chaambi during the month of Ramadan, suggesting that militants timed their attacks for a period when military forces may have been less alert. Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi claimed responsibility for the July 2014 attack.\(^{136}\) A month later, on 20 August 2014, militants again engaged in a firefight with Tunisian soldiers, with one soldier sustaining minor injuries.\(^{137}\)

Militants have also been active in other areas in Kasserine, including Jebel Salloum and Jebel Semama. On 11 June, an IED on a footpath in Jebel Salloum wounded two civilians, although it is likely that the bomb was intended for Tunisian security forces conducting operations in the area.\(^{138}\) On 23 June 2014, Tunisian security forces exchanged fire with militants who were reportedly trying to replenish their supply of food.\(^{139}\) On 29 July, militants based in Jebel Semama fired on a Tunisian military helicopter flying over the mountain pass, wounding three soldiers.\(^{140}\) Less than a week later, on 4 August, a Tunisian soldier was wounded in a firefight with militants on Jebel Semama.\(^{141}\) Then, on 1 December, one soldier was killed and another wounded in a landmine explosion during security operations in Jebel Semama.\(^{142}\)

A similar pattern of kinetic incidents occurred in the mountainous regions of Kef, where Tunisian security forces have intensified counterinsurgency operations. On 1 July 2014, a roadside bomb wounded six members of the Tunisian security forces involved in clearing operations.\(^{143}\) The next day, an improvised explosive device (IED) killed four Tunisian soldiers in Kef.\(^{144}\) Both landmine attacks occurred near Jebel Ouergha, a known militant stronghold that remains a focal point of clearing operations. On 26


\(^{137}\) “Soldier Slightly Injured as Army Tracks Down Terrorists in Mount Chaambi (Defense),” Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, 20 August 2014.

\(^{138}\) “Roadside Bomb Explodes Near Jebel Salloum,” Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, 11 June 2014.


\(^{140}\) “Tunisia Troops Wounded in Clash with Militants,” Agence France-Presse, 29 July 2014.

\(^{141}\) “Warrant Officer Wounded in Clashes between Army and Terrorist Group,” Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, 4 August 2014.


\(^{143}\) “Bomb Blast Wounds 6 Tunisian Security Force Members,” Agence France-Presse, 1 July 2014.

July, less than two weeks after the devastating attack on security forces in Jebel ech Chaambi, militants killed two Tunisian soldiers and wounded four others in an attack on a military outpost in a mountainous area close to Sakiet Sidi Yousef, the closest town to Jebel Ouergha. On 23 October, five more Tunisian soldiers conducting clearing operations were wounded in a landmine explosion near Sakiet Sidi Yousef.

Militants have also conducted operations against security forces in urban centers in both Kef and Kasserine. On the night of 2 August 2014, militants launched a mass attack against a military barracks in the town of Sbeitla in Kasserine, killing a soldier and wounding a civilian in the operation. The same night, security forces repelled an attack on a national guard outpost in the town of Hidra in Kasserine, which is located on the border with Algeria. On 30 August, militants raided the Sbeitla home of a Tunisian national guardsman, who managed to fend off the assailants. That same day—indicating the escalating pace of attacks—militants launched an assault against a police patrol stationed at the entrance to Kasserine. The attackers fled when security forces returned fire.

Starting in mid-September 2014, militants launched a series of increasingly brazen attacks against security forces in Kasserine and Kef. On 16 September, a group of militants engaged in clashes with Tunisian security forces, resulting in the death of two militants. On 5 November, two militants attacked a group of soldiers traveling in a bus along the road from Kef to Jendouba, killing 5 soldiers and wounding 10 others. The attack occurred close to the Algerian border, raising questions as to whether the militants were using Algerian territory as a base from which to launch their assaults. Subsequently, on 1 December, militants kidnapped a police officer and his brother as they were driving in the Tourief district near the city of Kef. According to news reports, the militants initially intended to rob the

two individuals, but they instead beheaded the police officer when they learned he was a member of Tunisian security forces. In a similarly chilling attack on 4 January 2015, militants kidnapped and slit the throat of an off-duty police officer traveling in a rural area in the northeastern governorate of Zaghouan.

Jendouba governorate has also witnessed an upsurge in militant activity. While there were no militant attacks in the area prior to February 2014, four attacks took place in the period from February to August 2014. Jendouba’s proximity to the Algerian border and to militant strongholds in the mountains of Kef and Kasserine make it a favorable area of operations for militants. On 16 February 2014, a group of militants disguised as police opened fire on a car driving near Jendouba, killing a prison official and a civilian. The group then attacked a Tunisian National Guard unit sent to investigate the attack, killing two members of the guard unit and wounding two others. In the aftermath of the attack, more than a thousand Jendouba residents took to the streets to condemn the attack and show their support for the security forces.

On 17 March 2014, Tunisian forces raided a militant safehouse in northwest Jendouba, killing three militants in the clashes that ensued. On 13 June, militants engaged in a firefight with Tunisian security forces in Jendouba, resulting in the deaths of two militants. Security forces claimed to have recovered explosives and bomb-making equipment in the March and June operations, suggesting that the two disrupted cells may have been planning terrorist attacks.

Police crackdowns on jihadist activity elsewhere in Tunisia at times sparked a violent backlash. In early April 2014, Tunisian forces raided a mosque in the town of Rouhia in Siliana governorate and arrested approximately 16 individuals suspected of militant activities, including numerous people alleged to have fought with jihadist groups in Syria. The next day, a throng of protesters, whom Tunisian security officials claimed were asso-

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associated with AST, attacked a police station in Rouhia, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails and wounding several police officers.\(^{155}\)

In addition to their ongoing campaign against Tunisian security forces, militants continue to target political figures as a means of disrupting the democratic process. On 27 May 2014, gunmen attacked the home of Minister of the Interior Lotfi Ben Jeddouh in Kasserine, killing four police officers in a 45-minute firefight but missing Ben Jeddouh, who was not home.\(^{156}\) In June 2014, AQIM claimed responsibility for the attack.

The assassination attempt against Ben Jeddouh was followed by another attack in Kasserine in September 2014, this time targeting Mohamed Ali Nasri, a member of Tunisia’s secular Nidaa Tounes party. On 1 September, at least five masked gunmen stormed Nasri’s home, although Nasri managed to evade the attackers by jumping onto the roof of his house and then hiding in the home of a neighbor.\(^{157}\) On 14 October, Tunisian authorities arrested a group of militants with suspected links to AST whom officials believed were planning to assassinate Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, a leader of Tunisia’s liberal republican party.\(^{158}\) This string of assassination attempts against political figures, though they were unsuccessful, underscores the militants’ continued efforts to target symbols of Tunisia’s democratic transition and the ease with which they can hit at these figures’ homes.

The elections held in Tunisia in late 2014 offered militants additional opportunities to undermine the democratic process. As the 26 October parliamentary election neared, militants accelerated their operational tempo in the hopes of disrupting voting. On 23 October, militants launched a series of attacks across the country that exacerbated security concerns about the elections. Early in the morning of 23 October, two militants, whom Tunisian authorities accused of plotting a bomb attack, shot and killed a night watchman in the city of Kebili before being arrested.\(^{159}\) The two detained


militants, who were identified by Tunisian officials as AST members, provided information about the existence of a terrorist cell operating out of a home in the town of Oued Ellil in Manouba governorate. Security forces immediately acted on this intelligence and attempted to disrupt the Oued Ellil militants, whom they feared were planning imminent attacks. However, as security forces moved against the militants, a firefight broke out as those inside the besieged house opened fire, resulting in the death of a member of the Tunisian National Guard. In the ensuing hours, Tunisian Special Forces established a cordon around the house, while Tunisian security officials attempted to negotiate with the militants. However, after a 28-hour standoff, Tunisian Special Forces stormed the house, killing six militants, including five women, and wounding two militants and two children who had also been in the house.

Investigations after the raid revealed the Oeld Elil cell’s capabilities and international connections. According to Tunisian officials, the women in the house, who allegedly opened fire on Tunisian Special Forces, were planning to travel to Syria to join anti-Assad rebels. The male militants had reportedly attempted to recruit individuals in the northern Tunisian town of Nabeul to fight in Syria as well. Moreover, Tunisian officials alleged that the cell was planning to conduct attacks in the towns of Kebili and Tozeur.

Tunisian jihadists again attempted to disrupt the democratic process on 21 December, the date of the presidential runoff, when gunmen opened fire on a polling station in the town of Haffouz in Kairouan governorate hours before the station was scheduled to open for voters. In the ensuing firefight, Tunisian security forces killed a militant and arrested three others, while one soldier was wounded.

Conclusion
This chapter primarily focused on AST, which was the first publicly identifiable jihadist organization to crop up in Tunisia following Ben Ali’s fall. In its early life, a phase lasting until December 2012, AST focused on dawa.

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160 “Public Prosecutor of Kebili Refers Case of Two Terrorists to Tunis Court (Sliti),” Agence Tunis Afrique Presse, 23 October 2014.
While it engaged in hisba violence, AST tried (ultimately unsuccessfully) to avoid a state crackdown. That crackdown was caused by a second distinct phase for AST, that of the group’s escalation: through the assassination of two secularist politicians and through Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi’s rise in western Tunisia.

AST’s escalation in turn prompted the third phase of its lifecycle, that of the state crackdown, which was followed by the rebound of AST and also Tunisian militancy more broadly. Thereafter, subsequent developments have pushed AST to the background as other jihadist groups have taken the fore in the fight against the Tunisian state.

The most shocking attacks are the most recent. Following the gruesome March 2015 attack on Tunis’s Bardo museum, the country received another shock on 26 June 2015, when a gunman massacred 38 tourists on the beach at the popular destination Port el Kantaoui. Among other things, the Sousse massacre, which was perpetrated by a jihadist affiliated with the Islamic State, may signal escalating competition in Tunisia between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.

One jihadist group that has become more prominent since the state crackdown is Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi. The prevalence of AST members in Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi has long been noted, but it seems that the two are not actually distinct, but rather different facets of the same organization. It seems that AST was the political front group; it did not participate in elections or the political process, but took advantage of its professed nonviolent approach to openly engage in dawa. Meanwhile, it appears that Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi was the organization’s military wing. This relationship between AST and Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi has not been announced, but is suggested by four factors: both groups’ geographic focus on Tunisia, the subordinate relationship both have with AQIM, the prevalence of AST members in Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, and the division of the groups’ responsibility into separate functions (AST handles dawa and Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi handles military efforts). If this is indeed their relationship, it helps explain AST’s marked decline in visibility since the Tunisian state banned it and cracked down. If AST’s main function was serving as a militant organization’s political front group, the fact that space no longer exists for the group to function openly calls its purpose into question. But as the organization’s military arm, Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi’s purpose remains clear, and it has continued to claim responsibility for attacks.
Meanwhile, the Islamic State’s potential for growth in Tunisia has long been clear due to the large number of Tunisians who fought under its banner in the Syria-Iraq theater. However, in 2015, the group’s claims of responsibility for the Bardo museum attack, which may have been a false claim on its part, and Sousse beach massacre have propelled the group further into the spotlight in the country. The Islamic State claimed a number of attacks after Bardo, culminating in the extraordinarily bloody shooting spree on the beach at Sousse. The Islamic State’s rising profile in Tunisia has the potential to rally the foot soldiers loyal to that organization, and the continuing competition between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in that country should be carefully watched.

Overall, Tunisia faces serious challenges, given the collapse of its tourism sector following the Sousse attack. Jihadists recognize the tourist industry’s centrality to the country’s economy, as well as its vulnerability. While AST has declined in the wake of the state’s crackdown, this does not appear to be a counterterrorism success so much as the political front group’s decline once it could no longer operate openly. Groups like Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi and the Islamic State will continue to target Tunisia, including tourist destinations, with the aim of crippling the country’s economy. Seeing no alternative, the Tunisian government is likely to continue its crackdown. But since jihadist networks have spread beyond Tunisia’s borders, the government’s efforts can at best contain but not solve the problem.
Chapter Two

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Libya, Mali, and the Next Jihadist War

by Anthony N. Celso*

With its 11 September 2012 attack against the U.S. embassy in Benghazi and its brief Northern Mali “safe haven,” al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allies have launched a new regional jihadist war. AQIM’s rapid ascent since January 2012 is surprising. The organization was confined largely to remote Sahelian areas noted for kidnapping, sporadic attacks on security services, and smuggling operations. Recent events, however, have coalesced to reenergize the group.

Qaddafi’s overthrow by NATO-assisted rebels in 2011 forced his heavily armed African mercenaries to return to their Malian homeland. Many of these fighters were Tuaregs and their presence fueled secessionist pressures that had threatened Mali for years. The flow of Qaddafi-era arms to rebel groups and their AQIM Islamist allies, moreover, contributed to the Tuareg rebellion that, by March 2012, had formed an irredentist homeland in north Mali.

The Tuareg-Islamist alliance did not last. Soon, international Islamists and Tuareg guerrillas were fighting for control over the area. Jihadist forces displaced the Tuareg movement for the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) from the north’s main population centers. AQIM and aligned groups divided north Mali into respective fiefdoms where they imposed a draconian version of sharia law. Alcohol was prohibited, adulterers were stoned, thieves’ limbs were amputated, and Sufi religious shrines and burial sites were desecrated.

Not since the Taliban had the world seen such a radical fundamentalist regime. AQIM soon erected terror camps, and jihadist recruits in the areas they governed increased. By autumn 2012, Islamist forces threatened to

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move against Mali’s capital, Bamako. Supporting Islamist ambition was a weak Malian military, which caused a political vacuum inside already tense army-state relations. Frustrated by Bamako’s meager efforts to combat the Tuareg insurgency, army officers overthrew their civilian overseers in March 2012, only to be forced to relinquish authority by Western leaders. Continued conflict between the army and the government created a dangerous power void. By January 2013, AQIM and its allies moved into central Mali and could have marched on Bamako.

Fearing for the safety of thousands of its citizens, France intervened militarily. Fighting continued in the impoverished country as the French secured control over the cities of Gao, Kindal, and Timbuktu and awaited the development of a pan-African force to consolidate Bamako’s control over north Mali.

The Benghazi attack, Islamist combat with French forces in Mali, and AQIM’s kidnapping of Westerners raise a variety of security concerns. Libya’s failed state and the presence of AQIM militias, moreover, threaten to extend the zone of Islamist anarchy. Will the Maghreb-Sahel region be the next battleground in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? This question will be addressed by making a historical analysis of the region’s Islamist movement. Past fears of jihadist resurgence have floundered on the shoals of the movement’s internal divisions, use of nihilistic violence, and ideological extremism. These tendencies are likely to impede AQIM’s future capability. Buttressed by French military forces and their bases in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Côte d’Ivoire, increased international and regional counterterror measures should, moreover, be sufficient to contain the Islamist threat.¹

This chapter examines the Maghreb jihadist movement from 1980s Afghanistan to the current period in four sections that focus on: the role of North African fighters in the global jihadist movement; the Algerian Civil War’s impact on Islamist radicalization and fragmentation; regional Islamist incorporation into al-Qaeda; and finally, AQIM’s development of Sahelian terror operations and sanctuary in the post-Qaddafi era.

**Jihadist Struggles in the Maghreb**

Islamic radicalism has historical roots in the Maghreb. Many Algerian and Libyan Islamists were involved in Muslim “liberation” wars in Afghanistan, Bos-

nia, Kashmir, and Iraq. They also contributed to Islamist rebellions at home. Jihadism is especially strong in rural communities where isolation and poverty allows jihadists to recruit prospective martyrs. Studies of the 11 March 2004 Madrid train attacks have shown the Moroccan rural town of Tetuan to be a source of radical jihadism whose violence has become transnational.

Maghreb jihadists have waged battles against the “near enemy” (Muslim apostate governments) and the “far enemy” (Western powers); the former, designed to liberate Dar al-Islam (House of Islam) of impious rulers and the latter, seeking to violently confront non-Muslim powers in Dar al-Harb (House of War). Frequently, these two struggles have converged. This merger of national and international jihadism occurred in the 1990s when Algerian fighters returned home after the Afghan jihad. These returning jhadists created the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1993 in response to the army’s refusal to respect the 1991 election victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the military’s 1992 seizure of power. The military coup sparked a civil war and inspired a brutal jihadist insurgency.

Islamists then mounted a vigorous insurgent and terror campaign against Algiers. The GIA’s indiscriminate killing of civilians, suicide bombings, ritualistic beheadings, and destructive rage would serve as the precursor to the grotesque tactics of al-Qaeda’s recently expelled Iraq affiliate known today as the Islamic State (IS).

GIA terrorism spread beyond Algeria’s national borders, striking France in the 1990s. The 1994 Air France highjacking that ended when French commandos stormed the plane in Marseilles and the 1995 Paris Metro bombings that killed six people were GIA retaliation for French support of the Algerian government’s repression of the Islamist movement. These attacks were backed by radical elements in France’s Algerian émigré community. Extremist Algerian, Libyan, and Moroccan immigrant communities in Europe have contributed money and recruits for a variety of jihadists during the last three decades.

The Algerian jihadist movement exemplifies the symbiotic relationship between international and national jihadist movements. Its organization and tactics have been shaped by national and international influences. We turn now to the impact of those internal and external influences.

**Algerian Islamism and the 1990s Civil War**

Algerians responded to calls for jihad against the Soviet “infidel” in Afghanistan and performed well on the battleground.\(^7\) Their return home came after a political liberalization initiative by the National Liberation Front’s (FLN) one-party state and the emergence of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Denied political opportunity until the late 1980s, the FIS built a civil society of schools, cultural centers, and medical clinics. This civil infrastructure eventually developed into a mass political movement.

The FIS swept municipal elections in 1989 and mounted a challenge to the one-party state. The FIS won the 1991 legislative elections, but its ascent to power would be curtailed by the government’s abrogation of the election results. Algiers’ violent crackdown against the FIS spawned an armed rebellion in which Algerian veterans of the Afghan jihad dominated insurgent groups. With fanatical determination, the GIA gained infamy for the scope and severity of their terrorist assaults. Officials estimate that the civil war produced more than 200,000 deaths. Driven by *takfir* doctrine\(^8\) that saw opponents (both civilian and military) as “apostates,” GIA violence caused the slaughter of entire communities. The group’s extreme violence divided the Islamist “liberation” movement. Many Islamists, including al-Qaeda, eventually repudiated GIA’s tactics.

FIS negotiated with the government in 1998 and disarmed in return for amnesty for its members. The reincorporation of FIS affiliates into the political mainstream of Algerian society (elections were held in the late 1990s) made it a target of GIA violence. By the late 1990s, Algerian Islamists were frustrated in their campaign to overthrow the government. The regime’s counterterror policy and divide-and-conquer strategy had limited and weakened the insurgency. As a result, GIA lost massive public support because of its tendency for violence.

Among Islamist guerrillas, the division accelerated. Created in 1998, the

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\(^8\) *Takfir* is the act of excommunicating or declaring a Muslim a nonbeliever, a sentence punishable by death.
Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) staked a middle ground between the FIS and the GIA, proselytizing violent action but only against government forces. The GSPC also favored jihad against the “far enemy.”

As a result, the group’s internationalist orientation captured the attention of the al-Qaeda terror network.

The Algerian Islamist movement’s mutation had profound ramifications. Moroccan, Tunisian, and Mauritanian Islamists formed their own GIA and GSPC groups. These organizations often intermingled with criminal networks and charities operating across North Africa and European diaspora communities. Algerian and Moroccan mafias and charities have financed many Islamist terror organizations whose operations span the Mediterranean.

Despite ample financing, Maghreb Islamists in the 1990s were unable to overthrow the Algerian and Libyan regimes. GIA violence in Algeria strengthened the government’s policy of dividing Islamist ranks, and the Moroccan Islamist movement was weakened by the government’s repressive campaign. The Islamist revolt against Qaddafi’s regime in Libya was similarly defeated. By the late 1990s, the Islamist jihadist groups were driven to the remote Sahel-Saharan desert regions.

The failure of regional jihadists to overthrow “apostate” regimes produced an existential crisis among Maghreb radicals who sought the commissioning of a new jihadist struggle. As Thomas Hegghammer, director of terrorism research at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, notes that jihadist frustration typically leads divergent Islamist groups to merge and coalesce against common enemies.

The 9/11 terror attacks and the Afghan and Iraq wars provided further stimulus to the international jihadist cause. The collapse of al-Qaeda’s Afghan sanctuary forced Osama bin Laden to rely on Maghreb affiliates for whom the GWOT provided a suitable geopolitical canvass for their revitalization.

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The Crisis of the African State

Al-Qaeda Central and Its North African Affiliates

The Taliban’s 2001 overthrow destroyed al-Qaeda’s organization and financial infrastructure, severing its ability to mount major operations. By 2002, the GWOT had resulted in the deaths or imprisonment of thousands of al-Qaeda operatives and much of its mid-level leadership. Al-Qaeda Central (or AQC, al-Qaeda Central Command) retreated to Pakistani Taliban-controlled Waziristan.

Faced with diminished command and control capability, al-Qaeda moved to a decentralized alliance strategy with regional networks and radicalized immigrant communities in Europe. As articulated by al-Qaeda theorists Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji, this decentralized strategy sought to unleash multiple battlefronts to weaken the West’s ability to wage war.13

Maghreb Islamist terror networks and their European émigré supporters offered al-Qaeda additional recruitment and financial resources. Moroccan, Libyan, and Algerian operatives in AQC and their links to home movements facilitated al-Qaeda’s use of groups such as GSPC.14 Maghreb jihadist networks aligned with al-Qaeda in a 2002 Istanbul meeting. Engineered by AQC leader Amir Azizi, the Istanbul meeting succeeded in getting Algerian, Moroccan, and Tunisian terror organizations to attack Western interests across the Mediterranean.15 Azizi’s prominence in AQC cannot be doubted, nor can his links to Spanish and Moroccan terror networks.16 The Moroccan jihadist developed al-Qaeda’s terror network in Spain, recruiting fighters and raising money for international jihad. During the 1990s, Azizi recruited Moroccan jihadists in Spain to train in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. Many of these recruits were instructed in the use of cell phone-triggered bombs like those used to killed hundreds in the 2004 Madrid train attacks.

Azizi’s connections to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) and the GSPC allowed him to direct attacks in North Africa and Europe. After the Istanbul meeting, the number of plots and attacks in North Africa

16 Ibid.
increased. Among these were a disrupted 2002 plot to blow up U.S. warships in the Straits of Gibraltar, the 2002 bombing of a Tunisian synagogue that killed scores of German tourists, and the May 2003 Casablanca attacks that targeted Spanish and British interests. These events would later be followed by the 11 March 2004 Madrid train bombings in which 191 people were killed.

The Casablanca and Madrid attacks were a direct result of the GICM and GSPC partnership with al-Qaeda; the terrorists who committed these attacks had close group and familial interconnections. Investigation of the March Madrid train attacks document al-Qaeda’s cross-fertilization with local and regional groups. Throughout these operations, Azizi had close e-mail and telephone contact with members of the attack cells. Azizi’s prominence in al-Qaeda is verified by his 2005 death in Waziristan from a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) predator drone attack. His corpse was found near Abu Hamza Rabia, who had ascended to al-Qaeda chief of external operations.

The Iraq War tightened al-Qaeda’s relationship with Maghreb militants. Frustrated in its efforts to destabilize Algeria’s government, the GSPC sought to use the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to raise its profile and prestige. GSCP leader Abdelmalek Droukdel recruited a thousand Algerian martyrs. The U.S. military estimated that, by 2005, one out of every four suicide bombers in Iraq was Algerian.

While the flow of fighters into Iraq weakened GSPC’s capacity to wage jihad against the Algerian “apostates,” it repeated patterns elsewhere in the Maghreb where Moroccan and Libyan terror networks offered their best fighters to kill the American “infidel.” The progressive internationalization of the North African salafist-jihadist movement was later consolidated by al-Qaeda’s formation of a Maghreb affiliate.

In September 2006, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the integration of the North African jihadist movement into the organization. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was officially recognized by regional militants a year later. The AQIM-Maghreb partnership aims to

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19 Ibid.
revitalize jihadist causes that separately had failed to achieve their central objectives. Since the Taliban’s overthrow, al-Qaeda’s organizational metamorphosis has been dependent on affiliates to recruit, train, and conduct terrorist operations. Al-Qaeda’s outreach to groups like the GSPC, GIA, and GICM gave it access to considerable capabilities.

GSPC and GIA fighters continued to hone their skills at home, offering Afghanistan and Iraq a valuable resource; their fanaticism, ruthlessness, and training are well known across the globe. Algerian fighters represented the third highest number of foreign jihadists to die in Iraq, and they have been the vanguard in the cause of international jihad for almost 30 years. Additionally, they have organized jihadist cells throughout North Africa and Europe. Islamist success in the Maghreb means an almost inexhaustible supply of fighters for Iraq, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.

GSPC and GIA cells exist throughout Europe and they are involved in criminal networks. The money raised through drug and immigrant smuggling, as well as the logistical services involving identity and credit card fraud, greatly facilitates the recruitment, indoctrination, and training of future generations of terrorists. GSPC and GIA European cells can be used by al-Qaeda to launch attacks against governments at home and abroad. Their fifth-column status is an invaluable tool to weaken Europe’s will to continue the Global War on Terrorism. The demographic, political, and economic tapestry of North Africa and the Sahel is suited for terrorist recruitment, indoctrination, and training. The Maghreb’s poverty and high population growth have contributed to generations of socially discontented youths who look to fundamentalist Islam to solve the region’s socioeconomic and political problems. Failed states in the Sahel and its warlords, disaffected tribes, and criminal networks are ideal terrorist allies.

Al-Qaeda Central and AQIM operate synergistically with a nucleus providing ideological inspiration and constituent parts impelled to action. It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that this is a highly centralized, efficient organization. AQIM is a fractured movement of competing

22 According to Encyclopaedia Britannica, a “fifth column” is a clandestine group or faction of subversive agents who attempt to undermine a nation’s solidarity by any means at their disposal.
clans. By aligning with al-Qaeda, North African jihadists are able to adopt the AQIM brand name and benefit from its global contacts and insurgent fighting techniques. AQIM has repeatedly attacked the Algerian and Mauritanian governments; between September 2007 and May 2010, 30 attacks that killed and wounded hundreds were registered. Among the most serious of these assaults were:

- the December 2007 suicide bombing against a UN complex and the constitutional court building in Algiers that killed 62 people;
- the August 2008 ambush of an Algerian military convoy outside of Algiers that killed 11 soldiers;
- the August 2008 car bomb explosions outside a police barracks and hotel southeast of Algiers that killed 48 and injured 45;
- the June 2009 beheading of a British hostage; and
- the July 2009 ambush of a convoy in a province west of Algiers that killed more than 20 soldiers.

The attacks represent an Islamist rebuke of the Algerian government’s amnesty policy. The government’s strategy included releasing Islamist fighters from its penal system, but many of these fighters joined AQIM to renew jihad. Algeria’s failure with amnesty, reconciliation, and dialogue is testimony to the unwillingness of jihadists to end their armed struggle. For them, the millennial promise of a pure Islam requires a clean slate free of “Jahili barbarians” and “apostates.”

The Moroccan, Algerian, Mauritanian, and Tunisian governments face Islamist insurgencies that presently do not threaten their existence. Even during the abyss of the Algerian Civil War, Islamists were never close to seizing power. Maghreb governments have oscillated between brutal repression and accommodation. Critical to these governments’ success has been the exploitation of divisions within the Islamist ranks and the capacity of the radical elements to alienate supporters through indiscriminate violence.

AQIM’s strategy of using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), car bombs, and suicide bombers suggests al-Qaeda’s influence over AQIM operations.

25 Group solidarity of pre-Islamic days that followed no law and observed no morals.
While al-Qaeda support increased the tempo of attacks in 2007 and 2008, terror incidents in Algeria have fallen since 2009 and the Islamists have moved their terror operations to the Sahel.\textsuperscript{26}

AQIM’s formation in 2007 did raise concerns in European capitals. With 8 percent of the population in France identified as Muslim, French officials were especially alarmed. Some feared a return to the 1990s Islamist assaults as AQIM has continued to target France. AQIM has made similar attack threats against Spain. Ayman al-Zawahiri has repeatedly called for the “liberation” of al-Andalus and the Islamic conquest of Spanish North African enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla.\textsuperscript{27} Despite aspirations to wage a war against Madrid, AQIM has failed to mount operations against Spanish interests at home.

The terror group has not been able to attack European soil and its main threat comes in the form of kidnapping European tourists and workers in the Sahel. These abductions (22 Europeans have been taken since 2008) have become a lucrative source of revenue with an estimated $25 million paid in ransom.\textsuperscript{28} AQIM is estimated to field only a few thousand jihadists, and its Algerian branch is split into Northeast Kabiya Mountain brigades committed to fighting the “near enemy” in Algiers and a Sahel faction that specialized in kidnapping and smuggling.\textsuperscript{29} The jihadist war against the “far enemy” amounted to the kidnapping and occasional killings of European hostages whose governments failed to pay the ransom or who had authorized military action against AQIM. AQC increasingly finds it difficult to control its fractured Maghreb branch.

Since 2009, Islamist attacks in Algeria have declined. The North African salafist merger with al-Qaeda has not weakened Maghreb governments. Instead, Algerian counterterror measures and a fractured Islamist movement have moved jihadists toward the Sahel, hoping to exploit weak states. AQIM’s outward drift is ample testimony to its failed jihad against Algeria.


\textsuperscript{27} Reinares, “The Madrid Bombings and Global Jihadism.”

\textsuperscript{28} Le Sage, \textit{The Evolving Threat of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb}.

AQIM has become strongest in the Sahel.\textsuperscript{30} The region’s weak states, tribal configurations, and poverty make it an ideal location for terror finance and recruitment. AQIM’s Sahel operations and alliance with the Tuaregs offer a territorial niche in which to train prospective jihadists. Recent events in Libya and Mali have given AQIM a chance for regeneration and a greater strategic opportunity to wage jihad.

**The Fall of Qaddafi, the Malian Sanctuary, and AQIM’S Rebirth**

Qaddafi’s overthrow raised fears that Libya could become a failed state.\textsuperscript{31} Radical Islamist militias tied to al-Qaeda in East Libya have heightened Western anxiety over insurgent recruitment and training camps. These worries are exacerbated by a post-Qaddafi government unable to secure weapons stocks, contain militia violence, or prevent the flow of arms to AQIM militants.\textsuperscript{32}

Concerns over an incipient terror campaign have been vindicated by attacks on Western interests. On 11 September 2012, al-Qaeda affiliate Ansar al-Sharia attacked the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, killing Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans. The U.S. consulate was poorly guarded despite repeated embassy warnings that AQIM militants were mobilizing against U.S. targets in the country. The attack triggered a congressional firestorm in Washington and precipitated a number of investigations. How a U.S. embassy could be assaulted by dozens of heavily armed Islamist militants and why the consulate was so poorly guarded are questions that have yet to be addressed. And little has been done to bring Ambassador Steven’s killers to justice as Libyan anarchy escalated beyond its borders.

In early January 2013, AQIM-aligned groups attacked an Algerian gas complex operated by Norwegian and British companies at In Amenas, taking 41 foreign workers and hundreds of Algerians hostage. Orchestrated by an ex-AQIM leader, the groups demanded an end to French military intervention in Mali and the release of hundreds of Islamic militants from Algerian jails.

After surrounding the plant, Algerian security forces assaulted the com-
plex, hoping to free the hostages. During four days and three military assaults, hundreds escaped and dozens of terrorists and 38 hostages were killed. The attack had been planned by radical Islamist leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar and his *al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam*, or Those Who Sign in Blood Brigade.

Belmokhtar broke with AQIM to form his brigade in January 2013 in hopes of consolidating his personal rule over stretches of the Sahel. Known as Mr. Marlboro for his fame as a tobacco smuggler, Belmokhtar is considered a high-level terrorist leader. The U.S. government recently offered a reward of $5 million to secure his capture. Belmokhtar’s group has considerable geographic reach with operations in Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria.

Fighting between tribal militias in Libya has led to national disunion and an extension of AQIM influence. Al-Qaeda’s presence is strong along Libya’s southern border with Mali where the Libyan state has traditionally been weak. The country’s stability is dependent upon a failing government that has yet to curb tribal and Islamist militias. Since the 2011 NATO intervention, Libya has devolved into civil war with Islamist Misrata-based militias fighting government forces and their Zintan-based tribal allies. Government forces in 2014 were driven out of Tripoli and Benghazi as pro-Islamist militants set up an alternative regime to challenge the legitimacy of the Libyan government now based in Tobruk. Despite their common ideological agenda, Islamist groups like the al-Qaeda aligned Ansar al-Sharia (ASL) and the Islamic State (IS) have established their own rule in Benghazi and Derna. The fracturing of the Libyan jihadist movement mirrors the larger conflicts between al-Qaeda and the IS seen in battles between the two bands in the Syrian Civil War. Libya is rapidly disintegrating into a loose confederation of criminal organizations, militias, and terror groups that have established their own microstates. Jihadists aligned with al-Qaeda and the IS openly compete for guns, money, recruits, and dominance. As in Syria, fighting between these groups may yet materialize.

Assisted by forces led by the Qaddafi-era General Khalifa Haftar, Zintan tribal militias, and Egyptian financial and military support, October 2014 saw the Tobruk government go on the offensive against the Islamists.

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33 For more information, see https://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/mokhtar_belmokhtar.html.
Fighting rages across Libya as government forces contest ASL’s control of Benghazi and fight the Islamists’ control over Tripoli. The civil war in Libya shows no sign of abating for no one group is able to assert dominance, leaving many jihadist groups virtual safe havens. The development of these terror sanctuaries in Libya is a source of continued concern for the region and international governments. Ousted by French forces from its Malian sanctuary in 2013, AQIM brigades have repositioned across the border in southern Libya, where they hope to construct a terror safe haven, financing their operations through illicit activity.

Libya’s precarious post-Qaddafi transition mirrors the collapse of state order in Mali. Al-Qaeda’s drive for strategic depth in West Africa has been facilitated by the destabilizing consequences of Qaddafi’s overthrow and weakness of states across the region. Maghreb Islamists have established good relations with Sahelian Tuareg tribes, supporting their smuggling operations and encouraging their resistance against West African governments. Some AQIM leaders have reinforced this relationship by marrying Tuareg women connected to important tribal families.

The Tuaregs have rebelled in the past, hoping to create an “Azawad” national homeland. Their last rebellion in Mali in the mid 1990s was resolved by a Qaddafi-brokered peace agreement. Qaddafi, the self-proclaimed “King of African Kings,” reinforced his military capability by forming Tuareg militias, providing employment for thousands of impoverished young men.

Qaddafi used African mercenaries to combat the spring 2011 Libyan revolt that eventually received armed Western support. Faced with NATO airstrikes and hostile Libyan rebels, thousands of heavily armed pro-Qaddafi Tuareg mercenaries streamed across the Libyan border into Mali. The diversion of arms and men into Northern Mali altered the balance of power, igniting a Tuareg revolt. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) rebel force joined with AQIM affiliates and made substantial progress against government forces.

The March 2012 military coup in Bamako by rogue Malian Army officers

38 Ibid.
who overthrew the civilian government created a northern power vacuum.\footnote{Harvey Glickman, “The Coup in Mali—Background and Foreground,” \textit{FPRI E-notes}, April 2012, http://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/04/coup-mali-background-and-foreground.} With the dissolution of army units in the north, the rebels and their Islamist partners marched into Kindal, Goa, and Timbuktu. By April, rebels had announced an independent Islamic Tuareg state. Shortly afterward, fighting between MNLA and its Islamist allies began. Ansar Dine (AD) and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) dislodged moderate Tuareg rebels, consolidating Islamist control over the north. Described as a “jihadist condominium” by Spanish terror expert Fernando Reinares, AQIM, AD, and MUJWA control over the north aimed to create a terror training sanctuary and a pure sharia state.\footnote{Fernando Reinares, “FATA in North Mali,” Expert Comment 15, \textit{Real Instituto Elcano}, 31 July 2012.}

Given their conflicts over past policy, such a jihadist alliance is extraordinary. Formed in 2011, MUJWA broke away from the AQIM organization to chart a purely West African path of jihad.\footnote{Tanchum, “Al-Qa’ida’s West African Advance.”} Its predominately Mauritanian leadership promotes an ideology that combines West African nationalism with jihad.\footnote{Dario Cristiani, “West Africa’s MOJWA Militants—Competition for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?,” \textit{Terrorism Monitor} 10, no. 7 (6 April 2012).} Some observers have argued that racial tensions between the black African MUJWA and the Algerian-dominated AQIM forced the separation, while others claim the split occurred due to leadership and strategy issues.\footnote{Ibid. See also “Some Things We May Think about MUJWA,” \textit{The Moor Next Door} (blog), 30 May 2012, https://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2012/05/30/somethings-we-think-about-mujwa/.
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AD is a Tuareg-dominated Islamist militia led by Iyad Ag Ghali, who played an important role in past ethnic revolts. Known as “Defenders of the Faith,” AD forged a relationship with MNLA in January 2012 and brokered the AQIM-MUJWA reconciliation. Reinares believes that AQIM is the dominant group within the jihadist ranks.\footnote{Reinares, “FATA in North Mali.”} Al-Qaeda, moreover, has historically played a role in the region. AQIM’s relationship with the Tuareg tribes is based on joint lucrative smuggling routes. With its Tuareg roots, AD’s role within the rebel movement catalyzed revolutionary unity.

By late April, the Islamists violently displaced the MNLA and transformed a separatist revolt into a quest for a new West African Afghanistan.\footnote{Javier Valenzuela, “Furia Iconoclasta Salafista en Tombuctú,” \textit{El País Internacional}, 8 July 2012, http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/07/08/actualidad/1341698882_271618.html.} AD and MUJWA subsequently seized major northern cities and their forces marched
south relatively unopposed. Salafi jihadist forces wasted little time erecting a Taliban-like state with religious police and brutal policies. Dispensing with Tuareg nationalism, AD and its allies desired a trans-Islamic state where Sufi shrines are desecrated, alcohol users are whipped, and unmarried couples are stoned. Thieves have had their limbs amputated without medical supervision, instruction in biology is forbidden, and the population has been brutally subjugated.

AQIM sent a thousand of its militants into northern Mali with sophisticated Libyan arms. Under AD protection, they established terror camps and intensified recruitment efforts. Al-Qaeda Web sites promise a new jihadist war against “Christian crusaders.” AQIM’s criminal activities and ransom funds from Western hostages give it considerable financial means. The flow of heavy arms, including shoulder-fired missiles into north Mali, fortified Islamist efforts to fund their secular Tuareg competitors.

Given their hegemonic dominance in the north and their brutal policies, AQIM and its allies have encountered local resistance, however. Jihadist rule was unpopular, especially in the lower north where the Tuaregs are a distinct minority. AD’s control over historic Timbuktu and its destruction of Sufi burial sites and mosques engendered the international community’s condemnation. The Islamists’ brutal application of Sharia law ignited local protests as many chaffed at “Talibanesque” rule.

AD responded defiantly to protests of its desecration of Sufi shrines. The group justified its actions, saying that it seeks to promote tawhid (the unity of God) by destroying shirk (polytheism). Such statements underscore al-Qaeda affiliates’ sectarian agenda aimed at local purification and ideological zeal.

Islamist dominance over north Mali created countervailing national and regional efforts. As such, the March 2012 military coup was short lived. Faced with international sanctions, rebellious army officers agreed to step down from power in April, allowing for a new civilian transitional government in Bamako and democratic elections.

Civilian rule in Bamako has been fortified by regional efforts. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is preparing a 3,000-man

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46 Reinares, “FATA in North Mali.”
pan-African Army to reinforce security in the north. The French are spearheading efforts to train this force and provide logistical support. Fear that a Salafi jihadist-dominated state could spread jihad southward was vindicated by Islamist incursions into central Mali. By early January 2013, Islamist forces were marching against the capital and Mali’s panicked interim president called for French assistance. Faced with the logistical problems of preparing a pan-African force that would not be ready until fall 2013, France militarily intervened.

France’s Operation Serval bombed rebel positions in the north and was followed by a ground campaign aimed at securing towns around major highways in north central Mali. By late January 2013, the Islamist bastions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu fell with scarce resistance before the Franco-Malian troops. Fears that the Islamists would use shoulder-fired rockets against French aircraft had not been supported. The local population that had been brutally suppressed by Islamist rule enthusiastically greeted the troops. Many of AQIM’s supporters were killed in retaliatory attacks after French and Malian forces recovered the north.

The French then paved a path for an assault against AQIM and AD northern fiefdoms in the deserts and mountains. By early March, one of AQIM’s top leaders—Abdelhamid Abou Zeid—had died in the fighting and his brigade was shattered by French airstrikes and Chadian ground forces. Some commentators see the Islamists mounting a protracted guerilla war—similar to al-Shabaab’s tactics against African Union soldiers—against the French-trained pan-African force. With forces levels reaching close to 4,000 soldiers, the French hoped to disengage from Mali within the year.

It is clear, however, that Islamists had overreached and miscalculated. By moving south, they risked losing their northern sanctuary. Like the Algerian case, Islamists forces fragmented in response to battlefield reverses. Factions of AD are willing to negotiate with Bamako, while others promise to continue their quest for a sharia state. Currently, Islamist forces are in disarray. AQIM and its allies hope to regroup in Libya and Niger, where they recently launched attacks against African troops and French mining interests. Radical Islamists in Mali continue to mount a low-level insurgent campaign against pan-African and French forces.

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48 For more on French Army operations in Mali, see Michael Shurkin, France’s War in Mali: Lessons for an Expeditionary Army (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2014), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR770.html.
Surprised by the rapidity and scale of France’s military intervention, AQIM also hopes to regroup in the mountains of Mali near the Algerian border. They are unlikely to take back what had been a genuine terror sanctuary for close to a year and experiment in extremist Islam. The United States’ agreement with Niger to host a Predator drone base to assist French and African forces also weighs against rapid Islamist resurgence.\(^4\)

Even having evolved from the failed GIA terror campaign in Algeria, AQIM has not learned from past lessons. It continues to adhere to a dysfunctional totalitarian worldview that impels many Islamists into counterproductive behavior. Such mistakes are inevitable for fanatics who are frequently oblivious to the ramifications of their actions. Ironically, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel presciently advised his forces in Mali to relax their repressive rule in a July 2012 letter found by the Associated Press in Timbuktu. In his missive, he admonishes his militants and writes,

> Some of the examples where we feel you were hasty in applying Sharia . . . include . . . the destruction of the shrines . . . and the application of the had (religious punishment) in the case of adultery, in the lashing of people and the use of force to stop things are haram, and the fact that you have prevented women from going out, and prevented children from playing and searched the houses of the population . . . so your officials need to control themselves and commit themselves to the guide that we will elaborate here.\(^5\)

Droukdel feared that AQIM’s excesses would invariably invite Western military intervention, ending the group’s safe haven. His militants failed to heed his advice. Droukdel’s complaints about his network’s ideological extremism and penchant for counterproductive violence echoes bin Laden’s concerns about the future viability of the al-Qaeda movement. Seized by U.S. forces when they stormed the Saudi leader’s Abbottabad compound, bin Laden’s letters chastise the leaders of al-Qaeda branches in Iraq, So-


\(^5\) “Mali: Al Qaida’s Sahara Playbook,” Associated Press, http://hosted.ap.org/specials/interactives/_international_/pdfs/al-qaida-manifesto.pdf. Droukdel’s complaints about the behavior of his militants in northern Mali and their counterproductive violence and ideological zeal echoes the concerns of bin Laden and others in al-Qaeda’s central leadership about the brutality of affiliate organizations and how they have lost popular support.
malia, and Yemen for the victimization of Muslims in their misconceived wars against apostate enemies. It is increasingly clear that the al-Qaeda movement has fractured and devolved into a decentralized struggle waged mainly against apostate Muslim regimes. This is underscored by al-Qaeda’s February 2014 expulsion of its Iraqi affiliate (Islamic State of Iraq or ISI) for ISI’s failure to withdraw its forces from the Syrian conflict. Since its expulsion from Zawahiri’s organization, ISI has conquered a third of Iraq and Syria, breaking colonial-era borders, and it has conducted a terror campaign against other Syrian rebels including al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Thousands of jihadists have died in Syria as a consequence of the infighting between rival Islamist groups.

The rise of ISI in Iraq and Syria and the group’s June 2014 announcement of a transnational caliphate (the Islamic State) have put additional pressure on AQIM’s organizational cohesiveness. In late 2014, an AQIM faction declaring itself the “Soldiers of the Caliphate” bolted from the network and pledged allegiance to IS. This development mirrors IS inroads in eastern Libya where the group has seized control over the city of Derna, hoping to align with IS’s Egyptian affiliate Ansar Jerusalem. Derna’s Islamic Youth Shura Council has set about emulating IS’s Syrian governance model in Raqqa by imposing a harsh version of Sharia law reinforced by beheadings and morality police. IS formed three provinces in Libya in November 2014 and the organization has taken credit for a series of terrorist incidents in the country, including grisly filmed executions of dozens of Egyptian and Ethiopian Christians. IS assaults against Tripoli’s Corinthia Hotel, attacks against foreign embassies, seizure of the town of Nawfaliyah, and bombings of oil

55 Zelin, The Islamic State’s First Colony.
56 An Islamic extremist group begun in Derna (eastern Libya) in March 2014.
57 Engel, Libya as a Failed State.
refining plants represent a concerted campaign to plunge the country into chaos. In the town of Qubba, IS suicide bombers killed more than 40 people in early 2015. Aaron Zelin argues that AQIM-affiliated Ansar al-Sharia Libya (ASL) is in decline with defections to IS’s growing network. ASL, moreover, has been weakened by its street fighting with General Khalifa Haftar’s forces and the death of its historic leader Muhammad al-Zahawi. The defection of a leading ASL ideologue to IS has given impetus to speculation of its merger into IS’s ranks. Controversy, moreover, has been generated by reports that Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s group, al-Mourabitoun, has sworn fidelity to IS, a claim both supported and rejected by different factions in the organization. Already fractured into a loose confederation of competing brigades, AQIM is not prepared to confront the IS challenge and it is not unrealistic to expect further defections.

AQIM’s Malian experience is consistent with failed past Islamist revolts. Whether in Afghanistan, Egypt, or Algeria, radical Islam has floundered as a consequence of internal factionalism and counterproductive extremist violence. Similar to its GIA precursor, AQIM has fallen prey to intolerance and a rigid ideological vision that invariably invites popular revulsion and international reaction. Continued counterterror pressure against the group and efforts to strengthen security capabilities of regional governments is critical to ensure the jihadists cannot expand their terror campaign. It is especially important that international and regional counterterror operations work to facilitate divisions among Islamist groups along ideological fissures, particularly when such power struggles impede jihadist seizures of power.

French policy may play a critical role in this process. The region’s fragile security, weak states, and Mali’s inability to address Tuareg grievances have forced the French to remain in the region. While French combat forces in

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62 Recently, controversy has been generated by reports that al-Mourabitoun has sworn fidelity to IS, a claim supported and rejected by different factions within the organization.
Mali have decreased from their original 4,000 soldiers, France is expanding its military presence across the region. Announced in July 2014, France’s Operation Barkhane envisions a regional counterterror strategy supported by its military bases in Mali, Chad, Niger, and the Côte d’Ivoire. With approximately 3,000 troops in the region, the French have formed a rapid reaction force to deal with the threat of jihadist attacks and safe havens.

France’s selection of Chad for Operation Barkhane’s headquarters enhances its capacity to respond to a multiplicity of threats given that the country’s air bases allow it to attack AQIM or Boko Haram. Libya’s descent into armed chaos, AQIM’s presence, Ansar al-Sharia’s Benghazi’s Shura Council, and the Islamic State’s presence in Derna and Sirte have raised fears of a renewed jihadist offensive against Western interests. French economic interests and its sizeable expatriate community in Niger and Chad are likely to keep France engaged in the Sahel. As seen in Mali, France was able to upend AQIM’s brief terrorist safe haven, and their commitment to the region is essential to mitigate the terrorist threat. While the turmoil of the Arab Spring has contributed to AQIM’s resurgence, the organization’s many internal fractures, ideological excesses, competition with other jihadist groups and its dysfunctional use of extremist violence are likely to diminish its popular appeal and capacity to seize power.

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65 John Daly, “Counter-Terrorism or Neo-Colonialism? The French Army in Africa,” *Terrorism Monitor* 12, no. 5 (March 2014): 6-10.
Chapter Three

Small Wars: Tactical and Strategic Drivers in Northern Mali, 2013

by Henri Boré*

One of the striking points in the current conflict in northern Mali is that the lessons learned in the 1920s and the 1960s and so brilliantly captured by T. E. Lawrence in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom and David Galula in his Counterinsurgency Warfare still apply today to what Marines refer to as small wars.¹

In the context of a small war-type conflict, local, regional, and international cross-dynamics often undermine any quick resolution of the battle at least from a strategic standpoint. Indeed, the variety of players involved and the complexity of their ties and relationships often turn initial military tactical successes into profound political and economic quagmires that derail any attempt to restore local and regional stability. Many examples can be found in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries from Indochina to Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. Mali in 2013 is a case in point as illustrated below.

The current conflict in northern Mali points to three primary lessons learned from T. E. Lawrence and David Galula. First, history matters. Second, conventional forces deployed to Mali need to focus on the risk of “eating soup with a knife.”² Third, a military response cannot fix a political problem.

First Small Wars Lesson: History Matters

Understanding history is critical to successfully plan and achieve small wars. In the context of Mali, understanding the precolonial and postcolonial his-

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² T. E. Lawrence wrote that “Making war upon insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife,” so it is difficult to fully appreciate until you have done it.
The Crisis of the African State
tory of the region provides political and military leaders with strategic and tactical advantages. In that respect, local and regional history reminds us of two paramount factors.

From a long-term perspective, the conflict between northern and southern Mali is rooted in the long-standing precolonial racial and cultural divide between Saharan groups that include the Tuaregs of northern Mali and the black population in central and southern Mali, mainly the Bambara groups. Tuareg and Bambara cultures may be as foreign to each other as a Japanese citizen can be from an American. The Tuareg and Bambara groups of precolonial history often despised each other and, in 2013, they still do to some extent. Acts of hate are not uncommon on both sides.

From a mid-term perspective, the growth of an Islamic extremist ideology in northern Mali is historically rooted in the 1990s war that opposed the Algerian government to the Islamist groups across Algeria. From a shorter-term perspective, the primary cause of the proliferation of heavy weaponry in northern Mali can be found in the aftermath of the 2011 toppling of Qaddafi in Libya, when heavily armed fighters fled to neighboring countries and across the Sahel region.

The second historical factor relates to the traditional social structure in the Sahel. Local influential players across the region, from political elites to successful businessmen, have traditionally built subtle and convenient political alliances even with their worst enemies, and the influence of personal relationships between conventional dominant players is paramount. As a result, the conflict in northern Mali involves a variety of regional stakeholders, such as Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, Niger, and Chad, who share similar interests. The fact that Algeria plays a critical role in the resolution of the conflict in northern Mali, for instance, is well understood by all national and regional actors. The impact of the conflict also affects a larger circle of regional stakeholders who are facing political and security challenges, as recently seen in northern Nigeria.

Another example of the regional domino effect of the Malian conflict can be found in the intervention of Chadian forces. Chad is not a member of

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the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). History, however, reminds us that it is a matter of national security for Chadian President Idriss Déby and his Gorane ethnic-led government to prevent the heavily armed groups (katibas) of AQIM from fleeing northern Mali and moving to northern Chad. Many of these katibas are composed of Chadian warriors who fought in Libya alongside Qaddafi in 2011; many of these fighters are mostly Toubous, a dominant ethnic group of northern Chad, whose spiritual guide used to live in Tripoli and was close to Qaddafi. The Toubou and Gorane groups have been long-standing rivals with a violent history of civil wars for the control of central power. Therefore, today’s fragile Chadian political stability would be threatened if these heavily armed Toubou fighters were able to make a comeback in an attempt to regain control of the capital city of N’Djamena, as has been seen in many occasions from 1980 to 2008. The 1980 war opposed the Gorani former dictator Hissen Habré and the Toubou former president Goukouni Oueddei. In 2008, the struggle for power between Idris Déby and his nephew Timan Erdimi led to the violent battle for N’Djamena in March.

Second Small Wars Lesson: Do Not “Eat Soup with a Knife”

“War upon rebellion was messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife,” T. E. Lawrence recalled in Seven Pillars of Wisdom. Military operations in northern Mali against the AQIM katibas may well take the same turn if the sub-Saharan African forces from ECOWAS prove unable to adapt to the specific and traditional way of war in the Sahel region. This way of war has shaped all military operations for centuries at the tactical and strategic levels. The modern conventional national forces of Mauritania and Chad know it well; their doctrine, organization, and equipment were designed accordingly. The cultural reality is that most of sub-Saharan militaries from Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Togo, Benin, and Nigeria are foreign to the Sahel way of war.

With regard to the tactical level, Chadian forces understand that operational success in the Sahel stems from the constant mobility of small and lightly equipped units. Most of their soldiers are ascetic and resilient north-

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7 Author interviews with U.S and French military attachés, N’Djamena, Chad, April 2008.
ern clan warriors who are used to living and fighting in complex terrain and austere conditions. According to their northern clan cultures, they do not fear death and they follow leaders who are renowned to fight from the front. In 2008, for instance, the chief of staff of the Chadian National Army was killed in action on the front line while manning a machine gun in a Toyota pickup to stop an armed rebellion. During the same event, Chadian President Idriss Déby, also a former chief of staff of the army, flew an attack helicopter to strike rebel forces on the outskirts of N’Djamena, the capital city.8

There is a saying among these Chadian forces: “If you want to win, fight like the wind.” This adage emphasizes the critical need for mobility in the Sahel terrain. Indeed, Chadian units that engaged Libyan conventional forces in northern Chad in the 1980s were highly mobile. Always on the move, company-size columns constantly “sailed” the Sahara desert, never stayed more than a day in the same location, and struck heavily armed Libyan forces in successive deadly hit-and-run attacks.9

Finally, a history of operations in the Sahel shows that, in addition to bravery, the success of military actions depends on the existence of an armada of spies and informants. The combat effectiveness of the Chadian, Mauritanian, and Algerian military organizations rests primarily in their intelligence capacity. Chadian intelligence on Libyan forces in the 1980s was collected by a wide network of spies and informants in Libya and in Chad, all on the Chadian government’s payroll. Their intel was often preferred by army staff over that provided by Western satellite imagery.10

The core of the AQIM heavily armed katibas fled the main urban centers of northern Mali shortly after the French aerial campaign began in January 2013. It is possible that some of these katibas—especially those composed of primarily Tuaregs and Toubous—will continue fighting in the Sahel traditional guerilla-type warfare. ECOWAS intends to quickly deploy the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) as an expeditionary force. Yet, this force will have to prove that its units can meet such war-fighting standards. Many observers remain skeptical. If they “eat soup with a knife” as T. E. Lawrence recommended, these forces may not be able to secure the line of Timbuktu-Kidal-Gao.

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8 Author interviews with American and French military advisors, N’Djamena, Chad, April 2008.
9 Feedback from French military advisors who operated with the Chadian forces in Moussoro, Chad, 1984.
10 Ibid.
Many ECOWAS planners acknowledge that only the Chadian forces within the AFISMA currently have the operational culture and capacity required to find, fight, and destroy the AQIM katibas in northern Mali. As for the Malian military, expectations remain very low. After decades and millions of dollars and Euros spent, most of the foreign military training and education programs have been unable to overcome a profound national culture of corruption in Mali. With regard to leadership ethics, well-designed curricula on ethics and human rights did not meet the objective of integrating ethic codes into the rules of engagement. For example, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program taught in 2005 in Mali did not close the long-standing racial gap between northern Arab and Tuareg groups and the southern black Bambara groups as seen with the Malian 62d Motorized Infantry Regiment based in Mopti-Sévaré.11

According to the French minister of defense, almost 3,000 French troops will be on the ground to prevent any offensive from AQIM against southern Mali and the capital city of Bamako and to pave the way for the deployment of West African forces. The French military intervention is already considered a success at least in the short term. French Marines and legionnaires have specific experience in this region and were once very familiar with Sahel warfare practices, especially after decades of military operations in northern Chad, northern Mauritania, and southern Algeria between the 1930s and the 1990s.

Whether the announced turnover between French forces and AFISMA will prevent the AQIM katibas from resuming operations in northern Mali in the near future remains to be seen. The indicators for potential tactical failure of a conventional force operating in the area of operations—that is, “eating soup with a knife” in northern Mali—could include:

- Setting up large static military bases in the Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal areas;
- Focusing on force protection rather than mobility;
- Equipping ground forces with main battle tanks and heavy armored vehicles to patrol the main roads and man-fixed checkpoints;
- Focusing on short-term tactics based mainly on air power effects;
- Relying on signals intelligence (SIGINT) more than on human intelligence (HUMINT) collection in terms of intelligence activity; and

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11 Feedback from the ACOTA team leader in Mopti, Mali, 2005.
• Underestimating the ability of the AQIM katibas to conduct enduring indirect guerilla warfare in the area of operations.

With regard to the strategic level, shifting the centers of gravity and opening multiple fronts is a traditional warfighting course of action in the Sahel. It is likely that AQIM Tuareg and Algerian commanders on the ground will try to open simultaneous fronts in the theater to counter any future Malian and ECOWAS military operations with the support of Western powers. In that respect, any action led by AQIM groups in countries neighboring Mali, especially in southern Algeria and northern Niger, will simply confirm the use of a classic Sahelian strategy.

The lesson learned by T. E. Lawrence in the Negev Desert in the 1920s applies to today’s northern Mali and the Sahel area. Military operations led by conventional forces need to focus on the potential risk of “eating soup with a knife” at both tactical and strategic levels.

**Third Small Wars Lesson: Military Action Is Not the Answer**

Lessons learned by David Galula in the 1960s also apply to Mali in 2013—military operations cannot end the conflict. In that respect, understanding the powerful role of individual networks in Mali and in the region when building subtle political alliances and how these alliances are prone to overnight changes is paramount.

Unless current military operations bring about the total destruction of AQIM-armed katibas, the French and ECOWAS intervention under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations\(^\text{12}\) will most likely result in increased indirect attacks led by AQIM against various strategic targets in the Sahel and beyond in Europe and in Africa. These terrorist attacks will aim to hit within the home countries of those states that participate or support the mission against AQIM in Mali.

In that context, the use of powerful individual networks to build subtle alliances—rather than relying on the military instrument—is crucial. Just as critical is the understanding of how these alliances are prone to quick changes. A key aspect of the cross networking in the Sahel should not be

overlooked; political and business networks play a primary role in the access to and the control of power.

In Mali, for example, a fluid social and political structure exists that is based on the fundamental role of three networks: family, ethnicity, and religion. The elite members of each of these groups collaborate. The deep and mutual contempt that often divides Bambara and Tuareg communities has never prevented politicians and businessmen from building trade networks and alliances meant to benefit from active commerce along the traditional Trans-Sahel trading routes. In 1813, these alliances were based on slave trade profits. In 2013, influential Bambaras in Bamako and Tuaregs in Gao continue to collaborate on a variety of financial opportunities from Trans-Sahel trading activities ranging from legal trading business to such illicit ventures as drugs, weapons, human trafficking, and money laundering. AQIM-armed groups use routes and caches that are known even within some of the elite networks in Bamako, Niamey, and Algiers since they have been the traditional trading routes in the Sahel for centuries.

Indeed, these elite networks have the ability to control political and economic decision-making processes and to shape the societies’ social fabric via the media. Far from being designed as stovepipes, these elite establishments are structured to rely on each other to collaborate or to compete in order to capture state revenues or to secure access to and control of the central power. While these elite groups compete with each other, they often use their Bambara or Tuareg networks and grassroots base to strengthen their power. When they collaborate to capture state revenues for their own benefit, they often disconnect themselves from their base and those segments of their network.

The situation in Mali cannot be seen as a black-and-white problem. In fact, this connection between Bambara and Tuareg political and economic networks often helps close cultural and racial gaps between the north and the south, between Bamako and Gao. These alliances, however, are prone to subtle changes when financial interests and political agendas stand at cross purposes. The military junta led by General Amadou Sanogo and the elite networks support each other as long as they can work together to

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13 These elite networks or groups are often composed of government officials, private sector businessmen, charismatic figures of the civil society, and traditional and religious authorities. Their association is driven by a variety of motives ranging from personal ambition, family and clan lineage, religious ideology, and economic and political interests.
access or control political power. The powerful influence of these Tuareg and Bambara networks reaches out to other foreign elite political networks, namely in Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso, and Chad.

**Mali 2013: So What?**

From a small wars perspective, the situation in Mali as of January 2013 can be analyzed through the following lenses. Assuming that French Marines and legionnaires are not going to “eat soup with a knife,” Operation Serval will not encounter fierce resistance from the AQIM-armed katibas in northern Mali. The bulk of these groups has fled the main strategic urban centers of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal. Many will likely hide in traditional locales spread across the low rocky mountainous area between Niger and Algeria; and no AQIM Toyota pickup will enter Bamako. France has paved the way to a faster deployment of the ECOWAS force and, as such, the French military intervention will be a tactical success, at least in the short term.

The long-term security problem in northern Mali, however, is far from being resolved. French President François Hollande may well call back the bulk of the French force as soon as the AFISMA force deploys. In the view of many military experts, West African forces are not familiar with the Sahel way of war. Chadian forces, who are not members of ECOWAS, are seen as the exception. The main criticism about the AFISMA mission is that its Sub-Saharan forces are not culturally fit to face Sahelian warfare. Therefore, keeping the AQIM katibas at bay, even with a training period in Bamako, will be a challenge unless the AFISMA benefits from persistent and direct Western logistics and combat support on the ground. Therefore, whether or not the political concept of a Sub-Saharan African force is credible to restore order and stability in a Sahel cultural environment remains to be assessed.

Tactical military successes that aim to control the triangle of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal will not suffice to end the Malian political conflict. The use of local and regional political and economic networks will remain paramount to success. A formal negotiation process has already generated an intense regional mediation in Ouagadougou and Abidjan with the support of key Western powers acting under the umbrella of legitimacy provided by various UN and African Union resolutions.

Parallel to this process, significant progress must be made through the less formal, although more traditional, Sahelian individual networks from Bamako to Gao, Algiers, and Niamey. In light of the lessons learned from
T. E. Lawrence and David Galula, a midterm objective to fix the security problem in northern Mali might well depend upon the ability of the political and military leadership of Bamako to make a political deal with the main Tuareg networks that are ready to be moved away from AQIM, as some did in summer 2012. More importantly, no midterm political solution will be set in Mali without the active commitment of Algeria.
Chapter Four

From Rebels to Rulers: 
Conflict and State Consolidation 
in Comparative Perspective

by Ian S. Spears*

The outside world tends to treat developing states uniformly and not as inherently different from developed states in the West. In fact, Africa’s often extensive and diverse territories and populations present enormous challenges to political actors—recognized governments or rebel movements—seeking to consolidate power and authority. The typical response of most African regimes has been to rely on varying degrees of patronage and coercion to maintain their rule. These methods came under greater scrutiny during the early 1990s as states were compelled to respond to global pressures for reform. But political and economic liberalization did not always lead to the expected outcomes. In some cases, liberalizing reforms dramatically undermined existing patronage networks without leading to Western-style democracy and free markets. In the most unfortunate cases—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia—the results have been near or complete state failure or collapse.

In Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda, however, the current regimes have experienced relative success in consolidating their authority, and they have frequently done so with considerably less reliance on patronage or overt violence. Remarkably, in each of these cases, the regimes were former rebel movements representing minority interests in their respective states. Yet, the regimes in these countries have been in power since 1991, 1993, and 1994, respectively.

How did these rebel movements acquire power? Once they achieved pow-

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er, how have they sustained their rule for so long? How have these regimes overcome their minority status and become the dominant political force in their respective countries? At what cost has this power been achieved? And how should the international community respond to their rule?

An examination of these three countries reveals that the regimes in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Rwanda have relied on an approach to governance that evolved quite naturally from their strategies as rebels. In other words—and not surprisingly—there is an important continuity between their strategies as rebels and as rulers; practices employed by regimes are very much informed by their earlier success as rebel movements. More importantly, their success as rebels is contingent on their ability to respond to and resolve historical, ethnic, and demographic features and contradictions associated with their states.

While this claim is intuitive and perhaps even self-evident, its implications are frequently overlooked by reformers who regard intervention and democracy as the only acceptable approaches to conflict resolution and state consolidation. To be sure, democratic elections may be an important means for regimes to legitimize their rule. However, winning an election is not the same as ruling a country or projecting power across diverse territory, and recent elections in some states have done little to confer legitimacy on those purported to have won. The tendency of liberalization processes to become unstable or, in the worst cases, to break down into chaos has been evident in places such as Kenya, Congo, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.

Democratic elections and other trappings of liberal reform are commonly associated with limitations on state power. Electoral outcomes may tell us more about relative ethnic population sizes and less about a party’s ability to project power. Rebels, on the other hand, prevail in their wars only if they have learned the hard lessons of accumulating power and managing the ethnic contradictions inherent to their states. Consequently, it is successful rebel movements rather than winners of elections who can more reliably project power and create more stable Weberian states.

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3 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 7.

4 According to Max Weber, a state was a single entity capable of maintaining authority (a monopoly) over a territory by way of legitimate process. For more information, see http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Monopoly_on_the_legitimate_use_of_physical_force.htm.
It is not surprising then, that some recent evidence highlights the value of rebel victories in ending conflict and consolidating peace. If the international community is disinclined to reform state borders or to recognize alternative forms of political organization, it may have little choice but to see rebel movements rather than democratic elections as the most promising avenue for consolidating state authority in Africa. It is also unwise for the international community to unseat regimes they do not like, in Africa or elsewhere, if it means leaving behind rebels who are incapable of ruling their vast territories. After all, if a rebel movement cannot defeat an incumbent government on its own, it will not be able to rule in the aftermath of a defeat engineered by the international community.

The remainder of this chapter will examine the political evolutions of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). In the following section, rebel movements will be considered collectively in terms of their commonalities. Next, the political and social origins of the three movements will be considered briefly, which will account for the ways they overcame the specific challenges in each of their states. In the final section of this chapter, the rule of these rebel movements-turned-governments will be assessed, and conclusions will be offered on how the international community should respond to rulers in these states.

Rebels to Rulers: Commonalities

A number of commonalities can be identified across these rebel movements. The first such commonality is that, by the time each had acquired power in their capital, the TPLF, the EPLF, and the RPF had become disciplined and battle-hardened survivors of African wars. In both Ethiopia and Eritrea, for example, the rebels endured and prevailed in fratricidal struggles against other local and like-minded liberation movements before defeating the incumbent regime in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. In Rwanda, many of the cadres that accounted for the core of the RPF had previously fought and trained with the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in neighboring Uganda. Collectively, not only did these movements follow a particular strategy vis-à-vis their adversaries during their liberation struggles, but the

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very process of surviving in this kind of unforgiving environment meant that they have since been much more likely to set demanding terms for inclusion in any subsequent government. In all cases, they have been intolerant of the efforts of others to share or acquire power; none of the movements have demonstrated a willingness to hand over power to organizations that had not participated in the struggle to liberate their respective countries. Their ruthless Darwinian births transformed these rebel movements into strong and deeply structured rulers.

Indeed, the second commonality concerns each movement’s instrumental use of democratic rhetoric. When out of power, all three movements justified their actions against incumbent governments in terms of their legitimate desire for rule of law, political pluralism, and respect for human rights. Their approach to democratic rule, however, now appears to have been calculated to secure sympathy or favoritism from abroad and open up their political system so that they could gain power for themselves. In the post-victory era, none of them have made good on their pledge to establish genuinely democratic rule, even if they have held some form of electoral process. In Eritrea, the government of Isaias Afwerki no longer pretends that democratic elections are imminent. In Ethiopia and Rwanda, elections have taken place but opposition parties have either been banned outright or had their activities severely constrained. Failure to achieve democratic objectives pledged during their respective liberation struggles has led to defections by disillusioned dissidents. The regimes, however, have remained intact.

Third, all three movements were the principal sources or initiators of violent conflict insofar as they rebelled violently against the incumbent governments. Yet, in all three cases, these movements succeeded in portraying their adversaries as brutal or genocidal regimes and themselves as disciplined and responsible saviors. In the case of Ethiopia, the TPLF challenged the hard-line Marxist regime known as the Dergue. Once in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, they delivered a welcomed political order that contrasted sharply with the chaos that ensued following Mohamed Siad Barre’s overthrow in January 1991 in neighboring Somalia. In Rwanda, in the face of the international community’s apparent dithering response to the 1994 genocide against their Tutsi brethren, the RPF took the capital city Kigali. And in Eritrea, the EPLF played to the international community’s apparent

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7 Dergue (short for Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army) ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987.
willingness to subject Eritreans to three decades of hardship at the hands of the Ethiopian government. In sum, since the rebels in all three cases were regarded by the international community as ending or preventing intolerable situations or as enduring unnecessarily unjust circumstances imposed by their incumbent governments, they were the beneficiaries of international sympathy. As governments, this has translated into an international willingness to overlook their failure to live up to democratic pledges.

Finally, all three movements based their strategies for post-victory governance on the particularities of their ethnic and regional demographics. It is here that differences between the respective movements become most apparent. Rebels who succeed in taking power and providing sustainable government are those who confront and overcome barriers presented by their ethnic structure—most notably their minority status—and incorporate this into their strategies. The remainder of the chapter will focus on elaborating these differences.

**Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)**

The origins of the RPF come from outside of Rwanda. During the European colonization of Africa, the Belgians relied on the minority Tutsi to facilitate their rule. In the last years before Rwanda’s independence in 1962, however, Belgian authorities shifted their allegiance to the majority Hutu. The transfer of power and subsequent decolonization precipitated violence that left thousands of Tutsi dead and sent many more into exile. These “59ers”—so called for the year many of them departed—consisted of Tutsi who left Rwanda for the neighboring countries of Uganda, Zaire, Burundi, and Tanzania. In Rwanda, the Hutu elite assumed power and declared the newly independent country a democracy on the basis that, since the regime was Hutu, they represented the majority of the population. Those Tutsi who remained in Rwanda after independence were increasingly disenfranchised and marginalized. A military coup installed Juvénal Habyarimana in power in 1973, and the regime itself remained in the hands of the Hutu.

The RPF was established in 1987 from the previous Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU). The rebels came from the descendants of those who had left Rwanda in 1959. Many of them had joined the National Resistance

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8 In Rwanda, Tutsi make up approximately 10–15 percent of the population; Hutu account for 85–90 percent of the population; and Twa make up approximately 1 percent.

Movement (NRM) of Yoweri Museveni to escape persecution in Uganda under the previous Apolo Milton Obote and Idi Amin regimes. Once the NRM achieved power in Kampala in 1986, many Tutsi rose to become senior members of Uganda’s political elite. But the Tutsi presence also generated tension among Ugandans and NRM fighters. President Museveni was regarded by many of his countrymen as too accommodating of Tutsis who were increasingly claiming Uganda as their own.\(^{10}\) Despite their ability to achieve positions of status in Uganda and other exile countries, the Tutsi saw themselves effectively as stateless people in search of a homeland.

The RPF’s invasion of Rwanda from Uganda in October 1990 helped relieve the tension directed toward the Tutsi population. It came at a time when the Rwandan regime was under increasing pressure to democratize and to get a bleak economic situation under control. Despite their confidence that they could replicate the NRM’s military success in Uganda, the RPF’s initial invasion of Rwanda did not go as planned. Their leader, Major General Fred Rwigyema, was killed on the second day of the invasion. Rwanda’s population—including many Tutsi—was more wary than sympathetic to their supposed liberators, who had been portrayed by the Habyarimana government as “foreigners.” When the RPF resumed its offensive, the approach was to bide its time and avoid direct engagement with government forces. As a consequence of government fearmongering, much of the population, including the Tutsi, vacated land before the advancing rebels.\(^{11}\)

There was, of course, some basis to the claim that the RPF were outsiders and invaders. Based on the fact that its combatants were mere *descendants* of refugees who had left the country 30 years earlier, most of those participating in the 1990 offensive had never previously been to Rwanda.\(^{12}\) Government propaganda demonizing the RPF meant the rebels would need to win the war without support from the local Tutsi population in whose name they claimed to be fighting. In fact, the RPF had little contact with the Rwandan civilian population. The government nonetheless saw the Tutsi population within Rwanda as potential fifth columnists in league with the RPF. Immediately after the 1990 invasion, the government began rounding up civilians it considered a threat to Hutu rule. “It was from that time on,” writes Gérard Prunier, “that the idea of the genocide (‘in the air’

\(^{10}\) Ibid., 126.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., 131.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 119.
ever since the 1959 killings), progressively began to be considered as a ‘rational’ political project.”

In this context, it seemed logical for the RPF to portray itself as having common cause with the Tutsi in Rwanda. While the international community had been active in managing the peace process between the 1990 RPF invasion and the April 1994 commencement of the genocide, it was apparent that neither the UN nor any other substantial international force would intervene to stop the killing. “All those claiming to be civilized had turned their backs” on Rwanda, observed Paul Kagame, the leader of RPF forces. “I knew that we were alone. We would have to sort out the problem.”

The key for the RPF was to reposition itself not as the invaders who had precipitated the war and subsequent genocide but as saviors—the only ones capable of bringing the genocide to an end. Kagame has not since missed an opportunity to claim “victim status” or that his movement’s mission was to end the killing of his people. But evidence suggests that the violence was perpetuated by the RPF to serve its own interests. Ironically, and much to the frustration of the UN Force Commander Roméo Dallaire, stopping the killing took longer than expected. Worse, the delay appeared calculated to strengthen the RPF position at the expense of civilian lives. Dallaire wondered why, for example, the RPF at one time appeared capable of taking Kigali within days, but was subsequently unwilling to advance on the capital. According to Dallaire, Kagame “did not speed up his campaign when the scale of the genocide became clear and even talked candidly with me at several points about the price his fellow Tutsis might have to pay for the cause.”

Nor, despite their public rhetoric since the genocide, was it evident that the RPF wanted international forces to put a stop to the killing, because international intervention or a cease-fire would have prevented the RPF from consolidating power in the capital. A power-sharing government or any other arrangement that kept the incumbent regime in place also was not desirable. The RPF saw a potential UN or French intervention or the

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13 Ibid., 132.
15 Dallaire took command of UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1993.
17 Ibid., 515.
fulfillment of the terms of the Arusha Accords\textsuperscript{18} as propping up the Hutu regime or preventing the RPF from taking the whole country.\textsuperscript{19} According to Dallaire, “Kagame wanted all of the country, not parts of it. I came to believe he didn’t want the situation to stabilize until he had won.”\textsuperscript{20} Because it was in position to win the war outright, the RPF wanted neither compromise nor intervention but victory. The RPF victory did, in fact, come in July 1994, when the rebels took Rwanda’s capital, Kigali.

The RPF has continued to consolidate its power since 1994. As the government of Rwanda, the front has been careful to manage the narrative of who the Tutsi are and what their relations are with other groups. Ethnicity and genocide, for example, are regarded as direct legacies of colonial rule that reinforced “racial” theories common to nineteenth-century Europe. Alternatively, the Tutsis’ role as agents of colonial power is downplayed as are social inequities that preceded colonial rule. The regime portrays precolonial Rwanda as integrated, harmonious, and peaceful.\textsuperscript{21} From 1962 to 1994, Rwandan governments are said to have “destroyed the identity and unity on which the Rwandan nation had been founded and exclusion became institutionalised.”\textsuperscript{22} Consequently, a new policy that focused on Rwandan unity was essential.

The historical narrative of 1994 has also been revised to serve the RPF’s benefit. The international community is now said to have let Rwandans down by not intervening. France is portrayed as having conspired with the genocidaires by arming the Habyarimana regime in the years prior to 1994. Consequently, the RPF believes it can credibly claim that it has little to learn from the international community and does not need to be scolded for its failure to live up to Western standards of democracy and human rights.

\textsuperscript{18} For more information, see http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB469/.
\textsuperscript{19} Melvern, \textit{A People Betrayed}, 189, 211.
\textsuperscript{20} Dallaire, \textit{Shake Hands with the Devil}, 438.
\textsuperscript{21} According to the “Brief History” of Rwanda provided by the Rwandan embassy in Washington, DC, “While the relationship between the [Tutsi] king and the rest of the population was unequal and parasitic, the relationship between the ordinary Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa was one of mutual benefit mainly through the exchanges of their labour. The relationship between the ordinary people was symbiotic.” From this perspective, the tensions between Hutu and Tutsi began after independence when President Grégoire Kayibanda “institutionalised discrimination against Tutsi and periodically used massacres against this targeted population as a means of maintaining the status quo.” See the Rwandan embassy Web site at http://rwandaembassy.org/Home/index.php/about-rwanda/brief-history.
The RPF’s position in Rwanda has been strengthened by its domestic and foreign policy. The RPF sought to demonstrate its national, as opposed to ethnic, orientation by naming a Hutu as president immediately after it assumed power. While current President Paul Kagame is a Tutsi, the regime has been inclusive of a significant number of women, and it has engaged in responsible technocratic government. As a result of its pragmatic approach to development, Rwanda has also been lauded as a “donor darling” that has secured the admiration of the aid community. On the other hand, critics accuse the government of exploiting a “genocide credit” by manipulating the international community’s sense of guilt over the genocide and ignoring human rights transgressions.

Critics also point to disillusionment among RPF cadres and nonpolitical Hutu. War crimes committed by RPF soldiers who pursued former genocidaires into the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo have not been adequately (or at least publicly) investigated. And there is decreasing confidence, even among Tutsi (let alone Hutu) in Rwanda, that the RPF has had their safety and security at heart. According to Filip Reyntjens, in the 10 years following the genocide, there were ongoing tensions between Tutsi returning from exile and genocide survivors. The latter, Reyntjens argues, “felt . . . that they were becoming second-rate citizens who had been sacrificed by the RPF, which was suspected of having been interested in military victory rather than in saving them.”

Another controversial RPF policy initiative, however, has been the regime’s commitment to ending “divisionism” and “fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations.” Rwandan laws against “divisionism” sanction such acts as “propounding wickedness,” “marginalizing,” “laughing at one’s misfortune,” “mocking,” “boasting,” “despising,” and “stirring up ill feelings.” The policy on sectarianism is defensible insofar as it ef-

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23 After entering Rwanda’s capital, the RPF claimed it would abide by the terms of the 1993 Arusha Accords, excluding members of the former regime. For a historic definition of “technocratic” government, see http://www.economist.com/node/21538698.

24 A 600-page investigation into possible Rwandan war crimes in the Congo was written by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and leaked to the public in 2010. The Rwandan government denounced the report as “amateurish” and “outrageous,” and pressed the UN not to publish the document.


fectively bans any resort to mobilizing ethnic identity to achieve political objectives. The government has claimed that, because ethnicity is a constructed and learned phenomenon, it can also be done away with and forgotten. Critics maintain, however, that it is a cynical effort to obscure the fact that the minority Tutsi remain in power. Ethnicity may be effectively banned, but Rwandans are well aware that the current leadership is predominantly Tutsi.

The larger consequence of the legislation on divisionism is that it has been used to silence its critics and emasculate or eliminate opposition parties. As one Rwandan human rights advocate explains, “Genocide ideology is a form of intimidation. If you dare to criticize what is not going well, it’s genocide ideology. Civil society and the population prefer to shut up.” Politically, the effect of the policy has been to dramatically reduce the field of opposition parties challenging RPF rule. For party leaders to acknowledge their oppositional role is to risk government accusations that the intention is to destroy Rwandan unity and divide the nation again. In the lead-up to Rwanda’s 2010 elections, the government arrested several opposition party leaders and accused them of sectarianism. As Amnesty International reported,

The timing of these accusations . . . and the manner in which they were brought strongly suggests a political motivation. The broad nature of “genocide ideology” and “divisionism” laws facilitate this by allowing prosecutions that focus on perceptions of a speaker’s alleged underlying philosophy, rather than an analysis of whether speech constitutes advocacy of hatred that amounts to violence, discrimination, or hostility.

In sum, while the RPF has brought peace and stability to Rwanda since 1994, it has done so at a high cost in terms of human rights and democracy.

Eritrea and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)

Despite the fact that Ethiopia was never colonized by European powers, its northern-most region of Eritrea was a colonial creation. Until 1993, Eritrea had no separate existence apart from its status as a territory ruled by Italy from 1896 to 1941. Following the Ethiopian victory at Adwa in 1896, Italian forces retreated north to Eritrea’s present borders where they established

28 Ibid., 22.
29 Ibid.
a colony. In 1948, the UN attempted to resolve Eritrea’s status by way of a consultative international commission.

As short and limited as it was, the legacy of Italian rule in the region was profound. Italian colonization brought together nine ethnic groups—Afar, Tigrinya, Kunama, Tigre, Saho, Bilen, Nara, Beja, and Rashaida—and integrated Christians from the Eritrean highlands with Muslims from its lowlands. The colony’s southern border also divided the region’s Tigrinya-speaking people. Unlike other regions in Africa, colonial rule is nonetheless regarded in positive terms by Eritreans because it set the region on a more advanced development trajectory than the rest of Ethiopia. “We look at colonialism more favorably than other peoples in Africa and Asia,” observed Yemane Ghebreab, the political affairs officer for Eritrea’s ruling party. While people in other African countries regard colonialism as the source of its developmental troubles, for Eritreans, it is their country’s raison d’être.

Because colonial Eritrea served as a staging point for another Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, Ethiopia’s emperor, Haile Selassie I, regarded the territory as a potential security risk. And indeed, there was a significant Eritrean constituency in favor of union with Ethiopia when the UN took up the issue of the colony’s status in 1949. In the end, the UN joined Ethiopia and Eritrea in a federal arrangement in 1952. Ten years later, and much to the chagrin of an emerging core of Eritrean nationalists, the emperor dissolved the agreement and reduced the territory to one of Ethiopia’s 14 provinces. Protests from Eritrean nationalists went unheeded, in large part, because of the emperor’s lobbying of the international community. Technically, the abrogation of the federal arrangement was a violation of the UN resolution that had created the federation. But once the UN had divested itself of responsibility for the protection of Eritrean autonomy, the issue became an internal matter, at least in the eyes of the Ethiopian regime. The failure of the federation agreement to protect Eritrean interests—and of the international community to ensure the federation was sustained—would serve as the basis for Eritrean skepticism about future arrangements short of independence.

The Eritrean struggle for independence was led initially by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was formed in 1962. At this time, there were

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31 For more on these events and the UN’s involvement in Eritrean autonomy, see http://www.shabait.com/about-eritrea/history-a-culture/1300-the-390-resolution-of-the-united-nations-assembly.
few indications that the rebels could prevail against well-armed government forces. In the 1960s and 1970s, the ELF was undermined by internal disputes, insufficient resources, and suspicions that the movement spoke only for Eritrea’s Muslim population. A secessionist strategy was also difficult to sell to an international community that preferred to maintain the status quo on the issue of African borders. In the 1970s, even socialist countries sympathetic to Eritreans as an “oppressed nation” were reluctant to support a movement fighting against the Marxist government in place in Addis Ababa since 1974.

In theory, the practical problem of extending state authority was less onerous in a smaller secessionist state. As it was, the Eritrean rebels had enough trouble forcing a common front across its own ethnically and religiously diverse landscape. The tendency of the various liberation fronts and internal factions to fight each other undoubtedly served the interests of the central government in Addis Ababa. Overcoming Eritrea’s ethnic and religious diversity required forging a common consensus by way of a renewed emphasis on the Eritrean identity and the anticolonial nature of the struggle. For the EPLF, the movement that eventually led Eritrea to independence and that has since been its sole governing party, the project required maintaining strict discipline and intolerance of political dissent, rewriting the national narrative, and exploiting the collective identity created by central government oppression. On its own, achieving this consensus was not enough to bring about Eritrea’s independence, which came about following the collapse of the Dergue. It is likely, however, that Eritrea’s era of independence would have been far more chaotic had this consensus not been achieved.

To improve the chances that a future declaration of independence would be recognized, the language of anticolonialism was embraced over that of secessionism or separatism. As the Eritrean liberation movement advanced on the battlefield, it sought to establish certain facts on the ground. According to Osman Saleh Sabbe, the leader of one of the Eritrean factions, “If we were to achieve independence by force, the United Nations would accept a fait accompli. . . . Only military victory could induce both [the UN] and the OAU [Organization of African Unity] to recognize our existence.”

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EPLF, thus, criticized its rivals for the “ridiculous belief” that, without concrete development or credible plans, “the shooting of a few rounds of ammunition would draw the attention of the UN which would then ‘grant’ Eritrea its independence.” The EPLF created structures and institutions that made Eritrea a virtual state within a state. This meant taking over foreign-owned plantations and operating them as state farms. Under the slogan “Destroy the enemy with his own guns and bullets,” the EPLF captured virtually all of its military equipment from government troops and serviced them in its own underground workshops. Finally, it developed its own cadre of physicians and paramedics, operated its own hospitals in the field, and supplied its own pharmaceuticals to treat its wounded. Self-reliance and self-discipline were the watchwords of the struggle.

Finding unity among Eritrea’s diverse people, however, was Eritrea’s greatest challenge. If Eritrea was to gain its independence from Ethiopia, it needed to do so not on the basis of one of nine ethnic groups but under a single coherent identity. During the 1970s, tensions between ethnic and religious factions accounted for two civil wars between the EPLF and the ELF. The EPLF did not deny Eritrea’s ethnic and religious diversity but instead paid it respect through an intensive education process that sought to emphasize diversity and unity. As David Pool writes, “The EPLF leadership deliberately shaped the Front on the basis of their conception of the causes of past nationalist failures. Central to this approach was the program of political education which all Front members underwent during their compulsory six-month training period.”

To divert attention from the predominantly Christian nature of the leadership, the EPLF focused on the secular and nationwide character of its struggle. It followed a Marxist approach to a liberation war that transcended the ethnic and religious cleavages. And it revised the Eritrean historical narrative to keep the attention on national unity.

Some of this work on the national unity front was done for them by the crude brutality of the central government in Addis Ababa. By the end of

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35 Ibid., 110.
the 1980s, Eritreans had endured nearly 30 years of aerial bombardment by government forces. Eritreans were determined that their future could no longer be in a united Ethiopia. The indiscriminate manner in which the war was being fought by the Dergue meant that few Eritreans were not uprooted, wounded, or affected in some way. Out of a population of approximately 2.3 million, an estimated 200,000 were killed and 70,000 were injured or suffered permanent disability. That this national tragedy, in combination with political education, also served the interests of national identity formation cannot be doubted.38

Not surprisingly, when the war with Ethiopia ended, the EPLF showed no interest in supplanting the regime that it had just helped defeat at such great cost. In the referendum that formally confirmed Eritrea’s intention to secede from Ethiopia, the option in favor of political independence was supported by 99.8 percent of the population. The EPLF’s political education translated into an uncommonly strong sense of national identity. According to a study of attitudes toward national and ethnic identity, virtually 100 percent of the Eritrean population indicated that they were proud of being Eritrean. Eritrea remains an African country where a broader Eritrean pride supersedes ethnic pride. When asked to describe themselves on a spectrum of national and ethnic identity, most Eritreans (69.5 percent) defined themselves more by their national identity (“Eritrean” or “more Eritrean”) than by their ethnic affiliation (7.1 percent).39

Ethiopia and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)

Ethiopia’s northern Tigrayan population had, along with the Amhara,40 served among Ethiopia’s ruling class. Its last Tigrayan emperor, Yohannes IV, ruled Ethiopia from 1872 to 1889. Since then, Tigrayans regarded their own province as unjustly impoverished but prided themselves as having a history of rebellion. The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 had promised to bring economic and social justice to Ethiopia’s beleaguered peoples, but the new regime instead distinguished itself with brutality that surpassed its predecessor. To remedy their dire circumstances, Tigrayan nationalists

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39 Ibid., 224.
40 From the Ethiopian central highlands, the Amhara are one of the two largest ethnolinguistic groups and account for one-third of the population.
initially, like the Eritrean liberation movements, pursued a secessionist agenda. The manifesto of the TPLF declared that its first task would be “the establishment of an independent republic of Tigray.”\(^{41}\) Thereafter, however, TPLF statements made secession conditional on the nature of the regime in Addis Ababa. An “independent and democratic state of Tigray” was the only acceptable outcome according to Ghidey Zeratsion, a TPLF official speaking in 1981, “if the existing oppressive conditions” in Ethiopia continued or were made worse. On the other hand, if a “democratic political atmosphere” was established in Ethiopia, Tigray could become a “voluntarily integrated nation with relations based on equality, democracy, and mutual advantage.”\(^{42}\) The decision was said to belong to the Tigrayan people.

In the earliest days of its struggle, Tigrayans suffered from a lack of resources and from interfactional conflict. Its membership included primarily urban students who were unfamiliar with the logistical demands of insurgency. Like the EPLF, however, it accumulated power as it defeated rival liberation fronts. Before it could challenge the Dergue, the TPLF made itself the dominant and exclusive liberation front in the province. For most of the late 1970s and early 1980s, that task required violently eliminating a number of other Tigrayan-based, or Marxist, movements. In what proved to be a perilous birthing, the TPLF became the region’s most powerful liberation front after the EPLF.\(^{43}\)

Once it had removed government forces from the northern province, it faced new challenges. The problem was not rooted in its military strength but in its minority status and geographic isolation within Ethiopia. The TPLF leadership did not believe that its security was assured as long as the Dergue remained in place. But as a minority population in an isolated province, venturing outside of Tigray presented its own difficulties. The challenge, then, was to find a way for a minority group to secure power outside its province. Since the TPLF had determined that Tigray’s economic plight was linked to domination by their ethnic rivals, overthrowing the existing gov-


ernment and installing yet another non-Tigrayan regime was unacceptable. The only way for Tigrayan objectives to be achieved was to encourage a broader mobilization on the basis of nationally based movements.

The solution was to diversify their membership by forging alliances with like-minded representatives from Ethiopia’s other ethnic groups and to include them in a new Tigrayan-led umbrella movement. The TPLF insisted that it be regarded as the sole representative of the Tigrayan people, but encouraged the formation of other liberation movements to represent Ethiopia’s other nationalities. The offer was appealing because political independence was already an explicit element of the rhetoric of incipient liberation movements in other provinces. The TPLF drew upon the same logic that it applied to itself: all of Ethiopia’s national groups had the right to self-determination. If the nature of the political center could be changed and previously marginalized national groups could be granted cultural freedom and autonomy, a unified Ethiopia was still possible. If the autonomy of national groups could not be respected, they would be free to leave.

In theory, the end result would not be a Tigrayan-dominated state but a democratic one, where power would be shared and national groups could determine their destiny. A constitutional right to self-determination not only attracted other disaffected groups to the TPLF cause but it also provided an “escape hatch” in the event that the future Ethiopian state did not live up to the promise. For the TPLF, the program provided a means to break out of its province and challenge the Dergue, the principal threat to Tigrayan autonomy.

The creation of nationally based groups, which then allied themselves with the TPLF, was a way to overcome one of the principal problems identified by conflict resolution specialists—that the strength and breadth of an insurgent movement in a divided state is restricted by their inability to extend their cause beyond their own national group. Following its third congress in March 1989, the TPLF announced the creation of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), an organization that the TPLF would lead but it included other nationally based People’s Democratic Organizations (PDOs). These PDOs were initially organized by the TPLF and led by captured army officers and soldiers who represented those groups. The TPLF pledged to share power because, as stated in one EPRDF statement, “it would have been ridiculous for one organization, operating in
only one part of the country, to have formed a government.”44 While not yet in power in Addis Ababa, the TPLF had found a way to extend its authority beyond its provincial borders.

The Marxist government of Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown by EPRDF forces in May 1991. Soon after, the EPLF declared independence for Eritrea, and the EPRDF, led by its chairman Meles Zenawi, began its reform of Ethiopia’s political system. A new constitution, ratified in 1994, established Ethiopia as a federal system of nine ethnically based states and two federally administered city-states.45 In this way, the EPRDF hoped to deflect disaffection with the central government and to direct political competition toward Ethiopia’s national homelands.

The EPRDF movement was welcomed by those who believed that democracy had finally arrived in Ethiopia and that a multicultural federation based on ethno-national representation was the only way forward for one of Africa’s oldest and most important countries. But what the regime claimed to be recognition of peoples’ right to self-determination was, for critics, a Trojan horse that advanced TPLF domination. From this perspective, Ethiopia’s ethnic enclaves merely divided potential opposition and left the political center exclusively for the TPLF who continued to form the leadership of the state.46 While the constitution established that all powers not attributed to the federal government were to be left to the regional states, the latter remained relatively weak. Much to the frustration of the EPRDF’s critics, Ethiopian opposition groups remained profoundly disorganized and divided throughout the 1990s. The imbalance between the EPRDF and the opposition, wrote Terrence Lyons, “encouraged many parties—particularly those unprepared or ambivalent about participation—to seek to discredit rather than strengthen the electoral process.”47 Lyons concluded, “By remaining out of the elections . . . the leaders of the opposition played a central part in the consolidation of the EPRDF’s control . . . ”48 Indeed, the first major electoral threat to the EPRDF did not come until 2005 when opposition par-

45 These include: Afar; Amhara; Benishangul-Gumuz; Gambela; Oromiya; Somali; Southern Nations, Nationalities and People’s State; Tigray; the Addis Ababa federal capital district; and Harar.
46 See, for example, Makau Mutua, “The Regionalization Controversy,” Africa Report 38, no. 5 (September–October 1993), 31.
48 Ibid., 139.
ties threatened to win Addis Ababa’s city council—only for the opposition to withdraw in protest of alleged election irregularities.

Even the departure of Eritrea was regarded by some commentators as part of the TPLF strategy to consolidate its power.\(^49\) While EPRDF leaders claimed that it was merely honoring a pledge to respect the outcome of a referendum on independence, the “loss” of Eritrea relieved Ethiopia of what was undoubtedly its most debilitating burden. Referring to the EPLF’s formidable military strength, Prime Minister Meles defended the decision to allow secession on the basis that even the well-equipped Dergue had failed to defeat the Eritreans. He cautioned that Ethiopia could no longer afford such “needless fighting.”\(^50\) Moreover, given the damage that Eritrea endured during its 30-year struggle, an independent Eritrea allowed a still-fragile Ethiopia to avoid costly reparations while the EPRDF consolidated its rule.

Critics claim further that the country’s ethnic federalism has failed to prevent ethnic or national conflicts within its regional states; it has, however, mitigated challenges to EPRDF and, more specifically, TPLF rule.\(^51\) Questions of whether this is good for the country as a whole or whether there were realistic alternatives to ethnic federalism are matters of perspective. For those who looked to political accommodations short of state break-up, “a commitment to national self-determination and the establishment of regional governments based on nationality . . . ensured the survival of the Ethiopian state.”\(^52\) Indeed, resorting to an arrangement that formally recognized Ethiopia’s ethnic composition was, for some, inevitable. While multiethnic parties have been influential in Ethiopian politics, they have also repeatedly broken down under the strain of political uncertainty, and their defectors have frequently denounced their existence in favor of ethnically based organizations. For the foreseeable future, ethnically based parties—and ethnically autonomous states—are likely to dominate Ethiopia’s political landscape.\(^53\)

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Assessing the Rule of Rebel Movements-Turned-Governments

It is important to note that none of the movements under consideration here was “born strong.” On the contrary, they all emerged under difficult circumstances and, incrementally and against all odds, accumulated power sufficient to challenge and defeat rival liberation movements or the state itself. While the RPF cadres were beneficiaries of arms and training from Uganda, the movement’s first venture into Rwanda was a military disaster resulting in the death of key personnel. The end result was a new leadership and a reconsideration of military tactics. In the case of Eritrea, the EPLF emerged only after prevailing in a protracted and extraordinarily violent civil war against other Eritrean-based movements. In Tigray, the TPLF emerged only after having defeated three rival Tigrayan-based movements and then devised a program and means to join forces with other like-minded nationalist movements outside of their province. In the last two cases, the accumulation of power meant defeating rivals who threatened their domination.

Adherence to the strictest discipline was a noted characteristic for each of the three movements. In the Darwinesque landscape of Africa’s civil wars, a lack of discipline was punishable by elimination. As rulers, their success was contingent on the projection of this internal discipline and organization outward onto society so that the problem of social fragmentation was managed or, preferably, not reproduced in destructive ways. Not surprisingly, the need to maintain such rigid internal coherence has provoked dissenion among those, including its own members and foreign advocates, who had hoped that winning the war would lead to greater freedoms and democracy. International organizations also have highlighted questionable human rights practices and concerns for the well-being of those who have fallen out with these regimes. For the time being, however, these rebels-cum-rulers have also produced sustained, and sometimes decent, technocratic governance and internal order that other postconflict zones in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have lacked.

But success was not merely contingent on each movement accumulating power, maintaining discipline, or providing technocratic governance. It was also essential that each movement resolve the contradictions of their existence and develop a program that could sustain their position as rulers. Each of the three movements discussed here had purposeful agendas be-
yond the accumulation of personal wealth or resources. These movements thrived on order over disorder and their political agendas, accordingly, focused on state consolidation. For the RPF, who came from outside of Rwanda, success was contingent on addressing their status as a foreign-based minority. Their solution was to put out a fire they had ignited by way of their own invasion. The RPF then devised a program that obscured both their foreign origins and their minority status, and focused instead on the idea of a common Rwandan identity. For the EPLF, their secessionist strategy meant that they had to build a common and inclusive identity within a multiethnic Eritrea that it could lead out of the Ethiopian state. For the Tigrayans, who already formed a majority within their province, their strategy was the opposite: defeating the Dergue required them to recognize and join forces with other nationalities and then assure them that their interests would be safeguarded in a liberated and explicitly multinational Ethiopia.

It is also notable, however, that there was a subtle distinction between the agendas of the respective parties and those in whose name the movements claimed to be fighting. Despite the benevolent tone struck in their public statements, each of these movements were singularly and profoundly self-interested. As Filip Reyntjens has argued regarding Rwanda, while the RPF seeks to perpetuate the perception that it was, like all Tutsi, a victim of the genocide, the regime has in fact been concerned with its own narrower interests of consolidating power in Kigali. Yet, it has not hesitated to appropriate the victimhood experienced by Rwandan Tutsis and extend it to itself.\(^\text{54}\)

Similarly, in Ethiopia, the TPLF proved to be accommodating of those nationalities willing to accept the strict terms of EPRDF rule. It has, however, been less accommodating of opposition parties who have maintained their independence.\(^\text{55}\) Finally, in Eritrea, the government made early assertions that its rule would be democratic, but has since banned opposition parties and criticism of the regime and paid little heed to rights that were ostensibly protected by its 1997 constitution. According to Amnesty International, thousands of political prisoners remain in detention.\(^\text{56}\)

\(^{54}\) Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On,” fn77.


The rebel movements in Rwanda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia have survived by appropriating and resolving their country’s most immediate security problems. But in solving these problems, these movements invariably privileged their own interests above all others. In each case, the interests of the rebel movement were aligned and conflated with the interests of the larger state. More importantly, each movement, as the author of its program, regarded itself as indispensable to its fulfillment and the guardian of its legacy. Consequently, not only have the RPF, the TPLF/EPRDF, and the EPLF regarded subsequent challengers to their rule as unworthy, but these issues are said to undermine the goals that citizens of their state were alleged to have prioritized. In short, an attack on the movement or the program became an attack on the state itself. This has become a powerful self-justification for each movement to reproduce itself by continuing its rule and further consolidating its power.

This approach to politics presents problems for the future. The collapse of any of these parties or movements would likely have serious repercussions in terms of internal stability. Alternatively, given the way in which these movements have become so deeply ensconced and their interests so intertwined with the state, their removal would likely involve an equally formidable rebel movement.

In this respect, the ways and practices of these regimes are indeed lamentable, and international pressure should continue to be applied to encourage these states to respect conventions on human rights and freedom of expression. But it would be a mistake to assume that, because they fall short of Western-style democratic rule, they are uniformly unpopular. These regimes have sustained themselves and their states—and avoided the chaos of other conflict environments—because the systems they have created serve their own interests. They have taken ownership of a political system in a manner that cannot happen in otherwise weakly institutionalized states or in countries in which belligerents and other societal actors are required to share power. Indeed, the international community should also recognize that its own approach to conflict resolution and state building has often been wanting. Important trade-offs may need to be considered between order and democratic rule. The imposition of a relatively uniform formula of elections and constitutional restraints is of questionable value in

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57 This assessment is made on the basis of formal and informal discussions with citizens in each of these countries, beginning in 1996.
the absence of some other strong organizational or institutional structures that these fronts have provided.

Finally, there is also value in the concept of “autonomous recovery,” whereby local players are left to solve their own problems—sometimes with impressive success. Implicit in this concept is a criticism of the view that only Westerners can solve developing world problems or that only outsiders can rebuild viable states. Successful rebel movements may dominate the postconflict environment, but the shrewdest political leadership surely recognizes that, at some point, their survival depends on negotiating new and more inclusive political arrangements. Those arrangements may offer the best hope for the creation of viable states in the future.

Chapter Five

After the Genocide

by Robert E. Gribbin*

This chapter focuses on Rwanda in the five years after the genocide. During that time, the new government concentrated on internal security, the resumption of government activities, the return and reintegration of refugees, domestic politics, and the delivery of justice. Rwanda was also involved in conflict in neighboring Congo. Although mention will be made of developments that have occurred since 2000, the thrust of the discussion here is to elucidate on the immediate postconflict era.

Rwanda’s genocide had run its course by July 1994. On 4 July, the largely Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) coming from the east and south took control of the capital of Kigali. By 17 July, RPA troops had pushed westward to Lake Kivu and north to the Zairian (now Congo) border, effectively emptying those areas of ex-FAR/Interahamwe (“those who stand together,” the former Armed Forces of Rwanda) genocidaire forces.¹ To the southwest of Kigali between Butare and Cyangugu, RPA forces came face-to-face with French peacekeepers from Operation Turquoise.² Leaders on both sides quickly negotiated a separation of forces agreement.³ Meanwhile the last remnants of the genocidaire power structure evacuated from the southwest across to Zaire.

By late July, the violence had largely ended. About a million people—mostly Tutsi—were dead, victims of the genocide.⁴ A half million or so displaced persons—mostly Hutu—had congregated into camps, primarily in the south-

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¹ Militia groups created to conduct the genocide.
² Operation Turquoise was the UN-backed mission to insert neutral French-led forces into Rwanda to establish a safe zone and protect the population regardless of ethnicity, religion, or background.

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west. Another two to three million Hutu had fled Rwanda to refugee camps in Tanzania, Burundi, and Zaire. In short, the nation was stunned, the government ceased to function, the economy stalled, crops grew untended in the fields and, in some places, the countryside was completely empty as were many of the towns. Moldering corpses of the dead lay piled in and around churches, in stadiums, and by the roadside. The remaining population was either the very old or very young, who wandered in disbelief.

The challenge of the new authorities was to maintain order and begin the process of rebuilding a nation with all of its complexities. In this beginning, the only instrument available for that purpose was the victorious army, the RPA. However, the RPA leadership was a complex compendium of military persons, civilian politicians, professionals (doctors and professors), and revolutionaries. Most of this inner cadre of the RPA—also double-hatted in its political wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—were the core group of exiled Tutsi who had grown up in Uganda. Years before, they spoke of organizing with the hope of returning to Rwanda to claim their birthright as citizens. Their initial aims were not to take power unilaterally to reinstitute sole rule by the Tutsi (although some participants probably did espouse that goal), but rather to return home, to regain their rights and property, and to share and participate in Rwandan politics and society without fear of persecution on account of their ethnicity.\(^5\)

The reality of actually achieving those expectations began to take on substance following the accession to power of Yoweri Museveni in Uganda in 1986. Museveni was a firebrand from Uganda’s southwest. His Banyankole ethnic group had much in common with Tutsi, so an affinity existed that both Museveni and Tutsi refugee youth took advantage of when Museveni decided that his only role to participation and power in Uganda was via revolution. Twenty-eight people joined Museveni in his early struggle. Among them were Tutsi refugees Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame. As Museveni’s revolutionary army (the National Resistance Army [NRA]) expanded operations inside Uganda, dozens, then hundreds, and then thousands of Tutsi refugees rallied to his cause. These refugees learned military skills and discipline as members of the NRA during the quest for power in Uganda and afterward when the NRA became Uganda’s national army. In short order,

Rwandan exiles realized that they had both a revolutionary model in Museveni’s quest for power as well as an instrument to achieve it in the thousands of newly trained soldiers.

Elected president of Uganda in 2001, Museveni had to forge links to all elements of Ugandan society as he engaged in the politics of ruling. RPF leaders quickly saw that—even though Rwandans had been a key part of the apparatus that permitted Museveni to take power and even though he was personally indebted to them—now as president of Uganda, Museveni had to preside in a broad fashion. Tutsi refugees were still exiles from elsewhere; they were not Ugandans. This realization inspired the conviction to return to Rwanda militarily in order to compel the Hutu government, led by Juvénal Habyarimana, to make space for them. Thus plans began to jell for this eventuality.

The time came in October 1990 when, using the preparations for Uganda’s national day parade as cover, Rwandan personnel in the NRA began to move men and equipment to Mbarara in Uganda’s south. On 1 October, the Rwandan contingent mutinied. Declaring themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) under the leadership of General Fred Rwigyema, a thousand well-equipped soldiers moved across the nearby border into northern Rwanda.6

Obviously this precipitated a crisis not only between Uganda and Rwanda but also within the international community. Despite much back and forth, meetings, pleadings, name-calling, finger-pointing, and resolutions, the underlying fact remained that the RPA was established and on the ground in Rwanda. It could not retreat into Uganda. The proverbial die was cast. One of the early setbacks for the movement was the battlefield death of the NRA’s commanding general, Rwigyema, in early October 1990. Paul Kagame, who had been sent by Museveni to train at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, returned surreptitiously to the front and took command. Under his leadership and for the next four years, the RPA enjoyed various degrees of military success and a stalemate in Rwanda’s far north.

While military issues stalled, politicians were busy negotiating. Under international aegis, the solutions for Rwanda’s imbroglio seemed to be power

sharing. Ultimately, after two years of negotiations, several agreements—collectively known as the Arusha Accords—were reached and signed on 3 August 1993. Foremost among them was the peace agreement that ended the hostilities. Five protocols were also signed. One affirmed the rule of law. Another provided for power sharing, offering a formula for allocating cabinet and parliamentary seats on a party-by-party basis within the framework of a broad-based transitional government. A third guaranteed the rights of refugees to return and established programs designed to reintegrate them into Rwanda’s social, economic, and political life. A fourth protocol provided for a combined national army, with supervision of its creation by a neutral observer force, and transition security arrangements for Kigali. The key provision of this agreement was that the government would contribute 60 percent of the troops and the RPA 40 percent, while the officer corps would be evenly split. A final protocol within the miscellaneous provisions provided for an RPF role in the intelligence services, oaths of office for high-ranking officials, and affirmation of adherence to and respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

These accords failed to achieve their designed purpose, principally because President Habyarimana delayed implementation. He apparently postponed enacting these protocols on account of immense pressure from ethnic hard-liners who saw the accords as a sellout—an abandonment of them, a victory for the Tutsi, and a worthless concession to the international community. Consequently, they plotted, designed, and prepared for genocide. They would resolve the Tutsi problem forever and kill all of their enemies, and the first to go would be Habyarimana.

Habyarimana finally succumbed to international pressure and agreed to implement the accords. As he was returning to Kigali on the night of 6 April 1994, his plane was shot down on final approach; all aboard died. That was the signal. The genocide began.

Over the next three months, approximately a million Rwandans were slaughtered by their fellow countrymen. It was a well-planned and efficiently implemented process. At first, the world turned a blind eye then, realizing the

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7 These five accords were signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on 4 August 1993 to end the Rwandan Civil War. They were the result of discussions that took place from July 1992 to July 1993, and were led by the Organisation of African Unity, France, and the United States.
The Crisis of the African State

enormity of the massacre, it began to respond. Unfortunately, it was too little, too late. As genocidaires ran rampant, the RPA gathered its strength and moved south. It was a cohesive force and well motivated, whereas the government troops opposing it were distracted by genocide and the anarchy prevailing throughout the nation. The RPA’s actions did little to stall the violence. The genocide madness spread across the nation; Tutsi were murdered by the tens of thousands, and Hutu farmers fled before the advancing RPA.

By July 1994, as noted above, the violence was over. Was it possible to put the nation together again? Whereas the Arusha Accords would have given the RPA/RPF leadership a slice of power, now they carried the responsibility of the entire country. They were not prepared for this eventuality but stepped up to the challenge. Security had to be addressed first to provide the foundation for decisions on political structures, justice, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and reconciliation. The advantage that the new RPF power structure offered in dealing with all the issues that came before it was that it was fairly monolithic. Decisions and policies were hammered out by the ruling clique in private. There was no organized opposition to deal with, no public criticism, and few other considerations to take into account. To the victors went the power. Everything could be justified—whether correctly or not—by security (i.e., the absolute necessity to see that genocide was squashed and that it and the ideology behind it could never rise again). Obviously, this was an extremely powerful card used internally to intimidate the Hutu populace and externally to maneuver around the international community and donors.10

In July 1994, only the RPA remained. Small contingents occupied the countryside; officers were in charge. The RPA had become a basic military. They had only a few vehicles and almost no heavy weapons. Communications were poor, and troops moved by foot. Some of the soldiers had been trained in Uganda prior to the mutiny, but many others had joined even as the genocide was underway. Their chief task had been the military—finding and chasing the enemy, fighting as required. They were ill prepared for peacetime occupation duties.

There were no civil authorities and few civil leaders, such as priests or teachers or elders; communities were in disarray. The RPA arrested thousands accused of genocide crimes and incarcerated them in national prisons.

or local jails. Yet, the central government’s demands for peace and a return to everyday life were compelling, and the people complied. The problem, however, was that many citizens just were not there. Some were dead, but most were grouped in internal sites or refugee camps in neighboring countries. The task of getting these small segments of the population home would remain for years, but the first step was to close the internal camps. Most of them were located in what had been the safe zone created by Operation Turquoise, the French-controlled area in the southwest. After the French left, the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was reconstituted, but the real security managers were in the RPA. The RPA assumed the task of closing the camps, which was accomplished peacefully for the most part, except at Kibeho, where some hard-liners took a stand and the army used heavy-handed tactics. Consequently, some people died. Even though protests came from the international community about further deaths, the new Rwandan government brushed off the criticism, noting that it was sovereign and pursuing a responsible policy designed to return citizens to their homes.

Meanwhile the ex-FAR/Interahamwe was reorganizing, rearming, and rethinking its tactics from its Zairian base. Although it had fled in haste, the ex-FAR had managed to escape with a good bit of military equipment. Their troops were well equipped with a large quantity of rifles, hand grenades, and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). In addition to seizing trucks and jeeps, they had absconded with several armored cars, some artillery pieces, a small plane, and a couple helicopters. The government of Zaire supposedly confiscated the large items, but reliable reports indicated that new shipments of small arms reached the ex-FAR via Congo’s Goma International Airport. The Kigali leadership never trusted Zaire’s good faith or, more importantly, its ability to rein in the genocidaire elements. The command structure of the ex-FAR after the genocide was hard to determine, but several of the ranking officers, including General Augustin Bizimungu and Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, seemed to have maintained control. Bizimungu and his men enjoyed freedom of movement in Kivu and were unhindered in running their activities from their bastion at Lac Vert, but they sought to be discreet so as not to embarrass their host.

The island of Iwawa, in the middle of Lake Kivu, was used by the ex-FAR

as a training base, even though Iwawa was considered Rwandan territory. When the RPA discovered the presence of ex-FAR members in November 1995, it organized a nighttime amphibious assault using old fishing boats, which destroyed the installation and allowed both the men and their weapons to be captured.\textsuperscript{12} The fight at Iwawa served as a wake-up call for both sides. The ex-FAR recognized that it would not fare well in any direct confrontation with the RPA and, as a result, it turned exclusively to insurgent terror tactics aimed at civilians. In addition, the Iwawa event made it clear that, as long as the genocidaires controlled the refugee camps and used Zaire for asylum and support, they would pose a threat to Rwanda.

And that threat was real. Violence had erupted sporadically throughout the nation since the genocide. Some of the incidents, especially in the former Operation Turquoise safe zone, were attributed to genocidaires who had been left behind, but a clearer pattern slowly emerged as new infiltrators joined stay-at-home genocidaire loyalists intent on terror activities.

Insurgent operations were concentrated in the western prefectures that bordered Zaire. During the first half of 1996, insurgent actions caused approximately 100 deaths per month. IEDs on roads in and out of the area seemed the favored tactic, as passengers would die in the resulting explosion as well as in the wreck. Such attacks hampered humanitarian operations because they made food deliveries and other road movements dangerous. Additionally, the insurgent forces focused efforts on assassinating local government officials and Tutsi survivors. In several instances, survivors were killed because they were witnesses to specific acts of genocide. Rural Tutsi households were singled out, raided, and the inhabitants murdered. These activities were indisputably a continuation of genocide, a fact that overshadowed any political rationale that might be offered for the insurgency. Local government officials, communal counselors, assistant burgomasters, and the judicial policemen who investigated genocide crimes were targeted and killed. Many of them were Hutu. The apparent intent was intimidation and sent the message that collaboration with the RPF government was life threatening. In one attack in March, insurgents threw grenades into a communal cachot (local jail), resulting in 40 deaths of Hutu prisoners.\textsuperscript{13}

Obviously, the insurgency had its strongest political impact in the rural

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 260–69.
\textsuperscript{13} Gribbin, \textit{In the Aftermath of Genocide}, 141–48.
zones. The local people kept their heads down, eyes averted, and doors closed. They did not want to risk violence at the hands of the intimidators and were not yet convinced that the RPF would prevail. They saw the violence as a continuation of the struggle. The government recognized that it had to do a better job not only in countering the insurgents militarily but also in convincing the people to join efforts to protect themselves. Prime Minister Pierre-Célestin Rwigema regularly preached this message to the masses, while prefects and burgomasters expanded grassroots efforts to elicit more cooperation from people in conflict zones.

Rwandan leaders raised the volume of their protests about ex-FAR/Interahamwe activities in the camps and the insurgency, also decrying Zaire’s role—witting or unwitting—in such nefarious designs. Rwandan leaders let it be known that if the international community would not rein in the genocidaires in Zaire then the government would be compelled to do it. While the international community dithered, insurgent attacks in Rwanda’s north intensified. Naturally, the RPA reacted.

UN human rights monitors kept careful track of violence in the countryside. Initially, most attacks and deaths, which totaled about 100 a month, were clearly the work of insurgents. However, RPA personnel committed some extralegal killings, which began to rise dramatically in the first half of 1996 as its anti-insurgent response gained steam. A typical pattern for violence was for infiltrators from Zaire to kill a local official or a Tutsi family. In response, an RPA detachment would sweep through the area in an effort to find the rebels, but if the insurgents escaped, the surrounding community bore the brunt of army brutality anyway. Some of the population of the western prefectures—Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye, Gitirama, and Cyanigugu—aided and abetted the insurgents voluntarily. More communities did so under threat of retaliation, but most were cowed into silence. RPA’s heavy-handed tactics exacerbated the situation. The civilian population was caught in this cycle of violence and neither side provided a safe solution. In June, July, and August of 1996, the RPA conducted search-and-cordon operations in northwestern communes. Troops marched across the hills, collected and confined all people, and then screened them. Men without identity papers, or who otherwise could not account for their presence, were detained as suspected insurgents. Credible intelligence pointed toward summary executions of such individuals. Records for July show that 365 people were killed in 93 separate incidents.
It was an anxious time for Rwanda. There was the danger that the nation would plunge into unending ethnic warfare. The government’s hard-earned reputation for good faith in its quest to rebuild and reconcile could be sullied by harsh reprisals. Diplomats stressed the need for strict army discipline during anti-insurgent forays and the need for new tactics to single out infiltrators. Although the RPA code of conduct was satisfactory, it needed to be applied vigorously by RPA leadership. Rwanda’s reputation was on the line. Its claim to the moral high ground and to the world’s support rested on the contention that it was not vengeful in outlook, that it was a proponent and practitioner of ethnic harmony. Killing innocent Hutu did not sustain that view. The RPA’s claim to self-discipline was eroded by egregious actions.

These criticisms stung, as they cut straight to the core identity of the regime. Leaders did not want to stir the ethnic pot, but they saw no way to combat the insurgency other than through confrontation. They regretted collateral damage to civilians but soon recognized how destructive such a cycle of violence entailed. Over the course of months, the code of conduct was rigorously enforced, including arrests of RPA personnel for abuses. Tactically, a rapid response/hot pursuit doctrine replaced widespread sweeps as a method to root out insurgents. Finally, on the military side, the activation and posting of integrated ex-FAR troops into RPA contingents in the northwest helped counter local fears of Tutsi dominance. The government was quite active in making its case for peace and national harmony, for the need for justice, for the return of refugees, and for redoubled efforts to rebuild the economy.

Yet, such rhetoric could be cloaked in not-so-subtle threats. In his speech on 4 July 1996, marking the second anniversary of Kigali’s liberation from genocide, Vice President Kagame spoke to the insurgency.

These acts will not make us deviate from our initial program. . . . We must find a solution to the problem, by fair means or foul. . . . We must do whatever is possible within the law. . . . Of course, there will be casualties. . . . It is the responsibility of soldiers to stop those killings. It is also the responsibility of all Rwandans . . . who understand that those acts are not in the interest of the country, but rather penalize each and every one. It is high time Rwandese stood up and declared their stand either for or against the crime. . . . I should add that that those who
think that the Government’s will to receive everybody, to unite them and provide them with subsistence means is a sign of weakness, are mistaken.\textsuperscript{14}

The vice president warned about rumors, saying that those who believed them were as bad as those who spread them. In closing, he stated, “Whoever will come with good intentions, we will welcome; whoever will come with bad intentions will be received in the same way.”\textsuperscript{15}

On the practical side, the United States sponsored a series of training sessions for the RPA and the gendarmerie on military justice. Professors from the U.S. Naval Justice School taught judicial organization, court-martial procedures, and investigations. Americans also shared experiences on how to educate troops about their human rights obligations toward civilians. In a linked but separate undertaking, U.S. military personnel assisted the RPA in developing a public relations campaign designed to promote the reintegration of returning refugees, the ideals of the new Rwanda (i.e., ethnic harmony), an end to violence, and cooperation with the RPA for local security. The messages directed to the rural population were intended to defuse tensions between residents and military personnel, as well as to ease the return of refugees and prisoners to their home communes. In part, this public relations effort was intended to counter the Hutu hate propaganda that still festered in the rural areas. It was also aimed at RPA troops and was designed to teach them how to deal more effectively with civilians. The program was an outgrowth of a very effective public awareness effort regarding land mines. Unfortunately, however, the U.S. military dubbed such programs psychological operations or “psyops.” That label rang alarm bells for international human rights organizations and the world press, some of whose members believed that the United States was engaged in Manchurian-candidate type brainwashing.\textsuperscript{16}

**War in Zaire**

In the fall of 1997, the combined weight of the northern insurgency and the unresolved issue of millions of refugees just across the border led the

\textsuperscript{14} Press release from the Office of the Vice President, Kigali, July 1996.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Gribbin, *In the Aftermath of Genocide*, 163–64. The premise of a Manchurian candidate was originally presented in 1959 by author Richard Condon. His like titled book featured the son of a prominent political family who was brainwashed to assassinate the U.S. president.
RPF government to act. First, it conspired with the government of Burundi to close the camps there and repatriate about 75,000 people. Although there was some international outcry, the refugees returned peacefully to their homes and began to rebuild their lives. Second, the Rwandan leadership followed through on its threats to take matters into their own hands vis-à-vis the camps in Zaire. Armed groups, purportedly Zairian, but in reality Rwandan, systematically attacked refugee camps in South Kivu. But rather than return home, the tens, even hundreds of thousands of Rwandans seemed to disappear. They had, in fact, fled north and west, herded along by the new military pressure, but also in seeming submission to their genocidaire overlords. Rebel/Rwandan pressure soon emptied outlying camps in North Kivu as well. Most refugees retreated and were then concentrated in the Mugunga refugee camp outside of Goma. Fighting there in early November broke the stranglehold of the genocidaires and a million refugees began to trek home. It took five days for them all to clear the border crossing at Gisenyi.

Yet the struggle in Zaire was not over. Armed genocidaire elements shepherded tens of thousands of refugees westward into the Congo basin rainforest. Rwandan forces, perhaps numbering several thousand, pursued them and clashed repeatedly. Along the way, this initially exported continuation of Rwanda’s ethnic war morphed into an effort—fed politically by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL)—to oust Mobutu. Uganda, Angola, and Burundi joined in that successful effort.

Ultimately, another 50,000 or so refugees returned to Rwanda from the rain forests of Zaire, but many of the armed ex-FAR/Interahamwe troops managed to stay together or later regroup into the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). FDLR elements have been upsetting peace in the Congo ever since.17

One immediate consequence of the imbroglio in Zaire was the suspension of U.S. military assistance to Rwanda, which had been negligible in any case. At the time, it consisted of one ongoing training session—the third or so repetition of training for patrol-size contingents. Additionally, the United States was supporting a demining operation that included a small military public relations component (i.e., teaching Rwandan counterparts how to

put together mine awareness campaigns). Finally, under discussion, but not yet implemented, was a rather substantial package of nonlethal equipment, including radio gear and night vision goggles. However, foregoing that aid was a price that the Rwandan leadership was willing to pay.

The regime was confident both in the righteousness of their quest and in their ability to accomplish their goals. Nonetheless, the legacy of this First Congo War (1996–97) was more conflict in eastern Congo; much of it related directly to nonresolution of Rwandan ethnic differences. Additional violence ensued during the Second Congo War (1998–2003) that drew continent-wide participation. Violence continues to this day in Kivu provinces as disparate forces, armies, militias, proxies, peacekeepers, and others contend for power.

However, back in Rwanda following the dismantling of the Zairian refugee camps, insurgent forces made several last-ditch efforts to establish themselves inside the homeland, including attacks on communal centers with hundreds of combatants. However, the better organized, led, and armed RPA, which then included substantial numbers of Hutu soldiers integrated into the RPA from the former army, defeated them at every turn. Deprived of cross-border support, as well as the narrative of restored Hutu power, the insurgency withered away.

**Politics**

When coming to power in July 1994, RPF leaders were faced with the necessity of creating a new government and an administration. To their credit, they decided to use the never-implemented provisions of the Arusha Accords that allocated seats in parliament and cabinet posts by political party. The National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND, Habyarimana’s party) was excluded as were other Hutu power hard liners. The RPF assumed those seats and allocated most of the others to the RPA (the army) and a few to women, labor, and youth. An initial problem arose in finding competent representatives from the various parties to take the seats. Decisions on who would become members of parliament (MP) were left to each party. Although there was the semblance of caucusing among several of the parties, there were no elections or primaries as such. Those who became MPs were second echelon leaders who had survived the violence and remained in country. Nonetheless, the new parliament was multiparty and multiethnic. In fact, Hutu MPs outnumbered Tutsi MPs, most of whom came from
the RPF and the liberal party. Similarly, in the cabinet, most seats were filled by Hutu. Even the new president, Pasteur Bizimungu, a card-carrying RPF member, was Hutu. Finally, the post of prime minister was given to Faustin Twagiramungu, from the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), a Hutu activist and opponent of the Habyarimana regime. Despite the façade of multiparty and ethnic cooperation, real power remained vested in the RPF, especially the RPA and its leader Paul Kagame. The government created the position of vice president for Kagame, a post that he would occupy for several years concomitantly with that of minister of defense.

Real decision making remained the provenance of RPF insiders. This was a mutable group of individuals, sometimes referred to as a “committee of colonels,” who had formed the RPA/RPF in Uganda and had remained engaged in the struggle ever since. The RPF presented a strong and united front to the outside, but from the beginning there was internal dissent. Gradually, as positions and viewpoints varied, even this group was winnowed down and the early practice of open discussion faded away. The style of rule that emerged over the next decade would be one of authoritarianism. Paul Kagame and his most trusted inner circle had a vision of governing that would not tolerate challenge. They would not permit any hint of a return to ethnic ideology to threaten Tutsi control or national security.  

The first outward evidence of reduced participation was the departure of Prime Minister Twagiramungu in 1995. He had argued for a more realistic inclusion of Hutu in the new polity. He was replaced by Pierre-Célestin Rwigema, also from the MDR, who was forced aside in 2000. The pattern of denigrating any Hutu in later years—including President Bizimungu, who seemed poised to command his own political base—became well established. This was a powerful political card because just an allegation that one was tainted by genocide was enough to end a political career. Even so, RPF Tutsi stalwarts were sidelined as well when or if their views challenged those of Kagame’s inner circle.

In addition to the structure of government at the highest level, the new leadership had to reestablish local government as well. The RPF adhered to the system already familiar to all citizens. The basic unit was the com-

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18 Rudasingwa, Healing a Nation, 243–60.
19 Joseph Sebarenzi, God Sleeps in Rwanda: A Journey of Transformation (New York: Atria Publishing, 2009). Sebarenzi’s ordeal occurred after the events related in this chapter, but his story of harassment and exclusion is symptomatic of the approach employed by the ruling clique.
mune (akin to an American county) headed by a burgomaster (a term left over from Belgian colonial times). All government services in a commune—health, education, police, tax collection, public works, etc.—were in some part a communal responsibility. A burgomaster wielded the clout of the central government but also exercised power conferred on leaders via traditional culture. Rwandan culture contained a strong ethic of obedience to leadership. Whatever the leader ordained would be accomplished. This cultural trait helps explain why so many people joined without hesitation in committing genocide. In hindsight, it also may explain why they readily complied with commands from the new government to reconcile, rebuild, and forego ethnic animus.

The RPF leadership made certain that the majority of the burgomaster slots were filled by RPF loyalists. Thus, it was able to move its vision forward throughout the nation. Only some years later would burgomasters be elected, but by then the people generally knew who to elect.

Since the genocide, Rwanda has held two national elections (2003 and 2010). Paul Kagame was elected president both times. An RPF-oriented slate of MPs and burgomasters was also selected. Even though the appearance of political inclusiveness is carefully cultivated, there is no question as to where power lies.

Reintegration of Refugees

Several million Rwandans left their homes during or just after the genocide. They grouped in displaced persons camps and in vast camps across the borders in Zaire, Tanzania, and Burundi. Although about a million people died during the genocide, almost that same number of Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda from camps in Uganda, Burundi, and the diaspora where they had lived for a generation. Still, it was obvious that the nation could not be rebuilt, and society and normal life could not be reestablished until the millions of Hutu returned home. The refugees began that trek in 1996 as the governments of Burundi and Tanzania closed their camps and the Congolese rebels and Rwandan forces broke apart the camps in Zaire.20

Returning Hutu refugees often found their houses occupied and their

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fields tended by strangers. The new government decreed that recent returnees were not to be dispossessed, but that they should share until housing and land could be provided for the returning Tutsi, which they did while the government—with assistance from international donors—created new villages and centers for social services.

The new government also required a portion of returning Hutu, especially the educated, youths, and former military personnel or government employees, to attend reeducation camps. For several weeks, they were taught the virtues of new Rwanda. They were inculcated with the need to disavow ethnic hatred, to recognize the impact of genocide, to accept the need for justice and the new order of peaceful coexistence. After being indoctrinated, some former military joined the new army, and others went back to work as teachers or government employees.

Justice

Genocide had been widespread. It took fewer than 100 days to kill a million people. Estimates indicate that 300,000 people participated in the slaughter in some fashion or another. By the end of 1996, about 120,000 people—mostly men, but also women and children—were in prison accused of genocide crimes. What was the government to do with them and with others implicated but not jailed?

The United Nations created the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, an international court designed to search out the “major players” (the planners, organizers, and leaders of genocide) to hold them accountable for their crimes under international law. Most of the indicted (about 40) had previously fled Rwanda and had to be retrieved from their various exile locations. Although that process was of great interest to Rwanda (because investigations and witnesses had to come from Rwanda), the more immediate problem was internal. The new government was anxious that justice be done and that it was witnessed by the population. The first step was to draft a genocide law that would enable appropriate prosecutions.

22 Gribbin, In the Aftermath of Genocide, 208-10.
step was to compile files and charges against those imprisoned. Concomitantly, the new government needed to recreate a destroyed judicial system so that trials could be held. All of this was accomplished by 1997. The first trials focused on the most egregious cases, and defendants were convicted and sentenced to death. After the required judicial review by the high court, more than 20 people were publicly executed in April 1998.25

Trials continued—and are ongoing—but there were to be no more executions. The specter of the state shooting thousands or even tens of thousands of its citizens by firing squads was not palatable. So those thousands sentenced to death remained on death row. Ultimately all such sentences were commuted to life imprisonment; Rwanda eventually abolished the death penalty completely.

While the most egregious cases were reserved for the formal legal system, clearly the pace of trials would never provide resolution within any respectable timeframe. Thus, it was imperative to find another mechanism to hold genocidaires accountable, at least those accused of less heinous crimes. The mechanism seized upon was that of Gacaca court, a traditional system of justice dealing with family, land, and property disputes that had largely fallen out of favor in the independence era. Plaintiffs brought their complaints before a council of respected neighbors who decided the case. That format was revived and expanded so that cases related to genocide could be considered at the local level. Judges were selected and trained. A uniform procedure was adopted, and the process began. Tens of thousands of people appeared before Gacaca courts. Neighbors testified, defendants offered explanations or excuses, and their cases were decided. Many were sentenced to time served and/or community service. A few were returned to prison. The Gacaca process gripped Rwanda for years, but formally ended in 2011—justice was largely seen to be done.26

Conclusions

By 2000, Rwanda had successfully emerged as a viable entity. It cherished its sovereignty and had become a regional player, especially in the troubled eastern Congo where some legitimate Rwandan security interests

26 Waugh, Paul Kagame and Rwanda, 166–84.
remained unresolved. Rwandan meddling in the Congo would remain an issue that would upset the international community for years to come. Additional criticisms leveled at the regime in Kigali included the authoritarian nature of governance wherein dissent was not well tolerated and the intrusive social engineering evident in reeducation camps, the Gacaca process, and also in the villagization program\textsuperscript{27} and constraints on how rural land could be used.

Even so, domestically, Rwanda was at peace and society was rebuilding. Under Paul Kagame’s leadership, the RPF carefully adhered to its vision of a society where ethnicity was not a determinant. However, memories of the genocide continued to be evoked, by the Gacaca trials, by regular commemorations, and by corrupt politics. Yet, Rwanda had created some democratic institutions; multiparties organized, civil society grew, the judicial system became more autonomous, local officials were elected, and parliament debated. Schools and universities flourished. The economy rebounded with a focus on agriculture and on the search for high-tech opportunities.

Rwanda’s recovery from the calamitous genocide that wiped out 15 percent of its population and sent another 30 percent into exile was nothing short of extraordinary. That it did so with a minimum of acrimony was even more astonishing. Under proud and self-reliant leadership, the citizens of this once terribly troubled land gained the space to look confidently to a brighter and more prosperous future.

Chapter Six

France and Libya in Chad:
A Strange Triangle

by Robert Nalbandov*

Introduction

The history of humankind is marked by constant struggle for existence. Within states or between them, conflicts had dual roles: they were either principal driving forces for human evolution, contributing to development of peoples’ thoughts, their ideas on reality, and their perceptions of the contemporary world, or they stalled progress by taking away human and material resources, which are limited by definition.

When talking about interstate or intrastate wars, the established approach for contemporary conflict resolution and intervention literature starts its epistemological inquiry into the post-WWII Cold War period, which heralded a new era of liberalization of the world, especially on the African continent. The process of decolonization was not an easy task to accomplish; many newly created African nations experienced severe human strife caused by ethnic clashes within state territories. At this point, the ideological identity of conflicting groups was replaced or layered with religious and/or ethnic ones. Ethnicity and nationalism was translated in the African context into interclan and interreligion rivalry, which became key distinguishing features of groups representing country populations.

Important insights for successful resolution are contained in the character of participants of the process of conflict. Domestic actors do not engage in wars in a complete vacuum; any process significant enough to change a country’s political and/or territorial settings would inevitably have a “butterfly effect”\(^1\) on its immediate surroundings and even far beyond. In essence,

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\(^1\) Coined by Edward Lorenz in 1961, the butterfly effect refers to aspects of chaos theory whereby a small event in a nonlinear system can create large changes in a later state.
conflicts may continue or end as a result of actions of the belligerents alone, or with the participation of third parties. Although the warring factions can, in principle, reach solutions to the disputes, outside interference or third-party interventions may play a critical role in shaping the course of domestic events. Outside actors may either aggravate or mitigate intrastate security dilemmas\(^2\) by skewing the local power balance toward the parties they support or, in case of their neutrality, by favoring the common good of a larger regional and/or international community of states they represent.

Intrastate conflicts and the means of their resolution have been the focus of international relations scholars and practitioners from diverse perspectives and entry points—their participants, the goals of belligerent groups, the specific outcomes of conflicts, the regional and international environment in which the conflicts take place, the consequences of civil wars, and many more. While some investigate the endogenous nature of belligerents\(^3\) and attempt to define conditions for the victory of domestic actors,\(^4\) others focus on external players that affect the course of civil war,\(^5\) study the effects of the composition of third-party interventions in the matter of conflict resolution,\(^6\) successes or failures of negotiations,\(^7\) the rules of the resolution process and the roles of postconflict institutions in conflict management,\(^8\) the ways in which civil wars end,\(^9\) and finally, domestic and international factors contributing to specific conflict outcomes.\(^10\) All these aspects of foreign interventions are abundant on the African continent, which makes it notoriously unique from the point of view of attracting the parochial interests of third parties.


\(^7\) Barbara F. Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” *International Organization* 51, no. 3 (Summer 199?): 335-64.


Peace-centric versus Goal-oriented Approach

With all the differences in approaches to the study of foreign interventions in domestic identity conflicts, there is a general agreement to view the successes of third-party actions by the duration of peace established after interventions occur, which has become almost commonplace in intervention and conflict discourse. The durable peace approach is widely used as a criterion for judgment about success of third-party actions with different proxies of peace longevity. For instance, Caroline Hartzell and Roy Licklider equate successful interventions with de facto peace lasting for at least five years.\(^{11}\) Two years of successful peacebuilding after the end of the wars are named by Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis as an indicator of an interventions’ success,\(^{12}\) while Patrick Regan applies a more rigid parameter for the “success” of interventions: peace that lasts for at least six months.\(^{13}\) Peace as the main outcome of interventions is also used in David Carment’s and Dane Rowlands’ analysis of third-party interventions in civil wars.\(^{14}\) For their part, Paul Diehl et al. focuses on successes of multilateral interventions, primarily undertaken by the UN, in domestic conflicts from the point of view of successful peacebuilding.\(^{15}\) The quintessence of these research endeavors means that the interventions are considered successful as long as postintervention peace in a target country lasts. Similarly, if the intervenors fail to establish peace in war-torn countries, or the peace had not lasted long enough, they are said to be unsuccessful.

Using durable peace as the main variable for the outcome of interventions has a number of theoretical and methodological fallacies. The main problem with this view is that it does not take into account the complexities of those intervening and the domestic players. Most importantly, this peace-centric approach does not consider the real intentions of interven-

nors and the causes of interventions. Third parties may intervene in a target
country as a response to humanitarian crises resulting from civil war; they
may even have been the instigator of those wars. Intervenors may support
belligerent groups by openly providing them military and/or economic re-
sources for prolonged hostilities or support by clandestine insurgencies.
They may intervene alone or in coalition, be biased, or neutral and/or
impartial. The dimensions of success for all these different interest- and
goal-driven interventions are set up by the years of peace after their actions
are over.

Domestic context also matters in evaluating the success of third par-
ties; the intricacies of local political environs and relative domestic power
balances between ethnic groups seriously affect outcomes of third-party
actions. For instance, external efforts to the majority that, according to Rob-
ert Wagner, are more capable of reaching decisive victory, are more likely
to succeed than support to the minority group. All these country- and
intervenor-specific differences make attempts to measure conflict resolu-
tion by a single constant variable of peace undesirably curtailed. Such a
time proxy brings in the “billiard ball” view of intervenors that all “third
parties intervene in intrastate conflicts to bring an end to the violence as-
associated with the underlying dispute” and that they “do not intervene to
exacerbate or prolong the fighting.” This means that all third parties are,
by definition, equally peace driven in their actions and that peacemaking
is their actual aim. However, when the matter concerns the real agendas of
intervenors and what they indeed wanted to achieve, this approach seems
to be inadequate.

We may have conflicts where a third party directs its support to an ethnic
group, which eventually loses the war to its rival, thus ending the conflict
and restoring peace in a target country. Duration of peace in this case will
actually depend on how effectively and decisively the victor could triumph
over the intervention-supported group, thus making third-party actions un-
successful. We may also see conflicts where intervenors are not concerned
with the fate of the belligerents per se and the resolution of conflicts in
general but, rather, aim at exercising their own power influence over the tar-

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get country by prolonging civil unrest. In these cases, they would be more interested in continuation, rather than cessation, of hostilities—the longer peace deals last, the less successful their actions would be.

Even if durability of peace is applied to the measure of success and cessation of hostilities is indeed the goal of the intervenors, using such a protracted indicator as several years or even six months of peace after the end of a war gives us a distorted understanding of intervention and is inconsistent with the actual situation on the ground in a postconflict country. At the same time, what may be sufficient time for postconflict settlement for one country may not be enough for others due to domestic context matters, the wide array of goals and aspirations of third parties, the roles they play on international and regional arenas, the interactions they have with other actors, the composition of intervenors themselves, and the nature of the conflicting parties. Even more so, outside efforts directed toward ending conflicts often become counterproductive to peace. Interventions may either not end conflicts at all or only provide temporary termination of hostilities, which are susceptible to resumption in a short time span. Similarly, a cease-fire achieved through intervention may merely grant additional time to the belligerents, during which they can marshal their forces for the resumption of hostilities in future. All these differences make attempts to measure conflict resolution by a single constant parameter scientifically curtailed.

Apart from theorizing, the peace-centric line of reasoning has quite a strong normative and moral connotation. It is a universal truism that peace is better than war, the latter leading to tremendous human suffering. If we assume that the success of third-party actions measured through long-lasting peace after interventions is positive, and their failure, as measured by the resumption of hostilities after a certain time period, is negative, then the question arises, “How was this peace, or a positive state of affairs, established in first place, and for whom was it positive?” What if, in order to reach long-lasting peace, one ethnic group being supported by a third party had to completely wipe out the other one?

What makes peace-centrism even more problematic is its methodological failure to differentiate between pro-pax (peace) and pro-bellum (war) third parties by putting them in one melting pot of discourse. Years of peace as a result of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts of neutral and impartial intervenors are equated in a statement of success along with
the extended nonresumption of hostilities achieved by biased third parties. In this line of reasoning, the nature of outside actors is limited to counting years of peace.

Another methodological failure of this peace-centric measure is its operationalization—or the process of strictly defining variables into measurable factors—based on a timescale for evaluating success. Even the most rigid criterion, such as a six-month period of peace after the intervention, proves unsatisfactory when considering the different agendas of the intervenors. A third-party intervention that aims to accomplish limited agendas (e.g., providing support to the government against a rebellion but not completely crushing it) would not be classified as a failure when, five years after it had retreated, the government it had supported was put down by the opposition, particularly if the aim of the intervenors was not the complete annihilation of the rival force. Also, intervenors’ preferences may change and, if they had intervened to provide support to the ruling government, they may decide not to do so at a later date when the same government is under threat, thus leading to the defeat of the previously aided side.

Intervention objectives vary depending on each specific case, hence the time relevance of their success. A period of limited-scope and limited-resources special operations is highly unlikely to be a sufficient indicator for the success of multifaceted peacebuilding and state-reconstruction missions. A timescale approach may well be applied for humanitarian interventions; however, even in this case, the postconflict development that follows peacekeeping missions takes longer than six months or even five years. Consideration of the immediate outcomes of interventions gives a better perspective on whether or not third parties have been successful in their actions. A situation that falls outside the intervenors’ powers to affect may change on the ground. Depending on variations of specific objectives in time (e.g., changes in mandates of third-party missions), fluctuating goals and corresponding actions of the same outside forces can lead to interchanges of successes and failures.

The empirical gap is clear: the longevity of peace cannot be used as a measure of successful intervention when peace is not the primary objective. We cannot attribute the role of a mediator of a peace agreement or an arbiter or outside guarantors of peaceful settlements, as Walter argues,19

to a third party whose objectives are not to end war but rather to help one ethnic group win over another with no further commitment to long-lasting peace. Similarly, intervenors tasked with monitoring the situation should not be held responsible for the failure to stop conflicts simply because it was not their objective.

The way to solve this measurement quagmire is not to assume that peace equals success, but rather to view the success of third-party actions by the actual fulfillment of their intervention objectives. Thus, to consider outside actors successful, they would have to reach their intervention agendas and goals. If they have failed to achieve their tasks, they should be viewed as unsuccessful. Judging the success of interventions through fulfillment of their tasks is a labor-intensive process since, unlike peace as the central dependent variable to success, objectives of third parties in each specific case shall be cross-referenced with the actual endstate of their actions. To see what had realistically been planned and achieved and to evaluate the degree of fulfillment of the objectives would require careful analysis of the intervention cases, their participants, courses of actions, and outcomes. Such a goal-oriented approach resembles the KPI (key performance indicator) tool for measuring both the financial and nonfinancial performance of organizations to evaluate how successfully they have developed within a certain period of time. The KPI defines goals and objectives and states the parameters of their successful implementation. Unlike the KPI method, which correlates planned parameters with actual output indicators, the goal-oriented approach has a more stringent view on the successes of interventions and measures them in binary absolute, or integer, values, not in fractions (either “yes” or “no”).

The goal-oriented approach is not free from its own fallacies that are related to the nature of the phenomenon—goals and objective of the intervenors—and may not necessarily be known to a researcher. The publicly stated objectives may (and, in some cases, would) differ from the ones pur-
sued in the conflict fields. Intervenors and their governments (usually the case with unilateral intervenors) may have hidden agendas they endeavor to reach while presenting to their own constituencies and to the international community more peaceful intentions. However, this is a rewarding exercise since it would enrich the discourse on international security and conflict resolution, at large, and foreign interventions in ethnic conflicts, in particular.

Chad: The Never-Ending Chaos

In many respects, the conflict in Chad after its independence in 1960 until relative peace of the early 1990s stands out among other ethnic conflicts in Africa and elsewhere. Relatively understudied, the Chadian civil war is notable for its unparalleled duration and the interests of the external power players. Although not as intensely violent as other cases of ethnic strife, such as in Somalia and Rwanda, the Chadian civil war remains one of the most protracted in the post-Cold War era. Nearly two generations of Chadians were born and lived through the constant threat of numerous rebellions and multiple foreign interventions tearing the country apart. Like most of the northern/central African nations, Chad had been a French colony, which played a determining factor in most of its post-independence political dynamics. To understand the causes of the civil wars in Chad and the rationales for the foreign interventions, it is necessary to begin the discussion of Chad’s history right after independence.

Although mostly deprived of valuable resources, such as oil, gas, gold, and gems, Chad is well situated along the major trans-Saharan crossroads, facilitating the development of trade and crafts, as well as the trafficking of slaves to Europe and beyond. Ethnic, environmental, and religious fragmentation is a distinctive feature of contemporary Chadian society. The country is divided into northern, central, and southern parts with about 200 ethnic groups who speak more than 100 different languages. In 1916, Chad joined the French Equatorial Africa, a federation with three French colonies to the south: Ubangi-Shari, Moyen-Congo, and Gabon. In 1920, the country became a separate French colony. French rule in Chad was characterized by strong favoritism toward Christian southerners over

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the Muslim northerners, and the settlers over the pagan nomads. The modus operandi of the colonial power created an unmendable gap between the more developed south and the less advanced north. The social and political segmentation of Chadian society that happened exactly along these geographic and religious lines was at the heart of most subsequent internal rivalries. As Mario Azevedo and Emmanuel Nnadozie described, “[T]he French administration reinforced polarization between North and South through the constant use of contrasting terminology: chrétien (Christian) versus musulman (Muslim); sudiste (southerner) versus nordiste (northerner) . . .” 23 Subsequently, this geographic and religious stratification created regional political-economic gaps—the underdeveloped north (called Tchade Inutile by the French) lagged behind the industrially advanced and better-educated south (Tchade Utile). As a result, southerners occupied the best administrative positions and enjoyed political and economic dominance over the rest of the country after Chad’s independence.

The process of decolonization was quite painful for Chadian society. It left the country with an essentially traditional and import-oriented economy, insignificant industrial sector, cotton-dominated agriculture, and an inadequate infrastructure. The turbulence arising from local politics and the fragmentation of the population into separate and sometimes conflicting groups along ethnic, religious, and regional lines aggravated economic hardships. This population divide led to the creation of geographically and ethnically oriented political parties after the end of WWII: the Parti Progressiste Tchadien or the Chadian Progressive Party (PPT), representing southern interests, and the Union Democratique Tchadien or the Chadian Democratic Union (UDT), which was an influential local branch of Charles de Gaulle’s Rassemblement du Peuple Francais or Rally of the French People (RPF). By August 1960, Chadian independence, the PPT, and the politicians from the south generally dominated the Chadian politics.

On 11 August 1960, François Tombalbaye of the PPT became the first president of Chad. Faced with the daunting task of consolidating a divided society, Tombalbaye used substantial French support, including numerous French advisors in governmental posts and allowing France to control most of the nation’s financial operations. This way, France managed to retain its “statutory” patronage over its former colonial land. Not only did the Chad-

ians, according to Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, “continue . . . to look upon France as their natural protector and source of aid,” but France also viewed Chad as an essential component of its prestige and external security. This relationship was reflected in numerous agreements signed between France and nearly all the Chadian governments.

One such legal mechanism that kept France in Chad was the bilateral “Assistance Agreement” signed in August 1960. According to this treaty, France undertook the responsibility to “provide . . . [Chad] with the assistance it requires to achieve the goals of economic and social advancement . . . [by] carrying out studies, supplying equipment, sending experts and technicians, training personnel, and granting financial aid.” Within another treaty, this time the 1966-67 multilateral Agreement and Conventions to Maintain Order in African Malagasy States signed between France and the governments of Chad, Madagascar, Congo, Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger, France obtained the right to intervene both indirectly and directly to uphold domestic law and order in these countries, if required. While indirect help from the French included the provision of logistics and communications support, direct assistance gave the French the right to intervene on behalf of the requesting government as the legitimate powers of the countries in question. In case the French military was needed, their “national forces although remaining under the authority of their direct command, temporarily and locally are included into the French command for the duration of the operations.” The French government was also entitled to “to use its forces for keeping order in one State . . . maintained in another State.”

Another bilateral agreement on French technical military assistance allowed Chad to seek French support in establishing their interior forces—Gendarmerie and National Army. Article 5 of this agreement bound the Chadian government to seeking “assistance exclusively from the French Republic in respect of the maintenance and further provision of equipment

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
and supplies for its armed forces.” All similar legal frameworks, including more than 20 agreements and treaties, were directed at normalizing relations between a former colony and its colonial metropolis.

Tombalbaye’s “one-man-only” rule soon antagonized a majority of the population and gave birth to the powerful opposition within other ethnic and clan groups. Tombalbaye was from a southern Sara group and allotted the majority of the administrative positions to his clans’ kin and southerners, in general, thus squandering his legitimacy through repressive tactics and regional favoritism. Heavy-handed policies against other groups exacerbated their grievances, and the northern Muslim religious leaders and warlords, each with ethnic-based agendas and supporters, began to openly challenge Tombalbaye’s rule. The opposition increasingly used traditional loyalties and clan-based enmities to condemn the ruling southerners and to gain popular support among their own adherents. Popular dissatisfaction steadily grew. Alleged or real coups were uncovered, prevented, or disrupted. The government faced increased oppression of all layers of the population, even including president’s own Sara group representatives, who became dissatisfied with the internal division of wealth.

One of the very first rebellions originated in the northern parts of Chad in 1966 and developed into a major political actor in subsequent domestic conflicts: the FLT (Front de Libération du Tchad [Liberation Front of Chad]). The FLT was later renamed FROLINAT (Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad [National Liberation Front of Chad]) with a strong military component that united those dissatisfied with Tombalbaye’s governance. However, it suffered from a lack of common political will and vision, the absence of a specific and concrete political platform, and only vague plans for future governance. Its political goals and objectives were too broad, overly ambiguous, and overarchingly ambitious. Another weak point of the FROLINAT, as Sam Nolutshungu notes, was that it “. . . had always been highly regionalized in its command structure and its regional wings were of different ethnic composition.”

Ethnic fragmentation among its members was worsened by diversities in personal loyalties and uneven access of various clans to

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30 Refers to the largest ethnic group of non-Muslims in southern Chad.
Three major military groups with separate agendas constructed the core of FROLINAT. The FLA (First Liberation Army), which later became the “Volcan Army,” was led by Abba Siddick and was largely composed of ethnic Arabs. Its internal rival was the Second Liberation Army, or the FAN (Forces Armées du Nord [Armed Forces of the North]), which was probably the most influential group and enjoyed strong support from Chad’s immediate neighbor, Libya. FAN was led by Hissène Habré (from Gorane clan) and Goukouni Oueddi (the son of a derdei, the Chadian spiritual leader exiled by Tombalbaye in Libya). The Third Liberation Army (later called the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Chad) mainly operated in the west-central Kanem District and did not represent a significant force.

An interesting fact about FROLINAT was that, while originating in the Muslim Toubou region of the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) and uniting predominantly Muslims, it never actually wanted to secede from the rest of the country. On the contrary, it had a very centric position and advocated for a unified Chad. This wish to keep the country intact and homogenous was quite rational; as Nolutshungu notes, there was “little for FROLINAT to gain from pulling out of the Republic, the least prosperous and economically least promising North, and certainly not when it had a realistic chance of taking the whole country.”32 Secession of a less developed northern region would make it susceptible to the parochial interests of Libya, which, since the very arrival of Qaddafi to power in 1969, wanted to annex northern Chad. Such Libyan aspirations were well known to FROLINAT leaders, who would find themselves as regional heads under the Libyan power should secession occur, which stood quite far from their aims.

French Interventions

Gradually FROLINAT showed ambitions that reached far beyond mere control over the Muslim north: they wanted the whole country by gaining significant territorial control in the north and advancing in the BET and the Wadai provinces. The Chadian Army stationed there was mainly composed of southerners who were viewed by the local Muslims sympathetic to FROLINAT as aliens who were fighting on hostile territory. Unable to cope

32 Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, 61.
with the increasing disturbances in the north, Tombalbaye invited France to step in and nip the rebellion advances in the bud. France promptly responded by sending an expeditionary force, the aim of which was “to make possible the reinstallation of the Chadian administration in the BET”\(^{33}\)–a mission narrow both geographically and operationally in scope. The primary aim of the intervention was short-term salvaging of the Chadian postcolonial government from the internal political turbulence and possible toppling down of the Muslim forces. Neither Tombalbaye nor the French government had the ultimate goal to completely crush the revolt; the former feared mass retaliation from the northern provinces, and the later was not prepared to engage in a costly and lengthy war far away from its borders.

The intervention was conducted in two stages. The first stage began in August 1968 and lasted for three months. France sent a limited number of troops that, by the end of intervention, amounted to 2,000 French Marines. After a series of military clashes with the rebels, the marines succeeded in retaking the government outposts in the north, which had been held under siege by FROLINAT since March of that year. The second phase began in April 1969 and was considerably larger in terms of the personnel and resources involved. The intervention officially ended in June 1971, however, approximately 1,200 French military personnel remained in Chad to train the national army—the FAT (Forces Armées Tchadienne [or Chadian Armed Forces]), which was about twice as large as the French contingent—altogether about 2,700 infantry and air force members.\(^{34}\)

The French intervention suppressed the revolt in the central and eastern parts of the country, curbing the threat from the BET, in general, and Tibesti, in particular. FROLINAT’s early gains in the north had been reversed; its southward advances were thwarted and it was unable to recapture most of the previously occupied regions. Participation in direct clashes with FROLINAT by FAT also raised the battle morale of its soldiers and gave them the feeling of being backed up by a major regional power. In sum, the French, according to Nolutshungu, “progressively weakened FROLINAT’s influence in this region and permanently deprived the Center-East of its leading role in the rebellion.”\(^{35}\) Battlefield losses also created significant disorganization within FROLINAT’s internal structure. The divide within its

\(^{33}\) Ibid., 71.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 69.
\(^{35}\) Ibid., 63.
political structure as well as in its rank and file grew even deeper and made the whole movement feeble and more susceptible to outside pressure.

After the intervention, France insisted upon conducting administrative reforms aimed at decentralizing state authority and shifting power to the provincial authorities and traditional community leaders. In doing so, France was promoting its own completely rational objective. While being aware that the rebellion was far from over, France feared that further worsening of the situation in northern Chad might lead to another call from Tombalbaye for intervention, which would be difficult not to accept. Based on the idea of its own democratic governance as a precondition for civil peace, France advocated for power-sharing mechanisms in Chad that would foster national reconciliation, increase the quality of public administration, and improve relations between northern and southern parts of the country. The overall purpose was satisfaction of the diverse (and sometimes conflicting) viewpoints of the population to prevent future discontent and possible renewal of rebellion.

Following French recommendations, the central authorities in N’Djamena, the capital of Chad, started negotiations with local chiefs. As a result, it managed to improve local tax collection practices and release some political prisoners. Unfortunately, these reforms turned out to be only visionary and failed to address the fundamental problems of Chadian society: high regionalization, poor economy, and political instability. Nothing had been done to improve the domestic political climate and single-party dominance; Tombalbaye essentially remained the sole ruler of Chad.

Dissatisfaction also grew within the FAT, which was feeling a sense of pride due to its recent successful operations against FROLINAT and wanted to play an active role in the political life of the country. Tombalbaye, for his part, feared the growth of the political power in the army and started reshuffling the army ranks and arresting the most intractable military officers on suspicion of organizing coups. The army eventually revolted and, on 13 April 1975, Tombalbaye was killed during the mutiny. General Félix Malloum—another southerner but with strong kinship ties to the north and a former government critic who was briefly imprisoned by Tombalbaye—became the second president of the country.

Malloum formed the Conseil Suprême Militaire (Supreme Military Council, or CSM), bringing in northerners in large numbers, which marked the beginning of the subsequent shift from southern to northern political
dominance of the country. Soon the CSM became largely Muslim, having more representatives from northern and eastern Chad than the rest of the country. With independence from any outside influence, especially from pro-Tombalbaye France, as its top priority, the new Chadian government, as Nolutshungu stresses, became increasingly “militar[istic] . . . with only a few civilians occupying fairly minor ministerial positions.”\(^{36}\)

Like his predecessor, Malloum strengthened ties with France in the Agreement on Cultural Co-Operation between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Chad signed on 6 March 1976. The agreement envisaged cooperation between the two countries in the areas of education and research, technical education; mutual recognition of diplomas issued by Chad and France; fostering of cultural exchanges and training courses; and the establishment of libraries, research centers, cultural facilities.\(^{37}\) According to another treaty—the Agreement on Technical Military Cooperation between the Government of the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of Chad—France became responsible for “. . . provision of the French military personnel required for organizing the military forces of Chad and their training.”\(^{38}\) France pledged to keep its military in the country for a fixed period that it deemed necessary. This clause allowed France to withdraw from Chad at its own discretion, which also gave some leverage to the Chadian government. In accordance with Article 4, the French forces were to abstain from participation in “operations during wartime nor in maintenance or enforcing law and order.”\(^{39}\) France also undertook the responsibility to provide military equipment and logistical support to the Chadian military and to train its officers at its military educational institutions.\(^{40}\)

Notwithstanding French political, military, and economic backing, problems with the Malloum government soon surfaced. The fact was that the majority of the Chadians were not supportive of Malloum. Even during times of opposition, he was neither a prominent national leader nor a charismatic figure and did not enjoy mass public support. The people did not support

\(^{36}\) Ibid., 94.
\(^{39}\) Ibid.
\(^{40}\) Ibid.
him personally; they were merely against Tombalbaye as such. Being neither potent reformers nor skilled administrators, the CSM leadership could not retain their authority, legitimacy, and popularity from the first days of the coup and largely failed to transform their initial gains into longer-term political stability. Gradually, Malloum’s governance resembled that of his predecessor. He seized control of all branches of government and banned almost all political activities, including the National Union of Chadian Workers, and further prohibited strikes.

Under such circumstances, FROLINAT became the organization that united the opposition against CSM. Feeling considerable liberty in their actions with no large French force around, FROLINAT successfully reestablished alternative administrations in outlying areas to compete with N’Djamena. In the aftermath of defeats in 1968–71, the rebel movement split as a result of chronic internal rivalry between Goukouni and Habré. The former, being generally receptive to Libyan interests, did not want FROLINAT to fight on two fronts: against N’Djamena and against Libya, who had its own stakes in domestic political developments in Chad.

Relations between Chad and Libya resembled those among amiable yet antagonistic neighbors. The strained nature of their interactions was born out of centuries of ethnic, religious, and commercial interactions. The countries shared similar colonial pasts—Chad being a colony of France and Libya of Italy—and the rivalry between the colonial powers framed the relations between their former satellites. Even from the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire, Libya attempted to exercise its influence over Chad. During the colonial period, a decisive event laid the basis for future interventions with Chad. In 1935, under pressure from fascist Germany, France was forced to change its administrative borders in Chad in favor of its colonial next-door neighbor, Benito Mussolini’s Italy, which held what is now independent Libya. As a result of these arrangements, the Libya-Chad boundary was relocated about 100 kilometers south across the Aouzou Strip, a 100,000 square kilometer portion of northern Chad known for its uranium deposits. After mutual independence from their respective colonial powers, Libya attempted to retain the strip by stationing troops in the region.

The Libyan presence did not trouble Goukouni much; for him, the top priority was defeating the central government and then possibly ousting Libya from Aouzou. In contrast, Habré objected to cooperation with Libya, who he
considered an occupying force. Another significant rift within FAN happened when Habré kidnapped a German and two French citizens and subsequently murdered a French security forces officer who came to negotiate a ransom. While Goukouni wanted to free the hostages, fearing retaliation from the Europeans, Habré insisted on keeping them as long as possible to renegotiate ransom. Finally, the French managed to release the hostages after holding direct talks with Habré, which outraged Malloum. At first, he ordered the remaining French forces to leave in retaliation for their alleged connections with the rebellion but then, because of the continuing volatility, Malloum decided to keep several hundred French soldiers in the country and renegotiated a series of military accords to ensure emergency aid from France.

Urged by African heads of state and French advisors to provide for power-sharing political arrangements that would prevent future instability, Malloum attempted to bring Habré and Goukouni into the joint government. However, they soon clashed with each other, and eventually with Malloum. While Habré’s troops engaged Malloum’s forces in the north, Goukouni defeated them in the central parts of the country and threatened N’Djamena. To shore up his position, Malloum offered a formal alliance to Habré, which was embodied in the fundamental charter, forming the coalition government in August 1978. Malloum became president and Habré prime minister of the new government.

The attempted coalition government, however, failed to resolve the conflict now brought to the national level. Feeling marginalized in the new government, Goukouni was now against Malloum and Habré altogether. Composed of three armies and with a new name—the People’s Armed Forces (or Forces Armées Populaires [FAP])—by 1978, FAP held the southern provinces and, in April, approached N’Djamena.

The situation became explosive not only for Malloum, who was faced with the prospect of losing power completely in event of a successful FAP action, but also for the French. France feared the growing strength of FAP, as a Muslim force with the backing of Libya might challenge the commonly accepted view that Africa was under French political, economic, linguistic, religious, and cultural influence. They were highly suspicious of the links between FAP and Libya and that the latter might exploit this situation—in which the central government was weak and the opposition was growing stronger every day—for its own benefit. The French government was also afraid that FAP’s advances would jeopardize their secure access to uranium resources
in Niger, which were vital for France’s nuclear force de frappe, the French nuclear weapons complex of nuclear weapons deterrence.

The second French intervention in April–May 1978 in support of the government was a small-scale and short-term rapid airlift of 1,700 troops with battle aircraft. France created a buffer zone around N’Djamena and heavily bombarded the advancing rebel troops. These actions showed the opposition that the government—even composed of former enemies—enjoyed the strong support of France, who was committed to retaining its influence in the country by keeping the ruling regime in power. As was the case in their first intervention, the French government refrained from deep engagement into Chadian politics and did not aim to completely defeat the FAP, nor were they prepared to act as external guarantors of peace and statebuilding among various Chadian warring factions. The scope and time-limited intervention, however, fulfilled its objectives.

The French presence during this time was restricted to N’Djamena and used minimal resources to achieve its limited goals. The French intervention dissuaded the FAP from further attacks on government forces and the capital, and pushed the rebels back northward to the province of Ati. These French actions revealed an important modus operandi that would reappear in all future French interventions in Chad: persistent conformity to the goals of the recipient of its aid—the government. A decade after its first operation in 1968, France kept the country’s leadership in power, even though this government now included Habré, the actor against whom France had previously fought and with whom it had uneasy relations due to the hostage situation. Ultimately, for France, who actually held in power in Chad was not so important; it still provided military aid to the central government, which was the strongest out of most of the militant groups in the country.

After the victory, the Malloum/Habré coalition, at first, seemed to manage consolidation of its power on the basis of apparent similarities among the interests of its leaders. Both of them opposed Libyan involvement in Chad and managed to reach consensus about rejecting the idea of a federal form of government that would aggravate existing ethnic divisions. At first, they shared a common vision on a secular state where the Arabic language would be given the same status as French, thus keeping Muslim aspirations of the north, backed by Libya, to a minimum. Finally, Malloum and Habré argued equally for a strong state-controlled economy.

The problems within the coalition government began when Habré,
among other things, demanded that more governmental positions be given to northerners and argued for the promotion of Arabic to be used instead of French in radio broadcasting. He also refused to surrender the FAN forces loyal to him under the FAT’s control and insisted on using them as his personal guards, which led to the situation with “de-jure two armies in . . . [a] city of barely quarter of a million souls, one belonging to the president and the other to the prime minister, both armed by France.”41

The tension further escalated when an exchange of anti-Malloum and anti-Habré pamphlets led to clashes between college students supporting rival factions. The final push toward another civil war, this time between Malloum and Habré, came about when three of Habré’s ministers’ passports were seized at the airport, which triggered escalating provocations. The major fighting, known as the first battle for N’Djamena, occurred on 12 February 1979. Interestingly enough, the French military contingent remained neutral and did not take any significant part in the conflict between the two governmental factions. According to French reasoning, the winner of the warring governmental factions would form another government with a new president, which is, actually, what France always did before.

At the same time, France tacitly favored Habré, notwithstanding his kidnapping of French civilians and assassination of a French officer. On only one occasion when French pilots contracted by FAT attacked FAN, did Habré manage to thwart the air raids by threatening retaliation against French civilians. This was essentially one of the most decisive factors in the confrontation; as Azevedo and Nnadozie claim, “Had the French not forced the Chadian government to stop air raids against enemy positions in February 1979, Malloum’s troops would have prevailed on the ground.”42 Thus, although the French government remained formally neutral, protecting only “. . . the central bank, the airport (where its base was), the urban telephone system (there were scarcely any telephones in African quarters), and the Israeli-built international hotel . . .”43 their operational inaction ultimately led to the collapse of Malloum’s CSM.

Demoralized from the abandonment of their French supporters, the FAT retreated from the capital. This withdrawal was followed by mutual retaliations between the retreating southerners and the advancing northerners.

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41 Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, 106.
42 Azevedo and Nnadozie, Chad, 53.
43 Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, 114.
During the battle of N’Djamena, about 1,000 people were killed and more than 80,000 fled the capital. In 10 days, Goukouni’s FAP seized the opportunity offered by the resulting chaos to enter the capital. By March 1979, the struggle led to the de facto partition of Chad: the FAN controlled the north, the capital was under Goukouni’s control, and Malloum’s troops occupied the five southern prefectures.

Postintervention Peacebuilding Attempts

Clashes between Muslims and Christians shifted the conflict from the north deep into the south and led to numerous reconciliation efforts by foreign governments. Four peace conferences with the aim of mediation for neighboring states—primarily Niger—were held from March to August 1979. However, their effectiveness was limited. As ascertained by Thompson and Adloff, the belligerent “... leaders ... wanted more power than they could acquire through a coalition administration and ... believed that they had the strength to seize it.” Although deployment of a peacekeeping force was envisaged at all these conferences, and some military forces (800 Nigerians, for instance) were dispatched, according to Nolutshungu, “they were neither an effective substitute for a police force nor able to disarm the contending factions. They were ... too few to dissuade a determined aggressor nor to decide the outcome of any battle between the indigenous armed political groups—and even less able to impose Nigeria’s choice of leader of the Chadians.” Under such circumstances, the Nigerian peacekeepers could not offer credible third-party guarantees of peace in return for their observance of a peace agreement.

The most important of these conferences was the last one, held in Lagos in 26–27 May 1979, which managed to include all the parties and political and military movements in Chad. Apart from stressing the need for demilitarization, the release of prisoners, amnesty, neutrality in radio broadcasting, and the introduction of a peacekeeping force, the participants agreed to form the GUNT (Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition [Transitional Government of National Unity]), which would reconcile the belligerent forces. GUNT was the major achievement of the reconciliation efforts as it laid down

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44 The Kano Accords (I and II) were held in Nigeria; with the failure of both agreements, the Lagos Accords (I and II) were created.
45 Thompson and Adloff, Conflict in Chad, 91.
46 Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, 124.
the grounds for subsequent postconflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Another positive development was that the distribution of cabinet posts in GUNT was regionally balanced, allowing for rudimentary power-sharing mechanisms. GUNT tried to incorporate all the factional leaders: Goukouni became the country’s president; Kamougue (a southerner and the leader of the Third Liberation Army) became vice president; and Habré, became minister of defense.

From the very start, however, GUNT suffered from problems similar to those of the CSM; an inherent mistrust among its leaders caused the failure to achieve political cohesion. Politically, apart from Habré, all the leading roles in the new government were given to pro-Libyan people, thus antagonizing Habré, one of the main figures of the anti-Libyan movement. The personal rift between Goukouni and Habré during the early years of FROLINAT continued in GUNT. After installing the new government, Goukouni and Habré maintained separate spheres of influence and occupied different parts of N’Djamena. GUNT was also inefficient in implementing power divisions of Lagos, Nigeria, as Thompson and Adloff noted, “. . . none of the key provisions of . . . [Lagos] had been carried out, the cabinet had met only once, the southern prisoners had not been liberated, and none of the African peacekeeping forces had yet arrived in Chad.”

The confrontation between the two leaders led to another civil war that started in March 1980 and lasted for nine months without much change in the standings of the combatants. In December 1980, the second battle for N’Djamena took place. In addition to the FAP and FAN, Kamougue’s southern Third Liberation Army also reached the suburbs of the capital but was pushed back after suffering heavy losses. Almost the entire civilian population of N’Djamena had left the city. Even when 600 Congolese peacekeepers had finally arrived, they, along with the French troops already present, were unable to bring peace to the city, which was divided into several sectors controlled by opposing factions. Fearing that he might lose the war, Goukouni called for Libya to intervene.

**Libyan Interventions**

A number of factors translated into the longtime Libyan interests in Chad. For Libya, the quest for dominance over Chad was a mix of rational calculus

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47 Ibid., 97.
and historical support for the Muslim north. There was a reported cache of minerals in the Aouzou Strip, including uranium, that Libya wanted to possess. At the same time, Libya, having once been a colony, wanted to liberate itself from its past by becoming a colonial power and colonizing Chad. Nolutshungu claimed that, like France, Libya was interested in establishing “[a]t most, a pro-Libyan government, similar in ideology and willing to accept the fait accompli of Libyan incorporation of the Aouzou Strip would be desirable; better still, it should unite with Libya and be led by men in whom Gaddafi had confidence.” Additionally, Libya hoped to reduce the European presence in Africa and project Islamic influence into the Sahel binding Chad and Sudan. Thus, by weakening Chad’s ties with the West and reducing African dependence on the Western nation-state system, Qaddafi hoped to fulfill his dream of a unified Muslim North Africa. Since the Chadian postcolonial government, highly dependent on France both economically and militarily, did not fit into this image, Qaddafi established alliances with several opposition leaders, including Goukouni, Ahmat Acyl (a Chadian of Arab descent and head of CDR [Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire, or Democratic Revolutionary Council]), and Kamougué—all of whom could foster Qaddafi’s interests in the Chadian government and shape their policies in accordance with his views.

In June 1980, GUNT and Libya signed the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, which allowed the Chadian government to treat Libya just as its previous governments had treated France: to call upon it every time the independence, territorial integrity, or internal security of the country should be jeopardized. The treaty defined Chad and Libya as “two fraternal people” with “common destiny and common objectives and aspirations” united by “deep-rooted spiritual, economic, human, and cultural ties.” In accordance with Article 1, “The two Parties shall defend each other if either Party or both Parties are exposed to direct or indirect foreign aggression” and that “any aggression against one Party [shall] constitute aggression against the other.” In Article 6, Libya also pledged to make its “economic, material, and cultural resources available for the economic and military reconstruction

48 Ibid., 147.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
of Chad.”\textsuperscript{52} For its part, Chad committed itself “not to permit the presence of any foreign base or colonialist, imperialist troops in its national territory,” (mostly referring to France) and had “the right to call upon the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for assistance in the event of a threat to its independence, territorial integrity, or internal security.”\textsuperscript{53}

Through this treaty, Libya claimed to support GUNT, which was, according to the 1979 Lagos Accord, the legitimate government of the country. Using this treaty agreement as a pretext, Libyan troops entered Chad in November 1980 at the invitation of Goukouni. Altogether, between 7,000 and 9,000 Libyan troops with tanks and self-propelled artillery, plus 4,500–5,000 soldiers from the Islamic Legion\textsuperscript{54} rapidly occupied posts in northern and central Chad.

The result of the Libyan intervention was the landslide success in suppressing FAN and bringing GUNT to power. Starting from northern Chad, the united front of the GUNT and the Libyan-backed Islamic Legion gained control of N’Djamena on 15 December 1980 as a result of the second battle for N’Djamena. The outcome of the Libyan intervention was devastating for the FAN, which lost nearly all its major battles. In one month, FAN was defeated and Habré was forced to flee to Sudan and reorganize his forces in Abéché, the fourth largest city in Chad. As a concession for its support, Libya made Goukouni agree to the merger of the two countries in January 1981. This was soon, however, disavowed by GUNT after pressure from France and a number of African states that were unreceptive to and even feared such Libyan “enlargement.”

Apart from gaining tangible benefits for itself in the form of institutionalizing Libyan presence in the country and continuous control over the Aouzou Strip, to its credit, the intervention also helped normalize the internal situation in Chad. According to Nolutshungu, “Libya’s . . . presence helped to restrain clashes among GUNT factions, facilitated the withdrawal of forces from the capital and their redeployment elsewhere, and the disarmament of civilians. The Libyan troops were deployed where they were most needed, and . . . held back the advantage of Habré’s rapidly constituted forces . . .”\textsuperscript{55} Libya was also concerned with popular support beyond

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} For more information on these Libyan-sponsored, pan-Arab paramilitary forces, see http://www.soldiers-of-misfortune.com/history/islamic-legion.htm.
\textsuperscript{55} Nolutshungu, \textit{Limits of Anarchy}, 155.
the traditional spheres of its influence in the north and in doing so “had brought money, thus giving a stimulus to economic life...”

As in 1979, the French abstained from intervening and made no effort to support Habré or to fight the Libyans; one reason may have been that he was not the “proper” government. Another reason for France’s inaction may have been that they did not want to escalate the conflict into an interstate war with Libya. Notwithstanding such a lackadaisical approach to the internal situation in Chad, the French government increased their military contingent in the adjoining Central African Republic. Such a move would have acted as a deterrent force to the Libyans and as a credible signal from France that it would have intervened had Libya gone beyond its bounds and made any substantial moves infringing upon Chadian statehood as such. Libya threatened to impose an oil embargo on Chad, which was in all senses illogical as it acted as GUNT’s partner. Eventually, under pressure from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and upon the request of Goukouni, who feared he might lose the country completely to Libya, Qaddafi withdrew his forces from N’Djamena in November 1981.

Libya’s prompt exit from the conflict scene can be justified in several ways. The economic considerations are likely the most plausible explanation. Libya simply could not sustain the cost of widening its intervention to cover the whole country. Its southward advances were quite expedient and Qaddafi did not envisage a large-scale permanent occupation of a foreign country despite his overarching ambitions. Also, in most of Chad, except for its northern part, Libya enjoyed little popular support—its troops were even more alien to the southern Sara than were their Muslim neighbors. Also, it might well have been that Libya wanted to avoid French involvement, which Libya would have thought imminent had it showed aspirations to full dominance over Chad. Yet another reason could have been that Qaddafi wanted to retain an image of a neutral and impartial peacemaker, an ardent supporter of the legitimate government, and a consistent follower of its will, like France. Qaddafi repeatedly mentioned that his “troops were in Chad at the request of the GUNT and its president, and that they would withdraw immediately if the Chadian president demands so.”

Finally, the regional geopolitical climate around Chad also could have influenced Libya’s decision to withdraw. Being in Chad for a long time and assuming responsibility

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56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 156.
for domestic security and, as a consequence, control over the country’s international policy, would mean running the risk of collisions with Chad’s anti-Libyan neighbors, including Sudan, Egypt, and Nigeria.

After Libya retreated, the OAU’s Inter-African Force (IAF) of 2,000 Nigerian, 2,000 Zairian, and 800 Senegalese soldiers entered Chad. Because of the vague mandate of the peacekeeping force and the hesitations of all three countries to openly engage any force, the IAF made no effort to block Habré’s military comeback after Libya’s exit. The most decisive factor in abstaining from fighting against Habré was that IAF countries wished to prevent Libya from spreading its influence in North Africa, where Habré could play an instrumental role.

After his defeat, it took Habré almost a year to regain control of the north. In response, GUNT again sought Libyan support but was refused. Qaddafi believed that the military advantage was on FAN’s side and that he might lose these battles if he openly confronted Habré’s rapidly advancing forces. On an emotional level, Qaddafi was also “hurt” by changes in GUNT’s stance regarding the presence of his troops in Chad and the denunciation of the merger deal. Eventually, Libya decided against assisting Goukouni militarily, which sharply contrasts with the general pattern of French involvement. Facing little resistance from the GUNT or the IAF, for that matter, Habré moved toward N’Djamena and, on 7 June 1982, victoriously entered the capital and proclaimed himself head of state.

**French and Libyan Interventions**

After his defeat, Goukouni did not vanish from the political scene completely. Numbering from 3,000 to 4,000, his own troops were joined by the remnants of FAP, FAT, CDR, the First Liberation Army, the Volcan Army, and the Western Armed Forces, now united against FAN. The new force—Armée Nationale de Libération (National Liberation Army or ANL)—had a total strength of 12,000 troops. Habré had also regrouped his forces and the new Forces Armées Nationales du Tchadiennes (National Armed Forces of Chad or FANT) had an estimated 10,000 troops. At first, Goukouni managed to make some progress on the battlefield. In June 1983, after a decisive bombing of FANT’s forces by Libya, Goukouni captured Faya-Longueau, the largest city in northern Chad. Moving farther south, ANL occupied Kalait, Oum-Chalouba, and, finally, Abéché. Unlike in June 1982, Libya now decided to assist Goukouni. Qaddafi feared that Habré, if he
gained momentum, might endanger his possession of the Aouzou Strip.

Habré was also seeking help from the outside, however, without much success. Finally, he took command of FANT’s forces. He first liberated Abéché four days after the city’s fall, then Faya-Largeau, and finally retook the northern posts. Habré’s counterattack in the north led to an inevitable collision with the Libyan contingents stationed there. The Libyan force, who enjoyed overwhelming superiority in military power (around 4,000–5,000 troops), tanks, armored personnel carriers, battle aircrafts, self-propelled artillery, and multiple rocket launchers, eventually expelled the FANT from Faya-Largeau.

Seeing that Chad might fall to Libyan dominance, which France was eager to prevent, it finally decided to intervene. This created a four-player intervention game where each of the belligerents had a corresponding “patron-state.” This internationalization of the domestic conflict in Chad, however, did not escalate into an open conflict between France and Libya, since their respective interventions “… had some of the characteristics of a cooperative game. Each kept to its side of the line of demarcation, France unwilling to retake the north for Habré and Libya unwilling to press its military advantage to help the GUNT move toward the capital…”58 None of the players involved were ready for a tête-à-tête fight and both were afraid of taking the Chadian civil war to the level of an international conflict. Therefore, France and Libya separately decided to limit themselves to a mere show of force, abstaining from any direct military confrontations on the battleground.

With the aim of preventing Libya from a large-scale and long-term occupation of Faya-Largeau and minimizing its role in Chadian domestic politics, in particular, and in the African continent, in general, France initiated Operation Manta (Stingray in French) in August 1983. The operation consisted of an airlift of 180 military advisors and equipment, followed by 3,500 troops, including air force, Foreign Legion, and airborne personnel. French troops used the same tactics as before: they secured N’Djamena and fortified their positions near the routes leading to the capital, where the government was based. France also tried to separate the belligerents via a no-fly zone on the 16th parallel to the north in an attempt to halt Libyan bombings.

By 1983, the country was divided into two parts: BET belonged to the...

58 Ibid., 189.
ANL, and the rest of Chad to the FANT. Libya was increasing its presence in the region by building new, modern radar stations and bringing in additional troops. The country was on the verge of collapse, and the conflict threatened to develop into an international war between France and Libya. Seeing this, in September 1984, the two intervenors decided to de-escalate the conflict and pledged to pull French troops from Chad and Libyan troops from the contested Aouzou Strip. The promise, however, was fulfilled only by France, who left the country in November in accordance with the agreement, while Libya kept 3,000 troops in the BET.

The outcome of the French intervention was to restrain Libya from further advances southward and threatening N'Djamena. Operation Manta delivered on the credible threat of punishment to the ANL and its supporter (Libya). At the same time, Libya did not want to engage in open conflict with France. The no-fly zone helped the FANT strengthen its position in the regions immediately adjoining the demarcation line. Finally—although after France had retreated, Libya remained in the BET—Operation Manta stalled further occupation of the territories beyond the BET. France’s presence also led to a rapid increase in the numbers of the FANT and improved the morale of its soldiers because of ANL defections and dissent, among other things. At that point, the FANT included around 15,000 personnel from the former “Codos Rebellion” in the south. As a result, Libya decided to increase its presence in Chad, and the combined ANL-Libyan forces totaled 10,000 soldiers in Tibesti and Fada.

Libya strengthened its position by building a new airbase and radar stations, which galvanized the French to return in February 1986 with Operation Épervier (Sparrowhawk) with 2,500 personnel, including a detachment of top-level Jaguar and Mirage attack aircraft. This deployment, however, was not an intervention in the full military sense. French troops participated only

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59 Human Rights Watch offers some historical background on the conflict in Chad on its Web site, saying that “Upon his ascension to power, Habré sought to impose his authority in the country’s southern region. Habré’s FAN, which had become the regular army and would eventually be called the National Armed Forces of Chad (FANT), took over the main southern towns, leading to the emergence of an armed, fiercely anti-Habré opposition, the ‘Codos’ (for ‘commandos’). This opposition further incited Habré, and the resulting tension gave way to the ‘Black September’ of 1984. . . . Repression against the southern opposition turned exceptionally violent, targeting not only the Codos rebels, but also civilians and administrative officials suspected of complicity. The rebellion was crushed and the region devastated.” The Codos Rebellion was insignificant for the purposes of this chapter, however, since it had neither serious consequences for future political developments in Chad, nor did it cause any third-party interventions.
in a few military activities, but instead used “swaggering” tactics to dissuade Libyans from attacking N’Djamena and Abéché. The only French force in the BET, where active military operations were occurring, was a group of 150 engineers engaged in demining the territories.

The build-up of the FANT and the French contingent coincided with a split within ANL. Acyl was receiving separate assistance from Libya, which antagonized other factions. This led to resentment of Goukouni’s own forces, especially the FAP, toward Libyan presence in the north and their unwillingness to continue the offensive against the FANT. This discord escalated into an open military confrontation between the FAP and the CDR. The latter, with Libyan support, forced Goukouni’s men, who accounted for around two-thirds of the ANL reserve, to retreat to the mountains. Under such circumstances, Goukouni made a reverse move and sided with his old rival, the FANT. Such a betrayal to Libya was very much favored by Habré, who signed an agreement with the FAP while Goukouni was under house arrest in Tripoli in October 1986.

At first, the FAP launched attacks against the CDR but was pushed back by the Libyans to the Tibesti Mountains. In December 1986, Libyan armored columns attacked the FAP settlements in Tibesti using napalm and poison gas, forcing them to retreat. At the same time—with the economic help of France and well equipped for desert war with light Toyota pick-ups carrying arms (the so-called “technical”)—the FANT attacked the CDR and Libyan troops in Fada. The Libyans, with the Islamic Legion’s heavy armored tanks, were not suited for such warfare, where highly maneuverable Toyotas can fire antitank missiles and recoilless rifles from close range. Libya’s total losses mounted to 700 dead, 150 war prisoners, and $1 billion worth of military equipment.\(^60\)

This defeat, however, did not stop Qaddafi from making yet another attempt to regain control over the BET. He resumed his offensive in February 1987 with a total of 11,000 troops without success. The FANT had not only crushed the two tank squadrons but also managed to capture the Libyan base in the north. The Libyan death toll reached 1,200 and an additional 450 soldiers were captured, which came as a severe blow to Libya, further decreasing the already low morale of its military. Without the hope for intervention from the government or any support from its former Chadian

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\(^60\) Azevedo and Nnadozie, *Chad*, 59.
allies, Libya found itself deeply bogged down in Chad as an occupant, not a liberator or helper. Libyan troops were isolated in unfamiliar terrain and, with no effective radar systems or an airbase to guide air strikes in support of their ground personnel, they could inflict no real harm on highly mobile FANT units.

Eventually, suffering heavy losses in personnel and military equipment and failing to reach its goal to secure the north for the CDR and to spread its influence in the BET, Libya retreated. In turn, the FANT successfully attacked the town of Aouzou, urging Libyans to leave their base. Libya retaliated by bombing the northern cities occupied by the FANT. At this time, Habré appealed to France for intervention, although without success. The French government did want to have a presence in Chad yet did not want to intervene in Aouzou, a territory under Libyan dominance. The French Ministry of Defence declared that neither French soldiers nor aircraft would intervene on behalf of the Chadian government to liberate northern Chad from Libyan occupation and that the 1,000 French troops and aircraft stationed in N'Djamena would be used exclusively to defend the capital.

The FANT was left alone and, as a result, was driven out of Aouzou by Libyan air strikes and followed by ground troops mimicking Chad’s own desert warfare tactics with the use of Toyota technicals. Habré responded with a surprise attack on the Libyan airbase, killing 1,000 and capturing 300 soldiers as well as a considerable number of Libyan fighter aircraft and helicopters. Also, France tacitly assisted Habré by establishing an air defense system to prevent any further Libyan military action south of the 16th parallel as well as bombing the Libyan radar installation at Qadi-Doum. Finally, seeing the fruitlessness of further military confrontation, both Habré and Qaddafi suspended fighting. The Chadian and Libyan foreign ministers met in August 1988, and the two governments agreed to conduct further talks with OAU mediation. Chad suspended its attempts to regain the Aouzou Strip, and Libya stopped bombing the southern regions of the country. The two states subsequently signed an agreement that ended their confrontation, while the Aouzou Strip remained in Libyan hands until 1994.61

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61 The dispute over the Aouzou Strip between Chad and Libya was taken to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1990 for a binding ruling. According to the ICJ decision made on 3 February 1994, the land will remain within Chad. The Aouzou Strip was formally transferred from Libya to Chad on 30 May 1994. See “The Summary of the Summary Judgment of 3 February 1994,” International Court of Justice, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=424&code=dt&p1=3&p2=3&case=83&k=cd&p3=5.
From 1989 onward, Habré pursued a mix of national reconciliation policies and punishments for faction leaders who openly and actively opposed his regime. In domestic politics, he advocated for national integrity and a unified state. When faced with internal threats to his regime, he used repression tactics against his political opponents. On the international level, Habré expressed a strong preference for French rather than Libyan patronage. France continued to maintain a sizable military and security presence in Chad as well as to provide strong economic and financial support.

Meanwhile, inter-religious and interethnic rivalry continued in Chad. Collisions among different ethnic groups and clans, especially among the representatives of Hadjerai, Zaghawa, and Gorane factions in the central government, led to the defection of Idriss Déby—a Zaghawa and one of Habré’s leading generals—to Darfur, Sudan, in April 1989. In December 1990, with no opposition from the French military stationed in Chad, Déby successfully occupied N’Djamena and ousted Habré to Senegal. Three months later, Déby, supported by his MPS (Mouvement Patriotique du Salut [Patriotic Salvation Movement]), became the new president of Chad, ending this era of foreign interventions but not necessarily the domestic insecurities.

**Analysis of Interventions**

The modus operandi of French interventions in Chad developed as a result of the intricate interplay of its domestic politics, perceptions of its role on the international arena, and the changing nature of the international environment by the 1960s. Ever since its former colony’s independence, France had been playing an important role in domestic Chadian politics by supporting its governments in many military, economic, and administrative forms. The French presence in Chad was always noticeable; their troops had either physically been present in Chad for a limited time or were stationed in neighboring states with the purpose of coming to the aid of the governments at any time. France was the most important supplier of economic aid through development assistance, loans, and other grants to support the

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Chadian economy. Although no longer a consumer of Chad’s agricultural goods, as was the case during colonial times, French economic assistance still accounted for a substantial part of the country’s budget.

At the same time, France had its own intervention goals, some of which had nothing to do with Chad per se. Important insights into France’s continuous support and presence in Chad were given by Nolutshungu:

In France, the fate of Chad was always linked to the security of French influence over the rest of his former colonies in tropical Africa. The kind of domino theory seemed to apply: if one were lost . . . others might be lost (or abandoned); if France were unable to protect one dependent state, its guarantees to others might become less credible. . . . France’s global status as well as its African economic interests and prestige would be undermined.63

So, from a purely realist perspective, by supporting the Chadian (legitimate) governments in their struggle with the (illegitimate) opposition, France was both reinstating the legitimacy of its involvement in the political lives of its former colonies as well as caring for its influence in the region. France considered Chad an inherent component of its security and wanted to maintain a stable situation.

Starting in 1968, all subsequent French interventions were consistent with France’s roles in international politics throughout the 1960s, known as Gaulism (after its prominent president Charles de Gaulle). France had to possess the nuclear force de frappe, emphasizing its grandeur in the world political arena and fulfilling its special mission of spreading democracy worldwide. In this way, the reasons for French intervention were deeply rooted, as Chaigneau noted, in their “need for . . . global presence and influence, [with] Africa having a major role to play in such a scheme.”64 Successful international operations of France, especially outside the statutory borders of Europe, would affirm its (regional) superpower status and would show to the allies in NATO that France was capable of acting independently on the international arena (especially when France led the NATO integrated military command in 1966). Also, restoring its international role would allow France to redeem itself domestically from the stigma of the German

63 Nolutshungu, Limits of Anarchy, 11.
occupation during WWII and revive the potency of the country in the eyes of its own citizens.

There was yet another reason for French involvement in Africa, and specifically in Chad: the desire to limit the influence of pro-Soviet and radically Islamist Libya in territory it considered its backyard. France opposed Libyan advances in north-central Africa, specifically Chad, because Libya might have brought overwhelming “Islamization” into the country. Even worse, this would have meant the “Arabization” of the Chadian population and a slow decrease in the use of the French language, presaging the demise of the French cultural atmosphere and mimicking what occurred during the first years of Habré’s rule. As a result, France stood to lose the traditional links between the French and their former African colonies. The Libyan build-up in the Aozou Strip also threatened France’s access to the uranium resources of neighboring Niger, which were vital for France’s national interests.65

The success of French interventions was largely due to three factors: France’s support for the ruling political factions of Chad, the externalization of interventions through limited operational involvement, and the institutional approach to interventions. The first variable that characterized the continuous pattern of French interventions and that made them largely successful in different circumstances was the direction of French support. France always channeled its aid to the government that, in most cases, was the strongest of all military factions in Chad. This path dependence for providing support to the nominal governments of Chad often took paradoxical forms, particularly when former enemies of the government relied on continuous French backing once in office. For instance, during the first intervention in 1968, France protected Tombalbaye against FROLINAT and then it supported Malloum, who overthrew Tombalbaye, against FROLINAT. Furthermore, during Operations Manta and Épervier, France assisted Habré, in spite of the fact that the French did not particularly like him due to his past anti-France rhetoric and hostile acts against French citizens.

This stance stemmed from the general “paternalistic” attitude that committed France to support its Francophone African states. As Prunier states,

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France has always considered Africa “le pré carré,” or our own backyard, and viewed itself as “a large hen followed by a docile brood of little black chicks”\(^\text{66}\) to be taken care of. France had always been committed to supporting countries with common historical ties. This attitude was galvanized by the \textit{lingua franca} of the continent (French), which played a decisive role in keeping France and its former colonies together under the common “threat” of Anglo-Saxon influence. With specific reference to Chad, the French government remembered the loyal role that the Chadian government played in the Second World War under its ex-governor Félix Eboué and were grateful for its support of de Gaulle’s Free France\(^\text{67}\) at that time. In its interventions in independent Chad, France continued to shield Chad’s various governments from domestic disturbances in the face of sometimes blatantly nondemocratic practices.

Another reason for supporting the government lay in its purely rational calculus. France preferred to maintain security in Francophone Africa and protect its economic and political interests in particular states. In most cases, state governments, having a comparative advantage through military and economic resources and larger territorial coverage, were stronger than the opposition factions and easier to assist by limited outside inputs into actions against various rebellions. Also, in terms of legitimacy, it was much easier to support nominal governments who had the task of preserving security in their respective countries rather than to contribute to the capacities of the opposition who posed threats to security and domestic stability.

The second factor contributing to the success of French interventions was that France always remained an external player. This stance was born out of a general postcolonial vision of France limiting its large-scale interventions and heavy military presence in African countries. Starting from the policies of decolonization, France tried to avoid deep immersion into conflicts on the continent, thus distancing itself from being a significant domestic actor for the African nations. This separation from internal African politics and conflicts was apparent in France’s attitude toward those they supported during interventions as well as in their operational choices. In nearly all its inter-


ventions, France closely followed the commitment to disassociate from the peculiarities of turbulent Chadian politics, the belligerents, and their internal rivalries. This externalized intervention approach was reflected by their limited agendas, scopes, geographic coverage, and allocation of resources.

Starting from the first intervention to preserve Tombalbaye’s regime, as well as ensuing attempts to save subsequent rulers, France never aimed to replace the Chadian government in any way. It did, however, reject the idea of exercising domestic law enforcement functions and other administrative tasks, which would have reminded both Chad and France of their colonial past and would have meant a long-term commitment of enormous economic and political resources. Neither did France want to install any external authority and put in place its “own” people, as this action would be uncomfortably reminiscent of their former colonial engagement from which France wanted to redeem itself.

Furthermore, France never intended to commit itself to upholding the security of the Chadian state with a large-scale presence. This position stemmed from France’s general stance toward African countries, which was not to be bogged down in the domestic affairs in Africa. It did prefer stability in the region, however, not through massive military interventions. This stance largely limited the goals of French interventions in Chad. France had never intervened with the aim of the total destruction of various opposition factions, which would have antagonized the population to support the faction against the French government. Neither had it undertaken the role of peacekeeper, under which it would have been bound to provide external security guarantees for the warring parties. Moreover, France had never actually led or mediated any formal peace talks or negotiations or made any agreement with FROLINAT to end the conflict, except for the release of French citizens.

Although the French presence in Chad was always felt, troops had never been stationed in the country for lengthy periods of time. Their interventions had a repeated but not continuous or prolonged character. France had never maintained a large-scale presence in Chad, except for during actual interventions, and it would always withdraw its military forces immediately afterward. During noncombat phases, French personnel on the ground were limited to military training officers and service personnel of the N’Djamena International Airport. The French detachments operated on their own; they did not mix with the Chadian Army and always represented
a separate entity. Thus, the French created a sense of credible autonomy for the Chadians, who believed they were acting on their own. Such a position facilitated high morale within the Chadian ranks, believing they were supported by a strong patron while having a sense of self-sufficiency.

This externalized approach to interventions led to a limited operational scope. On very few occasions did the French directly collide with the opposition factions’ military detachments. France did not have substantial face-to-face combat with Libya, which protected France and Libya equally from an international conflict. This also allowed France to maintain limited combat losses that presupposed popular domestic support for its military operations. The narrow scope of the operations also limited their geographical coverage. Unlike the Libyan troops who were largely scattered over the northern Chadian terrain, the French always maintained an encapsulated pattern of deployment when present, being stationed in N’Djamena and protecting the inbound routes. These tactics allowed them to keep good communication lines, highly mobile troops, and a dense concentration of manpower in the case of combat, but also to avoid extensive combat casualties. Also, unlike the Libyans, the French military had never been forced to operate in an unknown and hostile environment against the wishes of the population; they were in N’Djamena and close to the capital where the locals were usually very receptive to the French presence.

Finally, a very important aspect of the French interventions was that they were institutionalized both in the eyes of local Chadians and the international community. Institutional frameworks were achieved by supporting the Chadian government, which had a legitimate institutional authority, and by legalizing their presence in the country through corresponding legal acts. By supporting an actor with at least nominal institutional legitimacy—the government with its administrative apparatus, military, and law enforcement agencies—France institutionalized its presence in the country. France also provided institutional assistance to the Chadian governments by fostering power-sharing constitutional mechanisms. The Chadian leaders enjoyed French support not because of their personal qualities but because of the offices they held. Opposition factions, on the other hand, lacked the institutional legitimacy of the national government; their legitimacy was confined to their specific regions.

From a legal standpoint, the basis for French interventions came from different multilateral and bilateral cooperation agreements signed with the
African states. For instance, the defense agreement between France and the members of the AEF (Afrique Équatoriale Française [French Equatorial Africa], which included Chad, the Central African Republic, and the Congo) was signed on 15 August 1960.\textsuperscript{68} In accordance with its terms, military forces of the AEF states “shall participate, with the French armed forces, under a single command, in the joint defence system.”\textsuperscript{69} The agreement gave France the right “to discharge its responsibilities with respect to their joint defence” but granted “the French armed forces free use of the bases they require.”\textsuperscript{70} France would “provide the [states] with the aid needed to constitute their armed forces.”\textsuperscript{71} This included, but was not limited, to “unimpeded movement on the territory, in the air space and in the territorial waters . . . exercises and maneuvers . . . use[age of] port, sea and river, road, railway, and air installations . . .”\textsuperscript{72} The “discharge from responsibilities” clause meant that France would intervene to salvage the Chadian regimes from internal and external threats whenever France deemed it necessary, thus letting France act upon its sole discretion.

In return, France was obliged not only to provide economic support and military technical assistance to the Chadian Army, including training and coaching of Chadian officers, but also to protect Chad against external threats and provide domestic security, law, and order. This particular clause was invoked by Malloum when he asked for French assistance to put down FROLINAT. The agreement with its legal force would have tied France to a long-term commitment and the provision of permanent aid to the government, which could have been a serious burden. Such a legalized institutional approach to interventions from the viewpoint of Chadian domestic politics was significant in maintaining public support for the French intervenors. As a result, they were never considered intervenors but rather as genuine protectors of security and keepers of stability in the country.

The other intervenor in Chad—Libya—carried out its vital national interests in Chad for nearly two decades. Unlike the usual intervention scenarios that would commonly start at a certain point in time and end with fulfillment or failure to achieve their goals, Libyan actions resembled more of a systemat-
ic occupation and annexation of a foreign territory. With its forces stationed in the north and center of the country, Libya was introducing its own national ID cards and currency, educating young people in Chad, establishing local committees, and flying Libyan flags on Chadian government buildings. The key reason for the continuous failure of Libyan interventions was a direct result of such actions. Unlike France, who always viewed itself as an external player to Chad, Libya strived to become an internal actor on the Chadian domestic political scene from the very beginning of its involvement. Libya did not want to be merely an intervenor with its own agenda, but an occupant of and service provider for the territories it covered. While the French government entered Chad only when needed or requested, the Libyans were interested in the long-term prospect of territorial annexation. Even when their actions were backed by bilateral treaties with the Chadian government, these accords were merely a cover for Libya’s real goal, which was the creation of a unified Arab state.

Failures of subsequent Libyan interventions can also be explained by the overexpansion of its territorial hold in Chad and general intervention agendas, which eventually turned out to be absolutely fatal. While stationed in Aouzou, its troops could easily coordinate their actions, receive continuous supplies of military equipment and ammunition from Libya proper, and economically sustain their presence. They could also install their own administrations (which they, in fact, did) and conduct heavy expansion of Libyan culture and tradition as well as the Arabic language. Additionally, limited territorial coverage allowed Libyans to effectively survey the land installations and back up their infantry actions by aircraft fire. Once Libya decided to engage southward, however, it proved difficult to effectively sustain the presence of its troops in larger territories and on unknown terrain. Airlifts of cargo from Libya proper became increasingly difficult; air surveillance was limited due to the absence of radar installations in the south and troops on the ground received no air support. Libya also had to operate in a territory populated by other ethnic groups, which, apart from decreasing soldiers’ morale, led to greater popular resistance.

An important factor that contributed to the internalization of Libya’s intervention and its failures was that its actions went beyond mere operational presence by undertaking the external responsibility for domestic security and governance for the northern Chadian territories. Like France, Libya also wanted to be institutionalized in Chad but, for Libya, institutionalization was
tantamount to territorial gain. As a result of remaining in the Aouzou Strip for long periods, Libya became deeply immersed in domestic Chadian politics and its problems. This involvement intensified even as Qaddafi tried to rein in Libya’s commitments in Chad. However, Libya could not indefinitely remain in another state’s sovereign territory without a defined legal status. A decision had to be made either to legally institutionalize its presence in northern Chad by complete unification with Libya or to retreat. Libya could not claim to have wide support for its actions in the international community as well as in Chad due to its antagonism toward the West and its values. It also had poor relations with powerful actors in the international arena, such as the United States and the former USSR. Thus, it was unable to effectively annex Chadian territory or receive international blessing for its actions. As a result, Libya chose the least beneficial option of all—to remain a de facto government in Chad as long as possible—undertaking an increasing number of state functions and responsibilities that it was unable to bear.

Another significant contributor to the continuous failures of Libyan interventions was that it primarily supported the opposition rather than the legitimate government. The majority of the country’s population saw Libya as an unwelcome outsider because it acted on behalf of the opposition, which was usually operationally, militarily, and economically weaker than the government it fought against. Libya’s inputs barely equalized the capacities of the belligerents. A clear example of these poor choices can be seen in the fight against Habré’s FAN once it came to power. The opposition was tactically and operationally inferior to FAN, and Libya proved unable to effectively enforce its will against the government. Although FAN received no sizable assistance from the French, who mainly played the role of observers and protectors of European expats, Habré’s troops fought a decisive war that, according to David Ottaway, was the result of “the most successful collaboration between a Western army and a Third World army in modern times.”

After its initial defeat at N’Djamena, FAN forces became operationally more suited to desert warfare and tactically flexible. The Libyan Army, on the other hand, “. . . favored conventional Soviet-style operations in which infantry are backed up by armor, making them vulnerable to [the] FAN’s hit-and-run tactics.” As for its single victory against Habré in 1988, the Libyans drove the FAN out of previously occupied Aouzou by mim-

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icking FAN usage of highly maneuverable light vehicles and short-range self-propelled missiles.

Only on one occasion did Libya manage to fulfill its intervention agenda, and this was in the late 1980s when its troops brought the GUNT to power. Libyan troops succeeded in helping the GUNT stifle the FAN and, for almost a year, pushed Habré’s supporters out of N’Djamena. Libya was successful primarily due to the operational superiority of the combined Libyan-GUNT troops who possessed more advanced military equipment and generally outnumbered the FANT. However, the most important factor was that the GUNT, while being in exile, was still the legitimate government of Chad. As with the French interventions, institutionalization became the crucial determinant of success for Libyan actions. On the basis of the official agreement with Goukouni, Libya supported the GUNT, a legal entity installed as a result of the peace conference held in Lagos in 14–21 August 1979. Apart from securing public support in Chad, this agreement allowed Qaddafi to represent himself as a peacemaker, not an annexing power, and to distract international attention from his real interests in Chad.

If Libya had enjoyed popular support in the territories to the north, including their fellow Arabs and other African Muslims, the positive response to their presence in Chad decreased with their movement south. The south had always rejected northern domination, especially when this supremacy was installed and supported by an outside force. As Libyans began aiding the legitimate government of the country, Tripoli’s actions also looked legitimate, helping it achieve a certain level of popular support entrusted to the GUNT.

The institutionalization of interventions became an indispensible precondition for success for both internal Chadian politics and the international arena. The institutionalized intervention amplified the confidence of Libyans and Chadians that they were acting for the right cause and the right government. Qaddafi went even further and claimed that, since Goukouni had asked Libya to intervene, he might also ask it to depart. Libya, as a responsible member of the international community, would respect this request and leave. This may also have been a face-saving maneuver as, following Goukouni’s request, Libya did, in fact, leave.

The GUNT’s legitimacy, nurtured and endorsed by four reconciliation conferences, might have been an additional reason why France did not

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75 This conference was also known as Lagos II. Lagos was Nigeria’s capital after independence until the seat of the government was transferred to Abuja in 1991.
support Habré in 1980–81. Although then minister of defense, Habré was still an opposition rebel who, fresh out of the GUNT, was acting against the legitimate government that France had once supported. A logical question to ask would be why France did not support the GUNT as a legally placed government, as it did with Habré’s government. A possible explanation could be that the GUNT enjoyed backing Libya—with whom France had a competitive relationship in the region—and Chad. It was difficult for the French leadership to arrange popular support at home for their possible cooperation with a country that, if not an enemy, was certainly not a friendly state, and whose influence threatened France’s interests in Africa. Thus, a rational explanation, taking into account the general line of French support for legitimate governments in Chad (no matter who was in office) would be that, once a new government was in place, France could easily exercise influence over it.

**Conclusions**

The conflict in Chad and its concurrent interventions represent various degrees of success in fulfilling the intervenors’ objectives. One of the reasons for their successes was the remarkable path dependency in their actions (i.e., it is easier and more efficient to continue down the same path than to attempt a reversal of action). France and Libya were victorious if they supported legitimate government factions that were, in most instances, operationally stronger than opposition forces. Libya failed each time it provided aid to the usually weaker opposition. In both cases—France and Libya—the interventions triumphed when they were backed by institutional arrangements enshrined in formal legal agreements. Even when Libya supported the GUNT in opposition to Habré’s rule, it was still considered by the international community as the Chadian government in exile, on behalf of which Libya made a commitment to intervene. The direction of third-party support had an important effect on subsequent developments: the government-sponsoring intervenor enjoyed a higher degree of legitimacy locally (in the target country), domestically (in its own country), and internationally. Hence, an intervenor is considered by the populations abroad and at home as having a noble task to uphold law and order, which helps the intervenor achieve its objectives. In contrast, when the intervenor aided the opposition, it only had the backing of that party and its supporters that, by definition, was quite limited.
Another decisive element in the success of interventions was the externalization of the intervention, which contributed to a higher degree of success. Having distanced themselves from the parties involved, French troops made it easier operationally and logistically to stay out of the target country and intervene only upon the request of the party they supported. The French presence remained largely external to the situation in Chad, allowing France to retain its limited agenda. France did provide administrative and governance support by urging the Chadian authorities to carry out governance reforms. These actions, however, were mostly ad hoc in character and were not an inherent part of multidimensional intervention agendas, which France clearly did not have. In contrast, Libya's decision to extend its presence by going out of the area—both literally and figuratively—extending its territorial coverage and including additional components of intervention, such as statebuilding and external governance, worked against its ability to effectively achieve its intervention goals. As a result, Libya's interventions appeared too close to the quagmire of local Chadian politics and too far from Tripoli.

Limited intervention agendas also complement the externalization of actions. Both France and Libya were effective when they espoused narrower goals; the former not wanting to engage in long-term conflict with the opposition and succeeding in having a say in Chadian affairs, and the latter effectively maintaining its presence in a small area of the Aouzou Strip. Once Libya surpassed its initial scope of intervention, it could hardly sustain a multidimensional presence comprising infantry, armored vehicles, artillery, and air power, as well as public administrators on such a large territory away from its home base. Such an endeavor would have required not only a high degree of coordination between highly dispersed units but also a huge economic commitment to maintain its presence. It turned out to be a daunting task for Libya to move south and to attempt to provide for the local administration of the territories it was covering, mainly due to its limited economic resources and the diversity of the population it encountered on this path.

As is clear from the above analysis of interventions conducted by different external actors in a single geopolitical environment, the peace-centric approach to judging the success of interventions fails completely. Neither France nor Libya intended to bring peace to war-torn Chad or to contribute to peacebuilding efforts. A sustainable postconflict settlement is impossi-
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...ble to achieve without intergroup reconciliation processes. These should include, among others, statebuilding efforts via the “international conservatorship,” as discussed by Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner, which includes direct external governance by the multinational community replacing inept domestic forces; Arend Lijphart’s “consociational democracy” via power-sharing mechanisms where third parties successfully coerce the warring factions to agree upon joint participation in the country’s political, economic, and cultural life; or Chaim Kaufmann’s “reconstruction of ethnic identities,” where fluid and constructed identities can be reconstructed by skillful “ethnic entrepreneurs” or even physical separation of the belligerents into their defensive enclaves.

The interventions of France and Libya had none of these aims; they pursued their own sometimes rational, in most cases not, national interests that were not always aligned even with the parties they supported. Neither France nor Libya exhibited altruistic desires to end the interethnic strife in Chad. France shied away from the responsibility of full-scale intervention with subsequent multidimensional peacebuilding efforts that would get them bogged down in Chadian domestic politics. Libya, on the contrary, became only partially involved based on its own selfish concerns, which distanced it from most of the Chadian population.

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Chapter Seven

Political Economy and Stability in Nigeria

by Clarence J. Bouchat*

Nigeria represents the best and worst of what African states offer the world. The country is a mosaic of more than 250 different ethnic groups and languages that serve as a crossroad between various forms of Christianity, Islam, and indigenous beliefs, and Western, Arab, and native influence. Its expansive land area supports productive agricultural land and immense deposits of oil and natural gas rated as the tenth and ninth largest in world reserves, respectively.¹ Nigeria possesses international political clout through its strong military forces and active role in peace operations, and is recognized for its diplomatic leadership in international organizations like the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and as a founding member of the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).² Its population of 177 million people also makes Nigeria by far the largest state in Africa, and the eighth most populous country in the world.³

Nigeria also demonstrates many of the problems that plague much of Africa’s need for stability and progress. Nigerians have routinely endured strife along their many internal differences from the bloody 1967–70 civil war to more than a million Nigerians displaced by internal turmoil between

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1999 and 2004. Its larder of natural resources brings in much needed foreign revenue, but also stands as a vast source of corruption, internecine conflict, and degradation to the environment and agricultural livelihoods. Nigeria’s history since independence in 1960 has been tossed by political tumult with numerous military coups and autocratic governments, four different republics, and a poor human rights record. Such problems have hobbled economic, social, and human development in Nigeria, which suffers a low gross domestic product per capita (purchasing power parity [PPP]) of $2,800 (180th in the world), a literacy rate of only 61 percent, life expectancy of 52.6 years (212th in world), and poverty rate at 70 percent, all making Nigeria one of the 20 poorest countries per capita in the world. The country is noted as a hub for cybercrimes, drug and human trafficking, piracy, and extremism, as well as disease and general human suffering.

The paradox that is Nigeria offers much to its citizens and the world, but has been unable to deliver on its potential or realize its aspirations. Although currently enjoying a positive trend of strong economic growth and improving democratic resiliency, the fundamental problems that have challenged Nigerian progress through its history remain simmering. These issues have been ascribed to many complex causes, including its colonial legacy, international intrigue, poverty, and the cultural and religious conflicts that often leave Nigeria teetering at the edge of instability and liable to fracture. However, the root cause for these and many other problems may be the result of the political economy of Nigeria and the resulting centrifugal and centripetal forces that hold Nigeria as a unified state in the balance.

To test this assertion, this chapter will first explain the definition of political economy employed here, particularly as it pertains to why Nigeria wavers on the edge of failing as a state through the negative interaction of competing economics, politics, and societies and the resulting rampant

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corruption. We then analyze where and why fissures may occur that could destroy the unity of the Nigerian state.

The Political Economy of a State in Turmoil

In the daily routines of citizens and states alike, politics, economics, and culture are strong interrelated influencers. These are each encompassed in the useful term “political economy,” which is concerned with the “interconnection of economic and political structures in social formation.” The central use of political economy for our purposes considers the mutual influence of economic activities and policies with politics and its ideologies, cultural and historic factors, and the self-interests of affected groups. These broad interlocking concepts include several elements of the political economy that support this analysis to include formation of self-interested group action, redistribution of public economic gain, effects of cultural background, and reform and development in the political, economic, and social aspects of Nigeria. The economy in terms of its benefits and rewards, as they influence and are influenced by political and social activities and organizations, is our primary focus.

Despite its daunting intricacies, political economy is a rather self-evident concept. By our nature, human beings want to influence those things of most significance to us. Economic well-being ranks high in importance in meeting human needs, so it is not surprising that political and cultural associations would be formed to influence economic outcomes to benefit an individual or group. Indeed, classic economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo primarily addressed political economy issues in their works. It was not until the 1880s that politics and economics were divorced in the continuing effort to quantify economics free of the taint of outside influences to create “an independent sphere of economics where politics didn’t intrude

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10 Adam Smith is known as the father of modern economics. According to Smith, free markets allowed the natural laws of supply and demand to function properly. His most well-known works include *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) and *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). David Ricardo’s methods for comparative advantage and analyzing market forces using deduction and mathematics are still applicable today. His first book, *The High Price of Bullion: A Proof of the Depreciation of Bank Notes*, was published in 1810.
and that mathematics allowed markets to be predictable . . .”\textsuperscript{11} The linkage of these forces in human endeavors is undeniable, however, which explains why a serious examination of turmoil afflicting a state like Nigeria must rely on this inexact but encompassing concept. Therefore, political and social involvement in economic affairs should be expected, and economic results will in turn affect them.\textsuperscript{12} The political economy may be the most important factor when explaining a state’s current and future prosperity and stability, although certainly not the only factor.\textsuperscript{13}

Because they are so fundamental to the welfare of humans, the distribution of power and economic gains may be the most volatile of intrastate problems. Under conditions of robust equitable per capita economic growth, intrastate political and social rivalries are rare or can be ignored so as not to upset the shared benefits of growth. This situation occurred during the boom days of Yugoslavia when one of Europe’s fastest growing economies in the 1950s and 1960s overshadowed the interethnic and political turmoil that killed 750,000 Yugoslavs (through internecine fighting alone) during World War II. When relative standards of living decline or are inequitable, however, conditions often deteriorate and problems manifest as political or cultural cleavages in zero-sum pursuit of diminishing economic gains. Such was the case of the Yugoslav economic decline of the 1980s that followed international oil shocks and poor government policies, ultimately leading to the resurgence of political, cultural, and regional clashes that fractured Yugoslavia during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{14} These examples from Yugoslavia and states like Sudan are instructive to the situation in Nigeria today.

Through most of its history, Nigeria’s economy has woefully underperformed with the resulting expected competition along a variety of traditional and modern self-interest groups. From independence in 1960 to 2000, Nigeria’s income per capita stagnated in terms of PPP despite the income per capita from petroleum, Nigeria’s dominating source of income, increasing

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Clarence Bouchat IV, “The North-South Divide within Mediterranean Countries,” Mediterranean Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 128-41.
tenfold. The country’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP at the official exchange rate) dropped from a high of $1,500 during the 1970s to a low of $300 in 1998, doubling the poverty rate to 70 percent. By 2010, the GDP had nearly recovered to $1,470 (due in part to high oil prices, but also economic reform in nonoil sectors), but poverty still remained at 70 percent, signaling serious inequity problems. Analysis of 2010 communal clashes by a Nigerian professor in the chronically violence-prone central city of Jos noted a combination of political economic “factors including social apathy, economic deprivation, and political frustration . . . it’s simply an exhibition of the failure of governance in Nigeria; it’s an exhibition of a very serious economic problem that Nigerians find themselves in.” He goes on to observe that “too often in the midst of serious economic crisis, people often lose sight of the real problem to exploit the most visible difference between groups, in the case of Jos, the religious difference.” As this one example and the rest of this chapter will show, Nigeria’s frequent and bloody turmoil through its history is often the result of manipulated groups clashing for a bigger share of an inadequately sized pie.

This poor record of economic development in Nigeria, despite its potential, is in large part due to two political economic causes, which may explain why economic policies have not fared better. The first cause is the inability of its leaders to meld a unified nation out of the “fragmented geographic

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16 The use of GDP PPP is a relatively new method of measuring a country’s economic production, rather than the previous method of calculating GDP based upon a set exchange rate. PPP measurements reduce the error that transitory U.S. dollar (the usual medium used to ensure like comparisons) exchange rate spikes induce, and accounts for the difficulty in obtaining common basic necessities for living. Using the GDP PPP usually increases the amount of economic production per person in less-developed countries, thereby reducing the perception of poverty suffered when compared to unadjusted figures. Since this comparison starts with figures computed with the official exchange rate at the time, a GDP per capita of $1,470 based on the 2010 official exchange rate is also used. Thus, the average share of Nigerians’ slice of the country’s economic pie has remained stagnant for more than 40 years and has dipped considerably in the interim, despite Nigeria’s enormous natural resource wealth. The GDP PPP in Nigeria for 2013 is $2,800, ranking it 180th lowest in the world. See CIA, “Africa: Nigeria.”
18 CIA, “Africa: Nigeria.”
20 Ibid.
and ethnic components” in Nigeria. The second is the unstable government structure from colonial control to alternating elected and authoritarian regimes, with numerous military coups and different forms of governments.\(^{21}\) Nigerians did not possess a strong sense of unity before or during the colonial period, which not only discouraged a sense of nationhood, but British authorities may have actively played groups against each other.\(^{22}\) Economic development was also not seriously emphasized in colonial times beyond infrastructure development needed to exploit native resources and markets for imperial interests.\(^{23}\) Since independence, demagogic politicians seek to gain regional, ethnic, and religious group support for their own interests, and they have divided Nigeria’s society and polity severely. Claims of self-determination, a method used by minorities to mobilize against central authority and leverage their position for concessions, is a common tactic in Nigerian politics, and was taken to its limit in the unsuccessful secession of Biafra during the 1967–70 civil war.\(^{24}\) Nigeria’s wealth continues to be seen as a source of exploitation by its elite, often pitting groups against each other in pursuit of controlling national wealth.\(^{25}\) In these ways, the economic, political, and social forces—both historic and modern—have influenced each other, resulting in a chronically weakened state.

### The Political Economy in a Nigerian Rentier State

Many of Nigeria’s problems can be traced to its political economy because it contains the bread-and-butter issues that may sow internal disharmony. The country’s policies have unbalanced the economy into one highly dependent upon exporting energy resources, which then became the lucrative target of political


economic infighting. The effects of a single-product economy have encouraged self-serving actions by Nigerian citizens and organizations; fostered dependence on easy economic gains; and made the government overly centralized, unresponsive to its citizens, and corrupt. This section addresses Nigeria’s economy and explains how it has become the foundation for so many other problems.26

Nigeria’s huge population, many resources, and favorable location produced a large economy that has become integrated into the greater global economy through the centuries. Nigeria ranks 31st in the world in GDP PPP with $478 billion in 2013, and a healthy growth rate averaging higher than 7 percent from 2003 to 2012.27 The high price of petroleum over that period accounts for much of the wealth since oil produces 25 percent of GDP and 80 percent of government budget revenues.28 Petroleum has taken over Nigeria’s economy, rocketing from just 1 percent of GDP in 1960 to 26 percent in 1970; and at 94 percent, petroleum dominated exports by 1976, remaining at 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings in 2013.29 By comparison, Nigeria’s economic output during the 1960s was 61 percent agricultural, which was also the cultural base of many ethnic groups.30 The manufacturing sector, employing traditional skills and native products, grew to a high of 11 percent of GDP in the 1970s, before falling to just half that amount in 2000 and continuing to decline since.31 In 2013, the agricultural sector employed 70 percent of Nigeria’s labor force and represented 31 percent of its GDP, but accounted for only 4 percent of exports and 1 percent of manufacturing.32 Foreign enclave energy production has changed the basis of Nigeria’s economy and collection of government revenues, but also undemocratized its economy and tax base in the process.

The consequences of the oil boom in Nigeria and subsequent economic fallout is a classic example of “Dutch disease” whereby an economic boom, often based on a single source, commonly a natural resource, has the unwanted effect of expanding a country’s prices, and thereby depressing local production and nonresource exports through indirectly subsidizing cheap-

27 CIA, “Africa: Nigeria.”
28 Ibid.
29 Falola, History of Nigeria, 138; and CIA, “Africa: Nigeria.”
30 Falola, History of Nigeria, 112.
32 CIA, “Africa: Nigeria.”
er imports—all of which hampers growth.\textsuperscript{33} Although a country as large and
diverse as Nigeria has considerable influence over its economy through
government policies,\textsuperscript{34} Nigeria has consistently mismanaged its bonanza.
A common consequence of Dutch disease makes the economy more
dependent upon a single commodity or sector, and thus prone to buffeting
by international markets during unpredictable boom and bust cycles, and
thus becoming exacerbated in Nigeria by implementing expedient short-
term solutions over long-term development.\textsuperscript{35} Also, high economic growth
spurred by oil production has been unable to pace Nigeria’s staggering
population growth, which nearly quadrupled over the period from 46 mil-
lion in 1960 to 177 million in 2014, with an average 5.25 children born to
each woman of childbearing age.\textsuperscript{36} Nigeria’s chronic case of Dutch disease
was contracted through a combination of misguided and self-centered
actions by the government, individuals, and mutually suspicious interest
groups who have been unable to overcome partisanship in Nigeria.

Nigeria’s cycle of disruptive and violent intergroup competition was cre-
ated in part with good intentions and unintended consequences. Starting in
the late 1960s, the Nigerian government curtailed the amount of impartial
technical advice it received by disbanding its core of international economic
advisers.\textsuperscript{37} One outcome of this action was that the government tried “to do
too much too soon, leaving the government administratively overextended.”\textsuperscript{38}
The massive Nigerian government borrowing that followed went to finance
“lavish, often superfluous” factory construction, and poorly conceived pres-
tige projects of dubious need that suffocated private enterprise.\textsuperscript{39} Nigerian
producers were also undermined by a currency inflated with oil earnings,

\textsuperscript{33} “The term “Dutch disease” originates from a crisis in the Netherlands in the 1960s that resulted from
discoveries of vast natural gas deposits in the North Sea. The newfound wealth caused the Dutch guilder to rise, making exports of all nonoil products less competitive on the world market. For a more complete description, see http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/dutchdisease.asp; and Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 81.

\textsuperscript{34} J. Peter Neary and Sweder van Wijnbergen, eds., Natural Resources and the Macroeconomy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), 10-11.

\textsuperscript{35} Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 81; and Prendergast, Security Assistance in Nigeria, 16.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.; and CIA, “Africa: Nigeria.”

\textsuperscript{37} Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 3.


which greatly increased the imports of consumables at the expense of locally produced goods.\textsuperscript{40} Natural resource extraction absorbed nearly all foreign, private, and public investment, creating chronic rural underinvestment in the agricultural sector and its related infrastructure.\textsuperscript{41} Another unexpected effect was that energy production jobs diverted skilled and unskilled labor away from manufacturing and agricultural pursuits.\textsuperscript{42} These negative effects of misallocating resources are classic symptoms of Dutch disease. Another secondary consequence was the serious environmental damage from extractive industries, including coal and tin, that directly damaged agricultural and aquatic pursuits and the livelihoods of Nigeria’s poorest people, inciting crime and insurgency among the disaffected.\textsuperscript{43}

Beyond the misallocation of funds, other government policies inadvertently hurt Nigeria’s economic development.\textsuperscript{44} During the boom years, Nigerian officials allowed the official currency exchange rate to appreciate, and then kept it artificially overvalued when oil prices fell.\textsuperscript{45} The negative results of this monetary policy were to depress native production of goods, fuel inflation, and encourage black market activities.\textsuperscript{46} This policy crowded out other economic activities, such as agriculture and manufacturing, which could not play a sufficient role to counterbalance the effect of cyclical declines in oil revenue on the world economy and still could not during the depressed energy prices cycle of 2014-15. To smooth the troughs of international oil price fluctuations and to leverage export income during good times, Nigeria borrowed heavily from foreign sources, causing deep indebtedness and increased exposure to the dictates of crediting countries and organizations when those debts could not be paid.\textsuperscript{47}


\textsuperscript{41} Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 184; Falola, History of Nigeria, 132; and Elu, “Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 5.

\textsuperscript{42} Ikpeze, Soludo, and Elekwa, “Nigeria,” 341.


\textsuperscript{44} Lewis, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” 94.

\textsuperscript{45} Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 4.

\textsuperscript{46} Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 90; Elu, “Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 54; and Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 190.

\textsuperscript{47} Lewis, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” 81; and Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 98.
employment diverted talent from other economic endeavors and increased wage rates, adding to inflationary pressure.⁴⁸ Through either lack of vision or corrupt intent, Nigeria’s leaders failed to diversify its economy or maintain its infrastructure to the detriment of the economy.⁴⁹

Despite disbanding the international advisors group, Nigerian officials may have understood the nature of these heavily criticized economic policies. However, they were constrained by political pressure from their highly fractured constituents who were maximizing their share in an underperforming economy.⁵⁰ For many reasons, the economic sectors in which the large majority of Nigerians work receive much less support from public investment and policy than is given to the highly concentrated extractive sector; yet proceeds from these natural resource-based industries neither increase the general welfare of the population nor compensate them for their losses.⁵¹ In Nigeria, these represent political decisions with far ranging economic and social consequences.

In addition to poor decisions and constrained options, other base reasons also explain Nigeria’s underperforming economy. Since the rents from the resource sector usually go to the government, Thomas Friedman’s “curse of oil” posits how Nigerian autocrats misuse the state’s wealth because they hold control over its rich natural resources, freeing them from accountability of their citizens, and was probably an underlying motive for the civil war.⁵² The quality of a state’s institutions, whether prone to being “grabber-friendly or producer-friendly . . . is the key to understanding the resource curse: when institutions are bad, resource abundance is a curse . . .”⁵³ Throughout history, Nigerian administrations and their regional, cultural, religious, political, and economic associations have consistently been grabber-friendly.

Dutch disease also increases the occurrence of corruption.⁵⁴ In one ex-

⁴⁸ Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 185.
⁵³ Wadho, “Education, Rent-seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources,” 2.
ample, the regime of General Yakubu Gowon, which presided over the oil boom of the 1960s and ‘70s, saw the oil windfall as a means of patronage through economic policies like import substitution that could reward political allies “through gross misuse of the oil . . .” 55 From 1988 to 1993, an official government report found $13 billion, or 20 percent of total revenues, were “sidetracked to off-budget accounts” that were entirely unmonitored and undermined economic growth. Within two years of that 1994 report, the regime of General Sani Abacha diverted 17 percent of Nigeria’s GDP into off-budget accounts, thereby making two-thirds of government revenue unaccounted for. 56 Over decades, a quarter of Nigeria’s oil revenue, or $50-100 billion, “disappeared” and enabled a corrupt class of politically oriented millionaires. 57 Unfortunately, these are recurring events in Nigerian history, and their origin and ramifications deserve examination to better understand Nigeria’s broken political economic circumstances.

The more academic term for the curse of natural resources is a “rentier” state in which an easily controlled valuable commodity brings income or “rents,” rather than “a return on capital or entrepreneurship . . . it is wealth without work.” 58 The dominance of oil exports in Nigeria makes it a rentier state since government revenues are derived mainly from the export of state controlled oil. 59 The ability to receive state revenues independent of taxation and the will of the people is a potent force that may expand the jurisdiction of the controlling (usually central) government; encourage politicization of minorities and regions over redistribution of rents; eviscerate other economic sectors as already shown; and increase reliance on the “substitution of public spending for statecraft.” 60 Wealth without work attracts entrepreneurially talented Nigerians and organizations away from enhancing the economy through improved agriculture, industry, or services into self-interested public rent-seeking activities that misallocate skills and

55 Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 4; and Toyin Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000), 103, 141.
56 Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 90, 97; and Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 208.
efforts in the overall political economy.\textsuperscript{61} Rents are sought for direct wealth derived through corruption and embezzlement, but also for the power and influence they yield when distributed through the political economy to major private sector interest groups, ethnic groups, and government.\textsuperscript{62} The allure of concentrated oil wealth and power was probably also an underlying motive of the 1967 civil war.\textsuperscript{63} The wealth from rents may be dispersed through business contracts, foreign exchange manipulation, appointment to public office, trade controls, and bloated public sector employment among other ways.\textsuperscript{64} These rentier state behaviors account for Nigeria’s diverted wealth and reduced potential.

Control of state resources is a sure means to wealth and power in a rentier state, and the more avenues to resources, the more the revenues can be tapped.\textsuperscript{65} In 1960, Nigeria included three large economically viable formal political regions that balanced the power of the federal government. In response to a variety of ethnic, regional, and religious rivalries, and to counter the threat of secession, Nigeria sequentially fragmented into 36 states by 1996 (with more proposed but never implemented). This fracturing allowed some form of self-determination and economic control for each majority in the new ethnically favored states.\textsuperscript{66} However, it established fault lines that vastly increased the power of the central government as most smaller states grew dependent on federal handouts as their bureaucracies increased, and shut out the many smaller minorities not represented as the majority in a state of their own.\textsuperscript{67} The federal system in Nigeria has been chronically manipulated, often promoting regional interests over national ones.\textsuperscript{68} States from which natural resources originate, mainly in the oil-producing Niger Delta region, have gained more revenue through the rent allocation prin-

\textsuperscript{61} Wadho, “Education, Rent-seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources,” 3.
\textsuperscript{62} Ikpeze, Soludo, and Elekwa, “Nigeria,” 344.
\textsuperscript{63} Ayodele, “Silence on Climate Change and Natural Resources Conflict in Nigeria,” 111.
\textsuperscript{64} Ikpeze, Soludo, and Elekwa, “Nigeria,” 344; and Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 188.
\textsuperscript{65} Falola, History of Nigeria, 226; and ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 2.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., 133, 150; ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 5; Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 189; and Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 6.
\textsuperscript{68} Lewis, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” 2.
principle of “derivation,” which compensates the resource-producing states with greater cuts of the derived wealth, now standing at 18 percent of rents compared to just 3 percent in the early 1990s, although still not as much as the producing states desire.\textsuperscript{69} In 2004, one-third of federal revenue sharing, or $2 billion, went to four oil-producing states, but little of that went toward improving infrastructure and public services.\textsuperscript{70} Control over these states makes them lucrative targets of their rent seeking elites, and makes vulnerable the rest of the states who are dependent upon the central government’s revenue redistribution and subsidies.\textsuperscript{71} A stronger centralized government makes rent seeking more attractive and easier to dominate, thus raising the stakes for all involved.

Another downside to the political economy is that those elites in power, and those enjoying the benefits of rents, tend to hinder general economic growth by maintaining the status quo (referred to euphemistically as “sharing the national cake”) rather than building development initiatives (or “making the cake”).\textsuperscript{72} This maximizes the immediate resources available to the elites in power since their tenure is often tenuous, and panders to short-term distributive pressures from constituents rather than long-term economic investments.\textsuperscript{73} Some constituents of elites in power benefit from these arrangements in the short term, but such patronage and poor governance weakens state institutions through reduced accountability, buying allegiance of some groups through patronage and programs, and alienating opposition groups out of power since they claim little influence through taxes or voting.\textsuperscript{74} The Nigerian armed forces is another organization that benefits from the rentier system since their power (either in controlling the government or threatening to do so) ensures higher spending on the armed forces at the expense of education, health care, and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{75} As distribution of government-controlled revenues increases, so does con-

\textsuperscript{70} ICG, \textit{Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment}, 9; and Ayodele, “Silence on Climate Change and Natural Resources Conflict in Nigeria,” 111.
\textsuperscript{75} Elu, “Human Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” 57.
lict among groups and individuals over receiving those distributions.76

In a Nigerian society traditionally dependent on client-patron relationships, many constituents expect leaders to claim control of public resources to benefit their supporting interest groups through bribery, nepotism, extortion, and favoritism.77 Subordinates are often convinced that they gain when their identity groups benefit from the actions of politicians, and are thus mobilized to their service.78 This allegiance is reinforced when politicians can deliver public goods to their constituents through patronage when the state is ineffectual at doing so.79 To shore up their positions, Nigerian leaders may demonize rival identity groups to exacerbate their constituents’ collective anxiety and mobilize their self-centered support.80 This explains the Nigerian elite’s relentless pursuit of government office by harnessing the antagonisms of their constituent groups to demand representation and access to rents in the form of redistributed public revenue.81 Unfortunately, the trust of Nigerians in these groups is misplaced since greedy leaders usually leave little to trickle down, as is evident in the destitute Niger Delta states.82 Elites also tend to be dismissive of their clients except when manipulated in support of the elites’ interests.83 This toxic mixture of motivations leaves the Nigerian polity with weakened institutions, exploited subordinates, increased violence that fractures Nigerian unity, and a poisoned political economy.84

77 Alozieuwa, “Beyond the Ethno-Religious Theory of the Jos Conflict,” 28; and Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 170.
81 Falola, History of Nigeria, 130; Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 21; Conerly Casey, “Mediated Hostility, Generation, and Victimhood in Northern Nigeria,” in Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines, 276; and Wadho, “Education, Rent-seeking and the Curse of Natural Resources,” 4.
In a rentier economy, government office becomes one of the most effective ways to gain personal riches and power, and creates elites who mainly look after their own interests. Nigerian leaders have ample opportunity to overtly manipulate the political economy to their advantage through such measures as preventing repairs to government refineries to benefit vested interests in imported petroleum products or stalling construction of much needed power plants to profit from generator sales. Another visible form of rent seeking can be seen in financial services where liberalized rules in the 1980s allowed authorities to steer opportunities to cronies in banking, where the privileged could profit from currency control and foreign exchange schemes. Rent seeking through such overt manipulative methods also encourages illegal transactions, such as petroleum diversion, drug trafficking, and commercial fraud. The military elite especially gained from bunkering through exceptional access to oil resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars of smuggled petroleum and explaining, in part, the abiding interest in politics by high-ranking military officers. Since 1975, an estimated $50–100 billion of Nigeria’s more than $400 billion in oil revenues have “disappeared” to corruption and fraud. All of this leads to the practice of “godfatherism,” where powerful political financiers sponsor elected officials in return for “influence in running of the state, contracts, money, allocation of resources, amenities, employment appoints, etc. in favour of the godfathers.” Little wonder then that “six of the world’s one-hundred richest men are Nigerian, and each is politically powerful.” Nigeria ranked poorly in

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88 Ibid., 89-90.
89 Bunkering is a maritime term for filling a vessel with fuel. However, the term has been corrupted to also mean the surreptitious diverting of fuel and its proceeds for personal gain; a code word for mass petroleum theft in Nigeria.
91 Blessing, Nigeria’s Center(s) of Gravity, 17.
the perception of corruption with a score of 2.4 out of 10 in 2011, placing it 143d out of 180 countries worldwide.\textsuperscript{94} Corruption also explains why the elite resort to crime, including electoral fraud, killing, violence, intimidation, and imprisoning opposition members to protect their positions.\textsuperscript{95} On the personal, organizational, and group levels, corrupt policy and institutionalized public crime are demonstrably harmful to the political economy.

Although clearly a detriment, when some forms of extralegal public actions are accepted as regular practices, or even encouraged by segments of society, are they still corruption?\textsuperscript{96} In Nigeria, a long tradition of client-patron relationship is engrained in society, where northern elites, for example, have ruled for 200 years through patronage and religious support.\textsuperscript{97} Even if these practices are a customary part of Nigerian life, the extreme to which such conduct has gone, in comparison to acceptable international norms, has made Nigeria’s elite seem “venal, partisan, [and] self-serving.”\textsuperscript{98} Despite President Olusegun Obasanjo’s declaration of zero tolerance for corruption during his reign from 1999-2007, corruption remained rampant throughout his administration, as was true before and continues today.\textsuperscript{99}

However, in reaching compliance in 2011 with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—the international standard for financial, physical, and process management of natural resources and their revenues—Nigerian politicians have displayed rare political will over a contentious aspect of the problem by implementing a strong governance regime over their resources.\textsuperscript{100} That is a good start, but laws without adequate implementation are of little help, as abuse of past parliamentary and presidential constitutions could not prevent earlier destructive partisanship, corruption, and extreme violence in Nigeria. Even if the Nigerian EITI code should hold, the parochial political fights over distribution of revenues and its attendant

\textsuperscript{94} “Corruption Perceptions Index 2011,” Transparency International.
\textsuperscript{97} Okonta, “Nigeria’s Homegrown Terrorists.”
Evils will continue. Such revenue is a rich, but finite resource in a poor country. Strong leadership can correct the problems of weak institutions and properly execute well-intentioned laws, but Nigeria has seldom seen such leadership. This is where ethnic, religious, regional, political, and other interest groups complicate the operation of Nigeria’s political economy.

The Causes of Clashes

The people of Nigeria are a rich mix of many languages, beliefs, religions, customs, and agricultural and political systems. Such diversity could be a national strength for the country, but these differences are more often accentuated to gain advantage for a specific group or individual at the expense of the general population’s welfare. This is particularly true in an environment of limited resources and a declining political or economic order in which people tend to band together into ethnic, religious, or other groups to better compete against those not of the same ilk.\textsuperscript{101} The politicization of such diversity in Nigeria by its elite “instrumentalizes identity” for their manipulation, and these groups are often organized into “Mafia-like associations” used as “pawns on the chessboard of the political elite.”\textsuperscript{102} Although control over spoils from the political economy may be the ultimate motivating force for fracturing and violence in Nigeria, the splits occur along many identifiable cultural and regional lines over power and the distribution of public resources.\textsuperscript{103} Since the mid-1980s, the violence attributed to religious, ethnic, political, and economic factors has increased in Nigeria, with between 12,000 and 18,000 deaths under civilian rule from 1999 to 2009.\textsuperscript{104} Mass media perceptions may spotlight cultural grounds


for Nigeria’s violence, but the actual causes are much more interdependent and complex, as this section shows by examining two major fault lines in Nigeria among religious and ethnic groups.

Conflict between approximately 50 percent of Nigerians who are Muslim and 40 percent who are Christian is the most obvious of the religious conflicts in the news since it is easy to differentiate and demonize others, and “exhortations to violence acquire greater potency once framed in religious terms.” As in other parts of the world, Islamic movements in Nigeria seek political reform to conform with religious beliefs or traditional practices, especially in education. Since first demanded in 1978, these movements have attained full implementation of sharia law in nine northern Nigerian states, but with accompanying widespread protest and violence, killing thousands of people and displacing whole communities that remain divided and polarized. During the height of clashes in February 2000, then-President Obasanjo declared the resulting fighting the worse violence since the civil war. In response to imposition of Muslim law and the fear of an agenda to make all of Nigeria an Islamic state, some states in the southeast, most vocally Cross River, threatened to implement “Christian law.”

Within Islam, intrareligious tensions abound. Although Muslim Nigerians are predominately Sufi, its adherents within the Qadiriyya and Tijaniyya orders have clashed over economic and political power through much of the twentieth century. Since the 1970s, both groups have been vehemently opposed by the native Izala group, a Salafist movement, demanding a more

105 ICG, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 21.
107 These nine states are joined by three more with partial implementation and include: Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara. See, ICG, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 1.
110 Ibid., 217; and Falola, History of Nigeria, 29-31.
orthodox and public role for Islam against these older political and religious structures.\textsuperscript{112} Since the mid-1990s, clashes have increased between Sunni and Shia believers in the north too.\textsuperscript{113} Militant Islamism has fomented violence in Nigeria since the “riots” of the 1980s. The most recent of these militant threats comes from the group popularly known as \textit{Boko Haram} (meaning Western education is forbidden, which is indicative of its principles), operating in many of the same cities as did the Maitatsine sect, and is the most violent of the militant Salafist groups in Nigeria today.\textsuperscript{114} Boko Haram has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks against Christian and government targets that have killed thousands of people since 2003, including the 2011 bombing of the United Nations headquarters in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, the 2012 vehicle-born suicide attacks against senior military officers attending church at the Nigerian Armed Forces Command and Staff College, the notorious abduction of more than 200 girls from a school in northern Nigeria in 2014, and the seizure of the town and military base in Baga in 2015 that may have killed 2,000 people in possibly its deadliest attack to date.\textsuperscript{115} Some northern politicians have tried to use this group to advance their agenda, but Boko Haram is not controlled by the northern elites and seems to receive training and assistance from outside supporters, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and IS.\textsuperscript{116} Ominously, Boko Haram may be assisting other Muslim militants against Christians in these religious-political-economic conflicts.\textsuperscript{117} By 2015, Boko Haram may


\textsuperscript{113} ICG, \textit{Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict}, 20.


control 20 percent of the Nigerian state, demonstrating its strength in what
may have developed into a full insurgency to gain at least regional control.\(^{118}\) For decades, religious fighting has been reported as a major cause of vio-
lence in Nigeria, and indeed it is a means for groups to seize and control
power and resources.

On the surface, religious tensions may explain some long-term conflicts
like those between Muslim Fulanis and Christian Berom and Tarok in central
Plateau state in which Taroks were accused of killing hundreds and burn-
ing 72 villages in 2002 and 2003.\(^{119}\) However, this antagonism is probably
more a classic economic conflict between pastoralists and farmers, as sug-
gested by the Catholic archbishop of Abuja,\(^{120}\) describing tensions as old
as the Cain and Abel teaching revered in both religions. Numerous cases
of interfaith cooperation do exist throughout Nigeria with, for example, the
Yoruba, one of the three largest ethnic groups of Nigeria, split among Mus-
lim, Christian, and animist followers who peacefully coexist in their cities and
households.\(^{121}\) In northern Nigeria, far more cases abound of defused con-

dicts, interfaith consultation, and emphasis on tolerance and respect from
Christian and Muslim leaders than are reported.\(^{122}\) Two successful programs
promoting peace are Operation Yaki in Kaduna state and Operation Rain-
bow in Plateau state, both of which seek to “revive the economy, enhance
dialogue with and between different communities and act as a mediation
agency . . . ”\(^{123}\) When manipulated, religious differences can become a
divisive political tool, adding legitimacy to efforts pursuing power and eco-
nomic gain, and it is in this light that such conflicts should be examined.\(^{124}\)

Mobilizing religious groups has been an important tool in Nigerian poli-
tics. Although individual Muslims and Islamic groups are found throughout
the country, they are most concentrated and religiously politically active in the 19 northern predominantly Muslim states. For them, Islamic identity
fosters regional unity and maintains established privileges for the elite,

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\(^{118}\) Audie Cornish and Alexis Okeowo, “Boko Haram May Control Up to 20 Percent of Nigeria,” Na-
tional Public Radio, 13 January 2015, http://www.npr.org/2015/01/13/377024729/boko-haram-may-
control-up-to-20-percent-of-nigeria.


\(^{120}\) Alozieuwa, “Beyond the Ethno-Religious Theory of the Jos Conflict,” 25.

\(^{121}\) Falola, *Culture and Customs of Nigeria*, 40.

\(^{122}\) ICG, *Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict*, 13, 20.

\(^{123}\) ICG, *Curbing Violence in Nigeria* (I), 22.

\(^{124}\) ICG, *Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict*, 21; and Casey, “Mediated Hostility, Generation, and
Victimhood in Northern Nigeria,” 276.
especially through controversial demands for sharia law. Muslims reject the modern secular Western imperative to separate religious and political activities and, since the ninth century when Islam first arrived in present Nigeria, it has been used extensively by indigenous rulers to legitimize their rule and organize their lands from the early Kanem-Borno Empire to the nineteenth-century Sokoto caliphate. Conversions from indigenous beliefs to Islam were often heartfelt, but could also be forced to assert hegemony, with some minorities opposing coercion by instead embracing Christianity with the later advantage of associating with European systems during British rule that also came with such resistance. Jihad by the people was also used by the great Usman dan Fodio in the early 1800s against exploitation by the elite of his day, to go on to establish the Sokoto Caliphate and show how mobilization of the faithful could be an agent of change. That method is still used today by extreme groups like Boko Haram and some northern politicians who thought they could control it for their own purposes. The rise of Boko Haram and the Maitatsine unrest before it may lay outside the dynamics of the political economy motivations discussed in this chapter and would greatly complicate the quelling of internal divisions in Nigeria should it gain a real following in the country.

Both Muslim and Christian leaders have politicized their faithful’s allegiance to mobilize and give dignity to marginalized constituents, “demonize opponents,” and gain power since “religion provides a legitimizing framework for violence that would otherwise be considered unacceptable.” Religion then is often a fast and easy way to obtain and manipulate power in Nigeria—fighting over position and power rather than developing and delivering relevant policies and political platforms. Consequently, for decades, sectarian violence has become a weapon for economic and political gain, including communal distribution of public resources and religious-

ly oriented legal structures, through such overt uses as religious verses in political songs to burning rival houses of worship.\textsuperscript{131} Mobilizing religious movements for political causes often brings a sense of empowerment to the marginalized members of society, sometimes quite easily given the general dissatisfaction of Nigerians with their circumstances, and may explain why religious beliefs appear to be the cause of violence, but is more commonly a tool to incite violence for other reasons.\textsuperscript{132}

Although communal rivalry over faith issues is part of Nigeria’s conflicts, religious manipulation to gain political economic advantage is more the root cause of divisiveness.\textsuperscript{133} Political parties in Nigeria were often organized around regional religious special interest groups. Northerners, with a common history and a more defined regional religious identity, have been particularly effective at organizing collective action for their region’s benefit, explaining why northerners have dominated Nigeria politically through most of its history.\textsuperscript{134} The Northern People’s Congress (NPC), for example, was the dominant party during Nigeria’s formation and, as part of its persona, NPC invoked the legacy of the northern Nigerian Islamic caliphate to its advantage.\textsuperscript{135} The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), despite its name, also covertly manipulated religion in its strategies to win Muslim votes as the northern leaning political party that dominated Nigeria’s Second Republic.\textsuperscript{136} Although overtly political religious organizations are now banned, countrywide Islamic organizations like \textit{Jama’atu Nasril Islam} (roughly translated as Society for the Support of Islam) protect its members’ interests while fostering education and spreading the faith.\textsuperscript{137} On the other side, Biafran separatists were quite successful internationally portraying their cause as a Christian east resisting dominance by an Islamic north during Ni-


\textsuperscript{132} ICG, \textit{Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict}, ii; and Abdullahi, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Nigeria,” 296.


\textsuperscript{134} Lewis, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” 97.

\textsuperscript{135} Falola, \textit{Culture and Customs of Nigeria}, 91.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 168.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 43.
Nigeria’s civil war. During the tumultuous years from 1983 to 1998 between the Second and Fourth Republics, political parties were circumscribed or banned, so mainstream religious organizations filled the political void as they “began to resemble political parties; not only did they make important demands, they also mobilized their members.” Thus political activity by religious groups is deeply rooted in Nigeria, and their rivalries have set an enduring model of how to effectively mobilize for power.

Conflict among the approximately 250 ethnic and cultural groups of Nigeria is another commonly depicted source of friction that, like religion, masks political-economic roots. Of these many groups, however, 10 account for 80 percent of the population, and only 3 groups—the closely aligned Hausa and Fulani in the north (28 percent), Yoruba in the southwest (20 percent), and Igbo in the southeast (17 percent)—dominate politics and the economy.

As mentioned earlier, while the NPN and NPC stand as examples of parties who used religious affiliations for political purposes, ethnic allegiance was also the basis for forming political parties in Nigeria, particularly since ethnic and religious identity are often commonly held there is much overlap in these processes. Also, like religiously motivated parties, ethnic allegiance is an easy and efficient means to mobilize supporters by saving on recruiting and organizational time and costs, while assuming the cloak of social justice among its members and avoiding substantive policy matters. This practice traces back to the British colonial policy of indirect rule, or Native Authority system, under which culturally affiliated power prevailed through the use of existing traditional ethnic elites. Political parties coalesced around these ethnic self-interest groups when such activity was allowed in the 1940s and created an “aggressive regionalism based on cul-

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138 Ibid., 124.
139 Ibid., 187.
140 For our purposes, 200-300 ethnic groups are the usual ranges given based on definitions using language, customs, history, ancestry, foods, social organization, settlement patterns, and location among other characteristics. For more information, see http://www.onlinenigeria.com/tribes, which lists 371 tribes by name and location.
141 Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 4, 6; Alozieuwa, “Beyond the Ethno-Religious Theory of the Jos Conflict,” 26; ICG, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 2; and Abdullahi, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Nigeria,” 292.
142 Christopher Hewitt and Tom Cheetham, Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2000), 206; Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 5; and Blessing, Nigeria’s Center(s) of Gravity, 18.
143 Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan, “The Role of Youth in Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflicts: The Kaduna/Kano Case Study,” in Inter-Ethnic and Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria, 98.
ural, religious, and economic differences,” which intensified in the politics of independent Nigeria.\textsuperscript{144} Ethnic and cultural affiliation remains a common, if less overt, practice in Nigerian politics today.

Powerful political parties into the 1980s often represented regions and “grew out of ethno-religious and cultural associations,” such as the \textit{Egbe Omo Oduduwa} (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa) in the Yoruba southwest became the Action Group, the \textit{Jamiyya Mutanen Arewa} in the Hausa-Fulani north formed the NPC and Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) formed from an array of cultural associations and labor movements primarily in the Igbo southeast.\textsuperscript{145} These arrangements, however, left hundreds of minority groups either dependent upon one of the three major ethnic-regional parties or essentially disenfranchised, and sometimes resulted in defining other ethnic groups as political rivals.\textsuperscript{146} Ethnic parties were important in Nigeria because to advance as a community meant controlling government to ensure access to its resources and power. Once in power, the communal group must dominate to prevent the rise of competitors.\textsuperscript{147} These rivalries based on ethnic, religious, and regional alliances waged zero-sum fights against each other, rather than act as national political parties addressing strategic issues.\textsuperscript{148}

An example of such rivalry comes from one of Nigeria’s first political crises that, in 1963, forced the partition of the midwest region from the western region and started the fragmentation and Balkanization of Nigerian states.\textsuperscript{149} At the time, cocoa was Nigeria’s major export, primary rentier product, and grown mostly in the southwest. An alliance of northern and southeastern interests assured their federal distribution of cocoa revenues and was opportunistic in rending the western region as a way to weaken the Yoruba monopoly over cocoa production. When oil was discovered in the southeast

\textsuperscript{144} Hewitt and Cheetham, \textit{Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movements}, 206; and Falola, \textit{Culture and Customs of Nigeria}, 167.


\textsuperscript{147} Lewis, “The Dysfunctional State of Nigeria,” 97.


\textsuperscript{149} Falola, \textit{Culture and Customs of Nigeria}, 104.
in 1965, this alliance dissolved and a northern-southwestern alliance formed to ensure distribution of oil revenues.\textsuperscript{150} It was this alliance that fought Biafran independence when southeastern interests sought full control over oil (and to counter ethnic violence against Igbos) through secession leading to approximately two million deaths.\textsuperscript{151} From its beginnings, Nigerian politics has been fraught with political-economic ethnic clashes.

The historic momentum of ethnic-based clashes still agitates Nigerian politics but not as overtly as in its past. Historically, Nigerian political parties were mainly determined by ethnic affiliation and were often hostile to one another.\textsuperscript{152} The poisonous effects on the national well-being from tribal and sectarian political organizations was clear after the Nigerian civil war, however, and became the catalyst to ban political parties with ethnic or religious affiliations in the 1979 constitution and again in the 1989 and 1999 constitutions.\textsuperscript{153} In addition to the prohibition of ethnic and religious parties, the constitution further stipulates that political parties contending at the national level must also have countrywide representation to encourage nationwide support and address national issues. A Nigerian president must not only win a simple majority of all votes cast in the country, but also at least 25 percent of the vote in two-thirds of the states.\textsuperscript{154} Within these laws, however, modern Nigerian politics has retained regional, ethnic, and religious biases since political activity was again allowed in 1998. Modern parties often hold a strong base in a region associated with an ethnic group or religion, such as the Unity Party of Nigeria and Alliance for Democracy both from the southwest, the governing People’s Redemption Party from

\textsuperscript{150} Collier and Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” 17.
\textsuperscript{153} Section 202 of the constitution of the Second Republic, section 220 of the 1989 constitution, and section 221 of the constitution of the Fourth Republic. All three constitutions also ban the formation of any religion as a state religion in sections 10, 11, and 10, respectively. Sections 125-6, 130-2, and 131-4 govern the requirements for multiregional support for the election of the president as described later. See Igbuzor, “Nigeria’s Experience in Managing the Challenges of Ethnic and Religious Diversity through Constitutional Provisions.”
the north, and All Progressives Grand Alliance in the southeast—many centered around competing elites. Despite the ban on ethnic and religiously based political activity, this long Nigerian tradition of ethnic group advocacy and manipulation continues through ethnically organized violence for parochial political interests and control of resources, but the law itself may play a role in ethnic and religious fighting too.

Despite laws to the contrary, ethnic and religious affiliation remains an important basis for achieving political demands and redistribution of public wealth in Nigeria. As corruption and weak governance continue, Nigerians have found consolidated ethnic action a better means to meet their expectations. The best example of this today can be seen in the Niger Delta region, which serves as the source of most of Nigeria’s oil wealth (producing $200 billion in a decade) but also endures the lowest standard of living in the republic, suffers under heavy patronage and corruption, and hosts a severely degraded environment from the production of its resources. The 60 or so minority groups living in the delta are mainly disenfranchised and believe they should receive more than the 18 percent of revenue from their oil wealth that the region currently receives under Nigeria’s “derivation principle of revenue allocation.” Not surprisingly, the emerging cultural and political entity, which calls themselves the “Delta People,” also hosts Nigeria’s most potent, if currently suppressed, independence movement and at least two liberation factions in the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta. Their identity is, in part, a tool of delta politicians who encouraged its creation and the violent actions of local groups as a means to gain a greater share in Nigeria’s oil revenue distribution than they had been able to obtain by working within the system.

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158 Newsom, Conflict in the Niger Delta, 5; Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 25; and ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 5–6; and Blessing, Nigeria’s Center(s) of Gravity, 18.
159 Blessing, Nigeria’s Center(s) of Gravity, 18; ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 5–6; and Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 10–12.
The general lack of community security and adequate core government services throughout Nigeria has encouraged the rise of vigilantism and ethnic militias to provide protection through such organizations as the Oodua Peoples Congress, a nationalist Yoruba group, and the Bakassi Boys, Igbo vigilantes—all of which also resort to violent actions to pressure outside groups to attain their political or economic demands. As already shown, the situation in Nigeria is played as a zero-sum game. Ethnic and religious groups feud with each other over scarce Nigerian resources and ideological differences, so much so that ethnic and religious clashes remain a chronic problem with more than 40 major communal clashes recorded from 1999 to 2002. Between 15 August and 12 September 2011, 150 people lost their lives in communal violence, and in a two-week period a year later in August 2012, 57 people were killed through ethnoreligious clashes and their suppression. In all of 2012, its most deadly year to date, Boko Haram is reported to have killed about 770 people through terrorist attacks. Although such groups and activities are illegal in Nigeria, they endure because they meet their members’ needs when the government cannot do so, despite the cost to the general welfare.

The law also makes ethnic battles more common in Nigeria, as a way to assert control over the political economy. The concept of “indigeneship” started as British policy in the 1940s and was enshrined in Section 147 (3) of the 1999 constitution as the “‘original’ inhabitants of a local government area, or members of those ethnic groups that trace their lineage back to the area. All others are considered ‘settlers’ or migrants.” Originally this device was meant to preserve the culture and authority structures of native minorities, but it has become polarizing by excluding some basic rights of nonindigenes in terms of political participation, land ownership, employment, or education. In practice, some citizens have different rights at the

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165 Stewart, “Is Boko Haram More Dangerous than Ever?”

166 ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I); and Kwaja, “Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict,” 2.

local and national levels, which contravene other constitutional guarantees of freedom from discrimination and freedom of movement within the federation—an ambiguous paradox that creates friction and violence in society.\textsuperscript{168} These problems arise when an indigenous population fears domination by a migrant group with the diminishment of their own political power and the economic consequences that may result.\textsuperscript{169} “Elected officials, in turn, have a strong incentive to issue certificates [of indigeneship] as a tool to consolidate local ethnic majorities,”\textsuperscript{170} a practice that dates back to the 1960s and gives local officials great power. However, this practice also leads to “sharp differences in intergroup inequality, intercommunal animosity, and social fragmentation,” and is associated with both patronage and outright corruption.\textsuperscript{171}

The previously referenced Plateau state exemplifies the problems of indigeneship, as a region along the seam of many religious and ethnic groups; although it had previously epitomized the slogan “home of peace and tourism.”\textsuperscript{172} Here indigenous politicians and groups fear and denigrate Muslim migrants, particularly Hausa and Fulani settlers, as wanting to dominate local politics as they once did when Plateau was part of the former Northern region before the 1976 “Christian indigene emancipation.”\textsuperscript{173} The agricultural Berom minority, who are bereft of federal patronage or connections, have experienced the abuse of federal power to take away their lands or pollute them from nearby tin mines, and they fear the better connected Hausa and Fulani will further displace them as the latters’ powers grow locally.\textsuperscript{174} The 2002–3 violence by native Tarok in Wase against Hausa and Fulani villages and the 2004 Tarok bloodshed that killed hundreds of Muslim Jarawa were about “interlopers attempting to claim [indigene] benefits to which they were not entitled.”\textsuperscript{175} Such desperation stems from “political marginalizations and economic deprivation,” compounded by poor gover-

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 3-4, 12; and ICG, \textit{Curbing Violence in Nigeria} (I), 3.
\textsuperscript{170} Kwaja, “Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict,” 3.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.; and ICG, \textit{Curbing Violence in Nigeria} (I), 5.
\textsuperscript{172} Kwaja, “Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict,” 2.
\textsuperscript{174} Alozieuwa, “Beyond the Ethno-Religious Theory of the Jos Conflict,” 25.
nance and opportunistic ethnic leaders.\textsuperscript{176} Those labeled as migrants see instead a policy that guarantees entitlement to local power and resources, leading to corruption and partisanship, which contravenes basic civil rights in the constitution.\textsuperscript{177} From Plateau state’s capital of Jos to the conservative Muslim northern state of Kaduna to the oil-rich southern Delta state and many places in between, “the material ramifications of losing indigeneship are tangible drivers of [communal and ethnic] violence.”\textsuperscript{178} To reverse these trends, Sokoto state has implemented a zero-discrimination policy in education and balanced employment opportunities for indigenes and settlers.\textsuperscript{179} Control over political power and economic well-being through the advantages of indigeneship is a central underlying factor upon which religious, ethnic, and regional rivalries, violence, and fragmentation occur.\textsuperscript{180}

Even when the law in Nigeria is more straightforward than the confusion over indigeneship, poor governance and implementation also foster cultural conflict over power. The rule of law remains weak in Nigeria, in part, because of corrupt and self-serving leaders who have ample opportunity to bend or ignore even the constitution. Section 11 in the 1999 constitution (and similar sections in earlier constitutions) specifically bans the formation of any state religion, but has not stopped full implementation of Islamic sharia law in nine northern states and partial implementation in three more.\textsuperscript{181} In another example, the law that ensures wide representation in different ethnic regions of the country in presidential elections was flaunted during the 1979 elections that initiated the short-lived Second Republic. In that election, the required representation of two-thirds of the then-19 states in Nigeria was assumed to mean 13 states. However, the leading contender, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, received the necessary 25 percent representation in only 12 states. To avoid a run-off election, the Nigerian Supreme Court reinterpreted two-thirds to mean 12 and 2/3 states and awarded the presidency to Shagari based on a contrived geographic-mathematic interpretation.\textsuperscript{182} These are just two examples of why

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{179} ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I), 24.
\textsuperscript{180} Kwaja, “Nigeria’s Pernicious Drivers of Ethno-Religious Conflict,” 3.
\textsuperscript{182} Osae-Brown, “Mathematics of Winning the Presidential Polls.”
“it is often said that it is not good constitutions that Nigeria lacks, but good leadership.”

Another constitutional principle—“federal character”—found in Article 14 (3), is meant to accommodate “diversity, fostering inclusiveness and promoting national unity” in staffing the federal government. Such seemingly beneficial ethnic balancing, however, has led to informal provisions like the zoning system to apportion federal employment. This extralegal arrangement splits Nigeria into six geopolitical zones and, at its highest levels, aims to powershare on a rotational basis the top federal positions among the regional elites. Although meant to foster harmony, its implementation is neither democratic nor meritocratic, and is already skewed by the election of the “south-south zone” President Goodluck Jonathan in 2011 over expectations (and subsequent violence) by northerners that their region’s candidate deserved the nomination of the ruling People’s Democratic Party. On a positive note, these elections were considered the most democratic since 2000, and the election of a minority Ijaw as president holds promise for a more democratic future in Nigeria. A lack of a shared national identity, however, leaves Nigerian politics open to these types of machinations among rival political, economic, cultural, and regional interests.

Given conditions in Nigeria, cultural and regional fighting over political economic power seems unavoidable. Hostility over scarce but valuable assets, such as patronage and public revenue distributions, “becomes in-

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184 ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 11; and ICG, Curbing Violence in Nigeria (I), 3.
185 ICG, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 1.
186 The geopolitical zones are divided into: northeast, northwest, north-central, southeast, southwest, and south-south (or the Niger Delta area) for the positions of president, vice president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, senate president, and house speaker. This system was nearly made part of the constitution in the 1990s under Gen Sani Abacha. See Abdullahi, “Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Nigeria,” 292; and Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 200-2. The dominant ruling People’s Democratic Party reconstituted the system within its ranks, but that now seems discarded too. See ICG, Lessons from Nigeria’s 2011 Elections, 8.
evitable under conditions that politicize ethnicity and enlist governmental powers in socio-economic competition.”

Group interest theory expects people with common interests to band together to influence public policy, with each group’s strength dependent upon its numbers, wealth, organizational strength and leadership, access to power, and internal cohesion, the latter including ethnic or religious affiliations. Cultural groupings seem necessary to maintain or improve economic well-being by those involved, often through the power obtained from politics. This situation inspires the Nigerian euphemism to “get their fair share of the national cake . . . to loot enough resources to dispense to their villages or among their ethnic group.” When one group becomes institutionally dominant in a society, the government may lose its ability to cope with societal changes that may be destabilizing. For much of its history, the Nigerian government and its military have been dominated by northerners, leading southerners to push for more “decentralization of the federal government and constitutional changes.” Northerners, for their part, fear that liberalization of the Nigerian system will diminish their dominant position in politics. Entrenched positions and competition for limited resources have enabled ethnic and religious conflicts over power and wealth.

Nigeria’s diversity along its many cultural and regional lines may seem to be the cause of its problems, but in reality those differences are often the weapons wielded by elites of the powerful groups for their own gain in political power and economic spoils. Elites from all of the regions not only tolerate the gross inequality their system entails, but feel entitled to it despite the greater ensuing harm to social and economic development and political stability in Nigeria. The instrumentalization of identity by Nigerian elites is a zero-sum game over existing public resources rather than develop those resources further in a failure of good governance and

190 Ikpeze, Soludo, and Elekwa, “Nigeria,” 343.
194 Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 5, 217, 227.
leadership. Thus deadly fractures occur ethnically, religiously, and regionally that upset stability in Nigeria and may threaten its very unity. While democracy now seems to be taking root and the economy grows, Nigeria’s past cycles of autocracy and stagnant economic growth leaves the country brittle and exposed.

**Nigerian Instability**

Nigeria’s importance in the world stems from its towering political, economic, and demographic influence in Africa and from its rich natural resources and market potential. This is true, however, only while Nigeria remains a functioning integrated state. Thus, the world’s governments should maintain an interest in the viability of Nigeria as a state. As this chapter has shown, however, Nigeria is under considerable internal pressures over power and gains through competing regional, religious, and ethnic camps that have racked it with chronic and severe violence to the point of fracturing.

Since its independence, the internal political divisions in Nigeria have increased from 3 to 4 in 1963, to 12 in 1967 (to unsuccessfully counter the Biafran secession), 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in 1991, and 36 in 1996. A call for an additional 35 states in 1994 was ignored by the framers of the 1999 constitution in an apparent effort to stabilize the situation and halt further fracturing. As many of the past problems that have caused fragmentation continue, mismanagement of a recurring economic downturn or periodic political crisis by the country’s elite in the current inflammatory ethnic and religious environment could again result in the need for force to keep the brittle state unified. Although causes for the devolution of the Nigerian state clearly point to issues within the political economy using its ready religious, ethnic, and regional factions, those alone are probably not sufficient for the break up or failing of the country. Despite its present strains, Nigeria remains a functioning and influential state to the extent needed by Nigerian and outside interests.

Under what conditions then could this balance tip toward more dire circumstances? This chapter concludes by analyzing the potential for and gravity of Nigeria’s political instability.

Parceling a state along cultural divides is an oft-used means to diversify

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199 Falola, *Culture and Customs of Nigeria*, 5.

power and reduce minority fears of domination by stronger groups.\textsuperscript{201} Despite its good intentions, however, subdividing Nigeria has encouraged the worst in parochial self-serving activities, as unrelenting violence and political machinations show.\textsuperscript{202} Splintering reduces a rival’s power when sparring over the political economy, as occurred in the 1963 forced partition of the Western region, and to diminish the strength of the oil-rich Eastern region during the civil war.\textsuperscript{203} Subdivisions entrench a state’s majority group in their local power, but this method may also undermine a dominant group when a minority succeeds in subdividing again to create additional majority groups in smaller states.\textsuperscript{204} The allure of devolution includes creating new patronage opportunities within ethnic constituencies and controlling wealth distributed by the federal government.\textsuperscript{205} Subdividing, however, weakens each of the states with respect to the central government as smaller, less viable states are essentially obligated to federal officials for revenue and patronage to operate.\textsuperscript{206} Officials also used the creation of new states as a “diversionary tactic” to avoid addressing the causes of economic and political problems rather than just their cultural symptoms.\textsuperscript{207} One procedural technique used to counter devolution, but made the situation worse, was sharing public revenue from the central government with the states, which did not ensure fealty to the country. This technique failed because the distribution formula gave a fixed amount to each state and an allowance for its population, which became an incentive to create more states since that would ensure an increased amount of the fixed dividend without reducing the proportional amount received for population.\textsuperscript{208} For these reasons, Nigeria has fragmented through its history, and recent policies have sought to counter this devolutionary trend.

If internal fragmenting creates religious, cultural, ethnic, economic, regional, and political pressures on the Nigerian polity, what additional forces might push the state to break up? Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler examined

\textsuperscript{201} Yakubu, “Ethnicity and the Nigerian Constitutions,” 39; and Falola, History of Nigeria, 92, 109, 122.
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 9; and Bevan, Collier, and Gunning, The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 188.
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{206} Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 155; and ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 2.
\textsuperscript{207} Lewis, Nigeria: Assessing Risks to Stability, 88.
\textsuperscript{208} Collier and Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” 18.
the political economy of secession and found that secessionist communities formed when they perceived an economic advantage to do so. Although such an advantage was not the only way to motivate secession, it was a “particularly potent” method. An additional economic characteristic enabling secession is that the economic advantage, often a lucrative natural resource such as oil or cocoa, needs to be spatially concentrated so that an identity group might coalesce around it. Nigeria, with its rentier dependence on oil exports from the southern part of the country, is thus prone to secession, as Biafra (and the still active, if small, Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra) and more recent Niger Delta insurgency have shown. The relatively prosperous southwest Yoruba region is another geographically concentrated ethnic group with a natural resource—cocoa—associated with civil conflict, a smoldering autonomy, and secession movements since the 1990s. Political control over native economic resources, however, would solve many other existing problems for the residents of a state, and thus could be a spur toward partition. Economically richer regions with concentrated ethnic groups, such as some of Nigeria’s southerners who feel politically dominated by northerners and economically exploited, set the stage for internal divisions to grow into independence.

Concentrated resources may actually create the identity groups necessary for a secession movement to begin. The use of terms like tribe, ethnic groups, and nations are amorphous in a society as complex as Nigeria’s, and cultural allegiances and designations may shift. During the Nigerian Civil War, many southeastern people, such as the Ibibio, Efik, and Sobo, associated themselves with the Igbo movement to create Biafra while it was a viable means to regional political independence and increased economic wealth. Most of these same groups annulled their relationship with the

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209 Ibid., 3–5, 8.
212 ICG, Nigeria: Nigeria’s Faltering Federal Experiment, 1.
Igbo people and renounced the Biafra movement after defeat.\textsuperscript{213} Ethnic determination is neither definitive nor static in Nigeria, and often based on nineteenth-century European designations of convenience because true Nigerian cultural associations are multifaceted and often indistinct. For example, the concept of a “Delta People” is forming to bring together more than 60 disparate groups in the Niger River Delta region, who are geographically more compact than the situation in Biafra and endure Nigeria’s worse pollution and standard of living, to create their own identity as part of a political process for greater control over economic resources and development prospects.\textsuperscript{214}

The opportunity for increased wealth may be more important than past grievances in forming an identity group bent on secession, especially if the population is uneducated and susceptible to an exaggerated sense of common identity, and the imperative to control local resources is strong.\textsuperscript{215} For example, in Biafra, oil was located along the coast around Port Harcourt and not the inland Igbo cultural core around Enugu, necessitating the creation of a greater Igboland to gain support for secession.\textsuperscript{216} Experience with autonomy or previous secessionist ambitions is another factor in secession, and one which may help determine where future Nigerian divisions occur.\textsuperscript{217} Thus convenient ethnic loyalties based around economic advantage are strong factors in state fracturing, and Nigeria’s history indicates the potential for devolution remains potent.

Should mismanagement of circumstances in Nigeria cause the state to break up, the new states would likely form along lines of past politically autonomous regions.\textsuperscript{218} Such regions are often the historic short hand for traditional divisions reflecting differences in physical geography, agricultural and economic zones, and religious and ethnic groups that together define distinct and internally homogenous areas. So in addition to the mod-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{213} The economic motivation for these other ethnic groups to join the secession becomes more apparent because they were not generally victims of the mass attacks against the Igbo living in the northern region that preceded the civil war and was the second cause for the creation of Biafra. Collier and Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” 4–9, 18.
\item \textsuperscript{214} Benedict, “Breaking Barriers to Transformation of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” 211; Blessing, \textit{Nigeria’s Center(s) of Gravity}, 7; and Casey, “Mediated Hostility, Generation, and Victimhood in Northern Nigeria,” 276.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Collier and Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” 9, 14.
\item \textsuperscript{216} Ibid., 18.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Adebajo, \textit{The Curse of Berlin}, 328.
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ern construct of a compact economic resource and sense of exploitation around which an identity group may form, a distinct historic contiguous political territory is another trait of secession since it is an easily recognized rallying point for its members.

Nigeria, having already experienced one brutal civil war, is at risk for a recurrence of conflict or dissolution since some of the underpinning motivations of that war remain unresolved. The examples of Ethiopia-Eritrea and Somalia-Somaliland indicate that the weakest point in such failing states lies along relict colonial borders. These former integral states were each once administered separately by different colonial masters before being inadequately joined together and subsequently fractured along their previous international borders. Of more interest for Nigerian unity, this situation may also occur between regions separately administered by a common colonial power as what occurred between Malaysia and Singapore and between North and South Sudan, where differences eventually proved irreconcilable after the departure of British administration. At least some of the resulting regions and states of a possible Nigerian devolution may divide along such internal lines.

In Nigeria, these splits existed under the early British imperial administration, based on the differences found in older precolonial native states resulting from persistent physical and human differences. The nineteenth-century Fulani Sokoto Caliphate and Hausa-dominated remnants of the centuries-old Bornu Empire were first absorbed by British royal charter companies in 1885 and officially annexed as the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1900. Similarly, Nigeria’s southwest contained Yoruba-dominated states including the kingdoms of Oyo, Benin, and Warri. This area was first ruled by the British when Lagos and surrounding areas were annexed in 1861 to combat the slave trade, and were formally incorporated as the Colony and Protectorate of Lagos in 1886. True to their cultural heritage, the people of the southeast traditionally governed themselves in decentralized communi-

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219 Collier and Sambanis, “Understanding Civil War,” 5.
ties, setting them apart from the other regions and making the subsequent indirect rule by the British difficult and inefficient. The British nonetheless established a patchwork of protectorates starting in 1849 with the Bight of Biafra followed by the Bights of Benin, Brass, Bonny, Opobo, Aobh, and Old Calabar. After the 1885 Berlin Conference, these protectorates, stretching from the Niger River eastward to Old Calabar, were assembled into the Oil Rivers Protectorate and then reestablished as the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893 and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1900.

Each of these three regions was administered separately within the British Empire until 1906 when Lagos was incorporated into an enlarged Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, bridging the Niger River’s cultural divide separating Yoruba and Igbo dominated areas. This new protectorate was delimited by the British as a straight line from the German Kamerun (modern day Cameroon) border 10 miles south of Takum due west to Ida through then-uncharted territory, to follow westward the approximate northern borders of present day states Edo, Ondo, Ekiti, Osun, and Oyo. In 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were joined because the north was unable to sustain itself economically to create the external borders of modern Nigeria. Although the internal borders have been adjusted somewhat with time and better understanding of the areas, the lines defining these three key preunification areas in Nigeria have remained remarkably durable and significant as relict boundaries within modern Nigeria.

Indeed, the north and south continued to be administered separately within the united Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, and the three regions resurfaced again in 1939 when the British created internal political divisions—the Northern, Western, and Eastern regions—each organized

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224 Ibid., 49–50, 80; and Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 72.
227 Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 17, 68; and Imoh, “The Development of an Atlas of the Nigerian Political Evolution,” 49–60.
differently for internal self-governing to reflect their separate heritages.\textsuperscript{229} In 1954, these regions were reaffirmed under the Lyttleton Constitution that, along with the federal territory in Lagos, became the internal political structure of Nigeria upon independence in 1960.\textsuperscript{230} Despite a federal structure allowing regional autonomy, the people were insufficiently prepared and the government inadequately structured to prevent the Balkanization of Nigeria, however.\textsuperscript{231} The Biafran secessionists drew upon the legacy of the Eastern region and its predecessors for legitimacy, as do recent Yoruba separatists draw upon the Western region’s legacy. Interestingly, Nigeria’s most potent secessionist movement today in the Niger Delta also has its own legacy bound, in part, to the Midwestern region, first of the devolution states in the federal republic, and the native Benin and Warri Kingdoms to create its identity, although that has not been an important element so far in the insurgency. Thus, such groupings could become the entities around which to rally in defense of perceived and antithetical group interests, as may occur in political economy disputes, and thus remain powerful psychological borders and potential fault lines.

Despite the delineation of British drawn lines presented here as enduring internal boundaries, the divides are culturally and geographically less distinct, but the regions’ divisions remain potent.\textsuperscript{232} The Middle Belt, the southern length of the old Northern region including Plateau state, is a transition area of some 180 native ethnic groups partially swayed by northern and southern, Muslim and Christian, and Arab and European influences, and is one of Nigeria’s most violent regions.\textsuperscript{233} The Niger River Delta region is also as indistinct a cultural border, as the river delta itself is an indistinct physical border between Yorubaland and Igboland.\textsuperscript{234} Indeed the delta may constitute a discrete buffer zone through its physical, cultural, economic, and historic identities, real or constructed. Although such intermingling of

\textsuperscript{230} Ibid., 82; and Falola, Culture and Customs of Nigeria, 69.
\textsuperscript{234} Benedict, “Breaking Barriers to Transformation of the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” 211.
allegiances and economic interests across Nigeria’s internal divides makes secession difficult, violent partitions occurred under similar circumstances between India and Pakistan in 1947 and the two Sudans in 2011.

Regional, religious, and ethnic-inspired violence harnessed by venal leaders has fragmented Nigeria and its people for political and economic gain at the expense of the state. Economically advanced regions in southern Nigeria may be motivated to secede out of the dominating control of the north, using the opportunity their concentrated natural resource advantages offer. The desire to secede could also fashion the narrative to do so, by creating new coalitions of peoples into an identity group to justify and support separation. Such new identities are especially likely where education levels are low, and a history of regional autonomy or previous secession is strong—both conditions found in Nigeria. The danger of the predatory political economy in Nigeria is that it may cause the disintegration of the Nigerian state through enabling these mechanisms.

Conclusions

Nigeria is an extraordinarily important country in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of its economic strength, political and military importance, and cultural influence, despite the problems that severely divide it internally, and threaten its very integrity as a functioning state. That these problems revolve around the divisive use of political, ethnic, religious, and regional groups in which each tries to improve its position in power and economic revenue at the expense of the other is why this chapter identified political and economic problems as the source of much of Nigeria’s instability. Those sources, not the more easily reported symptoms, must be addressed directly to have a lasting positive impact on the recurring crises in Nigeria. Nigeria’s chronically poor performing economy puts pressure on various power groups to obtain their share of its rich public natural resource revenues to benefit their leaders and interest group supporters. Venal leadership and poor government organization and laws often prevent addressing these problems effectively, although attempts by administrations in the Fourth Republic to do better are still being tested.

Nigerians have defined themselves through their differences and not their similarities, which exacerbates the conflict over resources through violence and calls for self-determination that weakens the state. In many ways, oil production in Nigeria has become more a cause of serious problems
than the means to improving the economy and well-being of its people. That Nigeria has been poorly governed and subject to severe corruption that has left its polity divided and fighting over power and revenues rather than enhancing the economy to benefit everyone is a classic example of a rentier state under the “curse of oil.” Sectarian and communal groups have been led by their leaders, often through traditional client-patron relationships, to believe that such divisions are a sure way to improve their situation and ingrained this perspective into the national dialogue. Although religious, ethnic, and regional differences are often how dissension and violence are “instrumentalized” in Nigeria, they should not be confused with the deeper causes of competition over power and resources among a self-serving elite. Despite the best of intentions, the law is contorted in this battle over power through such principles as “indigeneship,” “federal character,” “derivation,” and “zoning,” which exposes even further the shallowness of leadership in pursuit of “the national cake.” Such differences are dangerous to the stability and unity of Nigeria, since the country contains traits found in other secession-prone states, and its people easily divided along recognizable fault lines with the motivation to secede.

Although many countries around the world face similar political and economic problems that hobble their development and security, Nigeria’s problems may be more consequential than most because it is both an important international state and geographically and historically more susceptible to fracturing—with all of the evils that entails. These fault lines in Nigeria are well established and deep. For these reasons, understanding the causes of the political and economic problems in Nigeria in order for Nigerians and others interested in supporting the region to better address them is an important endeavor, and this chapter is but the first step in that discussion.
Chapter Eight

The African Failed State and the Challenge of Combating Jihadism and Tribalism in the Global Era

by Anthony N. Celso and Robert Nalbandov

Globalization and Unleashing Religious and Tribal Passions

Samuel Huntington’s masterwork *The Clash of Civilizations* is frequently cited as a starting point for discussions of ethno-tribal and religious resistance to globalization.¹ The late Harvard scholar saw a variety of civilizational forces emerging in the post-Cold War era that clashed with Western-directed globalization.² Huntington predicted that these conflicts would be most pronounced in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa where indigenous cultures and traditions chafe against Western cultural and economic influence.

In these regions, Islamist resistance has been especially pronounced. Somalia, the Maghreb, and the Sahel contain jihadist groups mobilizing to overthrow governments tied to integrated markets. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Somalia’s al-Shabaab envision regional Islamic caliphates that would purge these areas of pernicious Western influence. Some theorists, moreover, argue that jihadist groups in the Middle East and Africa have brutally persecuted Christian and Sufi minorities.³ Huntington’s characterization that Islam has *bloody borders* inspired much criticism.⁴ While his work is controversial and disliked in some quarters, events in the Middle East and Africa have reinforced many of Huntington’s conclusions.

Some theorists have built upon his ideas. Benjamin R. Barber’s *Jihad vs. McWorld* similarly identifies two contending forces—globalization and trib-

¹ Chua, *World on Fire*.
alism—dominating the contemporary world stage. Similar to Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations*, Barber sees communitarian resistance to globalization as a last ditch effort to preserve threatened ethno-tribal and religious identities. The technological, communication, and economic imperatives of global markets have undermined state sovereignty by making goods, people, capital, and ideas portable and borders permeable. These forces, moreover, have challenged communitarian identities whose existence is predicated upon insular political and economic structures.

Threatened by the West’s export of Anglo-American capitalism, secularism, and individualism, tribal and religious resistance has paradoxically employed sophisticated means to arrest international integration. Al-Qaeda’s simultaneous rejection of globalization and its use of global technology and communications to organize and strike the West on 9/11 are symptomatic of the contradictions of the modern age. Bin Laden’s choice of jumbo jet liners packed with tons of explosive fuel to bring down the World Trade Center is replete with symbolism, as is the use of the Internet as a major source of jihadist recruitment and mobilization.

Equally prescient about the lack of tranquility in the emerging new world order is Robert D. Kaplan, whose work echoes Huntington’s ideas about the emergence of tribalism and religious fundamentalism as a counterweight to liberal democratic globalism. He argues that international relations has devolved into a world where moral rules are relative and state security is challenged by tribal warlords, terrorists, and rogue states resistant to globalization.

Weapons of mass destruction and the rapidity of modern transport give this emerging pattern of global conflict a frightening dimension. Globalization’s threat to communal identity and its weakening of state capacity has unleashed destructive forces. Islamism and tribalism seek to preserve a mythic idyllic past from the battering ram of the liberal global order. Tribal armies in the Congo and jihadists in the Sahel fight to preserve local rule and nativist traditions. Paradoxically, both groups are tied to clandestine international markets eager to acquire the blood diamonds, illegal labor, and drugs these groups sell.

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They have exploited the implosion of state authority associated with the implementation of IMF’s structural adjustment policies (SAP) that reduced public sector resources and authority in many African regimes. The shrinkage of the state’s role in the political economy and society has created a vacuum of power. Tribal and Islamist groups have sought to exploit and prosper from the retrenchment of public authority.

The growth of jihadism and tribalism has exacerbated the problem of the failed state. The challenge is two-fold as these groups compromise the territorial and political configuration of the modern African state. The colonial legacy of ethnic-tribal heterogeneity exacerbates state legitimacy as ethnic groups fight to control territorial space and jihadists seek to create transnational regional caliphates. Groups like the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) and Boko Haram (BH) seek to redraw colonial borders to achieve their transnational Islamist ambitions.

This problem is aggravated by the performance of postcolonial governments whose maintenance of patrimonial relations grouped around kinship ties resulted in the privatization of public wealth and rampant corruption. The patrimonial state and its bloated civil service worsened underlying economic problems that reached an apex in the 1990s with crushing debt burdens. SAPs supervised by the IMF forced a retrenchment of the state sector, resulting in withdrawal of government activity and the collapse of its entrenched interest. Governments consolidated authority in urban areas, leaving many rural areas free from state control. The implosion of state authority in the countryside allowed jihadist groups and tribal armies territorial space to mount insurgencies often financed by criminal activity. Exploiting a security vacuum in the Sahel, AQIM has evolved into a criminal terror organization where profitmaking parlays nicely with jihadi terrorist actions. Left unchecked, the spread of such movements could have disastrous consequences with profound regional security ramifications.

**Combating Jihadism and Tribalism**

Islamist insurgencies and terror campaigns have been given a powerful impetus by the Arab Spring. Once stable regimes in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya were rocked and overturned by mass popular protests and rebellions.

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8 Bayart, *The State in Africa*.
9 Thomson, *An Introduction to African Politics*. 
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross reminds us in chapter 1 that jihadist forces see the Arab Spring as an historic opportunity to expand radical Islam through preaching and fighting. As outlined in chapter 2 by Dr. Celso, the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime continues to have profound security ramifications throughout the region. Punctuated by Ansar al-Sharia’s attacks against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi on 11 September 2012 and AQIM’s brief sanctuary in Mali, radical Islamist forces threaten to destabilize the Sahel. Jihadists have struck across the region, including recent attacks against government and French interests in Niger. Libya has become a safe haven for AQIM and the Islamic State (IS).

Tribalism and jihadism converged in Mali with al-Qaeda’s support for the Tuareg’s rebellion in early 2012 that succeeded in establishing an independent state in the northern part of the country. AQIM’s alliance with Tuareg rebels, however, did not last and the Islamists were able to secure dominance by the summer of 2012. Had it not been for France’s January 2013 military intervention, Islamist forces could have moved against Bamako, achieving their ambition to extend a draconian sharia state. Despite the early tactical success of the Gallic military campaign, Henri Boré in chapter 3 notes that Pan African forces face an uphill struggle to secure stability in the impoverished country. While AQIM’s base of operations in Mali has been disrupted, the network has repositioned its activities to south Libya and Niger.

Islamist revivalism is a continent-wide problem. Recent examples abound, with West Africa jihadist groups a prominent concern of the international community. Nigeria has experienced an ultraviolent jihadist campaign organized by Boko Haram and its splinter movement Ansaru. As Clarence Bouchat’s work in chapter 8 vividly demonstrates, Boko Haram has mounted a brutal campaign against the Nigerian state, moderate Muslims, and Christian minorities. Its attacks against government installations, churches, beer halls, and Christian villages have left thousands dead. Boko Haram remains a potent force to destabilize Nigeria.

The scope of the jihadist threat in the Maghreb and the Sahel brings forth a number of troubling questions. Jihadist theorists reject democracy as a manmade and imperfect system that needs to be replaced by a sharia-based Islamic regime. While jihadism is incompatible with democracy, Islamists and Salafi movements claim they can coexist with republican forms of government.

Gartenstein-Ross’s depiction of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia and the rising
specter of Islamist violence against secular opponents in a post-Ben Ali Tunisia questions the democratic convictions of contemporary Salafists. The behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt under Mohammed Morsi’s regime, moreover, casts doubt on the group’s commitment to democratic values. Such a result is hardly surprising. As Paul Berman’s analysis establishes, the MB’s ideology and organizational history points back to totalitarian roots. Islamism Marxist and fascist ideological connections, its vehement *Judeophobia*, and its autocratic hierarchical structure seem incongruent with liberal democratic values and practice.\(^{10}\)

Given the autocratic behavior of the MB and Ansar al-Sharia, some suspect that they want to exploit their democratic participation to seize the state. Islamist authoritarianism has encountered increasing resistance by civil secular forces that have mobilized against Salafi activism and violence. The counter-reaction to the Islamist tide is most visceral in Egypt, where the army has toppled Morsi’s regime. Plagued by rising violence from Salafi and Jihadist forces, Tunisian secular and liberal forces won the 2014 elections and hope to reverse deteriorating security.

### Tribalism and Democracy

Similar problems emerge in multiracial societies where ethnic-based parties are likely to channel competition in an unstable and violent direction. The lack of an African democratic ethos complicates the successful transition to democracy especially in societies with poorly drawn and contested borders. Dr. Nalbadov’s chapter 6 case study of French and Libyan interventions in impoverished Chad speaks tellingly to the problems of societies plagued by religious and tribal cleavages that have sparked internal conflict and external incursions. This is especially true in such societies as Chad where religious divisions are regionally clustered. Qaddafi’s failed 1980s effort to use his military to Islamize Chadian society is an early precursor to Huntington’s concept of Islam’s “bloody borders.” The Islamist and tribal threat has only accelerated in the current period of Western-led globalization and democratization.

Multiparty systems in a culturally heterogeneous context can lead to civil war and genocide.\(^{11}\) The spread of democracy in Africa in the 1990s has

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\(^{11}\) Bruce J. Berman, ”Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa“ (JICA-RI Working Paper No. 22, JICA Research Institute, Tokyo, Japan, November 2010).
been associated with ethno-tribal conflict and violence. The international community’s demands for democracy often coincide with SAPs supervised by the IMF that allow global creditors substantial leverage to reorganize African state’s political and economic systems.

The 1994 Arusha Accords are a good example. Hutu elites balked at the international community’s efforts to implement a power-sharing accord leveraged by the overindebtedness of the government. The emergence of multiparty politics in Kenya, moreover, has been associated with ethnic-based politics and rising tribal tensions in recent years.

Given this dysfunction, there may need to be a modification of the democratic model that does not repeat the negative consequences of the old one-party authoritarian state and its parasitic exploitation of the political economy. Ethnic and communitarian resistance is also a conservative reaction to competitive pressures that could undermine the economic privileges of previously dominant groups. Therefore, some modification of the free market system needs to be erected to cushion the adverse economic impact of privatization and deregulation.

The West’s export of liberal democracy has also become divisive in societies steeped in religious fundamentalism and ethno-tribal antagonisms. It has produced a counter-reaction that may contain the seeds of a more functional African state. Ironically, ethnic minorities and former guerrilla rebels have played a key role in the development of a viable political-economic model. These groups have taken the lead to create a more stable though autocratic politics.

The Case for Guided Democracy and Entrepreneurial Political Elites

The dysfunctional character of the region’s transition to democracy calls for a modification of multiparty parliamentary systems adopted by many African societies in the last two decades. As Amy Chua presciently observed a decade ago, the imposition of liberal democracy and market economics has contributed to ethnic conflict in multiethnic Third World societies.\(^{12}\) The shrinkage of the state associated with decades-old structural adjustment policies has created centrifugal pressures allowing jihadist groups and tribal militias an opportunity to create sanctuaries and to further undermine

\(^{12}\) Chua, *World on Fire*. 
state territorial and institutional legitimacy. Left unchecked, these forces are likely to rend asunder many failing states.

This vacuum of power, however, cannot be resolved by a reconstitution of the one-party patrimonial African state. The dramatic contraction of public authority makes the resurrection of networks of patronage unlikely. The state must be streamlined and oriented toward security functions designed to defend territorial sovereignty and institutional capacity. Fortunately, in some African societies, this process is well underway.

Regimes in Rwanda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia have achieved some political stability and economic growth. Chapters 4 and 5 of this volume argue that entrepreneurial elites played a critical role in guiding this process through an adroit use of coercion and cooption. Based on their organizational and leadership experience in guerilla movements, such leaders as Paul Kagame were able to manipulate electoral rules to cushion the most destabilizing effects of multiparty systems and create an overarching one-party state that succeeded in forging a fragile national consensus. The democracies that emerged in these countries were far from perfect, but their economic and political performance exceeds that of the postcolonial patrimonial model.

Freed from the excessive burdens and crushing bureaucracy of the state socialist model, economic advancement in these societies benefited from a reinvigorated private sector. Long repressed by the patrimonial state, independent African civil society has begun to emerge to compensate for the lack of an adequately financed health and educational sector.\(^{13}\) Strong economic gains and the reorganization of public finances in these countries, moreover, have allowed political elites to better concentrate on security issues. Since the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan Patriotic Front government has been able to successfully combat multiple rebel campaigns. Though these security gains are fragile, Rwanda has stabilized in the last decade.

The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the Maghreb and Sahel, which continue to be rocked by the Arab Spring’s turmoil. Despite great hopes for a stable democratic transition in the region, the rise of Salafi and jihadist forces after the fall of the Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Qaddafi regimes has undermined public order. The proliferation of al-Qaeda affiliates in Tunisia, Libya, Nigeria, and Mali has caused international consternation that the terror organization is resurgent. How this new dynamic will unfold is still uncertain.

\(^{13}\) Thomson, An Introduction to African Politics.
Tribalism and jihadism have also convulsed the Nigerian state in the last decade. Chapter 7 discussed the emergence of tribal and Islamist insurgents who have complicated the West African country’s security situation. Recent events, however, offer some encouragement that the jihadist threat can be mitigated. France’s intervention in Mali effectively denied AQIM a safe haven and that country’s recent democratic elections suggest some chance of national reconciliation. The popularity of Egypt’s anti-Islamist regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sissi that overthrew the Muslim Brotherhood government in the summer of 2013 and events in Tunisia imply that the Islamist tide is waning. Tunisian liberals and secular parties won the November 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections and Tunis is now committed to checking Salafi and jihadist violence. The banning of Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist group aligned with al-Qaeda underscores the country’s commitment to reverse the slide toward chaos.

Boko Haram’s (BH) insurgency, however, threatens to destabilize northeastern Nigeria. Since 2011, terrorist violence has sharply escalated as BH begins to establish its rule over the northern part of Nigeria’s Borno state. Eight thousand people have died in the last two years in BH’s brutal ethnic cleansing campaign to de-Christianize northern Nigeria. The group is notorious for its April 2014 kidnapping of hundreds of Chibok schoolgirls, its bombing of churches, and its razing of Christian villages. Emulating the Islamic State (IS), BH has declared a caliphate over northern-eastern Nigerian states and the Cameroon border area. Like IS, BH is committed to a takfiri sectarian strategy that eliminates “apostates” and “infidels” in its savage quest to purify the Muslim world and create a transnational Sharia state that erases colonial-era borders. Terrorist violence in Nigeria may be reaching a critical stage, as Abuja seems powerless to prevent BH’s absorption of much of northern Borno state and the Cameroon and Lake Chad border areas. In January 2015, Amnesty International reported that up to 2,000 civilians may have been killed by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region after the Islamists drove multinational forces from their base in Baga.

Beginning in early 2015, Chadian, Cameroonian, Nigerien, and Nigerian military units began a major offensive to weaken BH’s insurgency. Despite some significant successes in driving BH’s militants out of its northeastern Nigerian sanctuaries, BH’s terror campaign in the Lake Chad area continues. Renaming itself as Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), Boko Haram’s 2015 merger with the Islamic State should augment its offensive capabilities.

Like Nigeria, many African states continue to be convulsed by poverty, corruption, failed governance, multiple insurgencies, and ethno-tribal antagonisms. The essays in this volume have attempted to examine these problems and offer some insight to how these security challenges may be successfully combated. Africa’s democratic transition is not likely to comport with the West’s aspirations. The region’s problems are daunting but not impossible to resolve. This book has offered a promising glimpse that entrepreneurial elites and guided democratic market societies may be able to abate the problem of the failed African state.

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## Glossary

This glossary focuses on key terms related to the topics and regions discussed in each chapter. Many of the terms are so specialized that full treatment within the text is not possible. For terms not covered here, please refer to the index.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Alliance for Democracy: a progressive opposition political party formed in 1998 in Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>Ansar Dine: a paramilitary terrorist group of insurgents based in Northern Mali but operating throughout the country to impose Sharia law</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADFLC</td>
<td>Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANL</td>
<td>Armée Nationale de Libération (National Liberation Army of Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APGA</td>
<td>All Progressives Grand Alliance: a Nigerian political party began primarily in the southeast and merged in 2013 with other parties to form the All Progressives Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQ</td>
<td>al-Qaeda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: formed in 2009, AQAP is a Sunni extremist group based in Yemen</td>
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<td>AQC</td>
<td>al-Qaeda Central Command</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASL</td>
<td>Ansar al-Sharia: Libyan militant Islamist group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia: founded in 2011, AST is the country’s strongest salafi jihadi organization</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakassi Boys</td>
<td>A group of youth known for their anti-crime vigilantism operating in the Igbo area of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>BET</td>
<td>Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti prefecture (Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Boko Haram: an Islamist group active in Nigeria since 2009 and wants to impose Islamic law as the only law in Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDR</td>
<td>Conseil Démocratique Révolutionnaire (Democratic Revolutionary Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Conseil Suprême Militaire (Supreme Military Council)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egbe Omo Oduduwa</td>
<td>Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa: a Nigerian political organization established in 1945 to unite the Yorùbá in the southwest</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIJ</td>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Jihad: active since the 1970s, EIJ is a militant group merged with al-Qaeda</td>
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<tr>
<td>EITI</td>
<td>Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELF</td>
<td>Eritrean Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPLF</td>
<td>Eritrean People’s Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPRDF</td>
<td>Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAP</td>
<td>Forces Armées Populaires (People’s Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAN</td>
<td>Forces Armées du Nord (Armed Forces of the North)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FANT</td>
<td>Forces Armées Nationales du Tchadiennes (National Armed Forces of Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Armées pour la Libération du Rwanda (Armed Forces of Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAT</td>
<td>Forces Armées Tchadiennes (Chadian Armed Forces)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDLR</td>
<td>Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLA</td>
<td><em>la Première Armée</em> (First Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td><em>Front de Libération Nationale</em> (National Liberation Front)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FLT</td>
<td><em>Front de Libération du Tchad</em> (Liberation Front of Chad)</td>
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<td>FROLINAT</td>
<td><em>Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad</em> (National Liberation Front of Chad)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICM</td>
<td>Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUNT</td>
<td><em>Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition</em> (Transitional Government of National Unity)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch: founded in 1978 to conduct research and advocate for human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Inter-African Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICU</td>
<td>Islamic Court Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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</table>
indigeneship  Nigerian constitutional law meant to protect the “original” inhabitants of a local government area, or members of those ethnic groups that trace their lineage back to the area in their homeland. This device was meant to preserve the culture and authority structures of native minorities, but has become polarizing by excluding some basic rights of nonindigenes in terms of political rights

IS  Islamic State

ISI  Islamic State of Iraq

ISWA  Islamic State of West Africa

*Jamiyya Mutanen Arewa*  Northern Muslin group established in the 1940s and formed the Northern People’s Congress

JN  Jabhat al-Nusra (or al-Nusra Front) is the Syrian offshoot of al-Qaeda

JNI  *Jama’atu Nasril Islam* (Society for the Support of Islam) is an umbrella group for the Muslim community in Nigeria that conducts Islamic education and missionary work in the region

KPI  Key performance indicator

Maitatsine  Mohammed Marwa was a controversial Islamic preacher in the 1970s whose fundamentalist movement in Nigeria resulted in riots and many deaths
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>MDR</td>
<td><em>Mouvement Démocratique Républicain</em> (Republican Democratic Movement)</td>
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<td>MEND</td>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta: one of the largest militant groups in the Niger Delta region founded in 2004</td>
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<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td><em>Mouvement Patriotique du Salut</em> (Patriotic Salvation Movement)</td>
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<td>MRND</td>
<td>National Revolutionary Movement for Development</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Mejahideen Shura Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mujahideen</td>
<td>Islamist guerrilla fighters engaged in jihad</td>
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<tr>
<td>MUJWA</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Native Authority system: British colonial policy of indirect rule under which culturally affiliated power prevailed through the use of existing traditional ethnic elites</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCNC</td>
<td>National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons: a Nigerian political party from 1944 to 1966 whose power was found primarily in the Igbo southeast</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Term</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDPVF</td>
<td>Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force:</td>
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<td>NEPU</td>
<td>Northern Elements Progressive Union:</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>Northern People’s Congress:</td>
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<td>NPN</td>
<td>National Party of Nigeria:</td>
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<td>NRA</td>
<td>National Resistance Army:</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRM</td>
<td>National Resistance Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation of African Unity:</td>
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<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organisation of the Islamic Conference:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPC</td>
<td>Oodua Peoples Congress (or Oodua Liberation Movement [OLM]): a nationalist Yoruba group consisting of the Yoruba people in the southwestern part of Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries: founded in 1960 to coordinate the petroleum policies of its members and to provide member states with technical and economic aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDO</td>
<td>People’s Democratic Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing power parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPT</td>
<td><em>Parti Progressiste Tchadien</em> (Chadian Progressive Party): founded in 1947, the party was much more radical and nationalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>People’s Redemption Party: a northern Nigerian progressive left-of-center political party during the Second Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qadiriyya</td>
<td>One of three important Sufi orders in West Africa that was named after Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d. 1166 CE in Baghdad)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RANU</td>
<td>Rwandese Alliance for National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIHS</td>
<td>Revival of Islamic Heritage Society: a Kuwait-based nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rassemblement du Peuple Français (Rally of the French People): originally conceived as a way to regain political power without having to participate in party politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front: founded in 1988 as a political and military movement to secure repatriation of Rwandans in exile and reform the government, including political power sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Policies: economic policies that countries must follow to qualify for new World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and help them make debt repayments on the older debts owed to commercial banks, governments, and the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi</td>
<td>The adherents of a concept in Islam defined by scholars as the inner “mystical” dimension of Islam, or those who seek the truth of divine love and knowledge through a direct personal experience with God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>Tunisian Combatant Group: hoped to establish an Islamist government in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government in Somalia: put in place between 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and 2012, it was intended to restore national institutions after the fall of the ruling regime and the civil war

**Tijaniyya**

Members of Sunni Islam who place great emphasis on good intentions and actions rather than on elaborate or extreme ritual

**TPLF**

Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front

**Tuareg**

Seminomadic Islamic people of Africa

**UDT**

*Union Démocratique Tchadien* (Chadian Democratic Union): founded in 1947 by traditional African leaders and represented French commercial interests

**UN**

United Nations

**UNAMIR**

UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda

**UPN**

Unity Party of Nigeria: a political party dominant in western Nigeria during the second republic (1978–83) that promoted free education and called itself a welfarist party

**Zoning system**

This extralegal arrangement splits Nigeria into six geopolitical zones, and at its highest levels aims to powershare the top federal positions among the regional elites
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by Col. Peter Michael Gish, USMC (Ret)